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## LIBYA

**Al-Qadhdhafi Discusses Developments in Sudan**  
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[Interview granted by Libyan leader Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi by unidentified correspondent on 15 April; place not given — recorded]

[Text] [Correspondent] Brother Leader, what are your impressions of the events surrounding the popular revolution in Sudan and what are the direct and indirect causes that led to the speeding up of the fall of the lackey Numayri's regime in Sudan?

[Al-Qadhdhafi] This is a happy occasion for me, to talk to the people of Sudan, to the radio of the Voice of the Greater Arab Homeland, and to its listeners in the Arab homeland.

I believe that the replies I will give you, members of the revolutionary committees, can be useful to our brother listeners helping them to get out of the current whirlpool and [words indistinct], the question of succession, of the republic, of the Army, of the Sudanese people.

With regard to the first part of the question, my first impression is that the road to the liberation of Sudan has been crowned with the Army's seizure of power. My first impression is that it seems the coup was against the May coup regime. It seems that the May regime, beginning with Numayri and ending with others down the list of the May coup regime, was the target of the present movement. We can say that the May 1969 coup was not technically well-planned.

I do believe that the regime was destined to fall because it was a regime without any ideology. The May 1969 coup differs from the April 1985 coup. The May 1969 coup was staged by officers against whom we have nothing, officers with popular and progressive aspirations. But Numayri succeeded in liquidating the majority of the progressive, patriotic, and revolutionary officers after the May coup. [Words indistinct] patriotic officers led by Numayri for few months.

Among the reasons that led to the success of the coup is that Numayri was not [word indistinct] in Sudan. I have repeated this on several occasions [words indistinct].

For some time we have said that the May coup has become a fascist regime. With the passage of time popular movements began to manifest themselves anew, aimed at making the Sudanese people have a say in matters affecting their destiny. Numayri, however, considered any complaint against the fascist authority which existed then, before April, as a challenge to the regime and an act of encroachment against it and consequently the regime would rise to defend itself and the authority became directed against the masses.

Secondly, the situation in Sudan proceeded exactly in line with our analysis and our explanations as contained in the Green Book and according to theory which says that any authority [words

indistinct] the people, even if it is friendly to the people and even if a movement has staged a revolution or a coup or a change for the sake of the realization of the popular aspirations. However, such a movement [words indistinct] and consequently a confrontation is bound to ensue between it and the people, and in the end it becomes a repressive authority and a fascist authority. This happened in the case of 'Abd al-Karim Qasim and is happening in the case of the current situation in Iraq. 'Abd al-Karim Qasim carried out a coup in the name of sacrifice. But the revolution was defeated because those who carried out the revolution remained in power. Inevitably, confrontation would take place between such an authority and the people. What has happened in Sudan is that the events proceeded along the lines of the analyses put forward by the Green Book and according to the concepts embodied in the Jamahiri theory which, as we have already said, provides that any authority, even if it is friendly to the people, will with the passage of time become an enemy of the people.

Thus, I personally have witnessed Sudan many times since the 1970s, and followed the popularity of Numayri and the popularity of the May movement. Then we witnessed the recession of the popularity of Numayri and that of the May movement, the revenge against it and finally its overthrow and liquidation. Why? Because this movement dropped out of the category of military coup by clinging to power. Naturally, the people, in accordance with the Jamahiri theory which provides for the people's defense of themselves, opposed it [words indistinct]. He sought the help of the Egyptian forces because he was afraid of the Sudanese people. He was even afraid of the police. Numayri resorted also to forming a state security department and a central security force. He also sought the help of the Egyptian forces and finally he sought the help of America. All these forces were amassed to bolster the regime against the people.

This is not important, however. What is important is that the regime failed to hand over power to the people. Ultimately the people demanded power and finally triumphed. Even 'Abd al-Nasir, the beloved of the masses, clashed with the students in 1968 at the University of Alexandria with the result that the students staged a sit-in strike and destroyed some of its faculties such as the science faculty. There were even demonstrations and sit-ins in Cairo. But they were not against 'Abd al-Nasir, whom the people loved, but against the authority which 'Abd al-Nasir represented.

There are direct and indirect reasons that led to speeding up the fall of Numayri. The indirect reasons we all know. They lie in the nature of the regime: It remained a regime while the people remained a people and consequently confrontation between them was inevitable.

The Arab countries decided at the Baghdad summit conference to boycott the Egyptian regime which committed an act of high treason. Numayri refused to boycott the Egyptian regime. He defied the Sudanese people and the Arab nation and the Palestinian people. He intentionally paid several visits to Egypt and deliberately walked in Al-Sadat's funeral along with Begin.

He joined hands with Al-Sadat and Husni Mubarak. He defied every Arab voice raised in condemnation of Sudan's recognition

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Foreign Ministry sources in Jerusalem told reporter Ruth Blaukopf that Israel greatly appreciates the Dutch representation of Israeli interests in Moscow and is looking into the matter. The Israeli sources would not confirm specific details of the Dutch statement, but acknowledged that the citizenship papers were being transferred as part of the struggle for the emigration rights of Jews in the Soviet Union.

**Correction to Prime Minister Office Chief Interview**

There has been a correction to the interview with Avraham Tamir, director general of the Prime Minister's Office, published in the 19 April Middle East & Africa *DAILY REPORT* on page I 4. Paragraph 14, line 4 should read "...of Tabah belongs to us, whereas this is..."(changing "Egypt" to "us").

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of a regime which recognized the Israelis. Numayri went far in his disregard of the Sudanese people and of the Arab nation and increased his ties with the Egyptian regime further and further. His defiance even went to the extent of passing under the Israeli flag in the vanquished capital.

Generally speaking, Sudan's subservience to Egypt and stable David was a blow struck by Numayri's regime which made the Sudanese people feel ashamed and disgraced by Sudan's attachment to a country which recognizes the enemy, the Israeli enemy.

His hostility toward the Jamahiriya and toward Ethiopia were contributing factors to his downfall. The trivialities which he introduced in the name of the Islamic Shari'a led to the secession of the south from the north and to the people's hatred even for the Islamic Shari'a. The problem with Sudan was that it was introduced a specific type of Shari'a. The holy Shari'a in a country like Sudan is the Shari'a laid down by the people themselves. This is because there are numerous religions in Sudan. There are even people who worship idols.

The Falasha Jews were smuggled on the orders of America. This is the hardest thing we can tolerate as masses. It was carried out under American conditions in return for food and essentials needed by the Sudanese, who have no purchasing power. Numayri submitted to the conditions of the IMF which is dominated by the United States.

The question, in fact, could have been how did Numayri manage to remain for such a long time in power? He prolonged his regime's life by a number of charlatan actions.

The first thing was the case of the Sudanese Communist Party, and I was a witness to this in Khartoum. He then struck at the [words indistinct] Communist Party. He relied on force [words indistinct]. He then made peace with Al-Ansar and the Unionists. Finally, he allied himself to a party called the Muslim Brotherhood, whom he used to torture. He tried to restore dignity to the Unionists and Al-Ansar.

Generally speaking, the May movement failed to solve the economic problems of Sudan. This resulted in hunger and thirst, particularly the thirst we have all witnessed in Sudan, when he had rain and rivers. Thus there was thirst, there was hunger, and there were diseases that spread in Sudan. He failed to face up to any of the problems. This is the fate of whoever antagonizes Arab unity, socialism, the Jamahiriya, and the revolution in Ethiopia and elsewhere and champions reactionary stands and defeatist stands and the capitulationist solutions and surrenders his affairs to America.

Indeed, the fall of Numayri was magnificent: to fall when he was in the lap of Reagan. This indicates that America cannot protect anybody. Furthermore, his fall as a lesson to whoever hands over his country to America.

In the last stage, he handed Sudan over to America. He asked them to build bases for the Rapid Deployment Forces in Sudan in return for measures to protect his regime. He accepted all their conditions and visited them.

The strange thing is that as we all know, Numayri was America's arch enemy at one time. I mean it is not in his nature to act in this manner. It seems that this was a deliberate political course. He went too far in his disregard of the Sudanese people and in his defiance of the Jamahiriya by his actions. He believed that he can depend on a superpower, which is America, to protect him. But he forgot the lessons of Iran, Ethiopia, Idriss al-Sinusi, Lon Nol, Batista, and Somoza. Numayri failed to learn these lessons.

[Correspondent] The people brought down the regime of the fascist military clique led by General 'Abbud. They did not wane or stop then. They continued with their sweeping revolution against exploitation and repression until they brought down on 6 April this year the fascist regime of the lackey Numayri. What relation do you see between the two cases and what is the commander's evaluation of the political maturity enjoyed by our Arab people in Sudan?

[Al-Qadhdhafi] It is the same inevitable line explained in the Green Book with its theses and Jamahiri theory. Any authority that takes a stand against the masses begins to collapse and have confrontation with the masses. This is exactly what happened. There was a fascist regime, the 'Abbud regime. There was a generally fascist regime in 1964. The situation then was very similar to the situation that existed at the time of the 6 April revolution. We admit that the Sudanese people were the most conscious of the Arab people and the most enduring in their struggle.

The Sudanese people were the people who fought the fascist regime. Other fascist regimes are sitting comfortably, except, of course, for the Lebanese people who fought the Israeli occupation and the Sudanese people who fought against fascism. There are no positive signs in the Arab homeland.

The revolution of 6 April is a repetition of the revolution of October 1964. The revolution will repeat itself twice and thrice if the conditions that follow the April revolution are similar to those which followed the October revolution.

[Correspondent][Words indistinct] so that the tragedy will not be repeated as was the case with 'Abbud and Numayri?

[Al-Qadhdhafi] So that the tragedy will not be repeated and the Sudanese people will not be forced to offer more sacrifices and have instability, the road leading to this result should not be pursued. If military rule is established it will be confronted by the popular masses. If a partisan rule, a one party rule is established, it will be faced with opposition from the other parties.

The situation in Sudan, we admit, is very intricate. First, there are traditional parties in Sudan. Second, there are the trade unions, vocational trade unions. In addition, there are new revolutionary forces, some of which are visible and some are not visible. This is in addition to the military establishment which is a reflection of all these other forces. I mean there are within the Armed Forces elements which support the traditional parties. There are other elements which belong to the trade unions. There is also a new extremist force with elements within the military establishment.

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Sudan is at present in a situation which makes it impossible for the military to rule it exclusively. I mean it is impossible for the military to continue in power without facing colossal troubles. If a party tries to rule Sudan it can never succeed, whatever party it may be from among the traditional parties, be they Al-Ansar, the Unionists, the Communists or the Islamic. None of these parties can assume government by itself. This is because there is a balance. These parties have failed in authority. We are talking about an intricate problem. The Army cannot remain in power, otherwise demonstrations will take to the streets anew. No one party can assume office. This is because the other parties will not let it. As for the trade unions, they are not political organizations able to rule. Besides, no trade union can dominate and rule.

One could ask then how can Sudan be ruled? We must confess that there is a crisis and an intricate situation. There are only two ways to solve this problem. The first way is the success of a violent revolutionary extremist action by any side. The military establishment itself could be the one that embarks on this extremist action. It embarks on physical liquidation of all the traditional forces and imposes its dictatorship similar to the proletariat revolution which liquidated the opposing classes and imposed itself, or similar to the bloody military dictatorships. To some extent, Numayri constitutes one such form, when he carried out bloody liquidations and on a number of occasions affirmed military power. This helped to prolong his life but it does not provide the final solution.

One side might embark on the physical liquidation of all the forces now in the arena. This is a difficult choice. The force that reaches this level of extremism in violence and the liquidation of its opponents might not be a revolutionary or progressive one. Any one of the parties might assume such extremism and arm itself and then carry out such an act, or the military establishment could do this.

In the absence of such a thing happening, the only alternative would be the Jamahiri system for Sudan. Every region would govern itself by itself through the creation of popular conferences or popular committees to assume administration. The whole of Sudan would then join together on various levels. This is the most suitable for Sudan which has a variety of races, tribes, languages, dialects, and religions, even geographic regions. Sudan is more suitable for a Jamahiri system. I do not know if the [words indistinct] is so: that the people rule themselves by themselves without any proxy.

The parties are not the people. If the parties were to rule, it would be like a liberal rule, but we cannot call it a people's rule but party rule. If the Army were to rule, we do not say that it is a people's rule but the rule of the Army. The military would be ruling. If authority were to be handed over — there are four parties, as is known, but they do not constitute the Sudanese people. It would be the rule of the leadership and members of these parties but not the rule of the rest of the people who are not members of these parties. We can say it is the rule of the four parties and we can no longer say it is a partisan rule. The authority would be then for the parties and not for the people.

If the parties assume power, another problem will arise from the trade unions and the other revolutionary forces. Demonstrations

will reappear and could be violent this time between officers and civilians, and there could be armed violence. There is a fear that the civilians may use arms against the military institutions. The latter possess guns, machineguns and aircraft yet their action was peaceful. But if civilians were to face up to other civilians there is a likelihood that they would use arms and violence on a large scale against them.

The four parties cannot continue in power because there is a growing revolutionary force, a new growing revolutionary force, which rejects the parties. There are also the unions which have massively and effectively contributed, played a decisive role, in the toppling of Numayri. These unions would not permit power to be handed over to the parties. Naturally, trade unions are not parties. The parties, naturally, have some federations and unions. But we cannot say that the present trade unions in Sudan are partisan trade unions. The unions, in fact, are the ones that brought down Numayri.

Well, if we exclude the four parties and give power to the unions, how would the unions rule? The unions' councils will have a confrontation with the parties which were denied power. If we bring the unions and parties together and hand power over to them, what form will this power have? The important thing is the popular base, the masses' base and that of the ordinary citizen, of the revolutionary forces which did not join these traditional organizations. There will constantly be a problem. There are the revolutionary committees and the Islamic extremists and the non-traditional forces. There are other forces that must also be taken into consideration. There are the forces of the trained and armed fronts abroad.

Naturally, I am in contact with these fronts because we supported and organized them against Numayri. Now we ask them to go into the country and to lay down their arms and build Sudan. We no longer encourage the ones abroad against the regime. If they persist with this, they do so on their own responsibility alone.

There are two fronts in [words indistinct]: the front led by Ahmad Sa'd which is spiritually dominated by Waliyi al-Din and [words indistinct]. They dream about returning. There is a retired revolutionary patriotic colonel, who returned on several occasions [words indistinct] from London and [words indistinct]. He too has formed a front [words indistinct] Ya'qub Ismail. This colonel is a tough and patriotic man. [Words indistinct] he has a large active front. [Words indistinct] 'Abdallah Zakariyah.

There is also the Communist Party which is abroad. There are the Unionists in two sections: a section inside Sudan and another outside it. The section outside used to get training. There are also independent elements, governors of some provinces.

There is another force which has struggled. Authority should not be entrusted to the parties, trade unions, or to the parties and trade unions together, or to the Army. [Words indistinct] peasants. They formed armed divisions. We were responsible for arming them and bringing them to this level. This is because they aligned with the Sudanese people and the Sudanese Popular Armed Forces [words indistinct].

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It is difficult to find a solution. Any solution found will have to be temporary and not guaranteed, unless a Jamahiri regime is established, in which every region governs itself through the popular conferences and popular committees. The Jamahiri regime would solve the problems of language, geographic distribution, and so forth.

But this system is not comprehensible to our brothers in Sudan. The Green Book is not spread there and the same applies to the revolution's theses. It is difficult now to make the parties change their identities and accept this system. The people's authority means no democracy without popular conferences and committees everywhere. The party represents a section of the people, but the people cannot be divided.

[Correspondent] Whenever a revolution takes place in any country, various quarters try to contain them. The popular revolution in Sudan is being exposed to such attempts. What do you think of these attempts which aim at imposing custodianship on Sudan? And what are the risks involved in this?

[Al-Qadhafi] Even under Numayri's rule there was no unity between Egypt and Sudan. To this day I wish to see unity established between Egypt and Sudan, or unity between any two Arab peoples [words indistinct].

The Sudanese position, however, can be understood from the statements they uttered and this was manifested by their recent demonstrations when they chanted: Husni Mubarak, you are a traitor! and: Down, down! [last two words spoken in English].

You will remember that Faruq was king of Egypt and Sudan. When he signed the abdication document following the July 1952 revolution, he signed it as king of Egypt and Sudan. The present rulers of Egypt still wear Faruq's crown and his view of Sudan: Every Egyptian ruler considers himself just another Faruq, considers himself king of Egypt and Sudan. But after 'Abd al-Nasir, the situation changed and the Sudanese people were left to determine their own fate. But even now, Egyptian rulers consider themselves kings of Egypt and Sudan. Husni Mubarak, and before him Al-Sadat [words indistinct].

Any regime in Sudan that is hostile to Egypt can harm Egypt. It can [words indistinct] the Nile or block the Nile. This being the case, the situation is upside down. For who really needs the other? Sudan or Egypt? Egypt needs Sudan. Then Egypt should be the one to be attached to Sudan, which could impose on Egypt anything Sudan wants. Because in the final analysis, it is Sudan that can choke the Nile and stop the Nile's resources and dominate it.

How can Sudan, which controls the resources of the Nile, be subservient to Egypt which needs it? Egypt needs Sudan [words indistinct]. We believe, however, that the situation will be redressed, and that Egypt will become attached to the Sudan [words indistinct] and Egypt will find itself obliged to [words indistinct] monopolizes the Nile resources [words indistinct].

What is happening at present is the reverse situation. The Sudanese people, we admit, [words indistinct] placing the cart before the horse. When Egypt becomes attached to Sudan, then the

horse will be in front of the cart. This is because Sudan controls the resources of the Nile and Egypt needs Sudan.

It is a well known fact that the Egyptians look upon the Sudanese as slaves. [Words indistinct] the Egyptians have an imperialist view of Sudan, a view that goes back to the days when the British controlled both countries and when Faruq considered himself king of both Egypt and Sudan. The imperialist outlook continues. We believe that the Sudanese revolution was in fact a revolution against subservience to Egypt and against Egyptian hegemony and Egyptian colonialism. If it had not been for Numayri — because he is the lackey Numayri — this state of affairs would not have existed.

Because Al-Sadat was the chief, Numayri had no alternative. When the chief joined stable David, the lackey also entered the stable. It is like a donkey and its tail. The donkey is represented by Al-Sadat and Husni Mubarak. The tail is Numayri. When the head of the animal entered stable David the tail followed it [words indistinct].

If Egypt had continued as it was in the days of Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir, then we have no objection to Sudan following behind Egypt. [Words indistinct] when Egypt commits high treason and [words indistinct], should Sudan allow itself to be accused of high treason too? No! Sudan should oppose this. [passage indistinct]

[Correspondent] Brother commander, what effect will the success of the popular revolution in Sudan have on the agent Arab regimes? What is the future of the popular revolution in the Arab homeland? What are your guidelines particularly concerning overt and covert revolutionary committees?

[Al-Qadhafi] Undoubtedly the Arab reaction has not learned the lesson. We hope now that it will learn the lesson. The reactionary rulers [word indistinct]. The important thing is that the Arab detachments should establish contact among themselves. [passage indistinct]

This is not a limited scientific analysis. But it is also a call from us to the Egyptian workers, to the Egyptian trade unions, to the Egyptian people, and to all the Egyptians and the Egyptian [words indistinct] should start demonstrations, strikes, sit-ins, and civil disobedience in order to end the reign of treason and hegemony which is daily supplying the Israeli enemy with fuel and iron, which in turn is transformed into weapons used to kill the Lebanese and the Palestinians. The Israelis planned to liquidate the northern front. [words indistinct] and turn the homeland into statelets. [passage indistinct]

The defeat of the Israelis in southern Lebanon at the hands of the Lebanese fighters has debunked their argument, and should encourage the Egyptians to topple the regime and destroy the Egyptian-Israeli agreement and stable David [words indistinct]. It should encourage the other countries to join the Arab revolution for the liberation of Palestine. [passage indistinct]

The present generation of revolutionary committees will bring about the changes which will transform the world from a world of governments to a world of masses and put an end to social suppression.

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But as for Sudan, the military commanders who saved Sudan a great deal of trouble by joining the people at the decisive moment and toppling the fascist Numayri regime should not be allowed by anyone to become lax. I hope the revolution in Sudan will not be aborted or that subservience will continue.

[Correspondent] Brother Commander, observers are unanimous in saying that the victory of the popular revolution in Sudan was a victory for the theory of the age of the masses and what Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi advocates and instigates. How can the fraternal Sudanese people safeguard their Jamahiri gains and build their popular authority?

[Al-Qadhafi] We have said that all indications point to the fact that the entire world is now moving toward the age of the masses: from the individual, to the group, to the parties, to the fronts. The base of participation in government has widened. This will not stop half way, but will continue until all the people attain power and the establishment of the government of all the people, which is the Jamahiri system. Thus, the hierarchy system will be brought down and replaced by the horizontal system: the system of conferences and committees everywhere.

What has taken place in Sudan is considered to be in line with the Jamahiri theses. There will be no halting in the middle of the road. Inevitably, the march of the masses will continue. Today, the people no longer accept rule by a party or a ruler or a soldier. The people now have the confidence in themselves to rule themselves by themselves. Every ordinary citizen must die in order to determine his fate, as has happened in southern Lebanon. The ordinary citizen has now decided his fate: He is prepared to die. This is the more important because proxy for the people has failed. The solution is for the people to determine their own fate by themselves.

If I had been a ruler in Sudan, I would [words indistinct] Sudan and its problems. [Words indistinct] the General People's Committee, the trade unions, federations, and the unity of the masses. [Words indistinct] popular committees everywhere and solve your problems. [passage indistinct]

Whoever rules Sudan at present is in an unenviable position. [passage indistinct] Today I spoke with Driss Djazairi, chairman of the International Fund for Agricultural Development. Libya is a major contributor to the International Fund for Agricultural Development and this position gives it some sort of rights and influence in making requests to the fund, and Driss Djazairi was a companion of Boumediene and he is an Arab and a fervent Arab and a man without a blemish and he sympathizes strongly with Sudan. I asked him when I met him in Tripoli a few days ago that, in view of the fact that Libya is a major contributor to the fund, I request that after Numayri was gotten rid of Sudan should be given priority in the projects of the International Fund for Agricultural Development. Brother Driss agreed enthusiastically. God willing, we will draw up a joint plan between Libya and the fund for the implementation of agricultural development projects in Sudan to be given priority.

In addition to the economic aspects, the regime in Sudan was sterile because of its subservience to Egypt and its recognition of stable David — because of its recognition it also recognized the

Zionist enemy — and its failure to sever relations with Egypt at the Baghdad summit conference.

This was a strong political blow to the Numayri regime. Thus the Numayri regime was exposed politically and economically. Furthermore, it took a hostile stand against the active forces: It antagonized Ethiopia and Libya. It attached itself to Egypt but took a hostile position toward the USSR. It surrendered itself to America.

Indeed, this is the road of loss. It is clear that it was in a muddled state. Libya is very influential in the world, not only in the adjoining and the feeble regimes. At one time, Libya armed and trained and enabled the Sudanese people to seize Khartoum for 2 whole days. It was Libya that brought Numayri out of prison at the time of the unionist coup when it believed that Numayri had become a supporter of unity. We, Libya, was the one that reinstated Numayri in power and aborted the military coup attempt by Abu Bakr al-Nur against Numayri.

When a mutiny took place at the Aba Island and at the time we believed that a revolutionary regime was in existence in Sudan, Libya played an influential role in crushing this mutiny against what we believed then to be a revolutionary regime in Sudan. Naturally, after that they allied themselves with us and the Al-Ansar allied themselves with us and we armed them against Numayri. The communists became friends of ours and allied themselves with us following that coup.

Things changed after it became evident that the Numayri regime was a fascist regime and a hostile regime. When Numayri antagonized Libya, he began to sink gradually [words indistinct]. Nobody can bet on the agent Egyptian regime, a regime so weak that whenever it faces economic or political crisis it runs to seek America's protection. Numayri bet on the Egyptian regime and defied the Libyan regime, the staunch, popular, growing regime which is free of [words indistinct] but popular conferences and popular committees and revolutionary force [words indistinct]. Indeed, Libya is awesome and has influence on both sides. I am not saying this because I am Libyan. Libya is awesome and very awesome indeed. It has positive and negative influence. Those against whom it takes a hostile stand are harmed and those it befriends benefit. The reasons for this are known to all.

Thus, by taking a hostile stand toward Libya, Numayri was walking on a road with a fixed limit, he walked to his doom by antagonizing Libya, and his acceptance of American radio stations against Libya encouraged the stray dogs. But the stray dogs have been slaughtered and he was expelled from Khartoum. This is the fate of anyone who takes a hostile stand against Libya. He went even further to antagonize Ethiopia, the USSR, and the progressive forces in the world and recognized stable David and placed his hand in the hand of Egypt and placed his hand in the hand of America. This is the road of loss.

[Correspondent] Brother commander, how can Sudan emerge from its choking economic crisis and overcome the heavy legacy left by Numayri, the lackey?

[Al-Qadhafi] This, brother, rests in changing all the oppressive relations in the street now: the abolition of the system of min-

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isters. The workers should take over the factories and set up people's conferences and workers popular committees and [words indistinct] production and they turn into partners. New slogans should be applied: He who produces consumes. The system of employers should be abolished and private trade should be abolished and so will be the contractors and brokers and employers who have increased the prices of commodities used by the ordinary consumer. The merchants used to buy a commodity for 5 and sell it for 20 and sometimes for a 100 — there was no limit. This kind of merchant cheats the ordinary citizen, the consumer. Sudanese citizens have no purchasing power. Their currency is very weak and is in short supply. Thus the citizen was a prey to the forces of exploitation. The forces of exploitation must be eliminated because no longer is there master and servant, employer and worker. The house should belong to the occupier and the car to him the driver and the land to the cultivator; he who produces consumes his produce. All consumer vocations in Sudan should be abolished. Nobody should any longer be allowed to sell only, to buy a commodity for 5 and sell it for 20. This sort of work is not productive and must end. The people must be responsible for this. The people buy a commodity for 5 and sell it to themselves for 5, that is, at cost price.

Nobody should be allowed to take a consumer vocation. One makes candy, another becomes a photographer, a third becomes a barber or opens a coffee shop. Such people must move into productive work. They must set up a workshop, a carpentry shop, become a blacksmith, a repair man, a plumber, a farmer.

The Sudanese people concentrated on the land and the vocations, and the foreigners took over the businesses. The Sudanese need investments. Arab countries such as Libya, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other wealthy countries, should invest their money in Sudan through the establishment of agricultural projects on a wide scale and on the basis of joint ventures. Half of the production of these projects would be for Sudan while the other half would go to the investing country. For example, Libya would take a piece of land covering several thousand hectares and plant wheat. Sudan would provide the land and water and Libya would provide the investment: the money, the seeds and so on. The produce would then be shared equally between Sudan and Libya. Saudi Arabia could do the same and so could Kuwait.

Economic integration could even take place. I believe Libya should be prepared to reclaim wide areas of Sudan and particularly to cultivate them with wheat, so that Sudan would become self-sufficient and export wheat.

Libya should invest large sums of money in the Nile Valley and in rain water reservoirs and subterranean wells for use in wheat cultivation.

The Sudanese people should be steered toward animal breeding. I mean the bourgeoisie towns should be abolished, the consumer towns should be abolished and so should consumer vocations and the consumer and bourgeoisie classes which make others work while they sit comfortably.

In short, what is needed is the implementation of Chapter 2 of the Green Book on the economy and the solution of the economic problem of Sudan, so that Sudan may emerge from its crisis, with

the cooperation of Arab countries in setting a system of joint ventures in Sudan coupled with rejection of the conditions of the international banks which are dominated by the United States. Their conditions must be rejected even if this leads to the loss of aid from those international banks.

These banks have destroyed several countries and brought them to their knees. They did not solve those countries' economic problems but left them in the grip of America.

Sudan cannot solve its problems through American-dominated banks because America's objective is to subjugate Sudan and to subjugate the Arab nation and the Third World and to blackmail them. These conditions must be rejected.

When Numayri accepted the conditions set by these banks, the crisis took place and intensified. The people starved and came out onto the streets. The door must be closed in America's face. I believe that in Sudan hatred is mounting against America and the Egyptian regime. This was evident from the demonstrations. America is being hit and is losing but it has not learned the lesson of Sudan. America is blinded by its prowess and it belittles the Arab nation.

[Correspondent] Brother Leader, the problem of southern Sudan is a [words indistinct] problem. This problem [words indistinct]. In the opinion of the brother commander, how can a sound and lasting solution for this problem be found so that fraternal Sudan can regain its unity and become a strong rock within this nation?

[Al-Qadhdhafi] This is yet another very complicated problem, but we must first analyze it. Chapter 3 of the Green Book deals with minorities. Let us first see what constitutes a minority and what are its rights and duties and how to solve the problem of minorities in accordance with the solutions provided for the various problems of man in light of the third universal theory.

Minorities are divided into two types. A minority which belongs to a nation and consequently its social framework is part of that nation. A minority without a nation has no other social framework than itself. This latter minority constitutes the historical residues which eventually form a nation by virtue of common destiny and affiliation. This minority has its own social rights, as has become evident to us. Social character is an inherent character and cannot be granted or withdrawn.

Economic and political problems can only be solved through the Jamahiri society, in which the masses possess authority, wealth and arms.

To look upon minorities as minorities from a political or economic point of view amounts to striking a wedge in the homeland. If our brothers in southern Sudan constitute a minority, then we must decide whether they constitute a minority of first type or of the second type. If it is of the first type, then it is a minority with a nation. But where is its nation? It must rejoin its nation. The fact is that southern Sudan is not Arab and even not Muslim. They belong to another nation. The Green Book says that the solution of such a problem lies in rejoining this minority to the mother nation, like the rejoining of the Kurds to their nation: the Kurds of Iraq, the Kurds of Turkey, and the Kurds of Iran. Why should

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we persecute them. They are part of the Kurdistani nation. Thus they must merge together and we should lift our hands from them. The Arabs demanded independence, and the Turks persecuted them and considered their demands an act of mutiny against the Ottoman Sultan — they actually persecuted us in the name of Shuubism, though what we had was actually a pan-Arab movement aimed at the liberation of the Arab nation from the Turkish nation; it was a conflict between pan-Arabism and Ottoman nationalism. The Green Book affirms that the conflict that formulated the map of the world was a religious and nationalist conflict. It started as religious and ended as nationalist because the nationalist is what dominates in the end.

If the conflict in southern Sudan is a nationalist one, then its only solution is through nationalism — respect of other nationalisms. But for someone from southern Sudan to come to me and say I am a Negro and I want independence and the Arabs have occupied my land and oppressed me, I am sorry there is nothing I can say to him. Unity with Sudan is unity with us as Arabs and should take place with the approval of that nationalism. Otherwise, those of that nationalism who are brought into such a unity will rebel again and again and so it will not last.

I met with John Garang and exchanged views with him. He is a revolutionary, progressive man. He did not want his movement to be a secessionist movement. However, he wanted to liberate Numayri's Sudan. Even Eritrea in the days of Haile Selassie used to say that it wanted to liberate Ethiopia. We armed it and trained it because it was a revolutionary movement against Haile Selassie. But after the start of the revolution in Addis Ababa, we could not continue to arm Eritrea and train it against the revolution which we advocated against Haile Selassie. We became allies of Mengistu. But the revolution in Eritrea has not ended. The Eritreans continue with their revolution and demand independence.

The southern Sudan movement could be a revolution or a rebellion against the Numayri regime. We have armed it and trained it as we did with Eritrea. But now that Numayri has fallen, the southern Sudan movement could become similar to that of Eritrea and demand independence. So far, I am not sure of this. All we know is that John Garang is a revolutionary and an ally of ours. We meet with him in terms of revolutionary principles. He is not a reactionary but a revolutionary. By God, when he says he is a Negro and a Christian and he does not want the Arabs, if I were a Sudanese I would have no argument to face him with in this case. I respect the will of any nationalism, the will of any nation.

If they want to remain within Sudan, then the solution — as stated in Chapter 3 of the Green Book — lies in the creation of a Jamahiri society in which there is no room for conflict between Arab and Negro or between an Arab village and a Negro village. Every village would govern itself. They have no relations with each other. The Arab village would not govern the Negro village and the Negro village would not govern the Arab village. Each would have its people's conference and its people's committee. They would only meet in the national conference, the General People's Congress and the general people's committees at the Sudanese national level.

There is no solution other than the Jamahiri system when all these oases, villages, and towns will become self-governed entities within a Sudanese Jamahiriya.

There could, of course, be secession. But, naturally, I hope there will not be secession. I have made efforts to persuade John Garang not to secede and not to continue with his war. We now support the regime in Sudan be it one of military, parties, trade unions, or all these collectively or be it a Jamahiri system. Indeed, we cannot but support Sudan from now on.

What we are saying now represents our views and our analysis which we express in a neutral manner about what Sudan could or could not do. Whatever direction Sudan takes, whether it is governed by the parties, the military, the trade unions, or a Jamahiri system, we will still support Sudan and we will support it in all cases.

Our problems with Sudan have ended with the end of Numayri. We are confident that nobody in Sudan will become a new Numayri. Nor do I believe that subservience to stable David will continue or that the disgrace Egypt brought upon itself will entice the Sudanese to continue with their subservience. It is not right that Sudan should remain attached to Egypt. We believe that the Sudanese possess sufficient capabilities to save it from being subservient. However, Sudan will always remain sympathetic to Egypt.

We are continuing our efforts to persuade Dr John Garang to stop the war and to begin negotiations with our brothers in Khartoum. In fact, I am against the continuation of the fighting in southern Sudan. If the fighting continues it means there is something else going on. If the fighting continues, then there must be another objective other than the toppling of Numayri because Numayri has already fallen.

We are allies of Garang. We have provided him with arms and training. Therefore, our evaluation of matters will be one and the same. I believe there is no alternative to negotiations and the unification of Sudan. I hope the south will unite with Sudan, but it must secure its rights. But the securing of southern Sudan's rights cannot be accomplished through the grant of provincial rule. Even Numayri tried that. He brought his vice president, Joseph Lagu, from the south and appointed him a vice president in Khartoum. There was one other [words indistinct]. All of them were made vice presidents and he assigned them self-governed regions. But this did not solve the problem and as we have seen, the fighting renewed.

The problem cannot be solved by repetition of past formulas. Either a Jamahiri society is established in Sudan and this will solve all the problems of Sudan categorically and consequently. No demonstrations, no sit-ins, and no mutiny, or nothing will happen again, for then the government will belong to all the people and there will be conferences and committees everywhere, or, in fact, I cannot [Al-Qadhdhafi seems to hesitate] encourage myself to continue explaining such a delicate situation which concerns a sister state in the traditional sense of the word. But we are prepared to help in bringing about Sudan's unity and Sudan's growth and the solution of the problem of southern



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Sudan. We are now friends of both: those in Khartoum and those in the south.

Members of the revolutionary committees, I believe, have now carried out their duties. The popular revolution is the revolution of the future. Revolutionary committees are the nucleus, indeed, the tools, of the popular revolution. Revolutionary committees consist of individuals, who through the Green Book, come to realize the falsehood of contemporary democracy and the truth about the exploitive societies and thus become revolutionaries. So that their individual revolutions do not become mere individual desparate suicidal attempts, they join ranks together and set up revolutionary committees everywhere.

It is not the task of revolutionary committees to assume power. Otherwise they become a constitutional tool for upholding authority to the exclusion of the masses and on their behalf.

The new cry uttered by the masses provides that there shall be no proxy for the people and representation is nothing but an act of charlatantry. This is the new tide which the revolutionary committees are working on to replace reactionary theses, the best of which revolves around the idea of providing the best representation of the people.

The duty of revolutionary committees is to instigate the masses to stage revolution, so that the masses themselves attain power. Revolutionary committees are the tools for the organization of the masses overtly and covertly in popular conference and popular committees. Revolutionary committees are the tools for leading the masses to undermine the foundation of despotic authority which is dominating the people.

Thus, revolutionary committees are the political and practical framework which embraces revolutionary forces everywhere. They are the revolutionary commands of the wide masses, daily leading them toward advanced positions. Revolutionary committees are also the nerve system that sets the masses in motion. They constitute the arteries of society, which is undergoing revolutionary transformation. They are the tools for heralding the new civilization. They are also the tools for advocating pan-Arab and religious unity.

The revolutionary committee member is the model of the new man, the ideal man who is committed to his religion and to his nation. He is a good example to be followed in skill and work. He is the herald of the new civilization and of the start of the age of the masses.

Following the success of the people's revolution, which is organized and led by revolutionary committees and after the assumption of authority by the masses, the duty of revolutionary committees is to instigate the masses to exercise authority, consolidate the people's authority, exercise revolutionary control, activate the popular conferences, rationalize the popular committees and the secretariats of the popular conferences, protect the revolution, and defend and propagate the revolution.

[Correspondent] At the end of this interview, what has the brother commander to say to the masses of our revolutionary people?

[Al-Qadhdhafi] We congratulate them and congratulate the Armed Forces, the land, naval and Air Forces, for responding to the call we made and for responding to the call of the Sudanese people, and joining ranks with the people in the decisive moments, instead of allowing themselves to become tools of repression and suppression against the people. This is a patriotic stand which we record for brother General 'Abd al-Rahman Siwar al-Dhahab and his colleagues, who saved Sudan from any problems which could have resulted from confrontation between the Army and the people under the plan drawn by Numayri, Mubarak, America, and the Israelis.

We cannot deny the struggle of the parties and their legacy should be respected. Although, in fact, parties have become now traditional and the era of parties has passed with the advent of the age of the masses. I ask the parties to develop themselves now and to respond to the new demands of the new revolutionary force.

I hope there will be a democratic solution for the Sudanese people's problems on the basis of the Green Book or the third universal theory. In fact, this is the solution, not because I am the author of this theory which in fact was not formulated by me but by mankind throughout its long history and bitter struggle for deliverance and emancipation. The Green Book is only a guide for the people in their long historic struggle for emancipation. It is the result of the struggle of the peoples and the fruit of their efforts and struggle throughout the ages as they tried to find a radical solution for political and economic problems. As a result of my study of history, I came up with these solutions for political and social problems. I place them now at the service of the Sudanese people, the fraternal heroic people.

In any case, the Sudanese people have brought honor to the Arab nation because they rebelled against subservience and blew a raspberry to America and chanted against it in the streets. Such slogans were raised in the streets of the Arab countries and the streets of Cairo but the name of America was mutilated in the streets of Sudan.

In spite of famine and thirst, the Sudanese people clung to their pride in an unparalleled manner. They upheld their right to be worthy of living under the sun and on earth and to reject dictatorship. Even Numayri, whom they had supported, was toppled after he deviated and disgraced the Sudanese people and encroached on them.

The Sudanese people were motivated not only by famine but also by their pride and glory. This is because the Sudanese people are in fact a great people. They abjectly defeated the British. We hope the revolution of the Sudanese people will move into Egypt and to other Arab countries. The Sudanese people must take the initiative and raise the flag of the new revolution in the Nile Valley. Thus, the Jamahiri system will triumph in the Nile Valley so that the darkness of dictatorship will fade and the night of dictatorship, subservience, and agency will be over. They should instigate this region against America, the bitter archenemy of the Arab nation.

The Sudanese people must now ensure that their land shall be hot under the feet of the Americans — the filthy feet of the bitter

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American enemies. This is because America is trying now to enter through the window. With cheek and insolence, the Egyptian regime is trying to woo the Sudanese. The Sudanese people are good people and the Egyptian regime might succeed in deceiving them. But they must not be deceived. They must continue their stubborn confrontation of the symbols of agency and apostasy, and must appreciate the patriotic stand of Siwar al-Dhahab and his colleagues and all the Sudanese Army, which joined the people.

In any case, even if the military handed over authority, we must hold them in high esteem. I personally appreciate their position and I will never forget what they have done. I feel very proud of the Sudanese people.

God willing, Sudan and Libya will merge together in one Arab unity and we shall succeed in liberating the Nile Valley and Palestine and in creating one Arab strong advanced liberated nation that extends from the ocean to the Gulf and live under the banners of glory and dignity and pride. Then we can blow a raspberry for America.

Forward, and the struggle continues.

#### **Sudanese Military Council Members Arrive**

*LD211319 Tripoli Domestic Service in Arabic 1230 GMT 21 Apr 85*

[Text] Brigadier General (Fadlallah Burnah Nasir) and Brigadier General Faris 'Abdallah Husni, members of the Transitional Military Council of Sudan, accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel Isma'il al-Hajj Yusuf and 'Abd al-Hamid [as received] Bashir al-Ahmadi, Sudan's former ambassador to Libya, arrived today in Libya for a visit to the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyyah. Major al-Khuwayidi al-Humaydi met the Sudanese delegation at Tripoli International Airport.

Brigadier (Fadlallah Burnah Nasir) made a statement to the JANA correspondent saying: We are extremely happy to come to our second home, the Jamahiriyyah; it is one of our desires: the desire of the Sudanese people who are linked with the one hope and the one destiny with their fraternal people, the Libyan Arab people.

#### **Received by Al-Qadhdhafi**

*LD212355 Tripoli Voice of Greater Arab Homeland in Arabic 2315 GMT 21 Apr 85*

[Text] The brother leader of the revolution last night [21 April] received Brigadier General Fadlallah Burnah Nasir and Brigadier General Faris 'Abdallah Husni, members of the Transitional Military Council [TMC] of Sudan, accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel Isma'il al-Hajj Yusuf and brother 'Abd al-Majid Bashir al-Ahmadi, the former Sudanese ambassador to the Jamahiriyyah.

The Sudanese delegation conveyed a message to the brother leader of the revolution from General 'Abd al-Raham Siwar al-Dhahab, head of the Sudanese TMC.

## **MAURITANIA**

### **Delegation To Discuss Debt Rescheduling in Paris**

*AB220825 Nouakchott Domestic Service in French 0700 GMT 22 Apr 85*

[Text] A delegation led by Lieutenant Colonel Anna Amadou Babali, CMSN member and minister of finance and commerce, and including Tarkhit Ould Sidi, minister of planning and territorial development, yesterday left Nouakchott for Paris. In the French capital, the delegation will hold meetings with the Paris Club concerning the rescheduling of our country's external debt.

## **MOROCCO**

### **Further Reportage on Working Visit of CAR President**

#### **Received by King Hassan**

*LD191533 Rabat MAP in English 1200 GMT 19 Apr 85*

[Text] Marrakech, April 19 (MAP)— General Andre Dieudonne Kolingba, president of the Central African Republic, was received here Thursday by King Hassan II of Morocco.

The two heads of states held a private meeting before presiding over a working session that was attended on the Moroccan side by the prime minister, the minister of finance, the minister of tourism, the minister of national education and acting minister of foreign affairs, the minister of the interior, and the minister of agriculture and agrarian reform.

On the Central African Republic side, the working session was attended by the minister of state for rural development, the minister of foreign affairs and international cooperation, the minister of the interior, and the commissioner for tourism.

According to observer, talks would have dealt with bilateral cooperation in the areas of defense, agriculture, tourism and particularly commerce, the volume of exchanges between the two countries having reached only 2.33 millions of French francs.

Mr Kolingba was also the guest to a luncheon banquet hosted in his honor by the Moroccan monarch. The head of state of the Central African Republic arrived here wednesday for a "work and friendship visit" to Morocco.

#### **Concludes Visit, Departs**

*LD201326 Rabat MAP in English 1200 GMT 20 Apr 85*

[Text] Marrakech, April 20 (MAP)— General Andre-Dieudonne Kolingba, president of the Central African Republic, has left Marrakech this morning for Bangui after a two day "working and friendship" visit to Morocco.

During his stay, General Kolingba held a private meeting with King Hassan II and presided over, along with the Moroccan monarch, a working session that was attended by the two countries delegations. This working session was devoted to examining