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18 November 79*

Approved For Release 2009/04/28 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501300001-2

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IRAN

No surprise - this week's biggest subject

Approved For Release 2009/04/28 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501300001-2

LOS ANGELES TIMES
13 NOVEMBER 1979

U.S. Protests Hostile Soviet Broadcasts to Iran

BY DAN FISHER

Times Staff Writer

MOSCOW—The Carter Administration has protested both here and in Washington what it terms “inflammatory” Soviet radio broadcasts beamed into Iran about the siege of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran by Moslem students, Western diplomatic sources said here Monday.

The broadcasts have painted the embattled embassy as “a center of corruption and anti-Iranian conspiracies,” termed the student takeover as “understandable and logical” and denounced the United States for giving the deposed Shah of Iran medical sanctuary while he undergoes cancer treatment in New York.

The Carter Administration was angered by the broadcasts and considered them “very inflammatory given the situation” in Tehran, the western sources said.

The Iranian students are holding more than 60 Americans hostage in the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, demanding that Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi be returned to face punishment for crimes against the Iranian people. Iran’s Moslem leader, the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, has implicitly sanctioned the siege and has thus far refused to negotiate the release of the hostages unless the shah is returned.

The Soviet broadcasts came from two sources: Radio Moscow’s Farsi language service (Farsi is the basic language in Iran) and the clandestine “National Voice of Iran,” which Western intelligence sources say broadcasts from Baku, capital of Soviet Azerbaijan. The clandestine station broadcasts in both Farsi and Azerbaijanian. About 10 million Azerbaijanis live in Iran, just across the border from almost 4 million who live in the Soviet Union.

According to Western monitors, Radio Moscow termed the takeover as “totally understandable and logical” because the U.S. Embassy in Tehran is filled with what Radio Moscow called “agents of the CIA” and “U.S. imperialists who have not ceased their imperialism against Iran.”

“The National Voice,” according to those same monitoring reports, called the embassy “a center of corruption and anti-Iranian conspiracies” and harshly denounced the United States for allowing the shah—whom it called “the executioner”—to get cancer treatment in New York. The station also praised the “struggling and enthusiastic” Moslem students who took over the mission nine days ago.

The Carter Administration has asked the Kremlin to participate in a joint effort to intercede with Khomeini on behalf of the hostages by those governments with embassies in Tehran. Sources here said the Soviets have indicated they are willing to do so.

The broadcasts, however, indicate that Moscow also hopes to gain political mileage out of the latest Iranian crisis. “They just can’t resist taking advantage of a major deterioration of U.S.-Iranian relations,” one Western diplomat commented.

The Kremlin remains leery of Khomeini, who has lashed out at communism almost as often as he has at U.S. imperialism. Last week, Tehran abrogated sections of a 1921 Soviet-Iranian treaty giving Moscow the right to intervene militarily in Iran should any third nation try to use Iranian territory as a base for an attack on the Soviet Union.

THE KIPLINGER WASHINGTON LETTER
9 November 1979

Dear Client:

Washington, Nov. 9, 1979.

This situation in Iran is worse than the news reports indicate. It's the beginning of the end for Iran as an independent nation. And it's THE END of normal ties with us...that's for sure.

What caused such a sudden rupture? Well, it wasn't the reason you've been hearing & reading...to force us to send the Shah back home. That's just a facade, a smoke screen. The real reason is as follows:
Khomeini's men wanted a clash with the U.S...to whip up emotions and use the opportunity to take full power of gov't into their hands.

Russia egged them on. It is supporting the demonstrators there. The "students" were led by Russian-trained organizers who are skillful at swaying mobs, taking advantage of confusion, using it to their ends. Khomeini went along with this...his anti-U.S. bias is still blazing.

Next step: Russia will keep Iran upset...keep things in chaos. Using the pro-Soviet elements there to create more mischief...feeding the turbulence and exhausting any opposition that comes along. Then...get CONTROL...either directly or indirectly, since Iran is the gateway to the Persian Gulf oil, which is Russia's MAIN goal.

One other important angle: When the mob invaded our embassy, they probably got their hands on secret U.S. intelligence equipment. Officials here know it was there at the time. They haven't yet learned how much the Red leaders of the mob got. It's highly sophisticated stuff that we've been using to gather information about the Russian military. The embassy staff undoubtedly tried to destroy it, but time was short.

Will Iran cut off its oil to the U.S.? That's far from certain, but even if it stops shipping here, we could still get oil elsewhere. From Saudi Arabia and other producing nations. Or the "spot market," where prices are MUCH higher. Then fuel prices would climb even faster.

Barring a total disruption of Iran's oil...to ALL countries... There will be only minor supply problems this winter in the U.S. On gasoline, best to expect temporary scarcities...localized... perhaps gas lines here & there. Some brands less available than others. Of course, prices will climb. The gov't decontrol assures this. And producing nations have already indicated that another boost in price will be voted next month...probably hitting hardest during midwinter. Diesel and heating oil will be tight...prices up constantly.

Natural gas, propane...supplies adequate, but more expensive. Coal, plentiful. Electricity, more than ample for normal uses. Low-sulfur residual oil, very tight...and very expensive. For the nation as a whole, the fuel supply doesn't look bad, but there's not much cushion between supply and demand. Allow for this.

EXCERPT

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A6THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
14 November 1979

Iran upsets takeover principles

By Jim Hoagland
Washington Post Service

WASHINGTON — The siege of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran has reversed one of the few cardinal rules of dealing with mass kidnaping: In Iran, time is on the side of the captors and works against those who are trying to free the hostages.

Because each passing day adds to the domestic and international political advantages sought by the Iranian extremists who hold the embassy, their promise not to kill their hostages can probably be taken seriously. The status quo is ideal for the extremists' aims.

That is true in part because their ultimate target appears to be not the hostages, nor even the return of former Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. With Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's connivance, the Tehran mob is doing its best to further damage the United States' standing in the Third World and, in a sense, America's national spirit.

The televised image of truckloads of cheering Iranian workers and farmers hooting past the captured embassy last weekend and screaming support for the captors will have made that point graphically for many American viewers.

Ironically, many of those viewers switched to the Tehran news film from Sunday night's broadcast of "Dog Day Afternoon," the Al Pacino movie about a hostage-taking in a Brooklyn bank. In the film, the police followed standard tactics and stretched out negotiations as long as possible to wear down the captors and prevent them from harming the hostages in panic.

President Carter and Secretary of

Analysis

State Cyrus R. Vance endorsed such tactics earlier this year when the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, Adolph Dubs, was held hostage by terrorists in Kabul. Ignoring pleas from Vance to continue negotiating with the terrorists, Afghan police and their Soviet advisers rushed the terrorists and Dubs was killed in the shooting.

In Tehran, Carter confronts perhaps an even more painful and difficult dilemma. The option of dragging the siege out lies with the captors. They watch with evident glee as each day brings a rise in the tarnishing of American prestige in the world and in national frustration in America.

A U.S. military strike into the center of crowded Tehran might stanch this hemorrhaging of pride. It would also probably result in the death of the estimated 62 Americans thought to be in the embassy. It is a trade-off that Carter has not been willing to make.

The course of the siege has made it clear that this is terror with a difference and that Carter has to choose a different approach. The goals and tactics of the Iranian militants are quite different from those of the Black September group that kidnaped U.S. Ambassador Cleo Noel and his deputy, G. Curtis Moore, in Khartoum, Sudan, in 1973.

President Richard M. Nixon decided immediately to refuse to negotiate with the Arab terrorists. On hearing this, the gunmen murdered Noel and Moore and a Belgian diplomat they also had seized.

In this siege, it is Carter who must race the clock. His most immediate task appears to be trying to get slightly in front of rising public anger and keep it within bounds. He is taking steps that do not endanger the captives but that do establish American ability to act. His order Monday to cut off Iranian oil imports will have more symbolic than practical impact.

Carter has refused to deport the

former shah, who has undergone cancer surgery in New York. In addition to dispatching special negotiators, the President has asked other nations to intervene with the 79-year-old ayatollah, but with no success.

The clock has been turned on its head in this case because the siege of the embassy is a key weapon in a power struggle inside Iran. Islamic extremists used the takeover to sweep away the weak but Western-oriented government of Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan. Each day of demonstrations around the embassy consolidates the radicals' hold on power.

Moreover, the militants have pinned the Carter Administration once again to the legacy of a quarter century of supporting the shah, a legacy the State Department had hoped to forget.

Despite the terror tactics being used, the new demand for an American admission of national guilt as part of the price for freeing the hostages will be popular in parts of the Third World that feel the United States has backed too many "dictators" in too many places since World War II.

Carter and his principal advisers came to office declaring a fresh start for American relations with the Third World. They pledged to eradicate the covert CIA operations and policies that had often inflamed world opinion against America.

But the longer the siege continues, the less chance there is for Carter or his successor to find significant support for a sympathetic policy toward the Third World. Calls for a return to covert intervention of the kind that brought Pahlavi back to power in 1953 — and even more belligerent action to re-establish American prestige — point to quite a different global future than the one Carter seemed to envision on election day three years ago.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 13THE BOSTON GLOBE
14 November 1979

Spot sales could ease cutoff of Iranian oil

By Bruce A. Mohl
Globe Staff

For the second time in less than a year, the United States will lose its access to Iran's oil, this time by its own choosing.

It is too early to predict what impact the cutoff will have this time, but the situation clearly is different from the one that existed on Dec. 27, 1978, when Iran, the world's second largest oil exporter at the time, ceased exporting oil altogether.

Unless Iran intends to reduce its production, this time the 500,000 barrels of Iranian crude oil imported directly into the United States daily will probably be sold elsewhere rather than be lost entirely to the world oil market.

If so, that would mean there would be "spare" oil somewhere that could be bought by the United States, most likely on the more expensive spot market.

"If Iran continues to sell crude to the rest of the world, it eases the pressure elsewhere and eases the pressure on us," Dan Lundberg, who publishes an authoritative gasoline newsletter, said. "The maximum Iranian hurt would be if Iran cut off the whole world."

That "maximum Iranian hurt" is what happened earlier this year when oil exports from Iran were totally cut off until April 1979. The cutoff meant a loss to the United States of 600,000 to 700,000 barrels of crude oil per day, according to the General Accounting Office (GAO).

It was widely believed that the summer gas lines in the United States were a direct result of the Iran cutoff. The Iran

situation also was blamed for the surge in oil prices on the spot market and pressure within the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries to press for (and get) the higher prices that have played havoc with the world's economy.

While the Iranian situation probably played a role in all these events, how big a role is uncertain.

Central Intelligence Agency figures show that the loss of Iranian oil had little impact on world crude oil production. Citing increased production by other nations, the CIA said that in the first three months of 1979 world crude oil production reached 60.4 million barrels a day and then rose to 62.1 million barrels in April, a net boost in oil production despite the Iranian cutoff.

The GAO report went a bit further and tried to pinpoint what caused the gasoline lines. Many of the problems could now re-emerge.

The GAO laid much of the blame for the lines on the US government and the oil companies. It specifically cited:

- Arbitrary oil company allocation procedures.
- Oil company reluctance, under pressure from the Energy Department, to buy oil on the more expensive spot market.
- An "unusual reduction" in domestic oil production of 200,000 barrels per day.
- Energy Department regulations on gasoline allocation and pricing.
- The loss of high-quality Iran oil which caused the problem of finding similar light, low-sulfur crude, the type of oil US refineries heavily rely on.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE VA 21THE WASHINGTON POST
15 November 1979

Jack Anderson

First Mossadegh, Now Khomeini

The loss of Iran may turn out to be the most grievous blow to the United States since the Vietnam War. This has opened the crucial oil fields of the Persian Gulf to a possible takeover by hostile forces.

For two decades, the United States had built up Iran to be the protector of American interests in the Persian Gulf. Then overnight, the government fell into anti-American hands. Suddenly, America's overseas oil supply has become dangerously vulnerable.

From secret documents, here's the story of the U.S. failure in Iran. It goes back to post-World War II.

In 1950 Mahammed Mossadegh, age 70, the eccentric leader of a splinter party in the Iranian National Assembly, began to inflame the nation with his demands for nationalizing oil.

To Western eyes, Mossadegh was sick, ugly, hairless and banana-nosed — factors which, given the Iranians' superior esthetics in such matters, gave him an irresistible charisma. Three years of incredible theater, grisly murders, baroque impostures, fantastic chaos and incomparable demagoguery followed. The pajama-clad "Mossy" roused the masses with impassioned spiels, weeps and blubbers, after which he would collapse in a great heap and be carried, unconscious, through admiring hordes driven amok by the sight of his inert body. The drama escalated magnificently, with the shah run out

of the country. For three years, Iran whirled in intermittent bedlam.

The miserliness of the oil companies, the growing appetites of the Arabs for the oil money flowing away under their feet, and the penchant of the State Department for taking the path of least resistance opened the door to a fatal precedent.

The decision on what to do about Mossadegh's upheaval was resolved not by seeking a new and just *modus vivendi* with awakening nationalism but by first destroying Iran's economy through a worldwide oil industry boycott of its exports and then by deposing Mossadegh through a CIA coup.

The CIA installed the young shah on the Peacock Throne and permitted the oil companies to assume their exploitation of Iran. But the ghost of Mossadegh was not completely exorcised. His ringing protests could not be stilled. And the spirit of Mossadegh remained as a growing undercurrent, bubbling beneath the surface, stirring the volatile people.

This undercurrent went undetected by our intelligence agencies. Carter used the tremendous leverage of the United States, meanwhile, to persuade the shah to relax his grip, ease press censorship, release political prisoners. The shah later complained, no doubt correctly, that these moves convinced his enemies that he was weakening.

He started to crack down, and the bloodbath lasted two days. This prompted a telephone appeal from

Carter to the shah to stop the bloodshed. It was too late. The spirit of Mossadegh was already shaking the Peacock Throne. The alarmed shah turned to the United States for support.

The president rushed veteran foreign policy strategist George Ball to Iran. Ball concluded that the only way to prevent a total collapse of the government was to turn it over to civilian control, with the shah as no more than a figurehead.


Carter disregarded this advice. At the urging of his military chiefs, he ordered a small naval task force, led by the nuclear carrier *Constellation*, into the Persian Gulf. Then he abruptly canceled the order.

Thus the president offered the shah no advice or support. "This is something in the hands of the people of Iran," he said blandly. So the people went on a rampage and trampled down the shah's government.

They turned for leadership to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, an ancient rigid Moslem who embodied the spirit of Mossadegh. Khomeini was reckless in a timid age, bloody in a squeamish age, puritanical in a hedonistic age, intolerant in an ecumenical age — in short, a fanatical man in a frivolous age. He would sacrifice oil wealth, safety, convenience, pleasure, life itself to pursue his beliefs. In so doing he puts chips on the table which his Western adversaries have thus far been unwilling to call.

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ON PAGE A-16


NEW YORK TIMES
15 NOVEMBER 1979



The New York Times / Nov. 15, 1979

All percentages except the Canadian are based on the latest figures made public by the United States Central Intelligence Agency, which issues a periodic review of energy statistics. The C.I.A. declined to give up-to-date data, saying such material is classified. The Canadian percentage was provided by officials in Ottawa. United States oil imports from Iran, which accounted for 1 percent of American oil consumption in May and 4 percent in September, have been suspended under an order issued by President Carter on Nov. 12.

STAT



ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 3THE NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
15 November 1979

Carter ices Iran's \$5B in U.S.

By FRANK VAN RIPER
and LARS-ERIK NELSON.

Washington (News Bureau) — With Iran about to undermine the value of the dollar by withdrawing all its deposits from United States banks, President Carter proclaimed a "national emergency" yesterday and froze \$5 billion worth of Iranian assets in the U.S.

At the same time, the administration launched a new strategy to secure the release of 62 American hostages who have been held by Moslem militants in the U.S. Embassy in Teheran since Nov. 4.

Secretary of State Vance flew to New York to try to block a meeting of the United Nations Security Council demanded by Iran's religious leaders.

The new strategy is that the U.S. — which has refused to surrender the deposed and ailing shah, Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi, in return for the hostages — will agree to a Council debate of Iran's grievances against the U.S. as soon as the hostages are released.

Beat 'em to punch

The freeze of Iranian assets, which applies only to government holdings, had been under consideration in Washington for several days. It was triggered at 5 a.m. yesterday when a Treasury Department duty officer received word that Iranian Foreign Minister Abol Hasan Bani-Sadr had ordered the withdrawal of what he said amounted to \$12 billion in Iranian assets from U.S. banks.

Bani-Sadr had thought, according to interviews he has given in Iran, that all of the money was in the Chase Manhattan Bank, and that its chairman, David Rockefeller, was paying interest to his friend, the ousted shah, who is undergoing treatment in New York Hospital.

In fact, the largest amount was \$1.3 billion in Treasury notes held by the Federal Reserve Bank in New York, and the rest was scattered among other banks.

Receiving word of the imminent withdrawal from a Central Intelligence Agency radio monitoring service, the duty officer awakened Treasury Secretary G. William Miller, who telephoned President Carter at 5:45 a.m. By 8 a.m., the President had signed an executive order, which said in part:

"I, Jimmy Carter, President of the United States, find that the situation in Iran constitutes and unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy and economy of the United States and hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat."

Used in the past

Carter acted under the authority of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. Similar authority has been used in the past to block the assets of Communist China, Cuba, Vietnam and Cambodia. Freezing of assets does not mean U.S. seizure of foreign property, but does prevent its owners from withdrawing it from the country.

At an early morning White House press conference, Miller said that the action was designed to protect U.S. owners of property in Iran from uncompensated seizure of their assets.

The value of the dollar plunged on European monetary markets when word was received of the Iranian decision, but the markets closed before they could respond to Carter's retaliation.

In New York, the stock market declined but regained ground as the day wore on.

A graceful way out

Vance's hasty flight to New York yesterday morning was part of an emergency strategy both to block a UN Security Council debate that might have diverted attention from the hostages and, more important, to give Iran's religious leaders a graceful way to back out of the stalemate.

The U.S. has been adamant that it will not hand over the shah to obtain the release of the hostages, but U.S. officials realize that they must give the Iranians something. That something, they hope, will be the airing of Iran's complaints about U.S. meddling and support for the shah in the lofty forum of the Security Council.

The public U.S. position dwelt on the first part of the strategy — and not on the underlying goal. State Department spokesman Hodding Carter 3d said: "The U.S. government strongly believes the Security Council should not meet to discuss any issue with respect to Iran while our diplomatic hostages are still being held."

Vance's goal in New York was to persuade at least seven of the 15 Council members either to vote against a debate on Iran or to abstain.

A long-held principle

In making this argument, Vance was asking U.S. allies to violate the long-held principle that any issue at least should be allowed to come up for debate. But Hodding Carter was adamant:

"There is no way this government can or will negotiate under the gun of its people being held illegally within our own compound," he said. "There can be no discussion about terms, agenda items or complaints so long as our people are being held."

A State Department task force continued yesterday to make periodic contact with the student militants who seized the embassy. One scare occurred, U.S. officials said, when the Iranian students received a garbled version of an incident in Denver, in which an Iranian student shot and killed a 17-year-old American youth who had smashed his window.

"The Iranians got it the other way around: they thought the student had been killed, and they were really getting threatening," one official said. "We had to talk them out of doing anything to the hostages."

Praises our values

Meanwhile, in Tehran, Foreign Minister Bani-Sadr gave a slight signal that Iran may be seeking a way out of the crisis. He praised America's "human values" and said that some of the non-American hostages at the embassy might be freed.

Reports had said that 60 American hostages were being held. Yesterday, it was reported that there were 98 hostages in the embassy — 62 Americans and 36 non-Americans. Most of the non-Americans were identified as Asians.

Bani-Sadr said yesterday that he would ask the militants holding the hostages to investigate the cases of the non-Americans, including cooks and janitors, and release them if they were found to be "innocent."

Then, in a remark that contrasted sharply with the anti-American tone of

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previous official Iranian statements, Bani-Sadr said: "On no account do we intend to humiliate or belittle the American nation."

"We want justice"

"On the contrary, we want the American nation to know we respect that country's human values," Bani-Sadr said. "We want justice. We just want the American nation to give back to us that criminal (the shah)."

Bani-Sadr then repeated the Iranian position that the American hostages will not be freed until the shah is returned to Iran.

"If the United States government accepts our just demand and returns the shah and his wealth, the Iranian government will be in a position to start a new phase and ask the students to follow the government policy," Bani-Sadr said.

The Iranian Mission to the United Nations released a statement saying that the hostages were being "treated humanely ... have no doubts about their well-being."

In related developments:

- Maneh Said Otaiba, chairman of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, said that OPEC would be ready to help extricate the hostages. Some OPEC nations were reported nervous that the U.S. freezing of Iran's assets could set a precedent for similar action against their own deposits, which traditionally have been invested in U.S. Treasury notes. Treasury Secretary Miller said that Saudi Arabia, a major U.S. depositor, had been briefed on the U.S. decision and was sympathetic.

- The Pentagon ordered two ships from the U.S. naval squadron in the Middle East to join an exercise involving the U.S. carrier Midway and a British squadron in the Arabian Sea south of Iran. Pentagon officials said that the ships were no threat to Iran and carried no Marine landing force that could be used to free the hostages.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 1-11LOS ANGELES TIMES
14 November 1979

What's Shah Worth? Even the CIA Can't Figure It Out

BY JOHN J. GOLDMAN and ROBERT E. DALLOS

Times Staff Writers

NEW YORK—The Central Intelligence Agency recently tried to determine just how much wealth the Shah of Iran had retained when he fled the nation he ruled for almost four decades.

But after worldwide analysis, the agency was left with a mystery. Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi's financial advisers had been so skillful in camouflaging his vast assets over the years that the true scope of his holdings escaped efforts to define it.

The best the CIA's scholars could do in the study completed months before the shah entered the United States for gall bladder surgery and cancer treatment, was to conclude that the former Iranian ruler was worth perhaps from a quarter to three-quarters of a billion dollars, or, perhaps, from \$100 million to \$800 million.

The vagueness of the figures was testimony not only to the financial secrecy of the shah's regime, but to years of blurring the shah's state, foundation and personal funds.

The CIA's scholars said they believed most of the shah's money was in Switzerland and Western Europe and that perhaps 10% of his assets were in the United States.

Some bankers however, say the shah's personal portfolio alone is worth well over \$1 billion, and one recent estimate set the figure at perhaps \$17 billion. Some investment bankers with foreign contacts say that perhaps between \$2 billion and \$4 billion was transferred from Iran to the United States in the two years before the shah's regime toppled.

"He was the country of Iran," a knowledgeable banker with ties to the Mideast said Tuesday. Just one measure of how much power the shah had

was that in 1976, the Iranian budget contained a \$1 billion discretionary fund solely for the shah's use.

The issue of the shah's wealth was underscored Tuesday when the regime of the Ruhollah Ayatollah Khomeini demanded that as one condition for release of the American hostages in Tehran, the United States return the shah's wealth. Some of this wealth, in private transactions as early as this summer had already begun to flow back to the Iranian revolutionary regime.

However, like U.S. financial analysts, Iran's new government faces massive difficulties in trying to determine what the shah has managed to accumulate.

The cornerstone of the shah's financial empire—which scholars say during its height, rivaled the holdings of the Sauds of Saudi Arabia and the al-Sabah ruling family in Kuwait—was the Pahlavi Foundation which he formed in 1958. Soon after the foundation was set up the shah said he was transferring 90% of his holdings to the new institution, a combination family organization and charitable trust. The shah's control of the foundation was absolute.

The foundation's known assets in December 1977 included everything from 10% of General Motors of Iran and B.F. Goodrich-Iran to a 25% interest in the Krupp Steel Works in West Germany. In the Tehran area alone the foundation owned four hotels, including the Hilton. Other holdings ranged from insurance and banking to agriculture and book publishing. One of the most important of the foundation's assets was 100% ownership of the Bank Omran, the fifth largest commercial bank in Iran. The bank, founded in 1952 to develop agriculture in Iran, evolved over the years into the royal family's personal bank, which made numerous investments worldwide—including some important ones in the United States.

One financial analysis concluded in 1978 that the foundation's assets were at least \$2.8 billion to \$3 billion.

The most prominent of the foundation's holdings in the United States is a 36-story office building on Fifth Avenue near Rockefeller Center. The site was purchased by the Pahlavi Foundation for \$8.6 million. The structure—now shrouded in controversy—has only been recently completed.

A spokesman for the New York State Attorney General's office said Tuesday that the Pahlavi Foundation's board of directors had already changed to represent the new Iranian revolutionary regime. He said it was

Also contributing to this report was Times researcher Victoria Horstmann.

expected that revenues from the building would continue to be channeled into the foundation.

One of the largest investments the shah's government had in the United States was a half billion-dollar commercial and residential complex in New Orleans. The Bank of Omran had invested \$250 million in the project in 1976, making it that year's largest foreign investment in the United States. Last July, Joseph C. Canizaro, the principal American partner in the investment, bought out the Iranian interests for \$50 million, although the new Iranian regime was willing to continue the joint venture.

The Bank of Omran also owned 5% of the First National Bank of Wisconsin.

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sin in Milwaukee. The status of that investment was unclear.

A key question for financial analysts is how much of the foundation's assets the shah was able personally to hold onto in the days before he was toppled from power by the revolutionary government. There are reports the shah has huge sums in Swiss bank accounts. A spokesman for the exiled ruler said Tuesday there would be no comment on the extent of the shah's current wealth.

The status of the shah's other assets in the United States, those not linked to the foundation, was unclear. These include homes in New York City and on nearby Long Island and 3,000 acres of land in upstate New York.

This land was purchased some years ago by the American section chief of Savak the shah's secret police. The land included a huge barn, which some reports said was destined to become the U.S. headquarters for Savak. However, it remained a dairy operation after the reports were made public.

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-31NEW YORK TIMES
15 NOVEMBER 1979

ESSAY

To Restabilize Iran

By William Safire

WASHINGTON, Nov. 14—When one nation deliberately infringes on the sovereignty of another, and seizes prisoners in the bargain, that is by definition an act of war.

Since we hope to save our citizens' lives, our response to Iran's invasion of our sovereign embassy territory has been muted: pleas to third parties, the ruling-out of force, a cosmetic switching of oil trade, a tit-for-tat banking maneuver, a finger-wagging at Iranian students here.

But restraint need not be paralysis. We have a nonviolent weapon that can have an effect in Iran: food. That nation imports 30 percent of its food, and relies on the United States for rice, much of its wheat, corn, and poultry feed-grain (in Persia, chicken feed is not chicken feed).

We should now impose a food embargo on Iran, arranging with alternative grain suppliers like Australia and Canada not to take up the slack. The Soviets could not take up the slack because we make up their grain shortfalls. This embargo will not cause starvation in Iran but will push up prices, contribute to the general unrest, and make the point around the world that a superpower is not necessarily muscle-bound.

Just as important as keeping cool is planning ahead: What do we do after the impasse is resolved? Assume that the Shah ultimately returns to Mexico (which has had the foresight to close its embassy in Teheran) and the American hostages are released; do we turn the other cheek, forgive and forget? On the contrary — we should treat this kidnapping with great seriousness and turn this provocation to our advantage.

The Ayatollah's act of aggression offers an opportunity for us to end the collapse of Western influence in the Persian Gulf, and to blunt the Soviet move — through Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa — which threatens the main sources of Western oil.

We should take the position that no legitimate government now exists in Iran, and that we would find intolerable the replacement of mob rule by a Communist regime.

Accordingly, our C.I.A. — already blamed for nonexistent conspiracies — should start conspiring now to aid those ethnic groups in Iran that are resisting the Ayatollah. In the north, the

Kurds — once doublecrossed by the Shah and the U.S. — should be supplied with weapons, including surface-to-air missiles, to help achieve their autonomy.

In the southwest, where the main oil fields are located, the area is not controlled by Arab oil workers but by two Iranian tribes — the Qashqai and the Bakhtiari — which are not beholden to the anarchists in Teheran. An uprising there would be crucial, especially if the Iranian armed forces are reluctant to crush it.

Mobs are by nature fickle; militant Islam turned out to be an underestimated force in Iran, but it is not the only force. Millions of Iranians are afflicted with an oppression worse than any they have known, and effigy-burning riots for television feed no bellies. Some political or military leader is likely to move into that vacuum, and it is not immoral for us to make sure that the successor to the 80-year-old strongman is not beholden to Moscow.

Elsewhere in the Persian Gulf, the United States should make its military presence felt. The Sultan of Oman is worried about Communist penetration of nearby South Yemen, and has offered to let us make a staging base of the island of Masira. We should take up that offer quickly, and top that with the leasing of the airbases that are being vacated by the Israelis in the Sinai.

The Ayatollah's slap in our face ought to wake us up to the fact that we are not at present capable of the rapid deployment of major military forces. A conventional threat in the Mideast would catch us flat-footed: it would take us more than a month to deliver two Marine divisions and support equipment. (When Mr. Carter announced his training exercise at Guantanamo to amuse the Cubans, our few landing craft had to be pulled out of heavy maintenance.)

Belatedly, Carter budgeteers are weighing the Pentagon secret Persian Gulf contingency planning study that shows how power could be projected into the area. (Our State Department fussed at not being included in this planning; fortunately for hardliners, it was not.)

Short-range, we are forced to strip our forces around the globe to create a three-carrier task force in the Indian Ocean. Long-range, we must make up for Mr. Carter's scuttling of the Navy by building Fast Deployment Logistic ships; also, to bolster our meager fleet of heavy-lift aircraft, we must build the "CX" — a new version of the C-5A air transports whose cost overruns in the 1980's still give Defense Secretary Harold Brown nightmares.

With our embassy staff held hostage, it makes sense to bite our tongues for a while. The job of creative diplomacy is neither to admire our own restraint nor to get ready to thump our chests; instead, we should be planning to react to this act of war with a strategy to stop the Soviet reach for the oil lifeline of the West.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE C-3WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
14 NOVEMBER 1979

The events in Iran dominate the Washington scene

Betty Beale

Even with Ted Kennedy announcing and all those stories about Chappaquiddick, and even with Ronald Reagan announcing, too, the sole story consuming Washington at every social event is what to do about the hostages in Iran.

At a dinner party the other night, discussions raged in varying degrees of polite vehemence at every table — and the opinions at one were fascinating.

Seated together were House Foreign Affairs Chairman Clement Zablocki who composed the congressional letter to the Ayatollah Khomeini; Deputy Director of the CIA Frank Carlucci who was carefully limiting his comments lest something be read into them; Middle East expert and former Undersecretary of State Joe Sisco who as president of American University had something to say about Iranian students; a beautiful young Iranian woman with Zbigniew Brzezinski staffer, bearded Bob Hunter; Shirley Metzenbaum who was the best listener; and Carl Rowan, who did the most talking.

Most rejected the idea that we should have conducted a tit-for-tat operation here the minute our embassy over there was invaded. The Persian girl, who has family in Iran, said Khomeini is an absolute madman who might then have ordered the Americans killed.

Sisco said there are definite signs on his campus that some Iranian students are shifting from support of the Ayatollah because his dictatorship betrays the goals of the revolution. Zablocki produced the letter

which House leaders and 220 members of Congress signed. It did not mention the shah, but urged release of the hostages "on humanitarian grounds."

"To love God and to do his will through righteousness and piety is a universally accepted religious tenet. We find this great truth in the words of the Koran," wrote Zablocki, soothingly to a man who hasn't shown an ounce of humanity to his own people who disagreed with him.

Privately, all seemed to be in agreement about one thing. Once all Americans are out of that country, we should cut off relations and ship all their students home.

With that off their chest, everyone took to the dance floor where Secretary of the Treasury and Mrs. Miller, Secretary of Energy and Mrs. Duncan, Presidential As-

sistant and Mrs. Frank Moore, were already sashaying to relieve the week's tension. No wonder this is the dancingest town around.

Things got even more serious at the Ken Giddens' supper Saturday night that was billed as "An Evening with Clare Luce" and put on by Ernest Lefever, director of the Ethics and Public Policy Center. He likes to gather, once a month, around an acknowledged brain, a cross section of opinions from public officials to press, pose a question to the brain — and let the evening unfurl from there.

The question was — Is the United States on the skids? Are we on an unstoppable decline, and what should we do about it? The gist of Clare's answer was, she has confidence in the American people providing they can get the right leadership.

For two hours La Luce held forth with her philosophical view of the world, accented with historical references, captivating reminiscences, and take-offs of famous personalities — she mimicked Churchill perfectly — and so entertained the group. They sat spellbound.

She wound up unravelling an hilarious plot about an American president, pretending Sen. Nancy Kasselbaum, who was there, was the president, and Arthur Burns, also present, was her advisor.

When the question, what can we do about Iran? came up, Burns said both the Iranian government and the Iranian citizens have enormous assets in this country which we could freeze; also, he suggested, by halting the shipment of spare parts, their advanced technology would eventually grind to a halt.

Frank Barnett, defense expert and president of the National Strategy Information Center, a think tank here and in New York, said our lack of military muscle was responsible for our inferior posture in the whole Persian Gulf area.

Brookings Institution President and Mrs. Bruce MacLaury were there along with Sen. and Mrs. Spark Matsunaga, Sen. Ted Stevens, and numerous others.

Clare was walking that evening. She had just been outfitted by a pair of soft contact lenses by famed Dr. John McTigue and for the first time in over 10 years, can wake up in the morning and see. They are the kind that are not taken out of the eyes for six months.

She was also pleased over the number of friends who came to West Point to see her get the Sylvanus Thayer Award and sword last month. "People came from all over the country," she said. "I was amazed."

From Washington went former Ambassador Elbridge Durbrow, Jim Angleton of CIA, fame Gen. and Mrs. Ira Eaker, and Charles

Murphy, author of the popular "The Winsor Story." Former Ambassador and Mrs. William Sullivan was there, as was Gen. E. Black from Honolulu, President John Silbe of Boston University, and Gen. Richard Stilwell. She was particularly touched that Gen. and Mrs. Lauris Norstad came.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-14NEW YORK TIMES
14 NOVEMBER 1979

Key Members of Crisis Task Force in Washington

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 13 — The Iranian crisis has spawned a special working group in the State Department's seventh-floor operations center that is staffed around the clock. Its centerpiece is a large conference table, with maps, a blackboard, source materials and files of the latest relevant information from Teheran and elsewhere.

The two men in overall charge of the task force operation are David D. Newsom, the department's third-ranking officer, and Harold H. Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.

After these two, members of the task force say that there is no fixed table of organization, with a great many officials filling in whenever a demand for their special knowledge or ability arises.

All agree, however, that two of the key members of the task force are Henry Precht, who has headed the Iranian Affairs office throughout the crisis in American relations with that country, and Peter D. Constable, the chief Deputy Assistant Secretary of State to Mr. Saunders.

David D. Newsom

A balding, sandy-haired, low-keyed veteran of 32 years in the Foreign Service... Was appointed Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs in 1978, after serving as United States Ambassador in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Libya... Born in Richmond, Calif., on Jan. 6, 1918, graduated from the University of California at Berkeley in 1938 and in 1940 from Columbia University's Graduate School of Journalism... A newspaper reporter from 1938 to 1941 and publisher of The Walnut Creek Courier-Journal in California, 1946-47, after serving four years in the Navy... Joined Foreign Service in 1947 and served in Pakistan, Norway, Iraq and England... Was officer in charge of Arabian Peninsula affairs from 1956 to 1969 and deputy director and then director of the Office of Northern African Affairs... Had difficult time as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from 1969 to 1974, when he often differed, though never publicly, with the Nixon Administration's policies... Married to the former Jean Craig and they have three sons and two daughters.

Harold H. Saunders

Tall, baldish, bespectacled, soft-spoken man who will be 49 years old next month... Came to high State Department offices not from the career

Foreign Service but by way of Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Council staff... Born in Philadelphia Dec. 27, 1930... Graduated from Princeton University in 1952 and completed his doctorate in American Studies at Yale in 1956... During three years as an officer in Air Force, he was detailed to the C.I.A. as an analyst in 1958-59 and remained with the agency as a civilian until 1961... Then joined staff of National Security Council and served in that White House agency for 13 years... Worked on problems in the Near East, South Asia and North Africa, until Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger brought him to State Department in 1974 as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.

Henry Precht

Outspoken Georgian who runs the Iran desk... Perhaps the most knowledgeable official State Department has on recent developments on Iran... Named to post in April 1978, after four years in embassy in Teheran now being held by Iranian students... Since then, has been deeply involved in one crisis after another... According to colleagues, his sense of humor and cool temperament, as much as anything else, has gotten him and other through... Is 47 years old... Had just returned from three week trip to Iran on a mission to strengthen relations when embassy was taken over... Was then sent with former Attorney General Ramsey Clark on his abortive attempt to win release of hostages... Born June 15, 1932... Graduated from Emory University in 1953 and spent next four years in Navy... After two years with Labor Department, joined State Department in 1961... Assigned to Rome 1962 and transferred to Alexandria, Egypt, in 1964, where he served as a consular official... Spent late 1960's first at National Aeronautics and Space Administration and then at Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy... In August 1970, was named Deputy Chief of Mission at Port Louis, Mauritius... Two years later he was assigned to Teheran, where until 1976 he served as political consular... Married and has three children.

Peter D. Constable

Brought back to Washington last July from post in Pakistan... Idea was to beef up State Department's coverage of South Asia... Since then, has been up to his ears dealing with Iran... Now Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Af-

fairs... At 47, finds himself in day-to-day charge of the task force handling the latest crisis... Called "well organized, cool-headed, and thoughtful" by colleagues... Has risen rather rapidly through ranks... Born in New York on April 10, 1932, and graduated in 1957, after two years in Army, with a masters degree from Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies... Joined State Department that year... First post overseas was as consular officer in Vigo, Spain, where he served for just over two years... In 1961, transferred to Tegucigalpa, Honduras, as political officer... In January 1967, detailed to Hindi-Urdu language training, and a year and a half later found himself serving as political officer in consulate in Lahore, Pakistan... Served there three years... In 1973, after a year at National War College, became director of Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh Affairs... Last post before his current one was as Deputy Chief of Mission in Pakistan... Wife, Elinor, is also a Foreign Service officer. They have three children.




Harold H. Saunders



David D. Newsom



Peter D. Constable



Henry Precht

Glimmer of new hope for US hostages in Iran

America could agree to economic cooperation and unofficial censure of Shah's 'misdeeds'

By John K. Cooley and Daniel Southerland
Staff correspondents of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington — Despite tense rhetoric from all sides, the United States sees some positive signs in the apparently hard-line conditions laid down by Iran for the release of American hostages.

In the State Department view, the tough conditions may at least leave room for negotiation. Until recently it appeared that Iran was presenting the US with an ultimatum: Agree to send back the Shah or we won't even talk with you about freeing the hostages.

There were other potentially positive signs:

- Iran has asked the United Nations Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim, to intervene personally in the crisis and has passed its demands on to him. The US sees some hope in "internationalizing" the problem. Inasmuch as a multiplicity of international contacts with the Iranian Government might lead it "to see reason."

- The State Department reports it is in direct telephone contact with the Iranian students holding the hostages and that it has relayed verbal messages through the students to the hostages from their families. Mail also is said to be going to the hostages after it is screened by their captors. This could be one indication that a long, slow process is the only prospect, but it is nonetheless viewed as a positive development.

In a meeting with foreign diplomats in Tehran Nov. 12, acting Foreign Minister Abolhassan Bani-Sadr declared that Iran had three demands: The US must recognize that the Shah is a criminal and extradite him to stand trial in Iran; acknowledge that the Shah's fortune belongs to the Iranian people; and guarantee an end to "American meddling" in Iranian domestic affairs.

Given the Shah's past friendship with the United States and the lack of any apparent legal grounds for his extradition, the US continues to refuse to return him to Iran. But once his medical treatment permits, it might encourage him to accept President Sadat's invitation to go to Egypt for convalescence. An Iranian diplomat had earlier indicated that if

the Shah left the US, it would have a positive effect on the situation.

The US is not likely to agree to the humiliation involved in recognizing that the Shah is a "criminal" and that his fortune belongs to the Iranian people. But there is no reason why some US officials, at a level perhaps lower than the President or the Secretary of State, could not acknowledge what is already widely accepted: that the Shah did commit misdeeds.

The US also could eventually agree to some form of economic cooperation — while not committing itself to the precedent of agreeing to "compensation" — under a new relationship with Iran. This might help overcome some of the frustration and resentment many Iranians feel toward the United States.

The least difficult of Iran's conditions to meet would be that of guaranteeing an end to "meddling" in the country's internal affairs. The Central Intelligence Agency's role in placing the Shah back in power in the 1950s is well known to many Iranians. But the US now appears to be in a position to affirm that this sort of intervention is neither in progress nor contemplated.

US hope for a diplomatic solution, in view of international pressures on Tehran, is supported by several American and Iranian experts. Said Prof. Richard Cottam, a University of Pittsburgh scholar of Iranian affairs: "The Iranians should realize that interventionists and pro-Shah elements are not making US policy."

Iranian suspicions, and a genuine, top-level Iranian belief in a US plot to restore the Shah, said Professor Cottam, at a recent academic conference in Salt Lake City, are "understandable." So, he added, is the belief

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of many Iranians in an Arab coalition being built against them, led by their western neighbor, Iraq.

Prof. Thomas Ricks, a Georgetown University Iranian expert personally acquainted with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and his followers, predicts the transfer of the Shah to Egypt, Mexico, or to some other destination would lead to the release of the hostages because it would help to relieve these Iranian suspicions.

Meanwhile, Iranian concern over neighboring Iraq has grown, say returning travelers, ever since Iraq denounced its 1975 peace accord with Iran two weeks ago. Iraqi troops have moved into forward border positions along the entire frontier, and there were reports of exchanges of fire across the frontier. There also were signs of increased Iraqi support to Iranian Kurds rebelling against Ayatollah Khomeini. Iraq has stepped up naval patrols on the Shatt al-Arab waterway, dividing their frontier near the gulf oil ports.

US and Arab analysts are watching the attitude of Iran's naval commander, Adm. Ahmed Madani, an anti-Shah leader whom the Ayatollah earlier dismissed as defense minister. Since naval maneuvers in September, Admiral Madani has deployed ships and about three battalions of US-equipped marines along Iran's gulf oil ports in a manner that, one Arab analyst said, "suggested more that he was expecting a confrontation with Tehran than with Iraq or some outside power."

Ali Akbar Tabatabai, a former Iranian diplomat who speaks here for an anti-Khomeini group known as the Iran Freedom Foundation, called on Americans in the meantime to be "careful about their anti-Iranian demonstrations."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 49

THE NEW YORK SUNDAY DAILY NEWS
11 November 1979

Iran: Out goes the rule book

By LARS-ERIK NELSON

WASHINGTON—At 3 a.m. last Sunday, Bob Steven, the senior watch officer in the State Department's windowless seventh floor operations center, began to feel he was in for a quiet night. The telephone hadn't rung for two hours. The bank of four teletype machines was quiet. Steven picked up a cloth and began mopping coffee stains off the long yellow desk he shared with his deputy, Don Lyman.

At 3:03, seven of the eight digital clocks on the far wall quietly flipped to indicate three minutes past the hour in London, Cairo, Hong Kong, and elsewhere around the world. (The Rio de Janeiro clock stopped at 2159 on Oct. 24 and hasn't run since.)

Then the black phone rang. Steven hurried to straighten the papers on his desk as a voice told him: "This is the embassy in Tehran. Demonstrators have broken into the compound and the staff is withdrawing to upper floors."

Steven flipped the call onto a loudspeaker, and the chants of 3,000 Iranian militants filled the wood-paneled, carpeted operations center. A thundering in the background seemed to be the sound of battering rams smashing into the steel security doors inside the embassy.

Keeping the line to Tehran open, Steven and Lyman pressed the direct phone buttons that alert the White House situations room, the National Military Command Center, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency. When the nightwatch and all six organizations were plugged into the conference call, Steven said: "Gentlemen, we have a crisis on our hands."

Steven's handling of the crisis was standard operating procedure, but the event itself — the seizure of a U.S. Embassy by a government-authorized mob — was an unprecedented breakdown of the rules of international diplomacy. None of the traditional mechanisms for negotiation worked, and the conclusion was swiftly drawn that in Iran the United States was faced with a national madness, an institutionalized bloodlust, against which rules of logic, decency, fair play and diplomacy were helpless.

STEVEN AND Lyman alerted Undersecretary of State David Newsom, who woke up a dead tired Secretary of State Vance — just back from the funeral of Korean President Park Chung-hee — before 5 a.m. Before 6 Newsom also briefed President Carter by phone.

A buzzer sounded in the operations center signaling the arrival of a flash telegram from Tehran confirming the occupation and asking permission to destroy codes and communications equipment. Assistant Secretary of State Harold Saunders quickly gave his okay.

But as the briefings raced through the secure phone lines of upper-echelon Washington, the sleepy officials assembled in the operations center could do little more than listen to the lone voice on the line from Tehran report:

"We have asked the foreign ministry to send police. None have come."

"The demonstrators appear to be students. They're telling us we have nothing to fear."

"The Marines are throwing tear gas canisters. The demonstrators have captured two Marines."

"We smell smoke. They may be using an acetylene torch to cut through the security doors."

"There are demonstrators on the roof trying to break into the upper windows."

"They're in the room. They're leading people out one by one, blindfolding them and tying their hands behind their backs."

The lone, courageous voice — U.S. officials have asked the Daily News not to identify it further —

manned the telephone quietly in the corner as colleagues were led out of the room. Finally, at 4:57 a.m., a loud electronic squeal sounded over the loudspeakers in the operations center, announcing that the phone had been ripped from the wall. The voice was gone, its owner joining 59 other Americans in captivity inside the embassy compound.

Attacks on U.S. Embassies are nothing new. Since August 28, 1968, when U.S. Ambassador J. Gordon Mein was murdered in a kidnap attempt in Guatemala, the State Department has listed 214 "significant terrorist incidents involving U.S. diplomatic or official personnel and installations."

The major ones:

- July 31, 1970 — U.S. Public Safety Adviser Dan Mitrione was kidnaped by guerrillas in Uruguay and murdered.

- March 1, 1973 — U.S. Ambassador Cleo Noel and his deputy, George Moore, were taken hostage by guerrillas in the Sudan and murdered the next day.

- August 19, 1974 — U.S. Ambassador Rodger Davies and an embassy secretary were killed when armed demonstrators fired into the windows of the U.S. Embassy on Cyprus. Six men were arrested, but the longest sentence served for the murders was 18 months.

- Dec. 23, 1975 — Richard S. Welch, CIA station chief in Athens, was killed outside his home by unidentified gunmen.

- June 18, 1976 — Ambassador Francis Meloy and economic counselor Robert O. Waring were murdered after a kidnaping in Beirut.

- Feb. 14, 1979 — U.S. Ambassador Adolph Dubs was seized by terrorists in Afghanistan and killed when Soviet-advised Afghan police — against U.S. wishes — stormed the hotel room where he was being held (that same day Iranian demonstrators occupied the U.S. Embassy in Tehran for the first time).

In only two of those cases — the Cyprus and Afghanistan killings — was there even a suggestion of official complicity in an attack on U.S. diplomats. Until last Sunday, no government had ever been so obviously involved in the seizure of a foreign embassy and the kidnaping of diplomats.

But last Sunday, when the government of Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan was still in power, Iranian security forces were five minutes away from the beleaguered embassy. Despite repeated pleas for help, as the Marines held off the 3,000-man mob for more than two hours, the Iranian police never came.

In such circumstances, U.S. officials insist there is nothing an embassy can do. "People picture Marines with their M-16s on their hips, mowing people down," one official said. "If they did that, they'd be butchered." Despite obvious threats to the embassy in Tehran, the Marine contingent numbered only 14 — just enough to protect classified documents and deter robbers.

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UNLESS YOU RELY on the host government for protection, you'd have to have a Marine division around every embassy, and that obviously can't be done," one official said.

Iran is not the only place where U.S. diplomats have been and will be vulnerable. Though the U.S. government has spent more than \$100 million beefing up embassy security and armoring diplomatic cars in recent years, the Stars and Stripes in a foreign land is going to remain a tempting target.

Last month an armed mob of 150 tried to seize the U.S. Embassy in El Salvador, but was driven off by Marine tear gas. Turkey has been the scene of scores of attacks on U.S. diplomats and servicemen and may be the likeliest place for a repetition of what happened in Tehran. Central and South America have repeatedly been the scene of attacks on U.S. Embassies.

For good or ill, America is a global power with interests that warrant 141 diplomatic missions around the world. When the threat is obviously great, one option is to close an embassy altogether as the U.S. did in Uganda in 1973 when now-deposed dictator Idi Amin was a clear threat to American lives. U.S. diplomats have also been withdrawn from Equatorial Guinea following a breakdown of law and order.

The hope in Washington is that what happened last week in Iran will remain unique, a bolt of lightning that will not strike again. But the last 35 years indicate otherwise: There are today more sovereign nations than responsible leaders. The Ayatollah Khomeini is clearly driven by his own special demons, but he is not alone. Amin, Cambodia's Pol Pot and the Emperor Bokassa of the Central African Empire have been equally blood-thirsty and equally impervious to conventional diplomacy.

In the past, when diplomatic reason has failed, nations went to war. Today it is impossible for a great nation to declare war against tiny countries with half-baked leaders. The day of colonialism — of "educating" the rest of the world to accept our notion of civilization — is also over. But until we can all agree on some rules of behavior, the quiet, carpeted State Department operations center is likely to resound again and again with the buzzer that means a flash cable has landed and Americans somewhere in the world are in danger.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 32THE NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
13 November 1979

Beyond the embargo, what?

PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

WASHINGTON—The awful ongoing humiliation of the American government in Tehran is a consequence of three years of the Andrew Young approach toward the Third World. Can one imagine the Kremlin response had the ayatollah seized the Russian Embassy and imprisoned and molested 60 soldiers and diplomats? Whether or not the fanatic in Qum instigated the "student" seizure of the U.S. Embassy, he has condoned it. Which comes close to an act of war against the United States.

We have reached the point predicted by many, where the upholding of the national honor has entailed an interruption of the nation's vital oil supply. We are at this juncture because of an absence of vision, decisiveness, imagination, courage and will at the highest levels of our government. It is symptomatic of the American condition that those carrying the messages of concern for the safety of our imperiled personnel have been the Palestine Liberation Organization and that Churchillian figure, Ramsey Clark.

Still, one rule of diplomacy is that one never closes off every avenue of honorable retreat for an enemy. To reassure the paranoids in Iran that the shah's hospitalization is not some Nixon-Kissinger-CIA scheme, Carter should allow the shah and his medical records to be seen by a doctor of the Iranian government's designation residing now in the United States. It would be an act of unforgiving national dishonor for the United States to accede to the ayatollah's demand and return the shah to the justice of his Islamic courts.

The message should be delivered privately, directly and unmistakably that the ayatollah will be held personally accountable for the fate of the hostages. Andrew Young once said the ayatollah would one day be considered a "saint." He should be placed upon notice that, if tragedy befalls the Americans, the United States will expedite his beatification.

Public saber-rattling makes little sense. Alerting of airborne or Marine units or the Seventh Fleet or SAC would seem both unnecessary and unwise. To do so would only incite the crazies. Unlike Entebbe, where the Is-

rael hostages were held by a handful of terrorists in an airport building remote from the capital, the U.S. hostages are in downtown Tehran. Any rescue attempt by U.S. forces would likely result in a bloody fiasco with U.S. soldiers joining the hostages in their almost certain fate.

Nonetheless, the present situation cannot be allowed to endure indefinitely.

The U.S. government should convey to the ayatollah a date after which the United States, in the absence of the release of the hostages, will consider punitive action. While such a secret message could inflame the situation and endanger the hostages—given the fanaticism of their captors—it might work. After all, the American POWs were never so well treated as when Nixon sent the B-52s over Hanoi.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE CITHE WASHINGTON POST
10 November 1979

So Let the Iranians Protest— It's the American Way

RICHARD COHEN

DOWN AT 18th and G, where the police chief sat in his car, the Iranian demonstrators filed by, calling for the death of the shah and yelling things about the CIA, and it was like they were singing "America the Beautiful." You had to listen hard, but that is what they were singing.

In the street, they kept coming. The students were olive-skinned, and always, it seemed in need of a shave, and the women were bundled against the 20th century—heads covered in the traditional fashion. Every once in a while, someone older would pass by, someone not a student. One of them was a man dressed in a blue business suit. He was old and he was short and he looked like he was lost on the way to the Metropolitan Club. But he was Khomeini's man, no doubt about it.

It was lunch hour in Washington. It was downtown, the area of the banks and the White House and the agencies. Some of the bystanders shouted at the demonstrators and some people made obscene gestures but most people just watched. Like me, they had never seen anything quite like this.

Come tell me, the sense of this sort of demonstration? Tell me why people march in support of people who are threatening the life of innocent hostages—march not in their own country but in the homeland of the hostages. Explain the gratitude they have for the country that has given them an education and tell me how you can call for the death of a man—any man—who is already dying of cancer.

Tell me if the shah, high in his New York hospital room, can hear the demonstrators down the block calling for his death, and if, somehow, he knew it would come to this—lots of money and lots of influential friends but without a home. He is wanted almost nowhere. The exception is Iran and there they want him dead.

The line of demonstrators moved on. It was long and surrounded by cops. There were cops in the front and cops in the rear and cops throughout the crowd. Every other po-

liceman had a bulge in his suit jacket and an earplug in his ear. Along the flanks of the march, cops rode on horseback. The horses walked close together—head to rump. It was like the flying wedge out of the old days of football. There was no way to break through.

This is a city of demonstrations. It has seen so many of them they are almost commonplace. People demonstrate here for causes you never heard of and in the name of countries you can't find on your old National Geographic maps. They march and they march and they march, and sometimes they march because they love something and sometimes because they hate something, but never because they love a man who does nothing but hate.

A student held a bullhorn. "Death to the shah," he shouted. The voice came out tinny but then the other demonstrators echoed it: "Death to the shah." Farther down the line of march, another student cheerleader called for a different slogan: "Long live Khomeini." Then the students behind him picked up this chant, and if you stayed between the two groups you could hear one chant with one ear and another chant with another ear. It is this way with marching bands in a parade.

All the time, the people on the curb yelled back. Some people yelled, "Death to Khomeini," and one person held up a placard with a toilet bowl drawn on it. It said, "Flush Khomeini down the drainey." It made you laugh.

But there was plenty of anger, too. It is not easy to have your own countrymen taken hostage. It is not easy to see your flag curbed and your nation spat on. It is not easy coming after Vietnam and Panama and all the losses—always we lose. It would be good to win one, to kick a butt or two, to see the flag run up instead of always down, to see the Marines hit the beach and yell "semper parati" and give them the old John Wayne.

But you cannot do that any more. Nobody can and we can least of all. We need oil and we need allies and we are not, in the eyes of the Iranians, virgins. The shah is here and we supported him when he was in power, and very important men have called him their friend. Still, the anger wells up in you. Somewhere in all of us is a flag that never touches ground.

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But as the students marched, as they cursed the country that has given them hospitality and praised the man who hates our guts, you had to wonder about them—about their faith in us. Their rhetoric aside, they were saying they really knew America. They knew they could march and they knew the cops would protect them and not arrest them, and they knew that in America you can give the country the finger and still keep your rights. It is not, to say the least, that way in Iran.

So they marched. They yelled and they screamed and they carried their signs. And in my head I heard "America the Beautiful" and I thought, honest I did, that I wish my grandmother had lived to see this. "Only in America," she would have said. And she would have been right.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE B7THE WASHINGTON POST
11 November 1979Joseph Kraft

Time for a Show of Power

Events in Tehran decree the opening of a full-scale inquest into American policy toward Iran. Not only because American citizens have to be protected. More important, the whole Mideast—and in the matter of oil, the whole world—needs to be insulated against the fanaticism of the Ayatollah Khomeini.

The starting point of the inquest is acceptance of a hard fact that does not go down well with moralists in the country at large and the administration in particular—namely, that the downfall of the shah was a calamity for American national interests.

Like him or not, the shah made available to the world a regular flow of oil in large amounts and without political conditions. His imperial pretensions, and the forces he maintained, imposed order on the Iranian plateau and the submerged nationalities that populate its borderlands.

The ayatollah, in contrast, instituted what amounts to a cultural revolution. He is preparing an Islamic constitution that vests absolute authority in the Moslem clergy, or mullahs. He pushes Iran's brand of Islam—the Shi'ite version—into neighboring countries where the more orthodox, Sunni brand

of the creed holds sway. He ties the sale and production of oil to narrow political considerations.

Since theocracy doesn't work, practical power gravitates elsewhere. In Tehran, militant students and revolutionary guards rule the streets. The minorities of the provinces—including the oil fields in the south—are restive or in revolt. Every country adjoining Iran sees in the ayatollah a threat to stability, which is not high in the region anyway.

Washington has tried appeasement of the ayatollah with disastrous results. Not only has American sovereignty been trampled in the embassy, but this country has been increasingly regarded by Iran's neighbors as a poor credit risk, a pitiful helpless giant.

In trying to right the balance, Washington first needs to reduce its vulnerability to the blackmail tactics of the Iranian militants. That means closing down the embassy in Tehran and shutting down the embassy here—at least until a firm understanding on ground rules can be reached.

In the bargain, as an indication that it means business, the United States ought to enforce seriously the laws governing Iranian students in this

country. If the laws are inadequate, then new statutes can be written.

A next necessary step is to blunt the Iranian oil weapon. The United States can easily push the few American companies that do business with Iran to other sources. Whatever is lost on that account, and it will not be more than 500,000 barrels daily, can be offset from allied countries—notably the Japanese, French and Germans—that buy Iranian oil. In that way this country would show Iran and the world something they both need to know—that Tehran cannot organize an oil embargo against the United States.

The next step is the truly important step. It involves finding occasion for an unmistakable, and preferably surprising, assertion of American power on behalf of the regimes that feel menaced by the ayatollah. That might take the form of supporting Iraq in its efforts to stir up provincial resistance inside Iran. It might mean giving military assistance to Turkey.

But the most likely candidates for American help are the oil-rich monarchies of the Persian Gulf. The regimes in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the Arab Emirates and Oman feel their security in danger. They would

like to develop a joint policy for the Persian Gulf, and they met to consider measures to that effect in Saudi Arabia on Oct. 18.

The United States could support them *en bloc*. More dramatically and more effectively, it could give assistance to a particular country in a particular place—say, Oman, at the choke point of the Gulf, the Straits of Hormuz.

To find and exploit such opportunities, there is required a crucial internal change, in Washington. The United States needs a capacity to do something besides sending Marines and bombing. It has to rebuild a capacity self-destructed only a few years ago—a capacity for covert intervention.

As that requirement suggests, the rebuilding of American policy toward Iran is going to be a long, slow, uphill task. It will probably be years before this country is ready to play a political role in Iran.

But in the meantime there is one thing ordinary Americans can do. There is nothing in the Constitution that obliges this country to be run by a president whose instinctive reaction to a challenge is a declaration of national impotence.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 1426

TIME
19 November 1979

Blackmailing the U.S.

The lives of some 60 Americans hung in the balance in Tehran

The Carter Administration found itself woefully short of ways to deal with the crisis. It quickly ruled out a Mayaguez- or Entebbe-style attack as impractical under the circumstances. Nor did the Administration have the option of undertaking any kind of covert action inside Iran that might have tempered the situation. When the Shah fell last January, most of the U.S. intelligence apparatus in Iran fell along with him. Confessed one Washington official: "We have reviewed our assets and our options, and they are precious few."

EXCERPT

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A1-10

THE WASHINGTON POST
13 November 1979

U.S., Iran Declare Halt to Oil Trade

Aide Lists Terms on Captives

By Jonathan C. Randal

Washington Post Foreign Service

TEHRAN, Nov. 12—A defiant Iranian government today raised the negotiating price for the release of hostages held at the U.S. Embassy here and declared an oil embargo against the United States.

Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr, appointed last week by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to run the Iranian Foreign Ministry, told a meeting of the more than 70 accredited chiefs of diplomatic missions here that Iran has three demands:

- American recognition that Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi is a criminal and must be extradited to stand trial here.

- The return to Iran of the shah's fortune, described as the assets of the Iranian people.

- An end to "American meddling" in Iranian domestic affairs.

Later, Iranian radio and television interrupted its nightly programs to announce an embargo on oil sales to the United States at about the same time President Carter was telling the American people that the United States would no longer buy Iranian oil.

Although the Iranian announcement seemed to follow Carter's statement, Oil Minister Ali Akbar Moïnfar insisted that the ruling Revolutionary Council had already made the decision in a six-hour meeting this afternoon and evening.

Independent observers said news that Carter was considering a boycott reached Iran by radio before his decision was announced.

"The Revolutionary Council had considered stopping oil supplies to the United States when the shah was admitted" to a New York hospital for medical treatment, Moïnfar said. "But they didn't want to do anything harsh to the American people, so they delayed it [the decision]."

"Tonight, in fact, the Revolutionary Council made the decision to stop oil exports to the United States," he said, insisting that Iran had acted first. The minister said the decision would be "to the financial benefit of Iran because we have plenty of customers."

Analysts here tended to agree that Iran could benefit from higher spot market prices and noted that Japan recently had been pressing for as much as a 40 percent increase in its normal oil imports from Iran.

The Iranian announcement that it was cutting oil deliveries to the United States contained no indication of whether Iran was considering reducing production.

Asked to transmit Bani-Sadr's demands to Washington, diplomats from countries as politically different as radical Algeria and neutral Switzerland raised objections to the form and content of the Iranian government's initiative.

In Tehran itself, about 1,000 unemployed men, mostly high school graduates, took over the Labor Ministry to back demands for jobs, unemployment payments and health insurance.

Shouting "down with fascism, down

with reaction and down with tyranny," the unemployed were received by Labor Minister Ali Esbabodi after routing the Revolutionary Guards, who unsuccessfully fired over their heads in an abortive effort to disperse the demonstration.

The demonstration, organized by the Union of Iranian Communists, was one in a series called to protest widespread unemployment. Since the February revolution, 2 million to 3 million of an estimated 9 million work force have been jobless.

At the occupied U.S. Embassy, meanwhile, a student leader said the 500 Moslem militants who invaded it eight days ago were armed with just 10 pistols and were surprised to meet no resistance from Marine guards, Reuter news service reported.

Observers searching for a glimmer of hope noted that the way was now open not only for an American gesture, but also for discreet diplomacy likely to meet Iran's objection to anything visibly connected with formal mediation.

[In Washington, a State Department spokesman said the hostages will be permitted to receive letters from their families.]

However, the diplomatic consensus was that there appeared little hope of any rapid resolution of the crisis.

Swiss Ambassador Erik Lang reportedly argued that Iran's charges of espionage at the U.S. Embassy did not justify taking hostages.

International practice in such cases provided for expelling diplomats, reducing an embassy's size or even breaking diplomatic relations, he said amid applause from Western ambassadors.

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Bani-Sadr replied this was not a time to be absorbed in juridical details since the Iranian people have suffered humiliations at the hands of the United States.

Algerian Charge d'Affaires Mustafa Belhocine asked if the message were Iran's final word and if the ruling Revolutionary Council could not soften its language.

Bani-Sadr offered no such encouragement.

Signs of tension not directly related to the U.S.-Iranian crisis were also evident from Tehran to the rebellious province of Kurdistan in the west of the country.

Britain, for example, today followed an earlier U.S. and West German lead in urging its nationals "without a need to stay" to leave Iran.

Possibly promoting the British decision were recent Iranian press reports accusing Ambassador John Graham of running a spy ring allegedly working with Israel and U.S. espionage agencies to kill leaders of Iran's revolution.

Another recent article alleged that the Anglicans' Church Mission Society hospital and other services in Isfahan were spy centers.

The church's facilities were taken over recently by Islamic militants, and the Anglican bishop in Iran narrowly escaped an assassination attempt.

In Kurdistan, further fighting was reported, with Kurdish rebels said to have launched an "all-out attack" last night on the major city of Sanandaj and the regional towns of Jovanrud, Mowsud and Saqqez.

The report, from the official Pars News Agency, said the fighting continued today. It quoted a progovernment Revolutionary Guard commander in Kermanshah as saying, "A large number of people have been martyred"—the Islamic term for killed—"or wounded" in the fresh fighting. In Sanandaj, the news agency said, rebels had used rocket-propelled grenades against the Revolutionary Guards.

Tehran press reports said a government goodwill mission has returned from Kurdistan without having yet persuaded Kurds loyal to Sheik Ezzedine Hosseini to accept a compromise apparently approved by Abdurahman Qassemli, the leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party.

The Tehran authorities' apparent willingness to negotiate a separate peace with the party is a full measure of their military weakness. Only three months ago Ayatollah Khomeini ordered talks broken off and the rebellion crushed by force. But both the Army and Revolutionary Guards in Kurdistan are reported to be in a shambles.

In front of the U.S. Embassy, crowds kept up their anti-American chanting as the student captors of the hostages announced a five-day fast to back their demands.

The students said the hostages would be fed as usual.

Dozens of Islamic groups—ranging from Tehran bus drivers to diplomats abroad—joined the fast, which will be in effect from sunup to sundown.

Meanwhile, a 36-year-old Iranian who immolated himself last week in front of the embassy to back Khomeini's demands for the shah's return, was reported today to have died.

His last will and testament reportedly left all his worldly goods to Khomeini.

Reuter quoted a student leader at the embassy as saying of the Nov. 4 takeover: "We had expected that many of us would be killed. It was quite a surprise."

The 24-year-old leader, who gave his name only as Hassan, repeated the occupiers' insistence that no hostages will be released until the shah is returned for trial.

Hassan said a plot to occupy the embassy was hatched about 2½ weeks ago and was planned down to the last detail.

Only 10 students were aware of the plan until the morning of the takeover. Then, they gathered some 500 trusted Islamic students at four Tehran universities, and the leaders told them where they should go in the embassy and what they should do, Hassan said.

"First we made sure everyone knew how to fire a pistol or an automatic rifle, which we knew we would find inside the embassy," he said. "But really we had a maximum of 10 pistols between us."

He continued: "The whole group of around 500 assembled a block east of the embassy, ironically near Roosevelt Avenue, at 10:30. They immediately marched west along Taleghani Avenue towards the embassy's front gates.

"The girls marched in front and we all sang and chatted. We let the girls march on past the gates, then turned and faced the embassy. A few hand-picked men ran at the gates and clambered over. The gates were not padlocked and they were able to open them easily and let us all in.


"There were three or four Iranian policemen, armed with pistols, inside the gate but they were dumbfounded. Anyway, we knew policemen were under strict orders not to shoot anyone.

"But we were surprised to find no Marines. We walked forward in groups in all directions through the compound. We met no resistance. The four or five Marines who live at the back of the compound locked themselves in their quarters.

"We all went to our arranged positions, occupying the chancery, the visa section and the bugalows first. Most of the Americans calmly put their hands on their heads when they saw us," Hassan said.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-1

NEW YORK TIMES
13 NOVEMBER 1979



ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A18THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
13 November 1979

Carter Bars Oil, Rejects Terrorism

By Phil Galley

Washington Star Staff Writer

President Carter has halted oil imports from Iran in a move designed to demonstrate American determination without provoking Iranian militants holding more than 60 hostages in the U.S. Embassy in Tehran.

"No one should underestimate the resolve of the American government and the American people in this matter," a grim-faced Carter said yesterday in a brief statement broadcast from the White House. "It is necessary to eliminate any suggestion that economic pressures can weaken our stand on basic issues of principle. Our position must be clear."

The president emphasized that it "is vital to the United States and to every other nation that the lives of diplomatic personnel and other citizens abroad be protected, and that we refuse to permit the use of terrorism and the seizure and the holding of hostages to impose political demands."

As administration officials view the president's action, it could provide impetus to U.S. energy conservation, ease American anger and frustration over the crisis and discourage other countries from trying to play their own oil card to gain U.S. political concessions. All of this could be accomplished, the officials say, without forcing Americans back into gas lines.

But the president's decision involves some risks — including the possibility that Iran's revolutionary leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and his Moslem followers could be provoked to further anti-U.S. moves. There is also the danger of added energy-related inflation in this country.

Administration officials regard neither as a likely prospect, however.

Asked about the chance of Iranian retaliation, a senior official told reporters, "There is unanimity among us that this should not produce any action on their part. It is merely an act of self-discipline on our part."

Another high-level official involved in shaping economic policy said that if Americans heed the president's call for conservation, the boycott of Iranian oil should have a "favorable impact" on the U.S. economy.

"To the extent that the American people support the president and restrain their own demands and use of petroleum products, I would see this as not impairing our economic outlook," the official said. "To the extent that we do not show some restraint, we would have to be concerned later about possible price actions."

Officials insisted that the president's only concern in taking the action was to demonstrate that the United States will not bow to economic pressures or political terrorism.

They conceded there is little hope Carter's action will cause the Iranians to relent in their demand that the United States hand over the deposed Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who is undergoing cancer treatment in a New York hospital, in exchange for the American hostages.

The idea of the oil embargo, they said, had been one of the options under consideration by the president almost from the beginning of the crisis, nine days ago when Iranian militants stormed the U.S.

Embassy in Tehran and seized the hostages.

Carter asked Cabinet members last week to assess the political and economic impact of such action. When they made their reports, the president decided the advantages clearly outweighed the disadvantages.

Administration sources said Carter, who canceled plans to spend the weekend at Camp David and remained at the White House, made the decision Sunday to carry out the embargo and went over the plan one last time with his National Security Council late that afternoon.

He was advised that it was about the strongest action he could take without risking retaliation by the Iranians. His advisers also saw it as a rare opportunity to enlist the country's support in the cause of energy conservation.

U. S. intelligence officials suggested that the sooner Americans sever their dependence on Iranian oil the better.

With Iran plunging deeper into political chaos, it is possible that a new internal convulsion could bring oil production there to a halt — a development that could have serious repercussions for world oil supplies.

Yesterday, about 15 minutes before the president announced his decision, the State Department advised the Iranian foreign ministry in Tehran.

Minutes after Carter spoke, Iranian officials, in an apparent you-can't-fire-me-I-quit response, announced Iran had decided to cut off oil exports to the United States.

Officials in Iran said they had decided to cut off oil shipments to the United States before Carter's announcement and planned to sell the oil to other customers.

The administration also informed members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries yesterday afternoon. In doing so, it asked OPEC members to keep oil production at current levels so the Iranian embargo did not lead to a worldwide reduction in supplies.

Meanwhile, U. S. officials said yesterday that efforts to secure the release of the hostages in Tehran have made no progress, but they said the administration will continue to pursue a settlement through diplomatic channels.

"We still have a number of diplomatic efforts going in various channels," said one senior official. "I do not want to go into what those specific channels are. I do not think it would help to disclose them. Indeed, I think it would be harmful if I did so."

The official said the only "encouraging" news from Tehran is word that "the hostages are having more access to people from the outside who can come in as observers."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A1-11THE WASHINGTON POST
12 November 1979

'Deportation Is a Poor Trick'

By Loretta Tofani
Washington Post Staff Writer

Iranian student activists in Washington said yesterday that they plan to continue demonstrating here and will not be deterred by President Carter's order that Iranian students illegally in this country be deported.

The activists, who attend universities here, continued their demand that Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, now undergoing cancer treatment in New York, be returned to Iran.

Aware of the growing anti-Iranian feeling in this country, they nonetheless voiced the Iranian government's position that the more than 60 Americans being held hostage in Tehran should not be released until the shah is returned to Iran.

"Deportation is a very poor trick," said an Iranian student at George Washington University who called himself Teimoor. "It will not work. If only one student is left here, that student will demonstrate."

Another student, interviewed at the Moslem Students Association at 16th and Montague streets NW, said: "If they wanted to deport me, even though I'm here legally, I would go back gladly. I don't feel like I have to waste my people's money by being in the United States."

Carter ordered the Justice Department on Friday to deport Iranian students who are illegally in this country in the hope of reducing the possibility of violent clashes between Americans and Iranian students. Government officials here believe that any such incident might provoke violence against the American hostages in Iran.

Beginning today, immigration officials are expected to visit campuses in the Washington area to check the status of Iranian students. In areas of the country with relatively few Iranian students, the Iranians probably will be asked to meet with officials at the nearest immigration office, according to a Justice Department official.

Students suspected of being in the country illegally cannot be deported summarily. If they are unwilling to leave, a Justice Department official said, they are entitled to hearings and appeals.

Those students who do not support the government controlled by Khomeini and fear that they will be in danger if they return home will be allowed to ask for political asylum, the official said.

In interviews with a number of Iranian students yesterday in cafes and dormitories and at the George Washington University student center, a reporter was met with angry rhetoric about the shah and past U.S. support of him. The students interviewed said they believed the Americans held hostage in Tehran should not be released until the shah is extradited.

Most of the students interviewed

said they did not know one another, yet all expressed similar feelings with the same intensity and similar rhetoric.

"The shah took fingernails out of our people's fingers and eyes out of our people's sockets," said one student as he sat at a table sipping coffee with a friend in George Washington University's Marvin Center.

"We want him dead," the student said. "The Americans must stay hostage until he is sent back to Iran."

The students, all of whom said they demonstrated here frequently against the shah wearing paper bags over their heads so they would not be identified and suffer reprisals, said they still are afraid to be identified in news stories even though the shah no longer rules Iran. They said they believe that CIA agents may work to replace Khomeini with a dictator, and they are worried they will suffer reprisals after they return to Iran.

Most of the students interviewed here yesterday spoke contemptuously of Carter's deportation order.

"Jimmy Carter doesn't have any power to do anything else," said one student at the Moslem Students Association, as he sat cross-legged on the bright gold rug.

"He thinks he can get something from the Khomeini government if he returns some students, but he won't get anything. And he can't return the shah because it would be bad for your international prestige."

U.S. government officials maintain, however, that the only reason for the order was prevention of violence here out of concern for the hostages in Iran and that the order should not be interpreted as retaliatory.

Although the students plan to continue demonstrating for the shah's deportation, they have not set specific dates for new demonstrations.

During Friday's march and rally in Washington, the Iranian students ignored insults and obscene gestures by bystanders and cooperated with police requests to keep the demonstration orderly. But in other cities throughout the country, Iranian student demonstrations resulted in violence between the students and counterdemonstrators.

On Friday, as Iranian demonstrators marched through downtown Washington shouting "Death to the shah," they were met by angry office workers, construction workers and students who screamed obscenities, pelted them

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with eggs and yelled, "Go home! Go home!"

Since that demonstration, Iranian students said yesterday, they have been getting "dirty looks," curses and obscene gestures, from other Americans.

At the Moslem Student Association offices, the pay telephone in the hall rings day and night. Occasionally a student will lift the receiver to disconnect the call, but then the phone immediately begins to ring again.

"Listen to this," an Iranian said yesterday, handing the receiver to a visitor.

The voice, soft and male, sputtered its message through the receiver:

"Get out of our country, Iranian scum. Don't go to our schools, filthy mid-Eastern scum, Persian worms. We're going to get you. You take American prisoners hostage. We are going to have absolute retaliation. I went looking for you last night and I couldn't find you."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A1-13THE WASHINGTON POST
12 November 1979

The Embassy Scene: Order and Chaos

Strict Captors, Unruly Crowds

By Jonathan C. Randal
Washington Post Foreign Service

TEHRAN, Nov. 11.—Daily the crowds gather outside the U.S. Embassy here chanting "Death to the shah, death to Carter," as the voice from the loudspeakers mounted on the embassy walls whips them into ever greater fury.

Outside, the atmosphere is like a campus on the day of a big game; but those inside the embassy, where about 60 Americans are being held hostage, are anything but innocent cheerleaders.

Unsmiling and wise to the ways of the contemporary world, these latter-day devotees of 7th century Iran have proven themselves past masters of the uses and abuses of the mass media, and every bit as disciplined as the U.S. Marines they hold as hostages.

Only in the past several days has a clear picture begun to emerge of what is going on inside Henderson High—as the main embassy building is named because its brick colonial architecture, built under Ambassador Loy Henderson in the 1950s, looks like the classic American high school.

Even that picture is a blurred one, based on the limited reports of foreign diplomats who have been allowed brief glimpses of the hostages and on the experiences of journalists who have been allowed to enter only a small part of the embassy compound.

The foreign diplomats who have seen the hostages report that their physical health is as good as could be expected but that they are under considerable mental

strain. They are bound hand and foot, night and day, and have to be spoon-fed by their captors.

Little more has been made public about the fate of the Americans—diplomats, Marine guards and other embassy personnel. About the 400 Iranian militants who seized the embassy last Sunday, however, more is emerging.

There are both deadly serious and comic touches at the same time.

Outside the embassy one banner lost a little something in translation to English: "Iran was like a kidney for America. With the help of our leader, Imam Khomeini, we have severed this vital link."

For those inside the embassy, there was no such fear of Americans. The hard-eyed men and women holding the compound have handled the press readily, keeping it bottled up in the motor pool, which is on one side of the compound. All requests to visit the hostages have been denied, although one blindfolded man, his hands tied behind his back, was paraded in front of the screaming, surging crowd several days ago.

Journalists must show their press cards, which are carefully noted by name and number on a neat sheet of paper. Then reporters are frisked before being allowed to enter the motor pool area.

Nevertheless, evidence is growing that those masterminding the embassy takeover are experienced in the ways of the world press and know how to get their message across. Amid all the posters and slogans plastered on the embassy wall is one neat spot carefully reserved and labeled in English: "For Reporters and Mass-Media Correspondents." Notices of new conferences and other announcements appear regularly here.

And once a news conference is under way, the spokesman's very agility at fielding even the nastiest questions has prompted suggestions that not everyone is, as advertised, a student from Tehran University.

Some Iranians watching television footage depicting events inside the compound have remarked that some of the group's leaders looked older—and acted more mature—than students.

In fact, in the week since the embassy takeover, there has been speculation that various outside groups have fought to get a piece of the action.

Some of the men heard by visitors to the embassy compound were speaking to each other in Arabic—apparently to prevent other Iranians from understanding their conversation—prompting suggestions that they might have been Iranian revolutionaries trained by Palestinian guerrillas in Lebanon.

Important clerics, such as Revolutionary Guard commander Ayatollah Hassan Labouti, also have been seen inside the compound.

"A lot of people have had fingers in the pie from the beginning and it's not over yet," a diplomat said. One close observer claims the extreme left had planned the embassy attack but was beaten to the punch by the Islamic fundamentalists.

The sophistication of the group inside the embassy extends to the arguments they have mounted in defense of holding diplomatic personnel hostage in violation of every known rule of international law and diplomatic practice.

By putting on a display of walkie-talkies, metal detectors and other nondescript bits of technology, they have built a case that the embassy was really a "den of espionage" and that those inside were spies who have lost their immunity.

"American spies must be executed," said one sign outside the embassy. Purported official documents found inside the embassy have been pictured as yet more evidence of espionage activity.

Outside the embassy walls, the crowds grow daily. For the first time today, the regulars on Telaghani Avenue were joined by a group of construction

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workers who rolled up in Mack trucks and sported yellow plastic hard hats. Later, a small detachment of blue uniformed Air Force cadets arrived. Pajama-clad Revolutionary Guards, back from the fighting in Kurdistan and wearing bandages to prove their combat experience, were given a warm welcome.

With an eye to the television cameras, various banners give a flavor of the times—often in English. One proclaims: "1942: Khomeini said the U.S.A. is worse than Britain. Britain is worse than the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.S.R. is worse than those two. Each is filthist (sic) than the other."

Underneath in smaller print is the current update of the original which condemned Allied intervention in Iran. It said, "But today our fight is against the U.S.A."

If nothing else, the embassy has become something of a tourist attraction. Braving the crowds and blaring slogans, a young Englishman named Keith Mooney, on his way to Pakistan, showed up just as a group of Moslem fundamentalists began praying in the motor pool.

"Sure put Iran back in the news," he said.

He seemed oblivious to the potential danger to foreigners, which has prompted West Germany to close its embassy and ordered about 1,500 of its citizens to leave what was officially described as a "dangerous situation."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A11 THE WASHINGTON STAR
11 November 1979

Iran's Top Diplomat Won't Yield On Demand to Put Shah on Trial

By Henry S. Bradsher
Washington Star Staff Writer

A very tough address to the American people by the Iranian leader in charge of foreign affairs calls not only for the return of the shah but also checking his supporters here and handing over his money.

Abol Hassan Bani Sadr, who has been named by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to supervise the foreign ministry in Tehran, said the U.S. government is deceiving the American people about Iran. He also accused the United States of plotting against the religious-based regime there.

The speech that was broadcast by Tehran radio deepened pessimism here about prospects for finding a solution to the hostage situation any time soon.

Administration officials see little hope of a break in the deadlock between Iranian demands for the return of former Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi for trial and President Carter's refusal to violate U.S. principles of asylum.

Although hoping that growing world opinion against the holding of the hostages would begin to affect Khomeini, officials recognize that he has in the past been impervious to outside pressure. And they are uncertain how much control he has over an anarchic situation.

Officials noted with satisfaction a statement yesterday by the militants holding some 60 Americans and 40 other foreigners in the embassy compound.

After accusing the United States of creating "a poisonous propaganda atmosphere," it said that "the children of this nation would never stain their hands by harming their prisoners." Iran is

on "a revolutionary course based on humanity and philanthropy," the statement added.

But the continuing hostility of crowds in Tehran and other signs suggested that the emotions unleashed by Khomeini's anti-American statements might be proving difficult for even his supporters to control. An announcement from Qom, the holy city 80 miles south of Tehran where Khomeini lives, said he would not receive any visitors yesterday or today.

The charge d'affaires of the embassy, L. Bruce Laingen, who has been trapped at the Iranian foreign ministry since Sunday, met there yesterday with Bani Sadr.

In his speech criticizing the U.S. government, Bani Sadr said, "O Americans, they tell you lies" to hide U.S. control of Iran during the shah's reign and plotting against the new regime.

It would be wrong, he said, for the shah "to remain and die in the hands of the CIA operatives" instead of being put on trial so the world could see how he had become "the manifestation of crime, treason and corruption."

Bani Sadr compared the shah to Hitler and his aides. He accused the United States of breaking the tradition established by the Nuremberg trials after World War II when it harbored the shah.

Bani Sadr said the American people should ask their government why it does not return to Iran the riches accumulated by the shah through "the biggest financial corruption in human history."

Sources here noted that the government lacks the legal authority to force the shah to go back to Iran, to turn any wealth of his in the United States over to the Iranian government, or to halt peaceable activities in this country who oppose the new regime in Tehran.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A13THE NEW YORK TIMES
10 November 1979

Publisher 'Correcting' Book on C.I.A. Involvement in Iran

By HERBERT MITGANG

A book about how the Central Intelligence Agency and British intelligence helped to overthrow Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953 and put the Shah of Iran — now hospitalized in New York — in power has been called back by the publisher, the McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, to correct so-called "inaccuracies." Some 7,000 copies are being "scrapped" and a "corrected" version of the book will appear at the end of January.

The book is "Countercoup: The Struggle for Control of Iran," by a former C.I.A. operative, Kermit Roosevelt, grandson of President Theodore Roosevelt. He runs a firm called Kermit Roosevelt & Associates in Washington that is described by his office as "business consultants to American companies active in the Middle East." Mr. Roosevelt's book tells of his role in the C.I.A. in Iran and elsewhere in the Middle East in the 1950's.

The apparent reason for withdrawing the book from circulation is that the British Petroleum Company, known as BP, objected to references in the book to its alleged intelligence role in the coup that led to the Shah's reign. At the time of the coup, BP's predecessor company was the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

Rupert Hodges, spokesman for BP-North America, said yesterday that BP officials had read the book "in proof form." He declined to say how a proof was obtained. But he said that objections were made to the author and publisher about what he said were the book's errors, which he called "libelous."

'Press Accounts' Cited

Mr. Roosevelt referred all questions to his editor, Bruce Lee, who referred all calls about the book to McGraw-Hill's "corporate" spokesman, Donald Rubin.

Mr. Rubin said the British Petroleum Company had heard about the book's existence through "press accounts." (There are a number of references to how Anglo-Iranian, with the aid of British intelligence, working in cooperation with American intelligence, was able to recover interests in Iranian oilfields under the Shah's regime after Premier Mossadegh had nationalized these oilfields.)

According to Mr. Rubin, BP then got in touch with Mr. Roosevelt, complaining about references to its cover role with British intelligence, through its predecessor company, in the overthrow of the Mossadegh Government, and Mr. Roosevelt and BP then sought changes from McGraw-Hill in the original edition of the book. These changes, while not spelled out by McGraw-Hill at this time, are expected to play down the significance of BP and British intelligence in the coup.

The Iranian oilfields and the influence of American and British oil interests there have become more sensitive since the overthrow of the Shah, and the publication of the first edition of "Countercoup," with its narrative about Western influence in Iran. The British Petroleum Company has a 40 percent interest in the oil consortium, 11 American companies hold another 40 percent, and the rest is held by a Dutch company and a French concern.

Two Captions Switched

Mr. Rubin said: "The first edition of the book was scrapped because there were some problems of accuracy at the time of shipping last summer. For example, two captions got switched in the picture section of the book."

A copy of the "scrapped" edition clearly reveals one of the mistakes in captioning. The caption reads: "Crowds fill the streets in support of the Shah." But the picture includes a crowd carrying photographs of Joseph Stalin, the Soviet leader. The caption continues: "This and other pictures of events were given to the author by a friend who prefers to remain anonymous."

Asked if the C.I.A. put any pressure on McGraw-Hill to make changes in the book — or if the C.I.A. or anyone else would pick up the costs of printing the new edition — Mr. Rubin said:

"Our position all along is that changes in the manuscript are between us and Mr. Roosevelt. We are prepared to make the changes to improve the book. It is the author's prerogative to suggest changes. We have not calculated the costs of printing the new edition, but the author is responsible contractually for changes. He signed a

standard McGraw-Hill contract. There were no references in it to clearance by the C.I.A.

Comment From C.I.A.

"We are not taking any money from the C.I.A. or any third parties. We were aware that, as a former employee, Mr. Roosevelt had an obligation to show the manuscript to the C.I.A. I do know that this book was one of 30-odd titles that McGraw-Hill acquired from Reader's Digest Press when they went out of business. We renegotiated some of the contracts."

Dale Peterson, a C.I.A. spokesman, explained:

"As a former employee, Mr. Roosevelt has a contractual obligation for life to show what he has written to the C.I.A. for review. He definitely did so. That does not mean that we censored what he had written, but it does mean that we can point out certain things in the manuscript that may be germane to his experience as an intelligence officer. However, we have no jurisdiction over a manuscript. If the author decides not to delete, then of course we can take the matter to court.

"Mr. Roosevelt did make some changes in the book. That occurred some months ago. My impression is that the changes were not too substantial. No, we cannot disclose what they are. We never spoke to McGraw-Hill, and we have no authority to do so. Any changes in the manuscript are a matter between Mr. Roosevelt and his publisher."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 4CHICAGO TRIBUNE
12 November 1979

U.S. monitors foreign reports on siege in Iran

By James Coates

Chicago Tribune-Press Service

WASHINGTON—Lacking a direct source of information, United States policy makers are keeping up with the siege at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran by monitoring foreign language radio broadcasts from reporters in Iran.

An arm of the CIA called the Foreign Broadcast Information Service prepares daily transcripts of broadcasts dealing with Iran.

With most Americans in Iran either held hostage or hiding from street mobs much of the time, the reports often are the CIA's only source of information.

For example, interviews members of the Iranian student mob gave to foreign journalists disclosed that the captors were commuting to and from the siege.

SOME STUDENTS granted interviews over leisurely dinners before returning to the compound.

A captor told of becoming weary of guarding the Americans, leaving the embassy for his nearby apartment to take a shower and a short nap, and returning to the siege.

Other reports picked up by monitoring stations around the world indicated that the Iranians were moving the hostages from building to building in the compound. One hinted that some of the Americans might have been taken from the compound to another location.

The student mob, which calls itself "Moslem Student Adherence to the Im-

am's Policies," has held so many press conferences with foreign journalists that even the CIA's broadcast information service has lost count. On the third day of the siege, the service listed the 18th "statement" from the mob and soon stopped numbering them.

EACH TIDBIT, even though there is no certainty of its accuracy, is carefully scanned by U.S. officials who must prepare a daily situation report on the crisis.

Especially difficult is the job of trying to determine Iranian intentions from the numerous addresses by the Ayatollah Khomeini, which are almost continuously broadcasts by Radio Iran. These addresses are translated into English at a field station of the service and teletyped to Washington.

Most of Khomeini's rhetoric occurs when different groups of Iranians—teachers, air force officers, students travel to the holy city of Qom for an audience with him.

It was in such settings that U.S. analysts first received word that the situation was stabilizing. During an "address" to air force officers, Khomeini warned that he would consider it "counter-revolutionary" for Iranians to capture any more Americans and take them to the embassy.

Similarly, the sectarian leader urged his student "adherents" to halt their occupation of several other foreign missions. That, too, would be "counterrevolutionary," he warned.

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-34NEW YORK TIMES
14 NOVEMBER 1979

SALT II Before the Senate

There is no point bewailing the unfortunate timing of the Senate's turn to another arms control treaty with the Soviet Union. It has been a perilous seven-year journey for SALT II, which is now caught up in its second Presidential campaign. It is a good treaty that would leave the nation secure — more secure than without a treaty — while its inadequacies are pursued in SALT III. As the flap-over Soviet troops in Cuba showed, no time is ever safe for such a critical vote.

Whether the Senate acts next month or early next year, it can no longer avoid partisanship. Senator Baker's opposition to the treaty in his campaign for President creates a formidable obstacle. He seems to believe that he would not otherwise be nominated by a Republican convention. President Ford made a similar calculation in 1976 — and regretted it.

Mr. Ford only delayed SALT. Senator Baker could take moderates with him and kill it. Senators Cohen, Lugar and Danforth, for example, play major roles in Mr. Baker's campaign and cannot easily desert him. If no other influential Republican champions the treaty — Henry Kissinger is an obvious but reluctant candidate — the Democrats will not easily produce the necessary 67 votes.

If the treaty survives, it will be because of strong support from the NATO allies and a growing recognition that its defeat would injure Soviet-American rela-

tions without strengthening American security. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has done a most responsible job of airing the many objections. It has sent the Senate a long and unusual "resolution of ratification" containing 20 understandings, declarations and reservations that leave the treaty intact and require no new negotiation with Moscow.

Since these statements address virtually all the concerns about SALT II, the struggle in the Senate will center on efforts to convert some of the reservations into crippling revisions requiring Soviet consent. The treaty forces appear to have the 51 votes needed to defeat these attempts, but they also need 16 of the 20 still undecided senators to ratify the treaty by two-thirds vote.

So the outcome may depend on a group that, with Senator Nunn, seeks at least a 5 percent increase in real defense spending in each of the next five years. The President is unlikely to offer that much, but he has promised 3 percent to NATO. Not much more than 3 percent a year plus inflation would lift the defense budget for the fifth year above \$200 billion. Perhaps that stark figure will finally shock Senator Nunn and his allies. If they would address specific weapons systems that need improvement instead of mere dollar goals, it is possible that a deal could be struck, as has been done with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A27THE WASHINGTON POST
14 November 1979*Rowland Evans
And Robert Novak*

The NATO Gambit Backfires

Senate troubles for SALT II persist, thanks to President Carter's failure to link the treaty's ratification with survival of the Western alliance, an ill-conceived effort that collapsed at last month's NATO political assembly in Ottawa.

Headlines proclaimed that assembled members of the alliance's parliaments had called for early Senate ratification of the arms control treaty. But behind the scenes, there were bitter recriminations among U.S. delegates and attempts by embarrassed Europeans to tone down the unrestrained language drafted for them by the Americans.

Those efforts belied the Carter administration's claim that Western Europe is pleading for salvation through SALT. Rather, it was American SALT-sellers in Ottawa who unwittingly buttressed the Soviet campaign against nuclear modernization in order to label Senate rejection of the treaty as subversive to NATO's future.

This NATO gambit bears a family resemblance to Carter's successful strategy for passage of the Panama Canal treaty. Instead of arguing the merits of giving away the canal, the president's men warned that rejection by the Senate would reap havoc throughout the Western Hemisphere and lined up Latin American statesmen to agree. Lloyd Cutler, Carter's chief SALT-seller, pursued the same strategy in tying an umbilical cord between SALT II and NATO.

But European political leaders proved less malleable than the Latin Americans. NATO parliamentarians visiting Washington resented being manipulated into a Senate debate. Members of the British and West German governments (including British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher) publicly declared that, of course, NATO would survive the death of SALT II.

At this point, SALT supporters sought to revive the NATO gambit at the Ottawa meeting of the North Atlantic assembly. With European parliamentarians on hand in Canada, their U.S. congressional counterparts remained in Washington for late votes. They were preceded, however, by a Senate Foreign Relations Committee staffer named John Ritch, renowned on Capitol Hill as a passionate arms controller.

Ritch brought to Ottawa a draft resolution urging "early ratification" of SALT and bearing the names of two pro-SALT senators: Republican Jacob Javits of New York and Democrat Joseph Biden of Delaware. It is widely believed, though denied by the White House, that inspiration came from the administration.

Peter Coterier, a Social Democratic member of the West German Bundestag and a supporter of SALT, was asked to introduce the resolution. After some hesitation, Coterier agreed. His initial caution might have stemmed from its extraordinary language. Besides contending that U.S. failure to ratify SALT would be "seriously disruptive" to NATO, it specified that would be true "particularly with regard to the forthcoming decision on the modernization of NATO's theater nuclear forces." Europeans were amazed at U.S. officials seeming to buttress the Soviet campaign against NATO's nuclear modernization.

With the U.S. delegation still in Washington, the assembly's military committee toned down the American language. The warning against undercutting nuclear force modernization was struck. So was a clause contending that linkage of "the current situation in Cuba to SALT ratification would unnecessarily jeopardize alliance security interests." The committee also added what the Javits-Biden resolution omitted: "respecting... the sovereign right" of the United States to decide on SALT and noting requirements for "credible deterrence, stable nuclear balance and future arms control negotiations."

When the U.S. delegation finally arrived in Ottawa, anti-SALT senators were outraged to discover the existence of a resolution demanding Senate ratification ready for passage by the assembly. A "caucus" of Americans followed, in which pent-up bipartisan passions were unleashed.

Two anti-SALT Democrats, Sens. Henry M. Jackson of Washington and Ernest F. Hollings of South Carolina, assailed Biden for not consulting them. Jackson accused Biden of conspiring with White House counsel Cutler, contending that "this whole thing" is "a Cutler operation which has backfired." While taking full responsibility himself, Biden apologized for lack of consultation.

Apology or not, Biden and Javits refused to change the resolution so that only an early "decision"—not "ratification"—would be urged. After much rancorous debate, it was finally decided that all U.S. senators would abstain from the voting. Added to the abstention of the French delegation plus that of conservatives from Britain and West Germany, that made 38 abstentions against 71 in favor—less than a certain trumpet.

The Ottawa meeting deepened SALT divisions among senators and intensified concern by British, French and German parliamentarians over what the Americans are doing. Thus, the NATO gambit won over no new senators for SALT but raised questions about the president's devotion to the Western Alliance among our puzzled European allies.

Around the Nation

Democratic Panel Pledges Support for SALT II

SAN ANTONIO—Amid some political sparring, the Democratic National Committee ended its two-day meeting after pledging support for SALT II and the Equal Rights Amendment and adopting officers for its national convention in August.

About 200 of the committee's 363 members met Thursday and Friday. Party affairs took a back seat to presidential politics most of the time.

Big photographs of President Carter and Vice President Mondale hung at the front of the meeting hall. Inside, a number of delegates wore Kennedy buttons. Several Carter delegates sported big red buttons that read: "Don't rock the boat. Kennedy in '84."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE E2THE NEW YORK TIMES
11 November 1979

The World

In Summary

SALT II Limping Out of Committee To the Real Fight

From the frying pan of the Foreign Relations Committee, the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty made it last week, well-grilled but still recognizable, to the Senate floor.

Of 20 understandings, declarations and reservations appended to the treaty during four months of hearings and debate, none were fatal. Only two required Soviet consent and those seemed likely to receive it. One said a written and oral statement by Soviet leader Leonid A. Brezhnev not to increase the rate of production or "radius of action" of the Soviet Backfire bomber had the same force as the treaty proper. The other was completely redundant, stating that a number of technical definitions agreed to by the United States and Soviet Union in connection with the treaty — and initialed by their respective leaders — were binding upon them.

But the treaty's prospects were not enhanced by the narrow margin of committee approval. Only nine of the 15 senators voted to recommend ratification and one of them, Edward Zorinsky, Democrat of Nebraska, said he would support substantive changes, better known as "killer amendments," in the floor debate. It is "entirely possible," he said, "to vote 'yes' in committee and 'no' on the floor."

The six opponents included two Democrats, Richard D. Stone of Florida and John H. Glenn of Ohio. Mr. Stone's statement that "the treaty in its present form" should not be ratified, seemed to make him the fifth Democrat likely to vote against an unamended treaty and meant that the Administration would probably need at least 13 Republican votes to achieve the required two-thirds approval.

With majority and minority committee reports still to be written and printed, the treaty, negotiated by three American administrations over seven years, can not be called up in the Senate until after Thanksgiving. But the accord is already embroiled in election-year politics — Howard H. Baker Jr. of Tennessee, an aspirant for the Republican Presidential nomination, cast a negative vote in the committee — and further delay could jeopardize it even more. A New York Times-C.B.S. poll last week showed that only 38 percent of those queried knew that the treaty was between the Soviet Union and the United States, compared to 30 percent in a poll last June. But five months ago, the knowledgeable were three-to-one in favor of SALT; now they split five-to-four.

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ON PAGE A7

THE WASHINGTON POST
10 November 1979

Goldwater Reverses on Monitoring of SALT

Sen. Barry M. Goldwater (R-Ariz.), the ranking minority member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, has reversed his assessment of American ability to monitor SALT II.

For several months, Goldwater's position had been that "we can do an acceptable job with the certain knowledge that we can improve this as time goes on," as he put it in early August.

But on the Senate floor Thursday,

Goldwater took that back, saying instead, "I have doubts now of a sufficient nature to say that I do not feel that we can depend on the verification capabilities of this country."

Goldwater said his earlier statements were based on "the availability of new equipment," and that "this new equipment has not come through." A senior Carter administra-

tion official said he could not imagine what Goldwater was talking about, since no new equipment had been anticipated at this time.

Goldwater's earlier endorsement of the arms limitation treaty's verifiability had been harshly criticized by fellow conservatives who felt his view of verification was being used effectively by SALT supporters. Goldwater has always opposed SALT II.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 4THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
12 November 1979

SALT Accord Approved by Senate Panel Likely to Be Altered or Rejected on Floor

By ALBERT R. HUNT

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON — The Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is likely to be altered or rejected by the full Senate.

That's the consensus of Senate experts following the committee's nine-to-six approval of SALT. To win ratification, the treaty needs the support of two-thirds of the Senate, a margin it didn't attain in the Foreign Relations Committee, which is slightly more liberal than the full Senate.

It's clear, however, that SALT supporters command a majority in the Senate and would be able to fend off any major changes. Thus, treaty backers, with Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd (D., W.Va.) emerging as the chief strategist, are searching for changes that would make SALT politically more attractive but wouldn't cause the Russians to reject the pact. The Soviet Union insists it won't accept any major revision of SALT.

The treaty probably will reach the Senate floor early next month and a final resolution mightn't come before January. The Carter administration is counting on ratification as a major political plus in the President's reelection battle next year.

Biggest Setback on Panel

Although the debate has taken on some partisan overtones, two of the committee's six Republicans voted for SALT and two of the nine Democrats voted against it. One Democrat opposing it, Sen. John Glenn of Ohio, suggested he still might vote for the treaty on the floor if U.S. monitoring capabilities are improved; another Democrat supporting it, Edward Zorinsky of Nebraska, indicated he may oppose it on the floor if major changes aren't made. But the biggest setback to the administration in the committee, was the flat opposition of Florida Democrat Richard Stone, who complained SALT "results in a strategic imbalance that favors the Soviet Union."

The single biggest issue determining SALT's fate may be the level of anticipated defense spending. Sen. Sam Nunn (D., Ga.) has insisted that military outlays be increased at least 5% a year after inflation, over the next five years. And the White House has promised to let Sen. Nunn see its defense plans for that period before the treaty reaches the Senate floor.

Separately, on Friday, the Senate approved a \$13.7 billion defense appropriations bill, which represents about a 3% annual increase, after inflation, but which also is \$2.2 billion more than the measure approved by the House.

If the Carter administration accedes to Sen. Nunn's demands, it would put SALT supporters within striking distance of ratification. The best current estimates, according to a variety of Senate sources, figure about 55 Senators are either for SALT or leaning that way, while about 30 oppose it or are inclined against it.

The Undecided Votes

The 15 or so who are undecided are about evenly divided between Democrats, mostly Southerners, who would be influenced by Sen. Nunn, and middle-of-the-road Republicans. To secure the necessary 67 votes for passage, the White House will have to win over almost all these Democrats and more than half the Republicans.

Earlier this year, the White House thought public opinion would help win ratification. But, over the past six months, major polls show the public gradually turning against the treaty. Nevertheless, these surveys indicate SALT isn't a high priority item in most voters' minds.

The committee-approved treaty, which would run through 1985, limits the number of strategic missile launchers each side could deploy. The ceiling on intercontinental ballistic missiles would be set at 2,250. This is slightly less than the current Soviet level and slightly above the current U.S. inventory. The treaty also would limit both sides in modernizing their strategic arsenals.

Resolutions Added

The Foreign Relations Committee also added almost two dozen understandings and resolutions to the treaty. Two would require Soviet assent but the Russians are expected to go along. The most important would upgrade informal Russian agreement to limit production of its Backfire bomber to a formal status.

Most of the other changes are considered "cosmetic" ones that don't require renegotiation and don't bother the Soviets. One, for instance, seeks to dampen the political furor over the presence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba. It requires that final approval of SALT is conditioned on the President's certifying that those Soviet troops aren't engaged in a combat role and won't "become a threat to any country in the Caribbean or elsewhere in the Western hemisphere." The White House already indicates it will give that assurance.

But the Foreign Relations Committee defeated all the so-called "killer amendments" that would require renegotiation. SALT critics claim these are necessary to equalize the treaty, but supporters insist they would doom SALT to Soviet rejection. Among the most important of these measures is one that would force the Soviet Union to reduce its arsenal of 308 "heavy" missiles or to permit the U.S. to build these big missiles, too. Others would count the Soviet Backfire bomber within the ceilings on strategic missile launchers and remove restrictions on verifying compliance with the treaty.

Several of these "killer" amendments failed by only a vote or two in the committee, and SALT critics anticipate some close votes on the Senate floor. But the key probably will be the ability of Sen. Byrd and other supporters to fashion alternatives to these measures.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A7THE WASHINGTON POST
10 November 1979

9-6 Vote Sends SALT to Uncertain Fate on Floor

By Robert G. Kaiser

Washington Post Staff Writer

SALT II passed across its first political barrier yesterday when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted 9 to 6 to approve it for consideration by the Senate.

The strategic arms limitation treaty with the Soviet Union is unlikely to reach the floor before the end of this month at the earliest, and a long debate is anticipated. Supporters spoke optimistically yesterday, but a careful count of the Senate shows that SALT II is still in trouble, and only an extremely successful political campaign can win the 67 votes needed for its ultimate approval.

The Foreign Relations Committee made 23 changes in the treaty by amending the resolution of ratification on which the Senate will eventually vote. Two of the changes will require explicit Soviet approval, and the others, either state American interpretations of treaty provisions or make technical alterations.

Seven Democrats and two Republicans voted for the treaty, four Republicans and two Democrats against. The margin was smaller than the two-thirds eventually needed to approve the treaty on the floor.

All attempts to make substantive changes were beaten back, sometimes by a single vote. Treaty critics led by Howard H. Baker Jr. (R-Tenn.) predicted that the Senate will reconsider those votes and may reverse them.

Baker said the Senate probably will insist on amendments to SALT II, and if they are not approved, he predicted, the Senate will defeat it.

Administration lobbyists hope that they will have more than 50 Senate votes—a majority—to beat back all substantive amendments of the sort that would require renegotiation with the Soviet Union. Treaty supporters have come to call these "killer amendments."

But as Baker and others have repeatedly said, if all amendments are beaten, there may not be 67 votes for approval of the treaty. To emphasize that point yesterday, one of the nine senators who voted for the treaty in the committee, Edward Zorinsky (D-Neb.), indicated he would withhold final approval unless more amendments are adopted by the Senate.

"In no way will my vote today predestine my final vote," Zorinsky declared. To win his vote in the end, the treaty must be further altered "in some way and in some manner" to weight it more favorably for the United States.

A high administration official said yesterday that perhaps 15 other senators might end up in a position close to Zorinsky's, raising the prospect of further changes that this official described as dangerous. Without those 15 yes votes, however, SALT II has no chance of final approval.

Zorinsky, a little-known first-term Democrat, typifies the senators the White House or Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd (D-W.Va.) will have to win over in the debate. The key-swing senators are, with a few exceptions, junior members without big reputations.

The most important exception is probably Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), who has withheld his support for SALT II until he sees and approves the administration's 1981 defense budget and its revised five-year defense plan. Nunn will see those projections within the next two weeks.

All optimistic predictions about SALT depend on the assumption that Nunn will support it.

In recent days President Carter has conferred one-on-one with senators

whose votes could be crucial but are still in doubt. The president has seen Henry Bellmon (R-Okla.); Thad Cochran (R-Miss.); J. James Exon (D-Neb.); Howell Heflin (D-Ala.); Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.); Nunn; William V. Roth Jr. (R-Del.) and Alan K. Simpson (R-Wyo.). Typically these private sessions have lasted 45 to 60 minutes, and Carter plans more.

At yesterday's final markup session, most of the Foreign Relations Committee members made statements explaining their votes. The statement revealed both the wide variety of senatorial concerns about the treaty, and general disappointment among both supporters and opponents that SALT II will have such a small impact on the continuing buildup of both Soviet and American strategic arms.

The nine senators who voted for the treaty were Chairman Frank Church (D-Idaho); Joseph Biden Jr. (D-Del.); Jacob Javits (R-N.Y.); George McGovern (D-S.D.); Edmund Muskie (D-Maine); Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.); Charles H. Percy (R-Ill.); Paul Sarbanes (D-Md.) and Zorinsky.

The six opposed were Baker, John Glenn (D-Ohio); S.I. Hayakawa (R-Calif.); Jesse Helms (R-N.C.); Richard

C. Lugar (R-Ind.) and Richard Stone (D-Fla.).

The four Republicans who voted no had previously indicated their positions. So had Glenn, who has explained that he hopes to vote yes on final passage, but will only do so if the United States has new eavesdropping technology in place that compensates for electronic spy stations in Iran that were closed this year. Stone explained his vote by saying "the treaty in its present form should not be ratified" because it is imbalanced in the Soviets' favor.

Apparently the charge that SALT II is tilted toward the Soviets will be the central argument in the debate. All the critics made that point yesterday. Responding, Muskie asked what the critics would be prepared to give up in return for the changes they want to negotiate. He has heard no suggestions, Muskie said.

The committee amendments that the Soviet will have to approve incorporate into the treaty assurances Moscow has given on the range and production of its controversial Backfire bomber, and "joint statements and common understandings" that accompany the text to spell out crucial details.

Approved For Release 2009/04/28 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501300001-2

MISCELLANEOUS

Approved For Release 2009/04/28 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501300001-2

PURCHASING
7 November 1979

STEEL
CIA: World steel glut looms

WASHINGTON—World steel markets—which have been relatively steady for two years—face new trauma because of a huge capacity buildup under way in less developed countries (LDC), says the Central Intelligence Agency in a new report.

"During the next few years, the slow growth of LDC imports—

now about 40 percent of the world total—will force developed-country exporters to increase sales to other developed countries in order to help improve depressed operating rates," the CIA says.

Glut or shortage? The CIA's forecast of a glut represents a sharp departure from world steel forecasts being made by American economists and steel executives who say that rising demand will put a sharp strain on steel capacity, possibly leading to shortages and rapidly rising prices.

The leading proponent of the steel shortage theory is the Rev. William T. Hogan, director of the Industrial Economics Research Institute at Fordham University. He said in a recent study:

"If U.S. steel capacity is not increased to take care of the nation's needs, steel consumers in this country will have a difficult time in procuring steel and, in times of tight supply—which are anticipated for the middle 1980s—will have to pay extremely high prices for any steel that is imported."

Asked by **PURCHASING** to comment on the CIA report, Father Hogan said, "It depends on what you buy in terms of a growth projection. If you think world demand for steel will be flat, then there won't be a shortage. If you think demand is going to grow at a 3-percent annual rate, as I do, then there won't be adequate capacity."

Data questioned. Father Hogan says the CIA figures for Third World countries may be high. For instance, the CIA lists Latin American steelmaking capacity at 30.5 million tons a year. But Latin American countries are producing only 24.3 million tons a year.

U.S. steel producers share Father Hogan's concern about future world steel supply. George Stinson, chairman of National Steel, told this year's American Iron and Steel Institute annual meeting: "There is at least a good possibility of a world steel shortage beginning in 1985 and growing thereafter."


The CIA bases its forecasts on a projected buildup of steel capacity of 51 million tons, or 80 percent, in non-Communist Third World nations through 1985.

More home-grown steel. New capacity in those nations would be 115 million tons, according to the CIA's economic sleuths. LDCs should be producing 75 percent of their total steel requirements by 1985, up from 61 percent last year.

As a result, their need for steel from large exporting nations, such as Japan, Great Britain, and France, will decrease. "Less developed countries' net steel imports will grow much more slowly in the decade ending in 1985 than during the period 1966-75," says the CIA.

The CIA points out that steel executives in Japan and Europe believe chances of steel shortages in the 1980s are remote.

"Most steel executives, particularly in Japan and Europe, feel that excess capacity will persist well into the 1980s. Only a minority believe that reviving demand will place capacity under heavy pressure by 1985 with steel shortages and soaring prices the result." ■



ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 29THE NEW YORK TIMES
10 November 1979

Duncan Paints Dark Oil Picture

Precariousness Of Supply Cited At Briefings

By RICHARD D. LYONS

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 9 — Secretary of Energy Charles W. Duncan Jr. has told Congressional leaders in private briefings that world oil supplies are precarious, that there are threats to American imports from nations other than Iran and that the Carter Administration is developing contingency plans to deal with severe cuts in petroleum fuels.

Some Congressional sources said the Administration had even developed what one termed a worst-case "doomsday energy plan" that would attempt to deal with a cutoff of virtually all oil from the Middle East.

With an eye to possible supply disruptions, Administration leaders are reassessing possible conservation measures, such as a much higher Federal gasoline tax, that had been previously discarded as politically impossible.

Alfred E. Kahn, chairman of the Council on Wage and Price Stability, told one House subcommittee today that Administration officials had been considering a gasoline tax of as much as 50 cents a gallon, gasoline rationing and even mandatory wage and price controls.

But he stressed that these measures were not under active consideration, at least for the moment, since energy supplies at present were ample to meet demand.

Those who have attended the Duncan briefings said he has stated that oil supplies in the non-Communist world next year will drop by 300,000 barrels a day because of the depletion of old oilfields.

This is not a large amount considering that production, according to estimates prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency, is now about 52.2 million barrels a day in the non-Communist world. United States consumption amounted to 17.5 million barrels a day in September, according to the C.I.A. But Mr. Duncan has warned that it could be enough to bring on disruptions because the demand-supply balance is so delicate.

Soviet Oil Output Down

Complicating the situation is a drop in Soviet domestic oil production, which means that Moscow eventually will have to buy oil from members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, probably those in the Middle East. Soviet purchases would only serve to put more pressure on both the price and availability of crude oil.

Those who have heard Mr. Duncan's assessment also say he has warned of the possibility of sharp reductions in exports of oil by Kuwait and Nigeria.

Nigeria is a major supplier of crude oil to the American market, exporting about one million barrels a day until recently when exports slackened somewhat.

While Kuwait sells little oil to the United States, it has been exporting about 2.4 million barrels a day in recent months, mostly to other countries. Should a significant fraction of that be withdrawn from the world market, major supply problems would ensue.

Task Force Formed in October

With all these factors in mind, the new interagency task force on energy supplies was formed last month to update contingency plans drafted last spring as a result of uncertainties about Iranian exports.

John C. Sawhill, the Under Secretary of the Department of Energy who also is the director of the task force, said the contingency plans were being revised. "We are developing contingency plans, based on those drafted last spring, in an effort to deal with a wide variety of energy shortages that might arise," Mr. Sawhill said today in an interview.

He added that the project had been receiving the "top priority" in the Energy Department and that "we're looking toward the development of new plans as variables shift."

As to the specifics of these plans, Mr. Sawhill said, "I'm not going to comment on the contingency plans or the options."

Choices Termed 'Draconian'

But some of the choices were described as "draconian" by Senator Dale L. Bumpers, Democrat of Arkansas, after he left a briefing given by Mr. Duncan on Wednesday.

O. William Fischer, an acting Assistant Secretary of Energy, is the staff director of the task force. It also has representatives from the White House staff, the departments of Defense, State, Transportation, Labor, Commerce, Agriculture, and Health and Welfare, as well as the Environmental Protection Agency, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

One participant in a Duncan briefing said information was relayed from the C.I.A. and the major oil companies, as well as the Energy Department.

"They showed us a whole bunch of charts, which were labeled 'confidential,'" said one participant, "showing that OPEC exports would be down slightly next year, but that non-OPEC exporters would export slightly more oil next year than this."

Dramatic Rise for British

Among the non-OPEC members expected to export more oil next year are Mexico, Britain and Norway. Britain, for example, is currently producing about 1.7 million barrels a day from its North Sea wells, a dramatic increase over previous averages.

"Mr. Duncan stressed that the vulnerability of OPEC production was of great concern to the Administration," one source said.

The degree of seriousness was evident in the testimony Mr. Kahn gave today to the Subcommittee on Energy and Power of the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee. He said the Iranian situation was not only endangering supplies but also driving up spot prices for oil and thus contributing to inflation.

For this reason, he added, Administration leaders are privately reconsidering a wide range of options to reduce energy consumption in such a way that the 700,000 barrels a day of oil normally imported from Iran would not be needed.

THE WASHINGTON POST MAGAZINE

11 November 1979

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 5

SUSPICIONS

Where can someone find previously classified documents that are so often quoted in the press? Details about the Glomar Explorer project, the wiretapping of civil rights leaders and other activities appear with some frequency in newspaper articles but no library seems to have the background documentation.

Many of these papers were obtained by reporters or researchers filing requests under the provisions of the Freedom of Information or Privacy acts. Anyone has a right to ask for information under the acts. One central source for such information is the Washington-based Center for National Security Studies. For a nominal charge, the organization makes available an array of once-secret government documents.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-1LOS ANGELES SUNDAY TIMES
11 November 1979

Leaks Halting Covert CIA Work; Lighter Curbs Urged

BY ROBERT C. TOTH

Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—In late 1977 the Central Intelligence Agency planned to undertake three secret intelligence operations and, as required by law, duly described them to eight congressional committees. No objections were voiced, and the projects began.

One was a propaganda campaign against Cuban troops fighting in Ethiopia. The second involved supplying radio and associated equipment to Egyptian President Anwar Sadat so he could communicate with aides without being overheard by his own military officers—and so he could eavesdrop on his own military. The third called for supplying the same equipment to Sudan President Jaafar Numeiri.

But all three operations were "blown" several months later, according to Administration sources, when they were mentioned in the New York Times.

The projects were cited in the newspaper as examples of a new permissiveness by congressional oversight committees toward covert CIA actions only a few years after the exposure of CIA abuses.

Administration officials cite the projects as examples of something else, however. They see them as part of a pattern that has brought U.S. covert actions to a virtual halt through leaks. And they blame the leaks primarily on congressmen who have been briefed under the disclosure requirements of the Hughes-Ryan Amendment of 1974.

Under that provision, sponsored by then-Sen. Harold E. Hughes (D-Iowa) and the late Rep. Leo J. Ryan (D-Calif.) as an amendment to an appropriations measure, six committees—Armed Services, Appropriations, and Foreign Affairs of both the House and the Senate—must be notified of planned covert activities.

Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.) said this means that "nearly 50 senators, over 120 congressmen and numerous staff members receive this highly sensitive information." The implication was that this is no way to keep a secret on Capitol Hill.

The Senate and House Intelligence committees, created after passage of the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, also must be briefed on such projects.

Efforts are under way, as part of the writing of a new intelligence charter, to repeal the Hughes-Ryan requirement. In large part it is spurred by a desire to curb leaks such as the one that "blew" the 1977 operations.

However, Administration officials and congressmen prefer to take the position in public that the House and Senate Intelligence committees have brought the CIA under control, and that the Hughes-Ryan measure is thus no longer needed.

Additional support for the reform comes from the belief of some in Congress that the public is tired of seeing the CIA picked on and that it now views the agency as unable to protect U.S. interests—from Afghanistan to the Caribbean.

"There is recognition," one official said, "that the United States should have options for protecting itself in the world, options that lie between a mere diplomatic protest note and sending in the Marines."

But the reform effort does face some trouble. A majority in Congress probably favors repeal of the Hughes-Ryan measure, but most members of the six committees object to losing their briefing rights—just as they object to any other loss of power.

Hughes-Ryan also is tied into broader intelligence charter issues. Many moderate and conservative representatives reportedly see little mileage in voting for a charter that legally restricts CIA actions.

At the same time, many liberals who want a tight rein on the intel-

ligence community want to delay final action on a new charter because they believe that Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.)—if elected President next year—would be more sympathetic to them than President Carter is.

Hughes-Ryan, which was the first attempt by Congress to restrain the intelligence community, makes covert activities nearly impossible to keep secret—thus making them nearly impossible to carry out.

It was passed in the wake of disclosures about CIA operations in Laos and Cambodia, when there was some public sentiment for forbidding all covert actions.

One effect of Hughes-Ryan apparently has been to jeopardize not only covert projects but the lives of CIA and other agents as well.

"We have lost one or two agents under strange circumstances that might have emanated from leaks," Sen. Walter D. Huddleston (D-Ky.), chairman of the Senate Intelligence subcommittee on the charter, said in an interview.

"But whether the leaks came from Congress, the White House, the State Department, or elsewhere, who knows? President Carter has said there were more leaks from the White House than from either of the two Intelligence committees of Congress."

"A lot more than two agents were lost," said an Administration source, who tended to blame the six congressional committees for most leaks.

"Many of the congressmen who must be briefed under Hughes-Ryan are deeply and irretrievably opposed to covert action as inherently, morally wrong," he said. "They veto operations by leaking."

One example of congressional leaks was the action of opponents of the Panama Canal treaties. They contended publicly that the U.S. government had evidence that Panama leader Omar Torrijos was involved in drug trafficking. To refute the charge, the Senate went into closed session during which the chairman and vice chairman of the Intelligence

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Committee. Sens. Birch Bayh (D-Ind.) and Goldwater, said Torrijos' brother had been indicted on drug charges but not the Panama leader himself.

During debate, the Senate was told that the Panama leader's residence was bugged by U.S. intelligence, as was his hotel room during a meeting of the Organization of American States. The bugging was soon reported in the U.S. press, which ended its usefulness.

Hughes-Ryan has also inhibited the presentation of ideas for covert actions, several sources said. "Covert actions are by definition controversial actions these days," one said, "so they are not being proposed very much because of the risk of leaks and of damage to the career of the proposer."

"And of course Allied intelligence services are telling us very little because of all these leaks."

In a new book, "Foreign Policy by Congress," Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband argue that efforts to tame the intelligence community have now gone full cycle.

Ten years ago members of Congress did not want to dirty their hands with intelligence, they wrote. "There was a lack of political payoff for work (overseeing the CIA) that had to be done out of the limelight," they said, and only with exposure of CIA skeletons—assassination attempts, mail openings, drug experiments on unwitting subjects—did representatives get interested. But now the pendulum is swinging back.

"There's no doubt there is less intensity on the Hill now for restraining intelligence operations," Huddleston confirmed. "In fact, at a Defense Appropriations committee markup session recently, two senators raised the question of encouraging the CIA to engage in more covert activities."

Huddleston said his panel is prepared for a final meeting with Administration officials, led by Vice President Mondale, to iron out remaining differences in the charter drawn up by the committee. It is al-

ready less restrictive than when first published a year ago, but the White House seeks further dilutions.

One of the chief issues is whether the CIA should be prohibited from ever using members of the American press, the clergy or the academic community for spying. The CIA does not now and has not used them for the last four years, Huddleston said, but it does not want the prohibition written into law.

Another question is whether the CIA should be permitted to get intelligence information from unwitting Americans by non-obtrusive means. The committee would permit the CIA to try to get such information—from an oilman, say, who might just be back from the Mideast—through his secretary or at a cocktail party, but not through wiretaps or mail openings, Huddleston said.

NEWSDAY
26 October 1979

Drug Traffic Is Said to Flourish

By Anthony Marro

Newsday Washington Bureau Chief

Washington—A major government report, said by the Central Intelligence Agency to be probably the most comprehensive ever done on federal drug law enforcement, contends that illegal drug traffic still flourishes despite huge commitments of money and effort, and that many of the publicized "gains" by federal agencies have been overstated and only temporary.

The 214-page study, made public yesterday by the General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress, says that the problem persists because of "enormous consumer demand, tremendous profits and little risk" that traffickers will be arrested or jailed.

"In addition," it says, "the federal drug supply reduction efforts have yet to achieve a well integrated, balanced and truly coordinated approach."

The essence of the report, in the words of one Senate staff member, is, "The problem may not be insoluble, but we're not going to solve it the way we're going about it."

A spokesman for the Drug Enforcement Agency, the principal federal law enforcement unit, was quick to challenge the findings, saying that much of the material is dated, and that the office had "regurgitated" many old criticisms that since have been corrected.

The report, which was presented to a Senate appropriations subcommittee by Comptroller General Elmer Staats, says that some major successes have been achieved in the past decade, particularly during the early 1970s, when President Richard Nixon made drug law enforcement a top priority. But it says that despite expenditures of about \$5.5 billion since 1968, the trafficking in illicit drugs has grown, and that many enforcement officials believe that the situation in the Southeast—which the report calls a "drug disaster area"—is completely out of control.

The study was commissioned by the GAO, but at some point during its evolution picked up the

sponsorship of Sen. Dennis DeConcini (D-Ariz.), a vocal critic of anti-drug efforts. DeConcini and three other senators have a resolution pending in the Senate Rules Committee that calls for the creation of a select committee that would deal only with drugs and drug law enforcement programs.

At present, oversight is spread through at least three Senate committees, and there is opposition to the DeConcini plan from members of the Judiciary, Government Relations and Human Resources Committees, which would lose at least part of their authority over the drug-control agencies if the new committee were formed.

DeConcini, however, is expected to use the report as ammunition in his own fight, since it concludes that one major reason for the lack of effectiveness in drug control programs is a lack of a clear, cohesive and coordinated strategy by the federal government.

"It is clear . . . that money alone cannot break down the barriers that still stand between success and failure in the war on drugs," he said. "We have reached a point where current strategies, tactics and programs must be evaluated, and if necessary changed, if we are to protect our citizens from this insidious evil."

Among the other problems cited in the study are these:

- While there has been a major shortage of heroin in the United States in recent years, largely because of the agency's efforts, many drug users simply have shifted to other, more easily obtained synthetic drugs, such as PCP (angel dust), Talwin and Preludin.

- There is no comprehensive border control plan, and thus, federal agencies at the U.S. borders carry out separate but similar lines of effort with little consideration for overall border security.

- Bail and sentencing practices throughout the country have weakened efforts at immobilizing drug traffickers, many of whom continue to deal in drugs while out on bail awaiting trial.

- The agency has not yet attained proficiency in investigating major interstate and international drug violators, and many of its agents have not been trained in the latest financial conspiracy techniques.

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This last was particularly upsetting to agency officials, who say they have been making great efforts in recent years to increase the ability of their agents to make these sorts of cases. "They hit us where we didn't think we could be hurt," said Robert Feldkamp, a spokesman for the agency. "We've been doing a lot of train agents in this work, and we think it's a bad rap."

The report, however, says that in seven of eight cities with major drug problems surveyed by GAO, local prosecutors complained that agents were unable or unwilling to make these cases, and instead concentrated on the sort of low-level "buy-and-bust" investigations that made for impressive-looking statistics and large numbers of arrests, but did little to disrupt major trafficking.

The CIA, which with many other agencies reviewed the report before publication, said that it is "probably the most comprehensive and authoritative statement" on the problem to date. The Justice Department, of which the drug agency is a part, agreed with some of the findings, but argued that many of the criticisms are based on "past performance, outdated information and misinterpretations."

While the report discusses at great length some of the weaknesses in the law enforcement programs, it does not raise, or attempt to deal with, the question of whether the programs themselves are valid, or whether some drugs simply should be made legal.

It accepts as valid the basic goal of federal drug law enforcement: To contain the problem for the moment, and eventually to reduce the quantity and quality of illicit drugs available on the street.

Many of the criticisms are not new. For example, virtually every congressional committee and executive branch commission that has studied the drug problem in the past decade has decried that lack of a comprehensive border control plan.

The Carter administration had put together a proposal calling for a major reorganization of border control agencies—DEA, Customs, and the Border Patrol—designed to better police the southern borders against smugglers and the inflow of illegal aliens.

This plan, however, touched a raw nerve with the Mexican government, which objected to the idea of anything resembling an army on its border.

And when the administration began serious negotiations aimed at getting greater access to Mexico's newly discovered oil reserves, the border control plan was quietly shelved.

The criticism of lack of coordination and cooperation also is an old one, dating back to the late 1960s, when rivalries between federal drug law enforcement agencies were so fierce that they often disrupted each other's investigations.

In a rebuttal issued yesterday, Peter Bensing, the head of DEA, said that such lack of cooperation is a thing of the past, and "interagency cooperation at the federal level is at an all-time high."

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THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
15 November 1979

That mystery 'flash' — it looks atomic

Puzzle over what it really
was may soon be solved

By John K. Cooley

Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor
Washington

New Zealand soon may provide the first solid evidence of whether the mystery flash observed in the Southern Hemisphere Sept. 22 signals a new member of the world nuclear-weapons club.

US State Department and defense officials say New Zealand's Institute of Nuclear Science at Gracefield, near Wellington, is verifying its findings of radioactive fallout in the atmosphere and may have a final statement within three weeks.

Since early this month, independent US scientists have held several meetings under auspices of White House science adviser Frank Press to study the flash. A US Vela satellite picked up the flash Sept. 22; these satellites have detected 41 earlier nuclear tests by the same means.

What had especially puzzled US nuclear scientists was that no radioactive traces had been picked up afterward in the atmosphere, despite extensive searches by long-range US aircraft, some coordinated by the US research station at McMurdo Sound, Antarctica.

Prevailing winds, US experts now say, could have carried the fallout from any blast westward to the Australia-New Zealand area, where it would have been trapped in the rain analyzed at Gracefield.

B. J. O'Brien, director of the New Zealand Institute of Nuclear Science, told newsmen by telephone that fallout has been detected equaling that produced by a small nuclear explosion of 2 to 4 kilotons. The fallout was measured in rain samples, and included many typical fission products of nuclear explosions.

A 2 to 4 kiloton blast — one-fifth or less the size of the bomb the US dropped on Hiroshima, Japan, in 1945 — was the blast size estimated by US nuclear specialists when the Sept. 22 flash was first detected.

The earlier 41 tests accurately detected by Vela satellites were atmospheric ones, either by China at its Lop Nor test site in Sinkiang Province, or France at its South Pacific site in the Kerguelen Islands, eastward of the area presently under suspicion.

The flash was observed somewhere in a 3,000 square mile area of the atmosphere south and east of South Africa and north of Antarctica, leading to suspicions that South Africa had tested a nuclear device. South Africa has denied this.

Apparent preparations for an earlier South African test on land were halted in the summer of 1977 after US intelligence satellites verified Soviet satellite sightings of the preparations.

US nuclear experts acknowledge that there is nothing but circumstantial evidence, so far, pointing to South Africa as the source of the Sept. 22 blast.

It is conceivable, these experts acknowledge, that Pakistan, Israel, Brazil, or some other power on the threshold of nuclear weapons development could have moved a nuclear device into the remote and little-observed area of the South Atlantic or Indian Ocean, with or without South African cooperation, and tested it in the atmosphere by means of a balloon, rocket, or other device.

US officials now hope that the final report of the Gracefield Institute may establish exactly where the blast, if there was one, took place.

TV GUIDE
17-23 NOVEMBER 1979

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ON PAGE 5

NEWS LEAKS = SHOULD THERE BE ANY LIMITS?

Media watchers are debating whether reporters can—and ought to—be stopped from acting on tips

By Ron Powers

It was not exactly your standard textbook news leak. Measured against all accepted norms of procedure, this news leak was approximately as subtle as the launching of Apollo 10. But a leak it indeed was, and the fact that it backfired does nothing to alter its significance as a media milestone.

For decades print journalism has enjoyed a near monopoly on major stories originating from insiders' leaks. But as of Feb. 10, 1978—in a bizarre story that did not play itself out fully until August of this year—the news leak announced itself at television's front door, dressed up in bright packaging, accompanied by all the hype and audacity that the electronic medium seems to demand.

A "news leak," of course, is the elegant term that describes information passed along to a reporter voluntarily, by someone who has a self-interested reason for seeing the information made public. (Usually because certain other people would rather keep the whole thing a secret.) The most celebrated news leaks involve vital questions of government policy, including national security. As did this one.

This most conspicuous of leaks took place in Miami, at a time when the Senate debates over the proposed Panama Canal treaties were at their height. At a news conference called by a Washington public-relations man named William Rhatican, a mysterious Panamanian unwound a horrifying account of decadence and corruption within the Panamanian government. The witness, one Alexis Watson Castillo, was presented as a former intelligence agent for the country's military head of state, Gen. Omar Torrijos. Watson (as he

came to be known) portrayed a Torrijos regime profiteering on prostitution, drugs, gunrunning, smuggling—and guilty of flagrant abuses of human rights.

Had Watson's allegations been relayed on the network television newscasts that night, they conceivably could have added to the American public's substantial doubts about turning the Panama Canal over to the Torrijos government. This, in turn, might have had an effect on the Senate debates. As it happened, because they were unable to document his charges, the networks held back on the Watson footage.

The most telling twist to this episode—a leak-within-a-leak, as it were—did not come until Aug. 14 of this year. On that date, Bernard Shaw broadcast a report on ABC that began: "This man says some prominent Washington conservatives paid him money last year to lie in a frantic scheme to defeat the Panama Canal treaties and humiliate President Carter. He's Alexis Watson Castillo. . . ."

As a result of his own investigation (following a telephone tip from the garrulous Watson himself, several weeks after the Miami conference), Shaw was able to document that members of a group called the Committee to Save the Panama Canal had paid Watson \$6000 to tell the news media the stories about prostitution and gunrunning in the Torrijos government.

While it is far from clear that Watson was bribed, as opposed to being reimbursed, one set of facts seems irrefutable: Watson was presented to the news media—the network cameras most specifically included—as an authority on a pressing matter of international concern. Those who presented him had a strong ideological interest in the issue at hand. Watson volunteered information that could have affected the outcome of the issue in a manner suitable to the committee that presented him. →

And the fact that Watson contradicted his story later raises important questions about how vulnerable television is to manipulation by sources whose facts are questionable. In this instance, even though their reporters and cameras showed up to cover Watson's charges, the TV networks exercised restraint and judgment. What about next time?

"Next time," of course, has already happened. Dozens, perhaps hundreds, of times. It is important to understand that the "leak" is an accepted, quasi-respectable coin of exchange in modern journalism. In Washington, where most national news originates and where nearly everyone knows some secret, leaks are as commonplace as parking tickets. Most of them are innocuous. Some are offensive to certain bureaucrats, even to senators and Presidents—but are legitimate news stories nonetheless. Only a relative few fall into the netherworld of "national-security" violations, attempts to manipulate sensitive policy issues or outright hoaxes.

"I have repeatedly told members of the TV press: 'Dammit, come to us. If you ask, we'll help you turn a leak into a flood.'" The speaker is a middle-management administrator in the Federal Trade Commission.

"Many bureaucrats who leak stories are doing it for a positive motive," continues this administrator. "Let's say the FTC has been investigating a shady manufacturer for a couple of years. Let's say we pretty much have the goods on him. Now: we are prohibited by protocol from formally announcing the existence of this probe. But if we believe the information is something that should be before the public, I can see no harm in leading the press to the story."

Sam Donaldson, ABC's White House correspondent, agrees. "The bane of our existence is that the White House controls what is perceived as 'the story of the day,'" he says. "Most of what we correspondents do is things like float down the Mississippi with the Carter entourage—what the White House calls 'planned participation.' Obviously, we can't do this and be behind the scenes, digging. So if I receive a piece of volunteered information, and I'm convinced that it's accurate, I think it's better to use it than not, in most cases."

But even as television journalists welcome leaks, they acknowledge that the nature of their medium has tended to discourage prospective sources—in favor of the printed page.

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"People who leak stories often want to get their side on the record," points out CBS correspondent Fred Graham. "The strategy is to have the other side read it, and then react to it. Television isn't perceived as 'the record'."

Jrit Hume has contemplated the issue from both sides—for three years as a top investigator for the syndicated political columnist Jack Anderson, and now as a Capitol Hill correspondent for ABC. "The difference," he remarks candidly, "is that few people in Washington fear the networks—on a day-to-day basis—in the way they fear the power of the print press."

"Television news is in the odd position of reaching a far greater audience than newspapers, but of having a smaller impact on policy. So most of the important leaks go to the papers."

Nevertheless, television news has had its moments in the news-leak limelight. Besides the abortive Watson affair, there was the much-publicized coup by ABC correspondent Tim O'Brien—who, on two successive nights last April, sent members of the Supreme Court and its staff into a frenzy by reporting advance information on major Court rulings. And the irascible Daniel Schorr bedeviled the CIA, the FBI and the Warren Commission for years, using unrevealed sources to bring off-the-record activities to the →

CBS airwaves. It was a leaked story, of course, that brought Schorr's CBS career to a premature end: his controversial release of the House Select Committee on Intelligence report on CIA secrets, which he had obtained from an anonymous inside contact. Ironically, it was Schorr's decision to print the document—in The Village Voice—that brought down the wrath of both the Government and his network. Under suspension by CBS, Schorr resigned in September 1976.

Whether a news leak is "packaged" and delivered to television, as in the Watson case, or whether it evolves from reporting, as with Daniel Schorr, its implications are many and troubling. Few people would deny that some leaked stories have furthered the public interest, by exposing corruption and the abuse of power and by reinforcing the accountability of public officials. But is there a point at which the broadcasting of classified (or inaccurate) information can harm the national security? If so, what can be done to impose reasonable limits on the practice?

Arizona senator Barry Goldwater is among those who believe that leaks of classified information constitute a clear and present danger. "They undermine our intelligence and our national will, and we have to put a stop to it," he says. "We have an existing law that covers that sort of thing—the Espionage Act. It provides penalties up to death for those who divulge this kind of information. I'd like to see national security violators prosecuted to the full extent of that law—and if that law isn't adequate to cover the problem, we'll have to write one that is." Goldwater added, however, that the leaks that disturbed him the most have appeared in print, rather than on television. "I wouldn't say that television is leaking nearly as badly as the few major newspapers in this country," he said.

There is, in fact, legislation being con-

sidered that would cover the specific question of national-security leaks. Being prepared by Sen. Walter Huddleston of Kentucky and other members of Congress, it would provide, among other things, fines of up to \$50,000 and prison terms of up to five years for any person convicted of disclosing the identity of a CIA agent. (This law, say Senate staff members, would not penalize the newspeople who receive and disseminate this information.)

Such attempts to curb leaks, naturally, prompt newsmen to quickly raise First Amendment warnings. Jim Lehrer, co-host of public television's *MacNeill/Lehrer Report*, is one. "The alternative to leaks," he says, "is so ominous and so chilling to free speech that I don't think it's reasonable. The only real way you're going to stop leaks is to have a totalitarian system."

CBS correspondent Graham, himself a lawyer and a student of constitutional law, agrees. "The problem with these proposed laws," he says, "is that under recent Supreme Court decisions, a journalist who had information about the commission of a crime—such as an illegal leak—could be called in by a grand jury and, if he refused to testify, be put in prison. I have found that leaks, in general, have been very healthy to the news process. Of course they must be checked out very carefully."

And ABC's Shaw, whose diligent reporting helped to discredit that grandiose made-for-TV leak by Alexis Watson Castiilo, argues that television news has at least some built-in restraints against abusing the news-leak syndrome.

"People on the outside," says Shaw, "don't realize how intimidated reporters in the electronic media are by the power of investigative reporting. We are all aware of the impact that a TV story can have. It instills in us, I think, a profound fear of being wrong. And an obsession with being right." (END)

MICHIGAN DAILY
7 November 1979

CIA recruiter meets prospects

By STEVE HOOK

The Central Intelligence Agency made its annual public recruiting appearance on campus yesterday in the person of Steve Gunn, the agency's regional personnel officer.

"I'm not really recruiting," he said. "I'm like a preliminary screener — getting a feel of the people's backgrounds, giving them information.

"I GIVE out some applications, but I don't hire people," he said.

Gunn said that he analyzes the "background and character" of prospective CIA members during the interviews. He gives applications to those who are "what we are looking for."

There have been no problems during his four months as a CIA interviewer, Gunn said. The past controversies concerning CIA campus recruitment have not touched him.

"It seems like I have overflowing schedules just about everywhere I go," he said. "Much like I had today."

GUNN SAID that the CIA is not looking for agents among college students. "We offer students a variety of fields, like engineering, accounting and mathematics." He said prospective agents "come to them;" that they rarely come out of an academic environment.

"Our agents usually have experien-

ces in other areas," he said. "They usually have diverse life experiences behind them — not necessarily academic."

Gunn described his job as "mostly public-relations." He said: "People come to me seeking information about the agency, and I give it to them."

When asked whether he detected apprehension among students over the activities of the CIA, Gunn replied that those who see him don't express reservations. "People don't come to me apprehensively," he said.

JOANNA STARK, a Residential College senior studying economics was one of the students who talked with Gunn.

"I wanted to find out what kind of people they were looking for," she said, "and what kind of approach they would use. I wanted to find out what kind of impression I would get of the CIA."

Stark described the interview as "formal, but comfortable." She said that the first question she was asked was "whether or not I went straight from high school to college."

She said Gunn also asked her about her major and her career goals. He also wanted to know how much time she had spent overseas and what foreign

languages she knew. In addition, according to Stark, Gunn wanted to know why she was interested in the CIA.

Much of the interview involved Gunn describing general functions of the CIA, a talk "which came off as really military."

"A lot of what he said was kind of general and flimsy," she said, "and not very descriptive at all. I had no more of a conception of the CIA when I left than I had when I came. He clearly gave me the information he felt I should know, and disguised information I shouldn't know about."

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AHA NEWSLETTER
(AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION)
NOVEMBER 1979

FEDERAL HISTORIANS CONFERENCE

The second conference of Federal Historians, sponsored by the Federal Resource Group of the National Coordinating Committee for the Promotion of History and the Department of Energy, was held in Washington, DC on September 13, 1979. The National Coordinating Committee is currently a consortium of twenty-five historical organizations; it was founded in 1976 by the AHA, the Organization of American Historians, and the Southern Historical Association. The conference was planned by a committee chaired by Ronald Spector of the U.S. Army Center of Military History. Other members of the planning committee were Fred Beck of the Office of the Chief of Engineers, Karl Cocke of the Center of Military History, Edie Hedlin of the National Historical Publications Commission, Morris MacGregor of the Center of Military History and J. Samuel Walker of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Approximately two hundred historians representing more than thirty historical programs within the federal government attended the meeting, which was held at the Department of Energy.

RESOLUTION ON THE HISTORICAL OFFICE OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Taking cognizance of the fact that the historical office of the Central Intelligence Agency is scheduled to be abolished and its functions absorbed by administrative personnel who may not be historians;

And being convinced that this is a backward step for an agency that has in its trust the records without which the full record of the nation's foreign relations can never be written adequately, and without which even the future needs of the agency itself cannot be met;

And being further convinced that the interests of the federal historical program in general can only suffer by the disestablishment of the historical office of an agency as important as that of the Central Intelligence Agency;

BE IT RESOLVED by the federal government historians, representing the historical agencies of the federal government, meeting on September 13, 1979:

THAT the Director of Central Intelligence be urged to reconsider the scheduled disestablishment of his historical office and give it new life and purpose to the end that historians may continue to serve the needs of his agency and the broad interests of the general public.

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE STUDY CENTER AWARDS

Two of the first three awards for writing on intelligence made by the National Intelligence Study Center (NISC) were granted for works on recent history. The two books that shared the cash prize for the best book on intelligence published or written during 1978 were *Perjury: The Hiss-Chambers Case* by Dr. Allen Weinstein, professor of history at Smith College, and *Piercing the Reich* by Joseph Persico, a study of OSS operations against Nazi Germany in World War II. NISC awards for research and writing by an American on intelligence are presented for a book, a scholarly article, and a journalistic series or individual piece.

Although the book award is set at \$1000, the awards panel, in dividing the first book award, presented \$750 to each of the award winners. The third selection made, a \$500 prize for the best scholarly article, was presented to Dr. Richard K. Betts of the Brookings Institution for an article published in *World Politics* (October 1978) entitled "Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable." The panel chose not to award a prize the first year for journalistic writing.

The National Intelligence Study Center was established in Washington, DC in 1978 to assist scholars and others writing and conducting research about intelligence and national decision making, intelligence activities in a democratic society, and related subjects. Activities of the Center include bibliographical support, research assistance, operation of a library and reading room, publications describing efforts of national organizations to improve public understanding of intelligence activities, and a survey of college courses on intelligence.

The Center Board and Advisory Board include a number of university professors interested in studies on intelligence, among them Professor Eugene Rostow of the Yale University Law School, Professor Lyman Kirkpatrick of Brown University, and Dr. Jules Davids, professor of U.S. diplomatic history, Georgetown University, who was co-chairman of the awards panel. Dr. Ray S. Cline, director of studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, is president of the Center.

NISC is interested in receiving from members of the AHA suggestions for books and other writing that might be considered for the 1979 and subsequent Center awards, and information on existing course materials covering intelligence activities. It is also interested in having more historians as members. In addition, it welcomes ideas on application of oral history techniques to historical aspects of intelligence, and on expansion of historical treatments of intelligence activities more generally.

Inquiries about NISC and its awards program should be addressed to Martin G. Cramer, Executive Director, National Intelligence Study Center, Suite 701, 919 18th Street NW, Washington, DC 20006.

EXCERPTS

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE AITHE WASHINGTON POST
14 November 1979

Fallout Studied To Confirm Blast Near S. Africa

By Thomas O'Toole

Washington Post Staff Writer

Radioactive fallout has been detected in New Zealand, providing new indications that a secret atomic explosion took place in the atmosphere of the southern hemisphere within the past three months.

The fresh radioactive debris in rainwater is the first corroborating evidence that a nuclear explosion was triggered near South Africa on the night of Sept. 22, when a U.S. surveillance satellite spotted what was presumed to be the fireball of an atomic explosion.

"Radioactive fallout was the key missing element in what we thought originally was a clandestine nuclear test," a White House source said yesterday. "The fallout in New Zealand could well be that missing element."

The increase in radioactive fallout was reported yesterday by New Zealand's Institute of Nuclear Science at Gracefield, just north of the capital city of Wellington. The rise in fallout was described by Institute Director B. J. O'Brien as the kind one would expect from a small but recent atomic explosion in the atmosphere.

"What we see in our fallout here would be consistent with a nuclear explosion having a force equivalent of two to four kilotons," O'Brien said by telephone from Gracefield. "We've searched for other causes of this fallout but can find nothing else."

While South Africa has repeatedly denied being the source of whatever the satellite detected on Sept. 22, U.S. officials have suggested that South Africa triggered a test. So far, however, the State Department has said it has no confirming evidence that Pretoria was responsible for an atomic explosion.

O'Brien said yesterday that increases in radioactive fallout were measured in rainwater samples collected from Aug. 1 to Oct. 28, with short-lived radioisotopes such as barium-140, praseodymium-143 and ytrium-91, all of them fission products of nuclear explosions.

"We didn't see much of an increase," O'Brien said. "Just enough to suggest they came from a small nuclear test."

At the time that the State Department released the information that a U.S. satellite had seen what appeared to be a nuclear fireball, it estimated the size of the explosion as between two and four kilotons. This would be an extremely small atomic explosion, not more than one-fifth the size of the first atomic bomb dropped on Japan at the end of World War II.

The increase in New Zealand's fallout was measured for radioactive isotopes with half-lives no greater than 59 days, meaning that if they came from an atomic explosion, it was a recent one. A half life is the time it takes a radioactive isotope to lose half its radioactivity.

The half life is 12 days for barium-140, 13 days for praseodymium-140, and 59 days for yttrium-91.

"What we've seen couldn't have come from an old test," O'Brien said. "Whatever it is, it is a recent event."

Prevailing winds at the latitude of South Africa and New Zealand are west to east, meaning that radioactive debris near South Africa could be carried across the Indian Ocean toward Australia and New Zealand.

The U.S. surveillance satellite that spotted the suspected fireball Sept. 22 saw a double pulse of light in the atmosphere in a circle 3,000 miles wide over the South Atlantic and Indian Ocean south and east of South Africa.

The twin light pulse is the characteristic "signature" of an atomic explosion. It is the fireball that briefly disappears from view when the explosion's shock wave makes it opaque

from space, then reappears when the shock wave begins to dissipate.

The Vela satellites that look for nuclear explosions have seen 42 double spikes of light in the last 15 years, officials say. The first 41 were confirmed as atmospheric nuclear tests, exploded either by China or France. The 42nd event took place Sept. 22.

A curious piece of information about the suspected test also turned up yesterday in Washington. An aide of the Senate subcommittee on nuclear proliferation said the subcommittee asked the National Technical Information Service who had sought a computer search of the literature on nuclear explosions and the seismic detection of nuclear explosions.

"The answer we got back," the aide said, "was the defense and naval attache of the Republic of South Africa."

*Part of
25 November 79*

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ON PAGE 8

CHICAGO TRIBUNE
29 November 1979

... And on the United Nations

U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim was overstating the case when he called the Iran-American confrontation "the most serious threat to peace since the Cuban missile crisis." Since that time the world has been through a major war in Asia, two in the Middle East, and Sino-Soviet border clashes that amounted to pretty serious threats to peace.

Nevertheless, the mounting conflict poses a danger of extensive loss of life. Mr. Waldheim's unusual decision to call an emergency meeting of the U.N. Security Council on his own motion deserves the wholehearted support of civilized people everywhere, despite Ayatollah Khomeini's contemptuous rejection of any council action—or perhaps because of it. Vigorous intervention by the U.N. could still be a deciding factor in obtaining the freedom of the embassy hostages.

Americans would be naive, however, to assume that a council debate will be limited to condemnation of Iran's willful violations of international law. The makeup of the council guarantees that even without Iran's active participation, the U.S. will also be attacked for our 30-year support of the deposed shah, and any agreed statement by the council almost certainly will contain approximately equal parts of criticism of both sides.

No matter. The whole world knows that the shah was a repressive autocrat who owed his throne in no small measure to the CIA, and it can't hurt for the Security Council to say so — especially if saying so will help defuse the crisis. What is of vital importance, however, is for the council to make the equally obvious point that the taking of diplomats as hostages for the resolution of an international dispute is totally unacceptable to the world community and that no progress can be made toward resolving the dispute until the hostages are released.

But if an emergency exists—and the deteriorating condition of the hostages certainly constitutes an emergency—it is impossible to understand why Mr. Waldheim and the Security Council are not giving it emergency attention. Except for some predictable and rather pointless procedural wrangling, the council has done nothing about the crisis and is unlikely to do anything before the weekend at the earliest. The reason is that Iranian representatives are not prepared to join in the debate. Mr. Waldheim apparently intends to wait until the acting Iranian foreign minister, Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, condescends to fly to New

York to state his country's case; he explains that the issues are "complex and delicate."

Of course they are. It was precisely to cope with complex and delicate international issues that the U.N. was created. And the most disappointing failure of the U.N. has been its willingness to use complexity and delicateness as an excuse for not settling so many questions—and indeed for not even taking them up.

To delay now would be unnecessary, unjustified, and unconscionable. It was Iran, after all, that first called for a council meeting three weeks ago. Yet now the ayatollah heaps scorn on "this so-called Security Council" and rejects in advance any action it may take.

The council has not hesitated to condemn other countries, such as Israel and Rhodesia, without hearing from them. The present plight of the hostages demands that the council get moving, with or without Iran's participation.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 25NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
29 NOVEMBER 1979

U.S. wants Security Council to meet as scheduled

By RUSS BRALEY

Staff Correspondent of The News.

United Nations—The sudden firing of Iran's acting foreign minister by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini threw into question yesterday whether the Security Council will meet as scheduled Saturday night, although the United States will insist that there be no further postponement.

In Washington, State Department spokesman Hodding Carter 3d said the United States will insist that the meeting be held Saturday. He said that Iran has enough diplomats available in New York, if the new foreign minister, Sadeq Qotbzadeh, does not arrive by Saturday.

The United States did not want the debate in the first place, and many delegates to the UN believe it will not help the American hostages or raise American stature in the world.

Iran has four representatives available for debate, special envoys Saeed Sanjavi and Ahmed Safarnian, and its charges d'affaires here and in Washington, Jamal

Jhemirani and Ali Agah. All are eager to seize an ideal propaganda forum for charging American domination, CIA subversion, decades of exploitation and sinister designs.

The United States agreed to the debate hoping it would impress Khomeini with the unanimous disapproval of UN delegates of the holding of diplomatic hostages, even though Khomeini rejected any council conclusions in advance. A Third World diplomat said that few UN members will want to speak.

The United States stumbled into the debate.

On Nov. 9, Secretary of State Vance flew to New York to head off a Security Council meeting suggested by Iran. Vance underlined to Secretary General Kurt Waldheim that the U.S. would discuss nothing with Iran until the hostages are freed.

Then the U.S. froze Iranian assets and sent a second aircraft carrier task force to the seas near Iran, and President Carter hinted at military action if the hostages were harmed.

Last week, Pakistan's President

Mohammed Zia Ul-Haq, even as the American Embassy smoldered in Islamabad, wrote Waldheim supporting Iran's requests for a Security Council meeting, citing an American threat to peace.

A veiled warning

Last week, Iranian envoys made a veiled warning to U.S. and UN officials: On the holy day of Tassua (today) Iran's Shiite Moslems work themselves into an emotional state, and on Ashura (tomorrow) they flog themselves into what can become a frenzy. The envoys said it would be wise to call a Security Council meeting, then postpone it as a sign of religious respect, to calm emotions in Iran that might erupt against the hostages.

The U.S., as the aggrieved party, expected to speak at the opening session, but two days of urgent consultations showed that some Security Council members thought that giving the U.S. such an advantage would confirm Khomeini's purported belief that the United States can rig the council.

So the opening session Tuesday was brief and without substance. Waldheim, who called the meeting as an emergency under Article 99 of the UN Charter, spoke only to call for restraint on both sides. He added almost apologetically, "I may mention that this move was supported and welcomed by the governments of Iran and the United States."

In the debate, if it occurs, the United States will not charge Khomeini with an act of war in seizing hostages. Neither will the U.S. delegation charge Khomeini with inciting mass murder (the burning of the Rex Cinema in Abadan in August 1978—the first large-scale killing) or with inciting mass suicide when he called a year ago for torrents of blood, promising his half-literate constituency holy martyrdom and everlasting life if they were killed rioting against troops.

U.S. diplomats instead are committed to restraint in the debate, avoiding anything that might stir emotion. Ambassador Donald McHenry said that the U.S. "will not descend into barbarism" in response to "the unbelievable outrage" of Iran's taking hostages.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 41THE WASHINGTON POST
28 November 1979

Khomeini

Ayatollah Bars Role for U.N.

By Jonathan C. Randal

Washington Post Foreign Service

TEHRAN, Nov. 27—Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini today dismissed United Nations Security Council efforts to help settle the American-Iranian crisis and said that any investigation of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's alleged misdeeds must take place here and not abroad.

Khomeini thus doomed a number of proposed formulas designed to investigate the ousted shah's purported crimes either in the U.S. Congress or in international tribunals.

His latest hard-line message coincided with a fresh and detailed warning from radical Islamic students that they have mined and placed explosives in the walls, grounds and buildings at the U.S. Embassy where they are holding 49 American hostages.

Among those caught off balance by Khomeini's latest message was Acting Foreign Minister Abol Hassan Bani Sadr, who had praised Rep. Henry Reuss (D-Wis.) for holding open the possibility of a House Banking Committee investigation if the hostages are released.

Reuss' initiative, Bani Sadr said, was proof that his "round-the-clock efforts to explain the facts to American and international public opinion have now borne their first fruit."

Reuss, responding to a cable from Rep. George Hansen (R-Idaho) requesting hearings on the shah's alleged crimes, said he might commit his committee to hold the hearings if they would help free the hostages but he would not proceed with such an inquiry until their release. Hansen visited Iran on his own initiative.

[Hansen accused the State Department of "pushing the self-destruct" button" by allowing the shah into the United States despite warnings of violent reprisals from Iran, the Associated Press reported from Tehran. Hansen, riled by Carter administration criticism of his unsanctioned intervention in the U.S.-Iran crisis, said Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance must have been aware of the dangers. The congressman is scheduled to leave Wednesday after a week-long visit.]

Bani Sadr urged Congress to "form other investigative committees to examine the crimes and treason of the former shah."

He added that the "scandal of the former shah and his American assistants will, by degrees, be greater than the Watergate scandal."

Khomeini criticized the Security Council for allegedly wanting to deal only with the hostage aspect of the crisis and not Iranian demands for the shah's extradition to stand trial here.

Convinced that the Security Council was "under direct U.S. influence," the 79-year-old religious leader said that its findings were prejudged and its membership "would welcome our oppressed nation's being found guilty."

"It is not possible to study the cases of the ousted shah and the hostages at the espionage center—as he now calls the U. S. Embassy—except in Iran because the evidence for the crime exists in Iran and cannot be transferred abroad," Khomeini said in a message from the holy city of Qom.

"We have given about 100,000 martyrs and have several million witnesses and more than 100,000 maimed people," he added, "whom it is not possible to take abroad to produce evidence to testify—apart from the many files which exist here."

Khomeini argued that the "investigation of the espionage center must be undertaken at the same so-called embassy because it is there that the evidence of the crimes exists."

Iran's leader has threatened to put the remaining hostages on trial for espionage unless the United States extradites the shah.

The students occupying the embassy said they booby-trapped and mined the compound to thwart any attempt to take away the hostages, who are in their fourth week of captivity.

"U.S. agents intend to enter the spying embassy these days by any means possible and hijack the hostages or harm them," the students' message said.

Analysts suggested that the warning may have been motivated by fears that the extreme left was planning to stage disorders at the embassy during the Tasua and Ashura holidays, Shiite Islam's holiest. The holidays this year fall on Thursday and Friday.

"If the U.S. mercenaries try to carry out the plot," the message said, "they can be identified and will receive their punishment." The message made clear that Revolutionary Guards on duty at the embassy would shoot anyone suspected of such an attempt.

Giant marches are scheduled for both Tasua and Ashura. They were scheduled partly in commemoration of last year's massive demonstrations, which spelled the beginning of the end for the shah, and partly to show support for Khomeini in the crisis with the United States and to work up enthusiasm for the forthcoming constitutional referendum.

During the day a small group representing the pro-Moscow Tudeh Communist Party tried to march on the embassy, but were driven off by the Guard.

Spokesmen for Tudeh, which has come under increasing Islamic criticism although it strongly backs Khomeini, today defended their performance.

The party said it had "never disputed the important social role of the religious and has never denied that the religions of all systems [slavery, feudalism and capitalism] have on numerous occasions, because of their revolutionary and progressive contexts, been the rallying cry of oppressed nations."

In other developments:

- The air space around Qom, Khomeini's residence 80 miles south of here, was "closed to all air movements by passenger or cargo planes," apparently as a precaution against any eventual American military intervention.

- A group calling itself "the militant clergy," again charged the United States was responsible for the attack on Mecca's Great Mosque, Islam's holiest shrine.

- Army headquarters announced a halt of military activity in Kurdistan to allow autonomy talks to move ahead between Kurdish leaders and a central government goodwill mission. Two days ago the Kurdish Democratic Party announced a 20-day ceasefire on condition that all non-Kurdish Revolutionary Guards were withdrawn from the western province within 15 days.

- Ayatollah Kazem Shariatmadari's office in Qom issued a statement contesting an interview the moderate leader gave to a Madrid newspaper. It said the newspaper's version was guilty of "great mistakes made in the translation" and denied "the remarks as they have been said."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 10

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
28 November 1979

US keeping an eye on Soviet tactics as Iran crisis unfolds

By John K. Cooley
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

As the Iranian crisis works its way through the United Nations, US analysts are looking beyond Iran's borders for any evidence that the Soviet Union might take advantage of the crisis to stir up diversionary trouble or advance its own purposes elsewhere in the world.

So far, neither in the NATO area — where the Soviets are asking West Europeans not to accept new US nuclear-tipped missiles — the Caribbean, nor the Far East are there signs of any major US-Soviet political or military crises that could divert American energies from the urgent search for a solution in Iran.

However, Soviet naval and air forces are closely watching the progress of the US aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk and its escorts as they steam from the Indian Ocean toward the crisis area, situated close to the USSR's southern energy supplies and sensitive Muslim populations.

Chinese-Soviet tensions over Cambodia and Thailand, and the volatile southern African situation arising from the guerrilla wars in Zimbabwe Rhodesia as well as the perennial Arab-Israeli tensions west of Iran do have disruptive potential, US officials acknowledge.

On Nov. 19, 1978, as the Iranian revolution began, Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev warned that "any interference, especially military, in the affairs of Iran, a state which directly borders the Soviet Union, would be regarded as affecting its own security." President Carter responded that the US had no intention of interfering, nor of permitting others to do so.

Members of the US intelligence community believe the Soviet warning still stands and does not need repeating. But they add that there are no obvious Soviet preparations for counteraction in Iran or elsewhere. If hostilities erupted between Iran and the United States, they believe, the Soviets would be inclined to issue new, stern warnings, but not to move troops (as they did into northern Iran in 1921 and 1944-46) to help Iran unless US ground troops actually entered the country in force.

This would not preclude some small-scale diversion in Africa, the Caribbean, or even Europe, to distract US attention and strength elsewhere and so take the heat off Iran.

In the Caribbean, US analysts say there are no signs of new aggressive actions by Cuba or the Soviets. They say, for example, that naval construction at Cienfuegos on Cuba's south coast does not indicate new Soviet missile or Cuban submarine facilities, contrary to some published reports.

The Soviets could, of course, increase their aid to African nationalists in Zimbabwe Rhodesia and such other hot spots as Angola. US analysts do not even rule out a new Soviet diversion in Berlin, or the sensitive Norwegian sector on NATO's northernmost flank.

In the Indian Ocean-Arabian Sea region, Soviet and possibly Iranian aircraft and ships have begun closely watching the US aircraft carrier Midway and its accompanying escorts; a US defense spokesman said Nov. 27. Soviet aircraft, including medium-range May patrol planes based at Aden, South Yemen, and combat aircraft have observed or buzzed similar task forces, most recently last June.

There now are 15 Soviet Pacific fleet

warships in the Indian Ocean, including a Kresta-class guided missile cruiser. This is an increase of three ships since the US carrier Kitty Hawk and escorts set out from the Philippines for the Arabian Sea about Nov. 21. Western naval analysts say this is a normal, or even less than normal, Soviet deployment in a crisis period.

However, there has been a major increase, including double the former number of Soviet combat ships in the South and East China seas since last February's China-Vietnam war. The Russians have made a record number of 60 naval port visits to Vietnam, including calls this month at Haiphong, Cam Ranh Bay, and Da Nang.

The Pentagon continued to insist Nov. 27 that no US forces have been specially alerted. Officials denied rumors of an alert to the 82nd Airborne Division at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina. Only the usual 40-man platoon of the 82nd Airborne is being kept in constant readiness, they added.

Besides the 82nd, the 101st Air Mobile Division, at Ft. Campbell, Kentucky, and the 6th Air Cavalry Brigade, at Ft. Hood, Texas, which carried out readiness exercises this month, are the main Army units normally earmarked for airlift overseas in any emergency. Similar Marine units include the 2nd Division at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, and the 1st and 3rd divisions at Camp Pendleton, California, and Okinawa, respectively. Marine air wings are based at Cherry Point, North Carolina, and El Toro, California.

Defense analysts estimate that the entire 82nd Airborne could be moved to the crisis area by airlift within a week on C-5A Galaxy and C-141 Starlifter transport planes.

One Marine division could reach the area by sea, but only within three weeks to a month. Several companies of marines are embarked aboard the Kitty Hawk and two US carrier task forces with the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE **AL-10**THE WASHINGTON POST
27 November 1979**Malaise in Tehran****Joblessness, Shortages
Sap Revolutionary Spirit**By Jonathan C. Randal
Washington Post Foreign Service

TEHRAN, Nov. 26—“You can't have everything with 'death to Carter, death to the shah,’” said the young man listening to a crowd bound for the U.S. Embassy to demonstrate.

“That's not going to get me a job,” he said glumly to his fellow passengers in a collective taxi stuck in a typical Tehran traffic jam.

Out of work for months like millions of other Iranians, he was not critical of the revolution that had caused his unemployment or of the continuing occupation of the U.S. Embassy that is diverting public attention from this and other serious economic problems.

Rather, after so many months of turmoil and dislocation, he seemed overcome by the general weariness here that even the current anti-American campaign has failed to more than mask.

Such expressions of discontent should not be interpreted as a longing for the days of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

“The revolution was a necessity and had to happen,” a surgeon said. “The regime was so corrupt—it was impossible to put up with it any longer.”

Yet he was clearly appalled by the Moslem religious authorities' lack of political, economic or management savvy and frightened by what he saw as dangerous leftist inroads.

The shah's departure was not enough to exorcise Iran's devils, he seemed to be saying, but perhaps the anti-Americanism would now suffice.

Once the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency helped put the shah back on his throne in 1953. “It took us 25 years to believe inside our heads that we could get rid of him,” the surgeon added. “We had become so convinced that the United States could keep him in power and protect him that we never questioned things.”

This history helps to explain the accumulated nationalist resentment against the United States in a country with a long tradition of imposed foreign domination. Playing on this resentment, the revolutionaries have touched a live nerve

in denouncing the United States and its works here.

Still, some Iranians are ambivalent. “There's not a small village in this country which doesn't have someone living or studying in the United States,” a middle-aged man said. “People are worried in the back of their minds. They think twice before calling their relatives back from America. There are few places in universities here, and anyhow they're not much good.”

But in a teahouse in poor south Tehran—the part of the city much invoked as a symbol of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's “revolution of the deprived”—the conversation is of shortages: eggs, meat and now American cigarettes proscribed in a fit of nationalism.

Rice costing 70 cents a kilo (2.2 pounds) before the revolution now fetches more than twice as much. Rice is a staple in Iranian diets.

A certain fatalism allows that all revolutions have problems. The current crisis—the Iranian demands for the shah's extradition and Washington's insistence about releasing the embassy hostages—evoke no great enthusiasm or venom.

For the record, a young man sitting on a well-worn bench along a white-tiled teahouse wall says all Iran wants the shah back to stand trial. There is general, but unargumentative, agreement.

“You'd have to ask the Revolutionary Council about that,” another man added. It was as if he was suggesting it was a matter for the politicians, be they mullahs or their equally devout Islamic lay colleagues.

Some middle-class Iranians clearly are betting on a generalized breakdown of Iranian society to cause the overthrow of the theocratic leadership. They delight in the mullahs' lack of management skill. The absence of spare parts, the generalized mess.

“This bunch couldn't run a provincial pawn shop, much less a semi-advanced economy,” a lawyer said almost gloatingly.

Without visible emotion a professor insists that “things are going to get a great deal worse.”

A European lawyer, here on his eighth trip since the revolution in February to iron out contract differ-

ences for important European clients, curses the bureaucracy's “passive resistance.”

“They're hoping to bring down the revolution,” he said, “by shuffling the papers and never getting anything done.”

“Things have improved a bit since the new bunch took over last month and started talking about purging the administration,” he added, “but that wouldn't work well either since they'd just put in greenhorns. Better to keep the old lot and put the fear of Allah in them.”

An Iranian architect suggests that “the country is looking for a Bonaparte, but not yet. He foresees the day when Iranians will settle for law and order instead of the liberty bordering on license that characterizes much of revolutionary reality despite the stern Islamic pronouncements.

Only peripherally do the middle-class critics realize they share this “worse-is-better” view of the revolution with the very leftists they profess to fear.

Few middle-class Iranians appear to realize their own weakness as a class without much backbone or organization faced by a left which is armed, disciplined and determined even if split into various rival parties.

The same doctor who pins his hopes on military coming to the rescue, concedes that several officer friends in the decimated Army have refused to fight in Kurdistan.

“It was all so much easier last year,” a political scientist remarked. “Then the intellectuals who had been for the shah for years finally asked themselves questions and dumped him. Now people don't know what to think.”

With perhaps as many as 500,000 Iranians—most of them members of the upper, upper middle and management classes—many of the remaining elite are out of work, or settling for as

CONTINUED

little as 20 to 30 percent of their former pay.

University professors wait for fresh purges. Professions wither. Lawyers no longer are in demand under an Islamic judicial system. Many professional journalists are jobless—despite a proliferation of publications—because the ultrareligious have taken their places.

The flowering of Iranian writing after the revolution has dried up, or been kept in desk drawers, because of the difficulty now in publishing anything but the fundamentalist Islamic line.

Newspaper sales, which soared during the long crisis before and after the revolution, are down drastically.

"There's little news in the papers which isn't on radio or television because of self-censorship," a newspaperman said, "and there's a reader resistance."

Yet, if there is one distinguishing characteristic about Tehran these days, it's a kind of stubborn national determination to see things through.

"This is not a simple country to run," an editor said. "We've no discipline, no dedication to work, our people want more and now."

And there is less and less to give. It's not just because of the dislocating repercussions of the revolution. Rather it also reflects the leadership's genuine belief that salaries should be nearly equal, that money is the root of all evil and that less is more.

Reflecting on the fundamentalist stamp of the revolution—and Iran's determination to see things Westernized Iranian said: "The worst thing the shah did was deprive a generation of political experience."

One thing that has survived the revolution, however, are the jokes, like the following which act as a safety valve for society's ills:

A man is discovered walking backwards down a street in Rasht, the northern Iranian city that has become the butt of jokes about the simple-minded. Neighbours rush to the man's aid, warning him he could be run over and asking him what he is doing.

"I was just taking back all those steps in all those demonstrations I marched in last year to get rid of the shah," is the reply. Even the mullahs laugh at that one, it is said.

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ON PAGE A 8

THE WASHINGTON POST
27 November 1979

Another U.S. Detainee

TEHRAN, Nov. 26 (AP)—Iran's Revolutionary Court has detained a U.S. citizen on suspicion he was an agent of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Tehran's Keayhan newspaper reported today.

The paper identified the American as Max Copeland, an employe of Electronic Industries, a firm with an office in Tehran. It did not give Copeland's home town.

"According to the evidence uncovered, this man has links with the CIA," the paper said.

Keayhan said Copeland had been under surveillance by Revolutionary Guards for some time

and had been wanted by the Revolutionary Court for allegedly smuggling \$90,000 out of the country illegally. He was detained at Tehran's Mehrabad Airport while "intending to smuggle eight boxes of radar consoles out of Iran," the paper said.

The radar equipment was imported into Iran, but never used, and Copeland was trying to re-export it illegally, according to Keayhan.

The prosecutor's office confirmed Copeland's arrest and said it was carrying out investigations, the paper added.

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ON PAGE A 8

THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
27 November 1979

3 U.S. Women in Iran Say Try Hostages

From News Services

TEHRAN, Iran — Three young American women living here yesterday publicly endorsed the occupation of the U.S. Embassy by Iranian militants and said the 49 American hostages should be tried as spies.

"If they are not spies, they should certainly welcome a public trial," Mariam Kazemi told a news conference organized by the Ministry of National Guidance.

Kazemi, who said she was from New York; Molly McComb, formerly of Los Angeles, and Margaret Hunter of Atlanta, all in their 20s, said they

represented a newly organized committee of "about a dozen" American women married to Iranians.

Hunter, who has been staying with an Iranian family for two months and plans to return to the United States, said, "I think that, in fact, many Americans do support the activities of the Iranian students here.

"There are a lot of people that want the shah sent back to Iran. They see him as the criminal that he is."

Kazemi and McComb are married to Iranians and have been here eight

months. They said they were convinced the U.S. government and news media had misled the American public about events in Iran.

Kazemi charged the embassy was deeply involved in the alleged crimes of the shah's regime.

"The previous ambassadors, (William H.) Sullivan and (Richard) Helms, were both from the CIA," she said. Helms was director of the CIA before he was appointed ambassador. Sullivan, his successor, was a career diplomat who had served as ambassador to the Philippines and Laos.

Shah's Disputed Wealth a Key Issue in U.S.-Iran Conflict

This article is based on reporting by Ann Crittenden and Kathleen Teltsch, and was written by Miss Teltsch.

The fortune purportedly removed from Iran by the deposed Shah has become a central issue in the tense conflict between the United States and Iran's revolutionary regime. But neither Government is able to say with much precision just how large that fortune might be, or what forms it may have taken, or where it might be.

The Americans must realize that this family, who were only illiterate peasants two generations ago, has stolen much of the national wealth from the country. Kamran Movassaghi, Iran's economic attaché in Washington, declared last week, leaving no doubt about Teheran's determination to recover assets of Mohammed Riza Pahlavi and his relatives.

But neither Mr. Movassaghi nor other Iranian officials said they knew the dimensions or locations of those assets, and the Iranian Government has begun an extensive search for them, using lawyers in Washington and Switzerland. Mr. Movassaghi said the Government estimates that \$17 billion to \$30 billion, drawn from oil revenues, land holdings, industrial earnings and profits from contracts with foreign concerns, had been taken from the country before the regime of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini deposed the Shah in January.

The Shah has disputed assertions that he is a billionaire, and is reputed to be uncertain about the total of his wealth. In an interview on Thursday, according to Barbara Walters of ABC News, the Shah suggested that his fortune was \$50 million to \$100 million.

C.I.A. Estimate of Wealth

A review of public records and interviews with investment bankers and well-placed United States officials indicated that the Shah has no investments in his name in this country of the magnitude asserted by the Iranians.

Supporters of the Khomeini regime have also charged that at least \$20 billion was transferred to banks in Switzerland. That assertion is denied by Fritz Leutwiler, president of the Swiss National Bank, who has said that Iranian holdings there amount to a few hundred million dollars.

The new regime's officials regard Mohammed Jafar Behbani, who was the Shah's Treasurer, as having the most complete record of the Pahlavi holdings abroad. Mr. Behbani is reported to be living in London.

Among the assertions of the regime's supporters are that the Shah's money went into multimillion-dollar real-estate investments in the United States. For example, Manoucher Shafie, who heads the Pahlavi Foundation in New York, a non-profit organization that provides financial aid to Iranian students in this country, has said that as much as \$800 million was secretly invested in a residence-office development in Atlanta, Ga. But he could not name the development, and real-estate agents there expressed skepticism that a foreign investment of that size had been made.

Role of Oil Revenues

Iranian officials have suggested that much of the wealth they say the Shah removed came from oil revenues, insisting that few distinctions were made between state funds and the Shah's own resources.

According to Ali Agah, the chargé d'affaires at the Iranian Embassy in Washington, the National Iranian Oil Company earned revenues of \$91 billion between 1973 and 1978, but only \$14.5 billion was transferred to Iran. The bulk of the other funds was deposited in Iranian Government bank accounts, but billions were not accounted for and opponents of the Shah have charged that this money was taken for the family's personal use.

While the Shah was in power, oil revenues were said to have been deposited largely in branches of the Chase Manhattan Bank. Chase has declined to detail the Shah's current investment.

The repository of much of the Shah's fortune was the Pahlavi Foundation. One of the foundation's most important assets was its full ownership of Bank Omran, the fifth-largest commercial bank in Iran, which was formed in 1952 to promote agricultural development but evolved into the Pahlavis' personal overseas investment bank. Its assets were estimated at \$771 million.

Bank's Links in United States

The officials who directed the foundation before the revolution could not be reached, and only two Omran undertakings in the United States have been made public: an association with the First National Wisconsin Bank of Milwaukee, and its financing of a half-billion-dollar commercial and residential complex in New Orleans called Canal Place.

Last July Joseph C. Canizaro, Canal Place's developer, announced that he had purchased the Iranian interest for \$50 million. The new regime was said at that time to have agreed to advance \$1.5 million for the project, suggesting that Teheran continues to have an interest as a lender in the project.

Omran's arrangements with the First National Wisconsin several years ago led to Husang Ram, president of Omran, being made a director of the American bank, and in June 1978, a statement showed that he owned 10,000 shares in it. Mr. Ram is believed to be imprisoned in Teheran, but Omran is said to have retained the stock. Omran has been taken over by the National Bank of Iran.

The Pahlavi family has also spent substantial sums for residential properties in the United States.

Princess Ashraf Pahlavi, the Shah's twin sister, owns two adjacent town houses at 29 and 31 Beekman Place — reportedly purchased for \$750,000 and \$900,000 — and a lavish, triplex cooperative on Park Avenue.

Princess Shams, the elder sister of the Shah, purchased a Beverly Hills mansion for \$550,000 and has put it up for sale at \$4.2 million. She is also said to have since purchased a seaside showplace in Acapulco, and to have planned a gold-domed palace on a 16-acre site above Beverly Hills with waterfalls and reflecting pools. The latter venture, however, reportedly was abandoned because of building restrictions.

(As Received)

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 17-18CHICAGO TRIBUNE
25 November 1979

The shah: For 30 years, Uncle Sam's nephew in Iran

By James Coates

WASHINGTON—The roots of the current cataclysmic events in Iran can be traced to 1953. That was the year when a team, code-named AJAX by the newly formed Central Intelligence Agency, used currency from a safe crammed with Iranian money in the American Embassy in Tehran to buy a "revolution" for a moody young monarch named Mohammed Reza Pahlavi.

That action, students of Iranian society generally conclude, forged a 26-year link between the now deposed shah and the U.S. These experts also note that the shah was so shaken by almost losing his crown in 1953 that he set up a network of secret policemen, torture chambers, and prisons as insurance against the kind of revolution which forced him to flee Iran for his life last January.

CIA sources have told of meetings with their counterparts in Iran's secret police, SAVAK, in which "torture was discussed matter-of-factly." And former CIA agents have written of the "exciting" days when they engineered the shah's rise to the status of absolute monarch.

THE MOST precise details of the CIA coup 26 years ago are to be found in fragments of a manuscript written by Kermit Roosevelt, the CIA operative who directed AJAX out of an office in the U.S. embassy compound in 1953.

The CIA has ordered copies of Roosevelt's book destroyed because the agency found it violated an agreement never to disclose the role of other intelligence networks in the coup—notably Great Britain's MI5 and MI6.

The CIA exercise in Iran was a classic game of cowboys and Indians, the kind field agents played in the early 1950s as the Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union began.

The CIA acted in Iran at a time when an erratic prime minister, Mohammed Mossadegh, had wrested control of the government from Pahlavi. In 1941 young Pahlavi had inherited the crown from his father, a hard-bitten militarist whom the allies forced from Iran in 1941 because of his wartime support for the fascist regime of Adolf Hitler.

During the war, British, U.S., and Soviet forces occupied the country.

After the war the shah enjoyed a few years of power. But many of his early years on the Peacock Throne were terrifying for him. There were routine assassination attempts and street violence was commonplace.

In February, 1949, a photographer called to take the shah's picture whipped out a pistol and shot the young king five times. "One in the face, one in the shoulder, one in the head, two in the body," the shah later recalled.

In all there were five assassination attempts and each one narrowly missed. Analysts blame,

those experiences for the repressive tactics Pahlavi later employed.

The shah had clearly lost his power in early 1953 when Mossadegh came to power and the gyrations of the new regime frightened U.S. planners, who even then knew how fully America depended upon Iran for oil.

Mossadegh, a Marxist sympathizer, was not a friendly figure. He had the eccentric habit of breaking into tears when speaking and held press conferences wearing pajamas.

Even more troubling, he built his popular support by nationalizing foreign oil holdings in Iran — then mostly held by the British.

WITH PRESIDENT Eisenhower only recently inaugurated and Allen Dulles heading the CIA, American agents decided to move clandestinely, out Mossadegh, and win the shah's gratitude.

Roosevelt, a grandson of President Theodore Roosevelt, commanded the joint CIA-British Intelligence venture.

Roosevelt in his confiscated book, "Counter-coup," indicated that agents used three methods of operation: They bribed Moslem leaders to remain quiet during the coup; supplied funds from a "gigantic safe crammed with rials (currency)" to pay street demonstrators and used British ties with Iran's army to guarantee that the military would back the shah.

Using the assumed name of James Lochridge, Roosevelt sneaked into Tehran and paid a midnight visit to the shah's villa by hiding under a blanket in the back seat of one of the monarch's limousines.

Roosevelt told the confused shah that he represented U.S. and British spies. He advised Pahlavi that President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Winston Churchill would confirm the plot by using "code phrases" in speeches delivered in the next 24 hours.

CIA operating procedure then was for all cables about the coup to use code names, Roosevelt wrote. The shah was called KGSVOY or "Boy Scout" and Mossadegh was "the old bugger." Roosevelt's "cryptonym" was RNMAKER.

Other reports indicate that the CIA resorted to many techniques later used to overthrow President Allende of Chile.

U.S. funds were paid to newspapers and radio stations to promote pro-shah propaganda while army officers were paid to support the coup and the American embassy was used to coordinate the various moves, according to Roosevelt.

Especially important, the U.S. cut off all economic aid to Iran and canceled many trade agreements which caused economic difficulties, according to another student of the coup, Robert Graham, author of "Iran: The Illusion of Power."

AS PLANNED, Pahlavi flew first to Bagdad in neighboring Iraq and then to Rome, where he was photographed on a three-day shopping binge with his then wife, Princess Soraya Esfandiari.

Mobs acting at Mossadegh's direction stormed through Tehran and tore down statues of the Shah. Three days later, however, the CIA triggered the trap it had so carefully laid for the 70-year-old prime minister.

Mobs paid from the money in the American embassy safe stormed through the bazaar and occupied government buildings. Colonels and generals rose up and overpowered the military loyal to Mossadegh and invited Pahlavi to return to his throne.

Mohammed Reza Shah returned with a vengeance. The boy king was a hardened man, his body pocked with bullet holes, his mind determined to seize absolute power.

He later told Oriana Fallaci, the Italian journalist: "Believe me, when three quarters of a nation doesn't know how to read or write, you can provide for reforms only by the strictest authoritarianism—otherwise you get nowhere."

And harsh he was. Taking a cue from his CIA friends, Pahlavi formed his own spy agency, its initials SAVAK standing for Security and Intelligence Organization Iran.

Parviz Sabeti, deputy director of SAVAK, matter-of-factly told visiting American journalists that the secret police operated jails filled with thousands of prisoners charged with being "Marxists and Islamic Marxists."

Iranians—especially those living abroad—told of widespread torture in the prisons. The Shah denied that he tortured his political prisoners, but admitted that his prisons held persons charged with ideological crimes.

CIA OFFICIALS who worked closely with SAVAK in recent years acknowledged in interviews that the Iranians were candid about physically abusing their prisoners.

One senior CIA analyst who made repeated trips to Iran recalled how one SAVAK chief introduced him to "a brave young SAVAK captain."

The chief had the captain remove his shirt to show the welts and abrasions on his back and chest, the CIA official recalled.

The man had been assigned by SAVAK to infiltrate "Marxists" by posing as a prisoner. "They said he was brave because he subjected himself to the same daily beatings as the other prisoners got," the CIA analyst explained.

In his years of power, Pahlavi outlawed political parties and consolidated his position by taking personal control of much of the Iran's national wealth.

Recent analyses of the Shah's personal wealth note that he "blurred" his personal funds and those of Iran. Especially important to the Shah's power was the income of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), which helped finance SAVAK and the army's Imperial Guard.

Swiss bank ledgers leaked to the press by a disaffected member of the Shah's inner circle showed that in a single month NIOC deposited \$12 million in one of Pahlavi's personal accounts.

USING IRAN'S WEALTH to buy the loyalty of top military officers and finance SAVAK, the Shah maintained his power during years when he deliberately alienated the country's Moslem leaders—the mullahs.

The Shah's reforms—such as allowing women to vote and taking property away from the Moslem leaders—prompted several mullah revolts. The most violent occurred in 1963 when its leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, staged riots in three cities that left 1,000 Iranians dead or seriously injured.

Khomeini was arrested in the Iranian holy city of Qom in 1963 but Pahlavi allowed him to leave Iran in 1964. That decision, of course, proved to be the Shah's undoing.

After Khomeini's Revolutionary Council seized power, the Moslems held a series of religious trials which ended in the execution of an estimated 600 persons ranging from SAVAK officers to brothel keepers.

DURING ONE trial Bahman Naderipour, pleading for his life, confessed to conducting a series of tortures for SAVAK.

"They were not always shot," said Naderipour. "Often we would torture them to death. We would stick hot iron bars in their noses and eyes. And we would tell the coroner to write suicide as the cause of death."

At one point, the terrified agent testified that SAVAK disposed of nine guerrilla leaders by announcing they had died in an escape attempt.

Actually, said Naderipour, "We took them out of the jail and put them in a minibus and drove them to the hills. We had only one submachine gun, an Uzi (Israeli made) among us, so we took turns shooting them."

Naderipour was executed shortly after his trial.

James Coates is a member of The Tribune's Washington bureau.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE G-1WASHINGTON STAR
25 NOVEMBER 1979

Iranians expect the angel when America departs

By Barry Rubin

Barry Rubin is a Middle East specialist and staff associate at Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies.

The United States is helpless in dealing with Iran, boasts Radio Tehran, because for America, "Politics is nothing but a mathematical process: two plus two equals four." Iran's strength, the broadcast concludes, is its unpredictability. Ayatollah Khomeini plays by his own set of rules.

These rules are well worth understanding in the current crisis. Their roots are in Islam, but they are very much a product of Iran's particular culture and history. The hostages' fate may depend on how rigidly Khomeini's forces stick to this pattern. Factions within the ruling group are already arguing over the best course to guarantee the regime's survival.

Politics and religion are inseparable in Iran's national experience. Periods of autocratic centralized government have alternated with eras of anarchy and disintegration, while dynastic politics have been torn by plots and counterplots. The whole world has been interpreted from the standpoint of this conspiratorial style, while foreigners have been hated and feared as potential upsetters of the delicate internal balance.

Iran's Shi'a Islam has lived long periods as a revolutionary sect whose bitter and bloody defeats inculcated a preference for martyrdom and revenge over compromise. Shi'ite clerics saw political power as a way to implement its programs. The shah was often confronted by a charismatic religious leader. The Imam — a title today bestowed on Khomeini — would some day come as a messiah to save the faithful and fulfill Iran's destiny.

Politics, so often in practice an arena for power struggles, was in theory the stage on which good would battle evil. Foreigners — and particularly non-Muslim foreigners — were clearly perceived as being in

the latter camp. Their deviousness was matched only by their unlimited powers. Khomeini's widely repeated slogan that "America is the cause of all our troubles" is no mere cynical exercise — it is a virtual article of faith.

Of course, even paranoids have enemies, as Henry Kissinger is fond of remarking, and Iranian willingness to credit any political event to foreign manipulation is based on a long history of real hidden interventions, though Iran never was formally colonized.

Nevertheless, this kind of explanation for events, this xenophobia, often reaches pathological heights. When an Iranian mob murdered an American diplomat who was photographing a religious ceremony in 1924, the killing was blamed on secret British machinations. In the early 1950s many Iranians believed that the British had built a pipeline out of the country to steal Iran's oil. Khomeini today blames Britain for harboring former Prime Minister Shahpur Baktiar — when it is well known that he is actually in France. Khomeini attributes a fundamentalist attack on a Mecca mosque to an American-Zionist conspiracy. Ayatollah Khalkhali, the revolution's hanging judge, describes President Carter's National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski as a man bent on Islam's destruction and as a founder of the CIA, the FBI, Israeli intelligence and the Pentagon.

In Khomeini's view, there can be no real conflicts among honest Iranian Muslims. Islam is the perfect religion ("100 per cent revolutionary," says the ayatollah) and its application to Iran is already in the process of creating the ideal society.

Obviously no reasonable person could criticize or rebel against this just order. So if Kurds or Arabs revolt, demanding autonomy, if women demonstrate for equal rights or if leftists attack Islamic rule, they can only be motivated by the satanic forces of the CIA and the American embassy. The technique has something in common with Communist practices but in Iran, of course, it is also applied to the Marxists. Asked the difference between the pro-Mos-

cow Communist party and new-left groups like the Fedayeen i-Khalq, Khomeini's top aides explain: The former is controlled by the British; the latter is an American front.

Since all dissent is a betrayal of Iran and Islam, moderates face a difficult situation. For example, anyone — no matter how exalted his position — suggesting the release of the embassy hostages would run the risk of being labeled a CIA agent. Ayatollah Shari'at-Madari, a popular clerical democrat with his own base of support, complains about Khomeini, "Anyone who criticizes is called a counter-revolutionary . . . whereas in my view it is the man who does not listen to criticism who is the counter-revolutionary." Liberal politicians like the recently resigned Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan are caught in a "Catch 22" paradox: "If you say that 2 and 2 makes 4," Bazargan mourns, "he says you are satanical."

Iranians thought their troubles were over when the shah left. As a classic Persian poem puts it, "When the demon departs the angel shall enter." But the revolution's victory was only the beginning of hard work, Bazargan told them, and he tirelessly explained that disruptions inevitably arose from the revolutionary process itself. The solution was to concentrate on a constructive program to reform the bureaucracy, to cope with unemployment, and to rebuild industry, agriculture and banking. Yet real power remained in Khomeini's hands and the politician's patient lectures could hardly compete with the ayatollah's demagoguery. Frustration finally drove Bazargan from office; the embassy takeover was the last straw.

Khomeini was not interested in the mundane tasks set out by his secular-oriented prime minister. His sights were set far higher. The revolution was an end in itself — a crusade for good against evil. What was needed was a permanent cultural revolution, and since he and his supporters stood for the good, they could gather all power in their hands without becoming dictators. Was the Prophet Muhammad a dictator? he asked.

CONTINUED

Melons or Lives

Americans see revolution as a response to material suffering, but this is not Khomeini's definition: The revolution was spiritual and only spiritual purity — not economics — can save Iran. "I do not accept," the imam says, "that any prudent individual can believe that the purpose of all these sacrifices was to have less expensive melons; that we sacrificed our young men to have less expensive housing. . . . No one would give his life for better agriculture."

As long as most Iranians agree, the sorry state of the economy is unlikely to bring down his regime. "Dignity is better than full bellies," intones Radio Tehran. Indeed, but the time will soon come when some Khomeinists will argue that Iran can have both. These men are the politicians and technocrats who have climbed to power with Khomeini and who are now being asked to run Iran.

It is easy enough for Khomeini to welcome the departure of thousands of skilled professionals and technicians daily, fleeing purges and instability. "Let these moribund brains drain away," he trumpets. "These brains have worked for the aliens." The modern sections of the Iranian middle class, Khomeini argues, are merely a source of trouble. They question Islam and act as agents of Western thought.

The modern sections of the Iranian middle class, Khomeini argues, are merely a source of trouble. They question Islam and act as agents of Western thought, imperialism's trojan horse. They demand freedom, which to Khomeini means ethical corruption, taverns, prostitution and coeducational swimming. "Freedom designed for us by the West, rather than a freedom planned by us." Some day soon, however, those doctors, professors and engineers will be missed.

The Real Enemy

As Bazargan has noted, Khomeini has not been able to transfer his role from anti-establishment rebel to leader of the new order. This does not mean, however, that his reign is doomed and that Iranians will soon be tearing up his picture. He may die in a few years, his charisma intact and leaving Iran as dizzy as Uganda after Idi Amin. It is equally possible that he will listen to some of his advisers who want the revolution to be only the prelude for implementing their blueprints for an Islamic society and economy.

For the moment, the occupation of the American embassy is no aberration. It is phase two of the revolution. Of course, he wants the shah back for trial, but the shah is only an agent.

America is the real enemy. "Iran was in turn enslaved by Britain and then America," says Khomeini, and America is the embodiment of total evil. Even the shah's repression of demonstrations last year is called a "mass slaughter committed by Americans." Fundamentally, the diplomats are not hostages, because the ayatollah believes them "spies" in the usual sense of the word, but because he and his followers deem them the true former rulers of Iran.

Those who have long followed or participated in U.S.-Iran relations can only respond to such assertions with bitter laughter. American influence over the shah was always quite limited. After all, he was the man who engineered his own detente with the Russians, and he was the man who succeeded in nationalizing Iran's oil production. "You have the resources and mines," preaches Khomeini's ally, Ayatollah Montazeri. "You do not need the United States. The United States needs you, oh Muslims." The shah learned that lesson long ago.

And so the Iranian students dredge up their pitiful evidence from the embassy archives. The normal information collection job of an embassy — gathering data on leaders, political groups and problems — is flourished as proof positive of the great conspiracy. Even the embassy's direct telephone and telex links with the United States are offered as evidence of subversion.

A Dirty Secret

Yet this whole operation, in addition to rationalizing the complaints of the Kurds and the Muslims and the threat from the Marxists, is subconsciously aimed at concealing the dirty little secret of the Iranian revolution. Even in comparison to what goes on in far fiercer dictatorships, the opposition to the shah's rule was infinitesimal. Almost everyone collaborated and prospered. Even many of the students who demonstrated abroad came home to take good jobs in the government. Like the Germans after Hitler, the French after the occupation, they must find alternate explanations for their behavior: It wasn't us, it was the shah and it wasn't even the shah! It was the Americans!

The pragmatists in Khomeini's entourage are believers in all of these principles. They are no more moderate and no less anti-American than their compatriots. It is precisely because they want power to put their Islamic ideas into practice, preferring success to another glorious defeat, that they seek some face-saving solution. Foreign entanglements threaten their isolationist program. Rhetoric about American subversion may become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Foreign/Finance Minister Abul Hassan Bani Sadr's critique of the kidnappings is the most articulate expression of this view. By demonstrating "that violence pays," he warns, the embassy takeover may lead to armed confrontations between Khomeinist factions. "The absence of a strong central government and the spread of anarchy will eventually undermine Imam Khomeini's authority, too. It is impossible to govern a country with permanent popular spontaneity."

Not a Diversion

Here is an extremely important point: It is misleading to think that the Khomeinists are orchestrating the embassy takeover to distract Iranians from other problems. Rather, it is precisely because these other problems have not yet reached a crisis point that Iran can afford to be preoccupied with such an unproductive stand-off. As new problems gradually provide distractions, Tehran may find it more difficult to maintain such an aggressive posture.

Iran's real foreign conflict lies with Iraq, not America. Baghdad, not the CIA, has been the main foreign sponsor for Arab and Kurdish insurgencies. Iraq also seized the strategic Shatt al-Arab River on the border and is seeking to unite the Arab states of the Persian Gulf into an anti-Iranian alliance. Unimpressed by Khomeini's claims, Iraq's President Saddam Hussein replies, "The Koran was written in Arabic, and God destined the Arabs to play a vanguard role in Islam." Iran's shattered army could not stand up to any Iraqi encroachment.

No matter what happens, however, U.S.-Iranian relations will remain bleak for a long time. Tehran's break with the past is as sharp as that experienced by the Arab world in the 1950s, and the West has still not completely bridged that gap after 20 years. Short of a bloody military intervention, Washington today has few sticks to use against Iran and Khomeini is hardly likely to accept — or to be offered — any carrots.

After all, the catch is not merely that America and Iran are playing different games with different sets of rules. The problem is that Ayatollah Khomeini is using over 40 Americans as pawns on his board.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A11 THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
26 November 1979Cord Meyer

Iran, Carter and a revival of national pride

President Carter's warning to the ayatollah emerged from intense debate that was only settled when Khomeini's threat to try the hostages tipped the scales.

The available military options seem all so counterproductive for the long-term interests of the U.S. and its allies that a revealing reversal of roles has taken place behind the doors of the White House situation room. Advisers typed as hard-line have been consistent in warning that military action should only be undertaken as a last, desperate resort, if hostages are harmed.

But some of Carter's political aides, normally cast as doves in policy discussions, have been pressing for a show of force in the hope that some replay of the Mayaguez scenario can be brought off. In these tense discussions, national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski has been in the middle, calming "sophomoric activists" on the president's staff and pressing the State Department to make more vigorous protests against the Soviet-controlled broadcasts that have been inciting the Iranian mobs.

One activist proposal has been to drop American paratroopers on three Iranian is-

lands in the Persian Gulf to hold them against release of the hostages. The price would have been a loss of world support for the American position and a propaganda field day for the Soviets.

Some Carter aides not directly involved in the management of the crisis are trying to think through the choices that lie ahead when and if the hostages are freed. With opinion more unified throughout the country than it has been since the early '60s, they see a golden opportunity for Carter to seize the leadership of this newly discovered sense of national identity.

Now that Americans have at last begun to awake from the long, debilitating trauma of Vietnam, the problem is how to focus this new spirit of national purpose on the real priorities, while avoiding pointless acts of vengeance against the Khomeini regime that will play into Soviet hands.

The complex and multi-faced Soviet offensive toward the Persian Gulf is seen as the main danger. The Russians know they will have the West by the throat, if they can gain control of the Middle East oil spigot.

By pouring fuel on the

blazing passions of the Iranian mobs through their inflammatory broadcasts, the Russians have been trying to force a complete break in U.S.-Iranian relations. Hoping to provoke a permanent cut-off of all trade with the U.S., the Soviets are seeking to isolate and weaken the Khomeini regime, which they deeply distrust for its religiously motivated anti-communism.

Simultaneously in northern Iran the Soviets have officially espoused the cause of Kurdish autonomy and covertly support the Marxist oriented Kurdish Democratic Party. American columnists who urge U.S. aid to Kurdish independence should realize that an ethnically divided Iran is likely to relapse into the chaos that will give the Communist Tudeh party its best chance of coming to power.

Across the Persian Gulf on the Arabian Peninsula, the Soviets have pulled off a little noted master stroke. They negotiated a large grant of military equipment to the North Yemen regime, to which last spring the Carter administration rushed American arms to rescue it from a Soviet-sponsored attack by South Yemen.

The North Yemenis will

now be more dependent on Russian arms and advisers. With their solid base in South Yemen guaranteed by a new treaty and thousands of advisers, the Soviets are extending their influence up the peninsula to the consternation of Saudi Arabia and Oman.

Carter is urged by some advisers to respond to this multi-pronged threat by agreeing to the 5 per cent increase in the defense budget called for by Sen. Sam Nunn, D-Ga. On the basis of the latest CIA estimates of Soviet military spending in the next decade, these aides calculate that Carter's currently proposed increase in our military budget of 3 per cent a year will leave the U.S. spending half as much as the Soviets over the 10-year period.

As new mobility is built into American forces by budget increases, the need for joint contingency planning with Saudi Arabia and Oman is seen as urgent and more likely to be acceptable to the Arabs in the face of the Soviet advance.

Through measures such as these Carter has an opportunity to rally behind him an aroused American electorate. He has the chance to pre-empt Reagan on the right and to isolate Kennedy on the left.

But even aides close to Carter are not sure that he can free himself from the grip of past illusions in time to make this choice.

PERISCOPE

THE MEN BEHIND THE OCCUPATION

European intelligence sources believe some of those who seized the U.S. Embassy in Teheran are not "students" but Marxist Fedayeen leaders. Working from pictures of the men who still hold 49 Americans hostage, these sources think they recognize well-trained Fedayeen veterans of last winter's revolution against the Shah.

Ayatollah Portrait: Iron-Willed Fanatic

Proud. Revengeful. Suspicious. Stubborn. Filled with a rage that only an elderly, self-centered religious fanatic can engender.

That is the psychological portrait of Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini as painted by American intelligence experts seeking some way to deal with the man who holds the future of the U.S. diplomats in his hands.

President Carter has studied at least three such Khomeini profiles in an effort to learn what makes the Iranian religious leader tick. Among the findings—

Spirit of revenge. An absolutist Shiite Moslem and a proud Iranian nationalist, the 79-year-old Ayatollah still burns with anger over being forced to spend 15 years in exile for protesting the Shah's rule and Iran's close connection with the United States.

He is obsessed with what he views as the Shah's treason and with U.S. impact on Iran's history and customs. His goal is to purge his nation of decadent Western ways.

Above all, the spirit of revenge runs deep within Khomeini. Says one American authority: "The Ayatollah is a man with a great deal of hate in his heart."

Adding to Khomeini's hatred of the Shah is the mysterious death in Iraq in 1977 of Mustafa, the elder of his two sons. Although Mustafa was listed as dying of natural causes, many Iranians believe that he was, in fact, murdered by secret agents of the Shah.

The Ayatollah views the world in black and white. One is either for

him or against him. There is no middle ground. Believing that he is divinely inspired, Khomeini is certain he knows God's will and sees no reason to negotiate or compromise. When things do not go as he expects, he blames a satanic plot.

He has a will of iron. Just as he is resolved to force the Shah to face Shiite justice in Iran, he is determined that Iran conform to the stark moral codes and harsh penalties of Shiite doctrine.

Most interviewers have found the Ayatollah to be a taciturn, enigmatic man. He sits with eyes half shut, giving monosyllabic answers or saying nothing at all. It is as if he were only tolerating the visitor because someone close to him told him to do so.

But he cannot be intimidated, and he cares little about what the outside world thinks of him.

Intelligence analysts point out that the Shiites are influenced strongly by oriental mysticism and authoritarianism and emphasize martyrdom. The Ayatollah himself has proclaimed: "We welcome any opportunity for sacrificing our blood. Our nation looks forward to an opportunity for self-sacrifice and martyrdom."

Analysts speculate that Khomeini may himself be seeking some sort of martyrdom as final proof of his spiritual credentials. In the view of some, he could also be suffering from a degree of age-related mental degeneration.

Behind takeover. Khomeini is perceived as being a generalist who is politically naïve and does not like to deal in details. This leads to confusion among his followers and convinces at least one analyst that he may not always know what his followers are doing in his name.

But few intelligence experts doubt that the Ayatollah inspired the takeover of the U.S. Embassy because his revolution was waning and needed an infusion of emotion. There is agreement that he could end the siege any time he wishes.

Before that happens, in the view of Americans who have studied him, the Ayatollah must be convinced that his actions are injuring the Iranian people. He regards them as his children and might respond in a more reasoned way if convinced that their future was threatened.



Washington Whispers

President Carter has spent hours reading intelligence reports that paint a psychological profile of Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini as "irrational but very crafty," with "a mind affected by age." Still, advisers grumble: "None of the reports tell you what to do."

★ ★ ★

A secret CIA study on the quality of intelligence flowing out of Iran before the takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Teheran found the embassy itself was a major source of misinformation. The diplomats had predicted U.S.-Iranian relations would soon improve and that a stronger American presence would be welcomed.

★ ★ ★

In the view of U.S. intelligence officials, the nearly simultaneous attacks by Pakistani mobs on American installations throughout the country—the embassy, a consulate, library and cultural center—appeared too closely coordinated to be blamed simply on spontaneous responses to rumors about U.S. involvement in the siege at Mecca.

Angry Attacks on America

Khomeini's tirades spur outbreaks of mob hysteria—and bloodshed

The rancorous quarrel between the U.S. and Iran darkened and expanded last week into an ever more perilous confrontation. From the U.S. came a warning of military force, from Iran an appeal to mob violence. Such violence broke out from Turkey to India, most seriously in Pakistan, where the first American blood was shed. And by this time Iran's fire-eating Ayatullah Ruhollah Khomeini had become so extreme, so demagogic, so streaked with irrationality that serious diplomats wondered how the breach could be repaired. "This is not a struggle between the United States and Iran," Khomeini declared. "It is a struggle between Islam and the infidels." He repeatedly threatened that the 49 American hostages held in the captured U.S. embassy in Tehran would be tried as spies, and possibly executed, if the U.S. does not send back the deposed Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi from the hospital in New York City.

The White House, supported by widespread American indignation against the Iranians, responded with a warning that "the consequences of harm to any single hostage will be extremely grave." President Carter backed up that warning by ordering the 80,000-ton carrier *Kitty Hawk* and five escorting warships to speed from Subic Bay in the Philippines to reinforce the carrier *Midway* and twelve other ships already in the Persian Gulf area. Until last week, the White House had emphatically ruled out all talk of using military force against Iran; now it just as emphatically warned that while it was seeking a peaceful settlement it had "other remedies available."

"Why should we be afraid?" jeered Khomeini. "We consider martyrdom a great honor."

Khomeini's inflammatory rhetoric played a major part in the wave of Muslim fanaticism and anti-American violence that swept far beyond Iran. In Saudi Arabia, possessor of the world's greatest reserves of oil and American dollars, a band of extreme religious zealots seized the Sacred Mosque in Mecca, the holiest shrine in all Islam (see *WORLD*). In Pakistan, a mob enraged by radio reports claiming that the U.S. had inspired the attack on the Mecca mosque stormed and set fire to the U.S. embassy. They left the modernistic, 30-acre compound a gutted ruin. Two Americans were killed; 90 others were rescued after seven hours of horror (see following pages). Angry crowds

also threw rocks through the windows of a U.S. consulate in Izmir, Turkey; another crowd chanted "Down with American imperialism!" outside the American embassy in Dacca, Bangladesh; demonstrators in Calcutta stoned the U.S. consulate and burned President Carter in effigy. Khomeini's reaction to the embassy attack in Pakistan was "great joy" and a call for all Muslims to join in an uprising against Western influence.

Indeed, even while the Pakistani attack was going on, Khomeini's office made a statement over Iranian radio blaming the Mecca violence on "criminal U.S. imperialism." It added: "The Muslims must... expect this kind of dirty act by American imperialism and international Zionism." There was not a shred of evidence for the accusation, and U.S. State Department Spokesman Hodding Carter promptly described it as an "outright, knowing lie." Indeed, the assailants were fundamentalist Muslims whose opposition to all Western influence is similar to Khomeini's archaic views. But though the U.S. has no quarrel with Islam, the report of U.S. complicity was widely believed in Islamic countries.

For the U.S. the immediate issue remained the 49 hostages in Tehran. Concern about their fate far overshadowed any relief about the return of the 13 hostages—five white women and eight black men—who were freed by their captors and who made it home for Thanksgiving dinner. As the 13 stepped off the C-135 military jet that brought them into Andrews Air Force Base outside Washington, dozens of relatives who had been flown there from all over the country rushed to embrace them. But the official welcoming could not be jubilant. Said Secretary of State Cyrus Vance: "Our relief that you are safe is muted by our concern for your colleagues who remain." A day later, White House Press Spokesman Jody Powell announced after Carter conferred with his top aides at Camp David: "The last American hostage is just as important to us as the first."

Khomeini's original threat against the 49 was conditional: "If Carter does not return the Shah, it is possible that the hostages may be put on trial," but his intentions seemed clear. The prisoners, Khomeini said, were not diplomats but people "whose acts of espionage have been proved on the basis of evidence." If the hostages are tried, he added, "Carter knows what will happen." Iran's Deputy

Chief Islamic Prosecutor Hassan Ghaffarpour was explicit. If the hostages are found guilty of espionage, he said, they would be "executed by firing squad."

The trials presumably would be held before an Islamic revolutionary court. Like many other acts in the Muslim world, the proceedings there begin with a prayer: "In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful." But compassion and mercy have scarcely been noticeable in Iran's revolutionary trials. They are often held at night, and the accused have never yet been represented by a defense attorney. They may speak in their own behalf, but members of the audience also may, and frequently do, step forward to add accusations of their own to those presented by the prosecutor. When the sentence of death is pronounced, as it has been this year against more than 600 Iranians accused as officials and agents of the Shah, it is usually carried out within hours.

It is possible that any Americans found guilty would be sentenced to prison rather than executed, or perhaps simply expelled. But the chances are that only some lower-level employees would be acquitted. To Western reporters, Deputy Prosecutor Ghaffarpour last week defined espionage as "the gathering of information for use in hostile operations, military, economic, political and psychological, etc., against the Islamic community." That is broad enough to cover nearly all the intelligence-gathering functions that just about every major embassy in the world carries out.

The students holding the Tehran embassy last week provided some ominous indications of the kind of "evidence" that might be produced against the Americans. In a courtyard decorated with portraits of Khomeini, students chanting "*Allahu Akbar!*" (God is great!) publicly interrogated in two groups the 13 hostages.

CONTINUED

who were eventually freed. Secretary Joan Walsh was quizzed about embassy correspondence with Shahpour Bakhtiar, the Shah's last Prime Minister, who is now in exile in France. Bakhtiar asked for material support and intelligence on events in Iran; the embassy denied his request, but expressed a wish to "maintain the dialogue." As the chants continued, Walsh said the exchange was "not normal embassy correspondence," though it seemed quite normal to Western diplomats in the crowd. The questioners implied that the U.S. was helping Bakhtiar encourage separatist movements.

The students also asked pointed questions about millions of dollars in counterfeit American greenbacks, deutsche marks and Iranian rials that had been found in the embassy. They had been brought there by an Iranian, and the embassy apparently was trying to track down the counterfeiters. Student interrogators implied that the embassy had been attempting to undermine the Iranian economy. "Oh heavens, we weren't involved!" exclaimed Walsh. The English-language Tehran Times, nonetheless, bannered a headline the next day: HOSTAGES REVEAL "PLOT" TO HIT IRAN'S ECONOMY.

Could any of the hostages actually be CIA employees? The U.S. is saying absolutely nothing about that possibility, but all major countries do have intelligence agency personnel that work out of their embassies. It is a worldwide practice, as the Iranians know. Trials of any of the hostages would be an absolute violation of international law. Accredited diplomats have immunity against being tried by the host country. If they are suspected of espionage, the normal procedure is to declare them *persona non grata* (unwelcome) and order them to leave the country.

President Carter, who has put aside almost all other business to concentrate on the Iranian crisis, was in a state of fury. He took care not to let it show in public, but he did not conceal it from his aides. "He's in an ice-cold rage," reported one. "That look in his eyes can just chill you solid." Carter reacted to the first threats of spy trials for the hostages by authorizing Press Secretary Powell to release a statement asserting that "worldwide outrage ... would be greatly heightened." Then he received a full CIA translation of

Ayatullah Khomeini's speech, which included an incredible taunt. The President, said Khomeini, "knows that he is beating an empty drum. Carter does not have the guts to engage in a military operation."

EXCERPT



Ten Americans being questioned by captors and reporters in Iranian capital before release
Said the White House: "The last hostage is just as important to us as the first."



Meeting Carter: Turner, Brown, Jones, Mondale, Brzezinski, Vance
Rewriting a sentence to make clear the U.S. can use force.

THE MOUNTING WAR OF NERVES

Administration officials maintained that the intelligence duties of the Teheran em-



Susan T. McElhinney—Newsweek

The Presidential crisis team arriving at Camp David: 'What does he do to Iran when this is over?'*

bassy had been cut back after the revolution that overthrew the Shah last February, precisely to avoid espionage charges from the suspicious new Islamic regime. One official said flatly that no agents of the Central Intelligence Agency or the Defense Intelligence Agency were assigned to Teheran at the time of the take-over. "You couldn't find an embassy that could be accused of espionage with less factual basis than this one," he insisted.

THE MOUNTAIN: Back at Camp David, Carter made something of a show out of his strategy talks with top advisers. He summoned Vice President Walter Mondale, Secretary Vance, national-security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, CIA chief Stansfield Turner and Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman Gen. David Jones, and for only the second time in his Presidency he allowed news photographers into Camp David. After coming down from the mountain, Defense Secretary Harold Brown ordered an indefinite suspension of flight training for 236 Iranian pilots in the U.S. He also directed that they be allowed to continue classroom studies—evidently to discourage the trainees from returning to Iran to practice their skills against the U.S.

EXCERPTS

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-2BALTIMORE SUN
29 NOVEMBER 1979

Crisis in Iran could affect SALT's fate

By ERNEST R. FERGUSON

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—The Iranian crisis has confirmed administration estimates that SALT II will go over to 1980—but the White House believes a “reasonably satisfactory” end to the crisis will improve chances for Senate approval.

Lloyd Cutler, the President's counsel and chief strategist in selling the strategic arms limitation treaty, said yesterday “I wish I could bottle” the apparent national and legislative unity created by the holding of U.S. hostages in Tehran.

That mood could brighten prospects for SALT II as well as for increased arms spending, he maintained. He said the administration's proposals for synthetic fuels and for an energy mobilization board already had picked up additional congressional votes because of the Iran situation.

Mr. Cutler said consideration of the windfall profits tax bill probably would take another week or longer. Then the strategic arms debate would take three or four weeks, according to Senator Robert C. Byrd (D, W.Va.), the majority leader.

There has been no decision so far on whether to delay submission of the treaty to the Senate because of the hostage situation, he went on. The question is whether the matter would get full attention while the hostages are still held.

But there is no doubt now that the treaty vote will come next year, Mr. Cutler said to reporters at breakfast.

“If Iran works out reasonably satisfactorily, it could help SALT. . . . But if we should somehow get crossways with the Soviet Union on it, it could complicate matters,” he explained.

The Washington lawyer, who took over SALT guidance duty this summer and became the President's counsel September 1, said he had the impression that recently the Soviet side has “behaved correctly” in the Iran situation. Earlier strident anti-American broadcasts from within the Soviet Union have become “much more moderate”, he said.

The arms treaty is “very much a ball game still to be played,” he stated in response to questions about how the Senate vote might break down. He said he himself favored going ahead with it, even though the administration is not assured of the votes necessary for approval.

He pointed out that if the treaty were rejected, it could be brought up again and again in later efforts at passage.

There are about 10 senators who cannot be counted on either side until the votes are cast, he estimated. It is possible that some “killer amendments” could threaten the treaty's substance sufficiently to bring up the question of whether to push for passage as soon as possible or to delay a vote.

Mr. Cutler's optimism that the Iran crisis could help SALT II prospects was based on his belief that the hostage situation assured more congressional support for higher-arms spending. Some senators have conditioned their possible votes for the treaty on a parallel commitment to boosting military strength to deal with “Third-World situations” comparable to that in Iran.

The situation there, “has probably cleared our minds,” he said. “Americans always respond better to crisis than to 5- or 10-year issues.”

THE DETROIT NEWS
25 November 1979

Our Opinions

SALT II, Phase II

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has approved SALT II and it now goes to the floor. The nation approaches a fearful moment because the document is so clearly incompatible with U.S. interests.

The merits of an arms treaty are best analyzed by examining the destructive power allowed each of the parties. SALT II counts the wrong things — strategic launchers rather than warheads.

Under its terms, the number of launchers allowed (2,400 now, 2,250 later) is equal, certainly. But the aggregate firepower is not. The Soviet Union would retain 308 heavy ballistic missiles. The United States has none. The USSR would be allowed to deploy 4, 6 and 10 warheads aboard each of its SS17's, SS19's, and SS18's, respectively. The United States could put only three warheads aboard its multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV's). It would make it impossible for America to have more than 550 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's) that are MIRV'd by 1985 when the treaty expires. But Russia will have 820.

Russia's firepower advantage is starkly apparent.

If there is a strategic arms race, the United States hasn't engaged in it for the past seven years. The Soviet Union modernizes and rearms 150 to 200 ICBM silos a year. The U.S. builds none. In 1972, the USSR had 1,600 nuclear warheads for its ICBM's; the U.S. had 2,154. In the early 1980's, the USSR will have between 6,500 and 9,200 warheads. The U.S. would still have the same old 2,154. Some arms race.

Liberals argue that if either country can destroy the cities and economy of the other with 10 warheads, it doesn't matter that the enemy has 100. This is absolutely not true. Sometime during the 1980's, the USSR will have the capability of destroying 90 percent of America's land-based ICBM's in a first strike,

plus half the submarine-launched ballistics missiles (SLBM's) because half the boats are in port for refit at any time — plus 60 percent of the B-52 bombers because that portion is not on alert and therefore on the ground.

To achieve the mass destruction of America's strategic weaponry, the Soviet Union would require only one-fifth to one-third of its MIRV'd missiles. Would a president of the United States, so stripped of his nuclear force, elect to fire a weak retaliatory volley . . . or would he submit to atomic blackmail to save America's cities?

No president should ever be placed in such an agonizing situation. And yet SALT II would effectively set the stage for just such a cosmic dilemma.

Verification is the most serious issue of all. If compliance can't be verified, the treaty is meaningless. And this treaty can't be verified. There is no provision in it for on-site inspection. The nations are to rely on satellites and their photographs. Yet the USSR has demonstrated that it can blind and destroy American satellites. Of course Moscow offers a gentleman's promise not to do so. Some guarantee.

Other factors have destroyed alternative means to check compliance. The electronic listening posts in Iran and Turkey have been lost, and the post-Watergate period was a bloodbath for the intelligence-gathering system, which has been rendered so ineffective it failed for several years to detect the presence of a full Soviet army brigade in Cuba, a piddling 90 miles from American shores.

There are many other reasons to reject the agreement. But just the few cited above should persuade any conscientious senator to vote against ratification — except, perhaps, for those individuals who have been totally mesmerized by the inane idea that even an anti-U.S. treaty is better than no treaty at all.

SAN DIEGO UNION
15 November 1979

Still A Bad Bargain

The dovish Senate Foreign Relations Committee has marched obediently to the Carter administration's drum, recommending ratification of the SALT II treaty after protecting it from any amendment that would annoy the Soviet Union. In doing so, the committee alienated several moderates and the final vote on the treaty was 9-6, less than a two-thirds majority and hardly a resounding endorsement of SALT II's terms.

If the Carter administration pursues the same all-or-nothing strategy on the Senate floor, it may win the battles over amendments only to find itself without the minimum 67 votes required for ratification.

As for the treaty itself, all of its least defensible provisions are fully intact, thanks to the dominant Frank Church-George McGovern wing of the Foreign Relations Committee.

The Soviets' growing fleet of supersonic Backfire bombers remains exempt from treaty limits despite the recent testimony of a senior Defense Intelligence Agency official that this aircraft is capable of reaching "virtually all targets in the United States" without refueling. The committee's rejection of an amendment requiring that the Backfires be counted toward SALT limits also contradicts the unanimous view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

No matter, the Carter administration and the Kremlin are as one in insisting that any change in treaty terms constitutes a "killer amendment" that would wreck SALT II and vastly dimin-

ish, if not preclude, chances for further Soviet-American arms negotiations.

The committee resisted even stronger pressure for an amendment granting the United States the right to possess the kind of super-heavy missiles specifically reserved for the Soviets under SALT II. In opposing this altogether-reasonable amendment, administration spokesmen argued lamely that, because the United States has no plans to build such a missile during SALT II's six-year life span, nothing is lost by surrendering the right to do so. Aside from the unfortunate negotiating precedent thus established, no one from the White House has explained why the Soviet Union should be permitted the exclusive right to a force of 308 heavy ICBMs so powerful that it alone exceeds the aggregate deliverable megatonnage of the 1,054 U.S. land-based missiles.

The heavy-missile amendment died on an 8-7 vote, a margin that fortunately guarantees its reappearance on the Senate floor.

An identical 8-7 vote turned back another amendment intended to close one of the treaty's most dangerous loopholes — its utter silence on the question of stockpiling ICBMs. The Soviets are known to have at least 1,000 reserve ICBMs not counted toward SALT limits because the treaty restricts only the numbers of conventional missile "launchers" and other strategic delivery systems, not the weapons themselves.

Thus, while the United States has only a minimum reserve of spare missiles and has closed its only Minuteman production line, the Soviet Union is free to continue turning out intercontinental ballistic missiles like sausages, to borrow the late Nikita Khrushchev's apt phrase.

Incredibly, the committee even rejected an amendment that would have denied the Soviets the right to keep some of their missile test data secret despite the fact that access to this information is critical to treaty verification. This was too much for the Senate's leading expert on verification, Sen. John Glenn, D-Ohio. He voted against the treaty on grounds that Soviet compliance could not be adequately monitored.

As a sop to treaty opponents, Sen. Church agreed to support a laundry list of mostly cosmetic "understandings, declarations, and reservations" tacked onto the ratification resolution. Only two of these 20 unilateral statements require Moscow's agreement; the rest either have nothing to do with the treaty itself or are not binding on the Soviet Union.

In sum, the treaty now presented to the full Senate is no better than the poor bargain signed by Jimmy Carter last June in Vienna. Its deficiencies, inequalities, and loopholes are such that it can neither impose a stable nuclear balance nor significantly slow a strategic-arms competition that the Soviet Union is clearly winning.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 1CHICAGO TRIBUNE
27 NOVEMBER 1979

Carter policies 'catastrophic'

Rumsfeld urges SALT defeat

By Raymond Coffey

Chicago Tribune Press Service

WASHINGTON—The five highest ranking civilian Defense Department officials in the Ford administration, led by former Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, Monday urged that the Senate reject the new strategic arms limitations (SALT II) treaty with the Soviet Union.

They also charged the Carter administration is pursuing potentially "catastrophic" defense policies that have "set the stage for the politico-military inferiority of the United States in the early to

mid-1980's."

Joining Rumsfeld in the assault on the SALT II treaty were Gov. William P. Clements of Texas, former deputy secretary of defense under President Ford, and Martin R. Hoffman, J. William Middendorf, and Thomas C. Reed, the former secretaries, respectively, of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

President Carter hopes to win ratification of the treaty before the end of this year. But ratification will require a two-thirds vote of approval in the Senate and the outcome of the struggle is considered uncertain.

RUMSFELD SAID he and his former Pentagon colleagues consider the treaty a "bad bargain" for this country. He said they also "strongly disagree" with those who argue that "this is not a good treaty" but that it is "better than none at all."

Rumsfeld also rejected Carter administration arguments that defeat of the treaty would cause the NATO alliance to "unravel" and said "the alliance is not that fragile."

Hoffman argued that the tentative agreement reached by former President

Ford in 1974 was "superior" to the treaty concluded by Carter.

He noted that the 1974 accord left open for further negotiation both the Soviets' modern Backfire bomber and cruise missiles, in which the U.S. has a technological lead.

But the Backfire now is left out of the formal treaty and is subject only to informal restrictions contained in a statement by Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev, Hoffman said, while cruise missiles are included in treaty restraints.

REED CHARGED that Carter administration defense policies have made the case for SALT II even weaker than it was under Ford. The Ford negotiations, he noted for example, were conducted against a background of commitment to build a modern new manned bomber, the B-1.

Carter has canceled that program and has caused crucial delays in development of the new Trident nuclear submarine program and the new mobile MX missile system, Reed said.

Clements said he and his four colleagues, who appeared at a joint press conference here, had all supported nuclear arms limitation treaties.

But SALT II, he said, "does not represent a net improvement" over the accords Ford negotiated at Vladivostok and should be rejected.

CLEMENTS ALSO called for immediate and major increases in defense spending to "recover from the false economies" of the Carter administration. He said even the 3 per cent increase, after inflation, being discussed now by the administration "falls far short of the true defense needs of the country."

A 5 per cent increase would amount to roughly \$8.5 billion more in defense spending a year, Clements said. What is needed, he said, is an increase of \$20 to \$25 billion per year for the next couple of years at least.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 9APHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
27 NOVEMBER 1979

SALT Treaty:

A matter of verification

By Sen. Richard S. Schweiker

Debate about verification of Soviet compliance with SALT II misses the bottom line when it focuses solely on U.S. monitoring capabilities and overlooks the extent to which the treaty's provisions can or will be enforced.

Effective strategic arms control depends largely on the ability of each party to verify independently the other's compliance with the agreements. Reliable monitoring procedures are essential to enhance confidence in the limitations on strategic nuclear forces and to guard against the "creeping circumventions" which could change the prevailing military balance.

Discussion of the verifiability of SALT II has tended to focus primarily on how adequately the treaty can be monitored by current U.S. "national technical means," such as photo-reconnaissance satellites and electronic intelligence gathering systems.

This concentration on narrow technical criteria is insufficient. Resolving the complex verification question demands that due consideration be given an equally critical, though more subtle aspect: the extent to which the treaty's provisions would be effectively enforced.

Since arms control is part of a broader political relationship between the superpowers, it follows that enforcement of specific agreements will involve political judgments about sometimes ambiguous technical data. No matter how sophisticated our intelligence capabilities,

therefore, the verifiability of SALT II ultimately depends on the nature of our potential responses to alleged Soviet violations.

Yet how willing would an administration be to enforce a treaty in whose negotiation and continued viability it has a pronounced political stake? Given the enormous importance President Carter has attached to SALT ratification, it would not be unreasonable to speculate that the political incentives to suppress or downplay evidence of Soviet violations not considered strategically "significant" would be quite strong.

The manner in which verification is defined with respect to SALT II raises disturbing questions. Whereas adequate verification once required an assurance from U.S. intelligence agencies that any Soviet attempts to circumvent a treaty would be detected, it now requires only that cheating serious enough to alter the strategic balance be discovered in time to assure an appropriate U.S. response.

The basis for determining adequacy therefore becomes quite subjective, depending on one's perception of the strategic balance and what kinds of treaty violations would be destabilizing.

There is, of course, no guarantee that "strategically significant" cheating would be detected in a timely manner, if at all. Moreover, there is no necessary correlation between a treaty item's verifiability and its strategic significance. Even apparently

minor Soviet circumventions, if undetected or tolerated for political reasons, could pose potentially dangerous strategic risks.

So where and when does one draw the line in deciding which kinds of violations (assuming they can be discovered) are both strategically significant and politically acceptable? Or does the conclusion of a long-sought arms control treaty justify side-stepping crucial "gray areas" that may affect both the strategic balance and the treaty's overall verifiability?

The compromise under which Soviet missile test telemetry "unrelated to SALT" may be encrypted is indicative of the type of problems created by quick-fix solutions to longer-term political and strategic issues. The telemetric data received from missile flight tests enable the U.S. to gauge certain qualitative characteristics, such as range, warhead accuracy, and throw-weight.

Previous Soviet practice of encoding some of the data was originally rebuked by the U.S. as a possible violation of the ban on "deliberate concealment measures" which could impede SALT verification.

But now the Soviets are to be permitted to decide which telemetry can be encoded. How can the U.S. be certain some of the data are not related to SALT verification and are not strategically significant? How does one know what one does not know? The administration claims all telemetry is required for verification purposes and that, in any event, we will apply a strict standard in determining the nature of the information being

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denied us by Soviet encryption.

Such an intriguing stance begs certain inevitable questions. Given the anticipated Soviet rebuttal to any charge that something illicit may have occurred, how do we prove that the encrypted telemetry is significant, especially when in many cases we might not even be certain what it was we were attempting to prove existed? Or would Soviet intransigence progressively result in the United States' being forced to *disprove* to skeptics that a significant violation had taken place? Moreover, how can potential political challenges to suspicious Soviet encryption practices (and Moscow's interpretation of the significance of the same) be posed in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) without revealing U.S. sources and methods of detection?

Beyond identifying questionable Soviet practices in the SCC, what would constitute an appropriate U.S. response to alleged violations?

When the Carter Administration asserts that Soviet violations of the pledges made on deployment of the Backfire bomber would be sufficient cause for unilateral U.S. abrogation of SALT II, the threat lacks credibility. This is because the treaty's domestic political importance, as well as the administration's belief that detente without SALT is impossible, argue against their adopting what would ultimately be considered an illegitimate response. Indeed, a willingness to rationalize "minor" incidents might well increase if larger political inter-

ests were perceived to be threatened by aggressively pursuing suspicious Soviet activities.

The recent controversy over the presence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba is instructive. After stating that the "status quo" was "unacceptable," the President, despite earlier claiming "persuasive evidence," chose to acquiesce and implied that a firmer response would have meant "a return to the Cold War," and the end of SALT.

In the process of taking certain compensatory measures, the "status quo" was redefined to reflect unilateral American actions, instead of indicating any Soviet move to redress the initial provocation. Can it be confidently predicted that the administration wouldn't react similarly in the face of repeated Soviet denials of certain questionable activities related to SALT II itself?

Our willingness to enforce SALT II is the key to determining the pact's verifiability. The Senate's obligation to examine thoroughly our technical verification capabilities should not be allowed to obscure the importance of, or deflect attention from, the enforcement issue, which, like the treaty itself, is ultimately political.

(Sen. Richard S. Schweiker represents Pennsylvania in the U.S. Senate.)

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 29-38STRATEGIC REVIEW
FALL 1979

A SALT DEBATE: CONTINUED SOVIET DECEPTION

DAVID S. SULLIVAN



THE AUTHOR: Mr. Sullivan is Legislative Assistant for Military Affairs to Senator Gordon J. Humphrey. He served as a strategic and Soviet foreign policy analyst in the Central Intelligence Agency from 1971 to 1978. A graduate of Harvard University and Columbia University, he has written extensively on international relations and military affairs. He is active in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve.

IN BRIEF

Not only was the United States deceived by the Soviet Union in SALT I, but that deception, which has since been acknowledged by former American officials who were its victims, is compounded in the SALT II Treaty. Soviet deception has embraced not only negotiation tactics, but also active concealment of offensive programs. The triumph of those tactics is a SALT II Treaty that seems to guarantee an overwhelming Soviet strategic superiority, with all of its implications, for the 1980s.

Mr. Slocombe's rebuttal to this author's original article is welcome, because controversy can help to illuminate the issues of the day—especially as complex an issue as SALT. Moreover, this reply permits an elaboration of some of the themes expressed in the original article.

The reader should be aware of what is probably a fundamental philosophical disagreement between Mr. Slocombe and the present author about the political significance of strategic nuclear power. Thus, an Adelphi Paper composed by Mr. Slocombe in 1971 addressed the implications of U.S.-Soviet strategic parity, but it carried the underlying theme that the United States could safely tolerate a decline of its strategic posture into a form of minimum deterrence.¹ By contrast, I believe that the United States should maximize its strategic power in order to

sustain its technological lead and to ensure the "extended deterrent" over U.S. alliance commitments in Europe and Asia. If U.S. strategic superiority is irrevocably forfeited, however, then the maintenance of world peace demands that we settle for nothing less than a strategic equality that is strictly applied to all categories of strategic power. A corollary belief is that, while arms control can be a vital element in shoring up an increasingly unstable international system, it can play this stabilizing role only if negotiated agreements adhere strictly to the principles of equality and mutual restraint.

The Soviet Union's SS-19 Deception

The crux of Mr. Slocombe's critique is directed to what I deemed in my article a blatant case of Soviet deception in SALT I: namely, the

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ongoing deployment of the SS-19 "heavy" ICBMs. The SS-19s are a pivotal factor in the growth of the Soviet counterforce threat, because the missiles today comprise about one half of this threat.

Mr. Slocombe contends that there was no Soviet negotiating deception in May 1972 regarding the SS-19—that the Soviets told us in May 1972 "quite precisely," "quite clearly" and "explicitly" about the SS-19's large size and heavy throw-weight. Ambassador Gerard Smith (Chief of the U.S. delegation in SALT I) has made the same allegation.²

Yet, such notions regarding Soviet negotiating candor fly in the face of all the available evidence. Dr. Kissinger's statements in 1972 and 1975 with respect to the SS-19, cited in the original article, clearly indicate that Kissinger did not know about the large size of the SS-19 in May 1972.

If, on the other hand, Mr. Slocombe's contentions were accurate and Kissinger did know of the SS-19's large size in May 1972, the implication would be that Kissinger knowingly misrepresented U.S. knowledge of the SS-19 to the Congress in 1972 and again in 1975. The implication would be, indeed, that Kissinger suppressed or covered up information on the SS-19 to delay U.S. recognition of its large size.

We need not engage in such speculation, however, because additional evidence has come to light which shows clearly that U.S. SALT I negotiators were guilty of naiveté rather than *ex post facto* misrepresentation. Ambassador Smith's *New York Times* article, the sole citation in Slocombe's article, contains only half of the fascinating story. It is true that in early May 1972 the Soviets informally told U.S. SALT negotiators that they had under development two new missiles, now known as the SS-19 and SS-17, which were represented by them as somewhat larger than the SS-11 ICBM. Yet, the Soviets deliberately misled their American counterparts with respect to the real sizes of the new missiles and Moscow's commitment to their deployment.³

Indeed, the Soviets added a touch of irony to their deception when they tried in May 1972 to justify their refusal to agree to a definition of a heavy ICBM by arguing that such a definition was unnecessary because both sides already knew which ICBMs were heavy and which were light. In a similar deceptive vein, the Soviets

also hinted at a possible willingness to agree to a total ban on any larger missiles replacing the SS-11. From what we know in retrospect of the Soviet commitment to their SS-19 program, this could not have been a serious gambit, and it was clearly designed to strengthen the misconceptions of the American negotiators.

Was U.S. intelligence deceived? In 1971, USAF intelligence warned of the likelihood that the Soviets would replace their small SS-11 missiles with a much larger, heavier missile. Yet, this warning went unheeded, and in 1971 the U.S. intelligence community erroneously estimated that the SS-11 replacement missile would be a "new small ICBM." This misjudgment of what was to become the large, heavy SS-19 persisted through the May 1972 negotiations. Indeed, even after SALT I was ratified and before the SS-19 was flight-tested in early 1973, U.S. intelligence still referred to the SS-19 as the "new small ICBM."

Senior policymakers in the Nixon Administration consistently demonstrated their misconceptions not only regarding Soviet missile programs, but also of the extent of the loophole that they left in the SALT I Interim Agreement for the SS-19 deployments that now threaten the survivability of the U.S. land-based ICBMs. We have noted Kissinger's statements to Congress on June 15, 1972, to the effect that "There is the safeguard that no missile larger than the heaviest light missile now existing can be substituted," and that we had "adequate safeguard against a substantial substitution of heavy missiles for light missiles."⁴

Similar statements came from other Administration members during the summer 1972 SALT I ratification hearings. For example, on June 6, 1972, Defense Secretary Laird said this about permissible increases in missile volume: "Senator Jackson . . . I believe that any growth of light missiles, in either diameter or depth, that exceeds 10 to 15 per cent would be a violation of the agreement. . . ." ⁵ Laird added on July 24, 1972: ". . . In no case would it be possible for the Soviet Union to retrofit their SS-11 silos with a new significantly larger missile. . . . I believe that up to a 30 per cent volume increase in one dimension could be possible and I believe anything over and above that would be a violation under the most liberal interpretation of the agreement."⁶

In light of his later contentions, it is also in-

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teresting to note a statement by Ambassador Smith on June 28, 1972: "Well, our position stated unilaterally was if they tried to deploy in SS-11 holes a missile substantially larger in volume than the SS-11, that would be considered a heavy missile and would count, and would be a violation of the nonconversion provision." When asked what the limits were on the size of new missiles, Smith then conceded that "we have no specific benchmark. I think we will have to look at what comes along."⁷

Mr. Slocombe, in alleging that U.S. negotiators were not deceived with respect to the Soviet SS-19 missiles, clashes with the admissions by prominent members of the Nixon Administration. Thus, the then Secretary of Defense Schlesinger confessed in March 1974: "What we were unprepared for was the enormous expansion of Soviet throw-weight represented by the SS-X-19 as the potential replacement for the SS-11. Earlier versions of the SS-11 were of lesser throw-weight but the SS-X-19 has a throw-weight of two to three times as much as even the SS-11 Mod 3. . . ."⁸ In fact, the SS-19 turned out to be 50 to 60 per cent larger in volume than the SS-11 and has four to five times its throw-weight.

Dr. Schlesinger added in a 1974 press conference that the SS-17 and SS-19 "can no longer be treated as light missiles." Nevertheless, it took the United States as long as until early 1975, after the Ford-Brezhnev meeting and the Vladivostok "framework," even to question the Soviets about the SS-19 for the first time—whereupon Washington meekly retreated, conceding that the SS-19 counterforce ICBM was a "light missile" after all. The Soviets have regarded it as a heavy missile all along.

Finally, we now have the (belated) testimony of the principal victim of the Soviet deception himself. In a "Meet the Press" program on August 12, 1979, Henry Kissinger reminisced as follows:

In 1972, the Soviet Union had two missiles that we were aware of. The SS-11 and the SS-9. The SS-9 was a heavy missile. At that time, the biggest worry that we had—in fact, the only worry we had about substitution—was the emplacement of the SS-9 into the SS-11 silos, and we thought that we had sufficient assurance that the SS-9—that is to say, the heavy missile—would not be emplaced

into the SS-11 silo. What we did not understand at that time *and on which we had no evidence whatever at the time, because it didn't exist*, was that the Soviet Union would construct a missile [the SS-19] which was *sort of half-way between the SS-11 and SS-9*; that is, technically did not violate the limitations of a fifteen per cent increase, but which, using all the fine points of the print, was technically within the agreement. It was simply our lack of knowledge that such a missile existed or could be built. . . . I would call it *sharp practice* [by the Soviets].⁹

The CIA reportedly has reached the conclusion that "we cannot exclude the possibility that the Soviet leaders, if they believed they could succeed, would approve a program of concealment and deception designed to help gain a strategic advantage over the United States."¹⁰ The facts of the "heavy missile" episode in SALT I render this a startlingly tame judgment. The combination of Soviet deception and U.S. gullibility and negotiating sloppiness already has given the Soviet Union an enormous strategic advantage—one that throws its shadow upon the fundamental viability of the U.S. strategic deterrent. What would stop the Soviets from trying it again?

One final observation needs to be made about Mr. Slocombe's rebuttal in this context. He mistakenly describes the U.S. *Unilateral Statement D*, which sought to define a heavy ICBM, as a "Common Understanding," thereby missing the entire point.

The Soviet SLBM Deception

The elaborate deception by the Soviet Union with respect to submarine-launched ballistic missiles in SALT I was basically fourfold. First of all, the Soviets obscured from the United States the fact that the ceiling of 950 SLBMs that was agreed upon in effect represented the force planned by them for 1977. Nor did U.S. negotiators know that 30 old Soviet SLBMs on nuclear H-class submarines were hidden beneath those ceilings.

Second, the Soviets in 1972 deliberately falsified the claim that they had 48 SSBNs and 768 SLBMs operational or under construction. They did this in order to minimize the number of old ICBMs that would have to be deactivated by

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them. The United States discovered this fact only in 1978.

Third, even the compromise ceiling of 740 SLBMs in all probability exceeded the actual Soviet force level in May 1972, still allowing them to minimize their required deactivation.

Finally, the whole rationale of "geographical asymmetries" upon which the Soviets based their claim for higher SLBM ceilings than the United States turned out to be a sham. It was belied by the unveiling of the long-range SS-N-8 missile, which was tested only *after* the 1972 SALT Summit.

Moreover, the Soviets have concealed submarines and submarine hull sections under construction; they have built dummy submarines; and they have constructed berthing tunnels. Thus, active physical deception was harnessed to negotiating deceit.¹¹

Mr. Slocombe concedes the fact that the SALT I Agreement failed to impose a freeze on Soviet SLBM deployment, but he argues that U.S. negotiators were not deceived in 1972—that they knew that 62 submarines with 950 missiles represented the original Soviet force plan through 1977. He supports this contention with a reference to Raymond L. Garthoff, who was a key member of the U.S. SALT I delegation. Inexplicably, however, Mr. Slocombe neglects to mention that Garthoff made his statement about likely Soviet force goals in 1977—that is, with the clear benefit of hindsight. The fact is that in 1972 senior U.S. officials were unanimous in their testimony to Congress to the effect that SALT would freeze Soviet SLBM construction—that in the absence of the 62/950 ceiling the Soviets would construct as many as 90 strategic submarines by 1977. Either they were deceived, or—if indeed they knew better—they deceived the U.S. Congress.

Mr. Slocombe also seems to concede (at least by implication) the possibility that the Soviets in 1972 presented a false claim of the number of Soviet SLBMs then operational or under construction, but he belittles this as "not much of a 'deception'." Are we arguing about the fact of deception or its magnitude?

As for the case of the SS-N-8, the long-range SLBM which the Soviets tested only after the conclusion of SALT I (and which negated the Soviet "geographical asymmetries" rationale for higher SLBM requirements), Mr. Slocombe avers that "There is surely no requirement for

SALT negotiators to reveal the detailed performance characteristics of their systems." This goes to the heart of the U.S. debilitations in SALT and of a major failure of the SALT process. The negotiations have largely been conducted on the basis of U.S. data with respect to the strategic postures of *both* sides. Even the SALT II quantitative data exchange, which some have deemed a significant crack in Soviet secrecy, is highly suspect. Judging from the Data Exchange memoranda of SALT II, the Soviets provided data about the numbers of their systems which could easily have been derived from the U.S. press. It is not surprising that this information is then found to be consistent with U.S. intelligence data, and therefore considered valid.

As long as these one-sided ground rules persist, the Soviets will obviously exploit them to the hilt. Whether this entails Soviet deception or U.S. self-deception is an arguable but academic point.

The Mobile ICBM Deception

Mr. Slocombe has apparently misunderstood the points made in the original article about mobile ICBMs. The contention was not that the Soviets violated the U.S. Unilateral Statement with respect to mobile ICBM deployment, but rather that the Soviets had violated Brezhnev's private pledge to President Nixon not to "build" mobile ICBMs.

There is in fact solid evidence that the Soviets, in contravention of Brezhnev's solemn pledge, have "built" and tested mobile ICBMs: a large number of SS-16s.¹² Moreover, the testing and production of the SS-16 have proceeded under cover of active concealment.¹³

Indeed, I argued in the original article that the covert *stockpiling* of mobile SS-16s by the Soviet Union constituted a potentially greater danger than their actual deployment today because of the shock effect that their sudden deployment would carry in a crisis situation. It needs to be noted, however, that even the current deployment status of SS-16 ICBMs is in doubt because their launchers are identical to those of the SS-20 intermediate-range missiles, which are not governed by SALT and which the Soviets are deploying in growing numbers.

There is additional evidence of Soviet deception involving mobile ICBMs. According to

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Ambassador Smith, the Soviets told the U.S. negotiators in SALT I that inasmuch as the Interim Agreement constituted a freeze on "on-going programs," and since neither side had mobile ICBMs, "it was inappropriate to include them in a freeze."¹⁴ Yet, as we now know, the Soviets did have a mobile ICBM program on-going at the time.

The contention that the Interim Agreement did not constrain Soviet ICBM and SLBM programs rests largely on two considerations. One, as has been alluded to already (and as Mr. Slocombe concedes), the SALT I ceilings on SLBMs coincided with Soviet SLBM force plans through 1977. If the Soviets endeavored (successfully) to avoid any real constraints on their SLBM programs, then it would defy all logic to assume that Moscow willingly agreed to constraints on ICBM deployments, the most important component of Soviet strategic forces.

Both logic and evidence suggest, rather, that the Soviet Union could readily accommodate to the SALT I ceilings on ICBM launchers because of a fundamental decision, made in mid-1970, to enhance the Soviet ICBM force through MIRVing rather than the quantitative addition of ICBM launchers. A number of factors account for this decision. The Soviet ICBM arsenal had already surpassed in number the U.S. ICBM launchers. Indeed, the United States was emphasizing at the time qualitative improvements of its ICBM force through MIRVing, and the Soviet leadership obviously assigned priority to efforts to catch up to the United States in this qualitative arena. Yet, Soviet production capabilities could not provide enough missiles for both new launchers and the retrofiting of old launchers. In July 1970 the Soviets themselves reportedly proposed that they could accept a ceiling of only 300 to 350 very heavy ICBMs. These numbers probably reflected their original plans, and they bracket the 308 that were allowed.¹⁵

Raymond L. Garthoff has summed up the situation that obtained in early 1970 as follows:

... Having surpassed the United States in number of ICBMs, *the Soviet leaders decided to cease the buildup of ICBM launchers.* After SALT began, no additional groups of ICBM silos were begun for a year. *Indeed, three groups of SS-9s in early construction were abandoned in 1970.* ... The Soviet ces-

sation of its ICBM buildup was, in my view, intended as a "signal" in SALT, although it also reflected a Soviet intention to shift to a new generation of ICBMs . . . construction began (i.e., in 1970) on some 80 new ICBM launcher silos. . . .¹⁶

Garthoff reports that the new silos that were started by the Soviets in late 1970 were for the MIRVed SS-18 and SS-19. The abandonment of the old SS-9 silos at the same time reinforces the conclusion that a shift in ICBM generations was in progress, the thrust of that shift being from number of launchers to MIRVing.

Inasmuch as Mr. Slocombe has alluded to a classified study by this author, it seems only fair to note the following reference:

It is difficult to envision how SALT II will contain Soviet strategic developments. As with SALT I, U.S. critics contend the SALT II Agreement merely codifies planned Soviet strategic deployments—a view substantially bolstered by the CIA analysis done by former CIA employee Dave Sullivan. Sullivan's analysis, based on U.S. intelligence monitoring of Soviet communications, reportedly illustrates quite clearly that the Soviet military has not allowed the SALT process to infringe on planned Soviet strategic forces and programs. . . .¹⁷

In short, it is difficult to believe that the Soviet Union accepted any real SALT constraints on its strategic programs.

Soviet SALT Victories

Mr. Slocombe elsewhere has evinced puzzlement about the purposes underlying the massive Soviet strategic build-up: "Exactly why the Soviets are pushing so hard to improve their strategic nuclear capabilities is uncertain."¹⁸

Striking evidence of Soviet negotiating intentions in SALT I and II has recently come to light. A senior researcher affiliated with the Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada (IUSAC), Rostislav G. Tumkovskiy, wrote the following in an obscure Soviet historical journal, *Voprosy Istorii*:

In essence, signing of the Interim Agreement signified the recognition by the American side

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of the *defeat* of the basic policy of the U.S.A. in the arms race unleashed by it against the Soviet Union calculated to achieve a decisive quantitative superiority over the U.S.S.R. in the sphere of strategic delivery vehicles. In addition, it affirmed the effectiveness of the U.S.S.R.'s reciprocal measures to strengthen its defense and deter imperialist nuclear aggression. The political significance of this victory of the Soviet Union in the arms race unleashed against it can hardly be overevaluated . . . [the] 1972 Moscow agreements, like the Vladivostok agreement of 1974, noted the defeat of the American strategic arms race policy. The reciprocal actions of the U.S.S.R. destroyed all attempts by the U.S.A. to achieve nuclear superiority and to employ it in the interests of its imperialistic policy.¹⁹

Tumkovskiy's frankness is surprising, especially given the timing of the publication of his article just prior to the U.S. Senate's SALT debate. Such a statement would be unlikely to appear in the IUSAC's journal *USA*, intended for American readers. The best explanation for its publication in the obscure Soviet historical journal is that it was aimed at a Soviet audience.

Tumkovskiy implies that defeat of a presumed U.S. intention to preserve superiority has opened the way for a Soviet thrust for that same goal. The Soviet "reciprocal" military measures allude to the massive Soviet military build-up.

Tumkovskiy's statement also exposes once again the harshly competitive role that the Soviets assign to SALT, as contrasted to the pervasive American view, reflected in Mr. Slocombe's analysis, of SALT as a cooperative "non-zero-sum" game in which both sides can win, and the whole world benefit, through mutual concessions. The Marxist dialectical approach to all negotiations dictates that one side must win and the other must lose. As such, another implication of Tumkovskiy's boast (as well as its timing) is that, as in SALT I, the Soviet leadership has signed a SALT II Treaty which, it believes, yields to it important unilateral advantages.

But we do not need Tumkovskiy's testimony. Ten years of detente and SALT have yielded ample evidence that the Soviets have been exploiting the SALT process to cripple U.S. weapons programs and to lull the United States

into complacency while they complete their broadly based military build-up and expand their influence on a global scale. The chief architect of SALT I, Dr. Henry Kissinger, now seems to recognize the dangers: ". . . The 1980s could turn into a period of great instability. . . . For a period of five to seven years the Soviets may develop an advantage in power useful for political ends. . . . We could be heading into a period of maximum peril. . . ." ²⁰

The record of SALT and the larger context of Soviet assertiveness during the past decade show conclusively that Moscow hardly views arms control negotiations as an abstract exercise in legal compromise and "problem-solving." SALT is an integral element of Soviet military policy, and the Soviet military clearly has dominated Soviet decision-making in SALT. Their objective is to gain unilateral advantages which, once achieved, are stubbornly defended. They seek to induce complacency and false hopes. They practice deception to bolster negotiating positions. Their most powerful negotiating weapon has been tenacity.

Have We Learned the Lessons?

Notwithstanding Mr. Slocombe's denial, SALT I in fact codified U.S. strategic inferiority, which clearly will persist throughout the period covered by the SALT II Treaty. The quantitative levels of about 2,650 Soviet to 2,060 U.S. delivery vehicles under SALT and presently existing are indisputable, as are the massive Soviet advantages in ICBM throw-weight and overall throw-weight that have asserted themselves particularly since 1972. While the SALT II Treaty ostensibly provides for equality in the number of "launchers" permitted to the superpowers, even this index of "essential equivalence" is a sham. Thus, for example, the Soviet Backfire bomber force, which will number about 375 by 1985, will be exempted from SALT ceilings, while U.S. Poseidon SLBMs dedicated to the NATO theater are included in all U.S. SALT II aggregates. Moreover, the United States is currently planning to deactivate unilaterally 10 Polaris submarines carrying 160 SLBMs. It is, to say the least, highly doubtful that the United States will ever attain its permitted level of 2,250 launchers.

The Soviets will, under SALT II, preserve their monopoly in heavy ICBMs. The 314 Soviet

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SS-18 ICBMs, carrying at least 3,140 warheads, can credibly threaten to destroy all 1,054 U.S. ICBMs, 154 ICBM launch control centers, 25 bomber bases, and 4 strategic submarine bases. The Soviet SS-18 force alone carries more megatonnage than the entire U.S. missile force of ICBMs and SLBMs—roughly 2,618 megatons as against 1,814 megatons.²¹ The SS-18 force by itself can thus neutralize all U.S. strategic forces. Similarly, the SS-19 force of at least 310 heavy ICBMs, carrying at least 1,860 warheads, also can threaten all U.S. strategic forces. The Soviets thus have in effect two independent first-strike forces. The remaining Soviet ICBM, SLBM and bomber forces would comprise a formidable Soviet reserve for second-strike use.

Has the United States learned from the SALT I record? Mr. Slocombe avers, for example, that SALT II permits the Soviets to deploy only one new ICBM of a "new type," and to make only "minor modifications" to others. We have seen that the pace and extent of the modernization and replacement that the Soviets carried out within SALT I came as a shocking surprise to U.S. policymakers. The SS-19 and SS-N-8 missiles turned out to be much more powerful than anything that had been anticipated.

Nevertheless, the Soviets have again been allowed to achieve the ambiguous language in SALT II's Article IV with respect to new types of ICBMs. Their arrogant and continued use of encrypted telemetry on SS-18 tests suggests quite clearly that there are things in their modernization program that the Soviets wish to hide from us. Moreover, the ambiguity in both Article IV (on new type ICBMs) and Article XV (on verification) gives to Moscow the leeway to test and deploy all five of the reported new fifth-generation ICBMs and SLBMs *fully within* the terms of SALT II. No less an authority than CIA Director Stansfield Turner has reportedly testified to this effect before the Senate Intelligence Committee.²²

Dr. Kissinger stated recently, with the obvious benefit of sorrowful hindsight: "We have to count on the fact that the Soviet Union is likely to push to the very limits of the [SALT II] agreement and do things that we cannot now foresee that would be technically legal but are now unforeseeable."²³ What makes this prospect all the more disturbing is the reported admission by a U.S. Defense Department official

to the effect that U.S. SALT II negotiators "know that the Russians deliberately negotiated Article IV so that they could go ahead and test and deploy all their new missiles without violating the Treaty."²⁴ Are we being deceived by adroit Soviet negotiators *and* by our own officials?

The Unrepaired "Heavy ICBM" Loophole

But again: Have we profited from the lessons of SALT I? Mr. Slocombe argues that we did so in negotiating SALT II, and that "the most important lesson was to be as specific and precise as possible in drafting treaty language constraining Soviet options." Mr. Slocombe was even more specific in a 1976 statement: "The lessons drawn from this episode [the SS-19 problem] by U.S. officials is the need for explicit and precise acknowledgement by the USSR on even the most technical details."²⁵

But if those were the lessons, why in the course of SALT II did we repeat not once, but twice, the most glaring mistake committed by the United States in SALT I—namely, the failure to negotiate a clear definition of a heavy ICBM? In Vladivostok in November 1974 we preserved the key SALT I prohibition on heavy ICBMs replacing light ICBMs, but again, as in SALT I, without an agreed definition of a heavy ICBM.

The failure has been compounded. It is worth noting first that, mindful of the sorry history of the U.S. Unilateral Statement on a heavy ICBM in SALT I, U.S. negotiator Paul Warnke in his February 1977 Senate confirmation hearings clearly ruled out any future such U.S. unilateral statements:

My conviction is that with regard to any agreement which is entered into at this time on control of offensive nuclear weapons, *that we could not afford to have unilateral declarations.* The trouble with the unilateral declaration is that you say "I am now about to say something which you refuse to say" so that is almost a built-in formula for disagreement and I don't think that in the kind of arms control agreement that we ought to use to replace the interim agreement, we ought to have that kind of a situation.²⁶

Nevertheless, there is again an important U.S. unilateral statement in the SALT II

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Treaty's final negotiating record—and again, incredibly, it involves the troublesome definition of a heavy ICBM. We *still* have no agreed definition of a heavy ICBM in the SALT II Treaty. Paragraph 7 of SALT II's Article II partially defines heavy ICBMs, but a clear definition requires an agreed and rigorous distinction between light and heavy ICBMs.

The SS-19 is to be the baseline between light and heavy ICBMs. In order to be effective, however, a definition must have clear, specific, *agreed* data on the SS-19's launch-weight and throw-weight. We must rely upon the negotiating record for these specific weights. The Secretary of State's SALT II Letter of Submittal with Annex provides the required negotiating record:

On August 16, 1977, in a plenary statement, the United States informed the Soviet Union that "... for planning purposes, with respect to ICBMs it might develop, test or deploy in the future, the United States considers the launch-weight limit on light ICBMs to be 90,000 kilograms and the throw-weight limit to be 3,600 kilograms." These figures are based on our estimates for the SS-19. *The Soviet Union did not respond to this statement.* The United States will regard these figures as the limits for the one new type of light ICBM permitted to the United States under Paragraph 9 of Article IV.²⁷

This is the full negotiating record on the definition of a heavy ICBM. Thus the United States in effect unilaterally defined U.S. heavy ICBMs in terms of the SS-19. But we evidently did not even try to get the Soviets to agree to such a definition for Soviet ICBMs. The above statement thus only *implies unilaterally* that any ICBM on the Soviet side with a launch-weight greater than 90,000 kilograms (198,000 lbs.) and a throw-weight greater than 3,600 kilograms (7,937 lbs.) will be regarded by the United States to be a heavy ICBM. Not only did the Soviet Union not agree to these baseline data; it did not even respond to them. Indeed, our present unilateral definition of what constitutes a heavy ICBM must be deemed even weaker than the more explicit U.S. unilateral statement of 1972.

The significance of the continued failure to define a heavy ICBM is that it continues to

allow dangerous Soviet deployment options: the Soviets are free to go ahead and test and deploy new ICBMs heavier than the heavy SS-19. When the United States complains and charges noncompliance in the Standing Consultative Commission, the Soviets can merely reply that they never agreed to the U.S.-supplied baseline data on the SS-19, and that these data are in any case wrong. They could then supply their own "correct" data, which would show their new heavy ICBMs to be really light missiles.

Moreover, all constraints on the testing and deployment of new missiles of no more than 5 per cent larger or smaller than older Soviet ICBMs reportedly also rely upon U.S. baseline data on the launch-weight and throw-weight of existing Soviet missiles. The same is true of the silo dimensional data for all Soviet missiles, which would comprise the baseline data from which to measure the incredibly large permissible increase of up to 32 per cent in silo volume.

The clear conclusion is that the United States did *not* learn the main lesson of SALT I. The claim is again being made that heavy and new type ICBMs will be constrained, but this claim will again be proven wrong. One has to agree in this context, unfortunately, with Mr. Slocombe's observation: "The Soviets should be presumed to be protecting something when they refuse to agree to a specific limitation."

Mr. Slocombe concludes with the observation that "Soviet secretiveness left it mainly to the United States to learn enough about Soviet programs to negotiate effective limitations." There is a presumption implied in this statement that is undeserved. As already noted, we need not have conceded meekly to the Soviet Union the enormous advantages that one-sided secrecy bestows in negotiations. The proposition that we can somehow outsmart the Soviets about the status and capabilities of their own secret programs—and then induce them to agree to constrain themselves through SALT—seems incredible.

The Flaws of SALT II

In sum, we have *not* learned the lessons of Soviet negotiating deception in SALT I. Our failure has led to the following fateful flaws in the SALT II Treaty:

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- the gross inequalities in very heavy and heavy ICBMs, throw-weight and counterforce capabilities, which neutralize or checkmate all U.S. strategic forces, and undermine deterrence at intercontinental, theater nuclear and conventional levels;
- the failure to include intercontinental Backfire bombers;
- the destabilizing constraints (even if temporary and negotiable) on vital U.S. ICBM survivability options in the face of the permitted growth in the Soviet counterforce threat;
- the grossly one-sided constraints on U.S. theater systems (GLCMs and SLCMs);
- the failure adequately to control missile production, stockpiling, excess missiles, and refire capabilities;

- the failure to prevent the Soviet program of camouflage and deception from hindering verification.

Totally within the provisions of the SALT II Treaty, by 1985 the Soviet Union will probably have superiority in total warheads and accuracy, thus toppling the last U.S. strategic advantages. Soviet strategic forces will carry as many as 14,500 warheads, as against roughly 11,900 for the United States. They will probably have about four times the throw-weight of U.S. ICBMs, about a three-to-one advantage in combined ICBM and SLBM throw-weight, and roughly a two-to-one ratio in total throw-weight (including bomber payload equivalent).

If this is "arms control," which is the side that is controlled? And which is the side that has been deceived?

NOTES

1. Walter Slocombe, *The Political Implications of Strategic Parity*, Adelphi Paper No. 77 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, May 1971).

2. Ambassador Gerard C. Smith, "Wrestling With the Plowshare Problem," *New York Times*, January 16, 1976.

3. *Ibid.*; see also Jack F. Kemp, "The SS-19 and the New Soviet ICBMs vis-a-vis SALT II," *Congressional Record*, August 2, 1979, p. E4076.

4. U.S. Senate, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, *Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms*, 92nd Congress, 2nd Sess., June-July 1972, pp. 128-129.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 165.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 548. In addition, Senator Jackson asked the following question for the record in July 1972, and Defense Secretary Laird and the Defense Department supplied the following answers (*ibid.*, pp. 565-566):

Question: The largest part of the Soviet land-based ICBM force is in the SS-11 silos. If the Soviets were to retrofit their SS-11 silos with a new missile, how much could they:

- a. increase the volume of those silos?
- b. increase the volume of the missiles that go into those silos?

DOD Answer: Up to about 30 per cent in both cases. This volume increase is not sufficient to permit installation of an SS-9 class missile in an SS-11 silo. [Note: the SS-19 is 50-60 per cent larger in volume than the SS-11 and can thus be considered an SS-9 class missile.]

Question: Why, in your view, did the Soviets refuse to agree to a prohibition on the deployment of ICBMs larger than 70 cubic meters (in excess of 313 permitted "heavy" launchers)?

DOD Answer: In my view the Soviets might have decided they wanted to retain the option to deploy a slightly larger version of the SS-11.

7. U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, *Military Implications*, *op. cit.*, pp. 341-342.

8. *Report of the Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger to the Congress on the FY 1975 Defense Budget and FY 1975-1979 Defense Program*, March 4, 1974. See also, "News Conference with Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger and Dr. Fred C. Iklé, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency" (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1974), p. 12. Also, U.S. Senate, Foreign Relations Committee, *U.S.-USSR Strategic Policies*, 93rd Congress, 2nd Sess., pp. 4-5. Defense Secretary Schlesinger said the following:

Subsequent to the signing of the [SALT I] agreement, we see a Soviet research and development program of astonishing depth and breadth. This is not to say that they deceived us in the agreement or that the program had been designed to emerge after the agreement. Obviously, these developments were in the cards years in advance because the Soviets have the same kind of lead time problems that we have. But I think it is fair to say that many people, particularly people in the arms control community, have been surprised by the strength of those programs.

Later evidence has allowed the judgment that the Soviets in fact did deceive the United States with the SS-19, SS-16 and SS-N-8, and that the flight-tests of these programs may have been timed or conducted with the status of SALT I in mind.

9. "Meet the Press," NBC-TV, August 12, 1979, p. 9.

10. Jack Anderson, "Soviet Subterfuge: A SALT Concern," *Washington Post*, May 22, 1979.

11. *U.S. Defense Posture Statements*; *Washington Post*, September 27, 1973; Michael B. Donley, ed., *The SALT Handbook* (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1979). See also Jack F. Kemp, "Congressional Expectations of SALT," *Strategic Review*, Winter 1979, p. 23; and Jake Garn, "The SALT II Verification Myth," *Strategic Review*, Summer 1979, pp. 19-20.

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NOTES (continued)

12. Bernard Weintraub, "Pentagon Aides Say Moscow Has Mobile Missiles Able to Reach U.S.," *New York Times*, November 2, 1977.

13. See footnote No. 11 above.

14. U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, *Military Implications*, op. cit., p. 381.

15. William R. Van Cleave, in U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, *Military Implications*, op. cit., p. 581, said: "... It is clear that for the past two years expected modernization of Soviet forces has been regarded as the most likely contingency and the greatest matter of concern to us and this is not at all stopped by the agreements." Dr. Kissinger, *ibid.*, said: "The field in which it is most likely that they [the Soviets] will make progress is in the modernization of the missiles that are permitted under the agreement. That is, they will not violate the numbers of the agreement, but they will improve the quality, accuracy, number of warheads, and this is what will represent a threat to our strategic forces." Dr. Foster (DD/RNE), *ibid.*, p. 245, said: "There is no evidence that they plan to deploy missiles beyond the new starts they had already made."

16. Raymond L. Garthoff, "SALT and the Soviet Military," *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1975, p. 30.

17. Peter Hughes, "SALT and the Soviet Search for Superiority," *Air Force Magazine*, March 1979, p. 51.

18. Walter Slocombe, public statement on SALT II, March 21, 1978, Department of Defense, mimeo.

19. Rostislav Turnkovskiy, *Voprosy Istorii* (Problems of History), April 1979.

20. Interview with Henry Kissinger, *The Economist*, February 3, 1979, p. 17. Also testimony statement of Dr. Kissinger to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July 31, 1979, pp. 3, 28.

21. Seymour Shwiler and Adam Klein, *Strategic Missile Counterforce Capability, U.S. vs. USSR*, U.S. House of Representatives, Armed Services Committee, unclassified staff paper, 1978.

22. *Baltimore Sun*, August 10, 1979, p. 1.

23. "Meet the Press," op. cit., pp. 9-10.

24. Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "SALT Soviet Style," *Washington Post*, August 10, 1979.

25. Walter Slocombe, "Learning from Experience: Verification Guidelines for SALT II," *Arms Control Today*, February 1976, p. 5.

26. Paul C. Warnke, Confirmation Hearings, U.S. Senate, Armed Services Committee, February 1977, p. 53.

27. *SALT II Agreement*, State Department Document, No. 12A, June 1979, p. 13.



SOVIET AEROSPACE
19 November 1979

FORMER CIA ANALYST WARNS OF SOVIET SALT II DECEPTION

Says SS 18 Capability Can Be Expanded Under Treaty

A former analyst of Soviet strategic military affairs in the Central Intelligence Agency Wednesday said the Soviet Union can deceptively test the SS-18's capability to carry more than 10 warheads under the SALT II Treaty, as part of an overall Soviet program of concealment and physical camouflage involving "all their strategic forces."

David S. Sullivan, a military affairs assistant to Sen. Gordon Humphrey (R-N. H.), said the Soviets can, by testing various payload combinations on different flight tests, develop the capability to deploy more than the 10 MIRV warheads allowed under SALT II.

The Soviet late last year tested a 12-14 payload dispensing capability with the SS-18 post-boost vehicle. And, on April 26, an encoded overland flight of the SS-18 demonstrated the capability to dispense 20 packages from the post-boost vehicle.

Sullivan, at a news conference held by the Coalition for Peace Through Strength, stressing that his analysis is based upon "a highly classified CIA study," warned that as a result of Soviet negotiating deception in SALT II, Soviet strategic programs are being developed and "will soon be tested using physical camouflage and telemetry encryption to conceal their vital characteristics.

"If the past is any guide to the future," Sullivan continued, "it will take the U. S. at least 5 years to discover that we have again been deceived by the Soviets in SALT II, just as it took us 5 years to belatedly discover that we had been deceived in SALT I."

SALT I Deception

The former CIA analyst said the Soviets in 1972 negotiated deceptively "on all of the important issues of SALT I in order to allow their new ICBM and SLBM programs to escape constraint under SALT I." Sullivan cited:

- * Soviet "false statements" about the size of their new large, heavy SS-19 ICBM; "false statements" that the SS-19 could be banned, "despite their then secret plans to deploy it widely;" repeated Soviet "false statements" that the U. S. already knew about the characteristics of new Soviet ICBMs;

- * Soviet "false claim" to having 48 submarines operational or under construction in May 1972, carrying 768 SLBMs (Sullivan says Soviets now have 65 "countable" SLBM subs in violation of SALT I's 62-sub limit);

- * Soviet "falacious" geographical asymmetry argument allowing them a huge superiority over the U. S. in SLBMs;

- * "False Soviet pledge" not to build mobile ICBMs, and the false Soviet statement that they did not have an ongoing mobile ICBM program (Sullivan says the Soviets now have a stockpile of over 100 mobile ICBMs);

- * "False Soviet claim" that SALT I avoided a new arms race and contained no Soviet unilateral advantages;

- * "The massive, expanding Soviet nationwide camouflage, concealment, and deception program involving all their strategic forces. This physical camouflage and deception was harnessed to negotiating deception, and its expansion during the years of SALT I represented a circumvention of SALT I's ban on deliberate concealment."

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Providing Cover For New ICBMs

"More significantly," Sullivan said Wednesday, "the Soviets have continued to exercise deliberate negotiating deception" in order to allow all five of their new fifth generation ICBMs and SLBMs to be deployed.

He notes that the Soviets have consistently refused to agree to a definition of a heavy ICBM, or to other key definitions and baselines, "following the pattern of similar refusals in SALT I and at Vladivostok.

"Soviet insistence upon imprecise SALT II 'constraints' on 'new type' of ballistic missiles, together with their refusal to ban telemetry encryption, constitutes negotiating deception," Sullivan stressed.

He also cited: The continued and "arrogant" telemetry encryption in missile R&D, indicating that they have many characteristics of their new ICBMs to hide;

- * "The false Backfire range data provided by the Soviets in 1976 and 1977;

- * "Brezhnev's false statement denying Backfire's intercontinental and refueling capabilities.

"Soviet negotiating deception in SALT II has also again been harnessed to Soviet physical concealment and camouflage," Sullivan said.

Soviets Seen Stockpiling SS-7/SS-8 ICBMs

Addressing what he said are other examples of Soviet "deceptions, falsifications, or arms control violations," he said the Soviet three times falsified claims about the number of SS-7 and SS-8 ICBMs being deactivated during 1976, and the Soviet deployment of large numbers of old SS-7 ICBMs at "an unidentified installation" suggest the Soviets are using their stockpile of over 1200 old ICBMs "as a strategic reserve, circumventing the numerical limits of both SALT I and SALT II."

Sullivan charged Zbigniew Brzezinski, the President's national security adviser, with suppression of evidence of Soviet SALT deception. Noting that Brzezinski wrote in 1971 that the Soviet military leaders "may be deliberately exploiting SALT to attain military superiority over the United States," Sullivan said Brzezinski "has somehow become a supporter of the SALT II Treaty. . . he has also participated in the suppression of an intelligence analysis showing Soviet deception in SALT."

Sullivan said "the combination of Soviet negotiating deception, U.S. concessions, and the strong momentum of the Soviet strategic development and deployment programs is shifting the strategic balance. . . Fully within the terms of the SALT II Treaty, the Soviets will gain clear strategic nuclear superiority over the United States in 1985."

He warned that the Senate would be "foolish" to approve "this dangerous Treaty." Sullivan said it contained seven "fatal" flaws and "perilously constrains" U.S. strategic programs.

SALT II: Modest but Useful

SALT II is in deep trouble. Any doubt on that score was erased when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved the strategic arms limitation treaty with less than the two-thirds majority that will be required for ratification by the Senate as a whole. The vote was 9 to 6 as Senator Richard Stone (D. Fla.) went into opposition. It now appears the administration has no choice but to risk a floor vote before it is sure of victory, even braving the dangers a rejection would bring.

The SALT II negotiations demonstrate that the passage of time has not helped the cause of arms limitation. President Carter probably could have gotten a treaty early on in his administration had he grabbed and run with the Vladivostok package accepted by Gerald Ford and Henry Kissinger. Instead, he lunged for a more favorable pact and then drew back as the Russians waited him out in classic Communist fashion.

The fact that the pending treaty is more beneficial to the United States than the Ford-Kissinger formula gives small comfort to Mr. Carter. For moods and circumstances have changed, and the Senate is set to begin its debate with Mr. Ford and Mr. Kissinger as treaty critics. Indeed, we have the Republican Party—the party that initiated strategic arms limitation talks—now fighting SALT II in highly partisan terms.

Why this erosion of support for a process that was so popular during Richard Nixon's 1972 re-election year? The answer probably reflects the whole history of this

decade: an America hunkering down after the Vietnam debacle, a Soviet war machine projecting Soviet power in many directions, a belated U.S. recognition of adverse strategic trends and, finally, the rise of religious and ethnic mass movements that mock the megatonnage of nuclear arsenals.

The ironic motif of the Foreign Relations Committee SALT II hearings was its emphasis not on arms limitation but arms buildup. Mr. Carter was given to understand that if he were to have any hope of getting a two-thirds majority he would need to pledge a mighty increase not only in nuclear but in conventional arms. He made that pledge but got little to sustain his hopes in exchange. Close votes on proposed amendments in the Senate committee make it pretty clear that if there is ratification, it will be barnacled with reservations that the Kremlin may not accept.

This newspaper believes the Joint Chiefs of Staff are correct in describing SALT II as a "modest but useful" step in slowing the nuclear arms race. But its greatest promise is in sustaining the arms negotiation process itself so that the Soviet Union and the United States can put together a SALT III that reduces—really reduces—the stockpiles that threaten nuclear holocaust. Only by moving in this direction can these two superpowers hope to induce smaller nations to forgo the "nuclear option" that someday could put the bomb in the hands of an Amin or a Khomeini.

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AIR FORCE TIMES
26 November 1979

VIEWPOINT

Ira C. Eaker

A Bad Week — and Why

THE WEEK which began Nov. 5 was certainly one of the worst this year as far as the national security and economic welfare of our people is concerned. It was also ominous for the future.

Assuredly, it is presently imperative that we take note of its events, analyze their causes and quickly resolve what to do about them.

Americans awake that bleak day to the news that student revolutionaries had seized our embassy in Iran and were holding our diplomats hostage, demanding that the exiled Shah be turned over to them.

In quick succession we were greeted with these other untoward events: inflation continued to rise; interest rates for prime customers reached 18 percent; the CIA reported that Russia was outspending the U.S. on military strength by 45 percent. A congressional committee revealed that U.S. military manpower, already below minimum war-plan requirements, was to decrease because armed services salaries had fallen 10 percent a year for the past three years. Then came the shattering news that no solution to our energy problem was assured before congressional adjournment. The falling stock market

responded to these disturbing denouements of "black week."

An analysis reveals that all of these dire events are our own fault in that they are the inevitable result of defective U.S. policies and uncertain leadership.

Our diplomats were seized and held hostage because our leaders failed to respond adequately to the Brezhnev-Castro brazen ploy of Russian troops in Cuba. Since these communist thugs got away with it, any two-bit revolutionary now believes that the U.S. can be blackmailed at will.

But our U.S. pacifists respond, "We cannot take reprisal measures because Iran provides one-sixth of our foreign oil requirements."

The reason that our foreign oil requirements make us helpless is also our own fault. Had an adequate energy program been initiated three years ago, we could now be well on our way to independence from foreign oil. That probably was forfeited during "black week" when we bowed to propaganda and stopped nuclear power development. Nuclear power is the safest, cleanest source of energy. The irrational environmentalists stopped it. They have also delayed all projects for synthetic fuel development.

When I last saw Albert Speer, he could not understand why we had not used his demonstration of synthetic fuel potential in World War II in Germany. He told me, "If you had used your tremendous resources of coal and shale for gasoline production, you would not now be so dependent on foreign oil."

Why have we also allowed Russia to get in a position to control our supply routes for foreign oil?

This occurred because the present administration believed there was no relation between military power and national security. So today we are a second rate military power, and are now reaping the consequences of that ignoble status.

The trembling pacifists, who now control our foreign policy, say, "We must not overreact to Soviet supported revolutionaries in Cuba, Iran or elsewhere or they may diminish the supply or increase the price of our foreign oil."

Why does no one pick on the Russians? Because it is unsafe, since the Kremlin will take instant and adequate reprisal.

Our fortunes will not improve until we establish the same international respect.

The writer, an air power pioneer, is a retired three-star AF officer.

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-10RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH
19 NOVEMBER 1979

Russia's War Machine

Last week an imposing procession of tanks, missiles and troops rumbled through the snow in Moscow's Red Square to commemorate the 62nd anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution. Reviewing the parade from atop Lenin's tomb, Soviet defense minister Dmitri Ustinov denounced what he called "false propaganda about a Soviet military threat" promoted by "reactionary forces in the United States and other NATO countries." The Soviet Union maintains its armed forces, he insisted, to defend "peace and socialism."

While the Soviets were putting on a blustery show of their military might, Sen. Harry F. Byrd Jr., Ind.-Va., was leading a Senate armed forces subcommittee in hearings examining how that military power compares with America's. Expert testimony before Sen. Byrd's procurement subcommittee tends to give the lie to Comrade Ustinov's protestations of peaceful intentions; moreover, it raises serious questions about the ability of the United States' armed forces to compete with those of the Soviets.

In unusual public testimony, two high-ranking officers of the Central Intelligence Agency estimated that total Soviet defense outlays since 1970 had outstripped the United States' by about 30 percent. In the procurement of military hardware, the CIA said, the USSR had outspent the U.S. during the decade by a ratio of 3 to 2.

Sen. Byrd was sharply critical of the CIA estimates, which he characterized as having underestimated both the proportion of U.S. defense spending going for personnel and the amount of Soviet spending for military hardware.

In its first presentation to the subcommittee, a CIA official testified that the Soviets devote 15 percent of their military budget to personnel, compared with 30 percent by the U.S. After Sen. Byrd objected that the 30 percent figure didn't jibe with congressional and Defense Department calculations, CIA witnesses returned to a subsequent session of the hearings to revise their figure to 60 percent, roughly matching the Pentagon's.

Sen. Byrd brought forward as additional witnesses William Lee, a former CIA analyst, and Steven Rosefielde, a University of North Carolina economics professor and occasional consultant to the CIA, who said that the intelligence agency had underestimated by half the growth in Soviet military procurement. A similar technical critique in 1970 caused the CIA then to double its estimates of Soviet

military spending. Academic experts such as Messrs. Lee and Rosefielde are considered the most authoritative checks on CIA analyses, since no institutional check on CIA calculations is carried on by the U.S. government.

The rate of increase in Soviet military procurement, adjusted for inflation, is galloping at 11 to 13 percent, said Mr. Lee, while President Carter is seeking only a 3 percent increase in American defense procurement. The expected comparative growth in military personnel costs is considered to be greatly in the Soviets' favor, since their largely conscript army is paid a paltry amount compared with what the U.S. pays its volunteer forces.

Whether one accepts the CIA analysis or the other experts' estimates, clearly the testimony before Sen. Byrd's subcommittee raises serious doubts about the American bargaining premise for SALT II, namely that the U.S. and the USSR are aiming toward strategic and military "parity." The Soviets' most recently published "Five Year Plan" for the economy, testified Mr. Lee, calls for cuts in both investment and consumption in the civilian market so that their military budget can swallow increasing proportions of the Soviet Gross National Product. A whopping 18 percent of the Soviet GNP is estimated to go for defense next year, compared with only 5 percent for the U.S. The Kremlin is making these burgeoning military commitments even though they place a great strain on the Soviet economy, Mr. Lee said. This strongly suggests that the Kremlin is committed not to notions of "parity" and peace maintained by "Mutual Assured Destruction," the prevailing American theory of nuclear deterrent. To the contrary, Soviet military spending rates give every indication that the USSR is committed to fighting, winning and surviving a nuclear war.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-6BALTIMORE SUN
29 NOVEMBER 1979

Kremlin lowers economic growth targets; failures rouse Brezhnev ire

By ANTHONY BARRIERI
Moscow Bureau of The Sun

Moscow—The Soviet Union has been forced to scale back its economic growth targets for the coming year as a result of generally disappointing industrial performances that have brought unusually sharp criticism from Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet Communist party chief.

Figures presented yesterday to the opening session of the Supreme Soviet—the nation's parliament—indicate that growth targets in many key industrial areas, including energy production, will not be met in 1980.

The presentation was made by Nikolai K. Baibakov, chairman of the State Planning Commission, who avoided direct comparisons between the new growth targets for 1980 and those originally set in the current 1976-to-1980 five-year plan.

But disappointment in the top levels of

the Kremlin over the nation's sluggish economic performance is unmistakable. Mr. Brezhnev delivered a harsh critique on the economy in a speech Tuesday before the Communist Party Central Committee.

An abridged version of the speech—strong enough in itself—was released late Tuesday night by the official Tass news agency.

Yesterday, however, the Communist Party daily, *Pravda*, ran the full text of the speech, and it proved to be even harsher, containing direct and sharp reprimands to a half-dozen government ministers and their subordinates.

"The time has come to bring order here," Mr. Brezhnev said.

The man in overall charge of the Soviet economy, Premier Alexei N. Kosygin, was not present to hear the Brezhnev speech before the Central Committee, nor was he present yesterday to listen to Mr. Baibakov.

The 75-year-old Mr. Kosygin is said to be ill with either heart trouble or a liver ailment. The news from the Kremlin yesterday can hardly be expected to improve his condition.

Overall industrial growth for the last four years will be about 20 percent—admirable by Western standards but below what the still-developing Soviet economy set for itself.

As Mr. Brezhnev made clear Tuesday, key industrial areas such as oil, metals and rail transportation are lagging.

The original five-year plan had set a 1980 target for oil production of 640 million tons. Mr. Baibakov said yesterday the revised 1980 target now is 606 million tons. The Soviet Union is the world's larg-

est oil producer.

Coal production also will not meet the original 1980 target. The Soviets had hopes of digging 805 million tons in 1980; now the target is 745 million tons.

The strong point in the Soviet energy picture is natural gas. Not only will the projected target of 435 billion cubic meters of gas be met, but Soviet planners are confident they can produce more if pipeline construction is speeded up.

While the Soviet Union will not be facing an energy problem of the magnitude facing the West, the slowdown in the growth of oil production could cause long-term political problems.

More high-level Western technology might be needed to help the Soviets tap their vast oil reserves in Siberia. And, the Kremlin has promised its Eastern Euro-

pean allies that they can count on a steadily increasing supply of Soviet energy—if not always oil—over the next 10 years.

As expected, Mr. Baibakov announced that Soviet defense spending would be cut next year by about \$155 million, bringing the officially announced total to about \$27 billion, or 6 per cent of the gross national product.

Many Western analysts, however, consider these figures valuable only for Soviet propaganda purposes. The Central Intelligence Agency, which attempts to calculate Soviet defense spending so that it can be compared with U.S. spending, estimates that the Soviet defense budget will grow by between 3 and 4 per cent and amount to about 11 per cent of the gross national product.

Beneath the bland economic figures lies what is apparently growing dissatisfaction with the performance of the economy. Last year, Mr. Brezhnev also criticized specific ministries and cited examples of production boondoggles.

The Soviet president did the same Tuesday, but also named names and pointed fingers.

Mr. Brezhnev criticized directly the ministers of railroads, of machine building, of heavy construction, dairy products, and trade.

He gave examples: a new tractor factory that produced tractors unsuited for their task, another factory behind schedule in modernization, rail transport bottlenecks that hold up production.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A15THE WASHINGTON POST
29 November 1979

Soviets Forced To Reduce Goals For Output of Oil

By Kevin Klase

Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW, Nov. 28—Faced with deepening energy problems, the Soviet leadership today reluctantly reduced coal and oil production targets for 1980 and set up a new high-level commission to solve its threatening energy crisis.

In a series of grim reports on the nation's lackluster economic performance in 1979 and projections for 1980, President Leonid Brezhnev and senior state planners said major new steps must be taken to save heat and power and perfect new energy sources, such as synthetic fuels and solar power generation.

Brezhnev made clear the urgency of the Soviet dilemma: Although it is the world's largest oil producer, massive efforts in recent years to expand oil and coal production have fallen short of goals, while outmoded and chronically wasteful basic industries threaten to outstrip energy supplies.

Oil production fell about 100,000 barrels per day below goal for 1979, it was disclosed, and coal production fell short by 7 million tons. These shortfalls cannot be made up. The planners revised the 1980 targets to 606 million tons of oil instead of the original goal of 620-640 million tons, and lowered coal targets to 745 million tons instead of the planned 790-810 million tons.

The results and projections come after controversial Central Intelligence Agency estimates that the Soviet Union will encounter increasing oil production difficulties in the mid-1980s and become a net importer of oil to power its economy. The Soviets have bitterly denounced those estimates but the figures disclosed today and the harsh tone of Brezhnev in excoriating major segments of Soviet industry underscores the seriousness of the long-term problems here.

In a speech yesterday to a Central Committee plenary session, the text of which was made public today in the party newspaper Pravda, Brezhnev criticized 10 economic chiefs and managers by name for poor performance.

"It is necessary to find those who are to blame for every 'shortage' caused by irresponsibility and to punish them," he declared. He named key officials in the transport, power, machine-tool, fertilizers, chemical, food and dairy and consumer goods industries, saying he found major shortcomings, waste and indiscipline. The step of naming the officials publicly is unusually harsh.

Brezhnev's attack by inference includes Premier Alexei Kosygin, who heads the national economy. Kosygin, 75, is recovering from a heart attack, according to Soviet sources, and was absent from both the plenum and today's public session of the Supreme Soviet or legislature.

Brezhnev said major research and engineering efforts must be accelerated to provide the U.S.S.R. with large-scale atomic power complexes, fast breeder and fusion reactor power plants, synthetic fuel, and solar and geothermal energy. He said that in January, the state planning committee, Gosplan, must submit "general concepts" of possible solutions through-1990 for Soviet energy and economic problems.

He declared that "plans for saving fuels [for winter use] must be fulfilled by all means. [This] continues to be a major nationwide task." He asserted the country must look well into the future to determine "the energy situation on which the economic growth of the country depends."

Nicolai Baibakov, chairman of Gosplan, indicated that the national economy grew by about 3.6 percent in 1979, compared with a target of 5.7 percent set a year ago by Baibakov and endorsed by the leadership and figurehead parliament. Each year during 1970s, the Soviet economy has expanded, but at steadily decreasing rates.

Baibakov pegged the 1980 growth rate for heavy industry and consumer goods at 4.5 percent, a modest increase compared with previous annual projections.

Soviet production in most key economic areas was badly retarded by last winter's severe cold snap, the worst recorded in European Russia in a century.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE DC 11THE WASHINGTON POST
29 November 1979**Jack Anderson**

An Oil Catastrophe Is Building

The oil caliphs are preparing new surrender terms to present, without negotiation, to the rulers of the industrial world. Next month in Venezuela, the OPEC partners will add another rocket burst to oil prices, already dangerously near the intolerable level.

The industrial powers, paralyzed by a loss of will, are expected to capitulate again. But there is a limit to how much extortion they will accept. Preparations have already begun inside the Pentagon to take the oil fields by force if Western acquiescence should become strained beyond endurance.

The princes of Saudi Arabia, conscious of the laws of economics and the powers of resistance of the United States, have tried to hold the price of crude to \$18 a barrel. But Arab militants have learned that the OPEC ceiling price is not immutable and can be ratcheted upward, that the oil companies will join happily in the profit-taking and that the U.S. government is a patsy for oil company pressure.

So the militants are charging \$40 a barrel on the spot market and are finding plenty of oil-thirsty customers willing to pay the price. The militants are clamoring for an official OPEC price of at least \$30, and the Saudis may be powerless to stop it. Intelligence reports warn that the balance of power is shifting from the moderates to the radicals, with hazards no one can comprehend.

In every Mideast oil country, na-

tionalism is surging, distrust for the United States is ripening into hatred and demands for astronomical oil prices are ricocheting from country to country. Analysts for the Central Intelligence Agency anticipate continued strife in the oil fields and renewed threats to use oil as a political weapon.

The Shiite Muslims, who look to Iran's Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini for spiritual guidance, appear willing to sacrifice economic benefits and to hold their oil as hostage for fanatical political goals. These people not only dominate Iran's oil fields but are also concentrated heavily in Saudi Arabia's eastern oil territory.

More ominous yet, the nearby Soviets see an opportunity to move into the Persian Gulf oil lands. The way may soon open up through Iran, and they are tightening their toehold on the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen.

All of this is tinder for a holocaust that could explode into a major war. For the United States cannot survive without Mideast oil; yet it, can neither succumb forever to Arab economic aggression nor permit deeper Soviet encroachment.

The American oil giants have responded to this national emergency by slavishly supporting the oil sheikdoms, which hold the key to their cash registers. Not only do severe price increases mean greater profits as the companies apply the mark-up to higher prices; it also permits a

hike in domestic oil prices to make it profitable for the companies to undertake secondary oil recovery operations on their long dormant property.

The American oil majors have sought to alter their country's foreign policy at the behest of Arab monarchs; they have staged briefings for high military officers and foreign policy makers; they have worked on government officials in private; they have even run advertisements designed to educate the American public to the Arab point of view.

The companies also provide a pipeline into the oil oligarchies, which helps them assess how to react to U.S. moves. The intelligence that passes through this pipeline into foreign governments at times violates our espionage laws.

There is no indication in Washington, meanwhile, that anyone is preparing to counter the oil catastrophe that is building up. The idiotic anarchy of Congress, the groping and stumbling within the White House and the government's obsequious devotion to the oil industry have left the United States without a policy.

The need is desperate for a strong, comprehensive policy to protect the Western world's main oil reservoir in the Middle East. Our allies have neither the means nor the disposition to protect this vital supply. It's up to the United States which — let's face it — must prepare to use force if necessary.

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LONDON DAILY TELEGRAPH
20 NOVEMBER 1979

CIA EXPERTS FEAR BLUNT UNMASKING SERVES KREMLIN

By STEPHEN BARBER in Washington

FEAR that the unmasking of Anthony Blunt as a former Soviet spy recruiter was really serving Moscow's interests, not the West's, was expressed to me independently yesterday by two former CIA officials.

Mr James Angleton, chief agent in the unmasking of Kim Philby as third man in the Burgess and Maclean affair, feared it would discourage defection by Soviet agents — a key element in counter-espionage.

He also thought it might be exploited to stir up hysteria and to undermine British intelligence services.

That point was also taken up by Mr Kerwin Roosevelt, who pointed out Philby to Mr Angleton as a prime suspect.

Mr Roosevelt was concerned that the unmasking of Blunt should not be made a pretext for the kind of witch hunt which in America in recent years had emasculated the CIA.

"Your people should be careful not to get drawn into that sort of dangerous hysteria," he said. "It is all too obvious whose interests that sort of thing serves."

'Egregiously violated'

Mr Angleton, the CIA's ace counter-intelligence chief before his retirement, said:

The nagging question that continues to cloud the central meaning of this case is whether the confidential arrangements made by sovereign governments in granting immunity from prosecution in a matter of espionage has not been egregiously violated.

The culprit, of course, is the leaker. He has, in effect, jeopardised — and perhaps permanently — the fiduciary relationship which at times is indispensable if we are to contain and neutralise the steady deployment of Soviet agents and assassins now operating in the West.

And inherent in the granting of immunity is also the granting of anonymity.

'Richly deserving'

Mr Angleton paid tribute to the British intelligence services, who, as he put it, "are richly deserving of acclaim and support for their perseverance and success in the particular and highly complicated case."

He also said that disclosures about Blunt and about a supposed "fifth man" were likely to be exploited by those who wished to undermine the British Official Secrets Act. That, in his view, would be extremely dangerous to not only British but Western security. America did not have such



Mr James Angleton

an Act, and CIA men very much respected this.

As regards allegations in print recently suggesting that Dr Wilfrid B. Mann, a former Briton employed by America's National Bureau of Standards, was the "fifth cat," Mr Angleton declared: "Dr Mann is a friend of long standing, a distinguished scientist whose loyalty is without blemish."

He added: "I am grateful that the Department of Commerce has so affirmed, because any insinuation to the contrary is false."

Stronger statement

The Commerce Department has formally stated there is "no question concerning Dr Mann's loyalty to the United States."

Dr Mann has himself repudiated allegations that he was the "Basil" referred to in the recent book, "Climate of Treason," by Andrew Boyle, as having given Maclean advice on American atomic secrets.

He has further stated he was not in Washington in 1947 when Maclean was at the British Embassy there.

Told of a Commons statement by Sir Michael Havers, Q.C., Attorney-General, that there was no information to justify his prosecution under the Official Secrets Act, Dr Mann said yesterday: "I will await a stronger statement than that from London before discussing the issue."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 24WALL STREET JOURNAL
28 NOVEMBER 1979

The Book That Surfaced Britain's 'Fourth Man'

By PHILIP REVZIN

It's mole hunting season in Britain. This past fall the whole country, it seemed, was riveted to the seven-part BBC television adaptation of John le Carre's novel "Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy." Everyone was waiting for the marvelously laconic George Smiley (Alec Guinness) to outwit the cunning Russian agent who had burrowed to the top of the Circus, as the British Secret Service is termed in Mr. le Carre's fiction.

For the past couple of weeks the drama has been re-run, though not on the BBC.

The Bookshelf

This time there's a real mole, Anthony Blunt, an ex-Knight and formerly the Queen's art adviser, unmasked as a traitor after more than a quarter century. Mr. Blunt's innocuous recent past—he says he quit helping the Russians in 1951, confessed to the British in 1964 and turned from spying to studying the French painter Nicolas Poussin—has done little to quell the furious reaction to his unmasking.

There has already been an emergency debate in Parliament, calls for a full inquiry into Mr. Blunt's past and the current running of the intelligence services, and a continuing stream of newspaper stories with any new fact about "The Spy at the Palace."

Why the fury now over spying that ended more than 20 years ago? And why all the excitement if, as Mr. Blunt insists, all he did out of youthful enthusiasm for Soviet communism was to give the Russians information about the Nazis that the Russians, our wartime allies, should have gotten anyway?

The reasons for the uproar include complex matters of class, abhorrence of betrayal of Queen and country, and perhaps a little collective shame about the circle of upper-class English gentlemen who spied for the Russians.

Many of these reasons are illuminated strikingly by a new book, Andrew Boyle's "The Climate of Treason," which led directly to Mr. Blunt's undoing. The American edition, titled "The Fourth Man," will be published in January by Dial Press. Mr. Boyle, a former BBC journalist and a noted biographer, has been working for the past few years on the Philby-Burgess-Maclean case.

These three traitors all fled to Russia when found out (Burgess died in Moscow in 1963, the other two are presumed to still be in Russia), tipped off by a shadowy Fourth Man. The fourth man has been for years the favored story of newspaper editors with nothing better to run on a slow summer Sunday. Past articles have named a variety of dead Cambridge professors and students as the collaborator.

Mr. Boyle doesn't name Mr. Blunt as the fourth man in the book, preferring the pseudonym Maurice to comply with Britain's strict libel laws. He does drop a lot of hints, however, and freely sprinkles Mr. Blunt's name about. It didn't take much for a magazine to catch on, and when questions were asked in Parliament, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher revealed all.

The book, however, does much more than solve a long-standing riddle (and pose a new one: the real identity of "Basil," the Fifth Man who helped the other four). It also paints a convincing picture of the sterility of the public school and Cambridge upbringing of Britain's future leaders between the wars, fertile plantations for astute Russian "talent spotters."

The atmosphere was of political and economic confusion. Britain had lost its empire and was nearing economic collapse. The sympathies of the Prince of Wales, later briefly Edward VIII, with the budding Nazi regime in Germany were barely hidden. The Cliveden Set was tilting upper-class opinion toward the Germans.

Against this the Soviet Communist experiment seemed to many not just a way to stop fascism, but a just path to economic recovery. The conversion of many Cambridge students and teachers to communism was profound, Mr. Boyle points out. Some were deterred by Stalin; a few persisted. By their lights Kim Philby, Guy Burgess, Donald Maclean and Anthony Blunt were simply being true to their consciences and their friends by sticking with the Russians. "This was a case of political conscience against loyalty to country; I chose conscience," Mr. Blunt said last week.

Mr. Boyle's sketch of Cambridge life makes such a statement plausible, although no more acceptable to current outraged public opinion. The arrogance of class, rampant at Cambridge and Oxford

during the Thirties, has led to old class wounds being reopened by the Blunt affair. Labor Party politicians want to know why less well-connected traitors have been jailed for 40 years while Mr. Blunt was merely stripped of his knighthood. They also want assurances that all the moles have been unearthed, an assurance Mr. Boyle isn't yet prepared to give.

And while Mr. Blunt's royal connection isn't deemed very significant (he was concerned more with Gainsborough than any official secrets at the palace) many Britons feel he directly betrayed and embarrassed the Queen. This view is tempered, however, by some politicians who think Mr. Blunt became a double agent after 1964 and has been feeding the Russians misinformation since. They figure that his job at the palace helped convince the Russians that he hadn't yet been found out.

The latter half of Mr. Boyle's book takes the spies out of Cambridge and into their shadowy world. Besides being a true-life spy thriller to rival Mr. le Carre's novels, Mr. Boyle's narrative provides a good case for taking the treason seriously. While Britain might not have had all that many secrets worth knowing, the U.S. busily building the atom bomb, did, and shared many of them with the British. These were easily passed to the Russians by their well-placed infiltrators.

Still, nobody claims that Anthony Blunt was working for the Russians up until he was revealed recently, and the outcry does include a large measure of helpless vengeance. Mr. Boyle is convinced that the hot-house of 1930s Cambridge is gone forever. The book concludes: "The deplorable conditions of that period, giving rise to the distemper which turned future pillars of the establishment into spies, then into transitory pseudo-heroes of the Soviet Union, have long since passed away. Like debris on the ebb tide of change, they have been swept out to sea, never to return."

Mr. Revzin is a member of the Journal's London bureau.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 32

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
28 November 1979

Britain's unrepentant spy

Many observers from afar may share the reaction of the author, Andrew Boyle, whose book led Prime Minister Thatcher to disclose that art historian and former security official Anthony Blunt had been a spy for the Soviet Union. After the secret long kept from the British public had been disclosed, Mr. Blunt issued a statement explaining his passing of information to the Russians as a matter of conscience but offering no apology for it. Mr. Boyle responded, "It might have been more appropriate if he had expressed a word of regret for his misdeeds rather than seeking to justify them."

To be sure, Mr. Blunt has gone on to say (in an interview with the Times of London) that by the 1950s he came to reject Marxism and Moscow and to accept British constitutionalism and the British way of life as "the best." But in previous decades he had been persuaded that Soviet communism was the only firm bulwark against fascism, and he

chose this view as a matter of political conscience over loyalty to his own land.

He was not the only person of talent and promise to be tempted toward communism in a proper revulsion against fascism in the days of Hitler. But few carried it to the point of treason. And Mr. Blunt's later secret confession and award of immunity do not really wipe the slate so clean that he now can afford to make a statement on the affair without some indication of contrition for letting down his country so badly.

It may be said that his country's government has let down its people by leaving it to an author, using sources under the American Freedom of Information Act, to bring the matter to light. The ensuing political discussion in Britain could draw attention to lessons for the future. Unfortunately, the spy in the case — after years of indulgence as a knight in high circles including the Royal Household itself — appears to have no lesson to bestow.

Time Essay

The Eclipse of the Gentleman

The Blunt affair came as no shock to the author of this Essay. He was recruited into the MI6 branch of British intelligence during World War II, and operated for 18 months as a spy at Lourenço Marques in Mozambique. His boss at MI6 headquarters was Kim Philby—as it turned out—of the KGB. "Intelligence gathering," the author later observed, "is even more fantasy-prone than news gathering. In the latter, you are often expected to make bricks without straw, but in the former, to grow lemons without a tree." He thus retired from spying with some relief at the end of the war, to "fall subsequently," he recalls, "into the more serious business of editing Punch." Since his days at the British humor magazine, he has plied his trade as a self-described "vendor of words" on radio and TV broadcasts, in magazine and newspaper articles and in a number of books, including his own pungently self-critical memoirs, *Chronicles of Wasted Time*.

In the latest outburst of spy mania, the English may be said to have embarked upon the last stages of the long drawn-out obsequies of the upper classes. Never again, we may be sure, shall we hear any serious suggestion that so-and-so, being a gentleman, may be relied on to tell the truth, be loyal to his country and behave with sexual propriety. The eclipse of the gentleman has happened stage by stage, as did that of the medieval knight at arms, with P.G. Wodehouse playing the part of Cervantes in affectionately revealing the absurdity of knight errantry in the new social circumstances. Nonetheless, the signs were there for those with eyes to see.

Thus, when I was at Cambridge (1920-24), undergraduates like myself from modest homes and borough secondary schools tended to emulate the dress and manner of speech of the Etonians, Harrovians and Wykehamists, etc., etc., among whom they found themselves. Nowadays it is the other way round. The richer and more upper-class the undergraduates, the more prone they are to get themselves up on proletarian fancy dress—which, incidentally, can often be quite costly—and to cultivate a nondescript accent which might belong to anyone anywhere. This is part of the worldwide social revolution for which America has provided the musical accompaniment—rock—and the uniform—jeans.

It is in relation to this social revolution rather than to any serious preoccupation with Marxism that the spy scandal must be seen. Of the four principal characters who have emerged so far, Maclean is the only one who might be assumed to have devoted any serious study to Marx's writings. Burgess's two most prized possessions, which he insisted on showing to everyone, were an inscribed copy of Winston Churchill's war memoirs and a note from Anthony Eden in his own hand thanking Burgess for being so attentive during a visit to Washington. These

would scarcely rate as revolutionary trophies. Philby, the only one of the four I knew at all well, he being my wartime boss at MI6, never gave me an impression of having any serious intellectual interests. I regarded him as just an adventurer, who found in Stalin's very ruthlessness something to admire, as his father, St. John Philby, the Arabist, had found in King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia. Anyway, his appalling stutter would have precluded any sort of Marxist dissertation: Marx spoken is bad enough, but Marx stuttered would be intolerable.

As for Blunt, he is the classic pattern of the Cambridge aesthete, with a quiet precise voice, and a taste for subdued lighting and respectfully adoring young men. In some ways, given the difference between Cambridge, Mass., and Cambridge, England, he is reminiscent of Alger Hiss. He mentioned in his apology that in the '30s he was drawn to Marxism and the U.S.S.R. in the light of Chamberlain's appeasement policy, but went on to admit that it was the influence of Burgess that led him to translate this vague sympathy into active service on behalf of the KGB. I cannot, in any case, see *Das Kapital* as his bedside book.

More evident than a common grasp of Marxism was the common practice of homosexuality, at least as far as Burgess, Maclean and Blunt were concerned. Here again Philby was different, being an ardent womanizer, though, it would seem, odd in his ways. His third wife, an American lady acquired in Beirut, in her excellent little book *The Spy I Loved*, describes how

he wooed her, which involved sending her a whole series of loving messages written on tiny pieces of tissue paper, with instructions to burn them when read and carefully scatter the ash, or, if that should be inconvenient, to swallow them—an illustration of how the fatuities of espionage infect even the practice of seduction.

Without any question, however, in the '30s at Cambridge, homosexuality and leftist opinions tended to go together. For instance, many of the Apostles, an elitist society at one time dominated by [Economist John Maynard] Keynes, and closely associated with

his college, King's, notoriously combined culture, Communism and the love that nowadays all too readily dares to speak its name. Also in residence at King's, and also decisively homosexual, was the famous but, as I think, much overrated novelist E.M. Forster, who provided putative traitors with a serviceable formula for justifying their treachery by insisting that if he had to choose between betraying his country and betraying his friend, he hoped he would have the courage to betray his country. Burgess fastened eagerly onto this line of thought, but how fraudulent it is! After all, betraying one's country would automatically involve betraying all one's friends who were also fellow countrymen: the two propositions are not alternatives but collateral.

What is it, then, that makes homosexuals tend to sympathize



"You're lucky, comrade—in Britain they strip traitors of their knighthoods."

CONTINUED

with revolutionary causes, and to find in espionage a congenial occupation? No doubt, psychiatrists' case-books shed light on this, but just common sense suggests that the same gifts which make homosexuals often accomplished actors equip them for spying, which is a kind of acting, while their inevitable exclusion from the satisfaction of parenthood gives them a grudge against society, and therefore an instinctive sympathy with efforts to overthrow it.



E.M. Forster



John Maynard Keynes



Lytton Strachey

I remember reading an account of [Biographer] Lytton Strachey sitting on a rock in the Isle of Skye, weeping over a lost lover he had shared with Maynard Keynes, and thinking to myself how perfectly they got their own back, Keynes by inventing an economic theory which, after a period of spurious prosperity, must infallibly bankrupt the countries which adopt it, and Strachey by overturning the gods of the Victorian age, and with them the virtues such as thrift, hard work, integrity and truthfulness which they symbolized.

Such scenes can best be conveyed by the use of the word decadence, whose reality I first encountered in Weimar Germany, and which so easily turned into Hitler's Third Reich. In England they have coincided with the decline of British power and influence in the world, and the transformation of an empire on which the sun never set, into a ramshackle and absurd commonwealth in which it never rises. Whereas our grandfathers found their heroes in empire builders celebrated by Rudyard Kipling, we have had to make do with expertise in espionage

celebrated by Ian Fleming and Le Carré.

Doubtless, some future Gibbon will amuse himself expatiating upon this theme, but he will still have to find some explanation for the fact that favored, pampered children of the Establishment like Maclean, Burgess, Philby and Blunt should have seen fit to betray their country, their culture and their class in order to help advance the power and influence of the most

ruthless, philistine and materialistic autocracy the world has ever known. Brooding upon this, he will surely note that, in all the speculation and analysis relating to espionage and treason, two essential categories would seem to have been left out: good and evil, conveying, as they do, a sense of a moral order, without which no other order—economic, political, what you will—can possibly exist. Moreover, that the voice making this point most eloquently came not from ancient universities like Oxford and Cambridge, but from, of all places, the *Gulag Archipelago*. I refer, of course, to Alexander Solzhenitsyn.

Furthermore, our future Gibbon may well go on to discover another prophetic voice—Dostoyevsky, who, in his novel *The Possessed*, shows how the absurd liberal, Stepan Verkhovensky, in the person of his son, Peter, is transformed into the revolutionary, who, in Baader-Meinhof style, calls for one or two generations of debauchery, to be followed by a little fresh bloodletting, and then, he exults, "the turmoil will begin." Has it not already begun?

— Malcolm Muggeridge

The World

In Summary

Britain's Spy Is Out of the Cold And Into Hot Water

If I had to choose between betraying my country and betraying my friend, I hope I should have the guts to betray my country.

E. M. FORSTER
in a 1939 essay.

Faced with that choice, another Cambridge man said last week, "I could not denounce my friends."

Emerging from a weekend in hiding and four decades of deception, Anthony Blunt defended his decision to spy for the Russians as a product of political idealism. "In the mid-1930's," the art historian and former art adviser to the British royal family explained, it seemed "that the Communist Party and Russia constituted the only firm bulwark against fascism." He said he "realized the true facts about Russia" after World War II and stopped passing information to the Soviet Union but he did not confess until 1964 to avoid exposing his "friends." They were fellow spies Guy Burgess, Donald Maclean and the "third man," H.A.R. (Kim) Philby, all of whom by then had cleanly skipped to Moscow.

As the "fourth man," Mr. Blunt admitted that he had recruited other agents at Cambridge University. But he refused publicly to give names or numbers, perhaps out of consideration for other "friends," or as his lawyer

said last week, with no apparent irony intended, to avoid violating the Official Secrets Act. This law, which prohibits publication of classified information, undoubtedly helped keep Mr. Blunt's identity hidden for so long. He was unmasked by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in the House of Commons only after he was implicated in a book based partly on data obtained in the United States under the Freedom of Information Act. As a by-product of the scandal, the Thatcher Government last week withdrew a bill that would have made mere possession of secret information a crime.

Parliament and the press cried for answers to questions about a coverup and the identity of other former spies, including "moles" in the British secret service. Mrs. Thatcher told Parliament that all Prime Ministers since Harold Wilson had known of Mr. Blunt's treason and implied that Queen Elizabeth II had also been informed. She admitted that "British interests were seriously damaged" by Mr. Blunt but suggested there was no need to dig further. However, she stopped short of rejecting calls to initiate a formal inquiry.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-17

NEW YORK TIMES
26 NOVEMBER 1979

World News Briefs

British Ex-Spy Is Linked To a Mission for George VI

LONDON, Nov. 25 (AP) — Anthony Blunt, the British art historian who spied for the Soviet Union, carried out a secret mission in Germany for King George VI soon after World War II to retrieve sensitive documents on the Duke of Windsor's relationship with Nazi leaders, The Sunday Times reported today.

Buckingham Palace declined comment.

The paper said Mr. Blunt's mission was confirmed by the historian Hugh Trevor-Roper, a wartime official with Britain's intelligence services who later became Lord Dacre.

The Sunday Times said most of the papers were letters written by Queen Victoria to her German relatives. But they apparently also included documents concerning contacts between the Duke of Windsor and Adolf Hitler which, if publicized, would seriously embarrass the British royal family.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A18THE WASHINGTON POST
26 November 1979

British Leaders Join to Bring an End To Discussion of Soviet Spy Scandal

By Leonard Downie Jr.
Washington Post Foreign Service

LONDON, Nov. 25—Britain's establishment has closed ranks to bring a rapid end to the affair of Anthony Blunt, whose confession to being a Soviet spy was kept secret for 15 years while he remained a knighted art adviser to the queen.

There are to be no investigations by groups equivalent to congressional committees or presidential commissions into Blunt's case or the clear indications that other, still unnamed prominent figures in postwar Britain were agents of foreign powers.

In Parliament, opposition leader and former prime minister James Callaghan joined with the present prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, in deciding that "There should not be a further inquiry into the Blunt conspiracy."

In Callaghan's view, it could only mean that "innocent names would be bandied about as they had been so far." Another former prime minister, Edward Heath, warned against the danger of "McCarthyism," referring to the hunt for communists conducted in the U.S. in 1950s by Sen. Joseph McCarthy.

Government officials told reporters that the reputation of Britain's reorganized intelligence services would unnecessarily be placed at risk by dredging up more scandal from a nearly forgotten past. Blunt's own account of the affair in televised interviews last week, Callaghan said, "was like the rustle of dead leaves."

Any further inquiries will now have

to be conducted by journalists. One, author and former BBC newsmen Andrew Boyle, forced the unmasking of Blunt in the first place. But the British establishment, which once was so easy for the KGB to penetrate, is much more effective at keeping secrets from the British press and public.

The Blunt affair forced Thatcher to kill legislation that would have further strengthened legal protection of official secrets here. The British government, however, still has sweeping and intimidating powers to stop its employees from giving unauthorized information and journalists from receiving and publishing it.

In addition, broad contempt powers enable judges to control tightly what is published about the courts and cases in progress. Strict libel laws also enable anyone with the money to hire a good lawyer to silence most press criticism of or investigation into their affairs.

Because of Britain's strict laws, Boyle gathered much of his information about British intelligence services from U.S. documents. He and an American author used the Freedom of Information Act to obtain about 3,000 pages of CIA, FBI and State Department files.

Some British officials, scholars and journalists are critical of the secrecy provisions here.

"What the present government cannot grasp," said Christopher Andrew, a Cambridge University historian and expert on Britain's security services, "is that official secrecy on so exagger-

ated a scale ... far from protecting national security, actually serves to undermine it. For its very extravagance it threatens to bring the whole concept of secrecy into disrepute."

Thatcher's government had introduced liberalizing amendments to the Official Secrets Act in Parliament, but withdrew them under pressure last week. Critics in the media and among academics discovered, however, that fine print to the amendments actually would have given individual government officials more power than ever to restrict the release of information and punish leaders.

In a country where it is already not possible to publish the names of the men who head the two intelligence-gathering agencies for example, it would have specifically become a crime to disseminate or publish any information about government wire-tapping, even the fact that it existed at all or the laws and rules governing it.

One government official, asked by his superiors some time ago to give his assessment of the legislation, demurred.

"How could I speak well of secrecy legislation that would be as restrictive and undemocratic as South Africa's?" he later asked rhetorically.

Thatcher has asked her civil servants to draft new legislation, but government officials say nothing should be expected soon. They clearly want the current argument about government secrecy, like the Blunt affair, to blow over first.

Approved For Release 2009/04/28 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501300001-2

MISCELLANEOUS

Approved For Release 2009/04/28 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501300001-2

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 19-22

NEWSWEEK
3 December 1979

LETTERS

BRIGHTER OUTLOOK

In your report "Spying on U.S. Business" (NATIONAL AFFAIRS, Nov. 12), you quote me as saying that the results of security checks of U.S. industrial firms are "discouraging." I would like to correct the record. That quotation was from a speech


made in August of 1977. Since that speech, I have been very encouraged by the responsiveness of American industry to new emphasis on industrial security. The results have been impressive. I no longer find the situation "discouraging." Instead, it is heartening.

STANSFIELD TURNER
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C.

BETTER LATE THAN -----

THE CORNELL DAILY SUN
 CORNELL UNIVERSITY
 19 November 1979

Official Urges Faith in CIA



— Central Intelligence Agency

INTELLIGENCE HEADQUARTERS: The Central Intelligence Agency headquarters lies obscured in the woods of Langley, Va.

By **MARCIE PENN**

Special to The Cornell Daily Sun

Washington, D.C. — Flanked by an American flag and a banner bearing the C.I.A. emblem, the agency's Deputy Director Frank C. Carlucci urged a gathering of Cornell and Princeton alumni last week to have more faith in the intelligence community.

"Only our failures come to light," although "there have been a number of... substantial... successes," Carlucci told 480 members of the Cornell and Princeton Clubs of Washington, D.C.

The intelligence chief said he was not at liberty to discuss the successes, because he would have to betray his C.I.A. sources, thus preventing future successes.

He was reluctant to say anything about the current crisis in Iran, a situation the C.I.A. has drawn a lot of heat for.

"Intelligence failure' is too categorical a term" to describe past U.S. actions there, he said.

"As a result of the Iranian experience, we've taken a fresh look at social movements in the Third World as opposed to narrow reporting of political movements."

The Princeton alumnus had taken a break from the Iranian crisis to address Cornell and Princeton alumni on "The State of American Intelligence Today." During his talk he focused on the nature of and need for covert action in any successful intelligence program.

Carlucci explained how the C.I.A. is dependent on accurate information complimented by "superior analysis."

"People think of us as a spy factory. It's more like a university." The C.I.A. does "pure analytical work" using information which originates largely from open sources and, in part, from secret ones, he explained.

Human Collection

Carlucci said technology, while "impressive," has "distinct limitations" in information collection.

"Human collection will continue to be fundamental," he said.

This aspect of intelligence gathering is especially problematic for the C.I.A., he said, in part because of the "unique" circumstances involved in the clandestine relationship at the "heart of intelligence collection."

Because the C.I.A. must seek out individuals who would otherwise not be in contact with the agency, its sources are often motivated by ideological, rather than material, reasons.

Pay frequently takes the form of an insurance policy to protect the person or his family in case he must leave his country, said Carlucci.

Although a C.I.A. contact "frequently... will violate laws of his [own] country," Carlucci said, "on no occasion" does he violate United States law.

Can't Keep a Secret

The C.I.A. is faced with the problem that the United States government is developing a reputation as "a government that can't keep a secret," Carlucci said.

A contact who believes his information will reach the press and be traced back to him is not likely to offer that information, he explained.

Yet, "we live in a climate where we glorify the whistle-blower, the investigative reporter... National security... [has] become a discredited term," he said.

In response to a question on the role of the media, Carlucci said he is not in favor of "abridging freedom of the press," but would argue with those who give out information "for their own purposes."

Media representatives are much less likely today than they were years ago to check with the C.I.A. on the sensitivity of a particular piece of information, he said.

Carlucci described "distribution" as a contributing factor in the

CONTINUED

C.I.A.'s current problems. The likelihood of information leaks increases with the number of people to whom it is available. "Far too many have access," he said.

Not a Crime

Carlucci said the C.I.A. faces a "structural problem," which is embodied in written law. While there are 30 criminal statutes that apply to divulgence of information in various parts of the government, there is "no such statute with regard to national security information," he said.

Only the 1917 espionage law, which requires proof of intent of espionage, applies to the C.I.A., he said. It does not include provisions on information leaks, he said.

The result, Carlucci said, has been "deliberate campaigns" to expose C.I.A. people, rendering "inoperative" those employees exposed.

The C.I.A.'s "only alternative is to ask Congress for legislation, which is difficult to draft without impinging on first amendment rights," he said.

Problems from within the organization include employees who publish books based on their spy experiences, Carlucci said. Every newly hired C.I.A. employee signs a contract saying he will submit material he writes for publication to the intelligence agency before giving it to a publisher, thus allowing the agency to remove "sensitive information," he said.

Carlucci said that while the "vast majority" will remove information from their manuscripts as requested by the C.I.A., many do not even submit a copy for examination.

In the 77 manuscripts submitted this year, the C.I.A. made six changes and asked one individual not to publish at all, said Herbert Hetu, who introduced Carlucci and is the C.I.A.'s director of public affairs.

When employees have broken their contracts the C.I.A. has taken their cases to court and "so far the courts have upheld the validity of our contract," Carlucci said.

Freedom of Information Act

Carlucci discussed the various ramifications of the Freedom of Information Act, which he said does not apply to all C.I.A. intelligence activities.

In answering the great volume of requests that come to the C.I.A., "there inevitably will be errors," he said. The agency has no way of knowing exactly who is seeking the information, he said.

Some requests definitely originate from foreigners, he said. By law, the C.I.A. must respond to all requests even those from the KGB, the C.I.A.'s Soviet counterpart, within a 10 day period.

A "seemingly innocent piece of information may be the last in a jigsaw puzzle" being solved by Soviet intelligence, he said.

The "symbolism" of the Freedom of Information Act may endanger C.I.A.'s relationship with a clandestine contact who may feel his information is not being adequately protected.

While Carlucci noted the need for "oversight mechanisms" to prevent C.I.A. abuses through Congressional committees and executive boards to prevent C.I.A. abuse, he defended the agency's need to use covert methods to influence events in foreign nations.

He called clandestine actions a "foreign policy tool" which at times should not be hindered by prerequisites of presidential or congressional approval, he said.

No Comment

The audience's questions after the lecture centered on concern about the C.I.A.'s capabilities compared to the spy network of other nations, as well as a desire to get firsthand information on the Iranian situation. Carlucci's responses shed little light on either subject.

Carlucci would not comment on the nature of our allies' intelligence services, but noted we have a "mutually beneficial" relationship with them.

While the Soviets are carrying on more intensive [technological] collection than the U.S., "our intelligence community is far superior to theirs," Carlucci said.

One member of the audience asked for Carlucci's opinion on a University of California law suit against the C.I.A. in which the school requested documentation of the agency's covert use of professors to obtain information on the political views of students involved in C.I.A. recruitment.

Carlucci said that other companies often request information from professors without informing the students, and that "we should be treated like any other organization."

Before Carlucci appeared on the stage of the dome-shaped auditorium attached to the main C.I.A. building by an underground tunnel, Hetu quipped about the fear he had felt the first time he approached the agency on a sunny winter day.

Before introducing Carlucci, Hetu explained that the C.I.A. is "trying to get more people to visit," because "this agency needs the understanding and support of the American public."

After the lecture, the alumni attended a buffet in the C.I.A. cafeteria, where they were able to speak with 10 Cornell alumni and eight Princeton graduates who are currently working for the C.I.A.

The program was organized by the Cornell Club of Washington, D.C.

25 NOVEMBER 1979

Hugh Sidey

Carter No. 2 strides forth to confront the real world

Some of these nights there must be a meeting in the far corner of Jimmy Carter's soul between that exuberant evangelical who walked down Pennsylvania Avenue with love in his heart and reason in his mind, and the current commander-in-chief who has the sabers rattling and the fleet moving.

What do you suppose they say to each other? It was that first Carter who proposed cutting the military budget, taking troops out of South Korea, reducing our garrison in Western Europe. He halted the surveillance flights over Cuba; proposed casually to the Kremlin that we both scrap a bunch of missiles (they scoffed); figured that we could round up Arabs and Israelis for a meeting in Geneva, invite the Soviet Union, and have everybody sit down and settle the Middle East problem (no deal). He promised to reign in the CIA, scolded the U.S. for having an inordinate fear of communism. That first Carter cancelled the B-1 bomber, stymied development of the neutron bomb, slowed the Trident submarine and the cruise missile.

He decided that radical movements around the world could be our natural allies, even while he preached that we should curtail our global involvement. That was the Carter of Inaugural Day 1977, a good man who abhorred arms and the love of great power, and who was utterly convinced that his predecessors had not tried amazing grace on this evil world. He believed that modesty and good will would please our friends and soften our adversaries.

That first Carter was profoundly human. His life had been. His success was based on individual relationships in family, academics and small business. In politics he expanded the personal appeal. So why not the world?

The second Jimmy Carter probably could answer the question by now. The interests of nations, not men, govern civilization. One society's reason is another's heresy. What may be found in the tender portion of Leonid Brezhnev's heart while meeting in the shadowy elegance of Vienna is not the thing which governs Brezhnev's actions when he is back with the Politburo in Moscow.

Unlike Carter, who made a valiant effort to reconcile his stated beliefs with his presidential actions, Fidel Castro had no such intentions. While the shah of Iran was westernized enough to know that he violated our precepts of dignity and he sought to correct his abuses, the Ayatollah Khomeini had no such understanding and was possessed by a spiritual fervor many times more constricting than that which narrowed Carter's view.

Layer by layer the president over these last two-and-a-half years has been forced by events to shed his ecclesiastical robes. He found he needed a better CIA and he lamented that he had no device with which to secretly help friends. Soviet military help plainly began to influence diplomacy and he increased defense budgets. In societies where the small seeds of democracy were supposed to sprout after repressive regimes had been shattered, the landscapes were even more brutally devastated by the successors, as in Cambodia and Iran.

Carter can brag that in his time in office American men have not died in battle, but the world in that time has seen more human suffering and bloody dislocation than in the depths of the Vietnam war. All of that cannot be blamed on the United States, but the question can be posed whether or not we could have pre-



Jimmy Carter

vented or at least reshaped some of the tragedy had we brought our strength to bear soon enough.

In any event, the Jimmy Carter who now strides in and out of the White House situation room is in military regalia. He has been forced back on that old American base of power which he tried to mute in his earlier life.

One of the things that makes these hours so worrisome is that the power machine is rusty after years of abuse and denial. Nobody is sure what we can and cannot do.

The picture that emerges from the secret crisis deliberations is of a president who is disillusioned and coldly angry — at the timidity of some of his own people, at the reluctance of our allies to help, at the abandonment of even the vestiges of civilized behavior of some of his adversaries.

He has never been so alone. Nor so grounded in reality.

SYRACUSE POST-STANDARD (NY)
1 November 1979

Carter and the CIA

It is not surprising that George Bush, a former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and now a Republican candidate for the presidential nomination next year, would declare that the nation must uphold its treaty obligations and improve its intelligence operations.

Nor was it surprising that he would tell his Rochester Chamber of Commerce dinner audience the other night, "We can't afford the luxury of tearing down the CIA and the FBI any more."

Bush is absolutely right and it is unfortunate that the incumbent president doesn't feel the same way. Jimmy Carter, meeting with a group of broadcasters in Washington not long ago, let loose with one of his usual abusive references to the

CIA when he underscored "Vietnam, Watergate and CIA violations of the law" while he was lashing out against his predecessors in office.

In recent years, Carter, his old Navy buddy, Adm. Stansfield Turner, now CIA director, and certain members of Congress, have been more than active in emasculating the the CIA and other of the federal intelligence agencies.

And if Carter's electioneering rhetoric is going to continue tearing down the CIA, the FBI, the National Security Agency and other such organizations, it can be taken as an indication that if he regains the presidency in 1980, the nation's intelligence apparatus will be more completely dismantled.

AUGUSTA CHRONICLE (GA)

29 October 1979

Colby is right

Former Central Intelligence Agency Director Richard Helms claims that the intelligence agency ought to lower its profile and stop issuing non-classified reports.

William Colby, another former CIA director, disagrees. He sees much good and little harm in making public the fruits of CIA intelligence gathering that does not bear on national and does not need to be classified.

We tend to agree with the Colby school of thought.

From what we can see, the reports that Helms objects to —

things like weather reports over China, several analyses of world energy problems and population studies — do not contain sensitive material. They are simply spinoffs from the agency's regular work. They might even be of help to some people and businesses in some way.

Perhaps John Hicks, a deputy CIA director, put it best. He says "the public is made aware of the CIA as a research organization, can see how some of its tax dollars are spent and, if only in part, how intelligence relates to national issues."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE C 23THE WASHINGTON POST
28 November 1979**Jack Anderson**

Roulette In Russia as Brezhnev Fades

Behind the grim, fortresslike walls of the Kremlin, a secret, Byzantine power struggle is stirring. At stake is the succession to aged and ailing Leonid Brezhnev, Communist Party boss and supreme ruler of the Soviet Union.

At 72, Brezhnev's days in power are clearly numbered. Even if he cheats death for a few more years, the frailty of the dictator's health may soon force him to retire.

The failing Kremlin leader is crafty but cautious, perverse but predictable. The policymakers in Washington feel a sense of security simply from knowing their adversary. There is a nagging apprehension, therefore, over his increasingly imminent departure.

U.S. intelligence agencies are working feverishly to identify the ultimate winner of the Kremlin's Russian roulette. The candidates for the top job are already jockeying for position, forming alliances and expanding their power bases for the showdown. The outcome will have a lasting impact on world affairs.

We reported earlier the interesting possibility that Grigory Romanov—no kin to the pre-revolution imperial family—might assume Brezhnev's title. At 56, he's the youngest member of the Politburo. CIA analysts believe his success or failure may depend on how long Brezhnev remains in power. Romanov's chances are thought to improve the longer Brezhnev holds on.

Whether the "young" Romanov, an older rival or a consortium of hopefuls, takes over from Brezhnev, one thing is certain, according to a top-secret CIA

evaluation: Any successor will have to have the support of Politburo member Yuriy V. Andropov, head of the pervasively powerful KGB secret police.

The KGB has an important role to play in the succession process or in a period of political instability, the CIA's secret daily intelligence report says. "Any serious contender for the job of general secretary must ensure that he has the tacit approval of the security organ if not its active support."

Operating virtually unchecked by the 14-member Politburo in the savage days of Josef Stalin's one-man rule, the KGB's influence plummeted temporarily after its chief, the hated Lavrenti Beria, was deposed and executed in 1953.

But in recent years, the KGB has recovered much of its lost power. "The (1964) coup against Khrushchev, for example, had the acquiescence of the KGB," the CIA reported.

This resurgence puts Andropov, if not in the driver's seat, at least in a position to block the succession of anyone he disapproves of. His influence in the Politburo is abetted by the KGB ties of two fellow members, Arvid Pelshe and Kirill Mazurov. Andropov is also a close personal friend of Brezhnev.

The Kremlin kingmaker is tall, scholarly looking and speaks English fluently. Sources told our associate Bob Sherman that Andropov is an "astute, ruthless party bureaucrat whose cold and calculating attitude" fits him well for his job as KGB boss.

The CIA experts won't hazard a

guess as to which of the six leading contenders will get the KGB chief's seal of approval. But they do discount the possibility that Andropov will be able to grab the brass ring for himself.

He is 66 and in poor health. Like former CIA chief George Bush, Andropov will also find that his assignment as head of the secret police will prove a serious political liability.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE D8THE WASHINGTON POST
27 November 1979**Jack Anderson**

Oil Firm Greed Led to U.S. Setbacks

The U.S. setbacks in the Middle East, culminating in the outrage in Iran, had their origins in a sordid love affair — the seduction of the Washington establishment by the oil industry.

The story goes back to the early 1920s when the American oil majors got the U.S. government to bulldoze their entry into the previously closed-off Middle East oil lands. Once inside, the companies joined with their European counterparts in closing the door to anyone else.

For the next 50 years, the State Department not only intervened with foreign governments to gain oil concessions but adjusted U.S. foreign policy to accommodate the oil industry. Throughout the Middle East, our embassies served virtually as branch offices for the oil companies.

The Central Intelligence Agency stood ready to undermine any foreign government that tried to deny the oil companies. To protect oil privileges in Iran, for example, the CIA deposed Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953 and installed the shah on the Persian throne.

With Washington connivance, the oil industry established a corporate world government in oil matters dominated by handful of companies. Of these, the greatest were Exxon, Shell and British Petroleum.

For American companies, the main result was that the American consumers were never to benefit from the incredibly cheap-to-produce Middle East oil. Nor would anyone else in international commerce. The world price was pegged to the high production cost on the U.S. Gulf Coast, not to the 10-cents-

a-barrel it cost to pump oil out of the Middle East.

The price-fixing was enforced by a complex system of worldwide marketing arrangements and spheres of influence. Then the growing world demand for oil made it possible for the cartel simply to control the world supply of oil at its main source—the Middle East.

It was a lesson that did not go unnoticed by the oil caliphs. Soon Mossadegh's throttled cry was picked up by Egypt's late Gamal Abdel Nasser who preached Arab unification and screamed "Oil is for the Arabs!"

As with most prophets, Nasser found his goals largely thwarted in his lifetime. But one of his most fervent disciples, Libya's Muammar Qaddafi, confronted the oil companies. As he suspected, the companies were far less willing than he to go without oil profits.

He divided them, as a wolf would cut out sheep, by imposing selective cutbacks first on Occidental, then Exxon, then others. In a year of grand blusterings and splendid ruses, Qaddafi conquered the oil companies one by one.

After he was through, OPEC heavyweights such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, which had been watching raptly from the sidelines, jumped in and got the same terms Qaddafi had won. Thus began the tyranny of the aggressive weak over the self-disarmed strong and the tolerability of torn-up contracts, unilateral cutbacks, illegal nationalizations and political blackmail.

By the early 1970s, the lordly oil majors had been reduced to the role of lackeys for the Arabs. The oilmen

pleaded that, in the hairy times ahead in the Middle East, price was not their vital interest since they could pass price increases on and profit by them. What was vital to the oilmen was continued preferential access to Middle East oil by the majors.

In return, the oil companies offered their magnificent worldwide system—system of exploration, production, transport, refining and marketing—without which a sheik's decrees were but weak whispers lost on a sea of chaos. But of far greater value, the oil barons agreed to use their influence in Washington to help the Arabs manipulate the United States.

Their success must go down as one of the greatest scandals of our times. First, the United States stood by in 1973 while the shah of Iran led the drive for a gigantic oil price increase. Top secret documents show that Washington had the muscle to shut up the shah and to restrain the Saudis.

Our only protection against being both closed down for want of energy and bankrupted by its cost, meanwhile, was to increase steadily the percentage of our energy needs produced at home.

The oil majors had a different goal: their aim was to continue raking in oil profits from the Middle East. The greed of the oil companies, rather than the desperate need of the nation, won out.

The performance of the Washington establishment has been pathetic, aimless, ignoble, listless, ignorant and self-indulgent while the problem has gone from worse to intolerable.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE _____PUBLISHERS WEEKLY
16 November 1979

Petroleum Firm's Protest over Name-Spill Fuels Recall of "Countercoup"

Factual distortions in an account of CIA and British Intelligence operations in Iran 26 years ago prompted McGraw-Hill in August to recall all copies of "Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran" by Kermit Roosevelt. The recall, and what led up to it, interested *The Wall Street Journal* so much that it featured its account on the front page of the November 6 issue under the headline, "The Coup Against 'Countercoup': How a Book Disappeared." The subhead on the report by David Ignatius read: "The Strange Story of a Fight Involving Spies, Oil Firm and a New York Publisher."

Author Roosevelt, grandson of Theodore Roosevelt, directed Middle East operations and also served as deputy to the chief of clandestine operations for the CIA from 1950 to 1958. "Countercoup," which details the CIA's role in the 1953 coup that restored Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlavi to power, was scheduled for August publication. Copies of the book had reached bookstores in mid-August when McGraw-Hill sent a telegram to distributors and reviewers, urging them to return all copies, at the company's expense, due to "errata and production imperfections."

According to the principals—Roosevelt, McGraw-Hill and British Petroleum Co. Ltd., the multinational oil company—Roosevelt changed the identity of a British Intelligence unit, MI 6, at the insistence of the CIA, which had reviewed the manuscript prior to publication. To disguise MI 6's identity, Roosevelt referred to the unit as Anglo-Iranian Oil Co.—the predecessor to British Petroleum. According to *The Wall Street Journal*, British Petroleum is 51% owned by the British government; the company is also the parent of Sohio, or Standard Oil Co. of Ohio.

Objecting to the implicit suggestion that British Petroleum played a part in engineering the Mideast coup, representatives of BP protested to Roosevelt and McGraw-Hill. The *Journal* said that Rupert Hodges, spokesperson for BP North America, characterized the statements associating BP with covert operations as "wrong, inaccurate and thought to be libelous."

Following discussions among author, publisher and oil company, McGraw-Hill determined that "misstatements" in "Countercoup" were significant enough to warrant a recall, Donald S. Rubin, director of public affairs for McGraw-Hill, told *PW*.

Rubin dismissed any question of McGraw-Hill's succumbing to pressure from BP. "We didn't feel coerced. Nor did we have a quarrel with BP. As responsible publishers we recognized a major problem and acted on it. The changes will only improve the book." A revised edition of "Countercoup" will be published in March 1980.

Rubin added that no one, including the book's editor Bruce Lee, had been permitted to see Roosevelt's manuscript before it was cleared with the CIA. Questioned as to McGraw-Hill's position on the matter of prepublication review by the CIA, Ruben responded: "That's an issue for the author. What happened between the CIA and Kermit Roosevelt is what happened between the CIA and Kermit Roosevelt. It's not a matter we should be involved in."

According to McGraw-Hill's estimate, only 400 copies of the 7500 print run of "Countercoup" ever reached reviewers and distributors, and of these, 85% have been returned since the recall telegrams were sent, August 17.

An informal survey of bookstores and wholesalers, however, found that many stores had never received word of the recall and that many more copies of the book may have been distributed than the company has accounted for. Ingram Book Company, which ordered approximately 150 copies of "Countercoup," according to Ann Phifer, assistant director of purchasing, had no record of the recall telegram. Baker & Taylor's Eastern district center never received the recall telegram, a spokesperson said, though the division had ordered "quantities" of the book.

Bookstores in the Washington area—where interest in "Countercoup" is presumed to be high—told *PW* they had received orders ranging from 15 to 100 copies. Few of the stores were aware of the recall.

Some booksellers who knew of the recall preferred not to return the title. Alfred McCabe, district manager for

the Eastern division at McGraw-Hill, told *PW* he had informed Washington-area retailers of the recall, but noted that they are not obliged to comply with the request.

"It's an independent feeling. If they want to keep selling the book, they go right ahead, and there's nothing we can do about it," McCabe declared.

Retailers that continued to sell "Countercoup" found sales especially brisk following *The Wall Street Journal's* story. Sidney Kramer of Washington's Kramerbooks sold out his 15 copies the day the *Journal* printed its story, and another bookseller, who had been selling "Countercoup" at a slow but steady rate since August, sold out the remaining stock of 10 copies the next day. Said the surprised bookseller who had purchased substantial quantities of "Countercoup" because friends of the author lived in the neighborhood: "We were cleaned out."

Before publication, McGraw-Hill had sold first serial rights for "Countercoup" to *The Washington Post*, which excerpted the book May 6. Macmillan Book Clubs had bought rights to "Countercoup" in July. Pat Crystal, club director, said the title was to have been offered as part of a midwinter dual selection—along with Peter Wyden's "Bay of Pigs" (*Simon & Schuster*). "Countercoup" will now be offered as a selection next year. STELLA DONG

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 12

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
28 November 1979

Anti-communist Khmers call for arms and CIA help

By Frederic A. Moritz
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
Ban-Nong Mak Mun, Cambodia

There he sat — in a field headquarters roofed with thatch.

Bearded, in military fatigues, with a colorful sash wrapped elegantly around his waist, this animated, emotional man explained to visitors: "We need arms and food and the support of the outside world".

The man is "Prince" Norodom Soriavong. He leads a Free Khmer anti-communist refugee camp holding between 100,000 to 200,000 Cambodians. "Help me contact your CIA. We need their help," he appealed to me, explaining the need to continue the fight against Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia.

A few miles to the north at a similar camp named Ban Nong Samet, chief of staff In Sakan makes a similar plea. In stylish fatigues and colorful sash, his high cheekbones and elegant face give an aura of dash to the hot, crowded shelter surrounded by the huts of thousands of destitute refugees.

To many experienced observers of Cambodia, military leaders like Norodom Soriavong and In Sakan seem all too familiar. Skeptical "old-timers" say such men swathe themselves in khakis, sashes, and rhetoric — and lead their bands of followers in hopeless quixotic quests.

But some analysts take the forces these men lead more seriously.

"The existence of these groups is a symbolic threat to Vietnam," notes one. "For they stand for what most Cambodians probably want — a noncommunist, non-Vietnamese-dominated Cambodia. The Vietnamese know that under some circumstances these groups could quickly grow."

Altogether the refugees in these Free Khmer camps straddling the Thai-Cambodian border total some 450,000. Just how many are able-bodied, armed military "men" (often soldiers in these camps are school age) is unknown. Norodom Soriavong claims to command 6,000. In Sakan claims 2,800.

The question to be answered in the weeks ahead is just how much the military potential of these groups is weakened by civilian groups accepting the Thai offer to relocate at Khao I Dang. This camp has just been set up to house about 200,000 refugees.

Leaders like Norodom Soriavong and In Sakan are clearly concerned that if they lose their "civilian" populations, their "case" for international food aid will be weakened.

Vietnamese troops are believed to be only 10 miles from the perimeters of Ban Nong Mak Mun. A visitor occasionally hears the thump of a distant howitzer. Khaki-clad lads carrying automatic rifles and grenade launchers straggle in and out of camp.

Indeed, some analysts believe a serious Vietnamese attack could begin against these camps at any time — even though Vietnam may consider the Communist China-backed Khmer Rouge further to the south a more potent military force.

Other observers see these Free Khmer camps as a relatively low-priority Vietnamese target. The Thai interest in relocating these refugees stems less from concern over Vietnamese actions — and more from concern over having independent Cambodian warlords on the Thai border.

If the Vietnamese do strike, there seems little chance the bands of young men carrying weapons larger than themselves could hold their own.