



Directorate of
Intelligence

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Near East and South Asia Review



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29 August 1986

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Articles

Morocco: Increasing Counterterrorist Measures [Redacted]

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King Hassan's meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Peres has increased the odds that Moroccan counterterrorist forces may have to respond to attacks from Middle Eastern terrorists. Although capable, these forces have not been tested by an actual terrorist crisis. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Syria: Countering the Israeli Air Force [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Since the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, Damascus has intensified its efforts to develop its capability to challenge the Israeli Air Force. Despite improvements, Damascus almost certainly could not prevent the Israelis from rapidly attaining air superiority in the event of a major conflict. [Redacted]

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Iran's Bazaar Merchants: Challenging Regime Policies

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Many Iranian bazaar merchants oppose government efforts to increase supervision and regulation of the economy and have responded by electing more conservative, traditional-minded clerics to the Majles, Iran's parliament. The success of the *bazaaris'* efforts and the deteriorating economy have forced the government to compromise on key issues.

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The Sunni Islamic Call Party: Developing Political Interests

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The Sunni Islamic Call Party is a worldwide organization of fundamentalist Muslims whose primary goals have been religious education and reconversion, but some branches in the Arab Gulf states are showing signs of politization and adopting goals similar to those of other fundamentalist groups.

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Saudi Arabia-Pakistan: Strains in the Relationship

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The close Saudi-Pakistani relationship is being strained by diverging economic and regional interests that are rooted in the Iran-Iraq war, the phasing out of Pakistani troops seconded to the Saudi armed forces, and Pakistan's perception that Saudi Arabia has failed to honor its aid commitments.

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Implications of Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Capabilities: Potential Military Requirements

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If India and Pakistan acquire nuclear weapons, they will face new defense requirements as well. Both will probably seek to augment their conventional forces as well as deploy nuclear forces.

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Pakistan: Narcotics Press Coverage Falls Short

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The Pakistan Narcotics Control Board is attempting to focus media attention on drugs to raise public awareness of the threat, but analysis of the Pakistani press during the first quarter of 1986 indicates that this program is making little progress.

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Some articles are preliminary views of a subject or speculative, but the contents normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA. Occasionally an article will represent the views of a single analyst; these items will be designated as noncoordinated views.

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Near East and South Asia Review [Redacted]

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Articles

Morocco: Increasing Counterterrorist Measures [Redacted]

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King Hassan's meeting in July with Israeli Prime Minister Peres has increased the odds that Moroccan counterterrorist forces may have to respond to attacks from Middle Eastern terrorists sponsored by Syria or Libya. US Government observers assess Morocco's security forces as capable, but these forces have not been tested by an actual terrorist crisis such as a hijacking, a hostage-taking, or an assassination attempt against the King. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

In addition, the Moroccan National Police maintains a small, well-trained SWAT team taught by French and West German instructors. This unit is responsible for maintaining liaison with US Embassy security in Rabat. Like the Gendarmerie units, it probably would support the Atlas Commandos. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Expansion of Royal Security Service
Hassan recently ordered the Royal Security Service—charged with protecting the King and the royal family—to expand its functions. [Redacted]
[Redacted] the first group of Security Service officers is in France receiving training in counterintelligence and technical operations, intelligence collection and analysis, crowd control, and security escort functions. In the past the Royal Security Service has depended on other Moroccan security services for such support. [Redacted]
this move is not an attempt to duplicate the functions of the existing Internal Security Service or National

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
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Police. It is more likely an effort by Hassan to gain better control of Morocco's broad security and intelligence network. [redacted]

Active External Cooperation

Morocco has openly advocated better cooperation among the Arab states to counter terrorism. King Hassan succeeded in obtaining a general condemnation of terrorism at the extraordinary Arab League summit meeting in Casablanca in August 1985—no small accomplishment, given the Arab political dilemma in distinguishing between "terrorism" and the Palestinian "armed struggle" against Israel. In a well-publicized address to the Council of Arab Interior Ministers in Casablanca last February, the King called for a better regional exchange of information on counterterrorism. We have no evidence that this proposal has been taken up by the Arab League. [redacted]



Heightened Terrorist Threat

Terrorist attacks on Moroccan targets from radical Palestinian groups probably represent the greatest threat to Moroccan interests in the wake of the Hassan-Peres meeting. Syria has publicly sanctioned anti-Hassan operations as legitimate acts of pan-Arab resistance. [redacted]



Hassan's persistence in maintaining the union with Tripoli probably bought him time against Libyan-directed terrorism. Even before the meeting with Peres, the threat from Libya was increasing, and Moroccan security officials stepped up the monitoring

of local Libyan activities. Moreover, the lukewarm nature of Hassan's support for Libya following the US military strike last April, along with more numerous joint US-Moroccan military exercises, had already increased the possibility that Libya may eventually support a terrorist attack by some of its radical Palestinian clients. Even without Libyan prompting, radical Palestinian groups that Tripoli supports and that strongly oppose Hassan's efforts to further an Arab-Israeli peace settlement could independently mount attacks. [redacted]

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Although Morocco strongly supports pro-Arafat Palestinians and clearly distinguishes between them and radical elements, the possibility of terrorist reprisals has raised Moroccan concern about the potential threat from local Palestinian residents. [redacted] some Palestinians who publicly criticized the Hassan-Peres meeting were warned by the police to cease their activities or face expulsion. Morocco also has tightened visa requirements for Palestinians entering the country. [redacted]

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Morocco undoubtedly would prefer not to expel Palestinians and probably imposed restrictions as a warning that it would not tolerate criticism of Hassan's strategy. Presumably to assuage PLO sensitivities, the Palestinian official was told that these restrictions were temporary until current "tensions" subsided. [redacted]

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Reducing Vulnerabilities

US officials in Morocco believe that security at the Casablanca International Airport may be better than at most West European airports of equal size and use. Last October a US Federal Aviation Agency survey team found that security at the airport was adequate for the threat level perceived at that time. Moroccan officials have requested FAA assistance in conducting seminars on airline security practices. Since the survey, US Embassy officers in Rabat report that passenger security screening procedures at the airport have been tightened. [redacted]

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
Morocco is paying considerable attention to stopping the widespread use of forged Moroccan passports. Security officials have begun issuing new passports

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that they claim are much more difficult to forge. They also have produced a guide of known passport forgeries for use by Western security services. It is too early to tell how effective these measures will be in stopping the production of counterfeit passports. [redacted]

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Future Targets

Like Jordan last year—when King Hussein was taking an active role in the Arab-Israeli peace process—Morocco may pay a price for its recent political gestures to Israel by becoming a primary target of terrorists. Morocco's intensified security efforts appear sound, however, and may hinder attacks. If so, terrorist groups may attempt reprisals against Moroccan diplomats and economic interests abroad where access to targets is easier. Jordanian diplomats and airline offices in Europe, for instance, were key targets of Abu Nidal in 1985. [redacted]

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Late last year Rabat's growing concern that its embassies could be attacked prompted preliminary steps to augment security overseas. Surveys of the physical security of its missions were conducted in West European cities where the threat from Moroccan dissidents was perceived as high, and plans were made to increase the number of security personnel. [redacted]

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[redacted] It is not known whether any of the recommendations stemming from the surveys were implemented. Even if they were, such limited measures probably would be inadequate to foil all plots by such determined and proven groups as Abu Nidal or the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. [redacted]

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Syria: Countering the Israeli Air Force

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Since the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982, when the Syrian Air Force was thoroughly drubbed, Damascus has intensified its efforts to develop its capability to challenge the Israeli Air Force. With considerable assistance from the USSR, Syria has modernized its command and control network, increased its electronic warfare capabilities, reorganized and reequipped its air defense force, and modernized the equipment in and begun to improve the operations of its Air Force. Despite improvements, continuing deficiencies in equipment and training are such that Damascus almost certainly could not prevent the Israelis from rapidly attaining air superiority in the event of a major conflict.

Assad's Strategy

Trained as an Air Force officer in the USSR, President Assad has undoubtedly been heavily influenced by Soviet doctrine and probably regards air and air defense forces as subsidiary to the ground forces. In planning for a surprise attack to recover the Golan Heights, he recognizes that Israel would try to buy time to mobilize its ground forces by using its Air Force aggressively to cut off the battlefield and provide close air support. As a former pilot, Assad undoubtedly appreciates the time, expense, and risks that would be required in enabling the Syrian Air Force to counter the Israelis—especially in air-to-air combat.

Consequently, in preparing for a war with Israel, President Assad probably is counting on reducing the Israelis' margin of superiority and freedom of action, but he probably is not aiming to put the Syrian Air Force on a par with the Israelis'. Instead, Damascus probably intends to use electronic warfare and limited airstrikes to disrupt Israeli operations, while relying on its air defense missiles and air-to-air fighters to wage a battle of attrition. In fighting as much as possible on the defensive, Assad would hope to delay the Israeli Air Force from attaining air superiority over the battlefield and prevent it from massively attacking Syria's economic infrastructure.

Improving Command and Control

Although Syria's early warning and ground control intercept system in June 1982 consisted of a dense network of radar sites and automatic or semiautomatic data links, much of the equipment was obsolescent. Since then, the Soviets have supplied considerable new equipment to improve the system's speed and accuracy and reduce its vulnerability to Israeli electronic countermeasures.

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Deliveries of late-model radars have enabled the Syrians to expand and modernize their early warning/ground control intercept system, increasing overlapping coverage and reducing the effects of terrain masking. In particular, the addition of the new Tin Shield to the three main Syrian radar centers has improved Damascus's ability to detect and track low-flying targets, including cruise missiles and reconnaissance drones. The Tin Shield is also designed to be much less susceptible to jamming than older Soviet radars.

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The Soviets have especially emphasized improving the links in Syria's command and control system, trying to stop the Israelis from isolating parts of Syria's air and air defense forces, and then defeating them in detail. In addition to providing more semiautomatic equipment to relay air surveillance data from radar centers to command posts, the Soviets have used a fully automatic system, the Vektor-II, to interconnect the three central defense command posts with the major air defense missile brigades. The Vektor-II is jam resistant and enables brigade command posts to control battalion fire-control radars remotely. To reduce the vulnerability of Syrian ground-to-air communications, the Soviets delivered additional Markham equipment, which enables a ground controller to provide a fighter-interceptor pilot with a reliable readout of the course, speed, and bearing of his target.

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
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Tin Shield in operation near Tiyas Airfield, Syria



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Enhancing Electronic Warfare Capabilities

After the disastrous air battles four years ago in which the Israelis jammed Syrian air and air defense radars and thoroughly disrupted air-to-ground communications, Damascus realized that electronic warfare could be an effective adjunct to conventional combat. Consequently, the Syrians began to rapidly expand their inventory of electronic equipment to support their naval as well as air and air defense forces. As they added to their holdings, the Syrians concentrated on acquiring command and control equipment, and they now have a dense, well-integrated electronic warfare system.

In expanding their electronic warfare holdings, the Syrians have relied principally on the Soviets and their East European allies for equipment, but they also used scarce hard currency to purchase key items from Western suppliers:

- The Soviets have provided a number of the modern AKUP-22 systems to control the activities of ground-based jammers that operate against aircraft radars as well as exporting a number of jammers, which are just beginning to enter service in their own forces.
- The Czechoslovaks have supplied three Ramona-M passive detection and tracking systems, which are located in southwestern Syria to provide overlapping

coverage of aircraft flying over the eastern Mediterranean Sea, Israel, and Jordan.

- The Syrians have acquired five Italian-made electronic surveillance systems that collect against ground-based radars, and they have purchased a number of French- and British-made communications and radar jammers to complement their inventory of Soviet equipment.

Although the Syrians have given priority to training as well as to acquiring more equipment, they have encountered problems in operating and maintaining their electronic warfare system. Part of Syria's difficulties are attributable to its rapid expansion of electronic warfare capabilities, which has been proceeding concurrently with efforts to modernize the air and air defense forces, but

most of the problems stem from lackluster leadership by the Alawite officers in charge of training and poor Soviet instructors. There is an acute lack of training materials, and the Soviets teach through interpreters and do not mingle with the students.

Revitalizing the Air Defense Force

Although Syria had a large air defense force in 1982, the Israeli Air Force vividly exposed Syrian weaknesses in equipment, training, and command. In

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addition to providing more communications equipment to improve the Syrian air defense force's data-handling capabilities, the Soviets have apparently pushed to decentralize command and control as well as expand their deliveries of surface-to-air missile equipment. [redacted]

Much as the Syrian Army has created three corps to better control its growing number of units, the Syrian air defense force has created a divisional air defense echelon. One division is apparently responsible for air defense operations in southern Syria and Lebanon; the other controls activities in Syria north of the Greater Damascus area. Although the divisions apparently do not have operational control over tactical air defense units, [redacted] they are responsible for overseeing training and maintenance. [redacted]

Deliveries of new surface-to-air missile systems have allowed Syria to expand and modernize its air defense system, increasing the density of coverage and complicating an Israeli attack. In addition to delivering at least one battalion of SA-13 heat-seeking tactical missiles and outfitting two regiments with SA-8 tactical missiles, which are both new to the Israelis, the Soviets have been gradually reequipping Syria's SA-6 tactical air defense regiments with a new missile that is faster and more maneuverable than earlier versions. The SA-6 units constitute the bulk of Syria's tactical missile force, [redacted]

By far the most significant addition to Syria's inventory has been the receipt of the SA-5 in 1983, which marked the first time it had been exported. The two SA-5 complexes were initially manned and controlled by the Soviets, but the Syrians gradually supplanted Soviet operators and technicians and assumed control in the spring of 1985. Although the system is not well suited in defending against low-flying aircraft, its long range enables Syria to fire at targets flying over Israel, Jordan, and the eastern

Mediterranean. In time of war this would give Damascus the ability to disrupt the Israelis' reconnaissance and command and control operations. [redacted]

Despite increased deliveries of modern air defense equipment, the Syrian air defense force contains a large amount of obsolescent surface-to-air missiles, [redacted]

[redacted] President Assad's drive to improve the quality of his surface-to-air missile weaponry is well founded because the receipt of modern equipment has done far more to enhance Syria's combat capabilities than mere increases in order of battle. This judgment is supported by a comparison of quantitative and qualitative trends using two different systems for measuring force effectiveness—one developed by The Analytic Sciences Corporation (TASC) and one used by the Soviets, which we call combat potential. [redacted]

Modernizing the Air Force

Paralleling developments in the air defense force, the Syrians have introduced a division echelon into their Air Force organization—one for the northern sector and one for the southern. The introduction of a division echelon and the expanded use of the Markham data transmission system are attempts to correct command and control problems and reduce the vulnerability of Syrian fighters to Israeli jamming. [redacted]

As a result of the lopsided aerial combat in June 1982, the Soviets were forced to replace a large number of Syrian aircraft. In so doing, they belatedly acknowledged the Israelis' wide margin of superiority in air-to-air combat and began to supply Damascus with some of their best equipment:

- Since the debacle over Lebanon, the Soviets have exported two squadrons of MIG-23MLDs and a squadron of MIG-25PDs. The MIG-23MLD is the

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
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SYRIAN SAM FORCES TRENDS




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latest version of the Flogger fighter, and the MIG-25PD is the newest model Foxbat interceptor. Both are equipped with improved radars that are more difficult to jam and can detect targets quicker and at greater ranges than those on earlier models.

- They have also begun to export improved air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles and continued to ship additional late-model SU-22 Fitter fighter-bombers, enhancing the firepower and deep-strike capabilities of the Syrian Air Force.
- To support the operations of the Syrian Air Force, the Soviets have stationed an electronic warfare squadron outside Damascus. The squadron is equipped with a variety of late-model reconnaissance and jamming helicopters, including one variant that has yet to be seen with Soviet forces in Eastern Europe. 

Because of the introduction of more new aircraft, the Syrians have thoroughly modernized their fighter

force, with qualitative improvements far outpacing quantitative gains. The continuing growth of the Syrian Air Force coupled with the need to train additional pilots and replace those lost fighting the Israelis, however, has complicated Damascus's efforts to improve operational efficiency. 

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
Force has begun to conduct more realistic operations, emphasizing nighttime intercepts with their Foxbat interceptors and antiradar sorties by their SU-22 fighter-bombers. Despite these improvements, the Syrian Air Force continues to be hampered by relying too much on ground controllers to direct fighters to their targets, slavishly adhering to outmoded Soviet air-to-air combat tactics and conducting too little

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QUANTITATIVE VS. QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT IN THE SYRIAN AIR DEFENSE FORCE




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SYRIAN FIGHTER FORCE TRENDS




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QUANTITATIVE VS. QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT IN THE SYRIAN FIGHTER FORCE



[Redacted]

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training.

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aircraft—are apparently stimulating Assad to intensify his efforts to counter the Israelis, indicating that further improvements in Syria's air and air defense capabilities are in the offing.

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[Redacted]

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Outlook

Although Syria has made considerable improvements in the size and quality of its forces, weaknesses in selected areas of equipment as well as in command and training continue to hinder President Assad in his drive to counter the Israeli Air Force. Despite budget cutbacks, the Israelis are continuing to emphasize electronic warfare and are modernizing their inventory, notably through the acquisition later this year of US F-16C/Ds. Two recent shocks—the Israeli shootdown of two MIG-23MLDs last November and the poor performance of Libya's SA-5s against US

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Iran's Bazaar Merchants: Challenging Regime Policies [redacted]

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Many Iranian bazaar merchants oppose government efforts to increase supervision and regulation of the economy and have responded by electing more conservative, tradition-minded clerics to the Majles, Iran's parliament. The success of the *bazaaris'* efforts and the deteriorating economy have forced the government to compromise on several key domestic economic issues. When Khomeini dies, the *bazaaris* may face tougher treatment because he has restrained regime radicals, who see the *bazaaris* as part of the unjust economic order they want to abolish. [redacted]

Background

The *bazaaris* played an important part in bringing the Khomeini regime to power. Outraged at the Shah's efforts to undermine their traditional role and status in Iranian society, the *bazaaris* bankrolled the clerical opposition and helped rally popular support for the revolution. [redacted]

Despite their initial support for the new regime, we believe that a majority of *bazaaris* have been alienated by the ruling clerics' efforts to expand government control over the private sector. The *bazaaris* fear that greater government control will lead to socialism and believe the regime's policies have significantly contributed to Iran's economic problems, according to Iranian press reports. They also resent the Khomeini regime's efforts to regulate their activities. [redacted] government representatives sit on bazaar councils in both large and small cities. These councils set guidelines for price and ration policies and establish punishments for violations. [redacted] the government representatives use bribery, the threat of negative media campaigns, and their control of trade licenses to gain compliance with regime guidelines. They also force the *bazaaris* to make religious contributions directly to the government or to favored clerics. [redacted]

Bazaari Political Reaction

The *bazaaris* are working closely with conservative clerics to counter the regime's policies. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] *bazaaris* are a main source of financial support for conservative clerics. 25X1

This helps offset revenue losses that many conservative clerics have suffered because the regime has channeled religious contributions to progovernment mullahs. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] the *bazaaris* give several hundred thousand dollars a year to the Hojatieh Society, a focus of conservative opposition to regime policies. 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

Iranian press reports indicate that *bazaaris* and conservative clerics worked to elect conservative candidates during the Majles election in 1984. *Bazaaris* threatened progovernment clerics throughout Iran with the loss of tithes and other 25X1

contributions unless they agreed to cooperate with the effort to elect conservatives to the Majles, [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] This effort helped produce a conservative bloc in the Majles of about 90 members, one-third of the total membership. 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

The *bazaaris* and their conservative allies have used their increased strength to challenge the radicals on a range of issues. Press reports indicate this bloc led the Majles to reject four of radical Prime Minister Musavi's Cabinet appointments in 1984, nearly 25X1

forcing the government to resign. They also headed the fight last year against new tax legislation and refused to vote for Musavi's reelection last October despite Khomeini's endorsement. [redacted] 25X1

Bazaaris are also trying to form a broad-based coalition of moderates and conservatives to challenge the radicals' dominance of the executive branch. 25X1

Bazaaris, conservative clerics, and moderates 25X1

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A Portrait of the Bazaar

The bazaar seemed immense. And because it was covered and somewhat dark, expeditions to the bazaar had a solemnity that other forms of shopping lacked. From the outside the bazaar, with its great gates, which were opened in the morning and closed at night, seemed bounded and defined. From the inside it appeared boundless and inexhaustible. It was a place of manufacture as well as sale, and it seemed more like a labyrinth because of its endless turnings, its abrupt changes from retailer to workshop and from alley to avenue. For example, the quiet street where cloth merchants sat among their bolts of material opened onto an avenue where the clatter from the coppersmiths sometimes made it impossible to talk.

To enter the bazaar was to enter a world of slow formalities and quick wits. It was also a world of old, even ancestral, loyalties. In general it was loyalty that directed a customer's steps. Whether it was in the small lane of the jewelers or the spacious, barrel vaulted central avenue of the cloth dealers, shoppers always went to the same merchant in any section, a reliable friend of the family.

The bazaar and the mosque are the two lungs of public life in Iran. Bazaars, like mosques, shrines, and private houses, look inward, psychologically and

architecturally, and more often than not they present bland and unexplained walls to the street outside. Bazaars, however, have a public character that is the antithesis of the privacy of houses. For over a thousand years the bazaar has been recognized by Islamic law as a special arena of human life.

In theory relations between mosque and bazaar are friendly; in practice they sometimes face problems. Merchants have not always liked the justice of the mullah courts (which in turn sometimes have depended on government for the execution of their decrees). Some bazaaris are patrons of forms of popular religious expression which some mullahs disapprove of.

Nonetheless, the religious establishment and the bazaar give each other shape and sustenance. To be successful, especially in commercial dealings over the long term, the merchant has needed the capital of a good reputation as much as he has needed material capital. If a Muslim is to have a good reputation, he must pay taxes to the mosque and seek the spiritual guidance of a mullah.

The Mantle of the Prophet
by Roy Mottahedeh

[Redacted]

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discussed forming a political party to run a candidate in the 1985 presidential election. [Redacted] [Redacted] They planned to recruit technocrats and professionals to their cause. We believe that these groups share the *bazaaris'* desire for better ties to the West and oppose radical proposals for land reform and government control of the economy. Although the plan to form a party apparently never got beyond the talking stage, a well-known bazaar merchant associated with the group was one of only three candidates allowed by the government to run for the presidency. [Redacted]

Evasion of Government Control

Government efforts to monitor and regulate the bazaar have elicited creative countermeasures from the merchants. [Redacted] they have created "shadow" bazaar councils that set bazaar policy without government representatives present. The *bazaaris* have responded to government efforts to institute new taxes by securing religious rulings from senior conservative clerics that such taxes are un-Islamic, [Redacted]

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[redacted] Prime Minister Musavi claimed last May that in 1985 only 3 percent of tax revenues came from self-employed businessmen, far less than what the regime believes should be paid. [redacted]

Bazaaris also have circumvented government controls on prices and profits on a massive scale. Government-supplied goods are regularly diverted to the black market where they bring *bazaaris* several times the official price. [redacted] many merchants keep their expensive products in the back of the shop to avoid detection by government monitors. Wealthy customers are invited to these back rooms to discuss sales, and the purchases are delivered to the customers' residences at night, often by taxi. *Bazaaris* regularly pay off officials and regime clerics to avoid their scrutiny. [redacted]

[redacted] Prominent *bazaaris* have developed a "symbiotic" relationship with local clerics, providing financial support in exchange for noninterference or support. Payoffs are also used to acquire foreign exchange or to permit the sale of items banned as un-Islamic. [redacted]

Government Accommodation

The *bazaaris*' success in the 1984 Majles election and the deteriorating economy have prompted the regime to give stronger public and private support to *bazaari* concerns. Since late 1984, Khomeini's speeches have emphasized the need to limit government interference in the private sector and to respect the role of the bazaar in Iranian society. More recently, the regime appears to be tailoring its economic policies to meet bazaar interests. The Iranian press reports that *bazaaris* now hold seats on committees that formulate trade policy, and last year a prominent *bazaari* headed a delegation to Africa to assess economic opportunities. Iranian diplomatic posts have been instructed to cooperate more closely with bazaar commercial representatives, according to the Iranian press. [redacted]

The regime also has eased its efforts to monitor *bazaari* violations of price controls. The Supreme Judicial Council announced last May that the "price patrols" and the special price oversight board were being disbanded because of *bazaari* complaints that they were hurting business. [redacted]

Outlook

The continuing deterioration in the economy brought on by the war, lower oil prices, and government mismanagement are likely to increase *bazaari* disenchantment with the regime and spur the merchants to play a more aggressive political role. We expect that the *bazaaris* will continue to use their influence to block legislative proposals by the radicals and will try to further reduce restrictions on business. The Majles election in 1988 will provide *bazaaris* an opportunity to increase the size of the conservative bloc and possibly even to force changes in the radical-dominated Cabinet. [redacted]

The *bazaaris* will come under increased attack from radicals once Khomeini is gone. Radicals in the regime already blame the *bazaaris* for profiteering from Iran's problems. We believe Khomeini, despite his sympathy for many of the radicals' policies, is a moderating influence because he fears that domination by the radicals or the conservatives would risk a civil war that could destroy the Islamic republic. After Khomeini dies, no one is likely to have the combination of unquestioned authority and political skills needed to contain the radicals. [redacted]

Over the longer term, the *bazaaris* are likely to face problems similar to those encountered under the Shah. Once the war is over and when oil earnings begin to recover, the regime probably will focus its energies on modernizing and developing Iran's economy, which again will force the bazaar to compete with technocrats and new industrialists who may prove better able to maneuver in a less traditional economic environment. [redacted]

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The Sunni Islamic Call Party: Developing Political Interests [redacted]

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The Sunni Islamic Call Party (SICP) is a worldwide organization of fundamentalist Muslims whose primary goals have been religious education and reconversion. In South Asia and elsewhere outside the Middle East, where competing religions have substantial followings, the SICP seeks to dissuade conversions to other faiths and reconvert Muslims who have left Islam. Although the SICP has stayed clear of political matters in the past, some branches in the Persian Gulf have been calling attention to themselves by adopting goals similar to those of other fundamentalist groups [redacted]

responded, [redacted] by forming a council to govern the Bahraini SICP, with Bihzad as an adviser. [redacted]

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Shifting Focus

SICP branches in the Persian Gulf are beginning to show signs of politization and, as a result, are being pressed by security authorities in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman. [redacted] the stated aims of the Gulf branches are:

The Bahraini branch's woes may have been triggered in 1985 by the activities of Shaykh Muhammad bin Salman Al Khalifa, the younger and unconventional brother of the Amir and Prime Minister. He had been involved in the past with several government opposition groups, and we speculate that his connection with the SICP may have attracted closer scrutiny. The combination of Shaykh Muhammad's public role, speeches promoting violence to close liquor stores, vocal support of Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini, and talks with Shia groups and the Muslim Brotherhood may have carried the SICP too far into the political sphere for Bahraini security authorities to tolerate [redacted]

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- To establish Islamic republics in all the Gulf states.
- To establish Islamic law and stamp out corruption.
- To eradicate foreign influence in Islamic states.
- To compel Muslims to wear Islamic dress.
- To educate the sexes separately.
- To close, and destroy if necessary, all liquor stores and bars. [redacted]

In response to the Bahraini crackdown and pressures elsewhere, the SICP throughout the Gulf has adopted additional precautions to ensure that group activities continue without interruption from government authorities. [redacted] these precautions were discussed during a conference in Kuwait in February 1985 attended by 120 delegates from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, Pakistan, Bahrain, Egypt, and Morocco. The conference adopted the following resolutions:

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Our information on SICP activities in the Gulf is best in Bahrain, where the organization is closely monitored. The group operates legally in Bahrain, but some group members have been deported and others may follow. Difficulties between the party and the Bahraini Government, [redacted] have caused several SICP leadership changes in the past year. Mahmud Yusuf Mahmud Muhammad Bihzad, a Bahraini trader from an influential religious family, took over leadership of the Bahraini branch in July 1985 when the then chief, Abd al-Aziz Shir Muhammad, was deported to Pakistan for unspecified activities promoting the SICP. In late 1985, Bihzad reported to In'am Hassan, world leader of the SICP, that he could not perform his duties because of pressure from Bahraini security authorities. Hassan

- The leader in each country will hold secret meetings with senior members each month to discuss domestic developments.
- Members should be lectured frequently on the need for secrecy, and nothing should be written or recorded.
- Contact with journalists should be avoided.
- When a member attends a lecture for the first time, his name should be announced to the others present to ascertain whether anything adverse is known about him.

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Development of the Sunni Islamic Call Party

The Sunni Islamic Call Party (SICP) was founded in Maiwat, India, in the 1930s by Maulana Muhammad Ilyas, an Indian Muslim who was concerned about the ignorance of Islamic tradition and ritual in his village. His message and demands were simple—daily prayers and respect for fellow Muslims. By the time of his death in 1944, the movement had spread to villages beyond Maiwat, and his son, Maulana Muhammad Yusuf, took over an organization that spread beyond India. Islamic Call world membership is probably now in the millions. [redacted]

The party has established hierarchical regional organizations. Branches in Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates report to the Gulf regional headquarters in Kuwait, which is run by Rashid Haqan and his deputy, Muhammad Miryah. All other countries report to the international headquarters in New Delhi, India, where world leader In'am Hassan resides. [redacted]

The intellectual center of SICP activity is the Raiwind Center in Lahore, Pakistan, run by Jamshayd Muhammad Ali, a Pakistani citizen. The center holds classes, lectures, and conferences, including an annual international SICP conference. Press reports indicate that over 500,000 people attended the annual conference in November 1985. All SICP leaders are trained there, and members from around the world regularly attend events at Raiwind. There is also a separate study center in Lahore, attended by both civilians and military officials. [redacted]

Full-time volunteers spend periods of six months or more in training at Raiwind. When they return to their homelands as preachers, they are organized into groups of 12 to 14 who travel together throughout towns and villages reminding Muslims of their Islamic duties. The SICP does not pay its preachers. Those who heed the call do so at their own expense. This is feasible because the proselytizing membership in most countries is composed mainly of middle- to upper-class faithful. [redacted]

We know little about the SICP's finances but speculate it receives most of its funds from individual contributions. [redacted] the Saudi Government may contribute funds to the SICP even though the group is illegal in Saudi Arabia. The Egyptian branch receives most of its funds from the Islamic World Organization, a Saudi organization that trains and educates religious leaders. [redacted]

The Sunni Islamic Call Party is not to be mistaken for other organizations with similar names. It is known in Arabic as Hizb al-Dawa al-Islamiah as-Sunni and in Farsi as Tablighi Jami'at Islami. It has no association, however, with the Jamiat Islami, a political group in Pakistan, nor is it related to the Shia Dawaa Party. The Islamic Call of Libya is a separate organization. The Saudis support a group known as the Islamic Call Organization, which is an Islamic missionary group similar to, but separate from, the Sunni Islamic Call Party. [redacted]

- Efforts to recruit members of the police and armed forces should be increased. [redacted]

In addition, the conference recommended that the Saudi SICP leader, Muhammad Sa'id, report directly to party headquarters in India and visit regional headquarters in Kuwait every two months to report on party developments in the Gulf. Because Riyadh does not allow unofficial organizations such as the SICP to operate, the conference urged party members visiting

Saudi Arabia to use prearranged codewords in contacting local party members. [redacted]

Links to Other Fundamentalists Groups

The extent to which the SICP is involved with more politicized Islamic fundamentalist groups is not clear, but there have been several reports of contacts:

- Former Bahraini leader Bihzad made unsuccessful overtures to Shias in Bahrain during the fall of 1985, [redacted]

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[Redacted]

governments, and the group's anti-West, antiprogressive attitudes could prove detrimental to development policies in the region [Redacted] the Gulf branches include a large portion of expatriate workers, particularly Egyptians, and security officials worry that the international connections of the SICP could make it difficult to control. [Redacted]

[Redacted] a resolution was adopted at the conference in Kuwait last year urging members to join other fundamentalist groups if invited "to discover their activities and give the impression of unity with them." We believe the SICP will be unable to develop close ties to Shia organizations or the Muslim Brotherhood, however, because of these groups' reluctance to attract additional attention from local security services.

We believe the Gulf SICP leadership's preoccupation with radical fundamentalism will not spread to the general membership, which would probably react negatively to extensive deviation from religious activities. Although other Gulf branches may express sympathy for the plight of the Bahraini branch, we do not believe that their members will become as vocal on political issues as the Bahrainis. Nonetheless, security forces will work to keep the influence of all fundamentalist groups, including the SICP, to a minimum as economies worsen and Islamic panaceas become more appealing. [Redacted]

South Asian Success

The SICP has prospered in South Asia. Press reports estimate that membership in Pakistan is about 500,000 and in the millions in India. Members attribute the organization's popularity to the simplicity of its religious demands. Members are asked to spend an hour a week with the SICP and are required to go to a mosque and pray. The Islamic Call does not actively seek conversions to Islam in South Asia, but [Redacted] it has won some converts in India, where lower caste Hindus are drawn to Islamic claims of social equality. [Redacted]

We do not believe that radicalism will spread to the more populous South Asian branches, where the SICP's growth and popularity are based on the party's simple religious message about the afterlife. Moreover, in India, the SICP's relations with government officials probably would deteriorate quickly if the organization actively solicited conversions of lower caste Hindus to Islam or broadened its activities beyond religious matters. Militant Hindu organizations in India in the past have attacked religious groups suspected of encouraging conversions and would be quick to demand political action by Hindu parties. New Delhi is likely to be increasingly wary of efforts on the part of any religious organization—including the SICP—to recruit members, press a sectarian agenda, and thereby weaken the secular public institutions of India. [Redacted]

The party has established good relations with authorities in India and Pakistan, where its activities are strictly religious. The governments of these two countries have encouraged the SICP in an effort to quell the activities of more radical Islamic fundamentalist groups. Press reports indicate that India particularly favors the SICP because of its nonpolitical nature and readily provides visas for its mobile members. [Redacted]

Outlook

We believe that Gulf security services, worried that the SICP could become a focal point for opposition, will continue to monitor the group for signs of growing politization. The stated objective of the Gulf branches—the institution of Islamic regimes throughout the region—is of concern to all Gulf

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**Saudi Arabia-Pakistan:
Strains in the Relationship** [redacted]

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The close Saudi-Pakistani relationship is being strained by diverging economic and regional interests that are rooted in the Iran-Iraq war, the phasing out of Pakistani troops seconded to the Saudi armed forces, and Pakistan's perception that Saudi Arabia has failed to honor its aid commitments. Such strains are not expected to disrupt the relationship, but in the short term they will hamper joint programs including close cooperation in mutual defense. [redacted]

troops seconded to the kingdom, and the level of Saudi economic and military aid commitments to Pakistan. [redacted]

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Background

Relations between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan developed rapidly after 1979 when Islamabad lost its main financial benefactor with the fall of the Shah of Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan threatened Pakistan's western border. Saudi Arabia feared Soviet designs on the Persian Gulf and worried about the domestic impact of the revolutionary rhetoric emanating from Iran. As a result, the two states drew together to protect their interests. Saudi Arabia looked to Pakistan to augment and train its overarmed and underskilled military forces. Pakistan turned to Saudi Arabia for economic assistance and access to Western military equipment. [redacted]

The Iran-Iraq War

Faced by potentially hostile states to the west and east, Pakistan has tried to maintain good relations with Iran. The two countries are major trading partners, and Pakistan performs maintenance on Iran's commercial air fleet. Pakistan has maintained a neutral attitude toward the Iran-Iraq war and has resisted Saudi entreaties to deploy Pakistani troops in Iraq, referring to earlier treaties between Iran and Pakistan. President Zia-ul-Haq has told the Saudis that Pakistani troops will not be allowed to do battle with any Islamic country. [redacted]

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Pakistani Troops in the Kingdom

Both Saudi and Pakistani officials have expressed displeasure with the status of the Pakistani troops in the kingdom. The Saudis are uncertain about the loyalty and the overall quality of the troops and are concerned about their expense. [redacted] many of the Pakistani military personnel lack sufficient expertise in technical matters and that the Saudis must pay for additional training. [redacted]

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In the early 1980s, Riyadh and Islamabad agreed to increase cooperation on a variety of economic, military, and political issues. In 1981 military cooperation was extended to include the seconding of 15,000 Pakistani combat troops to the Saudi armed forces. Riyadh in return agreed to help underwrite the cost of modernizing the Pakistani armed forces, particularly the purchase of armored vehicles and F-16 aircraft from the United States. Saudi Arabia also took the lead in convincing the Gulf Cooperation Council to supply relief aid to Pakistan for the Afghan refugees. [redacted]

The Pakistani Government's concerns are varied. [redacted]

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Islamabad fears that service in Saudi Arabia is creating a new mercenary class in the Pakistani Army because of the high wages paid for duty there. [redacted] the Saudis have yet to remit the 40 percent of troop salaries promised to the Government of Pakistan since 1984. [redacted]

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[redacted] Pakistani troops serve

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In the last three years, however, Saudi-Pakistani relations have suffered because of unrealistic expectations by both sides. Key areas of divergence include the Iran-Iraq war, the mission of Pakistani

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in isolated areas and have little responsibility; they also are patronized by their Saudi counterparts.

[redacted]

The Saudis are phasing out Pakistani troops in the kingdom as their current rotations are finished.

[redacted] the Pakistani armored brigade at Tabuk will depart in August 1986. A similar rotation is planned for Pakistani flight crews in the Saudi Air Force in January 1987, [redacted]

[redacted] even though some Pakistanis will remain for maintenance and administrative services.

[redacted]

Because of the departure of the Pakistanis, the Saudis have been looking elsewhere for defense assistance.

[redacted]

Worker Remittances

Diminished economic opportunities have caused frustration among other Pakistanis in the kingdom. Some 500,000 Pakistani workers are employed in Saudi Arabia, and their remittances totaled an estimated \$1.4 billion in fiscal year 1986. Many of these workers are employed in construction and other industries dependent on a buoyant economy. The continuing reduction in Saudi oil revenues over the past four years has cut the wages of many of these workers and, in our view, has probably resulted in forced repatriation for some. [redacted]

Lower oil revenues and the return of workers to Pakistan are having adverse effects in both countries.

[redacted]

[redacted] blamed the reduction in oil revenues for an increasing number of Pakistanis engaging in criminal activities such as passport forgery and smuggling in the

kingdom, [redacted] In Pakistan the government is concerned about the number of returning workers at a time of high unemployment, [redacted]

[redacted]

Saudi Military and Economic Aid

The Pakistani Government's belief that aid from Riyadh has been less than promised has been another area of contention. Saudi aid payments to neighboring states and to the PLO long have exceeded that sent to Pakistan. Moreover, diminished oil revenues have crimped Saudi aid. Although aid from Saudi-based multilateral organizations has increased since 1982, bilateral Saudi economic and military aid to Pakistan has fallen from a high of \$315 million in 1980 to \$30 million in 1985. The Saudi Government also has failed to honor arms procurement commitments.

[redacted]

Outlook

Saudi and Pakistani differences are likely to persist for some time but are not likely to undo the relationship. Pakistan will not abandon its neutral position in the Iran-Iraq war and will continue to ask for unrealistically high levels of Saudi aid. The Saudis will further cool their military relationship with Pakistan and will look to other countries for their defense needs. Even so, a commonality of interests

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
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Saudi Economic & Military Bilateral Aid to Pakistan from 1979-1985



Millions of US Dollars
Pakistan

[Redacted]

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regarding the Soviet threat, a commitment to Islam,
and mutual economic benefits will assure the
continuation of strong ties over the long term.

[Redacted]

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Implications of Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Capabilities: Potential Military Requirements

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If India and Pakistan acquire nuclear weapons, they will face new defense requirements as well. Both will probably seek to augment their conventional forces as well as deploy nuclear forces.

Pakistan probably would be satisfied with a small, slowly growing nuclear strike capability. It would hope that the ability to respond with a few atomic weapons would be a strong check on New Delhi's use of its superior conventional forces.

India would have much more demanding nuclear weapons requirements. Its ambitions to retain superiority would require India to meet gains by Pakistan with an effort that is several times larger. Moreover, India would have to develop a nuclear force capable of reaching and inflicting substantial retaliatory damage on China.

Indian Nuclear Force Requirements

The Pakistani Front. India's strategic policy objectives toward a nuclear-armed Pakistan would be:

- To deter a Pakistani nuclear attack by building and maintaining an unmistakably superior nuclear retaliatory capacity.
- To preserve or regain credible options to wage a short, intense conventional war against Pakistan for political leverage.
- To acquire the means to dissuade or disrupt external military resupply of Pakistan, particularly from neighboring powers.

This strategy would rely on the threat of punitive retaliation, but it would be reinforced by an offensive conventional and tactical nuclear posture and possibly also by a capability to wage unconventional war behind the frontlines. The Indians would not necessarily adopt a nuclear no-first-use posture.

¹ This article presents views from a study prepared for NESAR by an external contractor. NESAR analysts do not necessarily agree with the study's conclusions but believe it offers some useful insights.

New Delhi might want a force 10 times the size of what Pakistan is estimated to be capable of and more diversified in basing modes and delivery systems. Such a force could consist principally of airborne weapons, with a few allocated to sea-based aircraft and a larger number to land-based aircraft. The latter would be mainly for strategic purposes, but a few would be designated for tactical purposes.

If India goes nuclear, it probably would make a strenuous effort to develop surface-to-surface missiles with nuclear warheads. Such missiles need only be of short-to-medium range to reach vital Pakistani urban targets from Indian bases. Deployment of a larger number of the same type of missiles in a conventional mode would provide a deceptive-basing scheme for those that are nuclear-equipped and increase the latter's survivability without the need for costly hardened silos or mobile launchers.

The nuclear ordnance for airborne and surface-to-surface weapons could be similar to or even identical in design, weight, and other dimensions, provided they could fit inside the missile. If not, a separate warhead design for missiles would have to be developed.

A plausible early-generation nuclear force to support the strategy depicted above might consist of:

Delivery System	Warhead Inventory
Total	77
12 medium-range ballistic missiles	15
20 land-based nuclear deep-strike aircraft	30
6 sea-based nuclear-capable aircraft	8
Air-deliverable tactical weapons	12
Reserves	12

In the event a nuclear Pakistan can develop a force with more than 10 or 12 warheads and begins to diversify basing modes and delivery systems, India

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probably would feel the need for a larger and more sophisticated force than indicated above. But the requirements for such a force may be satisfied by planning for the China front.

The China Front. An Indian nuclear force dedicated to Pakistan would be seen by China as threatening. It almost certainly would generate pressure in China to reallocate some of its own nuclear assets—though probably few initially—to contingent target coverage of India.

India's near-term strategy toward China would have two objectives—to deter Chinese nuclear blackmail on behalf of Pakistan, and to dissuade direct Chinese conventional or conventional/nuclear military support for Pakistan in the event of an Indo-Pakistani conflict. In the long term, India might find that it also had a requirement to deter potential aggression from China, unrelated to Pakistan. India would not have any reason to seek conventional superiority over China, except at localized points of tension along their mutual border.

A key difference between the type of force India would need to underwrite its strategy for China and that for Pakistan would be in long-range delivery capability. India's objective would be to target China's densely populated urban areas, implying air-delivered nuclear ordnance and/or missile capability with an effective delivery range of 3,500 to 5,000 kilometers from northeastern Indian bases. For launch sites located in southern India, the required delivery range capability could be 7,000 or more kilometers.

A near-term Indian deterrent force could be relatively small, perhaps between 50 and 100 warheads (including those in reserve and a portion dedicated to tactical purposes), over and above that dedicated to Pakistan, roughly doubling the required nuclear warhead inventory overall.

India's planning requirement for such a force probably would postulate the development of a thermonuclear weapon capability within a few years. Crossing the thermonuclear threshold would require a more elaborate and prolonged testing program and

probably considerable additional expense. But it would be a way of guaranteeing or prolonging the credibility of a minimum deterrent force of relatively small size.

A force for strategic deterrence of China after the turn of the century probably would entail greater size, more sophisticated and dispersable hardened or concealed delivery systems, and more sophisticated warning and command and control systems. The Indian railroad network would provide infrastructure for an eventual mobile missile option. Smaller ballistic missiles could be strapped on medium-range bombers or converted transport aircraft. India may seek—as China has done—to develop nuclear submarine-launched ballistic missiles and nuclear antisubmarine warfare capabilities to cope with Chinese naval capabilities of increased operating range.

Pakistani Nuclear Force Requirements

Over the next 10 to 15 years Pakistan is unlikely to be able to develop a nuclear force of more than 20 or so nuclear weapons. It would take substantial outside financial or direct nuclear technical assistance to change this prospect radically, but such aid does not seem likely. Still, even a handful of Pakistani nuclear weapons would have a profound effect on the military relationship with India and on the self-confidence of the Pakistanis.

Pakistan probably would view a force of 20 weapons or less as essentially an air-deliverable strategic deterrent to be used mainly against Indian cities. Islamabad would seek to ward off national collapse in the face of an irresistible Indian invasion. The fact that most Indian cities contain large Muslim minorities would not be a vital consideration in Pakistani planning.

If its nuclear weapon stockpile exceeds a dozen, Pakistan probably could allocate a few air-deliverable weapons for tactical purposes to serve as a kind of tripwire. The Indians would have to plan on this possibility in any case, requiring some dispersal of battlefield forces in time of crisis. This in turn would increase the period of warning to Pakistan of an

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Indian conventional attack, since India's battlefield forces probably would have to be concentrated for an assault.

By the turn of the century, it is conceivable that technological developments in Pakistan could both increase its nuclear weapon production capacity and provide alternative delivery systems, allowing for a larger and more diversified nuclear force.



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Pakistan: Narcotics Press Coverage Falls Short

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Islamabad recently instituted a media-based drug education program to increase public awareness of the threat of narcotics abuse. Pakistan grows opium, refines and traffics heroin, and has a rapidly escalating rate of domestic heroin abuse—issues that Islamabad believes are largely ignored by the general public. A comprehensive education and information program recently gained impetus in Pakistan under the auspices of the Pakistan Narcotics Control Board (PNCB), with funding from the UN Fund for Drug Abuse Control and assistance from the US Information Service and the US Embassy Narcotics Assistance Unit. The PNCB is attempting to make the Pakistani public more aware of the dangers of drugs by distributing narcotics-related publications to the mass media, to selected segments of the public, and to leading government officials. The revitalization of the PNCB media program in early 1986 was concurrent with greater press openness following the transition to civilian rule, which allowed for a substantial increase in media coverage of narcotics issues and other social problems.

Press Coverage Weak

Analysis of press coverage of drug-related issues in leading Pakistani newspapers and periodicals during early 1986 indicates that the PNCB awareness campaign is making little measurable headway.¹ Narcotics-related articles were published infrequently during this period—almost never on the front page—and the majority were simple notices of arrests or seizures. Furthermore, those items not concerning arrests or seizures were generally limited to coverage of major meetings or speeches on narcotics by government authorities. There were no aggressive investigative articles or surveys that would encourage grassroots efforts to combat the narcotics threat.

¹ This study examined narcotics coverage in five Urdu-language daily newspapers, four English-language daily newspapers, and two English-language weekly magazines during the first quarter of 1986; evaluated the narcotics-related articles; and examined their placement and content.

Pakistani Urdu-language papers lack the resources for serious investigative journalism.² The English-language press appeals to an elite readership apparently considered unreceptive to narcotics-related articles. It concentrates primarily on economic news, with secondary emphasis on national political and cultural events.

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The Karachi *Morning News*—published in English and managed by the government-controlled National Press Trust—comes closest to focusing on the intricacies of the narcotics problem. It divides its coverage almost equally between analysis of the various aspects of the drug issue and notices of arrests or seizures. Echoing Islamabad's sentiments, it has run several articles condemning the United States and other developed countries for failing to adopt harsh measures to check their own involvement in international drug trafficking. Furthermore, the extent of its influence on the public is subject to question, since the *Morning News* has a daily circulation of only 90,000 and is widely viewed as a government mouthpiece.

Press analysis reveals that only limited coverage is accorded Pakistan's domestic drug abuse problem.

heroin use in Pakistan continues to rise despite the establishment of national drug treatment programs. Estimates of the number of heroin addicts range from 250,000 to 300,000, and middle- and upper-class youth are reported to be increasingly affected, according to the Pakistani press. In our judgment, Islamabad views drug abuse as an embarrassment rather than a problem to be solved and releases little information on this menace through the state-owned wire service. The

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² Chronic newsprint shortages since 1971, along with inflationary trends since 1972, have resulted in increasingly high production and distribution costs. In addition, Pakistan has more dailies than advertising and readership can support. These problems have undermined press economic viability and have led to an increase in the price of newspapers, creating a decline in circulation.


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
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
PAKISTAN
DAILY NARCOTICS PRESS COVERAGE



NEWSPAPER ACCOUNTS OF ARRESTS AND SEIZURES
Percent of Total Narcotics-Related Articles



LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
Percent of Total Narcotics-Related Letters



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Associated Press of Pakistan, which supplies the Pakistani press with as much as 60 percent of its news, concentrates on narcotics-related arrests and seizures to the virtual exclusion of information on the growing problem of domestic drug abuse.

Gadoon Incident Covered Extensively

The one exception to the limited treatment of the narcotics issue by the Pakistani press concerned the clash between government enforcement personnel and opium poppy farmers in the Gadoon District of North-West Frontier Province last March, which was reported extensively in both the English and Urdu press. The increase in press coverage, however, probably did more harm than good to the PNCB's public awareness effort. The overall tone of the press coverage was antigovernment and pro-opium poppy farmers. We believe the Pakistani press used the

Gadoon incident to print articles critical of Islamabad to test the limits of press freedom under the civilian government. Most articles about the government's opium eradication efforts depicted the opium poppy growers as the innocent victims of excessive government force. Islamabad's defense of its actions was given little space in the press. Instead, extensive coverage was given to condemnations of the operations by National Assembly member Yaqub Khan Jadoon and others.

Editorials in independent papers during March also attacked the United States for its role in Pakistan's antinarcotics program. Although the editorial writers for these papers were generally opposed to narcotics

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Pakistan: Leading Newspapers

	Language	Location	Estimated 1985 Circulation	Comment
Daily newspapers				
<i>Amn</i>	Urdu	Karachi	NA	Independent, liberal, skeptical of US and Zia's Afghan policy
<i>Jang</i>	Urdu	Karachi, Rawalpindi, Lahore, Quetta	507,000	Independent, conservative, pro-Arab, no political affiliation
<i>Jasarat</i>	Urdu	Karachi	50,000	Independent, liberal, influenced by the Jama'at-i-Islami, Sunni fundamentalist
<i>Mashriq</i>	Urdu	Peshawar, Karachi, Quetta	160,000	Managed by government-controlled National Press Trust
<i>Nawa-i-Waqt</i>	Urdu	Lahore, Karachi, Rawalpindi, Multan	250,000	Independent, democratic with Islamic orientation, anti-Communist
<i>Dawn</i>	English	Karachi	70,000	Independent, liberal, no political affiliation
<i>Morning News</i>	English	Karachi	90,000	Managed by government-controlled National Press Trust
<i>Muslim</i>	English	Islamabad	30,000	Independent, pro-Iranian, skeptical of US and Zia's Afghan policy
<i>The Pakistan Times</i>	English	Lahore, Rawalpindi	50,000	Managed by government-controlled National Press Trust
Weeklies				
<i>Pakistan and Gulf Economist</i>	English	Karachi	20,000	Conservative, business/economic-oriented
<i>Viewpoint</i>	English	Lahore	25,000	Leftist, political/literary, may receive some Soviet funding, generally hostile to United States

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production, some argued that poppy cultivation was a local tradition and that Islamabad's antinarcotics policy was adopted because of pressure by the United States. The influential Islamabad *Muslim*—an English-language daily—was quite sharp in its criticism and repeatedly blamed the United States for the police action. Other independent papers echoed this view. The Lahore Urdu-language daily *Nawa-i-Waqt*, for example, stated that the US complaint that Pakistani heroin subverts US youth sidesteps the more important issue of “stemming the flow of narcotics pills and capsules being manufactured in US laboratories and exported to Pakistan” and elsewhere.

The government-controlled National Press Trust (NPT) newspapers carried numerous stories relating Islamabad's defense of its actions and the denial of US Government involvement in the incident by Minister of the Interior Aslam Khattak and US Attorney General Edwin Meese. Two of the papers, however, the Peshawar *Mashriq* in Urdu and the Lahore *Pakistan Times* in English, each carried an editorial in March expressing disapproval of the force used against the poppy growers. In addition, all of the NPT papers covered the protest rallies of poppy growers in the Gadoon Valley and Yaqub Khan

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The Gadoon Incident

The Gadoon District enforcement action took place on 8 March 1986, when some 450 troops of the frontier constabulary supported by local police moved into Gadoon-Amazai, the site of a US-funded development project, to enforce Islamabad's ban on growing opium poppies. They were met by armed resistance from the growers, who objected to eradication so late in the growing season that substitute cash crops could not be planted. In the fighting between the constabulary and the growers, five persons were killed and 31 were injured. In a second clash, an anti-enforcement demonstration became unruly, and another eight persons were killed and 13 wounded. According to Embassy reporting, only 25 percent of the Gadoon-area poppy crop—some 220 hectares—was destroyed during the operation. National Assembly member Yaqub Khan Jadoon was arrested for inciting the demonstrators but was later released on bail by authorities. The arrest of Jadoon precipitated a walkout in the National Assembly. As a result, the government withdrew the forces, and the eradication effort was halted. A judicial inquiry was ultimately conducted, and the remainder of the poppy crop was harvested without further incident in early April.

Jadoon's speech to the National Assembly charging that the enforcement was undertaken with US backing. Even the government's press mouthpieces failed to support Islamabad wholeheartedly after the Gadoon raid.

Response From the Public Disappointing

Public response to narcotics issues in early 1986 was minimal in both the English-language and Urdu-language press, an indication that the PNCB's media awareness program is making little headway. Very few letters to the editor were carried, even during March, and the content of those published indicated little support among Pakistanis for Islamabad's poppy crop eradication program. Approximately two-thirds of the letters condemned the government action at Gadoon, and several suggested that poppy cultivation be made legal again. One letter noted, "In our

subcontinent poppy cultivation has been going on since time immemorial and is a source of bread and butter for many families." Another stated that if the United States "is so keen to stop illegal production of poppy, let it buy our crop legally as it is doing from India and let Pakistan earn some badly needed foreign exchange." In addition, press analysis indicates that Pakistanis have not changed their perception that narcotics is a Western problem. Nearly half of the letters printed during March referred to US domestic drug problems. One letter asked: "How or why should Gadoon be accountable for the diseases in the United States and their ever increasing thirst for heroin?"

We believe that the public's unwillingness to acknowledge narcotics as a domestic problem is rooted in the culture of Pakistan. According to academic sources, Pakistanis tend not to see themselves as culprits; they prefer to blame others. This behavior is reinforced when high government officials publicly blame narcotics problems on Western countries. For example, when Minister of State for Parliamentary Affairs Mir Nawaz Khan Marwat called for an endless jihad against drugs in late February 1986, he stated that Pakistan was being blamed without any valid reason or justification for being a bastion of drug producers and traffickers, although the responsibility lay with the developed countries. This speech was well publicized and underscores the fact that even Pakistani officials do not fully comprehend the dimensions of Pakistan's narcotics abuse problem.

Realizing the Media's Potential

The lifting of martial law in Pakistan has inspired a boom in the newspaper business, suggesting increased influence. A new English-language daily, *The Frontier Post*, for example, has recently been started in Peshawar, and the publishers of the two largest Urdu papers, *Jang* and *Nawa-i-Waqt*, are considering launching their own English-language papers from Karachi and Lahore. The radio and television industries in Pakistan, moreover, are growing rapidly. There are more than 5 million radios in use in Pakistan, and Islamabad estimates that 85 percent of the Pakistani people listen regularly. Television sets number 1.24 million, and sales are growing at an

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annual rate of 35 percent. Furthermore, foreign aid donors have agreed to help establish a second television channel that will run educational and instructional programs geared to serving the needs of the people. The potential influence of the media, in our opinion, may be even more extensive than these numbers indicate. Although the national literacy rate is only 10 percent, Pakistanis frequently read newspapers aloud in public for their illiterate friends and neighbors. Islamabad estimates that radios and television also have multiple users.

We judge that drawing the media's attention to the issue of domestic drug abuse offers the best prospect of swaying Pakistani public opinion and would be a key element in an effective awareness program. A significant portion of new heroin addicts—and the number is rising rapidly by President Zia's own estimate—are educated, middle- and upper-class, urban males. These youths are not only vital to Pakistan's future; some are the sons of the most influential members of society. In our judgment, the Urdu-language newspapers, which tend to be concerned with social issues, would be a natural starting point for a stepped-up awareness program. The independent papers are less likely to avoid controversy and would readily publish articles portraying the severity of domestic drug abuse.



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Near East and South Asia Briefs

Saudi Arabia	Oil-for-Planes Deal Grounded [redacted]	25X1
	<p>The Saudi financial crunch has led Saudia airlines to delay—perhaps indefinitely—taking delivery of two Boeing 747 aircraft, [redacted]</p> <p>[redacted] Delivery of the two passenger planes had been scheduled for late August 1986 and was to complete a countertrade deal for 10 B-747s and associated equipment worth an estimated \$1.34 billion. The Saudi Government agreed in 1984 to barter crude oil—perhaps as many as 50 million barrels—for about 73 percent of the cost and arranged to have Saudia pay the remainder in cash upon delivery. The oil barter portion has been completed, but Saudia has a deficit of more than \$100 million and cannot make the payment. [redacted]</p>	25X1 25X1 25X1
Nepal	New Antidrug Initiative [redacted]	25X1
	<p>Kathmandu has begun an aggressive effort to reduce Nepal's role as a prime transshipment point for opium and hashish bound for the West. [redacted]</p> <p>[redacted] King Birendra, disturbed by the country's reputation as a growing international narcotics-trafficking center, ordered his new inspector general of police in August to take "bold steps" to stem the trade. In response to this mandate, the inspector general has created an independent narcotics branch within the national police and begun to modernize the country's drug enforcement capabilities. [redacted] he plans to ask the King to approve special drug eradication teams to destroy marijuana and poppy fields. He also plans to call for independent national antinarcotics tribunals to bypass the current narcotics enforcement system, which often leaves the responsibility for prosecution of drug cases to corrupt local officials. [redacted]</p> <p>Previous attempts to initiate effective antidrug programs have not reduced Nepal's importance as a transshipment point for drugs bound for the West. The King appears committed to his recent initiative and has promised to prosecute users and traffickers rounded up in the sweep. The investigations, however, are likely to uncover the involvement of powerful members of the royal family and the government. Although the King will probably support the prosecution of lower level government officials to demonstrate his support for the antidrug campaign, he is likely to reevaluate the program if information appears implicating royal family members. [redacted]</p>	25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1

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29 August 1986

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Regional Organizations	Economic Difficulties <input type="text"/>	25X1
	<p>The Arab League and the Islamic Conference Organization face significant financial problems that could undermine their activities. More than half of the Arab League's 21 members have not paid dues to support this year's budget of over \$30 million, according to Tunisian press reports later confirmed by the League's secretary general. Several states have been delinquent for more than a year—reflecting domestic economic problems caused by the weak oil market and the regional recession. We believe that some members have also reduced contributions to underscore their dissatisfaction with the League's ineffectiveness. The Islamic Conference Organization's problems are even more severe. Only 11 of its 46 members have contributed funds, representing only 15 percent of this year's \$10 million budget, <input type="text"/></p>	25X1
	<p>The secretaries general of both groups have threatened to withhold employee salaries to force members to fulfill their obligations. The Arab League has delayed paying bills, stopped the activities of some subsidiary organizations, and reduced hiring. Secretary General Klibi almost certainly will raise the League's financial problems at a ministerial meeting in September. A continued lack of funds is likely to compound the effects of political disunity in Arab and Islamic ranks and erode both groups' regional and international influence. <input type="text"/></p>	25X1

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