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
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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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**Defense
Intelligence
Report**



**SOVIET TACTICAL TRENDS
SINCE THE OCTOBER
1973 WAR (U)**

APRIL 1977

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

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PREFACE

(U) This study was undertaken to determine if trends in Soviet tactics since the October War have been influenced by that conflict. Analysis of the available data indicates that evolving Soviet tactical concepts have been influenced by Soviet analysis of the war.

(U) Addressees are requested to forward information which will supplement or correct this paper. Questions and comments should be referred in writing to the Defense Intelligence Agency (ATTN: DB-1B4), Washington, D.C. 20301.

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SUMMARY

(U) Soviet tactical trends since the October 1973 war reflect Soviet observations of that conflict. Soviet writings indicate that the war resulted in a reevaluation of doctrinal concepts resulting in the relearning of some lessons and the reemphasis of others. No radical changes in Soviet tactical procedures have occurred, but persistent efforts have been made to further improve combined arms operations, with the tank remaining as the backbone of ground warfare.

(u) Soviet writings on the war contain factual errors and omit key data. One may only speculate why this is so.

(U) ~~The October War notwithstanding, the primary origin of current Soviet doctrine continues to be World War II. The Middle East War did not have the dramatic impact on Soviet strategic and tactical concepts that it had in some Western countries.~~

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SOVIET TACTICAL TRENDS SINCE THE OCTOBER 1973 WAR (U)

1. INTRODUCTION

(U) Soviet analysis of the Middle East War provides a relevant framework for the examination of Soviet tactical trends since October of 1973. These tactical trends have coincided with certain equipment and organizational changes designed to strengthen Soviet offensive capabilities.

2. SOVIET ANALYSIS OF THE OCTOBER 1973 WAR

a. Command and Control

(S) The War reinforced Soviet thinking concerning the increased demands placed on commanders to ensure more effective command and control. Improvements in command and control technology include the more rapid collection and evaluation of data. This in turn accelerates the decision-making process making timely communications critical. Many of these improvements can be attributed to both the improved automation of troop control and more powerful high-speed communications at various control echelons. The Soviets are currently in the process of seeking improvements in these areas.

(S) A fundamental principle noted by the Soviets was the strict centralization of command and control of Israeli, Syrian, and Egyptian ground, air, and naval operations.

(S) The Soviets also recognized the need for command posts and other control facilities to be brought closer to units in contact.

b. The Defense

(U) The war revealed to the Soviets the increased capabilities and lethality of defensive weapons systems. Soviet concern was best described by Marshal Grechko:

It should be noted that modern defensive systems, in connection with the appearance of powerful fire weapons in the inventories, have become more stable. This is caused primarily by the fact that the main striking force during an offensive

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operation--tanks--has become more vulnerable, while their use on the battlefield has become more complex. The continuing process of improving antitank weapons has imposed grave tasks for science and technology. These tasks have to do with substantially improving the survivability of tanks, troops, and developing more effective means and methods that would be reliable in neutralizing antitank defense measures.

(U) Other Soviet writers have commented extensively on the greater densities of antitank systems, the increased role of antitank guided missiles (ATGMs) and helicopters with an antitank role, and the greater depth of troop and weapons echelonment.


(U) The Soviets believe that the backbone of a defensive system is its antitank weapons--the primary threat to Soviet offensive doctrine.

(S) Another aspect of the defense extensively commented upon by the Soviets was the effectiveness of air defense systems in static positions and as mobile systems in offensive operations. Surface-to-air missiles, such as the SA-6 GAINFUL (Figure 1) played a key role in countering and, temporarily, neutralizing the strong Israeli air attacks. The massive employment of a variety of air defense weapons by Arab forces restricted operations of hostile aircraft at low altitudes, and forced them to higher altitudes where they became vulnerable to other air defense weapons.

c. Offensive Operations


(S) It must also be emphasized that the Soviets, while impressed with the increased lethality of defensive systems, also recognized the increased capabilities for the offensive, a point frequently neglected by Western analyses of Soviet "lessons learned." Light antitank weapons and mobile antiaircraft artillery (AAA) and surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems greatly contributed to the rapid Egyptian advances early in the war. These lessons have not been lost on the Soviets who, while concerned over antitank defenses, are continuing to concentrate on perfecting their offensive doctrine. A recurrent

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GAINFUL MISSILE

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STRAIGHT FLUSH RADAR

Figure 1. The SA-6 SAM (GAINFUL) and its radar (STRAIGHT FLUSH). (U)

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theme of Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov (Commander in Chief, Warsaw Pact), General Shkidechenko (Deputy Commander for Combat Readiness, Groups of Soviet Forces Germany - GSFG) and others is that further improvements in military technology will lead to further increases in the maneuver, firepower and the striking power of troops.

(S) Regarding offensive operations in the Middle East War, Soviet writers showed great interest in combined arms operations, that is, the closely coordinated efforts of the missile, tank, motorized rifle, artillery, and combat support units. The Soviets criticized Israeli and Arab offensive execution early in the conflict. Israeli tanks were initially committed without infantry and artillery support and suffered heavy losses. Arab offensive ground operations at the beginning of the war were conducted on a broad front, without established plans to continue the advance toward key objectives along main axes of attack. While the Soviets credited the Egyptians with a brilliant water-crossing operation, they condemned them for failure to follow up. With this exception, the crossing was a classic reflection of Soviet doctrine. The operation was well organized, the enemy on the far bank was neutralized at the outset, important multiple sites were secured by forward detachments, and crossing equipment was skillfully used by the attacking forces (Figure 2).

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


Figure 2. Egyptians crossing the Suez Canal. (U)

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(S) In their analysis of the war, the Soviets examined each component in the combined arms team:

(1) Tanks

The Soviets believe that the Middle East War did not diminish the role of the tank:

There has been no decrease in the importance of tanks; in fact, their importance has increased.

Moreover, they cite numerous U.S. and West German sources in support of that conclusion. Whereas initially Western writers wrote that the theory of tank warfare should be revised, the Soviets emphasize that current Western military opinion acknowledges the leading role of armor on the modern battlefield. Moreover, the Soviets now term earlier Western writings questioning the importance of the tank as radical judgments.

(2) Artillery

The Soviets were impressed by the effectiveness of employment of Arab artillery to neutralize enemy defenses. They believe that this disrupted Israeli defenses and reduced Arab casualties.

(3) Reconnaissance


The Mid East War reinforced the Soviet view that well-planned aerial and ground reconnaissance is vital to successful offensive operations. They further concluded that air crews should be trained to conduct reconnaissance missions under the most difficult circumstances, and that aircraft flying behind enemy lines should have at least a minimum of intelligence-gathering equipment. To further aid the ground force offensive, enemy antitank forces and possible ambush sites must be identified by reconnaissance.

(4) Infantry

Soviet commentary on the use of infantry during the war concentrates on its role as an important component of the combined arms team. One of its primary

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uses was to provide support for armor in the elimination of antitank weapons. The Soviets stress the losses to Israeli armor when it was not properly supported by infantry (Figure 3).



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



Figure 3. Destroyed Israeli armor outside Suez city. (U)

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The Soviets also noted the frequent use of heliborne troops in special purpose/diversionary roles. Both sides used commando detachments and groups to disrupt command and control and seize key terrain (Figure 4).

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


Figure 4. Egyptian heliborne operation. (U)

(5) Helicopters

Soviet writers were impressed by the uses and potential of helicopters, particularly in the antitank role and as a carrier for special purpose/diversionary forces.

Surprisingly, Soviet analysis of the Israeli employment of helicopters in the antitank role is inaccurate. According to numerous Soviet sources, the Israelis frequently employed helicopters against armor, when in fact this was not the case. Soviet interest in the helicopters as an antitank weapon is, however, strong.

The Soviet Union may have received erroneous information from the Arabs or some military theorists may be strengthening the case for a larger role for Soviet helicopters in antitank operations.

d. Attrition

(U) The heavy personnel and equipment losses sustained during the war were also noted. Marshal of the Soviet Union Grechko, describing the increased comb:

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capabilities of weapons, greater depth of operations and faster tempos of attack, also acknowledged the possibility of "heavy losses."

(S) Significantly, in exercises since the October War, the Soviets have placed increased emphasis on their personnel replacement system.

e. Surprise

(U) At the 24th Party Congress, Grechko said "...the armed forces should be capable of crushing a sneak attack, in any situation, involving nuclear or non-nuclear weapons..." In numerous writings on the initial period of war, the Soviets have often expressed concern over being taken by surprise. Events in the Middle East War seem to have exacerbated these fears.

f. Conclusions Regarding the War

(U) Soviet analysis of the October War and their use of Western critiques of the conflict clearly illustrate continuing Soviet faith in combined arms doctrine with the tank providing the primary means of successfully implementing that doctrine. ~~Soviet lessons learned seem basically undistinguishable from those of the foreign military specialists they extensively quote:~~

Correct use of tanks (particularly with infantry, artillery, antitank weapons and air defense means) ensures the achievement of operational success, despite heavy losses;

Tanks retain their ability to overcome modern defenses, especially centers of resistance, after neutralization of the antitank weapons and artillery.

Success in the use of tanks is achieved by the side which acts with initiative and resourcefulness, widely employing maneuver, cooperating with airborne landing forces and being capable of changing from one method of action to another.

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3. SOVIET TRENDS SINCE THE OCTOBER 1973 WAR

a. Equipment and Organization

(S) At this time, it is not possible to draw any cause and effect relationships linking the Middle East War with new Soviet equipment. Since the early 1960s, Soviet generals have advocated infantry combat vehicles, self-propelled (SP) artillery and better tanks. Research and development of self-propelled artillery and the T-72 tank, however, began prior to the October War. Other events, such as the placing of the SAGGER and SWATTER ATGMs on Soviet helicopters, have occurred since the October 1973 War and have considerably augmented Soviet antitank capabilities. Research and development on these systems, however, preceded the October War.

(S) Neither may we say with certainty that certain post-1973 organizational changes occurred as a result of the October War. Such changes may in fact have occurred prior to 1973, but were only discovered by the West later. The correlation, however, between Soviet lessons learned from the October War and the type of organizations desired to implement Soviet offensive doctrine is clear. Key organizational changes are as follows:

(1) Infantry

The addition of a motorized rifle (MR) company to tank regiments in tank divisions in GSFG increases infantry support for armor. This could be the precursor of MR battalions becoming organic to tank regiments. At any rate, the Soviets clearly perceive the need for infantry-tank teams and a high level of coordination between them.

(2) Armor

In recent years, the Soviets have added independent tank battalions (40 tanks) to the MR divisions and increased the number of tanks from 31 to 40 in the tank battalions of motorized rifle regiments (MRRs). In light of Soviet observations of the October War, the tank increases may have occurred to offset anticipated higher casualties. The increases also give the Soviets greater flexibility to task organize combat formations.

SECRET**(3) Artillery**

Soviet artillery changes since the October War have been quantitative and qualitative. They include the reintroduction of 203mm howitzers and 240mm heavy mortars (Figure 5) and significant increases in the number of guns within motorized rifle divisions and nondivisional artillery regiments. A great number of MRRs within the USSR increased their number of artillery pieces three-fold. One MRR in GSFG equipped with the BMP (infantry combat vehicle) went from six towed D-30s (122mm) to 18 SP M-1974s (122mm) suggesting that as sufficient quantities are produced, BMP regiments may have a battalion of self-propelled guns (Figure 6). The 34th artillery division in GSFG added a fifth regiment containing 72 multiple rocket launchers (Figure 7). The 34th also replaced one of its towed 152mm-equipped regiments with self-propelled 152mm guns (Figure 8). Such quantitative and qualitative increases indicate a greater capability for nondivisional artillery units to provide increased allocations of artillery to support combined arms operations.




Figure 5. The 203mm howitzer, M1931M(A) and The 240mm mortar, M-240 (B). (U)

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



Figure 6. The towed D-30 (122mm) (A) and The self-propelled 122mm gun, M-1974 (B). (U)

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


Figure 7. The BM-21 rocket launcher on The URAL 375 Truck. (U)



Figure 8. The 152mm self-propelled gun, M1973. (U)

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(4) Air Defenses

Since October 1973, SA-8 GECKO missiles in limited numbers, and SA-6 GAINFUL systems have been replacing the S-60 (57mm towed AAA). Moreover, SA-9 GASKINs (Figure 9) are being deployed at regimental level, augmenting ZSU-23-4s (Figure 10), thereby considerably increasing Soviet air defense capabilities.

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


Figure 9. The SA-9 SAM (GASKIN). (U)

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


Figure 10. The ZSU-23-4. (U)

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(5) Engineer

There are indications that the Soviets are increasing army and front-level ponton bridging by one-third (Figure 11). They are also speeding up deployment of mine-clearers (such as the BTR-50PK) and minelayers (such as the GMZ armored tracked mechanical minelayer)--figure 12.

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


Figure 11. Soviet ponton bridging. (U)

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


Figure 12. The BTR-50PK mineclearer (A) and The GMZ armored track mechanical minelayer (B). (U)

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b. Command and Control

(S) Since October 1973, the Soviets have continued to develop an automated support system for command, control, and communications. Successful completion of such a system depends on the compatibility of automatic data processing (ADP) components, software and communications.

(S) Automated command support has been tested during command post and field training exercises. Thus far, the Soviets have concentrated their ADP efforts on troop control, communications and fire control. Although some steps have been taken since 1973, a fully operational automated command, control, and communications system is not expected before 1985.

(S) The use of mobile signal units at most echelons also reflects Soviet communications, command, and control observations of the war.

c. Offensive Doctrine

(S) Soviet lessons learned from the October War have not altered their basic offensive doctrine. This doctrine, centered around combined arms combat (Figure 13), stresses high rates of advance by tank and combined arms units. Over the course of a campaign waged in nuclear conditions the Soviets hope to average 60-80 KM per day and under conventional conditions 30-50 KM per day. There are some reports that more emphasis should be placed on maneuver and speed in the attack, to increase rates of advance up to 120 KM per day. This is in consonance with remarks made by Marshal Kulikov, General Shkidchenko and others. Soviet tactical emphasis since the October War mirrors Soviet analysis of that conflict and reveals efforts to make each component of their combined arms forces more viable on the modern battlefield.

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Figure 13. Combined arms operations. (U)

(1) Tanks

~~That the tank remains the primary weapon in~~
the combined arms concept was made clear in September 1975
by the commander-in-chief of Soviet ground forces:

Despite the improvement and growth of the effectiveness of antitank weapons, tanks remain the main strike force and mobile force of the ground forces and a powerful means capable of resolving important tasks in modern warfare. Moreover, compared with other types of combat equipment, they are the best adapted for decisive, maneuvering actions.

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To increase the survivability of the tank on the modern battlefield, the Soviets have placed more emphasis on the following tactical measures by tank troops;

(a) The use of smoke and high explosive fragmentation shells against ATGM gunners.

(b) Camouflage

(c) Proper use of terrain

(d) Observation

(e) Speed in the attack

(f) Close coordination with infantry and artillery

(2) Artillery and Air Defenses

When nuclear weapons are not used to neutralize enemy defenses, the Soviets plan to rely on concentrated artillery fire for the suppression of antitank systems. On selected axes of advance, artillery will be concentrated to give both direct and indirect fire support with priority to the destruction of the enemy's nuclear delivery means and his antitank systems. While large amounts of artillery and air defense systems will remain under centralized control, individual batteries will be assigned to advance detachments, advance guard, and flank security elements to provide support.

Since October 1973, the Soviets have placed increased emphasis on the use of air defense ambushes along likely avenues of approach for enemy helicopters. This emphasis reflects Soviet concern over the tank-killing helicopters possessed by NATO and seeks to capitalize on a major Soviet strength--great numbers of mobile and accurate air defense systems.

(3) Motorized Rifle Troops

Infantry-tank-artillery coordination during the initial stages of the war is one of the most persistent themes in current Soviet doctrinal writings, which also discuss some unresolved questions (such as the optimum employment of the BMP).

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The Soviets clearly expect to dismount MR troops to overcome antitank defenses which have not been neutralized (Figure 14). Dismounted attack drills are probably more numerous today than prior to 1973, but it must be emphasized that the Soviets continue to stress speed in the attack. Whenever it is tactically feasible, the Soviets emphasize maneuvering around strong defenses; when this is not possible they will attack dismounted. The BMP, invulnerable to 50 caliber fire except at very close range, is ideally suited to operate with armor in fast moving operations. It is also capable of operating independently of armor, and of supporting dismounted troops with effective antitank and antipersonnel fire. Current Soviet emphasis, however, is clearly on the organization of combined infantry-tank-artillery formations.

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


Figure 14. Soviet infantry attacking a strong defensive position. (U)

SECRET**(4) Reconnaissance**

Although they have stressed the importance of reconnaissance in the past, current Soviet writings reflect increased emphasis on this vital element of the combined arms team. While identification of the enemy's nuclear delivery means remains the first priority of reconnaissance troops, the location of enemy antitank systems is clearly second (Figure 15). Commanders are urged to use their reconnaissance assets to the maximum degree, with increasing emphasis being placed on locating enemy antitank systems.



Figure 15. Reconnaissance is vital. (U)

(5) Airmobile Operations

Soviet airmobile doctrine is showing signs of becoming increasingly important within the combined arms concept. As this concept matures, it will give the Soviets an increased capability to maintain high rates of advance through use of airmobile forces to seize key terrain and communications, command, and control installations, destroy nuclear delivery means and storage sites, and generally to disrupt the enemy rear area. Soviet analysis of heliborne operations during the October War and the Vietnam conflict leaves no doubt that they are impressed by the advantages of airmobile operations, while being fully cognizant of their limitations. Soviet airmobile exercises will probably continue to stress operations of battalion and smaller sized units.

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4. CONCLUSIONS

(U) Soviet analysis of the Middle East War is clearly reflected in tactical trends since that conflict. Soviet writings show that the war caused them to reexamine their doctrinal concepts, to reemphasize some lessons and to note others.

(U) While impressed with the increased complexity of modern defenses and the lethality of antitank weaponry, the Soviets were equally impressed by enhanced offensive capabilities presented by mobile air defense systems and well-coordinated combined arms operations. It is instructive to note that in the 1973 War tank gunnery destroyed three-to-four times as many tanks as did antitank missiles.

(U) Soviet offensive doctrine, built around the tank and envisioning high rates of advance, remains basically unchanged. There are even indications that Soviet anticipated rates of advance may increase.

(U) The Soviets have taken numerous steps to increase the viability of their armored forces and to allow for anticipated losses of armored vehicles. They are stressing the use of combined arms units even more than previously, and there are clear indications that airmobile forces will be assigned a greater role in their operations.

(U) Soviet writings on the war contain factual errors and omit key data. One may only speculate why this is so.

(U) The 1973 war notwithstanding, the primary origin of current Soviet doctrinal thinking continues to be World War II. The Middle East War did not have the dramatic impact on Soviet strategic and tactical concepts that it had in some Western countries.

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 B364 DIA/DB-1B3 (2)
 B563 DIA/DB-1B5 (PENT) (2)
 B575 DIA/DB-1
 B576 DIA/DB-1A
 E644 DIA/DB-4D
 B728 DIA/DB-5D
 B731 DIA/DB-5F
 B734 DIA/DB-5E
 B777 DIA/DN-2B1
 B800 DL-1 LONDON
 B859
 B871
 B876
 B879
 B880
 B886
 B912
 B917
 B919
 B933
 B934
 B878

25X1

SECRET

ARMY

C020 DCS-MIL OPS (4)
 C030 CH RD&A
 C090 USAMSSA
 C204 TCATA
 C239 CO D 519 MI BN FLDA
 C241 FIRST US ARMY
 C242 FORSCOM
 C243 FIFTH US ARMY
 C300 172ND INF BDE (AK) (3)
 C307 24TH INF DIV (10)
 C309 DET N 500TH MIG
 C459 COMD-GEN STF COL (10)
 C461 INFANTRY SCH (10)
 C463 INTEL CTR & SCH (10)
 C465 US MIL ACADEMY
 C470 ARMY WAR COL
 C500 TRADOC (10)
 C507 INSIG
 C509 BALLISTIC RES LABS
 C512 DARCOM
 C515 EDGEWOOD ARSENAL
 C523 HARRY DIAMOND LAB
 C538 WHITE SANDS MSL RG
 C539 TRASANA
 C550 ELECTRONICS COMD
 C557 USAIIC
 C562 TRANS SCH
 C565 ARMCOM
 C569 MOB EQPT R & D COMD
 C587 CMBT DEV EXPR COMD
 C591 FSTC (3)
 C605 JFK CTR MIL ASSIST (10)
 C617 CONCEPT ANLYS AGCY (3)
 C619 MIA REDSTONE
 C620 'ISASRD
 C632 ORD CTR & SCH
 C639 CMBT & TNG DEV DIR (2)
 C641 AVIATION SCHOOL
 C644 LOG CTR
 C646 CMBARMSCMBTDEVACTY
 C649 SIGNAL SCHOOL
 C667 IMA/CMBT & TNG DEV
 C683 ASA
 C697 TEST & EVAL COMD
 C715 ARMOR CTR (20)
 C759 COLL DET USAINTA
 C763 OACSI-S & T DIV
 C765 OACSI-IOSD

ARMY (Cont'd)

C766 OACSI-INT SUP DET
 C768 OACSI-USAITAD (6)
 C786 OACSI-WESTERN BR
 C788 OACSI-SOV/EEUR BR (5)
 C419 9TH INF DIV (10)
 C428 OP TEST & EVAL AGCY
 C454 FLD ARTY SCH
 C588 DUGWAY PRV GRD
 C013 ASST SEC R/D
 C015 CHIEF OF STAFF
 C021 DCS-LOG
 C043 USAMIIA
 C061 MP SCH
 C202 III CORPS
 C227 101ST AIRBORNE DIV (10)
 C231 2ND ARM DIV (10)
 C232 3RD ARM CAV REGT (6)
 C235 1ST INF DIV (10)
 C286 417TH MID
 C301 193RD INF BDE (CZ) (3)
 C305 18TH ABN DIV (3)
 C348 453D MID
 C392 486TH MID (STRAT)
 C414 4TH INF DIV (10)
 C415 5TH INF DIV (M) (10)
 C429 1ST BN (R) 75TH INF
 C460 ENGINEER SCH
 C467 MSL-MUN CEN-SCH
 C471 OPGRU ARMY WAR COL
 C568 AIR DEF SCH
 C623 USAFAGOS-ARMY MBR
 C801 SIXTH US ARMY
 C234 1ST CAV DIV
 C417 7TH INF DIV
 C513 PICATINNY ARSENAL
 C535 AVIATION SYS COMD
 C545 FIO DR SAR-LEF
 C547 ARMY NUCLEAR AGCY
 C510 AIR MOB LTY R & D IAB
 C590 TASDC
 C306 82ND ABN DIV (10)

NAVY

D033 STRATANAL SUPPERU
 D042 NAVFACENGCOM
 D159 NAVAIRDEV CEN
 D202 NAVWARCOL

SECRETNAVY (Cont'd)

D217 NAVWPNCEN
 D249 NAVPGSCOL
 D507 COMINWARCOM
 D700 CGMCDEC (2)
 D971 OP-009F
 D972 OP-009BIP
 D032 NAVPHIBSCOL
 D204 NAVWARCOL/IO
 D153 PACMISTESTCEN
 D218 NRL WASH DC
 D246 NAVSURFWPNCEN DAHL
 D247 NAVSURPWPNCEN WOAK
 D256 NAVSHIPWPSYSENGSTA
 D506 NAVUSEACEN
 D510 CHNAVMAAT (MAT-09I)
 D914 OP-944F

AIR FORCE

E017 AF/RDQA-W
 E018 AF/RDQA-C
 E016 AFIS/INC
 E046 7602 AINTELG/INOA-1
 E053 AF/INAKA
 E054 AF/INAKB
 E200 AAC
 E303 AF/INAP
 E408 AFWL
 E436 AFEWC (SUR)
 E451 AUL/LESE
 E500 3420 TCHTG/TTMNL
 E410 ADTC
 E413 ESD
 E450 AIR UNIV
 E465 USAF ACADEMY
 E020 AFIS/INZA
 E100 TAC (9TH TIS/LDD)
 E317 AF/SAMI
 E409 AMD
 E411 ASD/FTD/ETID
 E429 SAMSO (IND)
 E437 AFIS/INI

U & S COMMANDS

G005 CINCAD

U & S COMMANDS (Cont'd)

H005 USCINCEUR
 H006 USEUCOM DEFANALCTR
 H300 USAICE (USAREUR) (4)
 H320 66TH MI GP
 H351 10TH SFG (ABN) 1STSF (10)
 H524 HQ V CORPS (2)
 H525 HQ VII CORPS (2)
 H530 HQ 1ST ARMORED DIV (6)
 H007 SILK PURSE
 H301 COMBINEDARMSTCGCFN
 H305 USA TECH SUPT ACTY
 H306 DCSI US-COM BERLIN
 H315 21ST SUPPORT COMD
 H526 HQ 3RD INF DIV (6)
 H527 HQ 8TH INF DIV (6)
 H528 1ST INF DIV (FWD) (6)
 H529 HQ 3RD ARMORED DIV (6)
 J517 COMNAVSURFLANT
 J575 FMFLANT/FMFEUR
 J579 4TH MAB (3)
 J614 SECONDMAR (2)
 J618 SIXTHMAR (2)
 J620 FIGHTMAR (2)
 J818 SECONDMARDIV (CFU) (6)
 J991 FITCLANT
 K005 CINCPAC
 K020 COMUSTDC
 K100 PACAF 548 RTG
 K300 IPAC (CODE IC-L)
 K340 I CORPS (ROK/US) GP
 K500 CINCPACFLT
 K515 COMSEVENTHFLT
 K516 FIRST MAF
 K601 FIRSTMAW
 K612 THIRDMARDIV (6)
 K650 COMNAVSURFPAC
 K658 COMUSNAVPHIL
 K679 FLTCORGRU 1
 K314 IPAC (CODE I-23)
 K315 IPAC (CODE I-24)
 K152 FOURTHMARDIV (6)
 K305 25TH INF DIV (6)
 K342 2ND INF DIV (6)
 K610 FIRSTMARDIV (6)
 K613 FIRSTMAR (2)
 K614 FOURTHMAR (2)
 K615 THIRDMAR (2)

SECRET

K617 FIFTHMAR (2)
K621 NINTHMAR (2)
K007 COMUSJAPAN
K115 5TH AF
K505 FICPAC
K510 COMNAVFORJAPAN
K514 COMTHIRDFLT

L005 CINCSAC
L040 SAC 544TH ARTW

N005 USREDCOM (3)

OTHER

P055 CIA/CRS/ADD/SD (14)
P085 STATE (5)
P090 NSA (5)

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