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30 October 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: FBIS Historical Officer

SUBJECT : Revised draft of FBIS history titled "The Foreign Documents Division, 1946-1967"



1. The DDI Historical Officer has read and approved the revised draft of the FBIS history titled "The Foreign Documents Division, 1946-1967" by [redacted] [redacted] has done an excellent job of revising his draft and the paper is now ready for further processing.

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2. The reviewer has a single suggestion -- that the present Appendix A "Commentary" be renamed "Conclusion" and made the final chapter of the history. Some minor changes, mostly editorial, have been made directly on the manuscript and are noted for the record in the attachment.

3. The Historical Staff will forward this paper directly to the DDI Historical Board for review prior to final typing of the manuscript in FBIS.

[redacted]

DDI Historical Staff

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Attachment


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THE FOREIGN DOCUMENTS DIVISION

1946 - 1967

VOLUME IV

*by*



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**THE FOREIGN DOCUMENTS DIVISION**

**1946 - 1967**


**VOLUME IV**

*by*



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**Approved:**

A large, irregularly shaped box with a thin black border, used to redact the signature of the Director.

**Director**  
**Foreign Broadcast Information Service**  
**Directorate of Intelligence**  
**April 1974**

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
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**SECRET**VOLUME IV**CHAPTER FIFTEEN**End of the Line: Transfer and Merger

This chapter of the history takes up the question of the disposition of the foreign-language document exploitation function in the Agency and the dissolution of the Foreign Documents Division as an independent CIA element to which had been entrusted the operation since its inception in 1946. The interplay and maneuvering periodically engaged in by individuals and components at various managerial levels in CIA who were assigned the task of resolving the problem of FDD's disposition led at times to heated and acrimonious exchanges, and the solutions reached reflected no unanimity of agreement. The development was twofold, first the transfer of the division to OCR at the end of 1963 and eventually its absorption by FBIS in early 1967. The overriding, though not the only, issues involved in these moves appeared to be operational streamlining, that is, a consolidation and cutting back of FDD reportage in the case of the OCR transfer, and primarily a matter of economy — in saving of funds and positions — in the case of the FBIS merger. In the latter instance the question

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of whether or not the contemplated move was likely to improve the operation played an apparently secondary role. Perhaps the hard facts of life -- the economic factor -- precluded any other decision.

A. The OCR Interlude

1. The Transfer and Reasons for It

It was intimated earlier in this account that from the very outset the "neither-fish-nor-fowl" character of FDD operations -- whether it was to be classified as a library or as a collection function -- created difficulties in permitting the division to find its proper place in the CIA administrative configuration. The settlement, if not solution, of this problem lay in the creation in 1946 of the Office of Operations, a sort of catch-all to which FBID and CD were assigned along with FDD. Participation by all three in collecting and exploiting information from open sources was the common denominator in this arrangement. It was regarded as desirable to create OO as a focal point of control for the three divisions.

With the addition of a higher level, the DD/I, in 1952, the control exercised by the Deputy Director over the resources available to him resulted in a direct working relationship with the head of the OO components, and the need for OO to serve as

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an intermediate managerial level declined. Realization of this fact periodically led to consideration of abolishing OO and re-assigning its components elsewhere. The usual destination assigned to FDD in these recurrent plans was OCR, despite the repeated insistence by OO and FDD that the division was not, like OCR, a reference facility. The question had been once again revived in 1957 at the time the NSCIDs were consolidated. In rebuttal to the effort to place FDD under Paragraph 15 of NSCID 1, which assigned to the DCI responsibility for providing central reference facilities as a service of common concern,  the DAD/O, emphasized that FDD was not and never had been a central reference facility. The decision, he stated, to regard document exploitation as a reference activity while treating broadcast handling as a collection function made the proposal even more difficult to understand. 1167/ In this instance the OO appeal was successful and FDD, with FBID and CD, was placed under NSCID 2.

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Nevertheless, pressure for change continued. In the early summer of 1959 the Inspector General, Lyman Kirkpatrick, suggested to the DCI, among other things, the dissolution of OO and reassignment of its divisions, but the DCI took no action at that time on the IG recommendation. However, near the end of 1961 the DCI

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appointed a small Working Group on Organization and Activities headed by Kirkpatrick to study the organizational structure of the Agency. In anticipation of a recommendation similar to that of two and a half years before, [ ] directed a lengthy memorandum to the AD/O in January 1962 outlining, in effect, an OO counter-attack. To the anticipated proposal that FDD be placed under OCR, he suggested that Carey insist that the division not be separated from FBID because a good part of FBID's work (press scrutiny) and all of FDD's involved the same medium. He made the further point that if the divisions were reassigned, their efforts would be gradually reoriented to the support of their new masters; thereby their collection potential would be dissipated and their common service functions would become secondary. As the most logical solution, [ ] suggested raising OO to Deputy Directorate and the three divisions to Office level. 1168/

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As far as the work of the Kirkpatrick Group was concerned, [ ] fears had been premature, for its recommendations were never approved by the DCI. The beginning of the end for OO and the transfer of FDD to OCR came about through initiative from another source. By late 1963 the new ADD/I for Management, Paul Borel, had concluded (without pre-knowledge of the Kirkpatrick recommendation) that the OO management level had long been archaic

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and should be abolished. Thus, on 5 December 1963 the ADD/I advised [ ] now AD/O following George Carey's retirement in October 1962, that he and Ray Cline, the DD/I, had decided to transfer FDD to OCR. The decision brought to fruition the wish to make the transfer expressed by Borel in September 1960 when he was AD/CR. At that time Robert Amory, then DD/I, had turned down the proposal. 1169/ Now, however, the move was confirmed by Cline on 18 December. In a rather bitter memorandum for the record [ ] disclosed that no reason had been given for the transfer except that some savings -- unspecified -- might accrue. [ ] concluded that the transfer of FDD to OCR, a move which he continued to deplore because of his view that the division was a collection and not a reference organization, presaged the eventual raising of FBID and CD to Office level directly under the DD/I and the end of OO. 1170/ In this presumption he was quite right, for on 30 June 1965 OO was dissolved and steps initiated to raise its remaining divisions to Office level.\*

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\* The overt collection function of the defunct OO was temporarily assumed on 1 March 1966 by a new organizational grouping known as the Intelligence Support Services (ISS), to which were subordinated the former OO components plus the Collection Guidance Staff (CGS) and OCR. ISS, whose only director was Paul A. Borel, was abolished after 19 months on 1 October 1967 when the former FBID and CD gained Office status.

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[ ] views on the FDD transfer were echoed two months later by Edward M. Ashcraft, the DAD/O, in a letter to Paul Borel in which he stated that after ten years of almost continuous study, all senior CIA officers had concurred that OO was properly organized as an Office and that FDD, FBID, and CD were rightfully located within OO. It therefore came as a shock to Ashcraft to have FDD suddenly removed to a non-operating element with "no indication of careful study or demonstrated reasons, and practically no opportunity for a hearing." 1171/ Dismissing the letter as simply an exercise in special pleading, Borel made no formal reply.

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Contrary to what [ ] and Ashcraft believed, however, the DD/I and the ADD/I did have reasons for the change. They differed with the OO chiefs in their interpretation of the nature of FDD's function. Thus, operationally the transfer of FDD to OCR was designed to place under the same management all library-type services (acquisition, dissemination, translation, indexing, and referencing) for all manner of published intelligence information (books, periodicals, and information reports). From the standpoint of personnel policy, the move was designed to increase career opportunities for professionals in OCR and FDD by broadening the number of assignments available in a single career service. Moreover, economies could be anticipated as a result

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of a reappraisal by new management of long-standing past practices. At the same time FBID (as FBIS) and CD (as the Domestic Contact Service [DCS]) were to be established at the Office level in recognition of the independent character of these major activities.

Moreover, with the possibility in mind of a new organization for the DD/I as a whole, the change would provide more flexibility for Cline by giving him a number of roughly equal components to handle rather than compelling him to deal with components which included the disproportionately large OO complex. 1172/

In order to elicit views on the issue from all sectors, in early December the ADD/I, through  requested from John Bagnall an objective appraisal of the proposed transfer of FDD to OCR. Replying on 9 December 1963 in what was one of his last memoranda as Chief, FDD, Bagnall listed six advantages of the transfer, dealing mainly with activities -- machine processing of documents, procurement, indexing, etc. -- in which the division had always cooperated closely with OCR. He cited only one disadvantage, but this he characterized as "very important." It pertained to FDD's primary function of intelligence collection from overt foreign-language documents. OO, he stated, appeared to be the

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logical organization for this activity, and the transfer of FDD would mean some reduction of this function and diversion of manpower to other activities. 1173/

The protestations of OO and FDD against the transfer proved fruitless. On 23 December 1963  summoned a staff meeting for the purpose of announcing "a regrettable change" in OO organization, 1174/ and four days later the assignment of the division to OCR was officially effected. 1175/ Thus, 17 years after the Office was established, FDD's association with OO came to an end.

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## 2. FDD under OCR

The transfer of FDD to a new Office had little if any impact on the character of its operations. Some changes inevitably resulted in the long run, but since the duration of FDD's association with OCR was rather brief -- only three years -- little was done to change the general nature of the work. For this reason this history will not dwell at length on the details of the operation, which in general continued much as before, or on changes in the routine or projects of an unusual nature -- the ALP test, for example -- which have already been treated elsewhere.

This is not to imply that the OCR-FDD relationship was a stagnant one. FDD's OCR period may, generally speaking, be

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characterized as one of reexamination and reappraisal. This may be attributed to a genuine operational need to tighten up the organization and to streamline its function.

In an early memorandum to the FDD staff, John K. Vance, the new AD/CR, spoke of two principal themes which it was his intention to pursue and develop during the initial year of consolidation. The first concerned career planning to encourage new experiences and fresh viewpoints, the second, a reexamination of the FDD program to seek improvement in that sector. 1176/

An immediate effect of the division's shift to OCR was a reshuffling of personnel at the higher echelons in the Office, including FDD. John Bagnall, after almost 17 years as FDD Chief, was advanced to DAD/CR and replaced in FDD by  here- 25X1

tofore Chief of OCR's Special Register. Another FDD officer to move was  who was appointed a branch chief in the 25X1

Special Register. Other personnel changes followed. By the end of September 1966 the cross-division assignment of some 30 individuals had occurred. 1177/

A retrenchment within OCR as a result of Agency-wide budgetary reductions in 1964 and 1965 also had an effect on the FDD structure. A curtailment and consolidation in the number of FDD and JPRS reports took place and will be more fully treated

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below. As a result of a reduction in force imposed in the summer of 1964 the FDD T/O was cut by  positions. Consequently, the secretarial staff of the various branches were sharply reduced, the subject index of the CTS was discontinued, FDD's editorial staff was eliminated, and the division's branches sustained sharp personnel cuts. 1178/ The latter resulted in a rather drastic reorganization of the Asia Branch which entailed the consolidation of two sections to form a single Economic Section, thereby eliminating one GS-13 slot. 1179/ The curtailment of service, particularly in the non-Bloc branches, was especially inopportune at this time from the FDD standpoint in view of increased interest and demands in the intelligence community for information on Communist China, Latin America, and the African countries. On the positive side, the Acquisitions Branch, formerly part of the CIA Library, was transferred to FDD on 1 April 1965, thus bringing the division into closer contact with the major procurer of its source material. 1180/

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In December 1964 in conformance with the earlier Vance proposal to reexamine all OCR programs as well as with the economy-imposed need to eliminate all but essential activities in the Office, OCR initiated a review of the FDD publications program. Since the review was conducted by Walter J. Moberg, Special Assistant to the AD/CR, it came to be known as the

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Moberg Survey. The survey had a number of primary and secondary objectives, but in essence its purpose was to test the responsiveness of the FDD product to Agency and community needs, to eliminate those parts of it which failed to measure up to the criteria set, and to consolidate the remainder in order to provide better and more meaningful service to the consumers. The methodology employed involved setting up small ad hoc FDD task groups or committees, convening a senior study group in the later phases of the review for purposes of evaluation, consultation with Agency and non-Agency consumer offices, interviews with employees at all levels, and preparation of a final report. It was anticipated that the major part of this special effort would be completed in six months. 1181/

Although approved in December 1964, the survey did not get under way until the following month and then took most of 1965 to complete. One reason for the slow process was the meticulous preparation and the detailed investigation involved, but it was also the result of Moberg's concern to disrupt normal operations as little as possible. Since the survey involved a total of 128 -- 33 internal (FDD) and 95 external (JPRS) -- serial publications and necessitated discussing each with the responsible officer and the branch chief involved in producing it and a

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survey by means of questionnaire of all recipients of the report, it is understandable that the survey was a formidable and time-consuming task. In general, it was well received by all participants. The various people involved were extremely cooperative in spite of the added chores which the investigation entailed. As a positive side effect, the survey stimulated a certain amount of self-analysis in the branches and caused, or at least accelerated, with positive results some reviews of consumer requirements and reactions even in advance of Moberg's own study.

FDD personnel participated extensively in the survey, not only because it was their production which was being investigated but also because their involvement was encouraged. All FDD branch chiefs were asked to comment on the Moberg "Publications Survey Form" with a view to making it more incisive and more responsive to the survey's purpose. After consultation with subordinates, all gave constructive criticisms -- some negative, some positive -- and, where feasible, these were incorporated.

With the consumer questionnaire finally hammered into shape, the survey of FDD's internal reporting program got under way in March 1965. In the meanwhile, plans were made and a similar survey form devised for review of the external (JPRS) program, but this was not initiated until the following spring. The questionnaires

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for the internal survey were sent out in two phases, one in spring to serve as a preliminary test on the basis of which an improved survey form was devised and the other in fall which covered the balance of the survey. The questions used were designed to determine the appropriateness of a particular serial report to the respondent's needs. Some 433 questionnaires were sent out, of which 347 were returned. The bulk of the questionnaires were turned in before the end of 1965, and Moberg submitted a summary of the responses to the Director of Central Reference (D/CR) in May 1966.

The Moberg report, based on an exceptional response figure of over 80 percent and representing the views of  CIA analysts, that is, an average of 74 for each serial report, furnished a comprehensive and relatively accurate analysis of consumer judgment of the FDD product. The view of customer reactions provided by the survey, while critical in some instances, in the aggregate gave FDD fairly good marks and provided a rough overall assessment of selected aspects of the processing of open literature. A by-product of the survey was the elimination of some 83 recipient components (or about 24 percent of those responding). Apparently many had regularly received serials for

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which they no longer had a need and had not taken the trouble to cancel their subscriptions. 1182/

The consumer survey on the JPRS reporting program was also completed, and in January 1967  Deputy Chief of FDD, reported on these findings. Here again, as in the case of the internal program, there were a fair number of critical returns, a few of which were completely negative while others offered constructive criticism. In general, however, the findings on the program were favorable and JPRS reports were characterized as an important source of basic factual intelligence information for a wide range of Agency consumers. A result of both surveys was a sharp consolidation of the FDD-JPRS output. The number of report titles originating in FDD area branches was reduced from 25 to 12 and in JPRS from 109 to 97. This was accomplished by merging those with related subject matter to serve a wider range of consumers and by eliminating those which were shown by the survey to be of marginal value. 1183/

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By the time the FDD-JPRS production survey was completed, the division's days as an OCR component were already numbered. Roughly coincident with the period during which the study was conducted, the DD/I under the DCI's general guidance undertook several major changes which exercised a profound effect on the

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OCR-FDD association and led eventually to the latter's demise as an independent organization. These changes involved provision of new guidance and new guidance machinery to DD/I collection and processing components, a reduction of the overall level of resources previously available to these organizations as well as a reduction in the relative level of resources allocated to them compared with those distributed to the intelligence production components, and the reorganization of several major components, principally collection and processing organizations.

The total cut in allocations projected by the DD/I for his Intelligence Support Services group, successor to the defunct OO and including OCR in addition to CGS, FBIS, and DCS, was on the order of 15 percent. This represented a staff personnel cut  over the period FY 1968-1976. Unfortunately for OCR, and thus in turn FDD, the projected cuts were not to be uniformly distributed. The reduction was to be much more drastic for CGS and OCR than for the other two components. In fact, the OCR cut reached proportions of between a quarter and a third of its personnel and financial resources. 1184/

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At the DD/I's request, in late November 1966 Vance submitted three alternative plans designed to implement the proposed

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one-third reduction of OCR's personnel strength, that is, from  
an authorized strength [redacted] Two of these pro-

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posals called for an FDD T/O reduction from the then current [redacted]

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[redacted] 1185/

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The reduction in personnel strength was immediately implemented,  
so that by March 1967, when the FDD-FBIS merger occurred, division  
strength had been reduced [redacted]

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Financial cuts were similarly stringent. FDD's FY 1967  
allotment for contractual funds had originally been established

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[redacted] but in August 1966 [redacted] had been informally

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notified of a reduction [redacted] Since surplus funds were,  
however, reportedly accruing to OCR, he decided to continue the

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JPRS program at the current rate. 1186/ A request for supplemental  
funds in January 1967 met with resistance and a severe cut-back  
in FDD services was threatened. 1187/ This problem was carried  
over to FBIS at the time of the merger but was eventually resolved  
in April 1967 with the approval of [redacted] in supplemental

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funds. 1188/

The new trend in the Agency toward consolidation of its  
resources designed to increase efficiency and to reduce waste  
to a minimum had, as we have seen, a far-reaching effect on FDD  
as an OCR component. The division had derived some benefits

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and sustained some setbacks as a result of these moves. The entire publications exploitation effort had been streamlined and consolidated, and consumers were better served by a smaller number of more precisely aimed and interrelated reports. New management and key personnel exchanges had also had beneficial results. On the other hand, FDD had suffered a severe cut in manpower with no concomitant reduction in its obligations to the intelligence community. Was it likely to stop here? If FDD management had entertained such expectations, its hopes would soon be dashed. The question soon to be answered was: Is FDD — as an administrative organization — really necessary?

B. Merger with FBIS

1. Formation and Work of the  Study Group

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Precedents for plans and projects to merge or at least to bring into closer synchronization foreign radio broadcast (FBID) and press (FDD) exploitation to better serve the intelligence community were not lacking when the subject was revived in 1966. Almost from the beginning of the Agency's existence in 1947 the subject had been periodically brought up, briefly considered, and then dropped until the next occurrence of duplication or trespass by one in the other's domain stimulated another exchange.

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While both units were generally agreed that "something ought to be done" and serious steps were on occasion resorted to to effect cooperation, the will to go all the way in bringing about a full-fledged merger of open source handling was never strong enough to carry it off. It was only when the crunch of economic necessity began to be felt in the mid-1960s that the Agency faced up to the problem and seriously began to look for answers.

On 19 April 1966, in a memorandum to the Executive Director-Comptroller, the DD/I, R. J. Smith, outlined plans for his Directorate for the coming six years, the main thrust of which involved a shift of manpower from the collection to the production area. Among suggestions offered to effect this change was one to save personnel slots by combining radio and press monitoring. 1189/ A study group was established the following month to examine the feasibility of such a move with a view to achieving economies in operation, greater speed in receipt of press information, and elimination of duplication between the two media. [redacted] Chief of the Resources and Industries Division, ORR, was selected to chair the group and 1 December 1966 was set as the target date for completion of the study. 1190/ Members of the committee selected to assist [redacted] were [redacted] [redacted] of FDD, [redacted] of [redacted]

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FBIS, [ ] of OBI, and [ ] of OCI. Others participated in the course of the investigation.

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At the outset of the study a problem arose in connection with the statement of the terms of reference with which the task force was to concern itself. FDD demurred over the initial wording of the statement which, in FDD's view, implied a relationship between consolidation of the press and broadcast monitoring on the one hand and the matter of overseas exploitation of the press on the other that the division declared did not in fact exist. 1191/ The matter was finally resolved by separating the two and having the Statement of the Problem read as follows:

This study was initiated by the DD/I to ascertain whether it is (1) feasible to combine broadcast monitoring and press exploitation abroad, and (2) to determine the extent to which the performance of these and related functions abroad would result in a net advantage to the US intelligence effort. 1192/

It was under this directive that the Ad Hoc Committee for the Study of Press and Broadcast Monitoring Activities began its task on 30 June 1966.

The tendentious tone of the investigation was evident from the outset and the divergencies in the viewpoints of FDD and FBIS became more pronounced and more firmly fixed as time went on. Each side, recognizing that the basic requirement was to free slots, agreed with the other that action was required but differed widely

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on what was to be done. In essence, everything revolved around the question of the continued existence of FDD. FBIS believed that the problem could best be solved by eliminating the FDD structure, with FBIS absorbing its functions, and thus effecting savings in costs and positions and, as a side effect, eliminating duplication by having the major portion of press monitoring performed at overseas bureaus in conjunction with broadcast monitoring.

FDD, on the other hand, having no desire to lose the organization and system which it had painstakingly built up and developed over the past two decades, fought hard to remain independent of FBIS and presented a well-documented case for bringing about savings in money and personnel through a series of changes and reforms in press and radio monitoring which involved the FBIS operation as much as FDD itself. FDD had no objection to overseas press exploitation, in fact, it enthusiastically supported the idea; it felt, however, that this function rightfully was within the purview of the FDD common concern charter as defined by NSCID 16 and subsequently by NSCID 2.

As it evolved, the discussion concerned three factors related to overseas exploitation -- saving of money, freeing of positions, and speed of transmission -- but it came down basically to the question of

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whether or not to merge FDD with FBIS. FBIS pushed for the merger, FDD was against it, and it was in this light that the task force conducted its business despite the resolve to conduct an objective appraisal of the problem. Proper obeisance to objectivity was evinced several times. In one of the early meetings [ ] stated his intention to determine first "if any merger is feasible" before going into costing details. 1193/ Moreover, in September, Roger Seely, FBIS Director, declared:

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Neither side should take rigidly preconceived positions in the Task Force. We should "push for total merger of FDD and FBIS" only as a sequel to an objective finding by the Task Force that the two activities should be merged. 1194/

Such statements notwithstanding, from the standpoint of FBIS there was little doubt from the beginning as to the final outcome on merger; the only issue was to spell out the justification for the move and to determine how best to implement it. In connection with the [ ] statement above, for example, in August, [ ] who carried the fight for FBIS until 16 September when [ ] replaced him on the committee and [ ] took over as FBIS spokesman, stated his opinion that the [ ] task force was not conducting a feasibility study but rather an implementation study and that, as he interpreted the background memoranda, the DD/I was in effect stating that FDD and FBIS would be

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merged. [ ] objected to this interpretation and [ ]  
similarly noted that this was not his understanding of his terms  
of reference. 1195/ Still, in September FBIS continued to stress  
its view that the merger had already been decided at the DD/I  
level by circulating the DD/I planning paper, which included a  
statement of intention to effect the merger. 1196/

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The investigation by the task force's chairman was conducted throughout in a fair and highly competent manner, but regardless of the sincerity of the expressions of objectivity at the beginning and the appeals to avoid pre-judgment of the issue, the atmosphere was highly partisan. The FBIS manner throughout was indicative of a feeling of confidence that the question was settled and that merger was only a matter of time. On the other hand, FDD efforts represented a rearguard delaying action. The task force meetings, which at the height of the study were held at least once a week, and the informal conversations and the memoranda and notes which followed, were pungent with sharp rejoinders and caustic exchanges and replete with accusation and counter-claims. The contributions of the OCI and OBI members of the committee proved to be minimal. OCI appeared to favor a merger if it would improve its receipts and to oppose it if this were not the case. OBI's position was that map and publications procurement was peripheral to the feasibility study and would therefore exercise little influence on the

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final decision. 1197/

At the opening session on 30 June 1966 the chairman directed both FDD and FBIS to submit their views on the items outlined in the committee's terms of reference. These reports subsequently served as the basis upon which further studies were made and discussions held. They were fairly voluminous documents dealing mainly with the structure and functions of the two components. Of chief interest were the sections in each report discussing the feasibility of consolidating the two media, representing as they did the arguments for and against a merger. The gist of the FBIS presentation was that there was considerable duplication in the content of the two media and that this led to an unavoidable duplication on similar themes. Combining radio and press exploitation would therefore lead to more efficient use of language skills, avoidance of duplication, and speedier transmittal of material to consumers. From this FBIS concluded that, on the basis of its own experience in radio and press exploitation, this activity not only could but should be collocated and that most of the exploitation could be done in the field. 1198/

In its report FDD conceded the desirability of overseas exploitation of current press material but pointed out that this category represented only a small segment of the FDD function.

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The greater portion of its mission consisted of basic exploitation and ad hoc translation which required the specialized knowledge and expertise of cleared intelligence officers positioned close to the consumer. The division also cited the linguistic and technical skills employed by JPRS and characterized these as a national resource. It further indicated that requirements levied on FDD extended beyond the apparent capability offered by the sites of the present FBIS bureaus. Moreover, the level of clearance of non-staff field personnel would determine how specific the requirements could be and was likely to make it more difficult to focus on the real target. The point was also made that it was unlikely that either an FDD field program or a combined FDD/FBIS endeavor would result in an appreciable saving in dollars or ceiling positions. 1199/

The task force continued to meet frequently throughout the balance of the summer and during the early fall, and at these sessions the various points presented in the feasibility studies of the two components were discussed thoroughly, claims and counterclaims were examined, and gradually a synthesis of the points at issue was arrived at by the chairman. This is not to say that agreement was reached by the contending parties. For the most part they held stubbornly to their original positions,

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but the interplay of the various points of view brought out many of the strengths and weaknesses in the argumentation presented by the participants.

By the end of August there appeared to be a perceptible swing in favor of the FBIS position. [ ] reported that although the chairman continued to appear totally objective, he was obviously impressed by the repeated statements of the FBIS representatives regarding the speed with which they could translate and transmit information from the press. [ ] judgment at this point was that the battle was not going well and that FDD was outweaponed. 1200/ FBIS was totally committed and the fact that they were overseas and were doing press exploitation plus their fast communications capability gave them a decided advantage.

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In the meetings which followed, the committee representatives reached agreement on a number of points relating to the FDD operation, namely, that S&T exploitation should not be sent overseas because of the difficulty of obtaining linguists with the required technical background, that a certain language capability had to be retained in-house to handle classified translation and ad hoc projects such as the translation of books, and that JPRS should not be abolished. This left at issue the question of the feasibility and cost of doing

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all non-technical translation work abroad. FBIS believed that this could be easily done at its overseas bureaus -- the Vienna and Frankfurt press scrutiny operations served as precedents -- and at less cost per linguist than in the United States. FDD opted for the concept of US embassy-based press exploitation which could be implemented without the assignment of division staff personnel overseas and at lower cost than the FBIS concept. The plan would free Headquarters personnel to meet consumer requirements for which no capability then existed. This arrangement, it recommended, should be carried out under FDD control. 1201/

With the target defined, the group set out to study in detail cost estimates, personnel requirements, and anticipated savings. For openers  suggested supplanting the Headquarters translation staff with overseas aliens, thus cutting some 100 from the staff of 167 and leaving the remaining 67 to provide Headquarters services. To do this would involve not only immediate processing overseas but also selection there for JPRS processing in the United States. 1202/ On 14 September FBIS submitted a study on the costs and advantages of doing all FDD and JPRS Soviet translations (excluding S&T items) at the Austrian Bureau. The study was intended to show that the work could be done with 18 fewer classified slots than required by FDD and

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would make current materials available on a daily basis. 1203/  
A week later FBIS submitted a similar study for East European  
exploitation which also promised savings in personnel and  
dollars. 1204/

The papers were discussed at length but no results were  
immediately achieved. The committee also reviewed problems in-  
volved in collocating press and radio monitoring in other world  
areas. In the next week or two FDD submitted a recomputation  
of the FBIS figures pertaining to overseas handling of FDD-JPRS  
materials and this contribution was in turn reanalyzed by FBIS.  
Thus the give-and-take continued, in general presenting the  
chairman with two versions of every issue discussed.

By fall, these issues included linguist productivity,  
scanning time, and media duplication. FBIS continued to emphasize  
that the press and radio treated essentially the same information,  
while FDD reiterated its contention that each medium encompassed  
an essentially different body of information. FBIS pushed the  
point that a combined FBIS-FDD operation would save both slots and  
money and would give improved service to consumers.  indi-  
cated that such a changeover would have to be carefully handled  
and that common sense dictated this could best be done under one  
organization. Significantly,  informed him that this was

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an important point, a portent of future decisions. 1205/

The likely effect on an in-house language capability if press monitoring were moved abroad was discussed at the 29 September meeting. FDD expressed its opinion that linguists would lose their skill if it were not used or would seek other positions and that no new linguists could be hired for essentially non-linguistic editorial positions. [ ] disagreed and they and the study group chairman suggested various possibilities for maintaining a language capability for Agency use by rotating linguist personnel to OTR, to the DDP, and to FBIS overseas positions or by using cleared contract personnel. There appeared to be a divergence of definition as to what constituted "language capability." At the conclusion of the 29 September meeting [ ] stated his intention to proceed with the drafting of a report for committee consideration and invited continuing comment and supporting argumentation from both sides. The latter was not long in coming as each side attempted to bolster its case. Almost immediately the Acting D/CR, [ ] submitted a memorandum, with supporting attachments, to the ADD/I arguing the case for continued FDD affiliation with OCR. Much of his argumentation rested on facts already presented earlier by FDD representatives on the [ ] study group. 1206/ The contributions

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from the FBIS contingent were equally impressive. They included reference to the 23 April 1964 memorandum from INR/State to the DCI requesting FBIS press coverage of North Vietnam and characterizing the FDD effort as inadequate 1207/ and two 1954 memoranda written by [ ] the FDD liaison officer at the FBIS German Bureau, and John Bagnall, then FDD Chief, respectively, urging and approving consolidation of German press scrutiny activities at Frankfurt. 1208/

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The plethora of paper continued, especially from the FBIS side. This dealt with all aspects of the problem -- costs, personnel, language, duplication, quality and timeliness of output, etc. -- all intended to demonstrate the validity of the sender's case and to sway the chairman's thoughts and conclusions as he prepared his report. During the week 13-19 October FBIS submitted five back-up papers on different subjects to

[ ] -- an illustration of the importance with which the pending decision was viewed. Despite the confidence expressed earlier by [ ] FBIS was taking no chances that any information or insights favorable to its side of the argument were not brought to the chairman's attention. The same attitude could be attributed to FDD, but the volume of paper from the division was not as great.

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## 2. The FDD Position Paper

On 15 November 1966, after four and a half months of discussion on the pros and cons of the merger question in the course of which reams of paper supporting each side's views were submitted, FDD issued a voluminous position paper on the subject. Defining the problem as the DD/I's search for T/O positions for intelligence production,  author of the paper, introduced a second question, namely, whether the option of seeking positions had to be limited either to an FDD-FBIS merger or to arrangements for increased press exploitation overseas without being given the broader scope of seeking economies by any practical manner in both organizations. In other words, he felt that a smaller target than necessary and the least attractive alternative from both an administrative and substantive standpoint had been chosen. Because the committee was limited to a single option, he stated, it became apparent that the only way to achieve savings, except by direct T/O reductions, was to consider the possibility of having foreign nationals perform overseas many of the tasks carried out at headquarters by staff personnel. It was around the pros and cons of this configuration that the FDD and FBIS positions had polarized, and the committee concentrated its efforts primarily

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on a comparison between operational costs and service capabilities of this arrangement and the existing FDD-JPRS operation.

FBIS based its arguments in favor of a merger primarily on the judgment that a merger would eliminate duplication, increase timeliness, and save T/O positions. FDD, which opposed the merger, followed the opposite tack in its argumentation. The cost per 1,000 words of FBIS published information, for example, was at least six times greater than FDD costs, and the reduction in costs that would accrue from the few positions saved would be offset by other costs directly related to the merger.

The position paper discussed in detail the factors which in FDD's view would have to be considered to ensure a logical solution. In summary, these discussions led FDD to the following conclusions:

1. There was no logical basis for merging FDD and FBIS operations since the two components consisted of two distinct intelligence collection systems, each covering different sources of information and requiring different methods of exploitation and differently skilled personnel.
2. The relocation of press exploitation overseas would yield no real economies.
3. FDD did not duplicate FBIS reporting.
4. The timeliness of FDD reporting was responsive to consumer needs, appropriate to the substance of the information reported by FDD, and consistent with the principle of responsible program and budgetary planning.

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5. The proposed relocation of press exploitation overseas would have a critically adverse impact on the Agency's linguistic support operations.

6. The change from domestic to foreign-based operations would have an adverse effect on current Administration and Agency policy directives relating to the balance of payments problem.

Having thus outlined the negative effects of the proposed merger, the FDD position paper then took the offensive and identified and analyzed in detail areas where substantial advantages could accrue through increased coordination and cooperation. This would entail, for example, putting to use uncommitted translation and editing capability in the FBIS field bureaus, seeking out the activities in both operations which yielded the lowest output of intelligence information and securing their elimination or the substitution of more economical means, and the elimination from high priority processing of FBIS services not deserving of such treatment. In the latter category the paper suggested a review of several FBIS operations.

In view of FDD's conviction that the disadvantages accruing to the DD/I and the Agency from an FDD-FBIS merger far outweighed the limited potential for personnel reductions,  recommended against the merger of these activities and proposed that, if the transfer of staff positions to intelligence production functions was mandatory, overall DD/I and Agency interests could best be served

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by a reduction in funds and personnel for those operations in each organization which did not meet the highest standards of cost effectiveness. 1209/

The FDD position paper was forwarded to the chairman of the ad hoc study committee on 16 November by John Vance, D/CR, with several supporting observations, including a brief analysis of the differences in sources employed by FDD and FBIS which stressed in particular the editorial judgments contained in the press which were not generally characteristic of broadcast traffic. He also emphasized the continuing need for a sizable staff complement at Headquarters even if the main effort should be shifted to a contract operation elsewhere. 1210/

FBIS comments on the FDD Position Paper, submitted by [redacted] a week later in a memorandum to [redacted] were predictably negative. The substance of the FDD paper, [redacted] declared, rested on erroneous premises. He disputed, for example, the FDD practice of comparing press scrutiny with radio monitoring costs; he felt that to lump FDD and JPRS output was to blur the picture since only FDD positions were under consideration; and he characterized the categorical statement of no duplication between FDD and FBIS as "demonstrably" inaccurate. Other points, including FDD's "curious" use of statistical computations, were brought up,

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and the memorandum left no doubt that the FDD paper had done nothing to change FBIS conclusions. 1211/ A fuller analysis involving a point-by-point reply to the FDD Position Paper was issued by FBIS on 14 December, but it merely presented in detail the content of the 22 November memorandum.

[ ] reaction to the FDD Position Paper and to the FBIS critique was significant. He informed [ ] that he had found the FBIS comments on the FDD paper "well tempered" and "responsive" to a number of important points. In contrast, the FDD Position Paper merely repeated arguments which had been offered in the course of his committee's deliberation and did not address itself to the original terms of reference. Its usefulness, he felt, was therefore compromised. 1212/

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Meanwhile, the campaign by both sides to influence the ultimate decision continued on all fronts. On 18 November the FBIS Director presented an elaborate case demonstrating the incidence of FDD-FBIS duplication despite the existence of an agreement between the two components designed to avoid this;\* 1213/

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\* On 4 January 1967, following a review of the study group working papers and a discussion with the directors of OCR and FBIS, Paul Borel, Director of Intelligence Support (DIS), addressed himself to the issue of translation duplication which had so frequently been brought up by FBIS in the course of the feasibility study. Although expressing some dissatisfaction with the scope and coverage of overall FDD and FBIS production, he concluded that there was no

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at the same time claims and counter-claims were put forward on the currency of reporting and on the receipt of sources; 1215/ and on 22 November FBIS once more pointed out, with illustrations, the benefits of single-packaging open material on the same subject. 1216/

By the latter part of November, having employed the mass of arguments and facts presented by FDD and FBIS to support their respective positions and having applied to this data an exhaustive method of inductive systems and cost analysis,  had completed his statistical presentation and had drawn up tentative conclusions and recommendations for the study committee report. He had made no fast commitment at this point, but it had become increasingly clear that he was leaning in favor of an operational consolidation and a shift overseas of much of the so-called "current" press exploitation. He fixed on the idea of identifying this as all material appearing in daily and weekly newspapers, which FBIS reminded him had to include all press items, in order to avoid double-scanning.

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\* (continued) basis for the FBIS complaint because no real problem existed. The examples cited by FBIS to back its contention he did not regard as valid. Moreover, the Moberg Survey earlier in 1966 had found that, out of 347 replies from CIA analysts, only four claimed total duplication and only 74 noted partial duplication, which many discounted as insignificant and unavoidable. 1214/

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By the end of November the chairman had devised a model overseas press operation based on doing European press scrutiny in London rather than Vienna. The change in locale was based on the greater availability of English-speaking contract personnel in London. The Hong Kong PMU operation, he felt, was well-suited to be used as an Asian model. Consideration was also given to the possibility of using Buenos Aires, Saigon, and Bangkok for other world areas. 1217/

The FDD position was beginning to erode by the beginning of December and [ ] attempted to salvage what he could. On 1 December he submitted to [ ] who had requested it, the results of a study of the proposed overseas exploitation of the USSR and East European press. If approved, such a program would be conducted at FBIS overseas bureaus but under the management of FDD staff employees. 1218/ In an 8 December reply, [ ] for FBIS sharply rejected the concept of separate management of press and radio processing through shared facilities and insisted that the opportunities inherent in a consolidation of operation "not be smothered in bureaucratic encumbrances" but rather "be assessed and pursued without regard for traditional preserves and empires." 1219/ Since it was the FDD "preserve and empire" which was about to bear the brunt of the study group decision, this was advice easily given.

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FDD repeated its opposition to relinquishing control of press exploitation, whether performed overseas or in the United States. [ ] insisted there was no valid basis for a merger of FDD and FBIS nor for the "one management and one chain of command" concept proposed by [ ] in order to achieve effective operation of the London model. He reasoned that as FBIS was not engaged in any language activity in London, there would be no occasion to share linguistic assets or for any other joint operation and that FDD would require only logistics and communications support from FBIS. It was anticipated that a minimum of five staff employees would be required to handle all linguistic processing in London. 1220/

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That a "consolidation" of FDD and FBIS in some form would take place was by now a foregone conclusion. [ ] was examining the management problem and weighing alternatives which he felt should be outlined for the DD/I. One possibility would be to place the two activities under one overall management. This would constitute roughly a partnership of equals, an arrangement likely to be preferred by FDD. Another would be the move suggested by FBIS, that is, the transfer of FDD *en bloc* to FBIS and the integration of its functions into FBIS operations. In either instance [ ] hoped to draw on the experience of both groups and to accomplish the change without it appearing to be

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a victory for either component. 1221/

Both FDD and FBIS had from time to time, at  request, expressed their views on a consolidated press exploitation operation, FDD most recently in its position paper. On 20 December FBIS presented to the chairman a detailed memorandum incorporating its suggestions on the structure of an overt media exploitation organization. This paper outlined in large part the program which was eventually implemented. It foresaw the emergence of a new entity reflecting the common features of both organizations while retaining the distinctive characteristics unique to each. FDD would be transferred to FBIS and the merging process would then begin. Present modes of operation would temporarily continue, but as press material entered the flow from overseas, these distinctions would dissolve. To free linguistic personnel at Headquarters, press exploitation operations in major overseas bureaus would be enlarged along the lines of the models presented to the committee. Managerial positions through division chiefs would be filled by either former editorial or linguistic personnel on the basis of experience and ability without regard for former affiliation. One of the chief benefits of a consolidation, as FBIS saw it, would be the emergence of a common mission based not on media but on requirements. 1222/

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The feasibility study had by the last weeks of December almost run its course. A final brief altercation occurred between FDD and FBIS over presentations by the two components of production figures; it was touched off by what FDD regarded as an inflated FBIS claim of wordage produced by its German Bureau monitors. 1223/ Each side had by now presented its case *ad infinitum* and had furnished the committee chairman with exhaustive data. [ ] had begun the task of writing the report in November, and all that remained was to put it in its final form.

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3. The [ ] Report and Aftermath

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On 1 February 1967, some eight months after initiation of the study, [ ] submitted to the ADD/I his report entitled "Study of Press and Broadcast Monitoring Activities." This 150-page vehicle encompassed a synthesis of all the facts considered in the course of the study and presented a total of 16 conclusions and 14 recommendations, two of the latter being basic and the remainder largely derivative. The study concluded that it was feasible to combine broadcast monitoring with foreign publication exploitation at certain locations abroad and that a significant reduction in staff positions could be achieved by using foreign linguists at these locations. To realize a comparable reduction in expenditures, however, foreign nationals

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would have to do most of the field editing as well. Such an arrangement was probably feasible, but [ ] recommended that this first be tested against the Soviet and East European press in London before applying the proposal to other printed media and adopting it generally for other areas. If the London model proved successful as a plan for general operations, [ ] anticipated an eventual net savings of about 100 staff positions together with greatly improved timeliness, elimination of duplication, quality maintenance, and retention of an in-house linguistic capability adequate for most contingencies.

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The study also concluded that the similarities between foreign broadcast monitoring and foreign publications exploitation greatly exceeded the differences. The examination of these two activities had convinced [ ] that FDD and FBIS had much more in common than the former had with its then parent organization, OCR. He therefore recommended consolidation of FDD and FBIS as essential to the more efficient performance of their present functions and as indispensable for the successful exploitation of foreign publications abroad. 1224/

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Needless to say, though they came as no surprise, the results of the [ ] Study were a disappointment to FDD management and staff. Two weeks after the report was issued,

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[redacted] directed a memorandum to the D/CR delineating the FDD position on the [redacted] Study. Concerning the two basic recommendations, that is, the merger of the two organizations and the testing of overseas press exploitation, he concurred in both, though he did not endorse [redacted] concept of operations or estimate of potential personnel savings. Of the remaining 12 recommendations he concurred in all but three. These pertained to negotiations with State to allocate to the Hong Kong PMU Chinese press exploitation on all but S&T subjects; contingent on success of the London model, collocating exploitation of Southeast Asian and Latin American publications with FBIS bureaus in these areas; and retention of Acquisitions Branch by OCR. 1225/

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To accompany the FDD Position Memorandum, [redacted] submitted a second one in which he urged careful, though expeditious, implementation of the [redacted] proposals. He expressed the belief that the best means to achieve this step would be to bring the FDD and FBIS functions into the new organization as equal partners, each under the supervision of a deputy reporting to a director of an office of foreign media monitoring. 1226/ Since this suggestion ran counter to the strongly-held conviction of the FBIS representatives on the study group that there should be a single chain of command, it appeared unlikely that this proposal would have much

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chance of acceptance. Indeed, [ ] proposal was never seriously considered.

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On 20 February Paul Borel, in recommending approval of the [ ] Report and the transfer of FDD from OCR to FBIS, offered some interesting comments to the DD/I. He cited the report as an excellent study but termed regrettable the fact that the original frame of reference had been so restricted as to obviate consideration of other alternatives for the disposition of FDD. In this he echoed [ ] earlier complaint. Borel also posed the interesting questions of why the merger of the two components had not occurred in the 15 years they were under OO or why in 1962 the then head of FDD had offered persuasive reasons why FDD, having nothing in common with FBIS, should be moved to OCR. Borel also noted the fact that the report made no mention of the impact on the US balance of payments problems of expanding overseas operations, a point frequently stressed by FDD in the negotiations just concluded. He also felt that the saving of 100 positions, contemplated in the [ ] conclusions, was too high a figure to come out of FDD alone as were also [ ] estimates of the extent to which the management of the translation effort could be turned over to foreigners. Borel, however, approved of the basic notion of doing this and believed it would result in appreciable savings, perhaps 50 or more in FDD. He thought the

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principle had application in FBIS as well. 1227/

That the impact of positions lost be shared by the two components, as suggested by the DIS, appeared not to have been contemplated. On 14 February [ ] chief of the FBIS executive staff, with other FBIS officers -- no FDD representative was present -- met with John Bagnall, since 1 November 1965 the DD/I Planning Officer, to discuss plans for the merger. Bagnall informed the group that the DD/I had decided to recommend to the DCI the transfer of FDD *in toto* to FBIS. In line with this decision, for FY 1968 he would allocate to FBIS [ ] FDD staff positions for the press monitoring program, a 16-position cut from [ ] already approved for FDD in FY 1968. This represented the savings in positions to be derived from establishing the London model. Added to the [ ] were five staff positions representing the present level of FBIS press monitoring, a total of [ ] for FY 1968. At the same time the number of positions allocated to broadcast monitoring and propaganda analysis for FY 1968 was [ ] Since the [ ] Report had contemplated a saving of almost 100 positions, further cuts would be required. This was to be accomplished by reducing the press monitoring positions to 180 by FY 1969 and 143 by FY 1973. Broadcast monitoring and propaganda analysis positions would be increased

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to 322 by FY 1969 and remain at this level through FY 1973. Also under consideration was the possibility of phasing down or closing one or more of the JPRS field offices to free more staff positions. 1228/

By mid-February the DD/I had accepted the [ ] recommenda- 25X1  
 tions to merge FDD and FBIS activities into a single component, and the FDD case for independent survival was lost. [ ] 25X1  
 accepted the decision in good grace and on 24 February formally apprised the FDD staff of it, expressing the belief that the pending changes would prove beneficial to both components by providing greatly enlarged career opportunities for all personnel concerned. 1229/

Meanwhile, preliminary to the actual transfer, steps had been initiated to plan and carry out the numerous tasks involved in beginning the long-term process of consolidation, including such matters as plans for the London model, transfer and consolidation of funds, development of a new and broader organization, space allocations, orientation briefings and many others. In connection with organizational planning, [ ] suggested 25X1  
 assigning the Chief, FDD, to the FBIS Director's Office to head a special merger task force, and this was done. This had the double advantage of involving the top FDD echelon in the merger

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process and relieving the Director's Office of participation in working out the details. At the same time  presence at the head of the task force would reassure FDD staff members, some of whom doubtless had qualms about a merger designed to eliminate slots they now occupied. 1230/

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The FDD story ended on 1 March 1967. Effective that day the division, less its Acquisitions Branch (which was retained by OCR), was transferred to FBIS. 1231/ For the next two months it operated essentially unchanged as a division of the new amalgamated organization, but on 1 May the old FBIS administrative set-up was reorganized, and with this change the designation "Foreign Documents Division" went out of existence.

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## CHAPTER SIXTEEN

Conclusion

To conclude this history, a brief highlighting of FDD's 20-year career and some random thoughts on these high points may be in order.

The close affinity between FDD and FBIS operations, offered at the merger negotiations as the reason for combining the two components, leads to the question of why the merging of press and radio monitoring was so long delayed. If it served to bring about fiscal economies in 1967, would this not also have been a desirable goal much earlier? The answer is an obvious "yes," but the reason for failure to push merger earlier is apparent, too. The two operations originated on the basis of widely divergent developments in the World War II period and, under the circumstances, little if any thought was given to combining them at that time. Subsequent growth brought the development and solidification of separate cadres, organizations, philosophies of function, and methods. Consequently, a consolidation of operations, which in the early years could have

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been more easily accomplished, was made many times more difficult 20 years later by bureaucratic inertia and opposition. Moreover, the saving in positions, the basic purpose of the move, could have been accomplished whether the two components were integrated or not. The merger fulfilled its purpose, but it created very little change in operations. As of this writing (1973), the anticipated integration of press and radio monitoring, which in the early stages of the merger negotiations in 1966 was foreseen as an amalgamated function of combined production branches, has not materialized. Each operation is still separately conducted.

Perhaps the single most significant operational event in FDD history was the establishment and development from 1957 on of the JPRS field office system. It was important because it constituted an escape from the quantitative limitations imposed theretofore on FDD production by required personnel and security qualifications and, at some sacrifice of quality control, represented a breakthrough to almost unlimited translation capacity at a very reasonable cost. It solved the division's most pressing and persistent problem -- volume of material.

On the other hand, the ALP/MT project to develop machine translation, designed to expand FDD operations further still,

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proved a failure. Despite expenditures of more than [redacted] and considerable time and effort, this experiment made no contribution whatever so far as the division was concerned. In light of the advances achieved in MT up to that time, however, it was a test which had to be made.

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The transfer of FDD to OCR in 1963 was ostensibly designed to effect savings through a reexamination and streamlining of the division's program. This was largely accomplished. Numerous reports were eliminated and the balance of the reporting program was reorganized and made more meaningful and responsive to consumer requirements. Basically, however, this purpose, though important, was secondary. The transfer was consummated as a by-product of administrative changes at a higher level, namely, the abolition of OO, which had outlived its usefulness, and the establishment of direct contact in the chain of command between the DD/I and two of the three former OO components. FDD was not a beneficiary of this change. Some, though less than serious, consideration was given to the possibility of advancing FDD to Office status, but this was never carried out.

A word or two on some of the strengths and weaknesses of FDD. Without doubt the overriding strength of the organization was the concept for which it was created in the first place, to serve as a focal point for the intelligence

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community — expanded later on even beyond this — for all foreign literature translation and handling. Through its CTS/DEX operation the division prevented untold hours of duplicative and wasteful translation and thereby saved the government thousands of dollars. Paradoxically, during the merger talks in late 1966 one of the primary reasons offered for merger was the duplication factor. As these discussions brought out, some FDD-FBIS duplication existed despite continuing efforts to avoid it. It was, however, minimal. Closer coordination and more stringent supervision could doubtless have reduced this even further.

Another strength was the consolidation by the division of valuable and, in many instances, unique language resources which offered capabilities in almost every known language and dialect required by the government. With FDD as the central medium, the dispersal of these resources was prevented and they were maintained as a common fund for the benefit of the community.

A weakness often cited during FDD's 20 years was the division's production delays. The nature and volume of the source material exploited by the division made such delays difficult to avoid and created a considerable degree of consumer dissatisfaction. In the course of time, procedures

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that were at least partially successful were introduced to eliminate the delays or reduce their effect. Still, the division never achieved the currency of output that FBIS, for example, maintained. Perhaps the solution would have been the early institution of overseas press exploitation to bring the division closer to its sources. Control of the PPO system would also have helped.

Another weakness -- one not of its own making -- which plagued FDD from the beginning and was never satisfactorily resolved was its physical isolation from its consumers. The encouragement of liaison and the establishment of language service units in various CIA areas were helpful, but it goes without saying that had the division been located within the main CIA area, its contribution could have been many times more efficient and timely.

FDD no longer exists, but the division's common-service function of document processing continues. Despite all the buffeting encountered, especially in the long interim from 1946 to 1953 when the issue was actively debated, in the final analysis the fact was accepted that the processing of documents, including translation, was better performed as a centralized operation than dispersed among separate Agency components. The delay on the part of the intelligence community

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in accepting this fact was a matter of self-interest mainly attributable to the fear that a central system was less responsive to consumer requirements than individual component translation units would be. This attitude is difficult to understand in view of the general acceptance during this same period of the central service performed by FBIS in connection with radio intercept of materials very similar in content to press items. Whatever the reason, it required a considerable selling effort by FDD over an extended period of time to convince the consumers of the quality of its output and the economies inherent in the system developed to service the community. Once acceptance had been achieved, the division played an important role in intelligence collection. The events of 1967 would appear to indicate that the importance of this role, if not of the administrative structure which performed it, continues.

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**Appendix A**


**Organizational Charts**

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DOCUMENTS BRANCH

17 December 1946



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
FOREIGN DOCUMENTS BRANCH

27 June 1947

Office of  
the Chief  
- - -  
John J. Bagnall,  
acting chief

Administrative  
Staff  
- - -  
[redacted]  
acting chief

25X1



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
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FOREIGN DOCUMENTS BRANCH

29 July 1948



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
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FOREIGN DOCUMENTS BRANCH

24 August 1949



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25X1

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FOREIGN DOCUMENTS DIVISION

27 June 1951

Office of the Chief  
John J. Bagnall,  
chief

Administrative Staff  
acting chief

25X1

25X1

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Reports Branch  
chief

Documents Control Branch  
chief

Scientific and Technical Branch  
chief

USSR Branch  
chief

25X1

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Eastern Europe Branch  
chief

Far East Branch  
chief

Near East /Africa Branch  
chief

Western Europe Branch  
acting chief

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
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FOREIGN DOCUMENTS DIVISION

7 May 1953



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25X1

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
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FOREIGN DOCUMENTS DIVISION

1 October 1953



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25X1  
25X1


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25X1  
25X1

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FOREIGN DOCUMENTS DIVISION

1 April 1957



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FOREIGN DOCUMENTS DIVISION

9 June 1960

Office of the Chief  
- - -  
John J. Bagnall,  
chief

Joint Publications  
Research  
Service  
- - -  
chief

Administrative  
Staff  
- - -  
chief

25X1

25X1

25X1

Support  
Branch  
- - -  
chief

USSR  
Branch  
- - -  
chief

Asia  
Branch  
- - -  
chief

Europe/Africa  
Branch  
- - -  
chief

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
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FOREIGN DOCUMENTS DIVISION

1 April 1965



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## Appendix B

FOREIGN DOCUMENTS DIVISION STATISTICS 1947-1967  
(Fiscal Years)

Date	Requirements Received	Foreign Documents Screened	Foreign-Language Pages Screened	Reports Issued (English pages)	Personnel on Duty (start of FY)	Languages Involved <sup>a</sup>	Annual Budget Allotments (dollars)
1947	194 <sup>b</sup>	82,790 (Feb -Jun 47)	111,750 <sup>b</sup>	20,407 <sup>b</sup>		36	
1948	533 <sup>b</sup>	111,397 <sup>b</sup>	2,784,925 <sup>b</sup>	51,942 <sup>b</sup>		36	
1949	635 <sup>b</sup>	144,496 <sup>b</sup>	3,612,400 <sup>b</sup>	59,410 <sup>b</sup>		43	
1950	1,443	153,171	4,436,725 <sup>b</sup>	56,608		47	
1951	1,560	226,644	5,666,100	76,855		52	
1952	2,182	252,954	6,444,600	119,868		60	
1953	2,664	260,901	6,649,640	137,795		72	
1954	2,859	200,022	5,111,533	169,664		71	
1955	3,150	194,058	5,026,885	163,991		60	
1956	3,055	175,986	4,462,912	164,963		51	
1957	3,407	173,048	16,511,397 <sup>e</sup>	167,410		57	
1958	3,713	173,298	20,232,471	184,739		57	
1959	3,131	168,143	28,202,000	225,060		n.a.	
1960	2,920	245,416	28,800,000	212,096		56	
1961	3,061	244,300	28,802,500	335,479		n.a.	
1962	3,358	271,700	32,773,500	390,861		n.a.	
1963	3,646	298,000	35,410,000	403,517		n.a.	
1964	3,990	395,300	52,036,000	434,309		52	
1965	3,956	n.a.	n.a.	438,069		50	
1966	4,334	n.a.	n.a.	413,715		51	
1967 <sup>f</sup>	2,990	n.a.	n.a.	268,153		46	

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a The figures in this column represent only the number of languages employed during the year and do not indicate the total language capability of FDD. In 1954, for example, the Division had a potential of 117 languages and dialects but used only 71.

b Calendar Year.

c Cost for January-March 1947.

d Cost for April-June 1948.

e A new system for computing foreign-language pages was instituted in 1957. In place of a miscellaneous, raw page count, a standard 300-words-per-page system was adopted.

f To 1 March 1967.

CHIEFS AND DEPUTY CHIEFS

<u>From</u>	<u>Dates</u> <u>To</u>	<u>Designation</u>	<u>Chief</u>	<u>Deputy Chief</u>	<u>Authority</u>	
1 Dec 46	28 Feb 47	DB	[REDACTED]	John J. Bagnall		25X1
1 Mar 47	13 Mar 47	DB	John J. Bagnall (acting)		DAD/O, 28 Feb 47	
13 Mar 47	27 Jun 47	DB	John J. Bagnall		AD/O, 13 Mar 47	
27 Jun 47	20 Oct 47	FDB	John J. Bagnall (acting)		AD/O, 27 Jun 47	
20 Oct 47	26 Oct 48	FDB	[REDACTED]	John J. Bagnall	AD/O, 24 Oct 47	25X1
26 Oct 48	14 Feb 49	FDB	John J. Bagnall (acting)		AD/O, 25 Oct 48	
24 Jan 49	1 Sep 49	FDB		Benjamin B. Cain (acting)	Acting Chief, FDB 24 Jan 49	25X1
14 Feb 49	29 Sep 49	FDB	John J. Bagnall			
7 Aug 49	29 Sep 49	FDB		Benjamin B. Cain		
29 Sep 49	11 Jun 50	FDD	John J. Bagnall (acting)		GO No. 45, 29 Sep 49	
29 Sep 49	31 Dec 59	FDD		Benjamin B. Cain		
11 Jun 50	23 Dec 63	FDD	John J. Bagnall		AD/O, 15 Jun 50	
10 Jan 60	23 Dec 63	FDD		[REDACTED]		25X1
23 Dec 63	31 Jan 64	FDD	[REDACTED] (acting)			25X1
31 Jan 64	1 Mar 67	FDD	[REDACTED]		AD/CR, 31 Jan 64	25X1

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Appendix D

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 16

FOREIGN LANGUAGE PUBLICATIONS

(Approved 3/7/53; CONFIDENTIAL)

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and for the purposes enunciated in paragraphs (d) and (e) thereof, the National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that:

1. The Director of Central Intelligence shall insure the coordination of the procurement of foreign language publications for intelligence purposes, it being understood that captured documents are excepted from this provision.
2. The Director of Central Intelligence shall provide, as a primary responsibility, for the following services to the IAC agencies:
  - a. Preparing and disseminating English language excerpts, summaries, abstracts, and compilations from foreign language publications.

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b. Developing and maintaining indexes, accession lists, and reference services regarding foreign language publications of intelligence interest.

3. The Director of Central Intelligence shall insure the coordination of the above activities, as well as the coordination of translation services, with similar activities maintained by the intelligence agencies in accordance with their needs; such coordination should not prejudice the maintenance of facilities necessary to meet departmental demands.

4. The intelligence agencies of the Government shall grant to the Director of Central Intelligence, upon request, access to foreign language publications in their possession.

5. An Advisory Committee on Foreign Language Publications shall be established to assist the Director of Central Intelligence in the implementation of this directive. It shall be composed of the IAC agencies and other agencies of the Government will be invited to sit with the Committee on matters which concern them.

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## APPENDIX E

Abbreviations

ACFLP	Advisory Committee on Foreign-Language Publications
ACML	Advisory Committee on Mechanical Linguistics
AC of S	Assistant Chief of Staff
AD/CD	Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination
AD/CI	Assistant Director for Current Intelligence
AD/CR	Assistant Director for Central Reference
AD/CS	Assistant Director for Computer Services
ADD	Air Documents Division
ADD/I	Assistant Deputy Director for Intelligence
A/DD/I (Admin)	Assistant to the Deputy Director for Intelligence (Administration)
AD/IC	Assistant Director for Intelligence Coordination
AD/NE	Assistant Director for National Estimates
AD/O	Assistant Director for Operations
ADP	Automatic Data Processing
ADPC	Automatic Data Processing Committee
ADPS	Automatic Data Processing Staff
AD/RE	Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates

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AD/RR	Assistant Director for Research and Reports
AD/SI	Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence
AEC	Atomic Energy Commission
AFB	Air Force Base
AGO	Adjutant General's Office
AID	Air Information Division
ALP	Automatic Language Processing
ALPAC	Automatic Language Processing Advisory Committee
A&M	Administration and Management
AMS	Army Map Service
AP	Associated Press
ARD	Air Research Division
ARDC	Air Research and Development Command
ASC	Army Security Center
ASDIC	Armed Services Documents Intelligence Center
ASPIC	Armed Services Personnel Interrogation Center
ATIC	Air Technical Intelligence Center
ATIS, SWPA	Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, Southwest Pacific Area
BGN	Board of Geographic Names
BID	Basic Intelligence Directive

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BR	Biographic Register
BR	Reports Branch (FDD)
BST	Scientific and Technical Branch (FDD)
CA/PROP	Covert Action/Propaganda Group
CD	Contact Division
CE	Counter Espionage
CEFD	Committee on Exploitation of Foreign Documents
CEFLD	Committee on Exploitation of Foreign-Language Documents
CEFLP	Committee on Exploitation of Foreign-Language Publications
CEIR	Corporation for Economic and Industrial Research (firm)

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CFSTI	Clearinghouse for Scientific and Technical Information
CGS	Collection Guidance Staff
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIG	Central Intelligence Group
C/M	Coordination and Management Staff
COAPS	Coordination, Operations and Policy Staff
CODIB	Committee on Documentation, United States Intelligence Board
CS	Clandestine Services
CTC	CIA Transliteration Committee

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CTS	Consolidated Translation Survey
DAD/O	Deputy Assistant Director for Operations
DAD/CD	Deputy Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination
DAD/CR	Deputy Assistant Director for Central Reference
DAD/NE	Deputy Assistant Director for National Estimates
DB	Documents Branch
DCB	Documents Control Branch
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence
DCID	Director of Central Intelligence Directive
D/CR	Director of Central Reference
DCS	Domestic Contact Service
DD/A	Deputy Director/Administration
DD/C	Deputy Director/Coordination
DDCI	Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
DD/I	Deputy Director/Intelligence
DD/P	Deputy Director/Planning
DD/S	Deputy Director/Support
DD/S&T	Deputy Director/Science and Technology
DEX	Central Foreign-Language Document Exploitation File
D/FI	Division D/Foreign Intelligence Staff
DIS	Director of Intelligence Support

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DNI	Director of Naval Intelligence
DOD	Department of Defense
DRS	Division of Research for the Soviet Union (OIR/State)

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ECA	Economic Cooperation Administration
EDP	Electronic Data Processing
EUCCOM	European Command
FB	Foreign Branch
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBIB	Foreign Broadcast Information Branch
FBID	Foreign Broadcast Information Division
FBIS	Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FDB	Foreign Documents Branch
FDD	Foreign Documents Division
FE	Far Eastern Division
FECOM	Far East Command
FLASC	Foreign Language Service Center
FLWG	Foreign Language Working Group
FOUO	For Official Use Only
FPB	Foreign Press Bulletin
FTD	Foreign Technology Division (Air Force)

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FY	Fiscal Year
GAO	General Accounting Office
GAT	Georgetown University General Analysis Translation Project
GOO	General Counsel's Office
GHQ	General Headquarters
GMDS	German Military Documents Section
GPO	Government Printing Office
GSA	General Services Administration
GSUSA	General Staff, United States Army
GU	Georgetown University
GULL	Georgetown University Institute of Languages and Linguistics
HKPMS	Hong Kong Press Monitoring Service
IAB	Intelligence Advisory Board
IAC	Intelligence Advisory Committee
IAD	Intelligence Acquisitions Division
IBM	International Business Machines (firm)
ICAPS	Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff
ICC	International Control Commission
ICC	International Copyright Convention
ICC	Industrial Catalogue Cards

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ICF	Industrial Card File
ICMTR	Interagency Committee on Machine Translation Research
ID	Intelligence Division
IG	Inspector General
INR	Bureau of Intelligence and Research (State Department)
IPF	Industrial Plant File
IR	Industrial Register
I&S	Inspections and Security
ISS	Intelligence Support Services
JALPC	Joint Automatic Language Processing Center
JALPG	Joint Automatic Language Processing Group
JCCC	Joint Committee on Contemporary China
JCP	Joint Committee on Printing (Congress)
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JIC	Joint Intelligence Committee
JICPOA	Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Area
JIG	Joint Intelligence Group
JIPC	Joint Interrogation Planning Commission
JMIA	Joint Materiel Intelligence Agency
JPRC	Joint Publications Research Committee

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JPRS	Joint Press Reading Service (US Embassy, Moscow)
JPRS	Joint Publications Research Service (FDD)
JPRS/DC	Joint Publications Research Service/District of Columbia
JPRS/NY	Joint Publications Research Service/New York
JPRS/SF	Joint Publications Research Service/San Francisco
LCS	Linguist Consultation Service
LPU	Language Processing Unit
LSS	Linguistic Support Staff
MAT	Machine-Assisted Translation
MICA	Monthly Index of Chinese Accessions
MIS	Military Intelligence Service
MIT	Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MLRA	Monthly List of Russian Accessions
MT	Machine Translation
MTI	Machine Translation, Incorporated (firm)
NIA	National Intelligence Authority
NIH	National Institutes of Health
NSA	National Security Agency
NSC	National Security Council
NSCID	National Security Council Intelligence Directive
NSF	National Science Foundation

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NYK	Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha (Tokyo)
OCD	Office of Collection and Dissemination
OCI	Office of Current Intelligence
OCR	Office of Central Reference
OCS	Office of Computer Services
ODM	Office of Defense Mobilization
OER	Office of Economic Research
OIC	Office of Intelligence Coordination
OIR	Office of Intelligence Research (State)
OIS	Operational Intelligence Support
OL	Office of Logistics
ONE	Office of National Estimates
ONI	Office of Naval Intelligence
OO	Office of Operations
OP	Office of Personnel
ORE	Office of Reports and Estimates
ORR	Office of Research and Reports
OS	Office of Security
OSI	Office of Scientific Intelligence
OSO	Office of Special Operations
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
OTR	Office of Training

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OTS	Office of Technical Services (Commerce)
P&A	Personnel and Administration
PACMIRS	Pacific Military Intelligence Research Service
P&C	Planning and Coordinating Staff
PCS	Permanent Change of Station
PERT	Program Evaluation and Review Technique
PMU	Press Monitoring Unit
PPO	Publications Procurement Officer
PRC	Project Review Committee
PSD	Printing Services Division
PSI	Programming Services, Incorporated (firm)
R&D	Research and Development
RID	Records Integration Division
RLP	Research Language Processor
RPB	Radio Propaganda Branch
RPD	Radio Propaganda Division
RQM/OIS	Requirements Staff/Office of Intelligence Support
SCAP	Supreme Commander for Allied Powers
SDS	Special Documents Section
SEATIC	Southeast Asia Translation and Interrogation Center

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SEFLP	Subcommittee on Exploitation of Foreign-Language Publications
SGO	Surgeon General's Office
SIC	Scientific Intelligence Committee
SILO	Soviet Scientific Institute Locator file
SINTIC	Sino Translation and Interrogation Center
SIR	Scientific Information Report
SLA	Special Library Association
SLATC	Special Libraries Association Translation Center
SMR	Steno Mark Reader
SOD	Special Operations Division
SOP	Standard operating procedure
SPFLP	Subcommittee on Procurement of Foreign-Language Publications
SRFLP	Subcommittee on Referencing of Foreign-Language Publications
SRI	Southwest Research Institute
SSRC	Social Science Research Council
S&T	Scientific and Technical
TDY	Temporary duty
TICD	Translations on International Communist Developments
TIS	Translator and Interpreter Service
T/O	Table of Organization

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TRW Thompson-Ramo-Wooldrige (firm)  
TSD Technical Services Division (DD/P)  
TSD Translation Service Division



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UCC Universal Copyright Convention  
USASEXC United States Armed Services Exploitation Center  
USIB United States Intelligence Board  
USIS United States Information Service  
USJPRS United States Joint Publications Research Service  
  
WD War Department  
WDC Washington Document Center  
WDC (Adv) Washington Document Center (Advanced)  
WDGS War Department General Staff  
WDP War Documentation Project  
WH Western Hemisphere Division  
  
ZI Zone of Interior

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APPENDIX F

Chronological Table

1944

- 6 Sep -- PACMIRS activated at Camp Ritchie, Maryland.
- 28 Dec -- First Washington Document Conference begins, ends 15 Jan.

1945

- 29-31 Aug -- Second Washington Document Conference held.
- 19 Nov -- WDC (Adv) document team arrives in Japan for six-months survey.

1946

- 17 Apr -- PACMIRS, Op-32F141, and old WDC combined to form the expanded Washington Document Center; Capt. Ranson Fullinwider, USN, appointed chief.
- May -- Special Documents Section established at Fort Holabird, Maryland.
- Jul -- [redacted] appointed chief of WDC. 25X1
- 17 Oct -- Office of Operations established in CIG.
- 30 Nov -- Documents Branch moves from Steuart Building, 5th and K streets, N.W., [redacted] 25X1  
25X1

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- 1 Dec -- WDC passes from Armed Services to CIG control; subordination transferred from ORE to OO, retroactive from 31 Dec 46; WDC renamed "Documents Branch."
- 16 Dec -- CIG policy change announced ending assignment of Allied personnel to WDC, retroactive to 1 Dec 46.

1947

- 6 Feb -- [redacted] document procurement mission to western Europe (Wannsee Collection) commences; completed 30 May. 25X1
- Feb -- DB releases first captured Japanese S&T documents to the public through Commerce Department.
- 1 Mar -- John J. Bagnall appointed acting chief, DB, vice [redacted] 25X1
- 10 Mar -- DB begins participation in ORE's "Sunshine Project," involving source survey at Hoover Library in California.
- 13 Mar -- Bagnall appointed chief, DB.
- 2 Apr -- DB begins first "current" production -- abstracts from USSR and Far East periodicals -- in new report *Periodical Abstracts*.
- 27 Jun -- DB reorganized and redesignated "Foreign Documents Branch"; GMDS and SDS transferred to FDB, effective 29 Jun 47; Document Source Survey Division created; Bagnall appointed deputy chief and acting chief.
- 11 Jul -- Bagnall proposes commencement of document "exploitation" by FDB.
- Sep -- [redacted] 25X1

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- 15 Oct -- First steps taken to formulate an NSCID to cover foreign document exploitation.
- 20 Oct --  appointed chief, FDB. 25X1
- 23 Oct -- ICAPS-OO study group gives approval for Air Force to proceed with document exploitation.
- 1 Dec -- Industrial Plant File (subsequently Industrial Card File) transferred by FDB to Reference Center; eventually incorporated in CIA Industrial Register.
- 22 Dec -- Translation Service Division established in FDB to furnish centralized service for CIA.

1948

- 13 Jan -- First NSCID (No. 8) draft for foreign document exploitation formulated.
- 26 Jan -- FDB begins press exploitation; first *Soviet Press Extracts* published.
- 10 Feb -- Bagnall makes first proposal to alleviate FDB translation load through use of commercial translation firms.
- 12 Mar -- First draft for FDD's contingency wartime organization drawn up.
- 25 Mar -- New FDB weekly publication *Bibliography of Russian Periodicals* initiated.
- 1 Apr -- FDB completes cataloguing of 1,478,611 captured Japanese documents and their transfer to National Archives.
- 4 May -- "Sunshine Project" transferred from ORE to FDB; terminated 30 Sep 48.
- 4 Jun -- Direct foreign document procurement arranged through State Department.

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- 2 Jul -- Yugoslav documents procured through State Department as first step toward a coordinated IAC program for foreign document procurement.
- 9 Jul -- SOCHI Project, "third country" Soviet document procurement through State Department, initiated; phased out in Nov 49.
- 12 Jul -- [ ] document procurement mission to western Europe begins; completed 19 Sep. 25X1
- 29 Jul -- First major reorganization in FDB; three new divisions added: Document Screening and Reference, Eastern Europe, Near East/Africa.
- 18 Aug -- FDB learns of Air Force establishment of "Treasure Island" translation project.
- 1 Sep -- 157,685 captured documents transferred to Library of Congress.
- 3 Sep -- FDB's translation coordination function (CTS/DEX) formally established.
- 26 Oct -- [ ] transferred; Bagnall designated acting chief, FDB. 25X1
- 8 Dec -- CIA Transliteration Committee established; Bagnall named chairman.

1949

- 1 Jan -- Dulles Report recommends FDB subordination under ORE; seconded by NSC 50 on 1 Jul 49 but never implemented.
- 10 Jan -- First meeting of Ad Hoc Committee on Central Translation held.
- 24 Jan -- Benjamin B. Cain designated acting deputy chief, FDB.
- 10 Feb -- Central clearing house concept for translation coordination approved by government components.

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- 14 Feb -- Bagnall appointed chief, FDB.
- 17 Mar -- CIA Document Procurement Committee formed; Bagnall designated FDB member.
- 11 Apr -- Final meeting of Ad Hoc Committee on Translations; replaced by temporary Ad Hoc Committee on Foreign Document Exploitation.
- 27 Jun -- Uniform policy on use of transliteration systems adopted by IAC.
- 25 Jul -- Translation control procedures of FDB formally recommended by CEFID (subsequently approved).
- 1 Aug -- FDB moves from  to Tempo "Y" Building, Constitution Avenue and 21st Street, N.E. 25X1
- 24 Aug -- FDB reorganized: Documents Control and Reports Division established; TSD abolished.
- 29 Sep -- FDB redesignated "Foreign Documents Division."
- 18 Oct -- *First Consolidated Translation Survey* published.
- 16 Dec -- First attempt to obtain NSCID for foreign documents abandoned.

1950

- 9 Jan -- Legal title to all captured Japanese documents transferred by CIA to Library of Congress.
- 11 Jun -- Bagnall promoted from acting chief to chief, FDD.
- 30 Jun -- First FDD discussions held with Armed Services relative to future interagency coordination in wartime captured document exploitation.
- 25 Oct -- Bagnall begins two-month document procurement mission in the Near East.

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27 Oct -- CIA (FDD)-JIG collaboration on wartime captured source material planning formalized; Cain appointed CIA representative for captured documents.

Nov -- OO Task Force set up to explore FDD/FBID propaganda analysis potential.

1951

6 Jan -- Project UT [redacted], FDD's first venture into field operations, authorized by DCI. 25X1

18 Jan -- *Periodical Abstracts (Scientific)* discontinued at OSI request; shortly thereafter resurrected at IAC insistence.

21 Mar -- Project UT begins operations.

29 Mar -- Effort to formulate NSCID revived.

7 Apr -- EARWIG Project, for procurement, through OSO, of Chinese Communist documents, instituted.

9 Apr -- ASDIC established.

27 Jun -- Western European Branch activated.

6 Jul -- CIA agreement with JCS on policies and procedures governing operation of wartime captured documents centers formalized.

29 Jul -- FDD field survey team [redacted] sent to Far East to survey world war II and Korean captured documents. 25X1

Jul -- FDD begins field scrutiny of the Vietnamese press; [redacted] assigned to FBIS Saigon Bureau for one year. 25X1

Jul -- FDD completes first world press reaction report in connection with propaganda analysis feasibility study.

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- 27 Sep -- New report series entitled *Reference Aids* initiated; this responsibility transferred to OCR at end of 1955.
- 13 Nov -- Jackson Survey report submitted to DCI; recommends issuance of NSCID on document exploitation; also retention of FDD by OO.

1952

- 28 Jan -- OO Task Force reports on need for propaganda analysis in both press and radio and notes OO capability to carry it out.
- 1 May -- First test project successfully completed by FDD and FBID on two-media approach to propaganda analysis.
- Jun -- First CIA representation at a formal meeting, at MIT, on machine translation.
- Jun -- [redacted] assigned to newly approved post of Language Consultant on staff of FDD chief; after Jan 1953 this also included function of coordination of language training. 25X1
- 8 Sep -- Agreement reached, in connection with SE-27 Intelligence Deficiencies Statement, for FDD, in cooperation with OCD, to investigate and identify all Chinese Communist literature in US.
- 22 Sep -- FDD T/O increased [redacted] highest attained by the division. 25X1
- 1 Oct -- [redacted] 25X1
- 7 Oct -- [redacted] designated FDD Coordinator for Propaganda Analysis. 25X1
- 24 Nov -- FDD Language Consultation Service established in M Building.

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22 Dec -- Bagnall submits negative analysis on GAT MT project to AD/O.

1953

4 Mar -- CTS/DEX activity expanded to include non-intelligence and non-government organizations.

7 Mar -- NSCID 16 approved; ACFLP established.

17 Apr -- FDD SE-27 survey project completed.

Apr -- FDD branch chiefs and deputies reclassified to GS-14 and GS-13, division chief and deputy to GS-15 and GS-14.

1 May -- Establishment and first meeting of SEFLP.

7 May -- Documents Control Branch dissolved and reconstituted as Foreign Branch/CIA Library.

8 Aug -- Screening Section set up to conduct document screening activity formerly carried on by defunct Documents Control Branch.

11 Aug -- FDD T/O reduced

25X1

19 Aug -- FDD Propaganda Analysis Staff dispersed; only Coordinator retained.

14 Sep --  on PCS to FBID's German Bureau; first FDD officer so assigned.

25X1

1 Oct -- Near East/Africa and Western Europe branches tentatively reorganized to form Western World Branch.

1954

7 Jan -- GAT Project conducted for practical MT demonstration -- 250 words.

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28 May -- Division-wide report *Selected Briefs from the International Press* initiated; forerunner of FDD's international Communism reports.

31 May -- FDD abandons use of guide-type requirements from consumers.

May -- Last analytical report completed by FDD's Propaganda Analysis Staff.

1 Jun -- Publication of *FDD Periodical Abstracts*, one of earliest FDD reports, discontinued.

14 Jun -- [Redacted]

25X1

Jun -- FDD's German exploitation consolidated with FBID press scrutiny.

Jun -- FDD and Air Force coordinate a division of labor in abstracting S&T publications.

Jun -- FDD begins scheduled reporting program.

10 Jul -- Establishment of Western World Branch formalized.

15 Jul -- First steps taken to coordinate FDD and HKPMS exploitation of Chinese-language publications.

13 Aug -- [Redacted]  
1 Nov -- [Redacted]

25X1

12 Nov -- FDD examined by [Redacted] Survey task force.

25X1

Dec -- Language Consultant Service and Division Language Training Officer combined to form Linguistic Support Staff.

1955

Apr -- *Foreign Publications Exploitation Review* issued for first time.

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May -- Project PBJOINTLY initiated; FDD participation terminated end of 1958.

15 Jun -- FDD begins participation in Operation Alert 1955, a three-day war-planning exercise.

[REDACTED]

25X1

1 Jul -- FDD begins participation in War Documentation Project [REDACTED] on captured German documents.

25X1

23 Jul --

[REDACTED]

25X1

19 Nov -- Report on FDD by IG Survey Team issued.

28 Nov -- FDD discontinues issuance of Reference Aids; function transferred to OCR.

7 Dec -- FDD Propaganda Analysis Officer transferred to FBID; formal propaganda analysis operations in FDD terminated.

1956

9 Jan -- Linguistic Support Staff post established at Barton Hall to service OSI.

23 Mar -- Monthly summary *Scientific Information Report* inaugurated.

7 May -- Linguistic Support Staff office opened [REDACTED]

25X1  
25X1

20 Jul -- FDD begins participation in six-day government-wide war-planning exercise Operation Alert 1956.

7 Aug -- SEFLP initiates action which leads to establishment of USJPRS.

9 Nov --

[REDACTED]

25X1

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Nov -- FDD ceases exploitation, first undertaken in 1948, [redacted]

25X1

1957

8 Jan -- FDD report issued on measures taken to conform to IG Survey recommendations.

1 Mar -- DCI approves JPRS project.

Mar -- [redacted] named FDD representative for GAT Project seminars.

25X1

1 Apr -- JPRS/NY begins operations.

26 Apr -- Pilot issue of *Survey of the Soviet Press* published.

3 May -- [redacted]

25X1

10 Jul -- [redacted]

19 Jul -- Current Intelligence Staff established.

16 Aug -- JPRS/DC begins operations.

12 Oct -- Distribution of *Survey of the Soviet Press* to US academic community approved.

28 Oct -- FDD initiates action to provide, through OTS/Commerce, its product for public consumption.

25 Nov -- *New York Times* article published on US lag in exploitation of Russian open scientific literature.

10 Dec -- Bagnall and DCI present briefing on CIA exploitation of Russian scientific publications before Killian Scientific Advisory Committee.

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- 16 Dec -- Move initiated to consolidate existing 17 NSCIDs, including NSCID 16.
- 16 Dec -- NSF Working Group on Russian Scientific Literature formed to make Russian S&T literature more accessible to the public; Bagnall designated CIA member.

1958

- 21 Jan -- NSCID 2 approved by IAC membership.
- 31 Jan -- Language Laboratory established in FDD.
  - Feb -- CTS, SIR, and 12 other FDD reports issued in unclassified form to the public for the first time.
- 30 Apr --  becomes first FDD employee to retire.
- 20 May -- Committee on Exploitation of Foreign Language Publications created, with Bagnall as chairman; ACFLP and SEFLP abolished.
- 2 Jun -- First meeting of CEFLP.
- 4 Jun -- FDD reorganized; section functions consolidated and number of sections reduced from 41 to 22.
- 1 Jul -- Commerce Department's OTS begins service as clearing house for government unclassified S&T translations.
- 8 Jul -- CIA Panel on Exploitation of Foreign-Language Publications formed and first meeting held.
- Jul -- Sharp decline begins in source receipts, particularly Chinese Communist publications.
- Jul -- FDD *Scientific Information Report* placed on commercial distribution through Commerce Department.

25X1

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17 Dec -- Linguistic Support Staff post [ ] closed.

25X1

1959

31 Dec -- Benjamin Cain, deputy chief, FDD, retires.

1960

1 Jan -- [ ] appointed acting deputy chief, FDD, vice Benjamin Cain.

25X1

Jan -- JPRS approached by JCCC and SSRC about expanded release of non-S&T translations to the academic community.

Feb -- Bagnall attends IBM MT presentation; first FDD contact with IBM on ALP/MT.

Mar -- [ ] awarded Intelligence Medal of Merit; first FDD officer to receive this award.

25X1

1 Apr -- Linguistic Support Staff posts at M Building and Barton Hall closed.

May -- FDD begins phasing out scheduled reporting in favor of a new press research program; new program formally proposed on 20 Jun; approved by DD/I and CIA Office Chiefs on 15 Jul and by CEFLP (USIB) on 9 Sep.

9 Jun -- FDD reorganized; six branches consolidated into four; T/O reduced [ ]

25X1

9 Jun -- New daily *Foreign Press Bulletin* on Bloc press first issued; discontinued 14 Oct.

20 Jun -- JPRS facility opened in San Francisco.

1 Jul -- FDD begins use of dictaphone for classified translation.

Jul -- ASDIC and ASPIC combined to form USASEXC.

3 Aug -- [ ] designated CIA member on JIPC.

25X1

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Oct -- JPRS operational headquarters moved from New York to Washington.

31 Dec -- Unclassified SIR, issued by FDD through OTS, discontinued.

1961

30 Jan -- FDD moves from Tempo "Y" Building to Matomic Building, 1717 H Street, N.W.

Mar -- FDD completes Phase I of its contribution (4 million Russian words) to GAT Project; Phase II (9 million Russian words) completed in May.

May -- Three area branch chiefs upgraded from GS-14 to GS-15 positions.

Jun -- MT program reaches evaluation phase.

1 Jul -- Expanded non-S&T report dissemination program by JPRS gets underway.

25 Aug -- FDD begins reportage on insurgency and counter-insurgency.

23 Sep -- FLASC established in Headquarters Building.

Oct -- FDD collaboration with Air Force on MT development begins.

1962

5 Mar -- JPRS/SF completes move to new quarters at 214 Front Street.

11-22 Jun -- First ASDIC/ASPIC training seminar held at Fort Holabird; [redacted] of FDD in attendance.

30 Jun -- JPRS facilities moved to Tempo Building T-30 in Potomac Park.

25X1  
25X1

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- Jun -- FDD discontinues press research program and reverts to current serialized scheduled reporting.
- Jun -- FDD becomes involved in Project CHIVE.
- 4 Sep -- Support Branch reorganized; two deputy chiefs appointed.
- Sep -- CEFLP disestablished as USIB organ and transferred to CIA as coordinating point.
- 18 Oct -- IBM submits formal proposal to install ALP/Stenowriter System in FDD.
- Nov -- [redacted] designated FDD representatives on Project CHIVE. 25X1
- 4 Dec -- ADPS evaluation group recommends acceptance of IBM ALP/Stenowriter System proposal.

1963

- 1 Feb -- *Translations on International Communist Developments* report employed for comprehensive coverage on international Communism.
- 4 Apr -- [redacted] initiated. 25X1
- 31 Jul -- JIPC dissolved.
- Jul -- FDD enters into general agreement for cooperative use of Air Force MT system.
- 7 Oct -- FDD participates in [redacted] five-day command post war-planning exercise. 25X1
- 26 Nov -- Training of flexotypists started in FDD to prepare for receipt of ALP/Stenowriter System.
- 29 Nov -- IBM formally notified of its selection by CIA to provide ALP/Stenowriter System for the Agency; installation, subject to successful test, set for 15 months hence.

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20 Dec -- DDCI approves promotion of Bagnall to DAD/CR;  
 [redacted] interim acting chief, FDD.

25X1

27 Dec -- FDD transferred from OO to OCR.

1964

17 Jan -- FDD begins cooperation with Air Force (FTD)  
 in MT operations.

31 Jan -- [redacted] appointed chief, FDD.

25X1

29 Apr -- First meeting between CIA (FDD and OCS) and IBM  
 personnel on implementing ALP test.

Apr -- ALPAC organized.

18 Jun -- CIA signs contract with IBM to acquire  
 ALP/Stenewriter System.

23 Jun -- JPRS facilities moved to Tempo Building "E"  
 on the Mall.

Sep -- JPRS/SF moved to new quarters at 100 McAllister  
 Street.

4 Dec -- [redacted] recommends discontinuance of CIA  
 investment in non-Russian MT.

25X1

16 Dec -- ALP Acceptance Test Criteria established;  
 Test Procedures issued 18 Mar 65.

Dec -- Moberg Survey of FDD/JPRS reporting program  
 begun.

1965

22 Mar -- Monitoring of Dominican press initiated, on  
 eve of April revolution.

1 Apr -- Acquisitions Branch, formerly of CIA Library,  
 transferred to FDD.

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- 15 Apr -- FDD-FTD cooperation in MT operations discontinued.
- 16 Apr -- FDD moves from Matomic Building to Key Building in Rosslyn, Virginia.
- 28 May -- Development problems in ALP system disclosed at meeting with IBM.
- 15 Jun -- FDD-ADPS meeting with IBM reveals further shortcomings in ALP system development.
- 15 Sep -- ALP system hardware delivered to CIA.
- 4-15 Oct -- FDD and ADPS test ALP system for acceptance by CIA.
- Nov -- FDD begins year-long pilot project to test ALP system under operational conditions.

1966

- 23 May -- Ad Hoc Committee for the Study of Press and Broadcast Monitoring Activities ( [ ] Task Force) established; begins its investigations on 30 Jun. 25X1
- 12 Oct -- [ ] announces termination of the ALP experiment. 25X1
- 15 Nov -- FDD Position Paper setting forth FDD's anti-merger case presented to the [ ] Task Force. 25X1

1967

- 1 Feb -- [ ] Report advocates FDD-FBIS merger. 25X1
- 1 Mar -- FDD transferred to FBIS; Acquisitions Branch retained in OCR.

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