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Near East and South Asia Review



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Articles

Libyan Aid to Sudan: Now You See It



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Egypt: Facing the Drug Threat



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Egypt is an increasingly significant drug-consuming country and an important transit point for narcotics moving west from the Golden Triangle and Golden Crescent. Although Egypt's antinarcotics effort has had only limited success in its first year, Cairo probably remains committed to an aggressive antidrug program.



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Afghanistan in July



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Combat activity remained at fairly high levels through July as Soviet and Afghan regime forces continued to mount large operations east of Kunduz and in the Shekhabad area between Kabul and Ghazni. Urban fighting continued heavy in Herat and Kabul with an increase in resistance-initiated activity noted.



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Some articles are preliminary views of a subject or speculative, but the contents normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA. Occasionally an article will represent the views of a single analyst; these items will be designated as noncoordinated views.



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Articles

**Libyan Aid to Sudan:
Now You See It**



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The growth in political and economic ties between Libya and Sudan since the fall of President Nimeiri in April 1985 has been erratic, hampered by Libya's irrational behavior in Sudan and Khartoum's misgivings about Libya. Nevertheless, as other foreign aid donors have become increasingly reluctant to support Sudan, due in part to the Sudanese Government's foot-dragging in dealing with its economic problems, Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi has continued to look for means to attract Libyan assistance.



Military Assistance. Food, the initial focus, soon gave way to military assistance as the government faced an expanding insurgency in the south and was in desperate need of military supplies. Military assistance, by far the largest portion of Libyan aid, is also the category with the most unfulfilled promises.



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Promised Versus Actual Aid




Although Libya supplied Sudan with a large amount of aid, much more has been promised than given.



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Food. Following the coup in 1985, Libya quickly promised large amounts of food to the drought-stricken western provinces of Sudan. Large quantities of sorghum, powdered milk, wheat, and other goods were sent to the Darfur and Kordofan regions for distribution. The Libyans were initially welcomed as providers of aid to drought victims. Libya insisted on distributing the food directly to the people, raising fears in Khartoum that the Libyans would win the loyalty of the population of the western provinces. These fears proved largely unfounded.



Oil. Libya has been supplying oil to Sudan gratis since the fall of Nimeiri. At least 300,000 metric tons, worth approximately \$60 million, have arrived in Sudan since April 1985. Libya recently informed Sudan, however, that it will no longer supply oil free of charge. The US Embassy in Khartoum reports Sudan is asking the Libyans to seek compensation from the resources of Sudanese nationals working in Libya—taking a share of their savings before the money is transferred to Sudan.



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strong stand against Libyan meddling in Khartoum as well as in the western provinces. Libyan cultural centers, for example, are being started to spread Qadhafi's revolutionary doctrines in Sudan.

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Other Aid. Most of what had been promised has not been delivered. Promised items include agricultural goods, medical supplies, student exchange programs, and agreements to share technical expertise in the fields of oil and mineral wealth.



Sudan's Strategy

Insurgent successes in southern Sudan initially drove the Transitional Military Council to seek military aid from any source. Libya was the most generous.

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Fearing a coup attempt because of the extremely low morale in the Army,

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
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the Council brought Libya in as a short-term answer to the problem. A positive effect was seen immediately as Libya began supplying needed equipment and ammunition to the Army.

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Libyan Aims

Libya's involvement in Chad is one of the main reasons Tripoli is courting Sudan so aggressively and focusing on western Sudan. Since November 1985, Libya has supported a large contingent of troops and other personnel in Sudan's western province of Darfur, claiming it needs the approximately 250 large trucks, 54 smaller vehicles, and approximately 1,000 to 1,500 Libyans (mostly military and aid personnel) to guard the food aid being brought in. Sudanese officials have not been permitted to inspect the contents of the vehicles. The trucks are suspected of carrying military equipment for the Chadian rebels.



Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi almost certainly sees ties to Libya as an aid to controlling the southern insurgency, but he also may be turning to Libya to shift Sudanese foreign policy toward nonalignment. Conscious that he may be charged with surrendering to Libyan pressure, the Prime Minister will argue to Western aid donors that the recent departure of Libyan personnel from western Sudan proves that he can use the Libyan connection to Sudan's advantage without coming under Libya's control.

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Outlook

Khartoum probably hopes to maintain and even expand trade relations with Libya. Numerous trade agreements have been signed between the two countries. Libya, though suspect in its promises, probably will continue to deliver some oil and military equipment. With limited export markets for its products, Sudan is always open to new opportunities to sell or barter its goods.

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Another incentive for Libya lies in the possibility of influencing both foreign and domestic Sudanese policy. Sudanese officials have stated that they voted according to Libyan demands at last year's Organization of African Trade Unity conference because Libya paid their conference dues and provided other support.



to the Umma Party in the hope that, if Sadiq al-Mahdi and his party won, he would steer Sudan away from its close ties to Egypt and perhaps move closer to Libya. In Tripoli's view, Libyan support may also deter Sadiq al-Mahdi from taking a

The recent departure of the large contingent of Libyans may have eased the anti-Libyan tensions in Sudan that have become stronger because of Libya's actions in the west and toward Sudan's foreign

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community. As long as Khartoum is mired in civil war and deep economic depression, the Libyan connection will most likely be attractive to the Sudanese Government. If other donors continue to limit their aid commitments to Khartoum, the opportunity for Libya to expand its influence within Sudan will grow.



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**Egypt:
Facing the Drug Threat**



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Egypt is an increasingly significant drug-consuming country and an important transit point for narcotics moving west from the Golden Triangle and Golden Crescent.

Egyptian domestic drug use is traditional, endemic, and increasing, according to Egyptian antinarcotics program officials. Their estimates—probably conservative—suggest that more than 1 million Egyptians regularly use hashish (derived from cannabis), and another 500,000 are regular users of opium, usually taken in hot tea. Although both of these products are probably grown in adequate amounts locally to satisfy domestic demand, Cairo notes a rising urban abuser population that is buying increasing amounts of imported refined narcotics and amphetamines.


Egypt has an active antinarcotics program, utilizing sophisticated drug interdiction techniques, severe penalties for drug abuse, and advanced training abroad for antinarcotics officials. Nevertheless,

estimate that at least 300 tons of hashish and 12 tons of opium were smuggled into Egypt in 1985. Estimates

this summer suggest that in 1986 opium cultivation has increased slightly, heroin use is only minimally down over last year, and for the first time cocaine abuse is increasing at a measurable rate.

Fighting Drugs' Debilitating Influences

Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak began restricting drug trafficking last fall to reduce the debilitating influence of the growing narcotics trade on the national economy and state security.




Cairo's Antinarcotics Team—A Scorecard

The responsibility for Egypt's antidrug effort is split between two powerful ministries, Interior and Defense. Interior's Antinarcotics General Administration ostensibly has responsibility for coordinating the overall program and a specific

mandate for enforcing antinarcotics laws in the urban areas of the country. The Ministry of Defense directs more than 17,000 men divided between the Coast Guard and Border Guard and has the primary responsibility for interdiction on the high seas and on Egypt's borders.

The two programs are in direct competition for scarce monetary and personnel resources. Efforts to create a national narcotics coordinating body earlier this year were apparently sabotaged by the Interior and Defense Ministers, both of whom believed they would lose personal prestige and bureaucratic power if their antidrug duties were brought under the control of a higher body.

We believe Mubarak—who has received disturbing reports from Egyptian security officials—fears that domestic dissident groups and antiregime elements rely on narcotics trafficking for significant financial support.



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death penalty. Recently, US-style laws regarding seizure of assets and property have been introduced as well, according to US Embassy accounts 

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A prime feature of Cairo's antinarcotics initiative has been a new willingness to cooperate with international efforts to apprehend and prosecute drug traffickers. A top spokesman for the Egyptian Foreign Ministry, for example, told visiting US officials earlier this year that the antinarcotics campaign is a model for bilateral cooperation and an example of "symmetry of goals" between the two countries. The spokesman noted that Cairo's support for an international convention against narcotics was virtually identical to the US stand on the issue, and that Egypt was grateful for US backing in its effort to be a candidate for a seat on the UN Commission for Narcotic Drugs.

In our judgment, Cairo fears that drug traffickers are creating dangerous international ties and are growing increasingly autonomous. By transshipping large amounts of drugs from heroin- and hashish-producing regions elsewhere in the Middle East to consumers in the West, traffickers have forged strong links to criminal groups outside the country. The large amounts of money involved in this trade and the widespread foreign connections necessary to handle illegal drugs have put local Egyptian traffickers in contact with international terrorist organizations, syndicated crime, and, ironically, Islamic fundamentalist groups.



Egypt has used antinarcotics cooperation as an opener in discussions with other countries as well. 

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Egyptian Interior Minister Maj. Gen. Zaki Badr—who has major responsibility for the national antinarcotics program—told the Cairo press in June that Egypt and Italy would explore ways to cooperate in reducing drug traffic between the two countries and would devise a system to share strategic antinarcotics information. We believe Cairo is committed to these cooperative efforts and values the opportunity to appear as an equal player in international events as much as the contribution they make in reducing drug trafficking in the region.

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Harsh Measures Against Drug Traffickers

Cairo is attempting to break drug trafficker-criminal networks with a multifaceted program of better narcotics interdiction, stricter enforcement, stringent punishment for narcotics traffickers and abusers, and a national public awareness effort. Beginning last October, according to US Embassy officials in Cairo, Egypt began a well-publicized national antinarcotics campaign that has involved the national media and the major political opposition groups. Last spring, Mubarak announced plans for a national narcotics coordination council, which has yet to be instituted. The call for tougher enforcement was supported by an announcement that anyone in possession of even a modest amount of heroin or hashish would face the



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**Pulling in the Mullahs:
An Islamic Response to Drugs**

We believe Mubarak is sensitive to opposition charges that his administration is too secular and insufficiently committed to basic Islamic goals, and he has turned to the government's antinarcotics

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


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program as a convenient means to boost his Muslim credentials. Mubarak's initial media appearances emphasized the immorality of drug use, tied narcotics to the corrupting influences of the West, and identified abusers as being under the effect of "new wealth." Major papers carried editorials lauding the government for its new initiative, singled out Mubarak as the prime mover behind the program, and highlighted colorful accounts of an imam leading an enraged crowd of Cairenes in an attack on a local drug dealer. 


than Egyptian nationals, may suggest that Cairo is unwilling to follow through on promises of thorough investigations and severe punishments. 


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Nevertheless, Egypt is publicly committed to eradicating drug abuse and trafficking and therefore is a potentially valuable partner for cooperative US antinarcotics programs in the region. Although President Mubarak's personal commitment to antidrug efforts may be tempered by his need to avoid antagonizing politically important segments of society, leading Egyptian officials have told US representatives that Mubarak values US involvement in the country's antinarcotics efforts and the opportunity it affords him to demonstrate publicly Washington's support for his government. 

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According to press accounts, Mubarak has been successful in finding respected Egyptian legal scholars to support his Islamic approach to the antinarcotics campaign. Within a month of the announcement of the program last fall, Cairo dailies carried large numbers of articles by leading Muslim judges from around the country endorsing the need to hang traffickers, citing justifications from Koranic commentaries. Cairo's largest daily, *al-Ahram*, ran a weeklong series of items last October summarizing studies done for the World Health Organization by leading Egyptian doctors and theologians on using the influence of the mosque in preventing and treating drug abuse. 

Although Egypt's antinarcotics effort has had only limited success in its first year, Cairo probably remains committed to an aggressive antidrug program. We believe Mubarak receives enough political benefit from the generally popular program to maintain his identification with the effort, at least for the foreseeable future. Cairo will, in our judgment, continue to seek opportunities to publicize its antidrug initiatives in international forums and to keep antinarcotics cooperation as a prominent part of its overall foreign policy strategy. 

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Outlook and Opportunities for the United States

Although Cairo is well into the first year of its aggressive antinarcotics effort, there are signs that the program has flaws Mubarak may be unable—or unwilling—to remedy:



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- Corruption is endemic in the Egyptian bureaucracy. For drug traffickers to move the volume of narcotics through the country that Cairo has claimed, dealers must pay officials at each level, yet this problem is not addressed in the current offensive.



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- Although at least 28 traffickers have been sentenced to death, none has been executed. This, and the fact that most of the condemned are foreigners rather

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Afghanistan in July 


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Combat activity remained at fairly high levels through July as Soviet and Afghan regime forces continued to mount large operations east of Kunduz and in the Shekhabad area between Kabul and Ghazni. Soviet and Afghan regime forces tightened their grip around Qandahar by establishing over a dozen new posts around the city. Urban fighting continued heavy in Herat and Kabul with an increase in resistance-initiated activity noted. Afghan Army manpower and equipment problems show no signs of being solved in the near future, and the regime initiated a special revolutionary tribunal that sentenced prominent insurgent leaders to death for "crimes against the government." 





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Regime Tightens Its Grip on Qandahar

Soviet and Afghan regime forces tightened their hold on Qandahar during July after the completion of a three-ring security belt around the city. 


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


 over a dozen major mountaintop outposts manned by Soviet and Afghan regime forces have been established northwest, west, south, and southeast of Qandahar City, which now is encircled by over 60 security outposts. These posts have slowed insurgent infiltration to a trickle, have made it difficult for the insurgents to receive material and financial support from within the city, and have placed a major obstacle in the path of important insurgent supply routes. 

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

Large Joint Operations Continue


The second phase of the joint Soviet/Afghan regime operation east of Kunduz 

 This phase was a major logistic operation designed to reinforce and resupply regime garrisons that were critically low on food, fuel, and ammunition, according to satellite photography  the garrisons in Kunduz and Badakhshan Provinces were "starving" and low on fuel. 



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 the resistance is also suffering food shortages and can no longer depend on local food supplies because Soviet retaliatory bombing has ruined agricultural production in Kunduz Province 

The insurgent supply system originating in Qandahar also has taken a beating recently. 


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 proregime militia leader Ismatullah has been recruiting men in the past few weeks to secure a 70-kilometer stretch of highway east of Qandahar on the Qandahar-Qalat highway, which will further disrupt already tenuous supply routes. Soviet and Afghan regime forces launched a major sweep and mining operation near the Pakistani border and closed an important resistance supply route. 

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
 insurgent groups are moving from vehicles to camels to avoid interdiction, but this mode of transport will add to the time and expense of insurgent logistics in the area.

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
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Heavy Urban Fighting Continues

Fighting in the Kabul area increased in the last month as US Embassy sources reported daily occurrences of unexplained explosions, gunfire, and outgoing artillery fire. The US Embassy reports insurgents launched a two-hour coordinated rocket and small-arms attack against the Soviet Embassy and its environs on 16 July, demonstrating the resistance's ability to occasionally put even the most secure facilities under military pressure. Resistance rocket attacks against Soviet installations at Khair Khana and Darulaman continued into late July and early August, according to the US Embassy. US Embassy sources indicate insurgent forces recently overran five or six Soviet and Afghan regime posts in the Paghman area, resulting in strenuous counterefforts to dislodge the resistance.



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Heavy fighting continued in Herat through most of July as major elements of a Soviet motorized rifle division and local regime units reinforced by units outside the province attempted to clear the city of insurgents. Soviet and Afghan regime forces apparently had secured the city by the fourth week in July when Soviet units were noted returning to garrison and Afghan party chief Najibullah visited the area.

Afghan Army Manpower and Equipment Problems Continue

Despite tough new draft laws and increased regime efforts at conscription, the Army has made no progress in resolving its serious manpower shortage. The problem may be insoluble. The US Embassy reports that armed conscription teams have patrolled Kabul since the mid-June draft decree to round up every available young man. The new recruitment regulations are designed to provide 19,500 men for three new infantry divisions to be formed by October 1986. These manpower goals, however, are excessively optimistic, and Najibullah, in a speech to the regime women's organization, admitted that the callup is "not working well," and that dissensions are continuing.

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The Army continued to have equipment problems during the past month. Air Force pilots are refusing to fly SU-22 aircraft because there have been several crashes that they believe are the result of faulty design. Although the problem probably is the result of a lack of pilot experience, the incident illustrates the lack of confidence regime pilots have for Soviet equipment.

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Increased Insurgent Activity

An increase in insurgent-initiated activity was noted during July with a larger number of convoy ambushes and facility attacks noted.



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Tried in Absentia

The latest development in Najibullah's get-tough policy toward the insurgency is the convening of a special revolutionary tribunal that has tried in absentia and sentenced to death several prominent insurgent commanders, including Ahmad Shah Masood, Ismail Khan, and Jalaluddin Haqqani. For months the regime has tried in vain to secure a cease-fire with Masood, and this latest action may be

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designed not only to force these insurgents to consider a cease-fire but also to intimidate other insurgent commanders to seek an accommodation with the regime. 

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Outlook

Soviet and Afghan regime forces probably will maintain their siege of Qandahar City, making it increasingly difficult, but not impossible, for the insurgents to conduct operations there. Most Soviet and Afghan operations nationwide will continue to be small, local operations, but the pattern of large operations launched about every month and using airborne troops and a heavy emphasis on artillery probably will continue. Regime attempts to solve the Army's manpower problem probably are doomed to failure. 

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
The resistance almost certainly will not enjoy the unrestricted freedom of movement and administrative control in Qandahar City that they have had in the past, although Qandahar will continue to be the scene of heavy fighting for the foreseeable future. Although the resistance has not scored dramatic victories over the past month, the current pattern of steady, unending, guerrilla pressure will continue to undermine regime efforts to control the country. Insurgent logistics will continue to be problematic, especially for those supplies originating from the Qandahar area, with deliveries of supplies taking longer and costing more as insurgents seek to avoid interdiction. 

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