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Warsaw Pact Arms Control Policymaking



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An Executive Summary

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
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An Executive Summary



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Warsaw Pact Arms Control Policymaking

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Key Judgments

*Information available
as of 10 January 1989
was used in this report.*

The Soviets have lessened their traditional monopoly of Warsaw Pact arms control policymaking over the last several years, with the East European regimes accorded a greater voice and allowed to play a more independent role. Revived Soviet interest in European conventional arms control probably was the major cause of these changes. They are potentially significant both for the USSR's ability to determine Pact arms control positions in multilateral negotiations and for NATO's ability to exploit differences among Pact members. These changes appear to be a genuine evolution of the alliance, rather than just Soviet-inspired ploys to make the Pact appear more attractive as a negotiating partner.

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The changes seem to be driven by the need to balance Soviet and East European interests in future negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe. Specifically, in the absence of Soviet diktat, the Pact's members will have to reach a consensus on apportioning conventional force reductions in any future agreement with NATO. Soviet efforts to monopolize the financial benefits of arms cuts—which the unilateral reductions and withdrawals Gorbachev announced in December 1988 appeared to pre-empt—almost certainly will lead to further East European resistance to military modernization and attempts to reduce contributions to the Pact's defense effort. Hungary and Poland have already signaled that they intend to use the Soviet cuts to justify reductions of their own in military spending and personnel. Other East European regimes may follow suit, further exacerbating existing alliance management problems.

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Gorbachev's consultations with his Warsaw Pact allies during the planning of the unilateral withdrawal of Soviet troops and tanks from Eastern Europe also illustrate the increased role the Pact members play. The Hungarians carried out a concerted lobbying effort that apparently led to a tentative agreement to withdraw Soviet troops from Hungary. This plan, however, reportedly was opposed by East European conservatives at the July 1988 Pact summit. Once Gorbachev overcame his domestic adversaries, he put forward a new plan that spread the withdrawal among three of the four groups of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe. While East European views were not decisive, they were not ignored.

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The most visible change in Pact policymaking has been the creation of two new bodies charged with formulating the alliance's arms control positions: a "Working Group on Conventional Reductions" and a "Special Commission on Disarmament." Although the new arrangements are not as

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extensive as NATO's policy-coordinating machinery, they provide venues for the East Europeans to defend their interests. The East Europeans have taken advantage of their new leeway to make a variety of proposals for regional disarmament that reflect both their particular security concerns and the desire of several Bloc leaders to play the role of international statesman. East European diplomats and negotiators are also now willing to acknowledge differences with the USSR. The Hungarians in particular have occasionally sided with the West at the Vienna Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and conventional mandate talks. In the fall of 1988, Hungarian and other East European criticism may have helped to persuade Moscow to abandon its demand for the exclusion of fighter aviation from future conventional arms negotiations. Romania, on the other hand, has exploited this new environment to obstruct progress on human rights issues at CSCE. [redacted]

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The Soviets have not, however, relinquished their determining role in Warsaw Pact arms control policymaking. East European disarmament proposals continue to be offered to Moscow for scrutiny before public presentation. The "Jaruzelski Plan," for example, was significantly modified at Soviet insistence. The Soviets continue to negotiate key issues privately with the more important members of NATO in the expectation that the rest of the Pact will go along. East European negotiators in Vienna have complained that key Soviet initiatives were not coordinated within the Pact before presentation to NATO governments, demonstrating both the persistence of old Soviet habits and rising East European expectations that they have a right to be consulted [redacted]

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The implications for the West of a greater East European role in the formulation of Warsaw Pact policy are mixed. Greater independence may allow those so inclined, like Hungary, to play a genuine mediating role. There may also be increased opportunities for the West to exploit differences within the Pact. As Romanian obstructionism on human rights issues at Vienna demonstrated, however, a greater East European role can also complicate multilateral talks. Instances of one or more East European states balking at concessions the Soviets have already accepted will probably become increasingly serious in future negotiations. Failure of the Soviets and their allies to agree on apportioning Pact conventional force reductions could lead to deadlock. At a minimum, it would make it even more difficult for the members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact to reach agreement on inherently complex arms control issues. [redacted]

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
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Scope Note

This paper summarizes a Research Study ¹ that examines in detail how the Warsaw Pact formulates policy for multilateral international negotiations, and assesses recent changes instituted by President Gorbachev in the alliance's internal relations. The primary focus is on Pact policymaking for the major European conferences on security, cooperation, and arms control over the past two decades: the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks; the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE); the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE); and the discussions between members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact on a mandate for the new negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CAFE).



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Warsaw Pact Arms Control Policymaking [redacted]

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The Soviet Union has traditionally dominated Warsaw Pact policymaking for international negotiations. The Soviets exploited the alliance's lack of multilateral policymaking institutions to ensure their domination. They used the Pact's high-level political and foreign policy bodies to promulgate general policy guidelines and to issue public appeals, but not to discuss substantive issues with their allies. They relied largely on bilateral consultations with individual Pact allies, and used caucuses among Pact members at multilateral negotiations merely to transmit Moscow's unilateral decisions [redacted]

among the seven Pact states. Moscow's advocacy of substantial conventional disarmament measures, and even more so, the unilateral Soviet troop reductions and withdrawals announced in December 1988, very likely will foster even greater East European foot-dragging in modernizing their armed forces and inspire several East European regimes to seek troop reductions of their own. [redacted]

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A New Style in Bloc Relations

As the Soviets prepare for the new talks on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CAFE), however, they are taking more seriously the problems of formulating arms control policy in an alliance context. Heightened Soviet interest in conventional arms control stems directly from President Gorbachev's efforts to reduce the Soviet defense burden and improve relations with the West. Preparations for the new CAFE talks come at a time when Gorbachev has sought to breathe new life into the Warsaw Pact by encouraging the USSR's East European allies to play a more active international role [redacted]

A variety of evidence indicates that Gorbachev has promoted new approaches to Warsaw Pact policymaking in an effort to overcome the damage done by the confrontationist policies of his predecessors and to forge new relations within the Bloc based on consensus. The frequency of high-level meetings has increased; consultations at lower levels have expanded; and additional coordinating bodies have been created. Gorbachev has publicly emphasized the importance of multilateralism in the formulation of Pact policies. Concomitantly he directed Soviet Foreign Ministry officials in May 1986 to show greater respect for the experience of their allies; to involve them more in the formulation of Pact initiatives; and to share with them the role of public authorship of major arms control proposals [redacted]

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In this new environment, the Soviets face alliance management problems that are in some measure akin to, albeit less complex than, those facing the United States with respect to NATO. The non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) states confront the same economic and demographic problems as the Soviet Union. They traditionally devote a smaller share of their resources to the military than the USSR and, if anything, are even more inclined than the Soviets to see disarmament as a means of achieving savings on defense. The Soviets thus will want to develop Warsaw Pact negotiating positions that accommodate their own preferences while mollifying their allies in the potentially contentious area of apportioning force reductions

There clearly is a self-serving aspect to the reports from Soviet and East European sources that Gorbachev has granted his Pact allies a greater voice in alliance policymaking. The NSWP regimes have their own reasons for wanting Western governments to take them more seriously as actors in international negotiations. Nor can the possibility be dismissed that the ostensible increase in the independence of East European delegations at such negotiations is at least in part a Soviet-inspired tactical ploy. The Soviets themselves want to undercut the traditional Western perception that Pact policymaking is merely a matter of Soviet diktat. Portraying the Warsaw Pact as an alliance in which each of the members has an equal

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say enhances Soviet negotiating flexibility by allowing the USSR to point to one or another ally as the source of a particular impasse. Nonetheless, the breadth and variety of the evidence indicate that these changes in Pact policymaking are not simply a facade, but represent a genuine evolution in alliance dynamics.

[Redacted]

Institutional Arrangements


Soviet domination of Warsaw Pact policymaking during the alliance's first three decades meant that the Pact did not develop multilateral bodies where detailed Eastern positions could be hammered out. Although Gorbachev is moving to change this, the Pact still lacks an institutional infrastructure on a par with NATO's (see figures 1 and 2). Meetings of Bloc leaders and of Pact foreign ministers provided only general statements of Eastern positions at multilateral talks. The Soviets traditionally relied on Pact caucuses at negotiations to impart instructions that were determined unilaterally in Moscow. Until the mid-1980s, no standing committee existed within the Pact to develop alliance policies or issue agreed-upon guidance to the negotiators [Redacted]

Gorbachev has recently moved to deal with this void through the creation of three new Pact bodies responsible for formulating arms control proposals and exchanging views on foreign policy questions. These bodies meet only sporadically, however; there is no Pact counterpart to the weekly meetings of the permanent representatives to the North Atlantic Council. The Warsaw Pact also does not have a political—as opposed to military—alliance headquarters nor an international staff to provide day-to-day support. Responsibility for chairing the Pact's relatively weak multilateral institutions, moreover, rotates to a new member state each year where it is vested on a part-time basis in a deputy foreign minister who still carries a substantial load of national responsibilities. The post is thus not comparable in stature or authority to NATO's Secretary General. [Redacted]

Warsaw Pact Leadership Meetings

The Political Consultative Committee (PCC) is the Warsaw Pact's highest level body, composed of the party, government, military, and foreign ministry

**Figure 1
Warsaw Pact Conventional Arms Control
Policymaking Institutions**



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
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leaders of the seven member states. Historically it had met every other year, but under Gorbachev it has met annually, usually in the late spring or early summer, with the meeting site rotating as in the past among Pact capitals. Each session issues an official communique assessing the international situation and supporting Bloc positions on arms control questions and East-West relations. These assessments routinely endorse Pact policies at important multilateral negotiations, but are not generally used to introduce nuances into Pact positions. [Redacted]

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Figure 2
NATO Conventional Arms Control
Policymaking Institutions



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PCC sessions do, however, serve as the primary vehicle for advancing major Eastern initiatives that relate to European security issues and may now provide a forum for the discussion of these questions. The March 1969 PCC meeting in Budapest, for example, issued an official Warsaw Pact "appeal" to convoke an all-European security conference, which eventually bore fruit in the establishment of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and culminated in the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. The three most recent sessions of

the PCC have focused on European conventional arms control, issuing in each case a separate public statement on this topic (see inset). The most recent PCC session reportedly also discussed but did not endorse a proposal for unilateral Soviet troop withdrawals from Hungary. Gorbachev apparently then withdrew the proposal, modified it significantly, and unveiled it at the United Nations General Assembly five months later (see appendix A)

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**Conventional Arms Control on the Warsaw Pact
Agenda**

European conventional arms control has provided the focus for the three most recent sessions of the Pact's Political Consultative Committee:

- *The Budapest Appeal* issued in June 1986 called for new European-wide negotiations on the reduction of ground forces and tactical aviation, including tactical nuclear weapons. It proposed initial NATO and Warsaw Pact reductions of 100,000 to 150,000 troops, to be followed by second-stage cuts of 25 percent from existing levels, with total reductions East and West of 1 million men by the early 1990s. The Budapest Appeal also urged priority reductions in tactical air forces in order to lessen the danger of surprise attack and increase stability in Europe. While suggesting the new negotiations be conducted in the CSCE framework, the Pact indicated willingness to consider other forums as well.
- *A Statement on Military Doctrine* issued in May 1987 proclaimed that the Pact's doctrine is "strictly defensive" and gives priority to preventing both nuclear and conventional war. It viewed "the existing military-strategic parity" as "the decisive factor

preventing war." It proposed consultations between NATO and the Pact on their respective doctrines, in order to reduce mutual suspicion and distrust. The statement additionally expressed the Pact's readiness in such consultations to consider eliminating existing imbalances and asymmetries in individual types of weapons and armed forces.

- *A Statement on Conventional Arms Control in Europe* issued in July 1988 asserted the Pact's desire to conclude the mandate talks and begin new negotiations that year. It proposed as priority objectives for the new talks the achievement of equal, lower levels in alliance armed forces and armaments; the prevention of surprise attack through removal of particularly destabilizing weapons from the zone of contact between the two alliances; and an early exchange of data on the armed forces of the two alliances, to be verified by on-site inspection. The statement also urged separate talks on reducing and removing tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, and a second phase of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Europe.

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Foreign Ministers Committee

Warsaw Pact foreign ministers began to meet regularly in the late 1960s to promote the Soviet proposal for a European security conference. The Pact's Foreign Ministers Committee (FMC), formally chartered at the November 1976 PCC meeting, serves as a forum for exchanging views but lacks the power to adopt policies binding on the member states. It meets twice a year, rotating its sessions among the Pact capitals. The Foreign Ministers Committee appears to have taken on particular responsibility for coordinating Pact arms control policy formulation in recent years. The FMC reportedly played a central role in establishing the Pact's Special Commission on Disarmament in 1987, and it may exercise supervision over its work. Discussion of arms control and CSCE issues at recent meetings of Pact foreign ministers has included

considerable give-and-take. During an unannounced informal meeting of Pact foreign ministers in conjunction with the July 1988 PCC session, for example, the Soviet Foreign Minister reportedly told Warsaw Pact members to do nothing that would allow them to be blamed for failure of the Vienna CSCE meeting and the parallel negotiations on a mandate for new conventional arms talks

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Defense Ministers Committee

The Pact Defense Ministers Committee (DMC) was established in 1969 to direct the development and activities of the alliance's Combined Armed Forces. During at least its first decade, the annual DMC sessions did not discuss MBFR policy or other arms control issues.

[redacted] Renewed Soviet interest in conventional arms control and stress on multilateral alliance policy-making may have changed this. Pact defense ministers met on three occasions in 1988, with arms control issues apparently on the agenda in each instance. Their first-ever midsummer meeting, held in Moscow on 5-8 July 1988, coincided with the 5 July meeting between Gorbachev and visiting Hungarian party leader Grosz that reportedly culminated in an agreement in principle to withdraw Soviet forces from Hungary. The PCC met just 10 days later to discuss this tentative Soviet-Hungarian agreement and to adopt a new Pact statement on conventional arms control. The DMC next met in Prague in October 1988, amid rumors that they were preparing the East's opening position for the new European conventional arms talks [redacted]

[redacted]

New Coordinating and Consulting Bodies

The Warsaw Pact has publicly identified two new organs below the ministerial level charged with developing alliance positions on arms control issues and a third new body that has discussed CSCE-related issues on several occasions [redacted]

The *Working Group on Conventional Force Reductions* was created in November 1986—some six months after NATO foreign ministers established the alliance's High-Level Task Force on conventional arms control—with the initial purpose of establishing contact and opening a dialogue with the NATO task force as its ostensible opposite number. Following the

establishment of informal talks among NATO and Pact members on the mandate for new talks on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe in February 1987, the Working Group met on at least eight occasions, alternating between Sofia and Budapest. It issued no substantive proposals of its own, other than to renew its call for direct contacts with the NATO task force. The level of attendees is not known, and it is possible, given the lack of announced meetings since mid-1988, that it has been disbanded or subordinated to the Pact's Special Commission on Disarmament.

[redacted]

The *Special Commission on Disarmament (SCD)*, officially established at the May 1987 session of the Political Consultative Committee, consists of representatives of the members' foreign and defense ministries. It meets under the de facto chairmanship of the PCC General Secretary, a deputy foreign minister from the state scheduled to host the Pact summit, with the result that the first two sessions were held in Warsaw and the next two in Bucharest. The participants exchange views and information on arms reduction questions, discuss arms control initiatives of the individual Pact states, and develop joint proposals in this sphere. The initial SCD meeting in February 1988 was held at the deputy foreign minister level, but subsequent sessions reportedly have involved "permanent representatives." The Soviets have indicated that the deputy chief of their Foreign Ministry's arms control directorate heads their delegation to SCD meetings. The level of military representation is not clear. Press releases issued following the SCD's four meetings indicated that negotiations on conventional armed forces and confidence-building measures had been discussed.

The *Multilateral Group for Current Information Exchange* was established in May 1987 to provide a regular forum for sharing views on key international issues. Like the SCD, its meetings are chaired by the PCC General Secretary and are held in the Pact capital that will host the next PCC session. Meetings are attended by local Pact ambassadors and/or equivalent foreign ministry officials. It has no authority to

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adopt or announce Pact policies, and the dozen meetings held during its first year and a half of operation issued only brief press releases stating that "topical international questions" had been discussed

[Redacted]

Pact Policymaking in Action: Four Major Negotiations

Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks

The greater leeway Gorbachev has allowed the East Europeans in foreign affairs had some modest impact on Warsaw Pact MBFR negotiating style, if not on the substance of policy. The US MBFR delegation in early 1988 noted that NSWP officials at the negotiations had adopted a degree of outspokenness that would have been unthinkable just a few years earlier.

[Redacted]

Given the deadlocked state of these talks, however, such distancing from the Soviet position has had little negotiating significance.

The Soviets ran the Warsaw Pact's conduct of the MBFR talks through a two-tiered system geared more toward restricting sensitive information on Eastern military forces in Central Europe than coordinating policy and negotiating strategy. The negotiations were nominally in civilian hands, and the delegation chiefs were drawn from the respective Pact foreign ministries

[Redacted]

Major European Negotiations

MBFR. Began in Vienna in October 1973 . . . participants include all Warsaw Pact states and all NATO members except France and Spain . . . USSR, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland form core Eastern group . . . deadlocked since early 1986.

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CSCE. First session convened in Helsinki in July 1973, culminated in signing of "Final Act" in July 1975 . . . followup review conferences held in Belgrade (1977-78), Madrid (1980-83), and Vienna (1986-89) . . . involves 33 European states (all but Albania) plus United States and Canada . . . has mandated a variety of specialized experts' meetings and conferences.

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CDE. Most important of CSCE-mandated forums . . . first session held in Stockholm, 1984-86 . . . resulted in agreement to notify major military exercises and invite observers to larger ones . . . East accepted principle of on-site inspection on demand as verification measure . . . Vienna CSCE meeting to mandate resumption of talks on confidence-building measures.

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Conventional Mandate Talks. Begun in Vienna in February 1987 . . . all 23 NATO and Pact members participating . . . agreement reached that new negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CAFE) will involve only alliance members, will be autonomous but within CSCE framework . . . West insisted on exclusion of nuclear weapons and naval forces from CAFE talks

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Throughout the 15-year history of the negotiations there has been no evidence of a Pact deliberative body—civilian or military—to formulate common

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policy or to provide guidance to the delegations in Vienna [redacted]

[redacted]

Vienna CSCE review meeting [redacted] 25X1
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Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe

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Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
The seven members of the Warsaw Pact nominally are equal participants at all CSCE meetings, but there is little doubt that the Soviets have consistently exercised the determining role over Eastern positions. The establishment of the Pact FMC in 1976 was intended in part to provide a mechanism for adopting Eastern positions for the CSCE.

[redacted]

[redacted] As noted earlier, more recent FMC meetings have involved somewhat greater give-and-take on CSCE issues. Although multilateral Pact consultations on CSCE and its spinoffs have expanded, reliable reporting indicates that this has not ended Moscow's leading role in these deliberations.

[redacted]

Discussions of CSCE issues among Pact members have taken place since 1987 in the "Multilateral Group for Current Information Exchange" and in ad hoc consultations at and below the deputy foreign minister level. As part of a general expansion of Pact foreign policy consultations, the Foreign Ministers Committee agreed in October 1986 to establish a working group on human rights questions that would also act as a forum for discussing Pact positions at the

Consistent with Gorbachev's reported loosening of discipline within the Bloc in the mid-1980s, the East Europeans gradually became somewhat more inclined to express independent views, both in the Pact caucus and at the negotiations themselves [redacted] 25X1
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ploy. Rather it reflected, in the view of the US delegation, growing NSWP disenchantment with Soviet stalling tactics at that time. [redacted]

Conventional Mandate Negotiations

Representatives of the 16 members of NATO and the seven Warsaw Pact states began informal discussions in Vienna in February 1987 to draft a mandate for new negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Reporting by the US delegation to the mandate discussions indicates that Soviet leadership of the Pact at these talks was routinely accepted by all the East Europeans except Romania. The standard Soviet-directed Eastern caucus was used to impart instructions on negotiating tactics and transmitted with little advance warning any policy shifts decided by Moscow. [redacted]

[redacted]

Only after the Soviets had made their demarche to the United States was it officially incorporated into Pact policy at the July 1988 PCC meeting. [redacted]

The mandate talks have provided perhaps the clearest case to date of East European disagreement with a Soviet negotiating position, a case that illustrates as well the rising expectations of NSWP governments that they should be consulted before new initiatives are broached in the name of the Pact. In early September 1988, the Soviets officially proposed that "fighter" aircraft (interceptors) be excluded from the future CAFE talks. Although some Pact delegations routinely backed the Soviet move [redacted]

[redacted] that fighter aircraft also are used to support ground attack aircraft over the battlefield, effectively undercutting the Soviet argument that fighters are purely defensive aircraft. [redacted]

[redacted]

The Soviets quickly dropped the fighter exclusion

proposal during Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's visit in late September 1988 to Washington. While US and NATO rejection presumably was the primary factor in the rapid Soviet retreat, East European disagreement may also have played a significant part [redacted]

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Implications

Changes in the way the Warsaw Pact formulates arms control policy over the last several years indicate that the USSR is granting the East Europeans a more genuine—and somewhat independent—role. This in turn has allowed the East Europeans to consider and more openly surface their differences with Soviet-preferred positions. An East German diplomat has claimed, for example, that the needs of the smaller Pact members will have to be considered in future Bloc disarmament proposals and that this will require expanded consultations between Soviet and East European leaders. US participants in unofficial East-West conferences on European security have noted that East Europeans—and especially East Germans—are far more supportive than the Soviets of "thinning-out" zones along the line of contact between the two military alliances. [redacted]

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[redacted] this is a point of real disagreement with the Soviets who, they claim, see the situation in much broader geographic terms [redacted]

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Gorbachev's encouragement of greater East European activism has had mixed results, with the Soviets' achieving some propaganda advantages but at the same time incurring certain costs. The most direct consequence of the new leeway granted the East Europeans has been a proliferation of national schemes for partial disarmament in various regions of Europe that are promoted at virtually any available international forum. The Soviets can still insist on modifications of such proposals as the "Jaruzelski Plan" in the drafting stage (see appendix B). The multiplicity of such initiatives, nonetheless, projects an impression that Pact members care more for their pet disarmament schemes than for agreed-upon Bloc positions. These proposals distract public attention

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from the growing list of Soviet initiatives for European arms control, while the inability of national sponsors to spell out precisely what their initiatives entail casts a shadow over Soviet and other Warsaw Pact proposals.

Although the Soviets are willing to run such risks as part of the price of forging a Pact arms control consensus, it is still an open question whether the USSR will in fact allow the East Europeans to have a significant impact on Bloc positions in arms control negotiations. Soviet behavior in Vienna and in bilateral dealings with members of NATO suggests that Moscow intends to retain control over key issues in any future negotiations on conventional forces in Europe. In the short term this need not lead to major problems within the Pact. Despite the signs of independent thinking on the part of the East Europeans, the habit of following Moscow's lead is deeply ingrained in most NSWP capitals. Soviet espousal of conventional disarmament plays well with East European publics and provides a convenient theme for the East European regimes to rally around.

Nonetheless, the Soviets will need to hold meaningful consultations with the other members of the Warsaw Pact to build the necessary consensus for successful arms control negotiations with NATO. This means coping in a new way with major problems in alliance management that the Soviets have traditionally handled by fiat. The most serious of these involves apportioning the benefits of prospective reductions in conventional forces among the Soviet and East European armies. Gorbachev's quest for savings in military expenditures through reductions in conventional forces is probably the most important factor underlying revived Soviet interest in European conventional arms negotiations. The USSR doubtless is aware that Western public opinion will be more impressed with cuts in Soviet forces stationed in Eastern Europe than with reductions in East European armies. From Moscow's perspective, then, the most attractive conventional disarmament option allows the Soviets to take the bulk, or perhaps even all, of the Eastern reductions, while the NSWP states pick up at least some of the slack by spending more on defense. These considerations probably underlay Gorbachev's December

1988 announcement of plans for unilateral withdrawals from Eastern Europe and reductions in the Soviet armed forces.

From a burdensharing perspective, however, this move probably will exacerbate longstanding alliance management problems. Most if not all of the East European regimes are at least as anxious as the USSR to reduce their defense burdens. None of the NSWP armies is as well equipped, trained, or combat ready as the Soviet forces stationed in Eastern Europe, and most of their governments traditionally have dragged their feet in response to Soviet pressure to modernize. The East Europeans, therefore, can be expected to resist Soviet efforts to monopolize the benefits of arms cuts, and will likely refuse to spend more on defense to compensate for the Soviet reductions and withdrawals. The Hungarians, while openly lobbying for withdrawal of Soviet forces stationed on their territory, at the same time have signaled their desire to reduce their own armed forces. Budapest has indicated plans to decrease real defense spending just as the Soviets are withdrawing some of their forces from Hungary

The Soviets presumably see increased multilateral consultations as essential to forging a Pact consensus on arms control positions while maintaining NSWP contributions to the Bloc's defense effort. Moscow's confrontational policies during the 1983-84 INF "crisis" led to conflict within the Warsaw Pact and sensitized the East Europeans to the fact that they have security interests distinct from those of the USSR. Gorbachev's loosening of the reins has fostered already existing tendencies among several

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NSWP delegations at major European negotiations to distance themselves from the USSR, or at least to distinguish their views from Moscow's. Soviet acceptance of greater pluralism in Warsaw Pact arms control policymaking is thus a matter of alliance management tactics and damage control [redacted]

The implications of such trends, from the Western viewpoint, are mixed. Greater latitude for the East Europeans at international negotiations may allow some—particularly Hungary—to become useful independent actors. Senior Hungarian foreign policy spokesmen, such as party secretary Matyas Szuros, have publicly advocated such a mediating role for Budapest, and both Hungarian and Polish delegations have in a modest way sought to do this in the past. There may also be opportunities for the West to steal a page from the Soviet playbook and exploit differences within the Pact. Western proposals that could inhibit potential Soviet military pressure on East European states by requiring forecasts of troop movements and concentrations well in advance could also have natural appeal to the NSWP regimes. [redacted]

Romanian behavior at the CSCE review conference in Vienna, however, shows the dangers inherent in the trend toward increased East European independence. Success has been achieved in major multilateral as well as bilateral negotiations—for example, the Stockholm CDE agreement and the INF Treaty—partly because the Soviets have been able to force their own concessions onto their East European allies. As Moscow has become less rigid on human rights issues, lack of automatic discipline within the Pact caucus has allowed stonewalling by one of its weaker members, perhaps with encouragement from some other Bloc conservatives. Instances of one or more NSWP states balking at concessions the Soviets have already accepted, moreover, will probably become recurrent and increasingly serious in future multilateral negotiations. Failure of the Soviets and East Europeans to agree on apportioning conventional force reductions among themselves could conceivably lead to deadlock within the Pact. At a minimum, it would make it even more difficult to achieve an inherently complex arms control agreement between the members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact [redacted]

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Appendix A

The Warsaw Pact and Unilateral Soviet Troop Withdrawals

What is known of the decision to withdraw 50,000 Soviet troops and 5,000 Soviet tanks unilaterally from Eastern Europe illustrates both the greater role the East Europeans now play in Warsaw Pact policymaking and the limits to their influence on Soviet decisionmaking when the stakes are high. We have not been able with full confidence to reconstruct how the decision was made, but it is clear that a move along these lines was being considered for a year or more and that the USSR's Warsaw Pact allies were consulted both individually and collectively

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Hungarian officials continued to lobby publicly for Soviet troop withdrawals even though Soviet spokesmen, both civilian and military, repeatedly denied that plans for unilateral reductions were under consideration. Gorbachev meanwhile achieved a signal victory over his domestic opponents at the CPSU Central Committee plenum in late September—a victory that in retrospect probably paved the way for putting unilateral cuts back at the top of his foreign policy agenda. It is not known whether the Pact's defense ministers or foreign ministers discussed such cuts at their October meetings. In view of the earlier experience with Western press leaks, a much tighter circle of Soviet and East European leaders may have been consulted the second time around

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[Redacted]

Hungarian lobbying apparently bore fruit when Gorbachev and Hungarian party chief Grosz agreed in principle in early July to withdraw at least some Soviet forces from Hungary. This tentative agreement may have been discussed at an out-of-cycle summer session of the Pact's Defense Ministers Committee held in Moscow at the same time. The agreement apparently was to be presented privately—and possibly to be announced publicly—at the Pact PCC session in Warsaw in mid-July. Western press reports anticipating such a move may have helped scuttle this timetable.

Gorbachev's new withdrawal plan sought to enhance its political appeal by focusing on Soviet tank forces in Eastern Europe, which in turn necessitated spreading the withdrawal among three of the four countries where these forces are stationed. Abandonment of the tentative agreement to focus the withdrawal on Soviet forces in Hungary may also be linked to Budapest's failure to commit itself to increasing its defense spending

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[Redacted]

Following Gorbachev's 7 December UN speech, Hungarian Defense Minister Karpati told the Defense

Committee of the National Assembly that only one-fourth of Soviet troops in Hungary would be withdrawn, but that Hungary would not increase the size of its army, while its defense spending would drop in real terms. Within a day of Gorbachev's speech, a senior Hungarian Foreign Ministry official indicated to the US Ambassador displeasure that the cuts would take two years to carry out and expressed hope that the United States and NATO would respond in such a way as to facilitate the withdrawal of all remaining Soviet forces from his country [redacted]

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It appears in retrospect that overcoming Soviet domestic—particularly military—opposition to unilateral reductions and withdrawals was far more important than handling objections from conservative East European regimes. Nonetheless, Gorbachev had consulted his Warsaw Pact allies on the initial proposal focusing on withdrawals from Hungary, apparently changed his tentative plan to announce this initiative at the Pact summit, and subsequently modified the original plan in light of East European reactions. The lack of public enthusiasm with which some East European regimes—especially Czechoslovakia—greeted the move suggests that consent in some cases may have been grudging at best [redacted]

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Appendix B

**The Jaruzelski Plan—
Polish Authors, Soviet Editors**

Poland traditionally has been accorded the honor of proposing Eastern initiatives for denuclearizing Central Europe. The "Rapacki Plan" in the 1950s, the "Gomulka Plan" in the 1960s, and the "Jaruzelski Plan," first offered in May 1987, are all variants of this idea. [redacted]

[redacted] the Jaruzelski Plan was conceived primarily with an eye to returning Poland to an active role in international affairs. The Soviets reacted with disdain when it was first presented to them in September 1986—one Soviet diplomat described the initial Polish proposal as "a mess"—and the Soviet Foreign Ministry apparently tried to kill the proposal through neglect [redacted]

Polish demarches made it clear that Warsaw would accept suggestions from any quarter to concretize the proposal. [redacted]

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