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CONTROLS

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WARNING: ATTN AMBASSADOR GLITMAN
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SERIAL: PM2310145689

Handwritten note in a box: "Rev in mie Affairs"

BODY

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/
COUNTRY: USSR
SUBJ: TAKE 1 OF 6 -- MOISEYEV ADDRESSES FRENCH MILITARY
REF: 1. WA1710165389 -- ANSWERING DR/HVAUGHN
2. PM0707133189 MOSCOW KRASNAYA ZVEZDA RUSSIAN 7 JUL --

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MOISEYEV ADDRESSES FRENCH MILITARY ACADEMY

SOURCE: PARIS DEFENSE NATIONALE IN FRENCH OCTOBER 1989 PP 57-71
 TEXT:

//((TEXT OF SPEECH BY SOVIET CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL MOISEYEV TO FRENCH MILITARY ACADEMY ON 5 JULY 1989: "THE NEW POLITICAL THINKING AND SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE" -- FIRST FIVE PARAGRAPHS ARE EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION))

((TEXT)) DURING MIKHAIL GORBACHEV'S VISIT TO FRANCE, SOVIET CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL MOISEYEV DELIVERED A LECTURE ON 5 JULY AT THE MILITARY ACADEMY TO THE CENTER FOR HIGHER MILITARY STUDIES AND THE MILITARY ACADEMIES.

TWO IMPORTANT POINTS SHOULD BE NOTED FROM THIS LECTURE: THE FIRST RELATES TO FRANCE'S DEFENSE POLICY AND STRATEGIC CONCEPTS, THE OTHER RELATES TO THE PRESENTATION WHICH THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES INTEND TO MAKE OF THEIR MILITARY EFFORT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THEIR DEFENSE DOCTRINE, AND THEIR PROPOSALS REGARDING THE BALANCE OF FORCES AND DISARMAMENT.

ON THE FIRST POINT, GEN MOISEYEV'S REMARKS IN REPLY TO THE QUESTIONS PUT TO HIM ARE UNDOUBTEDLY IMPORTANT. "I GAVE THIS REPLY," THE SOVIET CHIEF OF STAFF SAID, "IN MY CONVERSATION WITH MR CHEVENEMENT. FOLLOWING THE DISCUSSIONS I HAVE HAD WITH GENERAL SCHMITT, THIS REPLY HAS CHANGED. IT IS THAT YOU DO NOT REGARD NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS WEAPONS, BUT SIMPLY AS A POLITICAL MEANS AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE POLITICAL AUTHORITIES. YOUR DOCTRINE CORRESPONDS TO THE INTERESTS OF YOUR PEOPLE AND YOUR COUNTRY, AND TO THEIR SECURITY INTERESTS. IT DOES NOT MAKE PROVISION FOR AN ARMED ATTACK ON A STATE OR A COUNTRY, BUT IT DEFENDS THE INTERESTS OF YOUR STATE AND YOUR COUNTRY.... IT IS POINTLESS TO SEEK AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN US.... YOURS IS AN INDEPENDENT STATE AND A SOVEREIGN COUNTRY. GENERAL DE GAULLE CAREFULLY DEFINED THE BROAD OUTLINES OF FRENCH POLICY, YOU ARE FAITHFUL TO ~~THEM~~ AND, MOREOVER, THEY ARE IN KEEPING WITH YOUR CURRENT INTERESTS."

WHATEVER REMARKS COULD BE MADE ON THE TERMINOLOGY USED -- IT IS PRECISELY BECAUSE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAVE THE CHARACTERISTICS WITH WHICH WE ARE ACQUAINTED THAT THEY CAN BE THE INSTRUMENT OF FRENCH STRATEGY, WHICH IS ITSELF LINKED TO AN INDEPENDENT POLICY -- THE IMPORTANCE OF THESE REMARKS IS OBVIOUS. IT IS NOT THAT THEY ARE ENTIRELY NEW: QUITE THE REVERSE, IN THE SIXTIES AND SEVENTIES, THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP ADMITTED SEVERAL TIMES THAT FRANCE'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DETERRENT STRATEGY BORE WITNESS TO THE INDEPENDENCE OF FRENCH POLICY, AND THEY SAW THIS AS ITS "POSITIVE ASPECT." BUT, SUBSEQUENTLY, AND APPARENTLY IN RESPONSE TO FRANCE'S SUPPORT FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE AMERICAN "EUROMISSILES" IN EUROPE, MOSCOW SAW FRENCH NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS ONE ELEMENT OF THE NATO MEMBER COUNTRIES' NUCLEAR FORCES, AND THERE WAS A DEMAND THAT THEY BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, WITH A VIEW TO LIMITING AND REDUCING THEM, IN DISCUSSIONS ON A U.S.-SOVIET AGREEMENT ON NUCLEAR ARMS IN EUROPE. BY ONCE AGAIN RECOGNIZING NOW THAT THE FRENCH NUCLEAR ARSENAL IS IN KEEPING WITH FRANCE'S NATIONAL INTEREST, THAT IT IS THE INDEPENDENT INSTRUMENT DEFENDING OUR INTERESTS AND THAT SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY SHOULD CONSIDER IT AS SUCH, GEN MOISEYEV IS ADOPTING A NEW LANGUAGE WHICH MUST BE NOTED.

WITH REGARD TO HIS EXPLANATION OF SOVIET THEORIES ON THE USSR'S

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DEFENSE POLICY AND ON DISARMAMENT QUESTIONS, IT IS OBVIOUSLY AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF DISCUSSION AND STUDY AT A TIME WHEN THE VIENNA AND GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS ARE TAKING PLACE ON THESE SUBJECTS, AND WE THOUGHT THAT OUR READERS WOULD APPRECIATE US PUTTING THESE THEORIES TO THEM.

ALLOW ME TO EXPRESS MY GRATITUDE TO GEN SCHMITT, FRENCH ARMED FORCES CHIEF OF STAFF, TO THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE HIGHER NATIONAL DEFENSE STUDIES INSTITUTE, THE CENTER FOR HIGHER MILITARY STUDIES, AND THE HIGHER MILITARY ACADEMIES, FOR THE OPPORTUNITY THEY HAVE GIVEN ME TO ADDRESS SUCH A HIGH-LEVEL AUDIENCE.

IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT I AM ADDRESSING YOU AS A SOLDIER. I WILL DISCUSS POLITICAL AND MILITARY PROBLEMS; ABOVE ALL, I WILL TRY TO EXPLAIN TO YOU THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE WHICH, IN THE LIGHT OF THE "NEW POLITICAL THINKING," HAS UNDERGONE A RADICAL REVIEW AIMED AT GIVING IT A STRICTLY DEFENSIVE CHARACTER.

/***** BEGINNING OF TAKE 002 *****/

REF: PM2310145689 PARIS DEFENSE NATIONALE FRENCH OCT///STRICTLY DEFENSIVE CHARACTER.

TEXT:

((TEXT)) SOVIET DEFENSE MINISTER, ARMY GENERAL D. YAZOV AND FRENCH DEFENSE MINISTER CHEVENEMENT MADE A DETAILED EXAMINATION OF THE DOCTRINE QUESTION IN MOSCOW LAST APRIL. I WOULD LIKE TO CONTINUE THIS DIALOGUE, TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE CHANGES WHICH HAVE OCCURRED IN OUR COUNTRY DURING THIS PERIOD.

THE MILITARY DOCTRINE OF ANY STATE HAS TWO ASPECTS:

ONE IS THE POLITICAL ASPECT AND THE OTHER IS THE TECHNICAL MILITARY ASPECT. HOWEVER, THE PRIORITY IS GIVEN TO THE POLITICAL ASPECT. A SPECIFIC POLICY HAS A CORRESPONDING SPECIFIC MILITARY DOCTRINE. ALL THE OTHER FACTORS -- ~~THE ECONOMY, ARMS, EQUIPMENT~~ -- ALSO INFLUENCE DOCTRINE, BUT THIS INFLUENCE IS SHOWN THROUGH THE POLITICAL ASPECT TOO.

WHAT IS THE CONTENT OF THE POLITICAL ASPECT OF OUR DOCTRINE?

IT IS THE PLEDGE MADE BY THE SOVIET UNION AND THE OTHER WARSAW PACT MEMBER COUNTRIES NOT TO TAKE MILITARY ACTION AGAINST A STATE OR ALLIANCE IN ANY CIRCUMSTANCES UNLESS WE ARE EXPOSED TO AN AGGRESSION. WAR WILL NOT COME FROM THE SOVIET UNION, WE WILL NEVER START IT. WE WILL NEVER, IN ANY CIRCUMSTANCES, BE THE FIRST TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

THE USSR DOES NOT HAVE ANY TERRITORIAL CLAIMS ON ANYBODY AND DOES NOT REGARD ANY STATE OR PEOPLE AS AN ENEMY. WE ARE PREPARED TO ESTABLISH RELATIONS WITH ALL COUNTRIES BASED ON THE MUTUAL CONSIDERATION OF SECURITY INTERESTS AND PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE.

THESE ARE THE FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES. THEY DETERMINE THE CONTENT OF SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE AND ALL OUR PRACTICAL ACTIONS. SOME OF THE WEST'S REPRESENTATIVES ARE TRYING NOT TO NOTICE THE INFLUENCE OF THESE GUIDELINES ON OUR DOCTRINE. FAILING TO FULLY GAUGE THE PROFOUND NATURE OF THE CHANGES WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN THE SOVIET MILITARY ORGANIZATION, THEY CLAIM, IN THEIR STEREOTYPED REMARKS, THAT OUR POLITICAL PLEDGES ARE ONLY WORDS.

WE ARE SOMETIMES TOLD: "IN THE POLITICAL SPHERE, YOU SEEM TO TAKE DEFENSE AGAINST AN AGGRESSION AS THE OBJECTIVE, BUT YOU ARE

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TRYING TO ACHIEVE THAT GOAL BY AN OFFENSIVE STRATEGY." THE POLITICAL AND TECHNICAL MILITARY ASPECTS OF OUR DOCTRINE ARE THEREFORE APPARENTLY INCONSISTENT.

THE REAL SITUATION IS ENTIRELY DIFFERENT. THE POLITICAL AND TECHNICAL MILITARY ASPECTS OF MODERN SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE ARE CLOSELY LINKED: THE LATTER DEPENDS ON THE FORMER. THEY BOTH HAVE ONE THRUST WHICH IS DEFENSIVE IN NATURE. THIS IS REFLECTED IN THE MAIN POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE WHICH WE HAVE ADOPTED: PREVENTING WAR. REMOVING THE RISK OF A CONFLICT HAS NOW BECOME THE SUPREME GOAL, THE HEART OF THE DOCTRINE, THE ESSENTIAL FUNCTION OF THE SOVIET STATE AND ITS ARMED FORCES. THIS IS THE FIRST TIME THAT THE MISSION AIMED AT PREVENTING WAR HAS BEEN TURNED INTO A PRINCIPLE IN OUR DOCTRINE. OF COURSE, THE SOVIET UNION PREVIOUSLY MADE PROVISION TO STRUGGLE AGAINST WAR, AMONG OTHER THINGS; BUT THIS TASK HAS NOW COME TO THE FORE.

WHY HAS THIS HAPPENED? FIRST, BECAUSE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE, WAR CANNOT BE A MEANS OF ACHIEVING POLITICAL OBJECTIVES. IT WOULD LEAD TO DISASTER. THIS POLICY OF PREVENTING WAR IS NOW SEEN NOT ONLY IN OUR POLITICAL PLEDGES, BUT ALSO IN THE GENERAL THRUST OF OUR MILITARY ORGANIZATION, OUR MILITARY PLANNING, THE TRAINING OF OUR ARMED FORCES. UNLIKE THE NATO COUNTRIES, WE ARE NOT CONCEALING THE POLITICAL GUIDELINES OR THE TECHNICAL MILITARY GUIDELINES OF OUR DOCTRINE. IN ADDITION, WE ARE TRYING TO EXPLAIN THEM BOTH TO PUBLIC OPINION AND TO EXPERTS. WE ARE PREPARED TO HOLD CONSULTATIONS TO COMPARE THE SOVIET AND U.S. MILITARY DOCTRINES, AND THE WARSAW PACT AND NATO MILITARY DOCTRINES WHICH WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO DISPEL THE DISTRUST AND MUTUAL SUSPICION WHICH NOW EXIST AND TO ACHIEVE BETTER MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING.

THE NATURE OF THE TECHNICAL MILITARY ASPECT OF OUR MILITARY DOCTRINE INCLUDES AT LEAST FOUR MAIN QUESTIONS: THE NATURE OF THE THREAT, THE KIND OF AGGRESSION WHICH ~~WE~~ SHOULD PREPARE TO REPEL, THE KIND OF ARMED FORCES NECESSARY FOR THIS PURPOSE, THE MEANS OF TRAINING THE LATTER FOR THIS MISSION.

/***** BEGINNING OF TAKE 003 *****/

REF: PM2310145689 PARIS DEFENSE NATIONALE FRENCH OCT///FOR THIS MISSION.

TEXT:

((TEXT)) FIRST QUESTION: WHO IS OUR POTENTIAL ENEMY?
((SUBHEAD))

THE TWO SIDES -- THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES, THE WARSAW PACT AND NATO -- DENY THAT THREATS OF WAR COME FROM THEM. AT THE SAME TIME, THE AMERICAN AND NATO LEADERS ARE CONSTANTLY SAYING THAT THEY REGARD THE SOVIET UNION AS THEIR ENEMY. WHEN I WAS IN THE PLANE BRINGING ME TO FRANCE, I WAS LOOKING AT THE U.S. ARMY FIELD SERVICE MANUAL WHICH, ON PAGE SEVEN, CLEARLY DESIGNATES THE SOVIET UNION AND THE WARSAW PACT MEMBER COUNTRIES AS THE UNITED STATES' ENEMIES. FOREIGN SECRETARY G. HOWE, THINKS THAT THE "RUSSIAN BEAR" THREATENS WESTERN EUROPE AND THAT IT IS THEREFORE NECESSARY, IN HIS VIEW, TO STRENGTHEN NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE WESTERN MASS MEDIA ARE INCULCATING INTO THE PUBLIC THE IDEA OF THE THREATENING, FATAL NATURE OF SOCIALISM, ACCORDING TO WHICH THE USSR IS ENEMY NUMBER ONE AND NEGOTIATIONS WITH OUR COUNTRY CAN ONLY BE CONDUCTED FROM A

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POSITION OF STRENGTH. THE EMPHASIS PLACED ON FORCE, DETERRENCE, AND NUCLEAR ARMS, IS THE FOUNDATION OF THE BRUSSELS DECLARATION WHICH WAS ACCEPTED BY THE NATO LEADERS ON 30 MAY, IN OTHER WORDS, I AM ANXIOUS TO STRESS, NOT DURING THE PERIOD OF CONFRONTATION AND "COLD WAR," BUT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NEW POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND THE "NEW POLITICAL THINKING."

WHAT REMAINS TO BE DONE? THERE IS CLEARLY ONE THING: TAKING THIS INTO ACCOUNT IN OUR PRACTICAL ACTIONS. THE FACT IS THAT THE WARSAW PACT FORCES AND THE 3 MILLION STRONG NATO FORCES FACE EACH OTHER IN EUROPE. THOUSANDS OF U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE TARGETED ON SOVIET OBJECTIVES AND, IN THE SAME WAY, AN ALMOST EQUAL QUANTITY OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS CARRIED BY SOVIET MISSILES ARE TARGETED ON U.S. OBJECTIVES. SUCH A MUTUAL THREAT PRODUCES A POTENTIAL RISK OF WAR BREAKING OUT BY ACCIDENT AND IN AN UNPREMEDITATED WAY. THIS INFLUENCES THE SITUATION IN EUROPE, AND THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IN GENERAL.

FOR INSTANCE, WE ARE NOW VERY WORRIED, AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE VERY WORRIED, BY THE HUNDREDS OF U.S. MILITARY BASES SURROUNDING THE SOVIET UNION IN A HUGE CIRCLE; WE HAVE BEEN ENCIRCLED IN THIS WAY FOR 40 YEARS. WE ARE WELL AWARE OF THE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONAL POTENTIAL OF THE U.S. AND NATO AIRCRAFT CARRIERS, NAVAL AIR FORCE, AND NAVAL FORCES, WHICH HAVE SUPERIORITY OVER SOVIET NAVAL FORCES IN MANY SPHERES. THE SEABORNE CRUISE MISSILES, WHICH THE UNITED STATES REFUSES TO LIMIT AND WHICH ARE DEPLOYED AROUND THE SOVIET UNION, ARE A MAJOR THREAT.

LOOK AT THE SITUATION FROM OUR VIEWPOINT. OUR TERRITORY IS EXPOSED TO A TWOFOLD AGGRESSION -- THAT OF THE U.S. AND NATO OFFENSIVE STRATEGIC WEAPONS, AND THAT OF THE FORWARD-BASED U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IN ADDITION TO THAT, THERE IS "STAR WARS," THE B-2 HEAVY BOMBER ("STEALTH BOMBER") -- THIS IS THE INSTRUMENT OF A NUCLEAR FIRST STRIKE -- THE REFUSAL TO STOP NUCLEAR TESTS, PLANS FOR "COMPENSATION" AND THE MODERNIZATION OF VARIOUS NUCLEAR STRIKE SCENARIOS.... CAN WE REALLY THINK THAT THIS ALL REPRESENTS PEACEFUL ASPIRATIONS?

WE MUST TAKE ACCOUNT OF THIS AND BUILD OUR DEFENSE ACCORDINGLY. BUT WHY SHOULD EASTERN AND WESTERN EUROPE NOT TRY TO UNDERSTAND EACH OTHER IN THE MILITARY SPHERE? WHY COULD WE NOT GRADUALLY ELIMINATE WHAT CONSTITUTES THE MUTUAL THREAT? THE MILITARY THREAT IS THE MAIN SOURCE OF OUR MUTUAL DISTRUST. AS LONG AS IT REMAINS, SUSPICION WILL PERSIST, ENGENDERING INSTABILITY AND NERVOUSNESS, INCREASING THE DESIRE NOT TO LAG BEHIND, TO PRODUCE A COUNTERFORCE OR, WORSE STILL, TO ACQUIRE UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES, IN THE ILLUSORY HOPE OF INFLECTING DEFEAT ON THE ENEMY WHILE REMAINING SAFE AND SOUND, BY SOME MIRACLE. THE ONLY WAY TO END THIS SITUATION IS A JOINT EFFORT BY STATES TO PROMOTE DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS. HOWEVER, JUDGING FROM THE BRUSSELS DECLARATION, NATO IS TAKING A CAUTIOUS LINE IN THE DISARMAMENT SPHERE AND IS BRAVELY ACCUMULATING ARMAMENTS.

SECOND QUESTION: WHAT AGGRESSION SHOULD WE PREPARE TO REPEL?

WE DO NOT HAVE A CHOICE HERE EITHER. THE UNITED STATES AND NATO ARE PREPARING AS MUCH FOR NUCLEAR WAR AS FOR CONVENTIONAL WAR. THEIR MILITARY DOCTRINE, DESPITE PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON ITS "DEFENSIVE" NATURE, HAS HITHERTO PRESUPPOSED THE USE OF NUCLEAR

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WEAPONS WITH THE AIM OF THREATENING, FIGHTING A WAR, AND GUARANTEEING A VICTORY. ALL U.S. MILITARY PLANS ARE BASED ON CARRYING OUT MILITARY OPERATIONS ON FOREIGN TERRITORY AND ACCEPT PREVENTIVE STRIKES "IN CASE OF SUSPICION."

/***** BEGINNING OF TAKE 004 *****/

REF: PM2310145689 PARIS DEFENSE NATIONALE FRENCH OCT///CASE OF SUSPICION."

TEXT:

((TEXT)) THIS IS CONFIRMED BY THE AMERICAN CONCEPT OF AIR AND LAND OPERATIONS, A FORM OF BATTLE EXPLAINED IN THE U.S. ARMY FIELD SERVICE MANUAL (FM-105). THIS DOCUMENT STIPULATES IN BLACK AND WHITE THAT THE U.S. TROOPS SHOULD ACT IN AN OFFENSIVE WAY, AND DEAL POWERFUL BLOWS FROM UNEXPECTED DIRECTIONS. AFTER INVADING FOREIGN TERRITORY AND CONSOLIDATING VICTORY, THEY MUST ENERGETICALLY PURSUE OFFENSIVE ACTIONS, PENETRATING DEEP INTO THE ENEMY'S DEFENSES. THE RATE OF THE OFFENSIVE MUST BE RAPID, TO DEPRIVE THE ENEMY OF THE CHANCE OF RESORTING TO COUNTERMEASURES.

THESE ARE THE GUIDELINES ON THE BASIS OF WHICH THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES ARE TRAINING AND EQUIPPING THEIR ARMED FORCES. IN ADDITION, THE UNITED STATES IS OPENLY STATING THAT IT CAN BE THE FIRST TO RESORT TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

FOR INSTANCE, GENERAL LEYLAND, U.S. ARMED FORCES CHIEF OF STAFF IN EUROPE, SAID DURING THE SENATE HEARINGS ON 14 JUNE: "THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE'S ARMED FORCES ARE ALWAYS PREPARED TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND EVEN TO BE THE FIRST TO USE THEM, AT WHATEVER LEVEL, FROM THE START OF AN ARMED CONFLICT WITH THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES ON THE EUROPEAN THEATER. THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD HAVE NO DOUBT ABOUT THE FACT THAT THE UNITED STATES AND THE NATO COUNTRIES WILL USE THEIR WHOLE NUCLEAR ARSENAL." THIS STATEMENT WAS MADE AT A TIME WHEN ADMIRAL CROWE, CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE OF U.S. ARMED FORCES CHIEFS OF STAFF, WAS MAKING AN OFFICIAL VISIT TO OUR COUNTRY AT MY INVITATION AND WAS TRYING TO CONVINCE US OF U.S. POLICY'S PEACEFUL ASPIRATIONS.

IT IS BLATANTLY ILLOGICAL FOR THE UNITED STATES TO OFFICIALLY ADMIT THAT NUCLEAR WAR WILL LEAD TO DISASTER AND AT THE SAME TIME TO CONTINUE TO ADAPT NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO BATTLEFIELD AND THEATER OF WAR MISSIONS ON A WORLD SCALE. WHILE STATING THAT THERE CAN BE NO VICTOR IN A NUCLEAR WAR, NOT ONLY IS IT REFUSING TO BAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR SIMPLY TO PLEDGE NOT TO BE FIRST TO USE THEM, BUT IT IS SEEKING TECHNICAL PROCEDURES AND A SERIES OF METHODS AIMED AT MAKING THE USE OF THESE WEAPONS ACCEPTABLE FOR IT IN SPECIFIC CIRCUMSTANCES.

THE SOVIET UNION CANNOT FAIL TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THAT. WHILE TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION U.S. NUCLEAR DOCTRINE AND STRATEGY, WE ARE FORCED TO TRAIN OUR ARMED FORCES TO REPEL ANY AGGRESSION. BUT WHY SHOULD NOT THE UNITED STATES, THE USSR, FRANCE, AND BRITAIN, WHICH NOW FACE NEW CIRCUMSTANCES, MAKE A JOINT AND RECIPROCAL PLEDGE NOT TO BE THE FIRST TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS? THE WARSAW PACT IS ALSO IN FAVOR OF A JOINT PLEDGE NOT TO BE FIRST TO START A CONVENTIONAL WAR.

WE ARE ALSO PROPOSING PRACTICAL MEASURES TO AVERT THE DANGER OF THE SUDDEN OUTBREAK OF A CONFLICT: A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION IN THE

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TWO ALLIANCES' ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE, AND THE REMOVAL OF THEIR OFFENSIVE POTENTIAL; THE CREATION OF A NUCLEAR-FREE CORRIDOR ALONG THE LINE OF CONTACT BETWEEN THE WARSAW PACT FORCES AND THE NATO FORCES, AND AREAS IN EUROPE WHERE THERE WOULD BE LOW CONCENTRATIONS OF WEAPONS; THE FORMATION OF A EUROPEAN CENTER FOR REDUCING THE RISK OF WAR AND PREVENTING A SURPRISE ATTACK.

IT IS DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND THE REASONS WHY THE NATO COUNTRIES WOULD NOT ACCEPT OUR PROPOSALS, WHICH TAKE ACCOUNT OF EVERYBODY'S INTERESTS AND DO NOT UNDERMINE ANYBODY'S SECURITY.

THIRD QUESTION: WHAT KIND OF ARMED FORCES SHOULD THE SOVIET UNION HAVE?

THIS QUESTION IS DISCUSSED IN OUR DOCTRINE, ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF A REASONABLE AND ADEQUATE LEVEL OF DEFENSE. BY THIS WE MEAN THAT A COUNTRY (OR A COALITION OF COUNTRIES) MUST HAVE THE MINIMUM LEVEL OF ARMED FORCES WHOSE COMPOSITION AND STRUCTURE GUARANTEE A RELIABLE DEFENSE OF THE STATE AND ITS ALLIES, WHILE RULING OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF CONDUCTING OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS.

WITH REGARD TO OFFENSIVE STRATEGIC ARMS, THE PRINCIPLE OF ADEQUATE DEFENSE, IN OUR VIEW, IMPLIES A BALANCE IN THESE WEAPONS BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES. THEIR STRUCTURES MAY BE DIFFERENT, BUT WHATEVER THE LEVEL OF REDUCTION, THEIR POTENTIAL CAPABILITIES MUST BE EQUAL IN TERMS OF THE EFFICACY OF USE. ON THE BASIS OF THESE POSITIONS, WE ARE CONDUCTING NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES ON A 50 PERCENT REDUCTION IN STRATEGIC WEAPONS AND ARE PROPOSING THAT THEY TOO SHOULD ADOPT THIS POSITION.

WITH REGARD TO CONVENTIONAL FORCES, ADEQUATE DEFENSE IMPLIES A COMBAT STRUCTURE WHICH ENABLES THE SIDES CONCERNED TO REPEL ANY AGGRESSION, WITHOUT AUTHORIZING THEM TO EXERCISE A RECIPROCAL THREAT, AND WITHOUT HAVING THE CAPABILITY OF CONDUCTING LARGE-SCALE OFFENSIVE ACTIONS. THIS INVOLVES GIVING THE ARMED FORCES A NONOFFENSIVE STRUCTURE, ~~LIMITING THE NUMBER OF~~ OFFENSIVE WEAPON SYSTEMS, MODIFYING THE WAY IN WHICH THE ARMED FORCES ARE GROUPED AND THEIR DEPLOYMENT DISTRICTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR DEFENSIVE MISSIONS, AND REDUCING MILITARY SPENDING AND THE VOLUME OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURED.

/***** BEGINNING OF TAKE 005 *****/

REF: PM2310145689 PARIS DEFENSE NATIONALE FRENCH OCT///MILITARY EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURED.

TEXT:

((TEXT)) THESE ARE NOT JUST WORDS. WE ARE ALREADY IMPLEMENTING SOME OF THE MEASURES WE CAN TAKE UNILATERALLY WITHOUT UNDERMINING OUR DEFENSE. WITHOUT WAITING FOR THE SAME MEASURES FROM THE WEST, THE USSR, IN CONSULTATION WITH ITS ALLIES, HAS TAKEN A SERIES OF MAJOR INITIATIVES WHICH GIVE OUR DOCTRINE A PRACTICAL DEFENSIVE CONTENT. IN 1989 AND 1990, OUR ARMED FORCES WILL BE REDUCED BY 500,000 MEN (12 PERCENT OF OUR FORCES). IN EUROPE, THE REDUCTION OF SOVIET TROOPS DEPLOYED IN THE GDR, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HUNGARY, POLAND, AND IN THE EUROPEAN PART OF THE USSR, REPRESENTS A TOTAL OF 240,000 MEN, 10,000 TANKS, 8,500 ARTILLERY SYSTEMS, AND 820 FIGHTER AIRCRAFT. HALF OF THE 10,000 TANKS WILL BE DESTROYED, THE OTHER HALF WILL BE TURNED INTO TOWING VEHICLES FOR THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE CIVILIAN ECONOMY, OR INTO SIMULATORS. THE MILITARY BUDGET WILL

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BE REDUCED BY MORE THAN 14 PERCENT AND THE PRODUCTION OF ARMS AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT WILL BE REDUCED BY ALMOST 20 PERCENT. YOU WILL SEE THAT WE ARE CONVERTING 2,250 TANKS INTO TOWING VEHICLES FOR FIGHTING MAJOR FIRES. THESE ARE CATEGORY T-55 AND T-62 TANKS.

THESE PLANS ARE NOW BEING IMPLEMENTED. ALMOST 30,000 MEN, MORE THAN 3,000 TANKS, AND A LARGE NUMBER OF OTHER ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN FROM THE SOVIET FORCES STATIONED ABROAD. THREE OF THE SIX ARMORED DIVISIONS DUE TO BE WITHDRAWN ALREADY HAVE BEEN. THE REMAINING THREE WILL BE WITHDRAWN NEXT YEAR. ALL THE DIVISIONS BEING WITHDRAWN ARE BEING DISSOLVED. AT THE SAME TIME, WE ARE WITHDRAWING 500 NUCLEAR WARHEADS FROM FORCES WITH TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS (166 WARHEADS ON AIRCRAFT, 284 WARHEADS ON MISSILES, AND 50 ARTILLERY WARHEADS), AND WE ARE ALSO WITHDRAWAL AIR ASSAULT UNITS, AND ASSAULT BRIDGING UNITS WITH THEIR ARMS AND EQUIPMENT.

AT THE SAME TIME AS THIS LARGE-SCALE REDUCTION, WE ARE CHANGING THE STRUCTURE OF THE ARMED FORCES. THE NUMBER OF MILITARY DISTRICTS AND ARMIES HAS BEEN REDUCED AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE REDUCED. THE NUMBER OF COMBINED FORCES DIVISIONS HAS BEEN REDUCED BY ALMOST HALF. WHAT WE CALL OPERATIONAL MANEUVER GROUPS AND "ARMORED GROUPS" HAVE BEEN ELIMINATED. THE DIVISIONS WHICH FOR THE TIME BEING REMAIN ON OUR ALLIES' TERRITORY ARE BEING REORGANIZED. A LARGE NUMBER OF TANKS HAVE BEEN REMOVED FROM THEIR STRUCTURE (40 PERCENT IN THE MOTORIZED FUSILIERS DIVISIONS AND 20 PERCENT IN THE ARMORED DIVISIONS). THE DIVISIONS ARE BEING GIVEN A DEFENSIVE STRUCTURE. IN ALL, THE SOVIET TROOPS' SURPRISE ATTACK POTENTIAL HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLY REDUCED.

SIMILARLY, OUR ALLIES ARE CONSIDERABLY REDUCING THEIR ARMED FORCES, MODIFYING THEIR STRUCTURES, REDUCING THEIR MILITARY SPENDING. IN ALL THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES ARE REDUCING THEIR FORCES IN EUROPE BY MORE THAN 320,000 ~~MEN~~, MORE THAN 13,000 TANKS, MORE THAN 1,000 PLANES, AND MORE THAN 10,000 ARTILLERY SYSTEMS.

DESPITE THESE RADICAL CHANGES IN SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE, NOTHING HAS YET CHANGED IN THE NATO COUNTRIES' POLICY. INSTEAD OF PRACTICAL MEASURES IN RESPONSE TO OUR INITIATIVES, WE ARE MERELY HEARING PROPAGANDA. THE WEST CLEARLY HAS NOT YET DRAWN UP A COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT WHICH IS SUITED TO THE PRESENT STAGE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS -- A CONCEPT WHICH INCLUDES ALL NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, WHICH TAKES ACCOUNT OF THE POLITICAL CHANGES WHICH HAVE OCCURRED NOW THAT THE POLICY OF FORCE HAS BEEN DISCREDITED, AND NOW THAT IT HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED THAT A DIFFERENT APPROACH TO PROBLEMS IS NECESSARY AND RECOURSE TO MILITARY SOLUTIONS LEADS TO AN IMPASSE. FOR THE TIME BEING, THE WEST DOES NOT HAVE SUCH A CONCEPT.

WESTERN PROPAGANDA ABOUT "THE SOVIET THREAT" IS NOW NO LONGER CREDIBLE. NATO SECRETARY GENERAL WOERNER, EXPRESSED HIMSELF VERY FRANKLY ON THIS POINT. THIS IS WHAT HE SAID: "IT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT FOR NATO TO DRAW UP A NEW WAY OF PERCEIVING THE THREAT, BECAUSE VIRTUALLY NOBODY NOW BELIEVES IN THE POSSIBILITY OF WAR WITH THE USSR. HOWEVER, FOR THE TIME BEING, THERE IS NO PARTICULAR IDEA ABOUT THE CONTENT AND SPIRIT OF THIS NEW APPROACH." WE CANNOT HELP MR WOERNER EITHER.

FOURTH QUESTION: THE MEANS OF TRAINING OUR FORCES TO REPEL

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AGGRESSION:

WE HAVE NEVER HAD ANY INTENTION OF BEING THE FIRST TO LAUNCH A WAR. BUT, BASED ON WORLD WAR II EXPERIENCE, WE HAVE UNTIL RECENTLY PLANNED TO REPEL AN AGGRESSION BY BOTH OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE ACTIONS.

TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE WESTERN COUNTRIES' CONCERN, WE HAVE JUST REVIEWED OUR STRATEGY, AND WE ARE BUSY RESHAPING THE THINKING OF OUR GENERALS AND OFFICERS. IN CASE OF AGGRESSION, THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES' MAIN FORMS OF ACTION WILL CONSIST OF DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS AT THE START OF A CONFLICT. IN TRAINING OUR ARMY, DEFENSE IS NOW PLACED IN THE FOREFRONT. WE ARE CONSEQUENTLY REVISING THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR OUR LAND, AIR, AND NAVAL TROOPS, AND THE FUNDAMENTAL DOCUMENTS AND RULES OF COMBAT TO WHICH OUR ARMED FORCES REFER. WE HAVE CONSIDERABLY REDUCED THE NUMBER OF LARGE-SCALE MANEUVERS, WE ARE SHOWING MODERATION IN OUR DEFENSE PROGRAMS, IN WHICH QUALITATIVE PARAMETERS NOW HAVE A MAJOR PLACE, BOTH IN THE TECHNICAL SPHERE AND IN THE COMPOSITION OF OUR ARMED FORCES.

/***** BEGINNING OF TAKE 006 *****/

REF: PM2310145689 PARIS DEFENSE NATIONALE FRENCH OCT//OUR ARMED FORCES.

TEXT:

((TEXT)) HOWEVER, WE HAVE A NUMBER OF SUBJECTS OF CONCERN WHICH THE UNITED STATES AND NATO SHOULD TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION. DURING THE "GLOBAL SHIELD" MANEUVERS, THE UNITED STATES HAS, SINCE 1979, IMPLEMENTED AN AIR SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM BY ITS STRATEGIC BOMBERS, INVOLVING THE PARTICIPATION OF AROUND 30 PERCENT OF THE B-52 AND B-1B BOMBERS. IN THIS SURVEILLANCE OPERATION, THE AIR ROUTES ARE IDENTICAL TO THOSE IN THE REAL SITUATION. STARTING FROM U.S. TERRITORY AND PASSING OVER THE NORTH ~~POLE~~, ALASKA, AND THE ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC OCEANS, THEIR PLANES APPROACH TO WITHIN 1,300 OR 1,500 KM FROM THE SOVIET BORDERS, AND SOMETIMES LESS. SUCH EXERCISES ARE DANGEROUS AND CANNOT ALWAYS BE CORRECTLY IDENTIFIED.

NATO'S ANNUAL MANEUVERS IN EUROPE OF THE "AUTUMN FORGE" TYPE INVOLVE BETWEEN 300,000 AND 400,000 MEN; THEY HAVE TAKEN ON SUCH PROPORTIONS THAT ONE WOULD THINK WE WERE ON THE THRESHOLD OF WAR. WE HAVE TO WORK HARD TO ESTABLISH THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THESE MANEUVERS AND A REAL DEPLOYMENT OF NATO'S ARMED FORCES IN CASE OF WAR. WHY NOT TAKE ACCOUNT OF OUR CONCERNS, IN THE SAME WAY THAT WE WOULD TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THOSE OF THE WEST ON THE SUBJECT OF OTHER ACTIVITIES BY THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES?

THERE IS ANOTHER QUESTION WHICH DEFINES THE NATURE OF OUR DOCTRINE. I AM THINKING OF THE PLANS TO MODERNIZE NATO'S TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WHAT IS THE ROOT OF THE PROBLEM?

IN VIEW OF THE CONSTRUCTIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS AND TO CREATE A STABLE SITUATION AND REDUCE THE DANGER OF WAR IN EUROPE, IT IS VITAL TO START SEPARATE NEGOTIATIONS ON TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WITH A VIEW TO REDUCING AND COMPLETELY LIQUIDATING THEM. THIS IS THE PROPOSAL WHICH THE WARSAW PACT ORGANIZATIONS MADE TO THE NATO COUNTRIES. AND WHAT WAS THE REPLY?

IT WAS MADE DURING THE MEETING OF NATO COUNTRY LEADERS IN BRUSSELS. IT LARGELY CORRESPONDS WITH U.S. INTENTIONS. THE NATO

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COUNTRIES AFFIRMED:

THE IMPORTANCE THEY ATTACH TO THE CONCEPT OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND THEIR REJECTION OF THE IDEA OF THE "TRIPLE ZERO" OPTION IN EUROPE, THUS PERPETUATING THE NUCLEAR THREAT.

THE POSTPONEMENT UNTIL 1992 OF THE DECISION TO BRING INTO SERVICE AND DEPLOY NEW MISSILES. BUT WHAT WILL HAPPEN AFTER THAT DATE? IT IS NOT DIFFICULT TO SEE, BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES HAS RECEIVED THE SUPPORT OF ITS ALLIES IN FINANCING ITS LANCE-2 MISSILE PROGRAM.

THEIR DETERMINATION TO LINK THE START OF NEGOTIATIONS ON TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITH REACHING AN AGREEMENT IN VIENNA ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES. THIS METHOD OF LINKING THINGS IS, IN MY VIEW, AN ERROR OF PRINCIPLE. THE UNITED STATES IS TRYING TO SURROUND ITSELF WITH A "WALL OF CHINA," WITH REGARD TO NEGOTIATIONS ON TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS. I MUST SAY THAT MR GORBACHEV'S VISIT TO BEIJING HAS SHOWN THAT THE WALL OF CHINA HAS NOW BECOME A MEETING PLACE, A FAVORABLE GROUND FOR DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS.

THUS, TO REVEAL THE ROOT OF THE PROBLEM, THE BRUSSELS MEETING VIRTUALLY EXCLUDED TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM THE GENERAL DISARMAMENT PROCESS. THE NATO LEADERS REJECTED THE PROPOSAL BY THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES AND GAVE THE UNITED STATES THE OPPORTUNITY TO "QUIETLY" IMPLEMENT ITS MODERNIZATION PLANS.

THIS IS NOT A FLEXIBLE POSITION AND IT DOES NOT SOLVE THE PROBLEMS. THIS ISSUE HAS BEEN AVOIDED TO SOME EXTENT, THUS CLEARLY RUNNING THE RISK OF HAMPERING THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS, AND HAMPERING EUROPE'S PROGRESS TOWARD A SECURE AND STABLE WORLD.

WHAT IS THE POINT OF MODERNIZATION IF WE CAN, DURING THESE 2 OR 3 YEARS, SECURE A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION IN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS? WHY DOES THE UNITED STATES WANT TO DEPLOY THE LANCE 2 MISSILE IN EUROPE, IF WE ARE DESTROYING OUR SS-23 MISSILES, WHICH HAVE A SIMILAR RANGE? THIS IS CLEARLY A WAY OF ~~CIRCUMVENTING~~ THE INF AGREEMENT.

MODERNIZATION IS NOT IN HARMONY WITH THE POSITIVE CHANGES WHICH HAVE OCCURRED IN THE INTERNATIONAL SPHERE AND WILL NOT INCREASE SECURITY IN EUROPE. THE LATTER IS SEEN SOLELY AS SECURITY "FOR ONESELF" AND NOT AS COMPREHENSIVE AND EQUAL FOR ALL. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO AGREE WITH THIS POSITION, WHICH CONTAINS THE RISK OF CONFRONTATION AND COULD PROMPT A RETALIATORY RESPONSE.

DISARMAMENT MUST BE APPLIED TO ALL TYPES OF WEAPON. NATO IS NOT JUSTIFIED IN FEARING NEGOTIATIONS ON TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND IN INDEFINITELY POSTPONING THEM. NOR HAS IT ANY REASON TO REGARD NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS SOMETHING "SACROSANCT."

IN SHORT, THERE ARE MANY PROBLEMS ON WHICH WE MUST WORK TOGETHER TO REMOVE OUR RESPECTIVE ANXIETIES. I MUST SAY THAT THE TALKS I HAVE HAD ON THIS SUBJECT WITH ARMY GEN SCHMITT AND DEFENSE MINISTER CHEVENEMENT HAVE PRODUCED AREAS OF AGREEMENT. OVER THE PAST 3 YEARS, EASTERN AND WESTERN EUROPE HAVE MADE CONSTRUCTIVE PROGRESS IN ALL DIRECTIONS, NOTABLY IN DISARMAMENT. WE MUST SAFEGUARD THESE ACHIEVEMENTS TO AVOID ANY REGRESSION WHICH WOULD TAKE US BACK TO GLOOMIER TIMES. AND, IN THIS SPHERE, ALL THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, AND ESPECIALLY THE USSR AND FRANCE COULD CLEARLY MAKE A POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION THROUGH THEIR JOINT EFFORTS.

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