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Near East and South Asia Review



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19 December 1986

LETTERS 14 JANUARY

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NESA NESAR 86-028
19 December 1986

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**Near East and
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Articles**Syria: Inner Circle Infighting**

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Political infighting within President Assad's inner circle has intensified in recent months in the wake of Syria's mounting domestic and international problems. Assad's declining health and heavy workload may be forcing him to increasingly delegate authority, and this is certain to intensify rivalries and jealousies in the inner circle.

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Syria: Assad's Mounting Foreign Policy Troubles

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The regime of President Assad has entered a period of severe political stress brought on by a series of policy crises and marked by Assad's apparent inability to cope with them. This has resulted in mixed political signals, especially in Lebanon and in the use of terrorism, that will erode Syrian influence.

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Hornet's Nest in South Lebanon

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The return of the Palestinians to South Lebanon reinforces the de facto partition of Lebanon and further weakens the authority of the central government. The failure of the Syrian-backed Shia Amal militia is an important setback for Damascus's Lebanon policy and almost certainly will undercut Syrian prestige.

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West Bank: Growing Fundamentalist Strength

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Islamic fundamentalists are capturing more support in West Bank universities and refugee camps by offering a stark alternative to Palestinians who have grown weary of the secular political parties' competition and skeptical of their effectiveness.

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Israel: Tourism, Terrorism, and Exchange Rates



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Tourism and tourist-related industries in Israel—an integral part of the national economy—have slumped in 1986 because of the decline in the number of visiting Americans. Econometric analysis indicates that the specter of international terrorism, along with fluctuations in real exchange rates, are the primary causes of the decline.

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Iran: Khoiniha—The Maverick Radical



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For the last seven years Mohammad Asgar Khoiniha, the spiritual mentor of the US-hostage takers, has been a maverick in the radical faction of the Iranian clergy. His willingness to engage in unpleasant judicial chores as Iran’s prosecutor general and his value as a radical symbol ensure Khomeini’s favor and will prevent his removal.

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Kuwait: Islamic Fundamentalist Currents Flowing Steadily



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Kuwait’s Islamic fundamentalists have become more assertive and have made significant inroads into Kuwaiti politics and society. The government continues to implement measures designed to control the spread of fundamentalism, but these measures could incite antiregime activity over time.

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North Yemen: SA-3s to Marib



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The deployment of North Yemen’s first Soviet-supplied SA-3 surface-to-air missiles to the Marib area reflects Sanaa’s heightened concern over the vulnerability of its oilfields to South Yemeni air attack. North Yemeni reliance on Soviet military expertise will increase as it deploys more of its SA-3s.

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Sudan's Vulnerability to Ethiopian Air Incursions

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Sudan's air defense continues to be ineffective against Ethiopian aircraft incursions. These violations of Sudan's airspace are politically embarrassing for Prime Minister Sadiq, who has publicly pledged to strengthen the Sudanese armed forces.

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South Asian Nations: Inching Toward Cooperation

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The second annual summit meeting of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation produced modest progress toward the organization's goal of increased partnership. The member states agreed to further discussion on terrorism and narcotics and provided an opportunity for the leaders to conduct private talks on sensitive issues.

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Prospects for Pakistan: Political Officers' Assessment

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Pakistan's civilian government is anemic and beset by internal problems, but the opposition is also hurting, in the view of US diplomats and Embassy local employees at the recent Political Officers' Conference in Pakistan. Deteriorating public order and sectarian violence were identified as potential problems for the government.

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Pakistan: A Primer on Punjabi Political Parties

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Political parties in Punjab feature highly personal leadership, poor organization, and a multiplicity of factions. The effective lifespan of political parties has tended to be short, but, as politics has become more ideologically polarized, the Islamic parties and the Pakistan People's Party appear to be taking root.

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Afghanistan: Supplying Qandahar—Problems and Prospects


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To weaken resistance activity in and around Qandahar city the Soviets have placed intense pressure on insurgent supply routes to the area, but through adaptations in tactics and the overall increase in the availability of supplies to all insurgents, the insurgents in Qandahar maintained an effective presence in 1986



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Afghanistan: The Fall of Farkhar

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Panjsher Valley Commander Masood's capture of the Afghan army garrison at Farkhar on 21 August was a major step in the insurgent leader's campaign to increase the tempo of the war in northern Afghanistan and marked the first successful offensive deployment of Masood's multiethnic, specially trained central units.



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Brief

India-Sri Lanka: Sri Lankans Arrested for Bombing in South India

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


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Some articles are preliminary views of a subject or speculative, but the contents normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA. Occasionally an article will represent the views of a single analyst; these items will be designated as noncoordinated views.



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**Near East and
South Asia Review**

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Articles**Syria: Inner Circle Infighting**

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Political infighting within President Hafiz Assad's inner circle has intensified in recent months in the wake of Syria's mounting international and domestic problems. Syrian Air Force Intelligence Chief Muhammad Khuli in particular has been the focus of criticism by rivals in the inner circle, most notably Military Intelligence Chief Ali Duba, for his role in the failed El Al bombing attempt in London last April. This criticism is motivated probably less by the damage done to Syria's reputation than to the perception of Duba and others that Khuli's growing power and influence with the President threaten to eclipse their own.

influence through their positions, their individual indebtedness to the President and antagonistic relationships with each other make corporate opposition to Assad's authority unlikely.

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In the past Assad's intolerance of open conflict within his inner circle and his unwillingness to take decisive action in mediating disputes have channeled infighting into subtle intrigues. We believe Assad's declining health and heavy workload may be forcing him to increasingly delegate authority, and this is certain to intensify rivalries and jealousies within the inner circle. Senior Alawites who have enthusiastically supported Assad's policies may be less tolerant of policies originating with lesser figures. Members of the inner circle, who we believe were architects of such policy and intelligence miscalculations in the past year as the stillborn tripartite accord in Lebanon and Syria's involvement in international terrorism, have relied on Assad to fend off attacks by rivals within the regime.

Assad has kept a tight rein on members of his inner circle by decentralizing responsibility. Undelineated and overlapping roles within the inner circle afford the President the luxury of shifting power among its members without displacing them from their posts. Since the ouster of Naji Jamil as head of the National Security Bureau and the shaking up of that organization in 1978, no individual or agency has had sole responsibility for security and intelligence affairs. Likewise, power in the military is shared by a handful of Alawite generals, who, while nominally under the Minister of Defense, a Sunni figurehead, enjoy a direct link to the President.

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Assad Still Balancing

Assad has not been intimidated by powerful members in his inner circle and continues to maintain a balance of power and responsibility among them while not shying away from disciplinary action when necessary. Despite the ascendancy of Muhammad Khuli, Assad has slowly transferred responsibility for his personal protection from Khuli's Air Force Intelligence to Adnan Makhluaf's expanded Republican Guard. In the past year Assad has supported Army Chief of Staff Hikmat Shahabi's brief suspension of the powerful head of the Special Forces Ali Haydar, and, has himself in recent months taken disciplinary action against air defense officers close to Ali Duba. Assad

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The Inner Circle: A Delicate Balance

Assad's longevity in office and his success in maintaining a firm grip on power in Syria are a testament to his skill in assigning loyal cronies and kinsmen to key security, intelligence, and military positions within his ruling apparatus. Although inner circle members accrue a good deal of power and

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Inner Circle at a Glance

The following are the most prominent members of Assad's inner circle, distinguished by their close personal relationship to the President, their sensitive role in the regime's security, and their ability to speak authoritatively for the President without his close supervision.

Director of Military Intelligence Maj. Gen. Ali Duba. *Ali Duba is an Alawite and a longtime Ba'hist and military officer who played a key role in bringing Assad to power in 1970. Nominally under the Minister of Defense, Duba actually reports directly to Assad and has served as a special envoy for Assad in sensitive negotiations. Duba's principal responsibility is to maintain internal security by monitoring internal dissidents. In recent years his intelligence network has been expanded to include Lebanon, where his deputy, Ghazi Kan'an, is a powerful figure.*

Chief of Air Force Intelligence Maj. Gen. Muhammad Khuli. *Khuli's association with Assad goes back to the 1960s when both men were Air Force officers. Since Air Force Intelligence became independent of Military Intelligence, Khuli has taken orders directly from the President. Khuli's responsibilities include the personal security of the President as well as domestic security and foreign intelligence operations. Khuli, an Alawite from Assad's hometown, has served as a personal representative for the President in talks with Syria's key regional allies and as a key link to various terrorist groups like Abu Nidal and the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia.*

Special Forces Commander Maj. Gen. Ali Haydar. *Haydar is a career military man and has held a prominent position among the Alawite officer elite since Assad came to power. The predominantly Alawite Special Forces has been used as a spearhead*

against potentially dangerous political unrest in Syria and is currently a major part of Syria's security force in Lebanon.

Commander of the 3rd Armored Division Maj. Gen. Shafiq Fayyad. *Fayyad is a prominent figure in Alawite military circles and has ties to the Assad family through blood and marriage. The 3rd Armored Division has long been considered the best fighting unit in the Army. The home base for Fayyad's division is north of Damascus at Qutyfah, where it serves as a strategic reserve for national defense in times of war and is also used to quell civil unrest.*

Chief of Republican Guard Brig. Gen. Adnan Makhluף. *As the head of the Presidential Guard, Makhluף is the last line of defense for the President in the event of a coup attempt. Assad recently demonstrated his support for his kinsman Makhluף by promoting him to the rank of general and adding three regiments to the Guard, bringing it up to division strength. Assad also assigned his son Basil, who is rumored to be his personal choice as his successor, to serve under Makhluף.*

Vice President for Foreign Affairs Abd al-Halim Khaddam. *Khaddam came to power with Assad in 1970 and became the President's first Foreign Minister and a rare Sunni within Assad's inner circle. Khaddam's depth of understanding of Assad's complex and sometimes ambiguous foreign policy objectives has made him indispensable to the President as an adviser, spokesman, and sounding board.*



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also appears determined to carry through an antismuggling campaign that is certain to cut off a major source of income to most members of his inner circle. [redacted]



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A key element of inner circle solidarity—the collective opposition to Rif'at Assad—has been diminished by the absence of the President's brother from the Syrian political scene over the past year. Although Rif'at's political fortunes are uncertain, his self-imposed exile and the disbanding of his Defense Companies have created a power vacuum that individual members of the inner circle hope to fill discreetly. As a consequence, their suspicions and distrust of Rif'at have been, in part, transferred to each other. Moreover, Assad probably hopes that leaving open the prospect of Rif'at's return will continue to keep his inner circle off balance. [redacted]




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
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Duba and Khuli: Clash of the Titans

The current round of infighting has centered around Assad's two most powerful intelligence chiefs—Muhammad Khuli and Ali Duba. [redacted]



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The notoriety Khuli has received from revelations of the Syrian Air Force Intelligence's role in the London Heathrow attempted bombing does not appear to have affected his standing with Assad, but it has given ammunition to his political rivals. Khuli has carried out sensitive visits to Iran and Saudi Arabia since April, indicating he is still well regarded by Assad. Although Assad has probably held off punishing Khuli for fear that it would be an admission of guilt, the order for the mission probably came directly from Assad, at least in general outline, and, therefore, Khuli's position probably is secure. [redacted]






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Laying Down the Law

While Assad may be delegating more authority and autonomy to inner circle members, he has been quick to check excesses and criticize poor performance:

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authority. Assad's position is firm enough, in our view, that he can, in extremis, remove any of his lieutenants—even Khuli or Duba—as he ousted Jamil in 1978 and exiled Rif'at. Nonetheless, should Assad delegate more authority to individuals in his inner circle or his health decline seriously, it will become increasingly difficult for him to maintain this delicate balance. 

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Assad appears confident of the unflagging loyalty of his inner circle and is not likely to make dramatic personnel changes that could disrupt the status quo. The President will go a long way in forgiving transgressions of Khuli, Duba, and the others who form a bulwark against regime opponents. Assad does not appear menaced by interelite intrigues. He probably believes that encouraging them minimizes the opportunities for collective challenges to his

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Syria: Assad's Mounting Foreign Policy Troubles

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The regime of Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad has entered a period of severe political stress brought on by a series of domestic and foreign policy crises and marked by Assad's apparent inability to cope with their multitude and complexity. The current lethargy in Damascus has resulted in mixed political signals, especially in Lebanon and in the use of terrorism, that, if left unchecked, will erode Syrian credibility and regional influence. Although Assad still is in control, there are tentative signs that the decisionmaking process may be in transition and that the President's ability to affect the outcome of regional events is diminishing.

Since 1982, Assad's regional influence has been at an all-time high as a result of dramatic victories in undermining US and Israeli policies in Lebanon, blocking initiatives on the peace process, and improving Syria's strategic position against Israel. These successes appear to have encouraged greater adventurism in Syrian policies, particularly in Lebanon and regarding the use of terrorism. Serious miscalculations on both counts, however, have resulted in serious policy failures, loss of credibility, and political embarrassment.

Trouble at the Top

Rivalries among the President's closest advisers have intensified in recent months, and Assad's temporizing may reflect growing dissension within the regime. Although Assad is notorious for his micromanagement, there are indications that he is delegating more authority than previously. Squabbling among his advisers would have a crippling effect on implementing key policies and force Assad to make choices among those on whom he depends for the survival of his regime.

The errant nature of recent Syrian policies may also reflect strains brought on by Assad's declining health. Although we do not believe his physical deterioration has impaired his judgment, his morale is being sapped by his country's serious economic decline, major

incidents of internal subversion, and a severely damaged international image resulting from revelations of Damascus's direct involvement in acts of international terrorism. Assad, nonetheless, has demonstrated remarkable resilience during his 16 years in power, and he may yet overcome mounting odds against his continuing to direct regional events.

Lebanon Policy in Disarray

A series of miscalculations and half measures in Lebanon illustrate the downturn in Syrian fortunes. Damascus's problems began last January when, after months of tortuous negotiations, Syrian efforts to hammer out a framework for factional reconciliation fell apart following a Christian revolt against the scheme. Since the collapse of the so-called tripartite accord, Damascus has been stymied in its efforts either to cajole or threaten Lebanese Christians into cooperating with the plan.

A number of car bombs in Christian East Beirut, presumably the work of Syria's Lebanese allies, were met with reciprocal bombings in Muslim West Beirut. Syrian officials believe that some of the devastating bombings in northern Syria and in Damascus last spring and summer may also have been the work of hardline Lebanese Christians signaling their distaste for Syrian plans in Lebanon. Assad's dissatisfaction with the stalemate in Lebanon led him to end Vice President Khaddam's monopoly on the account and to increase the roles of Foreign Minister Shara and Brig. Gen. Ghazi Kan'an, Assad's intelligence chief for Lebanon. Since then, policies in Lebanon have become even more confused as those responsible cast about for a solution and for clearcut authority to implement it.

The dearth of Syrian options in Lebanon was dramatically revealed last September when Damascus backed what amounted to a coup attempt by pro-Syrian Christian forces against the East Beirut

Christian establishment. Elie Hubayqa, the ousted and discredited Lebanese Forces militia leader who was the only Christian signatory to the tripartite agreement, led an incursion into East Beirut that was quickly and decisively routed by his former Lebanese Forces colleagues. Syrian forces in Lebanon did little or nothing to support the coup once it ran into trouble after playing a key role in putting Hubayqa up to the attack. Eight months after Hubayqa's leadership and politics had been rejected by the majority of Lebanese Christians—who literally ran him out of the Christian enclave—Damascus has not come up with a better alternative.

The failed coup attempt compounded the damage to Syrian credibility that had resulted earlier from the collapse of the tripartite agreement. Nonetheless, rumors continue to circulate that the Syrians are considering letting Hubayqa have another shot at East Beirut. The only thing that seems certain is that the absence of consensus on Lebanon will stifle both the formulation of strong initiatives and, as in the case of Hubayqa's machinations, successful follow-through when a course of action is attempted.

The Shia-Palestinian-Iran Triangle

Damascus never could fully concentrate on efforts to overcome Lebanese Christian intransigence or nurture the reconciliation process because a more serious threat to Syrian interests was emerging as greater numbers of Palestinian fighters loyal to Yasir Arafat began returning to Beirut. In July Syria began implementing measures in the Muslim sectors of Beirut, ostensibly to restore calm to the Lebanese capital, but in fact designed to inhibit PLO activities. Despite the insertion of Syrian Special Forces into Beirut to give backbone to the security plan, Damascus has been losing ground in its efforts to contain the PLO.

Syria's chosen instrument to confront the Palestinians, the mainline Lebanese Shia Amal militia, has proved to be as inept in defeating the Palestinians as it was during its earlier engagement in the 1985 version of the camps war. The PLO not only has held its own in Beirut but also has achieved a major buildup in the south, where it is engaged in a bid to break out of the camps around Sidon and carve out an enclave with its Lebanese Sunni allies.

Despite Syrian determination to undermine the PLO in Lebanon, Damascus has not been prepared to give Amal the kind of support it needs to stand up to the Palestinians, especially in view of growing ties between the PLO and Amal's Shia rival, the radical Iranian-backed Hizballah organization. After their experiences in the late 1970s, Syrian leaders are not prepared to commit large numbers of troops to the Lebanese quagmire, recognizing that the effort would not guarantee a favorable outcome. Moreover, it could spark an Israeli response against Syrian forces in Lebanon or in Syria itself, where their defenses would be significantly weakened because of extensive involvement in Lebanon.

Syria also has been unsuccessful in undercutting the activities of the Shia fundamentalists, who over the last year have become the most dynamic political force in Lebanon. Damascus opposes Hizballah's goal of transforming Lebanon into an Iranian-style Islamic republic. Nonetheless, the value of Syria's alliance with Tehran continues to override concern about Hizballah's expanding influence. Despite growing strains between Damascus and Tehran, Assad is unlikely to move against Iran's allies in Lebanon so long as he believes the alliance with Tehran is useful.

For the time being, Damascus is checkmated in Lebanon. Syria's adversaries—the Maronites, the PLO, and the Hizballah—have been more effective than Syria's allies in directing events there. Assad's hiatus in decisionmaking on Lebanon could reflect his traditional caution in searching for new ways to cope with complex problems. It may also indicate that the President has vacillated too long and that the problems confronting him in Lebanon now outdistance his considerable abilities to deal with them.

Terrorism: Syria Aims for the Big Leagues

Syria, long a major practitioner and patron of international terrorism in the Middle East, was implicated this year in two attempts to bomb El Al airliners in Europe, one at Heathrow Airport on 17 April (where the evidence is strongest) and another

on 26 June in Madrid. The attacks probably reflect Assad's evolving strategy of stepping up pressure on Israel in an effort to achieve psychological as well as strategic balance. Nonetheless, the El Al attempts suggest a recklessness that has not been characteristic of Syrian terrorism.

The Assad regime uses or supports terrorism as one of several coercive instruments to advance Syrian goals. When diplomacy fails, Assad uses assassination and intimidation to raise the cost to other states of pursuing policies inimical to Syrian interests, to keep opponents off balance, and to extract financial support. Generally, however, the Syrians have been more disciplined in their methods and less arbitrary in their selection of targets.

Syrian involvement in terrorism had undergone a fundamental shift in recent years as it moved away from direct involvement in terrorist acts in favor of using surrogate groups that enabled Damascus to conceal its hand. Attempts to use Syrian personnel resulted in significant embarrassment to the regime through bungled operations and public exposure of Damascus's direct participation. In February 1981, for example, a failed attempt to assassinate the Jordanian Prime Minister resulted in the televised confessions of the would-be assassins—members of the elite Defense Companies then under the command of Assad's brother Rif'at.

The El Al attacks—and the successful bombing of the German-Arab Friendship Union in West Berlin last March—represent a return to Syria's previous operating methods. The planners of the London operation probably believed the spectacular nature of the act was worth the risks.

Although international scrutiny of Syria's role in terrorism intensified following the Heathrow incident, the Madrid attempt was not aborted. This raises questions about Assad's intentions or the level of control he exercises over his extensive intelligence apparatus. The El Al incidents demonstrate Syrian willingness to risk direct involvement in terrorist spectacles designed to maximize casualties and suggest that Syria may have altered its guidelines for the use of terror. The decision to go forward with the

Madrid plot despite the flap caused by the Heathrow attempt, moreover, indicates that Damascus apparently believes it can escape serious retaliation or, more ominously, that it is prepared to absorb Israeli punishment to pursue an aggressive terrorist campaign.

Assad is concerned about the damage to Syria's international image that has resulted from its involvement in terrorism. He is devoting considerable energy to damage limitation and is especially eager to maintain contacts with the United States. Nonetheless, we do not believe that Damascus will sever its ties to groups engaged in terrorism or make serious efforts to undermine their operational capabilities. Damascus has used its influence to encourage these groups to lower their profiles, at least temporarily.

Despite persuasive evidence of Syrian guilt in a number of recent terrorist incidents, Assad apparently has decided to stonewall on the terrorism issue. At least for the near term, he cannot move against those within his regime who are closely connected with terrorism. To do so would be tantamount to either admitting guilt or acknowledging lack of control over his subordinates.

Outlook

The problems confronting Assad—and his choices for resolving them—are getting tougher. His expertise continues to be as a spoiler capable of blocking initiatives he opposes. A recent example would be the Syrian role in pressing Tehran to make public US arms shipments to Iran. We believe Syria played a key behind-the-scenes role—probably in cooperation with some Iranian factions—in publication of the story in the pro-Syrian Lebanese paper *al-Shira* on 3 November.

Assad apparently saw the revelation as a means to embarrass Washington at a time when the United States was attempting to rally international opinion against Syria for its role in international terrorism. The move backfired to some extent, however, as

Damascus has been embarrassed by the Israeli role in the arms transfer—an aspect of Iran's dealings it apparently had been unaware of at the time of the revelation. Nonetheless, Assad will try to minimize the strains the arms deal is adding to the already tense relationship between Damascus and Tehran and will continue to take advantage of US discomfiture over the issue.

In many respects, Damascus's foreign policy has become a victim of its own success. Its ability to direct events through negative action established its regional preeminence in the Levant. The nature and complexity of the problems besetting Syria are changing, however, and need constructive initiatives if they are to be resolved or at least contained. Assad—and his potential successors—have not yet demonstrated their mastery of this approach. Consequently, Syria's primacy is largely the result of one man's leadership style, not an institutionalized policy process that could be utilized by his successors.



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Hornet's Nest in South Lebanon [redacted]

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The Palestinians have withstood Amal's latest round of attacks and, despite a tentative cease-fire, are bent on establishing a permanent enclave in South Lebanon. The return of the Palestinians in strength reinforces the de facto partition of Lebanon and further weakens the authority of the central government. The failure of the Syrian-backed Lebanese Shia Amal militia to halt the Palestinian expansion is an important setback for Damascus's Lebanon policy and almost certainly will undercut Syrian prestige. [redacted]

The Christian Lebanese Forces militia is apparently providing support to the PLO in its fight with Amal.

[redacted]

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The situation in the south continues to favor the Palestinians, who have the upper hand in the strategic town of Maghdushah, making it more difficult for Amal or Syria to move men and materiel to the south from Beirut. In the camps of West Beirut, the Palestinians are holding their own despite intense shelling by Amal. Underground shelters and tunnels have protected the Palestinians in the camps. To root them out Amal would be forced into costly close infantry fighting, something that neither it nor its Syrian sponsor have much stomach for. [redacted]

[redacted] the Lebanese Forces militia sees this policy as a way to take Syrian pressure off the Christians and to weaken Syria and Amal in Lebanon. [redacted]

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Political Impact on Lebanese Groups

This latest round of the two-year-old camps war reveals the growing irrelevancy of the central government, the salience of sectarian divisions, and the reinjection of the Palestinians as a factor in Lebanese politics. The government in Beirut has been unable to prevent pro-Syrian Shia elements of the Lebanese Army from joining Amal in the fighting. The Shia 6th Brigade along with elements of other Army brigades shelled the Shatila and Burj al-Barajinah camps in West Beirut and took part in the fighting near Sidon. [redacted]

Since the camps war began in the summer of 1985, Shia Amal leader Nabih Barri's authority has been unraveling. In the south, for example, key Amal military commanders like Daud Daud have balked at Barri's orders, and [redacted] Amal fighters near Sidon are far more responsive to local leaders than to Barri. As the Palestinians gained ground, Shias from the Army, Amal, and the Hizballah came together in a common resistance—underscoring the importance of confessional allegiances and illustrating the Shias' fear of renewed Palestinian strength in the south. [redacted]

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Lebanon's Sunnis have looked to the PLO as their prime military force since the start of the civil war. The Sunnis' position has been revitalized by the PLO's return to Lebanon, although pro-Syrian Sunnis like Prime Minister Karami are uncomfortable with Arafat. [redacted]

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Palestinian Goals in the South

Since the Israeli invasion of 1982 and the evacuation of Palestinian fighters, the PLO has been slowly reinfiltrating into Lebanon. Arafat's initial motivation after 1982 was to regain close proximity to Israel in hopes of conducting cross-border operations and to

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[redacted]

ISSN - 0153 - 3428

اعترافات
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الوطن
AL WATAN AL ARABI

حقيقة ما جرى بين العراق ومصر

مجازر نبيه بري

لماذا يسكت العرب عن استباحة بيروت؟



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الطبعة الشهرية - العدد 10 - حزيران (يونيو) 1986

Arab commentary on Nabih Berri

Al Watan Al Arabi

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protect Palestinians within the camps. Most returning fighters were first rearmed and placed in refugee camps in Beirut. Amal's attempts since 1985 to disarm these Palestinians forced Arafat to redirect his efforts toward building up the PLO's strength in southern Lebanon by infiltrating fighters from Cyprus and elsewhere through ports near Sidon and Tyre. [redacted]

In the most recent fighting, Arafat has again demonstrated his capacity to survive a Syrian-backed military onslaught and has scored a political and military victory. Arafat is likely to point to the Palestinian presence in the south as proof that his wing of the PLO is still a force to be reckoned with in Arab politics and the Arab-Israeli peace process. As they grow stronger, Palestinian guerrillas will launch more frequent attacks on Israeli and Army of South Lebanon troops. [redacted]

The PLO's strength, however, is likely to remain largely defensive. Arafat does not have—and is unlikely to obtain—the arms and manpower necessary to recreate the state-within-a-state the PLO ruled in South Lebanon before 1982. Moreover, Arafat's guarded statements on PLO intentions in Lebanon suggest that he wants to avoid involving the PLO in local conflicts so as not to risk losing ground recovered since 1982. He appears acutely aware that the PLO cannot suffer another forced evacuation from Lebanon at a time when its fighters are scattered among seven Arab countries. [redacted]

The View From Damascus

Syria remains the preeminent foreign power in Lebanon, despite Amal's failure to contain the Palestinians, and it is unlikely to be dislodged from this position any time soon. Several of Damascus's interests in Lebanon, however, have been compromised by a string of events ranging from the January 1986 repudiation of the tripartite accord to the recent consolidation of the Palestinian position in South Lebanon. Despite occasional cease-fires, Syria will continue to urge Amal to keep pressure on the Palestinian camps and to have radical Palestinian groups end military cooperation with Arafat's forces or risk losing bases in Syria and the Bekaa Valley. Damascus is unlikely to commit its own troops to South Lebanon. [redacted]

Israel's Stake

Israel's interests in the south converge with those of Amal and Syria. The Israelis, too, are determined to keep the Palestinians from reestablishing a military infrastructure in southern Lebanon, and Amal's military operations against the camps further this goal. The Israelis clearly hope that Amal eventually will emerge victorious over the Palestinians. Nonetheless, Tel Aviv recognizes that protracted and inconclusive battles between the various factions in Lebanon serve Israel's interests. Such battles sap the PLO's military strength and resources while at the same time embarrass Syrian efforts to negotiate cease-fires and divert Syria's attention from its confrontation with Israel. [redacted]

Israel is concerned that Amal's demonstrated weakness in the recent fighting will erode its prestige in the south and further reduce the already remote prospects of security guarantees for Israel's northern border. Tel Aviv has long viewed Amal as the only militia capable of entering some type of Syrian-approved security arrangement in the south that would allow Israeli troops to withdraw completely from the security zone. Further weakening of Amal coupled with the resurgence of the PLO and Hizballah would eventually force the Israelis into more frequent, forceful military interventions in southern Lebanon, an option they have conspicuously avoided for much of the past year. [redacted]

Outlook

The anarchy of southern Lebanon, the disarray of the government in Beirut, and the involvement of Syria, Israel, and the Palestinians ensure that the area will remain explosively unstable. Although the latest cease-fire appears to have calmed the situation, the possibility of renewed fighting—and escalation—is unabated. [redacted]

If a Palestinian stronghold does emerge in the south, it probably will remain merely that—a primarily military enclave rather than a political entity. As a consequence, the Palestinians will rely on local Lebanese militias, such as Mustafa Sa'ad's Popular Nasirite Organization, for political legitimacy and support. [redacted]

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West Bank: Growing Fundamentalist Strength [redacted]

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Islamic fundamentalists are capturing more support in West Bank universities and refugee camps by offering a stark alternative to Palestinians who have grown weary of the secular political parties' competition and skeptical of their effectiveness. Dissatisfaction with their standard of living and the prospect of increased restrictions under hardline Israeli leadership may cause West Bankers to look for solace in traditional religious practices. As the fundamentalist groups grow stronger, various political organizations are likely to vie for Islamic support to broaden their political appeal. Moreover, the recent Islamic Jihad attack on Israeli soldiers near the Western Wall in Jerusalem shows that organized Palestinian groups may exploit growing fundamentalist fervor to carry out violence on the West Bank. [redacted]

Background

Islamic fundamentalist groups gained momentum and strength at the end of the 1970s as a consequence of the Iranian revolution. The US Consulate General in Jerusalem reports that fundamentalism is making slow but steady progress throughout Palestinian society on the West Bank and Gaza strip—accounting for about 15 percent of the Muslim population. A controversial poll published recently in a Palestinian newspaper showed that Ayatollah Khomeini trailed Jordan's King Hussein in popularity by only one point—71 percent chose PLO Chairman Arafat as their preferred leader, 3 percent chose King Hussein, and 2 percent Khomeini, with a 4-percent margin for error. The poll, however, was widely criticized for its glaring methodological problems. [redacted]

Although fundamentalism's influence can be seen in all age groups, its greatest impact has been among Palestinian youth. University students increasingly view Islamic piety as a means of expressing their opposition to the Israeli occupation and their adherence to Palestinian nationalist goals. The Consulate General reports a marked increase in the number of students wearing traditional Islamic garb. [redacted]

[redacted]

The fundamentalist Islamic groups in the West Bank can be divided into two groups, those with views similar to the Muslim Brotherhood—advocating the establishment of a state based on Islamic law and therefore antinationalist—and those that are religious-nationalist and support current national frameworks, including Palestinian nationalism.

[redacted] the following groups have recently gained greater political strength:

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- *Muslim Brotherhood.* The strongest and most powerful West Bank fundamentalist group whose stronghold is Nablus and Hebron. [redacted] the Brotherhood has had considerable success in establishing its self-reliance, effectiveness, and independence from the Jordanian Waqf, or Islamic trust, which owns property and uses its income to advance Islamic concerns, such as public prayer, education, and social assistance. The Brotherhood's spiritual leader in Jerusalem is Shaykh Sulayman.

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- *Islamic Liberation Party (ILP).* Although of modest size, this group's influence is growing rapidly in West Bank secondary schools, [redacted] The ILP is based in Hebron and is led by Shaykh Qanaybi, who preaches spiritual liberation and establishment of an Islamic government. A splinter group in Jerusalem is led by Ahmad Khatib, who has gathered support by changing party doctrine to permit armed struggle against Israel from inside the occupied territories.

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- *Practitioners of the Koran.* This group is a loosely organized coalition of smaller, conservative religious groups whose central belief is the divine power of prayer with an element of mysticism. The group favors an Islamic government but is sympathetic to PLO policies, [redacted]

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- *Sufis*. These Muslims pursue activities of a mystical nature as prescribed by several preachers and dervishes, mostly in the villages around Hebron. They are strongly influenced by Egyptian Sufis and have no particular political leanings. [redacted]

The power in traditional West Bank Islamic institutions is concentrated, at least formally, in the hands of one man, Shaykh Saad Eddin al-Alami, who is the Mufti of Jerusalem, Chairman of the Supreme Islamic Council, Chairman of the Board of the Waqf, and Chief Justice of the Islamic courts, among other things. Consulate General sources complain of his ubiquitousness and charge that the Mufti's relative weakness—and the lack of other strong leaders in positions to oversee the vast network of Muslim institutions—leave the system open to manipulation by ad hoc activist leaders. [redacted]

Efforts To Manipulate Fundamentalist Sentiment

A variety of political groupings appear to be vying for fundamentalist support to broaden their appeal. [redacted]

[redacted] the main goal of the pro-Hashemite Jordanian-Palestinian Grouping is to gain support of fundamentalists to strengthen its political base on the West Bank. The grouping believes the fundamentalists are a natural political ally in countering PLO influence. The grouping hopes to convince the fundamentalists to play a leading role in any future government or entity in a West Bank confederation with Jordan. [redacted]

Palestinian nationalist groups, such as the Arafat-led PLO, also have tried in the past to win fundamentalist support primarily to counter secular leftist bodies, including the Communists, the Democratic and Popular Fronts for the Liberation of Palestine, and pro-Syrian Fatah dissidents. This tactical alliance may be ending, however, and Islamic groups may begin to challenge all secular Palestinian parties, particularly for control of student governments at West Bank universities. [redacted]

Nevertheless, Fatah in at least one incident has successfully channeled fundamentalist fervor into acts of violence against Israelis. On 15 October two assailants hurled grenades at Israeli soldiers and their families near the Western Wall in Jerusalem, killing one and injuring 69. Israeli authorities subsequently arrested three suspects who claimed to be members of Islamic Jihad. [redacted] the suspects were

fundamentalists recruited by Fatah's Force 17 who, in return for their cooperation, were allowed to distribute fundamentalist literature at the site of the attack. [redacted]

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Muslim leaders, moreover, may be incensed by the heavyhanded Israeli response to recent violence on the West Bank. At least three Palestinians were killed in early December by Israeli troops trying to disperse violent demonstrations at Arab universities and refugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza strip. [redacted]

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According to press reports, [redacted] [redacted] blamed religious extremists in part for inciting the recent violence and claimed there had been a significant increase in the activities of young people who sympathize with Hizballah goals in Lebanon. [redacted]

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Outlook

Religious groups in the past have apparently not sought to vent their frustrations through attacks on Israelis. For that reason, the Israeli Government has not moved against the fundamentalists because it believes they serve Israeli interests by fracturing the Palestinian national movement. As recent events illustrate, however, fundamentalists may be more willing to fight back, and this may lead to greater Israeli restrictions on their activities. [redacted]

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We believe, however, that Islamic fundamentalist groups will continue to play a more important role in intra-Palestinian rivalries than in anti-Israeli violence in the near term. Moreover, most West Bank Palestinians are Sunni Muslims and generally are not inspired by fundamentalist Shia fervor. [redacted]

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As long as pro- and anti-Arafat groups continue to wrangle inconclusively, and particularly if the peace process remains stalemated, the fundamentalists' prospects for making inroads among West Bank Palestinians will grow. Islamic fundamentalists are likely to attract more converts, and this will lead to greater opportunities for political influence. So long as the Israeli occupation lasts, many West Bankers are likely to turn to Islamic bodies as the few truly Palestinian-controlled institutions in the area. [redacted]

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Israel: Tourism, Terrorism, and Exchange Rates

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Tourism and tourist-related industries in Israel—an integral part of the national economy—have slumped in 1986 because of a decline in the number of visiting Americans. Econometric analysis indicates that the specter of international terrorism, along with fluctuations in real exchange rates, are the primary causes of the decline. To turn things around, the government must find ways to reduce the cost of tourism to American visitors by following a more consistent exchange rate policy and by encouraging lower construction costs and greater competition among hotels and restaurants. Moreover, with the scope of tourism to Israel greatly influenced by security factors, additional steps are needed to show potential tourists that Israel is a safe destination.

Tourism's Economic Value

Israel is the location of some of the world's most famous historical sites. Although the absolute number of yearly visitors to Israel's sites is lower than in other countries dependent on the tourist trade—such as Greece, Italy, and Spain—the relative scope of tourism in Israel is impressive given the country's small size. Income from foreign tourism traditionally amounts to about 3 to 4 percent of Israel's gross national product.

Foreign currency income from tourism totaled about \$1.1 billion in 1985—a 5.8-percent increase from the 1984 level—while an additional \$242 million was derived from airfares. These earnings are particularly important because of Israel's chronic need for increased foreign exchange earnings.

In Israel each export dollar brought in diminishes in value according to the amount of materials imported to provide the service. In the case of tourism, materials include transportation equipment such as tour buses, food products unavailable in Israel, and other imported products specifically geared to tourists. Tourism's value-added percentage is estimated at 70 percent, which means that for each dollar brought in through tourism, Israel can retain

Estimating Tourism Relationships

To explain fluctuations in Israeli tourism levels, we developed an econometric analysis to incorporate factors that help to determine tourist flows. Generally, natural catastrophes, tourism/political unrest, real exchange rates, and the structure of a country's tourist market—where the tourists are from—play major roles.

To work terrorism into the analysis, a variable covering terrorist attacks was incorporated. Two different values were then assigned to the terrorism variable depending on whether a terrorist attack occurred each month. The findings suggest that tourists are sensitive to terrorism, especially those incidents receiving widespread media coverage.

Tourists, like other consumers, also respond to relative prices. Our analysis incorporated real exchange rates—which are calculated by multiplying the nominal or everyday market exchange rate by the country's consumer price ratios. As expected, when changes in real exchange rates indicated that tourism was a good buy, tourism levels increased.


70 cents after paying out 30 cents for import costs. This makes tourism one of the nation's most profitable export industries. In dollar terms, the added value for 1985 was estimated at \$840 million, about 15 percent of the total added value of Israeli exports.

The overall number of visitors to Israel in 1985 was slightly over 1.4 million, an increase of about 200,000 from 1984. Close to 1.2 million arrived by plane, while the rest came either by land from Arab

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Israel: Total Cruise Passenger Arrivals



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The Western Wall in Jerusalem, a prime tourist attraction

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countries or by sea on cruise ships. Nearly 60 percent of these tourists came from Western Europe—mostly from France, West Germany, and the United Kingdom. About 30 percent were from the United States—the largest single source of tourists to Israel—with the remaining 10 percent from the rest of the world.

After the especially successful 1985 tourist season, tourism industry personnel were convinced that their long-term goal of attracting 2 million tourists annually would be achieved by 1988. With that in mind, facilities were built to accommodate an expected mass influx of visitors. New construction was started to add 3,200 hotel rooms to the already existing 30,600 rooms. The decline in tourism in 1986, however, has forced a halt to these projects. Except on certain religious holidays, many hotels stand half empty.


Tourism's Other Benefits

The benefits that accrue to Israel from foreign tourism go far beyond economic gains. First of all, an enjoyable visit improves Israel's image in the eyes of foreign tourists. Surveys undertaken before 1986 have consistently revealed that 80 to 90 percent of the tourists questioned were satisfied with their visit and that their overall impression of Israel was positive. Thus, tourism represents an invaluable tool for the improvement of Israel's international image. Second, Jewish tourism contributes to a strengthening of ties between Israel and overseas Jewry. Third, tourism contributes to the development of regions such as Eilat on the Gulf of Aqaba—a haven for European tourists—and the Dead Sea area, where tourism is the

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Real Shekel/Dollar Exchange Rate and Total Tourism



^a December 1982=100



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primary source of income and employment. These additional benefits, along with the economic rewards, will become harder to realize if terrorism continues to exact such a damaging toll.

The Terrorism Link

Major terrorist attacks in Europe and the Middle East over the last year have left searing marks on Israel's tourism industry. The hijacking of a TWA airliner in June 1985, the seizing of the Italian luxury liner Achille Lauro in October 1985, the attacks on airports in Rome and Vienna in December 1985, the attack on an Istanbul synagogue in September 1986, and the grenade attack in mid-October 1986 near the Western Wall in Jerusalem—a particularly popular area for tourists—each generated flurries of telexes from US travel agencies to Israeli hotels and tour offices canceling scheduled visits.

Hotel industry officials predict the overall decline in visitors could reach 30 percent by the end of this year, mainly because of reduced US tourist arrivals. During and immediately following major terrorist incidents, Israeli tour operators typically estimate a cancellation rate as high as 70 percent. The number of American tourists coming to Israel dropped by 47 percent in the first eight months of 1986 when compared to the same period in 1985.

Cruise ship tourism appears to have been particularly hard hit by the Achille Lauro seizure. During the first eight months of this year, total cruise ship arrivals were down over 48 percent from the same period in 1985. The most severe drop—a 64-percent decline in the first quarter of 1986 as compared to the same period in 1985—was in the number of American tourists coming to Israel via cruise ships.

The Exchange Rate Effect

Exchange rate policies, encompassing formal or informal pegs to the US dollar, have a lesser but still important impact on tourism, according to our econometric analysis. When a country like Israel becomes expensive relative to its competitors, a prime and growing source of foreign exchange earnings could be diverted or destroyed as tourists travel to more affordable areas. With respect to the shekel's performance vis-a-vis the US dollar, the pattern of

real exchange rate movements indicates that from about July 1984 until July 1985, Israel was a relatively good buy for American tourists as the dollar's value increased in shekel terms by about 25 percent. This advantageous real exchange rate appears to have helped offset tourist concerns about terrorism.

Since July 1985, however, exchange rate changes have been unfavorable, with the shekel appreciating by about 18 percent with respect to the US dollar. This has made tourism to Israel relatively more expensive for US visitors. Predictably, the currently less advantageous exchange rate appears to have contributed to the major decline in US visitors.

Outlook

With terrorism exacting such a heavy toll on tourism, 1986 will probably end up a disappointing year for Israel's tourism industry. The tourism industry's poor performance comes at an especially bad time for the Israeli economy, which is already grappling with economic austerity.


Despite terrorism's deleterious effects, Israel can improve its prospects for increased tourism in several ways:

- Hold the line on construction costs for hotels and related services. Currently, Israel is at a cost disadvantage with competing countries on the Mediterranean coast such as Spain. Working to overcome this cost disadvantage will go a long way toward reducing the relative cost of tourism to Israel.
- Increase competition within Israel among hotels and restaurants, thereby creating lower prices for travelers. This could be accomplished by encouraging restaurant chains to offer meals for tourists at special prices. Furthermore, additional government controls could be imposed on prices for services used almost exclusively by tourists.

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Real Shekel/Dollar Exchange Rate and US Tourism



^a January 1985=100

^b January 1985=100; seasonally adjusted data with January 1985 tourism of 32,552 visitors

Legend
<u>tourism index</u>
<u>exchange rate</u>



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- Improve the public image and reputation of El Al, Israel's official airline, as a safe carrier for tourists.
- Explore ways to extend the average stay of tourists in Israel and to encourage more off-season tourism. In addition, successful promotional efforts to encourage greater tourism from nearby countries such as Egypt could offset declines in US tourism.

A more consistent exchange rate policy also would help encourage tourists to visit Israel. In the past, exchange rates have been adjusted to try to offset the effects of hyperinflation on the competitiveness of Israeli export goods. These adjustments, however, were piecemeal at best and sporadic in their application.

Large devaluations in exchange rates are no longer necessary because of the progress made in controlling Israel's runaway inflation. Some economic policy makers, including Bank of Israel Governor Michael Bruno, insist that no further devaluations are planned in the near term. A return to steadier exchange rates—if maintained for an extended period—would help those contemplating a visit to Israel to better gauge their planned expenses and might offset some of their concerns about terrorism.



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**Iran: Khoiniha—
The Maverick Radical** [redacted]

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For the last seven years Mohammad Asgar Khoiniha, the spiritual mentor of the US hostage-takers, has been a maverick in the radical faction of the Iranian clergy. Mercurial and violent, he has used a series of political positions to espouse and advance the radical line. Currently, as Iran's prosecutor general, he is attempting to make the judiciary an instrument of radical reform. Khoiniha's inflexibility sometimes has led to disagreements with other radicals, but his willingness to engage in unpleasant judicial chores and his value as a symbol of the radicals ensure Khomeini's favor and will prevent his removal. [redacted]



Mohammad Asgar Khoiniha
[redacted]

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Background

Khoiniha became involved in radical politics soon after the establishment of the Islamic republic in 1979. [redacted] Khoiniha's rise to a position of influence was aided by Ayatollah Khomeini's son Ahmad, whom he met after the revolution while prayer leader of a mosque near Tehran. Khoiniha took advantage of the US Embassy seizure to enhance his role in the radical movement. He was a key figure behind the takeover and served as an adviser to the student hostage-takers, [redacted] [redacted] He appeared in the Iranian press as an advocate of spy trials and the severing of ties between the United States and Iran. [redacted]

Over the past several years Khoiniha has called for the nationalization of industry, the distribution of expropriated land to the peasants, and the elimination of Western cultural influence from Iran. Khoiniha has devoted much of his attention to the latter effort, and his dogmatic adherence to this issue has at times estranged him from other radicals. [redacted]

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Khoiniha found a new forum for his radical philosophy in 1985 when Ayatollah Khomeini appointed him prosecutor general. [redacted]

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Following the resolution of the hostage crisis, Ayatollah Khomeini appointed Khoiniha as his personal representative to the hajj, a position he held through 1984. In this role he advocated export of the revolution to the Gulf states and fomented anti-Saudi demonstrations in Mecca. [redacted]

Current Power

Khoiniha has used his current position to make the judiciary an instrument of radical reform. According to the Iranian press, he believes Iran's internal difficulties are rooted in the failure of certain Iranians to faithfully follow Islamic precepts. He sees himself as an enforcer and targets those elements he deems deficient. [redacted]

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An important target of Khoiniha's wrath is former officials of the Shah's regime. In his view, these officials profited by slandering Islam and colluding with foreigners, activities they would repeat if given the chance. [redacted]

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He also has attacked those he believes are subservient to Western interests. Khoiniha includes in this group those individuals who oppose his radical reforms, those who support a negotiated settlement with Iraq, and former Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan's supporters. According to the Iranian press, members of the latter group hold Khoiniha responsible for the disruption of their meetings by Hizballah gangs. [redacted]

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Khoiniha has differed from other radicals over the return of exiles. Prime Minister Musavi has called for the return of exiles and assured them that their property will be respected. Khoiniha, however, has told the exiles to stay in the West, as they are "contaminated" and would pose a threat to the revolution. Through his office, he has continued his efforts to seize their property as a means of discouraging their return. [redacted]

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Outlook

Khoiniha appears intent on building a power base within the judiciary. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted] We believe Khoiniha will continue to rely on his personal connections and his willingness to espouse the radical line to maintain his position within the government. If his actions hamper the policies of more powerful radicals, or if the radicals should lose in a power struggle, Khoiniha would not last. [redacted]

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We believe Khoiniha will continue to obstruct efforts by pragmatic elements to improve relations with the West. He will also continue to use the judiciary and the media to prevent the return of exiles. But, as he lacks a firm power base among the clerics, he will not play a decisive role in the struggle over Khomeini's succession. [redacted]

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**Kuwait: Islamic Fundamentalist
Currents Flowing Steadily** [redacted]

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Kuwait's Islamic fundamentalists have become more assertive and have made significant inroads into Kuwaiti politics and society. Sectarianism in Kuwait—sharpened by the Iran-Iraq war and by gains made by the fundamentalist movement throughout the Arab world—is worrying Kuwait's ruling family. The government continues to implement measures designed to control the spread of Islamic fundamentalism. The Amir's decisions to dissolve the National Assembly and increase press censorship earlier this year were intended partly to warn fundamentalists that they were demanding too much. [redacted]

Fundamentalists on Campus

Islamic fundamentalism is at the heart of student politics in Kuwait. Fundamentalist groups operate through the Union of Kuwaiti Students at the University of Kuwait and among Kuwaiti students abroad. Founded in 1969 and organized as a miniparliament, the union acts as the students' liaison with the university administration. [redacted]

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Gaining Political Respectability

Traditional Islamic religious associations in Kuwait continue to flourish and to attract greater numbers of sympathizers. Fundamentalists are found throughout all levels of Kuwaiti society, including wealthy businessmen and government officials. Most adherents are young, relatively well educated, and have studied in the West. Many received their fundamentalist indoctrination in Kuwait's public schools where religious instruction is mandatory and dominated by fundamentalists. Although most fundamentalists—Sunni and Shia alike—support the ruling family, some groups advocate an Islamic form of government and have been associated with antiregime activity, including terrorism. Fundamentalism, however, has not yet become a mass movement in opposition to the government. [redacted]

Over the years the union has become a political forum through which special interest groups disseminate their ideas. Cultivated by national political groupings, the union mirrors Kuwait's political spectrum and receives financial and moral support from a variety of special interest groups in Kuwait. As in the case of the National Assembly, the union has become highly politicized and less concerned with its purported role—the improvement of higher education. [redacted]

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Islamic fundamentalism in Kuwait has been gradually transformed from a social to a political phenomenon over the past five years. Kuwait's small fundamentalist groups—both Sunni and Shia—gained significant political stature as a result of gerrymandering in the 1981 election and won 10 of the 50 seats in the National Assembly. When an election was held again in 1985, the fundamentalists gained five more seats. Sunnis—who constitute a majority of the Kuwaiti population and hold important committee assignments in the Assembly—

Fundamentalist groups dominate the union. The largest group—al-I'atila'f (Coalition)—operates virtually as an arm of the Social Reform Society and won about 37 percent of the votes in the most recent student election. The Coalition has sought to relate the principles of Islam and Islamic ideology to each position it takes on a wide variety of issues raised in the context of student politics. Shias represent about 20 percent of the membership, and their group is closely affiliated with the Islamic Cultural Society. Those affiliated with the Islamic Revival Society claim about 16 percent of the union's supporters. [redacted]

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Fundamentalist activity on Kuwaiti campuses has been limited mostly to nonviolent activities such as meetings and the distribution of leaflets. Last April, however, fundamentalists organized a one-day university strike to protest regulations they believed to be antifundamentalist. [redacted]

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have gained more political clout in that body than the Shias. Although Shias are tolerated in the Assembly, they have held on to only three seats through several elections and do not serve on any committees, largely because of ineffective organization, internal divisions, and government gerrymandering in favor of Sunnis.

[redacted]

Having secured a foothold in the Assembly, the fundamentalists have begun pressing the ruling Al Sabah family to follow more conservative policies and to take a more Islamic outlook. Harsh fundamentalist rhetoric has been embarrassing to the government on such issues as women's suffrage and the rights of non-Muslims. The government has also come under fire for attempting to revamp Kuwait's educational system to incorporate more Western values. To complicate matters, the government has had to deal with sectarian differences over such issues as aid to Iraq and Syria.

[redacted]

The ruling family has accommodated the fundamentalists on a number of issues, and Kuwaiti laws and social practice are more restrictive than in past years. Kuwait's leaders share many of the conservative social values of the fundamentalists and have a long tradition of governing by consultation and accommodation. The ruling family has been discreet in displaying its wealth and has avoided the extravagance of other Arab ruling families. The Al Sabah maintain good relations with Sunni and Shia leaders and have tried to respond to their views. To satisfy some of their demands, the government has banned public dancing and the sale of pork and alcoholic beverages. In July 1985 the government allowed religious leaders to issue a *fatwa* (ruling) opposing women's suffrage.

[redacted]

These concessions failed to satisfy the fundamentalists, however, and they have continued to make more demands than the government believes it can satisfy without alienating other sectors of the population. Kuwait's influential merchant families, the Bedouin community, and Arab nationalists have opposed the drift toward social and religious fundamentalism. To appease these groups, the government has allowed the press to criticize Sunni fundamentalist efforts to segregate the sexes in

Sunni Islamic Call Party

The Sunni Islamic Call Party (SICP)—a worldwide organization of fundamentalist Muslims—has an active following in Kuwait.

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[redacted]

In 1985 several conferences were held in Kuwait, and about 500 regional delegates attended. Their activities included visiting various mosques and delivering daily lectures. It does not appear that the SICP is engaged in significant subversive activity in Kuwait, but its strong fundamentalist orientation could bring it into conflict with the Kuwaiti Government.

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[redacted]

The extent of SICP involvement with other Islamic fundamentalist groups in Kuwait is not clear. SICP leaders at a conference in Kuwait last year called for members to join other fundamentalist groups. The SICP has tried to appeal to the Shia community in Bahrain, and we suspect that similar contacts have been attempted with Kuwaiti Shias. These overtures are likely to fail, however, as these groups probably view the SICP as alien and too noticeable by local security services.

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Kuwaiti schools and change the country's Constitution to make *sharia* (Islamic law) the sole basis of civil law.

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[redacted]

The government's enforcement of some antifundamentalist measures suggests that its tolerance for the Islamic trend is limited. In 1985 the regime issued a law banning public prayer outside of mosques. Last January the government closed 80

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Abdallah al-Nafisi



Dr. Abdallah al-Nafisi, a 41-year-old professor turned politician, will exploit any theme as long as it is anathema to the Al Sabah. He was a leader in Kuwait's Arab Nationalist Movement when it was popular in the late 1960s and rode the growing tide of Islamic fundamentalism into the National Assembly in 1985. In the Assembly, Nafisi has advocated greater government attention to Islamic principles but has frequently joined secular nationalists in attacking the royal family and their close ties to the United States. He contradicted his fundamentalist constituency last year by supporting female suffrage. To increase his popular appeal, Nafisi has consistently called for a broader political process and greater freedom of expression in Kuwait. [redacted]

Nafisi's high-profile activism has earned him little reward and much trouble over the years. He lost his chairmanship of the Political Science Department at Kuwait University in 1978 after writing a book critical of the royal family. Shortly after, he attempted an unauthorized pilgrimage to Mecca and was detained by Saudi officials. To avoid further problems with the Kuwaiti Government, Nafisi lived in self-imposed exile in the United Arab Emirates from 1979 until his reinstatement at Kuwait University in 1981. [redacted]

Koranic teaching centers, according to the Iranian press. In connection with the newly imposed press censorship, the Kuwaiti Government announced it is working on a law that will prevent the publication of items that touch on any aspect of Islam. Rumors are circulating that the Kuwaiti Government has purged Shias from government positions and applied strict security measures to the Shia community partly to warn against increased fundamentalist activity. [redacted]

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Sunni Fundamentalist Groups

Sunni fundamentalists are the most vocal element in Kuwaiti politics and society. Their political base is divided between the Social Reform Society and the Islamic Revival Society (the Salafiyyin). Before the dissolution of the National Assembly last July, these groups probably held six seats. Led by Abdallah al-Nafisi, their political agenda includes making Islamic law the basis of all constitutional law, enforcing *zakat* (the alms tax), limiting naturalization to Muslims only, and opposing female suffrage. They do not, however, advocate the repressive social strictures practiced in neighboring Saudi Arabia.

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The Social Reform Society has more political clout, financial resources, and membership than other Sunni fundamentalist groups in Kuwait. According to the US Embassy, the society has about 1,000 members, all of whom are Kuwaiti nationals. Many more, however, including expatriates, participate in activities that include seminars, conferences of Islamic scholars, youth and sports programs, charity programs, and the publication of its magazine *al-Mujtamah*. A 12-member board manages the society's \$800,000 budget, which is funded by voluntary contributions and an annual government subsidy of \$80,000. Reflecting its considerable resources, the society operates in an impressive modern building complex in Kuwait that includes a large mosque and a sports field for its youth program.

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The Social Reform Society is in effect a front for the Muslim Brotherhood, which was outlawed by the Kuwaiti Government in 1959. When the ban on

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religious organizations was lifted in 1963, the resurrected Muslim Brotherhood was renamed the Social Reform Society, and Kuwaitis replaced its Egyptian founders as the organization's leaders. According to Embassy reporting, Egypt's Muslim Brethren maintain some influence and have close personal contacts in the society. [redacted]

The Salafiyyin, a more radical Sunni movement, is much smaller and has no front organization or publication of its own. According to the US Embassy, it advocates an ultraconservative view of Islam and operates out of mosques run by sympathetic prayer leaders. The US Embassy reports that the Salafiyyin have been accused of using brainwashing techniques to indoctrinate adolescents, even against their parents' wishes. [redacted]

Shia Activity

The Islamic Cultural Society is the major Shia fundamentalist organization. In contrast to its Sunni counterpart, the Islamic Cultural Society is reputed to be a small, apolitical organization that caters to the country's conservative and staid Shia merchant families, whose interests tend to parallel those of the regime. The government closely monitors its activities for political content but largely ignores its proselytizing. The US Embassy reports that Shia clerics and religious institutions have been given more autonomy by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs than their Sunni counterparts. [redacted]

Kuwait's large Shia population—over 30 percent of the native population—is a sensitive point for the ruling family, and Kuwaiti security takes seriously the possibility of Iranian-inspired subversion. The presence of Iranian and Arab Shias who have developed contacts with radical Shias in Lebanon and exiles in Iran poses the principal domestic terrorist threat in Kuwait. Radical Shia elements have been associated with the rash of terrorist incidents that have occurred in Kuwait since 1983. The Al Sabah family, however, has done better than most Gulf ruling families in integrating Shias into society, giving them an economic stake in the country and allowing them a limited political voice. [redacted]

The impact of the Iranian revolution on Kuwait's Shia community has been mixed. [redacted]

[redacted] the size and influence of pro-Khomeini Shia elements have diminished over the past several years. Iranian threats and attempts to intimidate Kuwait through airstrikes and attacks on Kuwaiti ships have caused many fundamentalists to view Iran more as an enemy than as a model.

Although many Shias continue to be spiritually inspired by the teachings of Khomeini, they have been disillusioned with what they perceive to be a burgeoning bureaucracy bogged down in its own redtape and peppered with corrupt leaders. [redacted]

[redacted] The continuation of the war with its effect on business travel and family relationships has slowly convinced many Shias that a change in the leadership in Tehran is necessary. The deportation of 15,000 to 20,000 Shias from Kuwait in 1985, apparently for security reasons, has been a factor in reducing threats from the potentially militant segment of the population. [redacted]

For some Shias, however, a successful Islamic government in Iran is proof that an Islamic republic is feasible. The US Embassy reports that pro-Khomeini Shias are dispersed among shadowy, clandestine groups without identifiable leaders or organizational structure. Tehran has channeled some support to these groups over the years. Anti-Sabah leaflets printed in Iran and calling for an Islamic republic in Kuwait have found their way to Kuwait. Some Shias have received terrorist training in Tehran. [redacted]

Outlook

Although Kuwaiti fundamentalists have been silenced, fundamentalist currents are unlikely to subside in Kuwait. The Amir's decision to suspend Kuwait's democratic institutions could incite antiregime activity over time. Now cut out of Kuwait's political decision making process, Shia and Sunni fundamentalists, particularly the young firebrands, could be more inclined to undertake antiregime activities to make their views known. Moreover, the fundamentalists are unlikely to be placated by the Amir's use of the traditional *diwaniyyas* (informal gatherings) to defuse domestic grievances. [redacted]

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The Al Sabah, whose legitimacy rests on political rather than religious grounds, feel increasingly threatened by the spread of fundamentalism. In part this stems from their lack of strong allies in the religious establishment; none are religious leaders and none hold prominent positions in Islamic circles. Despite their pious image and efforts at accommodation, their perceived materialism, political liberalism, and personal ties to the West will spur criticism in the fundamentalist community. [redacted]

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Kuwait's proximity to Iran and its large Iranian and Palestinian populations will continue to make the country a target of Islamic militants. Although Shias as well as Sunnis have rallied around the ruling family on the issue of terrorism, particularly that sponsored by Iran, circumstances such as religious repression or further economic decline could rejuvenate interest in violent activity directed against the Al Sabah regime.


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**North Yemen: SA-3s
to Marib** [redacted]

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The deployment of North Yemen's first Soviet-supplied SA-3 surface-to-air missiles to the Marib area reflects Sanaa's heightened concern over the vulnerability of its oilfields to South Yemeni air attack. The SA-3 system will require Soviet military advisers to operate and offers Moscow intelligence collection opportunities in the Marib area. North Yemeni reliance on Soviet military expertise is likely to increase as it deploys more of its SA-3s. [redacted]

Deployments

[redacted]
[redacted] The position includes three SA-3 missile launchers, each capable of firing four missiles before reloading. [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] area to make the first site operational and six more launchers sufficient to set up two more sites.

The SA-3 deployments to Marib should significantly bolster defenses of the oilfields against South Yemeni air attack. The decision to deploy the SA-3 system to Marib [redacted]
[redacted]

The SA-3 missile is intended to counter fast, low-flying fighter-bombers and complements the SA-2, which is better suited for higher altitude air threats.

[redacted] area as well as the equivalent of three fully equipped Army brigades. North Yemeni forces enjoy a decisive numerical advantage over South Yemeni or Saudi forces in the triborder area. [redacted]

From Russia With Love

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North Yemen's reliance on Soviet military expertise probably has increased with the acquisition of the SA-3. [redacted]

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President Salih recently has looked to Arab states to diversify his sources of military support for the SA-3 program. [redacted]

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
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early December, presumably to support the SA-3 program. [redacted]

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SA-3 air defense missiles [redacted]

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Outlook

The deployment of the SA-3 missile to Marib will improve North Yemen's ability to protect its oilfields against air attack but will also allow the Soviets increased access to the Marib area. To operate the SA-3 system effectively, North Yemen will require close Soviet supervision, maintenance, and logistic support. At the same time, President Salih will try to limit Soviet attempts to collect intelligence on the progress of Marib oil operations and the activities of South Yemeni military exiles operating in this area.

[redacted]

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Salih's reliance on Soviet military expertise for his air defense forces is likely to increase despite his attempts to acquire non-Soviet training and advisers for his SA-3 program. North Yemen will require additional Soviet air defense advisers as it prepares to deploy SA-3 missiles around Sanaa. North Yemen's efforts to secure substantial training, logistic, and maintenance support for its SA-3s from other Arab or Asian states with Soviet equipment—such as Egypt or India—will be limited by North Yemen's inability to pay for the assistance. [redacted]

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Sudan's Vulnerability to Ethiopian Air Incursions

[Redacted]

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Sudan's air defense continues to be ineffective against Ethiopian aircraft incursions. Ethiopia engages in cross-border operations to support the rebel Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in the south and to strike Eritrean insurgents fighting against Addis Ababa from positions along the Sudan-Ethiopia border. [Redacted]

an additional precaution, Ethiopian markings have been removed from many aircraft to provide for a degree of deniability in the event an aircraft is downed. [Redacted]

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Ethiopia is likely to continue to make helicopter sorties into southern Sudan to support SPLA operations there. [Redacted]

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Ethiopian violations of Sudan's airspace are politically embarrassing for Prime Minister Sadiq, who has publicly pledged to strengthen the Sudanese armed forces. Sadiq will continue to seek military assistance and equipment from foreign donors to bolster Sudan's air defenses in his efforts to keep the military satisfied. Foreign military procurements, however, are unlikely to be sufficient to redress Sudan's air defense deficiencies. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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In the absence of an effective air defense, Ethiopian aircraft violations of Sudanese airspace will continue and contribute to Sadiq's resolve to pursue alternative means of retaliation against Addis Ababa. His most readily available options are to continue to allow Eritrean insurgents to operate against Ethiopia from bases in Sudan and to press militarily in southern Sudan against the Ethiopian-backed SPLA. [Redacted]

Ethiopian Aircraft Operations Against Eritrean Insurgents

Sudan's airspace along its border with Ethiopia is also penetrated periodically by Addis Ababa's aircraft flying missions against Eritrean insurgents operating from Sudanese territory. For example, [Redacted]

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Ethiopian Support Flights for the SPLA

Ethiopian helicopter flights support SPLA operations in southern Sudan. The helicopters carry primarily small arms and ammunition, including light machineguns and mortars, [Redacted]

[Redacted] Food apparently is also delivered to the SPLA by these flights. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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Ethiopian pilots fly only in those areas firmly in SPLA control to reduce their vulnerability to Sudanese ground-based air defenses. [Redacted]

[Redacted] no Ethiopian helicopter has been fired upon in southern Sudan—which may attest to the effectiveness of this tactic. As

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[Redacted]

Sudan's Air Defenses

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The Air Defense Force, in conjunction with the Air Force, is charged with defending Sudanese airspace and territory against hostile air attack. The force, headquartered in Port Sudan, consists of three brigades—an air defense artillery and an SA-2 brigade based on Port Sudan, and an air defense and artillery brigade based near Khartoum. The Air Defense Force, therefore, can provide only limited point defense for these localities, while other areas remain highly vulnerable to air attack.

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In addition, periodic Ethiopian aircraft violations of Sudanese airspace are probably for reconnaissance of Sudanese military activity along the border. [Redacted]

Sudanese Response to Ethiopian Aircraft Incursions

Sudanese air defenses are incapable of effectively deterring or defending against Ethiopian aircraft operations in Sudanese airspace. [Redacted]

The Air Defense Force also controls about 30 radars—late-1950, Soviet-manufactured models—for early warning and target acquisition. Most of the radars, however, are inoperative because of inadequate maintenance and spare parts. Operational radars, moreover, probably cannot perform to original capacity.

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Sudan lacks the air defense assets required to counter intruding Ethiopian aircraft. [Redacted]

The Air Force, headquartered in Khartoum, primarily relies on 12 MIG-21s for air defense missions, although probably only four of these aircraft are operational because of inadequate maintenance and spare parts. The Air Force's ability to perform air defense missions is further limited by factors such as low pilot proficiency because of insufficient training, inadequate logistics, and inadequate communications between the Air Force and the Air Defense Force.

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Sadiq Looks for Help

Sadiq will continue to look to foreign donors for the military assistance and equipment needed to upgrade Sudan's air defenses. [Redacted]

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Ethiopian aircraft incursions are heightening the frustration of the military over its inability to perform its air defense mission. [Redacted]

[Redacted] Sudan has had difficulty keeping its 12 MIG-21 aircraft—Khartoum's primary interceptor—operational partly because of a lack of spare parts.

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[Redacted] Sadiq is likely to feel increased pressure from the military to upgrade Sudan's air defenses as part of his pledge to modernize the armed forces. [Redacted]

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Sadiq has turned to Saudi Arabia for tactical aircraft.

[Redacted]

Although Sadiq's justification for this request was to aid the military in its dry season offensive against the SPLA, the armed forces could seek to exploit the F-5's interceptor capability against Ethiopian aircraft.

Sadiq probably asked the Soviet Union for military assistance, including air defense equipment, during his visit to Moscow in August 1986.

[Redacted]

Prospects for Increased Air Defense Capability

The near-term prospects for Sadiq to procure sufficient military assistance and equipment from foreign donors to significantly bolster Sudan's air defenses are poor. The acquisition of additional fighter aircraft alone, for example, is not likely to significantly enhance Sudanese capability to engage Ethiopian fighter aircraft because of the inferiority of Sudanese pilots and inadequate ground-based radar acquisition and control capability required to vector aircraft to their targets. Moreover, additional fighter aircraft will increasingly burden the country's already inadequate maintenance and logistic infrastructure.

[Redacted]

Additional ground-based air defense weapons such as antiaircraft guns may strengthen the defense of fixed installations such as bridges, dams, and airstrips, but Ethiopian aircraft are likely to avoid flying over these sites. These weapons, moreover, are unlikely to significantly increase the armed forces' capability to interdict Ethiopian helicopters, which are careful to

fly over only those areas controlled by the SPLA. This tactic probably will also preclude effective employment of portable air defense systems such as SA-7 missiles, since in most instances the military lacks the requisite access on the ground.

Foreign donors are unlikely to provide sufficient military assistance and equipment to financially strapped Khartoum to redress major air defense deficiencies resulting from shortages of maintenance, logistics, and training. Without correction of these problems, the armed forces will be unable to optimally employ newly acquired weapon systems.

In the absence of an effective air defense deterrent, Ethiopian aircraft operations in Sudanese airspace will almost certainly continue. These aircraft incursions will constitute a political irritant, both domestically and internationally, to Prime Minister Sadiq. Recognition that no near-term solution to correct Sudan's air defense inadequacy is available is likely to encourage Sadiq's pursuit of alternative means of retaliation against Ethiopia. Sadiq probably views continued tacit support of Eritrean insurgents and military operations in southern Sudan against the Ethiopian-backed SPLA as the most readily available retaliatory options. Should Sadiq pursue these avenues, he is likely to fuel Ethiopian incentives to increase support for Sudan's southern insurgency.

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South Asian Nations: Inching Toward Cooperation [redacted]

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The second annual summit meeting of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in Bangalore, India, on 17-19 November produced modest progress toward the organization's goal of increased partnership. The member states—India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, and the Maldives—agreed to joint declarations and further discussion on touchy issues such as terrorism and narcotics. The SAARC summit meeting also provided an opportunity for the leaders of the individual states to conduct private talks on sensitive bilateral issues that produced several new efforts to relax regional tensions. The self-interest of each state, however, will work against significant movement on controversial regional issues. [redacted]

SAARC's First Year

SAARC was formally launched in December 1985 at a summit meeting in Dhaka, Bangladesh. Throughout 1986 officials from the SAARC member states met to prepare for the second summit meeting in Bangalore. General declarations and recommendations were issued on ways SAARC members could better cooperate on issues, such as terrorism and narcotics, but no major substantive agreements were reached:

- A SAARC economic ministerial meeting was held in Islamabad in April.
- A SAARC study group on terrorism met in Dhaka in June.
- The SAARC Foreign Ministers' Conference was held in Dhaka last August.
- A study group on drug trafficking and drug abuse met in September, also in Dhaka. [redacted]

This low-key approach to cooperation has apparently paid off in a lessening of distrust among the SAARC member states. [redacted]

[redacted] All the SAARC member states agreed to Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi becoming the next chairman of SAARC at the Bangalore meeting. He will serve until the next summit meeting, scheduled for late 1987 in Kathmandu. [redacted]

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Results of the Bangalore Summit

The SAARC summit meeting produced the "Bangalore Declaration," which stressed general agreement on substantive regional concerns. [redacted]

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Terrorism. All seven member states agreed to condemn "all methods and practices of terrorism" as criminal and decided to reconvene the study group, headed by India, at a date to be determined. The members also recognized the importance of UN Resolution 2625, which requires all states to abstain from organizing, instigating, assisting, or participating in terrorist acts. A US Embassy source in Dhaka said that the member states deliberately avoided defining terrorism in order to skirt contentious issues such as the Sikh agitation in India and the Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka. [redacted]

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Narcotics. The SAARC countries formally agreed to add narcotics to the "core issues" addressed by the organization. The Bangalore Declaration urged greater cooperation and information sharing in halting illegal narcotics trafficking and reducing drug abuse in the member states. The declaration also pledged to set up a technical committee, chaired by Pakistan, that will meet next year to draw up more specific recommendations, according to the US Embassy in Islamabad. [redacted]

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Other International Issues. The SAARC heads of state rounded out the Bangalore Declaration by calling for a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty and a return to economic "multilateralism" through a resumption of the North-South dialogue. The

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declaration specifically advocated enlarged concessional economic assistance from donor nations, "amelioration" of official debts, trade liberalization, commodity price stabilization, increased technology transfer, and special treatment for the least developed SAARC countries. [redacted]

Administrative Issues. In a separate Memorandum of Understanding, the SAARC countries agreed on several unresolved administrative issues. All seven states agreed to set up a permanent secretariat in Kathmandu, Nepal, with a target inauguration date of 16 January 1987, according to the US Embassy in Nepal. The first secretary general, Abdul Ahsan, is from Bangladesh and will serve for two years. There will also be four directors general—one each from India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Nepal. Bhutan and the Maldives will not be represented in the Secretariat because they cannot afford to pay the salaries, according to the US Embassy in Kathmandu. Finally, the SAARC heads of state approved a formula for funding that assigns most of the burden to India (32 percent) and Pakistan (24 percent). [redacted]

Bilateral and Trilateral Talks

The South Asian heads of state took the opportunity provided by the summit meeting to hold private bilateral talks and achieved modest progress on sensitive issues. [redacted]

India-Pakistan. Prime Ministers Rajiv Gandhi and Mohammad Khan Junejo held private conversations that produced agreements that may ease currently tense bilateral relations. At the end of the summit meeting, the two countries announced that high-level officials from their respective Interior Ministries would meet in Pakistan in December to discuss border problems including illegal border crossings, alleged Pakistani support to militant Sikhs, drug trafficking, and smuggling. Indian Foreign Secretary Venkateswaran is to travel to Islamabad at a later date to resume stalled talks on normalization of bilateral relations. [redacted]

The two leaders, however, made no progress on easing Islamabad's concerns about large Indian military exercises near the Pakistani border or dealing with New Delhi's charges that Pakistan is developing a

nuclear bomb, according to the US Embassy in New Delhi. Gandhi publicly said he was "utterly unconvinced" by Junejo's denials that Pakistan was building a bomb and also criticized Junejo's proposal at the summit meeting that SAARC states send observers to monitor each other's military exercises. [redacted]

India-Sri Lanka. In a series of meetings, Gandhi and Sri Lankan President Jayewardene appeared to make progress on reviving the stalled Sri Lankan peace talks. The US Embassy in New Delhi reports that Gandhi and Jayewardene came up with a plan to redraw provincial boundaries in Tamil-dominated areas of Sri Lanka and to coax the insurgents back to the negotiating table. The major Tamil insurgent group, however, has rejected all of Colombo's peace proposals. [redacted]

Water Sharing. India, Bangladesh, and Nepal discussed ways to better apportion the waters of the Ganges River that runs through all three countries. Bangladeshi officials told US diplomats that Dhaka was glad that Gandhi agreed to include Nepal in the talks, since New Delhi had previously insisted that the Ganges water issue should be settled bilaterally between India and Bangladesh. [redacted]

[redacted]

Prospects for SAARC

The Bangalore summit meeting reaffirmed the basic viability of SAARC as a vehicle for South Asian cooperation. US diplomatic reporting indicates that most SAARC countries viewed the meeting as a modest success, both in its progress toward multilateral cooperation and in its use as a forum for bilateral talks. India appears relieved that the smaller SAARC states did not use the meeting to "gang up" on New Delhi, while the smaller states are probably pleased that India is not trying to dominate the organization. [redacted]

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Despite this optimism, SAARC remains a fragile organization that could be easily disrupted by the injection of intractable political issues. Cooperation on neutral administrative issues may unrealistically increase expectations about progress on more substantive matters. The agreement to discuss terrorism, for example, risks renewed Indian and Pakistani charges of meddling in each other's internal affairs. Future SAARC progress will probably be confined to noncontroversial issues, although the organization will continue to be valuable as a venue for private bilateral discussions among the member states.

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**Prospects for Pakistan:
Political Officers' Assessment**


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Pakistan's civilian government is anemic and beset by internal problems, but the opposition is also hurting, in the view of US diplomats and Embassy local employees at the recent Political Officers' Conference in Pakistan.¹ Deteriorating public order and sectarian violence between Sunnis and Shias were the two problems identified by the participants as posing potential problems for the current government. Little has changed in the Afghan conflict despite the increase in the level of fighting. There are few favorable prospects for either the Afghan resistance alliance or the Geneva peace talks, but Islamabad continues to enjoy considerable support for its Afghanistan policy. The conferees saw no signs indicating an improvement in Indo-Pakistani relations.

The Current Government

One speaker at the conference said that Pakistanis regard Prime Minister Junejo as a man who lacks the intelligence and the charisma required of a leader, but they are willing to give him more time. President Zia has handed over the day-to-day running of the government to Junejo while continuing to cultivate members of the National Assembly and to keep open lines of communication with many opposition figures, probably to maximize his leverage over Junejo. Zia and the Pir of Pagaro—the spiritual head of the ruling Pakistan Muslim League and Junejo's mentor—clearly despise each other.

The Pakistan Muslim League is not much better organized than its opponents who are in disarray. At the district level, most members of the National Assembly and the provincial assemblies are spending more time attacking each other than in organizing the party. One speaker claimed that the Muslim League



exists only in its offices and that, unless something is done in the coming months to develop public support, there is a distinct possibility that the League will vanish as a viable political party when Junejo leaves office.

One participant observed that the one thing that might hasten the demise of the government could be the deterioration in public order. He said that the military is rapidly becoming disenchanted with the lawlessness, sabotage, ethnic violence, and corruption that appear to have spread since the lifting of martial law. The consensus at the conference was that, while the Army would not hesitate to move if disorder spread, the situation would have to worsen considerably before the Army would intervene. The key factors arguing against imminent reimposition of martial law are the dispirited state of the opposition and the lack of a pressing external threat.

The Political Opposition

Most of the conference participants agreed that the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy—a coalition of opposition parties dominated by Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP)—appears incapable of mounting a credible challenge to the government for perhaps another year. In tacit admission of its weakness, the movement has announced that it will avoid agitation over the coming months and is adopting a strategy of peaceful public meetings.

Benazir Bhutto was disappointed in the lackluster public support—most of it confined to Sind Province—she received in the wake of her arrest on 14 August. Since then, the chief of the PPP in Sind quit his post, and many PPP members in Punjab are making no secret of their unhappiness with provincial party chief Jahangir Badar. Punjab is Pakistan's most important province, and Benazir must demonstrate substantial support there if she is to have any chance

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of unseating the government. Some participants contended that the position of the PPP has not deteriorated in Sind and in the North-West Frontier Province as much as it has in Punjab and that, if anything, the August confrontation increased support for Benazir in rural Sind and did little to affect her standing in the North-West Frontier.

Ghulam Mustapha Jatoi—former chief of the Sind PPP—is trying to take advantage of the disarray in the PPP by establishing his own National People's Party. One participant said that for Jatoi to succeed, he needs Mustapha Khar, a former member of the PPP and governor of Punjab Province in the mid-1970s. Khar is feared and respected throughout Punjab [redacted]

[redacted] President Zia is recruiting Jatoi as a possible replacement for Prime Minister Junejo. One of the indications of such a maneuver would be Jatoi's running in a parliamentary byelection. The Constitution requires that the Prime Minister be a member of the National Assembly, a qualification Jatoi currently lacks.

Most participants believe that the newly formed Awami National Party is the same wine in new bottles and that it appears to be even more pro-Soviet and more anti-American than the parties that formed it. The party platform advocates a reduced US presence in Pakistan, increased provincial autonomy, immediate party-based national elections, expulsion of Afghan insurgents and refugees from Pakistani territory, and a secular, democratic government rather than Islamization. For tribal rather than ideological reasons, the head of the party, Wali Khan, is a powerful figure in some areas of the North-West Frontier. Outside that province, his brand of radicalism has little support.

Sectarianism

The participants agreed that, over the past year or so, the Sunni majority has become less tolerant of the Shia minority. Much of the blame for the September anti-Shia riots in Lahore can be laid at the doorstep of Sunni extremists, including one cleric who gave an extremely provocative sermon just two days before Shia religious processions. A key test of the new civilian government will be proposed legislation that

would make Sunni interpretations of Islamic law the law of the land. Shias oppose the bill because they believe it will lead to Sunni domination. One participant said that the bill itself would not lead to major changes and would be just "another one of those laws." The participants agreed that, if the government cannot forge a compromise acceptable to the Shias by recognizing Shia interpretations of Islamic law, a further deterioration in sectarian relations is likely.

Regionalism

A deep feeling of alienation from the current government exists among much of the population of rural Sind Province, in part because of the apparent inability of the provincial government to come to grips with the bandit problem. How the Army acts in suppressing banditry will determine whether alienation increases. Accounts of Army behavior conflict; some point to excessive use of force.

One participant remarked that influential Punjabis are beginning to realize that there is deep-seated resentment toward Punjab, particularly in Sind, and they are beginning to consider the consequences. This observer noted that one reason Jatoi has some support from Punjabis is because his party is seen as broad enough to unite Sindhis and Punjabis.

The conference consensus was that, although alienation from the central government exists in the North-West Frontier and Baluchistan, it is less virulent than in Sind. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has taken much of the steam out of the separatist movements that exist in the North-West Frontier and Baluchistan. Moreover, both provinces have done fairly well in recent years. Massive grants from the federal government—a model many participants believed could be usefully applied to Sind—have helped in Baluchistan, and Pathans from the North-West Frontier have done well in the military and the bureaucracy and in competition for jobs in the oil-producing Gulf states and Karachi.

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Foreign Affairs

There was a general consensus that, as a national issue, Afghanistan is overshadowed by domestic issues and concern about India. Because of the Afghan resistance alliance's uncertain nature, Pakistan is reluctant to encourage it to play a more prominent role. Islamabad may also be keeping its options open should a political settlement or a slackening of outside—especially US—support on Afghanistan require it to change its policy. The Geneva peace talks show few hopeful signs, although all parties appear willing to see them limp along. The cost of the Afghanistan conflict is growing in the North-West Frontier, where increasing sabotage has renewed talk about restricting refugees to camps. Air and artillery incursions from Afghanistan are again occurring at a high rate and present a continuing threat to Pakistan.

The conferees found few signs of hope for Indo-Pakistani relations. Pakistan is dejected and frustrated with what it believes is India's unwillingness to respond to its initiatives on border security, terrorism, drugs, nuclear nonproliferation, and trade. India seems preoccupied with domestic political issues and is keeping Pakistan in the public eye as at least a partial explanation for India's problems. One participant noted that, because Indian Prime Minister Gandhi was naively overoptimistic about his ability to make foreign policy gains, he has been frustrated by his failure to do so. Despite the rhetoric about the Pakistani threat, a conferee noted that India is more concerned by the greater challenges posed by China and by the possibilities of Soviet-Chinese rapprochement that India can do little about. The participants agreed that neither India nor Pakistan is in a position domestically to make the political concessions the other side demands as a precondition for substantive progress on normalization of relations.²

² The conference took place before the South Asian regional summit meeting at Bangalore during which Prime Ministers Junejo and Gandhi agreed to bilateral meetings to discuss border issues, leading to a visit to Islamabad by the Indian Foreign Secretary.



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Pakistan: A Primer on Punjabi Political Parties¹

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Political parties in Punjab, with the exception of the Jama'at-i-Islami, feature highly personal leadership, poor organization, and a multiplicity of factions. To date, the effective lifespan of political parties has tended to be short. But, as politics has become more ideologically polarized, the Islamic parties and the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) appear to be establishing more permanence. The PPP seems to be the most popular, but its strength is sapped by splinter groups.

Pakistan People's Party

Founded at Lahore in November 1967, the Pakistan People's Party, in our view, is the most popular party in Punjab. Very much a mass movement party at its height in 1968-70, the party is a coalition of interest groups.

The unprecedented outpouring for Benazir Bhutto when she returned to Pakistan through Lahore in April 1986 demonstrated the hold the PPP retains over the urban and rural poor in Punjab, a constituency that only social change will break down. Whatever its shortcomings, the PPP was the first party to represent their interests and take seriously their capacity to effect political change.

Nevertheless, the party's structure has been twisted and torn by poor organization, factional struggles, and the disruption of major events, and over time, important faction leaders have left. Although we doubt that any of the departed faction leaders have taken with them a major bloc of supporters, their loss has narrowed the base of the party and deprived it of skills needed to explain the party program, mobilize voters, and function as government leaders. In Punjab, the PPP has lost the following groups:

- Leftwing leaders like Khurshid Hasan Meer and Taj Muhammad Khan Langah, both with small followings, who formed the Awami Jamhoori Party (People's Democratic Party) in 1977. Meer and

Langah were disillusioned with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and hoped to refashion the left wing of the Punjab PPP as a new worker-peasant party. Their efforts to form a viable party failed, largely because Sheikh Mohammad Rashid, the titular head of the PPP Punjab left wing and a member of the PPP Central Committee from the beginning, stuck with Bhutto to the end and now supports his daughter.

- The Islamic socialist group around Mohammad Hanif Ramay, Chief Minister of Punjab (1974-75). A key group in the early propaganda and ideological effort of the party, Ramay left in 1976 and later founded the Musawat (Equality) Party after toying with a recrudescence of the Muslim League. After some years in political exile, Ramay returned to Pakistan and has now thrown in his lot with the newly established National People's Party.
- The rural landholder group around Ghulam Mustapha Khar, former governor and Chief Minister of Punjab. Jailed when he returned from exile in the United Kingdom in 1986—he had been convicted in absentia by a martial law court—Khar is a potentially influential figure. He has acquired some popularity as a defender of Punjabi interests, and his connections with rural powerholders—Rajput and Jat clan leaders—should not be underestimated. He has developed ties to Ghulam Mustapha Jatoi and can be regarded as a founder-member of the National People's Party.

Pakistan Muslim League

The Pakistan Muslim League is being organized from the top down. The secretary general for the Punjab organization is Ghulam Haider Wyne, a member of the Punjab Assembly from Multan.

We doubt the League will gain a significant mass following anytime soon. Although it has gained the adherence of many of the old landed families of the Indus basin—valuable if a future election elicits

¹ This paper was prepared by an outside contractor. It was not coordinated within this Agency. The views expressed are those of the author.

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Key Leaders in the PPP From Punjab

Gen. (Ret.) Tikka Khan, secretary general of the national party. Known at one point as the "Butcher of Bengal," Tikka Khan was a highly respected officer who commanded Pakistani victories in the Rann of Kutch fighting and the 1965 war. He showed a willingness to serve under civilian leaders, and Bhutto gave him command of the Army in 1972. Retired in 1975, Tikka joined the PPP, stuck with Bhutto, and went to jail several times after the Prime Minister's fall. Originally from the Potwar region, Tikka is assumed to retain some support in the Army, and PPP politicians undoubtedly hope he will serve as a link to serving officers discontented with President Zia.

Sheikh Mohammad Rashid, member of the Central Committee. Rashid is elderly and unwell but retains traditional respect in the left wing of the party. A lawyer who has specialized in land cases and an activist whose career goes back to the Muslim League (1946) and the Azad Pakistan Party (1951), Rashid is a self-made man who sees himself as the leader of Punjab's peasantry. He lacks a forceful personality, however, and stayed loyal to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto when others would have taken umbrage at his treatment by the former Prime Minister. He recently returned from medical treatment in Eastern Europe to a massive welcome in Lahore.

Jahangir Badar, chief of the Punjab PPP. Badar is a relatively unknown figure who rose within the PPP organization. He stood out as a public opponent of Bhutto's execution and has been jailed several times. He replaced Sardar Farroq Leghari as head of the Punjab PPP, an action by Benazir Bhutto that confirmed the hold of left-oriented urban professionals over the provincial organization.

Sheikh Rafiq Ahmed, Central Information Secretary of the PPP and former Speaker of the Punjab Assembly. Experienced and able, Rafiq inclines to the left—at one point he was in the National Awami Party—but he also is pragmatic. He has ties to the urban trade union and professional circles.

Malik Meraj Khalid, member of the Punjab PPP Executive and former Chief Minister of Punjab. Khalid is a more centrist urban politician. At one point he was in the Convention Muslim League. He is skilled and has stayed loyal to the Bhuttos when many others fell away.

Salman Taseer, Propaganda Secretary for the Punjab PPP. A biographer of Bhutto and a teacher, Taseer is another organization man who has emerged in the Punjab PPP since the execution of the former Prime Minister. Taseer is also believed to be close to Benazir.

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multiple candidates in single-member rural constituencies—the party has a far weaker footing in the cities.

Prime Minister Junejo is trying to build an urban constituency through his program to give proprietary rights to urban squatters, but he will have to do much more to reach key Punjabi social groups—the bazaar merchants, lower middle-class groups, students, and professionals. Thus far, the most notable legislation pressed by the League has been to permit landholders to use land as collateral for loans—an effort clearly designed to enable large rural landholders to move into commercial and industrial ventures.

National People's Party

Founded in August 1986, the National People's Party is the most credible group so far to have split from the PPP. It was formed in Lahore by Ghulam Mustapha Jatoi, a Sindhi, and includes in its membership several other former PPP leaders, including Mohammad Hanif Ramay and Ghulam Mustapha Khar. Jatoi served under Bhutto both in the Federal Cabinet and

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as Chief Minister of Sind. A major landlord and political moderate, he has long been viewed as the one PPP figure acceptable to the Army.

Although Jatoi claims to represent the original PPP, we doubt that his party will attract a significant portion of the PPP rank and file in Punjab or elsewhere as long as Benazir Bhutto remains active. For now, the main significance of the National People's Party is that it constitutes a credible alternative to the Muslim League should Prime Minister Junejo and his Cabinet falter badly. The party is a core around which an alternative government could be constructed, either by itself or in coalition with the Muslim League.

Tehrik-i-Istiqlal

The Tehrik, or Movement for Self-Determination, is a party of lawyers and other urban professionals, retired military officers, and retired senior government bureaucrats. Its national leader, Air Marshal (Ret.) Asghar Khan, is a man of integrity if not of notable political skill. Originally a moderate, Asghar Khan has adopted more "Third World" positions in recent years, possibly to attract more of a mass following. He became a bitter opponent of Prime Minister Bhutto in the mid-1970s and was one of the first to call for the Army to intervene against the PPP. Asghar is now critical of Army involvement in politics and supports the restoration of the 1973 Constitution. He has kept his party affiliated with the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy, but the Tehrik opposes the return of the PPP to power and has not cooperated in opposition mass campaigns.

In Punjab, the party has an elite following in the major cities but lacks either the rural connections or urban following it needs for electoral success. In Punjab, the Kasuris—a political family founded by Mian Mahmud Ali Kasuri, a self-made man and internationally respected lawyer—have been associated with the Tehrik since the early 1970s. Mian Mahmud Ali Kasuri had belonged to the National Awami Party but joined Bhutto before the 1970 election. He gained a seat in the National Assembly and served as Bhutto's first Minister for Law and Parliamentary Affairs, but he broke with the PPP to protest Bhutto's effort to create a presidential

rather than a parliamentary system in the 1973 Constitution. Kasuri subsequently joined the Tehrik. His son, Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, currently serves as Information Secretary for the party. Others from Punjab in the Tehrik include Arif Fasihuddin Vardag, who is from the Rawalpindi area, as secretary general, and Malik Haider Usman, a Lahore lawyer who is Punjab chief of the Tehrik.

Pakistan Democratic Party

The Pakistan Democratic Party is like the Tehrik in its support base, although it is in decline and has even less potential as an electoral party. In 1970 it gained 2.3 percent of the Punjab vote in the National Assembly election but won four seats in the Punjab Assembly election, mostly because the party concentrated its efforts in a handful of constituencies.

It is largely the party of one individual, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, a figure of some note during the partition period. A Muhajir—a Muslim who immigrated from India after partition—Nawabzada's chief asset is his reputation for integrity and passion for democratic politics. This, together with his lack of a popular base, has made him the natural convener of coalition groups. His party belongs to the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy.

Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan

The Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan is probably the largest of the Islamic parties in Punjab. It represents the mainstream culture of Sunni belief and practice in Pakistan. The party is strongest in the old trading towns of Punjab—Chiniot, Eminabad, Sharaqpur—and in the old city wards of Lahore, Rawalpindi, Gujranwala, Sialkot, and Jhang. Its supporters are the long-established artisan communities, like weavers and goldsmiths, and the small traders. The party has made a name for itself in both anti-Ahmadiya and anti-Shia agitations.

The leadership in Punjab is composed of respected figures, but the party is not well organized. It depends on the lower clergy who control individual mosques and who are sufficiently powerful to ignore the directives of the national or Punjab organizations.

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During the Zia period, the mainstream Sunni clergy in Punjab have responded to Zia's Islamization program far more positively than the party leadership.

Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam

The Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam is a reformist "orthodox" Sunni party that has its strongest influence in the most backward parts of the country—Dera Ismail Khan and Kohistan in the North-West Frontier Province, the Zhob Valley in Baluchistan, and the southwestern fringes of Punjab. The party is more socially radical than the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan. A part of the anti-British underground in the 1920s and 1930s, its founders admired the Soviet Union and promoted a program of social reform in India. Its institution at Delhi, the Jamia Millia, was organized to oppose Aligarh University, the intellectual center of the Pakistan Movement.

The party has had difficulty shedding this past and has little support in Punjab, where Maulana Obeidullah Anwar is the primary leader. The national leader, Maulana Fazlur Rehman, son of the late Maulana Mufti Mahmud, has kept the party in the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy, although the Punjab wing does not support this policy and may break with the parent organization.

Jama'at-i-Islami

The Jama'at-i-Islami represents the Islamist or fundamentalist thrust in Pakistan. It is a party of the educated—students and professionals—who have turned to a purified Islam rather than to Marxism or to Western models as a guide to the proper working of government and society in the modern age. For them, "Islam is a complete code of life," sanctioned by Allah through the Prophet, containing all one needs to know about how life individually and communally should be lived. They hold that the troubles of the Islamic community can be traced both to an Islam weakened by the cultural and scholastic freight acquired over centuries and to an overenthusiastic acceptance of non-Islamic models by modernizing, secular elites. The party has contact with the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East and with the Saudi clergy and royal family. Zia clearly has been influenced by the Jama'at, quite beyond the fact that

both he and the party's leader, Maulana Tufail Mohammad, are Arains from Jullundur (in Indian Punjab) and are distantly related.

The party is not large and has never done well in elections, but it is probably the best organized and financed in Pakistan. Its membership is carefully screened and vetted. The party concentrates on students, often providing security, academic assistance, and jobs to students coming into the major cities from villages and small towns. The student wing, the Islami Jamiat-ul-Tulaba, controls student unions in key universities, including Punjab University, and has influence throughout the academic community through alliances of conservative students and teachers. The party aims more to take over from the inside—by penetrating the bureaucracy, commercial and academic establishments, and even the military—than to win power through elections. It has an active program of targeting and then courting influential, respected citizens. The party and its student wing were a crucial element in the anti-Bhutto movement of 1977. The party made a major effort in the 1985 election, gaining seven seats in the National Assembly. Its group in the National Assembly is formally part of the Independent Parliamentary Group but often supports the Junejo government.

Lesser Parties and Groups

Strongly leftist parties have little following in Punjab, where they tend to be connected to leftist labor unions, such as the Railway Workers Union, and to the pro-Moscow All-Pakistan Trade Union Federation. Many of their leaders have backgrounds in the old Communist Party of Pakistan, a postpartition offshoot of the Communist Party of India. Punjab lacks a party with its own pro-Punjab platform, although the Punjab Forum in Lahore seeks to promote both Punjabi interests and a better understanding between the provinces—two quite contradictory tasks.



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**Afghanistan: Supplying Qandahar—
Problems and Prospects** [redacted]

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To weaken resistance activity in and around Qandahar city—one of the most hotly contested areas in the seven-year war in Afghanistan—the Soviets have placed intense pressure on insurgent supply routes to the area since late 1985. These efforts—which include ambushes, mining operations, and air attacks—have made it more difficult for resistance commanders to supply their men and have contributed to escalating transportation costs. Nevertheless, through adaptations in tactics and the overall increase in availability of supplies to all insurgents in Afghanistan, the insurgents in Qandahar received sufficient materiel to maintain an effective presence against Soviet and regime forces in 1986. Insurgent supply problems will almost certainly persist in 1987, but we believe the overall logistic situation will improve. The increased availability of air defense weapons to the resistance in the area should help reduce the Soviet air interdiction threat.

[redacted]

Putting the Pressure On

Most caravans leaving Pakistan for Qandahar are formed in Chaman in Baluchistan Province. The insurgents use both trucks and camels to move men and supplies into the Qandahar area. After departing Chaman, the caravans take a variety of routes into and through Qandahar Province. The Spin Buldak route through southern Afghanistan and the Salesun route running north of Qandahar city traditionally have been two important routes into Qandahar.

[redacted]

Because of the high level of resistance activity in the city, Soviet and regime forces in December 1985 increased military pressure on resistance supply routes leading into Qandahar Province, [redacted]

[redacted] Stepped-up Soviet efforts include mining operations and the establishment of new security outposts along routes normally used by the insurgents, making it more difficult for the insurgents to infiltrate men and supplies into Qandahar city. The Soviet and Afghan regime measures have also limited

the ability of resistance groups operating in the surrounding countryside to receive financial and material support from civilians within the city. In recent years, much of the population in Qandahar Province that has not fled to Pakistan has taken up residence within the city limits. [redacted]

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Improved intelligence has been crucial to Soviet and Afghan regime efforts. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted] Convoys subsidized by Red Crescent during the past few months have had high attrition rates, apparently because Soviet and regime forces received forewarning of their planned routes and times of departure. [redacted]

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The most notable KHAD success in co-opting tribal elements is Ismatullah Achekzai, who defected to the regime with his men in early 1985. Ismatullah succeeded throughout much of 1986 in impeding the flow of insurgent supplies through the Spin Buldak area of southern Qandahar. [redacted]

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[redacted]

We believe that, for the most part, Soviet and Afghan regime successes in co-opting border tribes are likely to be short lived. To a large extent the tribes in the areas, through which many insurgent supply routes to Qandahar transit, show no loyalty to either side. They offer their services to the highest bidder. [redacted]

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The Soviets also stepped up their ambush operations by increasing their deployment of Special Purpose Forces—whose primary assignment is road interdiction—to the Qandahar area. [redacted]

[redacted] of [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Impact of Soviet Interdiction Efforts in Qandahar Area

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The Office of Soviet Analysis believes [redacted] that Soviet and Afghan efforts to reduce insurgent activity in and around Qandahar have had more effect than is reflected in this article. [redacted]

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[redacted] new security posts had nearly closed off access and retreat routes, causing many insurgents to withdraw from the city and nearby villages. Soviet and Afghan attacks on insurgent base camps have led many groups to move farther from the city. Insurgent countermeasures are both costly and time consuming. Although judging whether the level of insurgent activity in the area has been reduced is difficult, analysis shows that Soviet ground force activity levels in the Qandahar area are some 60 percent less than in 1985. Although Soviet units from other parts of Afghanistan frequently participated in local operations in 1985, operations in 1986 have been conducted exclusively by the single Qandahar-based Soviet brigade and Afghan regime troops. This is a sign that the Soviets may not perceive the insurgent threat to be as great this year as in the past. Given these developments, it is premature to suggest that the situation is likely to improve in 1987. Even if the insurgents receive more and better air defense weapons, these will have only a limited effect on Soviet interdiction strategy, which relies on a combination of mining, outposts, small-unit ambushes, and air attacks. [redacted]

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Insurgent Countermeasures

The insurgents have adopted a number of countermeasures during the past year to reduce the risk of interdiction. Resistance convoys now travel more at night and vary their routes. They also make greater use of secondary dirt roads. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] the Soviets have concentrated their efforts north of Qandahar city [redacted]

The insurgents have also placed increased reliance on camels and other pack animals. Camels often are preferred because of their better capability in difficult terrain, [redacted]

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[redacted] Camels can also be used in winter when it is impossible for trucks to move through the snow. Some roads are not passable by truck or jeep in any weather. The animals are also less vulnerable to landmines, and pack animal convoys are less easily spotted by Soviet units patrolling at night. [redacted]

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[Redacted]

Some insurgent commanders also complain about delays and inefficiencies in the arms allocation system. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

commander's success is determined by his personal connections, social and tribal origins, and political loyalties. The process can take as long as five months, and on some occasions commanders do not even receive the quantities and types of weapons originally promised to them. [Redacted]

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Nevertheless, we believe that the insurgents' adaptations in strategy and the overall increase in availability of supplies for all insurgent groups in Afghanistan this year enabled most groups in Qandahar to receive sufficient materiel to maintain a high level of activity in 1986 and to prevent Soviet and Afghan regime forces from consolidating control over the city and the surrounding area. [Redacted]

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To protect their arms caches against Soviet air attacks, commanders have been careful not to concentrate their stores of weapons in one place. Many insurgent leaders in Qandahar followed the example of Comdr. Mula Malang of the Hizbi Islami (Khalis) Party and established base camps in the rugged valleys near Chenartu, approximately 90 kilometers east of Qandahar city. [Redacted]

Outlook

Despite adjustments by the insurgents, some logistic difficulties—particularly financial constraints—are likely to continue in Qandahar. Greater reliance on pack animals will increase the demand for camels and donkeys and may lead to even higher transportation costs unless more animals are made available. To cover these costs, resistance groups may be forced to divert money from other purposes, such as food and support of the civilian population, reducing insurgent effectiveness. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Insurgent Constraints

Despite their adjustments, insurgent commanders in Qandahar still face several constraints to keeping their fighters well supplied. The depopulation of much of the countryside has reduced the amount of support insurgents can expect from the local population. Resistance groups now must devote more of their supply caravans to bringing in food and other necessities that they could formerly obtain locally. Although those groups with access to the bazaars in Qandahar city can still obtain food and other items, prices have risen considerably, [Redacted]

Still, we believe that some steps being taken by the insurgents should have a positive impact on the supply situation and overall insurgent performance. For example, greater acquisition and effective utilization of air defense weapons—such as surface-to-air missiles and Stingers—by the resistance will almost certainly reduce the threat of Soviet air interdiction efforts. Furthermore, increased cooperation among insurgent groups in their efforts to keep supply routes open may lead to greater cooperation in combat operations against the Soviets. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

In addition, although the Soviets have demonstrated that by concentrating their forces they can place severe pressure on insurgent supply routes to Qandahar, they probably cannot maintain this pressure long enough to have a decisive impact on resistance capabilities because of the relatively small number of Soviet forces in the area and the poor performance of Afghan regime troops who man the outposts. Even if supply routes from Pakistan became impassable, some insurgent commanders in Qandahar believe they could remain active for a number of years, although at a reduced level, by relying on captured arms and munitions. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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Afghanistan: The Fall of Farkhar

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Panjsher Valley Commander Masood's capture of the Afghan army garrison at Farkhar on 21 August was a major step in the insurgent leader's campaign to increase the tempo of the war in northern Afghanistan and marked the first successful offensive deployment of Masood's central units, the multiethnic, specially trained groups that he has been developing over the past year. The attack demonstrates both Masood's ability to bring together insurgent units from several northern provinces and his growing influence and power outside his home base in the Panjsher.




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The Opponents



Ministry of State Security, police, and other regime officials were also stationed at Farkhar. There were no Soviet advisers.



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Uneven Execution

In the initial attack against the garrison, the insurgents captured all but one of the main bases and one of the security outposts,




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The assault resumed the next morning following a meeting between Masood and his commanders to discuss tactics.



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Preparations



¹ Central units are 25-man multiethnic, highly trained units with insurgents drawn from different provinces. They are expected to operate throughout the north as autonomous units as well as to join for conventional assaults against high-value targets.

² Mobile groups are 30-man elite units that are drawn from and operate in their own region. They have a specialty such as convoy attacks.

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Press reports indicate resistance booty included a 76-mm field gun and over 70 tons of foodstuffs. Masood's forces suffered only five killed and eight wounded, according to press reports. Masood's success at Farkhar apparently encouraged him to go ahead with a similar—and equally successful—attack on an Afghan garrison at Nahrin in mid-November.

[Redacted]

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Looking Ahead

Masood will almost certainly be looking for similar targets to attack this winter. He will want to build on his military success to enhance his political standing throughout the north. Masood's willingness to minimize his own role in the planning and implementation of these attacks and allow local leaders to take the credit will probably ease some of the frictions that have inhibited insurgent operations in the north in the past.

[Redacted]

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The Panjsher Valley commander's careful planning, skillful use of intelligence, and relatively sophisticated tactics underscore his reputation as perhaps the most effective insurgent commander. His operations at Farkhar, Nahrin, and, last year, at Peshghowr demonstrate that he has made a start toward building the kind of national guerrilla army that he has talked about.

[Redacted]

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Farkhar and Nahrin demonstrate the continued vulnerability of isolated Afghan army garrisons and show that the army is still plagued by poor morale, ineffective leadership, and dependence on Soviet air and artillery. The absence of Soviet or Afghan regime air support at Farkhar indicates that regime air resources are too limited to defend remote outposts and that the Soviets are not willing to take over that role.

[Redacted]

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**Near East and
South Asia Brief**

India-Sri-Lanka

Sri Lankans Arrested for Bombing in South India [redacted]

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According to Indian press reports, nine Sri Lankan Sinhalese—members of that island’s majority ethnic community—were arrested in India early this month for suspected involvement in the bombing of a rail line in Madurai, south India. Police speculate this group may be the same one that bombed the residence of a prominent Sri Lankan Tamil dissident leader in Madras, India, earlier this year. Police officers said that some of the arrested were retired Sri Lankan police personnel. [redacted]

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The nine arrested Sinhalese—including four women—may have been operating at the direction of Sri Lankan intelligence or possibly on orders from the Sri Lankan High Commissioner in Madras, who has been implicated in anti-Indian activities in the past. The railway bombing is the first instance we have seen of Sri Lankan Sinhalese saboteurs attacking Indian targets. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted] Madurai is a likely target for future Sinhalese efforts to disrupt arms consignments to the Tamil insurgents. [redacted]

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