


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30 October 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: FBIS Historical Officer

SUBJECT : Revised draft of FBIS history titled "The Foreign Documents Division, 1946-1967"



1. The DDI Historical Officer has read and approved the revised draft of the FBIS history titled "The Foreign Documents Division, 1946-1967" by [redacted] has done an excellent job of revising his draft and the paper is now ready for further processing.

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2. The reviewer has a single suggestion -- that the present Appendix A "Commentary" be renamed "Conclusion" and made the final chapter of the history. Some minor changes, mostly editorial, have been made directly on the manuscript and are noted for the record in the attachment.

3. The Historical Staff will forward this paper directly to the DDI Historical Board for review prior to final typing of the manuscript in FBIS.

[Redacted signature box]

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DDI Historical Staff

Attachment


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THE FOREIGN DOCUMENTS DIVISION

1946 - 1967

VOLUME III

*by*



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**THE FOREIGN DOCUMENTS DIVISION**

**1946 - 1967**

**VOLUME III**

*by*

[Redacted]

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**Approved:**

[Redacted]

**Foreign Broadcast Information Service  
Directorate of Intelligence  
April 1974**

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
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## CHAPTER ELEVEN

Three FDD Staffs

We have noted in the preceding chapter a number of examples of FDD functions which dealt with special situations requiring the linguistic expertise which the division, of all Agency components, was in the best position to furnish. Although related to the handling of foreign languages -- in spoken or published form -- these activities differed from the normal FDD routine of press exploitation and document translation. But as the common-service agent for the intelligence community in foreign-language matters, the division assumed responsibility for the new problems, adjusted rapidly to the challenge of these assignments, and incorporated them as part of its regular on-going program.

The present chapter will describe in some detail three staffs which performed functions of more than routine nature and played an important role in FDD operations. One of these, the FDD Linguistic Support Staff, had strictly a service function. Its work was in effect an extension of that performed

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in the division area but with emphasis on speed and convenience for the consumer's benefit. The other two, the Propaganda Analysis Staff and the Current Affairs Staff, represented approaches to press exploitation in depth. The Linguistic Support Staff proved highly successful and survived for the duration of the division's life. The latter two were largely experimental and succumbed, for reasons which will be discussed below, after several years.

A. Linguistic Support

The first of FDD's staffs to be treated in this chapter functioned as a component under several names but during most of the period covered by this history was known as the Linguistic Support Staff (LSS). Unlike the two staffs discussed below, it outlived FDD and still exists at the time of this writing, though under a different name and subordination. It differed also in the nature of its function. Unlike the Propaganda Analysis Staff and the Current Intelligence Staff, both of which were exploitative organizations dealing in large part with substantive intelligence, the LSS was strictly a service organization. It was established, not to search out, process, and supply the consumer with semi-finished intelligence, but rather to assist the consumer offices in the solution of language problems.

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Since responsibility for language training in the division eventually became one of the functions of the ISS, the evolvement of this task as a concurrent development with the consultation aspect should also be mentioned at this point. In June 1952 a language consultant attached to the office of the division chief was approved, and [REDACTED]

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one of FDD's most versatile linguists, was assigned to the position. 814/ This move was designed to formalize and to raise the level of his position in FDD's Special Language Section, where he had up to now served as chief, with [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] as his deputy. His duties in the new position included assistance, to FDD linguists specifically and to the intelligence community in general, in problems arising in the rarer languages and in the FDD language-training program. Later in the year, on 4 December, [REDACTED] another gifted FDD linguist,

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was also attached as a member of the Special Language Staff. 815/

On 9 January 1953 [REDACTED] was designated Coordinator of Language Training for FDD. 816/

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On 24 November 1952 FDD established on a trial basis a Linguist Consultation Service (LCS) in M Building in the main CIA compound at 2430 E Street, N.W., as a service for intelligence components in that vicinity. [REDACTED] and

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[redacted] two of the division's better multi-linguist officers, were assigned to staff it. The objective of the service was to facilitate the processing of consumer requirements in the M Building area by providing rapid scanning of the original language material presented by the analysts and quick translation of brief passages, thereby eliminating the usual lengthy transmittal procedures and preventing the levy of requirements of no value. The two officers were capable of covering 20 languages and were therefore in a position to satisfy the needs of almost any requester desiring assistance. In those instances where further help was needed, the document was referred to FDD. After only one month the operation appeared to have proved itself. The service was found to be valuable to ORR, OSI, OCI, and OCD and was popular with their analysts. All of the consumer Offices affected expressed satisfaction with the service and urged its continuation on a permanent basis. 817/

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There was a rapid increase in the use of the new facility. Beginning with 18 requests during December 1952, the first full month of its existence, 818/ LCS activity mounted as consumers became accustomed to its usefulness. It increased to 330 and 353 transactions in January and February 1953, respectively, and to 508 in March 819/ and by October 1953, less than a year

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after its commencement, it had reached a peak of 758 items. 820/ During 1953 a total of 6,675 cases were handled for the Offices to which the service was available, 821/ an average of 556 a month. The rise continued and by FY-1955 averaged 850 contacts per month. Principal emphasis was on requests for assistance with German and Russian language problems. During FY-1955, for example, each language averaged 40 percent in the number of requests, with Satellite Slavic at 15 percent, and 5 percent for the balance. 822/ Though the bulk of interest remained with German and Russian, the proportions varied from year to year. In FY-1956 the respective figures were 50 percent for German, 30 percent for Russian, 4 percent for French and Italian, and 12 percent for the balance, 823/ but in FY-1957 German had dropped to 33 percent and Russian to 22 percent while Polish rose to 18 percent and French to 15 percent. 824/ The principal customer during this period was ORR, with OCR and OSI following in that order. The LCS maintained close cooperation at all times with the CTS and its Index, with the result that numerous cases of duplication were prevented.

The LCS operation in M Building proved so successful that early in 1954 extension of this FDD facility was requested for OSI and for the DD/P complex in the CIA buildings occupied

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by these components, but for the time being space limitations prevented implementation of such an expansion. However, some changes were made to improve the organization and to render it more responsive to consumer needs.

In December 1954, to meet requests by other CIA components that the LCS be expanded and to strengthen the FDD language training program, the functions of the LCS and of the FDD Language Training Officer were combined to form the Linguistic Support Staff (LSS). Two positions, a GS-13 and a GS-12, were initially authorized for the new staff. [redacted] formerly Chief of the LCS, was appointed Chief and [redacted] of the Far East Branch was designated Acting Assistant Chief. As the staff's services were expanded to other parts of the Agency, FDD personnel were assigned to man these posts. With exception of that of the chief, it was contemplated to use these positions for rotational purposes to enable the assignee to benefit not only the component which he served but also himself and FDD by gaining valuable linguistic experience. The program was to a large degree successful in doing this. Initially, the rotation period was a month, but the period was gradually lengthened as

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\* This represents a name change. Cf. [redacted] on p. 451.

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it became obvious that, because of the special qualifications required by the positions, the number of personnel suited to fill them was limited.

In 1956 the space problem which until then had prevented an expansion of LSS support activities beyond the M Building area was eased and two additional linguist service stations were soon established, the first on 9 January 1956 in Barton Hall primarily to service OSI requirements and the second on

7 May 1956

[redacted]

Assigned

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full-time to these posts were

[redacted]

Scientific

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Branch, and

[redacted]

Eastern Europe Branch, respectively.

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To judge by the subsequent reduction in needless transmittals to FDD following activation of the two posts, their effectiveness was almost immediately apparent. The number of contacts made by the three stations during FY-1957 was some 2,200 for M Building, 700 for Barton Hall, and 400 for [redacted] a total of 3,300. 825/

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From mid-1957 on, though the three LSS stations continued to furnish a needed service, there was a gradual drop-off in the number of contacts with consumer Offices, possibly a reflection of more effective program coverage in FDD proper and through the translation service provided by the newly established JPRS. In any event, the number of transactions at M Building for the

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respective fiscal years from 1958 through 1961 were approximately 2,000, 1,600, 1,400, and 1,200 with concurrent reductions for the other posts. 826/ The need for retrenchment was apparent. Since the [ ] was the one least used, FDD announced as early as October 1958 its intention to close down this station. The DD/P components admitted less than full use of the facility but felt they would suffer if it was eliminated. They therefore petitioned not only that it be retained but that additional personnel be assigned to it. FDD agreed to a limited trial period until 1 December 1958 when it would review the matter. The trial period failed to show improvement of ISS use [ ] and on 17 December 1958 the facility was closed down. 827/

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The rather precipitous drop in Barton Hall contacts, from 748 in FY-1959 to 373 in FY-1960 828/ and the lack of improvement during the following year, led to placing ISS service at this station on a part-time basis. 829/ The units at Barton Hall and M Building continued to be maintained for OSI and other DD/I elements until these moved to the new Headquarters Building at Langley, Virginia, in 1960. In August 1959 a manpower reduction pending in FDD resulted in elimination of the last two ISS posts in the old CIA area in Foggy Bottom effective 1 April 1960. 830/

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Discontinuance of the linguist service was, however, only temporary. On 23 September 1961 the division reconstituted its linguist service at the Headquarters Building in Langley and redesignated it as the Foreign Language Service Center (FLASC). 831/ It was initially placed in charge of [ ] and staffed with four multi-linguists, a number increased to five in FY-1963. Its functions remained much the same as they had been under the LSS. Service was improved by the transmittal of requirements and completed translations via a twice-a-day FDD courier. In FY-1964 the FLASC staff was augmented by an additional three persons with a resultant increase in production. 832/ It is essentially in this form that the organization has continued to function down to the time of this writing.

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As mentioned above, a secondary function of the LSS was to train FDD personnel in rare languages and specialized vocabularies which would be beneficial to other Agency components. The LSS also provided training directly or through other training facilities in less rare languages. The purpose of this instruction for division personnel and recruit-trainees was to back up the division needs and to provide a hedge against the constant drain of FDD professionals for manning projects of other CIA Offices. FDD, through LSS, undertook this training function,

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normally the province of OTR, because of numerous instances where FDD required special language skills at irregular and unpredictable intervals and could not wait for courses in these skills to be fitted into OTR schedules. The language training provided by LSS was extensively used. During FY-1955, for example, 93 FDD personnel -- almost a third of the division's total complement -- participated in some kind of language training. 833/ In January 1958, to provide further opportunity for FDD officers to improve their language competence and as a supplement to the LSS training, a language laboratory was established in FDD. 834/ In June 1958, in connection with the FDD reorganization at that time, the language training function heretofore conducted by the LSS was transferred to the FDD administrative office. 835/

B. Propaganda Analysis

The concept of propaganda analysis based on research of the press and radio media had originated during World War II and was introduced into the Agency during its formative years. After a variety of surveys and experiments, propaganda analysis activity was finally assigned to OO. As early as November 1946,  then FBIS Director, who had been asked by OO Chief Gen. Sibert to explore the feasibility of studies of

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all forms of foreign propaganda, reported that in his opinion coverage of press sources could best be handled by a central organ, whose functions would include long-range special reports on public opinion or government propaganda as expressed in the foreign press. 836/

The problems that accompanied FDD's birth and early growth left the division with little time available to consider sophisticated types of press treatment such as propaganda analysis, and for three years the idea lay dormant. Near the end of 1949 John Bagnall informed the AD/O that division officers, on the basis of experience gained in reporting factual information from the daily press, had developed a facility to "read between the lines" which often enabled them to note items of intelligence value that did not fit into the category of "factual" text. Such data included: deliberate omissions of names, places, or events; shifts in a newspaper's editorial policy; unusual methods of presenting apparently insignificant information; and similar indications. This information was likely to be lost unless reported in some form to the consumer. Bagnall therefore requested authorization to proceed with reportage of this nature 837/ and his request was supported by Theodore Babbitt, the AD/RE, to whom Carey had forwarded Bagnall's

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memorandum. Babbitt expressed the opinion that the FDD objectives set forth by Bagnall would be of considerable value to his Office. In this connection, he suggested that FDD acquaint itself with an interim report issued in February 1949 by the Rand Corporation entitled "The Intelligence Value of Content Analysis." 838/

OO plans to handle community needs for propaganda analysis gathered impetus, particularly as interest in psychological warfare grew in the early stages of the Cold War. One early result was the formation in November 1950 of an OO task force, chaired by FBIS's  which, with OIC assistance, explored the FDD/FBID propaganda analysis potential during the next few years and beyond. To test this potential, FDD was assigned preparation of one of its earliest world press reaction series reports, a study on the dismissal of Gen. Douglas MacArthur as commander of Allied Forces in Korea. Consumer reaction to the experiment was generally favorable, though some concern was expressed by the Special Support Staff about the press receipt time lag. However, the Staff went on to say that, despite the speed advantage of radio broadcasts, the printed word still remained "the concrete evidence, the considered expression, the record." 839/

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In its final report to the AD/O in January 1952, the task force stated that there was a real need for additional analytical and collative work on both radio and press propoganda of the Soviet Orbit, that such work lay within the potential capacity of the OO divisions, and that it could appropriately be done by them. The task force recommended that the two media be exploited separately by the two divisions but actively guided and coordinated by a specialist on the OO staff. It also recommended the expansion of existing FBID operations and the initiation by FDD of systematic content analysis on a pilot scale. It advocated assignment of 20 individuals to the operations, two on the OO staff and nine each for the divisions. 840/ The OIC consultant, Allen Dines, expressed general concurrence with the report and added a few comments, none of which appreciably altered the thrust of the document. 841/

Despite FDD representation on the task force, Bagnall found the results of its deliberations somewhat disappointing and did not concur with its report. He found fault, for example, with its failure to define clearly the term "content analysis," which in the sense of the report covered only that type of quantitative content reported in the FBID series *Trends and Highlights*. This coverage, he felt, was but

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one of many methods. The fact that FDD's technique of exploitation was quite another form of content analysis made the task force recommendation that FDD "undertake content analysis on a pilot scale" inappropriate. Bagnall also vigorously opposed the recommendation for central control by a specialist on the OO staff. The FDD Chief's position was based on various lines of reasoning, *viz*: the difference in the FDD and FBID operations made impossible the application of similar methodology; the collation of reports deriving from the two separate media was the responsibility of consumer Offices, not OO; and, the coordination of FDD and FBID operations was the obligation of the two division chiefs. 842/

Other comments of the task force report contrasted with Bagnall's views. One example is that of Robert W. Komer of ONE; he concurred with the report's conclusion that something had to be done and that OO was the organization to do it. He also agreed with Bagnall's complaint about the lack of definition of the term "content analysis", but his own concept of it differed considerably from Bagnall's. Complaining that the intelligence community did not have a clear understanding of content analysis or a specific technique for tapping its potential as an intelligence tool and noting

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that the monitoring services of FDD and FBID were only partially and unsystematically applied to this problem, he urged those responsible to become familiar with the Rand Corporation studies on the subject and to hire Rand specialists as consultants. 843/

Regardless of the disagreements and the continuing lack of a consensus definition of "propaganda analysis," the project moved ahead. An informal study was undertaken to check out the feasibility of a two-media approach. A test project on "Sino-Soviet Relations," based primarily on an analysis of Soviet and Chinese comment on the 1951 and 1952 anniversaries of the Sino-Soviet Treaty, was selected as the first effort, and the Far East and USSR Branches of FDD started research on this subject in limited collaboration with FBID. Despite some overlap insofar as Soviet and Chinese sources were concerned, 844/ the result of this effort was a minor triumph. Comments from CIA components were generally favorable, although OIR/State termed the FDD/FBID study "dangerous and misleading" because of several alleged false assumptions on which the analysis was based. Even so, the State Department did not condemn the quantitative method of propaganda analysis out of hand but admitted its usefulness as an aid in determining the general character of Sino-Soviet relations. 845/

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The test run was so successful that a program for greater development in this field was initiated. Since OO was not staffed to put out studies of this nature on a continuing basis, a first step was to provide personnel for a projected propaganda analysis group in FDD. On 9 June 1952 John Bagnall submitted a request for nine positions -- three each for the USSR, Far East, and East European Branches. 846/ This figure was revised downward in August to seven, including a GS-13 as chief and coordinator and one GS-12 and one GS-11 for each of the three branches involved, and on 22 September a T/O increase was approved to provide the required slots. 847/ On 7 October

heretofore Chief of FDD's Eastern Europe Branch, was officially designated Coordinator for Propaganda Analysis 848/ and  a USSR Branch unit chief, was selected to assist him. Subsequently, two Chinese linguist/intelligence officers were added to the staff.

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At the outset, Loftus Becker, the DD/I, expressed some reservations concerning the propriety of an intelligence collection component such as OO and its two subordinate divisions, FDD and FBID, engaging in what appeared to be an obvious research function similar to that done by OCI or ORR. 849/ However, the DD/I was apparently won over to the propaganda analysis side,

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for he was reported by Bagnall as agreeing to the proposition that research and analysis were necessary techniques in the exploitation of foreign documents. 850/

In any event, by September 1952 the project appeared safely launched and ready to move on to new accomplishments. In October a second study, a special propaganda analysis report of the Soviet "Hate America" campaign based on a quantitative survey of various themes and categories of anti-American propaganda appearing in *Pravda* for the period 1 January 1946 - 21 July 1952 was completed for ONE. Owing to differences in approach, methods of analysis, and dates of completion, the FDD and FBID papers on this theme were submitted separately.

Early in 1953, FDD requested OO approval to work with

[redacted]	on a consul-	25X1
tant basis. It was	[redacted]	25X1
[redacted]	Approval was granted and on	25X1
27 February 1953 a conference was held in which the	[redacted]	25X1
researcher participated along with representatives of OO, FBID, and FDD. [redacted]	represented the division. This	25X1
meeting was basically only an initial exploratory discussion in which the coordination of analysis of press and radio propaganda was deliberated. <u>851/</u>		

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To firm up the establishment of the propaganda analysis function under FDD, [ ] on 30 May 1953 formally requested authorization from the Deputy Director for Administration (DD/A) for establishment of a Propaganda Analysis Staff within FDD carrying the seven-man T/O decided on earlier. He further asked that the position of chief of the new staff be reclassified from GS-13 to GS-14 and a deputy chief slot be provided at a GS-13, together with a clerical position. 852/

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This request marked the high point in the hopes and expectations within the division for a viable and independent propaganda analysis staff. On 28 July the Chief of the Classification and Wage Division granted approval of the staff, but withheld action on the personnel requests because of pending budgetary problems. 853/ This hesitation proved a harbinger of things to come, for the curtailment of FY-1954 funds required abandonment, on 19 August 1953, of the existing propaganda analysis staff, except for the coordinator.

Nevertheless, propaganda analysis operations were continued on an *ad hoc* basis in response to requirements from ONE, OCI, and DD/P. The difficulties of depending on part-time exploitation to furnish information for interpretive propaganda analysis were readily conceded. The division's only recourse was to draft experienced area branch personnel for temporary

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full-time assignment to the propaganda analysis effort to handle such requirements. This was done and such TDY assignments were made —  in March 1954, for example — but experience demonstrated that, while the operation was useful for descriptive propaganda analysis, it was weak in the interpretive field because concentration of application was lacking.

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While the budget cuts all but eliminated the division's propaganda analysis effort and the operation from the FDD standpoint appeared to be dying, it was not yet wholly defunct. The staff coordinator continued to service requests for propaganda analysis, with the help of experienced analysts. This resulted in the production of several FDD research aids either by the Propaganda Analysis Staff itself or by other members of the division under its coordination. In all, three analytical studies were prepared in support of national estimates in response to specific requirements from ONE. A fourth was issued for the use of the Clandestine Services. Two more propaganda studies in depth were completed and a third one was in process when the operation, and FDD's active participation, ceased at the end of FY-1955. One of these studies, issued on 8 September 1953 under the title *Chinese and Soviet*

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*Views on Mao as a Marxist Theorist and the Significance of the Chinese Revolution for the Asian Revolutionary Movement*, met with high praise from all major consumers. Sherman Kent, the AD/NE, characterized it as excellent and of great value to ONE, a judgment which evoked from  the comment: "A little more of this and we may have to reconsider the Press Propaganda Branch." 854/

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The issue of propaganda analysis, originally envisioned as a cooperative venture between FDD and its sister division in OO, FBID, had by 1954 deteriorated into a dispute over control of the operation. From the FDD standpoint, it was not a question of sole possession of this function but rather the extent to which its chief contribution, the exploitation of the elite journals, would be used in the analysis of the mass media, mainly radio intercept.

On 12 February 1954 OO, FDD, and FBID representatives held an inconclusive discussion of the general problem of propaganda analysis. FBID took the position that integration of press and radio material was necessary at the raw material level and that integration of the finished product of the two divisions would not work. FBID also contended that press propaganda was supplementary and peripheral to radio propaganda

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and that elite journals could be exploited better and at less expense by FBID in the field than by FDD. 855/ Needless to say, FDD did not share these viewpoints and regarded the latter contention, in particular, as constituting a direct denial of the FDD common-service function.

After the meeting, the division chiefs outlined their points of agreement and disagreement in a memorandum to the AD/O. In essence, they were in agreement that both radio and documentary sources should be exploited as a unified propaganda analysis operation but they differed on how to use the additional personnel requested to staff it. FBID recommended calling in a consultant to resolve the impasse, while FDD felt that this determination would be better left to the parties directly involved. 856/ When Carey later analyzed the memorandum, he noted that the personnel cuts in July 1953 had made the problem academic.

A meeting was eventually held on 18 November between Carey, Bagnall, and FBID Chief, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The strained relations between FDD and FBID were still apparent at this meeting, but it was possible to reach an agreement that [REDACTED] without

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cost to CIA, would undertake a purely theoretical study of the relationships between political and propaganda analysis and between analysis of press and radio broadcasts and of the advantages and disadvantages of propaganda analysis by linguists/ analysts from original language texts or by analysts from translations.

[redacted] undertook this detailed exploration of propaganda analysis and, after consulting with FDD and FBID staff members, he completed a 72-page study [redacted]

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[redacted] The report, in effect, resolved the question of the future handling of this problem. It recommended that a single propaganda analysis operation be set up which would have responsibility for overall scrutiny of all types of Communist elite communications, irrespective of source or media, and for both long-range and current intelligence analyses. This, it predicted, would result in better service to the community than was then provided by separate analysis operations by FDD and FBID. [redacted]

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Copies of the 1 April  study were distributed in May to the DD/I, the DDCI, and other interested parties. It was generally well received and it marked, for all practical purposes, the end of FDD's venture into propaganda analysis. In August the establishment of an integrated Propaganda Analysis Branch in FBID was approved and the FDD Propaganda Analysis Coordinator was transferred to it soon afterwards. With this action, except for occasional support action, formal propaganda analysis operations in FDD ceased.

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C. Current Intelligence

The events just discussed closed out the experimentation in full-scale press analysis for FDD, but despite this disappointment some FDD officers retained the strong conviction that the division had much to contribute to intelligence operations that could be gained from no specific and sharply defined source material but rested largely on insights based on extended experience with and exposure to the target press over long periods of time. The subject has been touched on at some length in an earlier chapter in connection with inter-component disputes over alleged FDD "analysis" when division officers inserted bracketed commentary in translated text in order to clarify a point or to interpolate information not available

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from the translation. This practice had arisen in a haphazard fashion, quite disconnected and disorganized. As also noted earlier, after the establishment of format ground rules, opposition to FDD commentary had lessened in the course of time.

The desire to make available to the intelligence community this type of "out-of-the-ordinary" knowledge was accompanied by the wish to speed up dissemination of the FDD product. The subject of delay and the reasons for it as well as steps taken, with middling success, to improve the situation have also been treated at various places in this history. The problem was a continuing one. The wish to improve the timeliness of FDD output and at the same time to establish a means of dispensing FDD interpolative knowledge culminated in 1957 with the formation of the third staff with which this chapter will deal. This was the Current Support Staff, which, through the medium of its *Survey of the Soviet Press* (joined after a period of time by a similar publication on Satellite affairs, the *Eastern Europe Press Survey*), hoped to achieve the timely dissemination of significant items of information. Because of the nature of their purpose these Current Support Staff publications dealt almost exclusively with political and sociological information.

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On 16 July 1956 [ ] of ONE entered on a one-year rotation (subsequently extended for a second year) in the USSR Branch of FDD, primarily to improve his knowledge of the Russian language. Approaching the FDD operation with a fresh viewpoint, [ ] in cooperation with [ ] and other division personnel, investigated the possibility of going beyond the mere extracting and translation of isolated bits and pieces of information. They suggested producing instead a report featuring coverage in depth and including commentary based on the researchers' own knowledge and experience with the source material. The purpose of the new publication that resulted from this investigation was to record all developments which appeared to be new or "out of the ordinary" that reflected tensions in the Soviet system or pointed to the emergence of problems which could ultimately engage the attention of Soviet policy makers. The report would consist mainly of summaries, excerpts, and condensed translations. Full translations would be the exception. Moreover, timeliness would be of the essence.

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The proposed publication was to differ from other press surveys of this period, such as the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* published by the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, the publications of the Moscow

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Embassy's Joint Press Reading Service, the Soviet-produced *Daily Review of the Soviet Press*, by the fact that it was to be based primarily on provincial press and specialized journal sources. Coverage of the central press, such as *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*, was to be left mainly to other exploitation media. As it developed, the new publication also featured a well-received "Highlights" introduction and a supplement devoted to special features such as full translation of important articles or to a summary and interpretation of data uncovered in the press. The report was issued as a weekly, and to assure maximum currency the staff worked on a tight schedule to meet a fixed deadline each week. Arrangements were made with the Reproduction Division to issue the publication within 24 hours of receipt from FDD.

Advance copies of the new publication were issued to consumers in April 1957 and though reactions to the initial effort varied, the response was in general very favorable, ranging from a comment of "useful" from the State Department's Division of Research for the Soviet Union/Office of Intelligence Research (DRS/OIR) 858/ to enthusiastic approval by OCI components. 859/ ORR and OSI, in view of the *Survey's* emphasis on political and sociological subject matter, were

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noncommittal, 860/ but this attitude on the part of ORR changed later on as greater stress was placed upon treatment of the political overtones inherent in Soviet economic activity. ONE termed the *Survey* a "valuable contribution" that was particularly useful in estimative intelligence and expressed the opinion that its coverage was considerably more relevant to the problems of Soviet politics than other government and non-government surveys. Its concentration upon regional reporting and internal party affairs filled two notable gaps, in the opinion of ONE. 861/

With the new report well launched, some doubt arose as to its future viability and whether the quality of the publication could be maintained after [redacted] left

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the division to return to ONE. 862/ To provide for regular *Survey* coverage, the political section of the USSR Branch was reorganized and a Current Intelligence Staff directly subordinate to the branch chief was established on 19 July 1957. [redacted] was designated Chief. Other intelligence

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officers assigned to the staff at this time were [redacted]

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[redacted] 863/ Earlier, contributions

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to the report had been made on a part-time basis by all members of the political section; this was now changed to full-time

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activity by the staff members. To complement the "current" coverage by the new staff, steps were also taken to organize the section's "basic" coverage. Later in the year a Political Research Staff was formed to include the remaining personnel of the USSR Branch political section. Its primary function was to prepare reports on the basic structure and operation of the Soviet government and Communist Party and on long-term ideological trends. 864/ Following formation of the Current Intelligence Staff, the position of *Survey* coordinator was established with the primary function of preparing the "Highlights" section of the report and shepherding the publication through its weekly preparation in time to meet the deadline. Selected on the basis of their special qualifications, the successive report coordinators were

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As the *Survey* was gradually developed and refined, there evolved a growing realization of the report's potential value to academic researchers working in the fields it covered. Thus, in September 1957 when translations of a number of Soviet literary documents which dealt collectively with the then-current revolt against "party tutelage" in the USSR

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were issued in a *Survey* supplement, Benjamin Cain, Acting Chief of FDD, suggested to Carey that the issue of the report containing these documents be sanitized and made available to the Russian Institute at Columbia University. He felt this material would be of considerable value to the academic community and would pay dividends to intelligence by contributing to a better informed study of processes current in Soviet intellectual life. 865/ The Office of Security interposed no objection to this proposal and Carey forwarded the request to the DD/I, who approved it on 12 October. 866/


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Reception outside the Agency of the *Survey of the Soviet Press* and, similarly, its counterpart for the Satellite countries, the *Eastern Europe Press Survey*, was as gratifying, if not more so, than it had been among CIA Offices. During early 1958, after regular distribution of the publication by CD had gotten under way, numerous complimentary messages from academic recipients were forwarded by CD to FDD. Requests to be included in the distribution were also received from

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


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individuals not on the original list and some of these, where warranted, were honored.

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*Survey* distribution did not end with the intelligence and academic communities. The publication was sent on request to interested parties elsewhere in the government, as a commendation from the Library of Congress received in October 1958 indicated. 870/ The *Christian Science Monitor* also asked for and received copies, 871/ and distribution was not limited even by national boundaries. Victor Zorza, a correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*, was a regular recipient and in several communications expressed his appreciation and commented on its "excellence" and the "sophisticated selection" of materials. 872/

A generally high regard for the type and quality of reporting represented by the Soviet and Eastern Europe surveys continued in the IAC community. DRS/OIR/State, which initially had found the *Survey* no more than "useful," later changed its judgment and said the publication was "of

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more value than had originally been expected." 873/ In a critique of the report a year after its first issuance, OCI, one of the major users, commended FDD for the useful and worthwhile service offered by the *Survey*. The Acting Chief of OCI's General Division wrote, "There is no better way FDD can furnish regular political coverage and there is no better vehicle for it than this weekly *Survey*." 874/

Early in 1958, to meet the increased demands of IAC members, distribution of the *Survey* was increased from 100 to 150 copies. 875/ This and subsequent increases, particularly after distribution to colleges and universities commenced, resulted eventually in the same persistent time-lag problem which affected other FDD issuances. In September 1963  of the DD/I Research Staff complained about a delay of as much as a month in the reproduction of the report. To overcome the problem FDD took over the reproduction itself with the hope of cutting the time down to two or three days. 876/ Service thereby was much improved.

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The *Survey of the Soviet Press*, in the form in which it had been conceived and produced since 1957, was issued until near the end of 1965. Although publication of the report continued until late 1966, the original approach of

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research in depth, involving the use of research files and the inclusion of commentary with the text, was gradually abandoned and the publication near its end became simply another vehicle for current reporting. There were several reasons for this, but the most important were, on the one hand, a reduction in personnel trained to maintain the former high quality level of the report, and, on the other, a change in the philosophy of the division's mission, leading to greater emphasis on current reporting of press information to the detriment of press research as this had originally been employed in the *Survey* operation. As a result of these changes, the *raison d'etre* for the Current Intelligence Staff no longer existed. The group was therefore disbanded and its personnel assigned to regular section duties.

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**SECRET****CHAPTER TWELVE****Cold War Problems**

Throughout most of its history the Foreign Documents Division's operations, like those of other intelligence components, were closely attuned to and greatly influenced by the events of the Cold War period. The division had to adjust its functions to cope with each occurrence as it surfaced. The procurement difficulties encountered in connection with Soviet and, later on, Chinese Communist publications in the 1950s and early 1960s represent a good example of the type of problem which required solution. In some situations the problems faced had to be dealt with under circumstances of more than normal urgency, as in periods when the Cold War heated up close to the boiling point, during the Korean and Vietnamese actions. At other times the problems were not war-related but were rather manifestations of national rivalries inherent in the Cold War atmosphere. An example or two of each form, as it affected FDD actions, is discussed in the pages following.

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A. Emergency War Planning

1. Early Action and the War Planning Exercises

One of the earliest issues faced by US intelligence at the end of World War II was the question of preparation for new military emergencies. Paradoxical as this situation at first glance appears to be with the war only recently won, it was in fact consistent with the changed world conditions created by the war. The fighting had ceased, but the political issues still begged solution. In the immediate postwar euphoria it was difficult to maintain a stance of preparedness, but rapidly growing US disillusionment with Soviet intransigence after the war led to an early and more realistic reconsideration of the US position. This change affected the intelligence community as well as all the other contributors to national security. The establishment of CIG and the development of the central intelligence concept was in fact a part of the reappraisal and represented a concrete manifestation of having learned from the mistakes of the past. As part of the greater realism in international relations the intelligence establishment accepted the fact that future wars were a distinct likelihood and that contingency plans for such events were a necessity. It was in this light that FDD, as

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an Agency component, became involved in emergency war planning.

A first step in the division's preparation of contingency plans for hostilities was taken in the spring of 1948, not many months after the document exploitation components of World War II had been consolidated to form FDB, when, in accordance with a memorandum issued by the AD/O on 12 March 1948, a plan for wartime organization of the branch was initiated. 877/ The development of the project for FDB, as well as for the Agency as a whole, proved to be a long drawn-out affair which in the course of its preparation was subjected to periodic review and revision. At the end of 1948 FDB war plans were still in the process of being drawn up, with a completion date of January 1949 contemplated. 878/ These were destined for incorporation in the overall war emergency plan being prepared for the Agency under the aegis of the CIA Emergency Planning Committee.

In 1951, as part of overall war planning, the subject of the military reserve status of CIA personnel in the event of an emergency mobilization came up for discussion. A list submitted in August 1950 revealed that FDD at that time had a total of 55 reservists and a similar one, dated 29 May 1951, showed the number to be 51. 879/

A hard-line approach was adopted, that is, no deferments

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for CIA employees except in difficult-to-replace cases and then only for temporary periods. 880/ The effect of this policy on FDD was minimal. Of 114 draft-eligible males in CIA, only three FDD men were considered to have exceptional linguistic skill and therefore difficult to replace. 881/ FDD took steps to protect these individuals from induction and appealed to the Personnel Director for assistance in solving the problem. The available source material does not reveal the eventual disposition of the three FDD officers involved. In the overall, the division was not harmed to any considerable degree by personnel losses to the armed services.

As important as personnel in wartime was the availability of sources with which to carry on the division's work. With this in mind John Bagnall on 22 May 1951 met with a G-2 representative to discuss the possibility of developing advanced planning for procurement of Soviet publications in the event of outbreak of war or of possible retaliatory measures by the Soviets in limiting their publications as a result of trade controls by the United States. Bagnall expressed the opinion that at a minimum an advanced program should be developed with a policy determination as to which agency(ies) should implement it. 882/

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On 17 July 1951, Bagnall, as chairman of the CEFD, called a meeting of State and armed service representatives to discuss further the problem of source procurement. This meeting produced agreement that in the event of an outbreak of war with the USSR or an intensification of the Cold War to a point where normal diplomatic relations would cease, the regular receipt of Soviet Bloc material through normal channels would be likely to stop. The group therefore agreed to formulate a contingency collection plan to cope with such an emergency.

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[redacted]  
[redacted] This would be augmented by third-

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country procurement where practicable. Each agency represented was asked to prepare a priority list of titles which it wished FDD to exploit centrally, with the aim of formulating a coordinated priority list for guidance of emergency field collection. 883/

One important aspect of emergency war planning in the Agency was the establishment in the early 1950s of the Vital Records Repository at the CIA Emergency Relocation Center outside the Washington, D.C., area. It represented a central collection of materials, mainly published, with which the CIA could continue to carry on its mission in the event of a serious emergency and with the headquarters area presumed

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destroyed. Each Agency component was required to deposit its "vital" materials in the repository and periodically to review and alter its inventory as circumstances required.

The first consignment of FDD vital records was sent to the center in January 1951 and a second was dispatched later in the year. After the initial decisions had been made and the list of items gradually shaken down, the division's deposits remained relatively stable. The materials held in the repository for FDD at the beginning of 1955, for example, included the following:

Materials pertaining to division organization, including NSCID 16, personnel assignment notices, statements of functions and missions of the branches, etc.

Minutes of meetings of the CEFLP

FDD publication "List of Foreign-Language Serial Publications Received and Screened by FDD"

FDD Style Sheet

Armed Forces Document Intelligence Center memoranda

Translation Service memoranda

Joint Intelligence Bureau memoranda

List of dictionaries used by FDD and copies or microfilms of some.

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## List of FDD personnel by languages

Copies of FDD Summaries, Translations,  
the CTS and its supplement, Reference Aids,  
Research Aids

External Contract Records 884/

Additions and deletions were periodically made. For example, in December 1951, at CIA Library request, a list of the most important foreign-language periodicals was prepared for the Repository. 885/ In November 1960 each OO division chief was asked for a statement on line of succession of command, five deep, for use in case of death or disaster. The directive specified that no explanation of choice was necessary. This list was also placed on file in the Vital Records Repository. 886/

By 1955 war planning had progressed to a point where the Agency considered it expedient to test the organization's potential for coping with a simulated emergency. In preparation for this exercise, scheduled for the summer of 1955, George Carey on 22 April submitted to the DD/I a memorandum briefly delineating his concept of what the role of OO would be in the event of a global war. 887/ Attached to the AD/O's memorandum were four enclosures, one for each OO component, outlining their

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anticipated activity in the event of large-scale war.

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The exercise Operation Alert 1955, involving the upper echelons of the US government, took place during the period 15-17 June. It was designed to evaluate the effectiveness of relocation planning, to determine the ability to conduct essential wartime functions of the government at relocation sites under conditions of sustained alert, and to test ability to deal with problems under attack conditions. 888/

Operation Alert 1955 involved only top management personnel in the Agency, including FDD. Insofar as day-to-day operations were concerned there was no impairment, and desk-level activities continued routinely. In his critique of the exercise sent to the AD/O on 22 June, John Bagnall stated that from the FDD standpoint all phases of the operation had worked satisfactorily. The only deficiencies noted were the poor lighting in the office area at the Relocation Center in

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\* See p. 493, below.

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the lack of magnifying glasses to read photostats and poorly written materials, and the need for an index of FDD Summary and CTS publications to be kept in the Vital Records Repository. 889/

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War planning on the higher levels continued in the Agency. The part FDD was to play in the overall projections for a crisis situation remained virtually unchanged from what it had been since the beginning. As Robert Amory, the DD/I, expressed it, 30 percent of all DD/I activity in an emergency would be devoted to the collection function, and within this, FDD participation boiled down essentially to carrying out its current mission. The division would, however, maintain a linguist pool for especially "hot" documents and would work more closely with ASDIC in captured document exploitation. The latter activity could well involve theater linguist teams, but these would be under military rather than CIA leadership. 890/

On 10 April 1956 the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) announced plans for Operation Alert 1956, an exercise similar to that conducted the previous summer but somewhat more extensive. This operation was to last from 20 to 26 July and went a step beyond the earlier test by making the assumption

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that a massive nuclear attack against the United States had occurred. Again, only senior management people in the government were involved and day-to-day operations progressed without interruption.

FDD participants in Operation Alert 1956 were nine in number and, to minimize the time absent from regular operations, the group was divided into two parts. John Bagnall,

[redacted]

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[redacted] an administrative assistant in the FDD chief's office,

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were assigned to travel to the CIA Relocation Site and to participate in the exercise during the period 20-23 July.

They were relieved on 23 July for the balance of the operation

by

[redacted]

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[redacted]

891/ The FDD part of the exercise was con-

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ducted similarly to that of the year before. Some "alarm" was created by the erroneous report of a simulated casualty toll for FDD of 92 percent, but this was subsequently corrected to read 92 "survivors" and thus represented a simulated casualty figure of approximately two-thirds of the division complement. 892/ Operations were thereafter conducted with the corrected figure in mind. Information on surviving procurement centers and PPOs was obtained, and simulated operations were

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conducted in light of the reduced work force and facilities. As in the earlier exercise, cooperation with ASDIC was stressed.

Following completion of Operation Alert 1956, critiques of the exercise were requested and submitted. Bagnall repeated his judgment of the previous year that from FDD's viewpoint all phases of the operation had worked well. His criticisms and recommendations were minor. He criticized the failure of certain requesters of translation service support to define the type of information desired; he complained that microfilm readers were not readily available; and he cited the inclusion of non-essential and outdated materials in the Vital Records Repository and the omission of certain reference books and FDD reports. 893/

In his report on the operation George Carey referred to FDD participation in the exercise and questioned the desirability of having division representation at the relocation center in view of the likelihood that all of FDD's source material would be destroyed and that six months or more would elapse before a flow of captured material from strategic areas would begin. Carey believed that best use of FDD survivors could be made in conjunction with Contact Division and FBID operations, at least prior to establishment of military

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control over document exploitation or the location of intact and available unexploited repositories. In this way FDD personnel could be held together pending activation of the division. 894/

Operation Alert exercises continued to be held in the next few years with FDD participation. As late as 1963, during the period 7-11 October, CIA took part in Exercise KEY CHAIN, a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) world-wide command post exercise which followed roughly the same format as the earlier alert exercises. Designed to test communications and procedures, it was held on premises and no relocation of FDD headquarters was involved. 895/ [redacted] was designated as FDD contact, with [redacted] as alternate.

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2. FDD and the Armed Services Documents Intelligence Center

The Armed Services Documents Intelligence Center has been mentioned in passing several times in the pages above. Given impetus by the Korean War then underway, plans for this documents organization were formulated by the armed services in the early 1950s to carry on a document exploitation function in the event of wartime emergency. At the same time plans were also devised for two matching units designed for personnel and materiel exploitation, the Armed Services Personnel

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Interrogation Center (ASPIC) and the Joint Materiel Intelligence Agency (JMIA). Since only ASDIC was of direct concern to FDD operations, it alone will be treated in this history and only to the extent that its development affected the division.

On 30 June 1950 a beginning in interagency coordination for future wartime captured document exploitation was made as a result of an informal discussion by John Bagnall with representatives from the intelligence organizations of the three armed service branches. Bagnall posed three questions:

- (1) What directions had been given or were planned for respective theaters concerning handling of captured documents and what directions had been issued concerning the type of documents to be forwarded to Washington?
- (2) What plans had the services envisaged for processing of captured documents in Washington?
- (3) To what degree did the services intend to rely on FDD in the matter of captured documents?

The gist of the service representatives' replies was that the matter had been only tentatively considered and all agreed that a plan of implementation should be formulated. The Army representative informed Bagnall that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recently issued a directive instructing Army's Intelligence Division to establish an exploitation activity on captured documents for the services but with no

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results so far. He complimented FDD on its support for the services but added that planning in document exploitation had been hindered to some degree by failure of CIA to make clear its plans for utilizing FDD in the event of an emergency. 896/

In a 26 July 1950 memorandum to Chief, Coordination, Operations and Policy Staff (COAPS), George Carey outlined OO's views on wartime document exploitation. Complaining that a 2 May Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) report on the subject had failed to consider CIA interests and had ignored the "common-concern" principle in captured document exploitation at the national level, he pointed out that FDD was well suited to serve as a nucleus for a national organization to carry out this function. For a variety of reasons he recommended that FDD participate in this project without assuming sole responsibility for its operations and administration. 897/

When the matter came up in a JIC meeting two days later, the JIC representatives confirmed that they recognized CIA's interest in captured document information, but since there was as yet no NSCID on the subject, JIC had felt it necessary

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to act on its own to establish a procedure for dealing with any likely emergency. 898/

Joint Intelligence Group (JIG) plans were clearly based on the concept that the armed services would have full jurisdiction in any military theater and that CIA representation would be unnecessary. The exploitation center would be under exclusive armed services control and requirements of CIA and other civilian agencies would be dealt with on a liaison basis only. Carey, on the other hand, recommended formal action to ensure recognition of CIA interests by the services, namely, that CIA should actively participate in the formulation of plans for these activities -- personnel interrogation and materiel, as well as documents. 899/

It was not until fall that CIA-JIG collaboration was formalized. It was then agreed that appropriate CIA and JIG staff representatives would collaborate both in the formulation of CIA requirements for intelligence which might be derived from captured sources and also in the integration of these requirements into the policy manuals which would govern the operation of whatever centers were established. JIG members were designated to collaborate with CIA representatives concerning the three categories of captured source

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materials, 900/ and several days later their CIA counterparts were also appointed. These included Benjamin Cain of FDD for the document centers. 901/

Action on a Defense Department request for the DCI to coordinate the JCS recommendations to establish in the Zone of Interior (ZI) the joint agencies for captured documents was delayed on 8 February 1951 pending resolution of the related question of CIA representation in the theaters of operation. This delay was overcome when in March William H. Jackson, Acting DCI, urged that the project to set up the joint agencies move ahead while the question of Agency representation in the theaters of operation be handled as a separate matter. On the basis of IAC concurrence with his proposal, he recommended that the Defense Department proceed with the establishment of the organizations. 902/

After some further delay the report of the ad hoc committee to the JIC on the "Joint Manual Establishing Policies and Procedures Governing the Operation of Captured Documents Centers" was endorsed by the JIC on 9 April 1951, 903/ and the subsequent approval by the IAC was little more than a formality. In view of the fact that all amendments requested by FDD in previous drafts had been incorporated, Bagnall

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expressed the division's approval of the action. He believed that CIA's interests were adequately covered by these amendments, which gave the Agency an assistant directorship in ASDIC, membership on the reading panel in such force as FDD deemed necessary, and reproduction facilities for producing copies of documents desired by FDD. 904/ Carey also approved, citing the fact that OO had accomplished all its major objectives except participation in the theaters of war, a question which was still under consideration. 905/ The agreements with the JCS were formalized in Special Regulation 380-350-2, an Armed Services Joint Intelligence Directive on Captured Enemy Documents issued on 6 July 1951. These regulations contained essentially the same provisions noted in the Joint Manual. On 10 July a Memorandum of Agreement with the State Department and the AEC was issued formally providing for CIA representation of these two agencies in ASDIC. 906/

With the basic directives, agreements, and manuals for the joint intelligence exploitation of captured documents, personnel, and materiel completed and approved, JMIA was established and operating by 1 August. Progress on the other two was less prompt, although logistical and training preparations were underway to bring ASDIC and ASPIC into operation at a later date. Carey requested FDD to think about releasing

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an individual to serve as an assistant director of ASDIC; 907/ but as it turned out this was somewhat premature. On 27 July CIA was informed that no date had yet been set for activation of the centers, and since G-2 did not favor their activation under present circumstances, JIC felt that no action on the part of the Agency would be necessary for the next 12 months. 908/ Meanwhile, planning continued and the Army requested from Bagnall an estimate of the number of CIA personnel to be assigned to ASDIC when it would be placed in operation. The following tentative figures were given with the understanding that these would be personnel assigned to ASDIC in the ZI: one assistant director, one to three representatives on the reading panel, and one to six personnel in the screening operation. 909/

As an interim measure to satisfy current needs, Bagnall brought up the matter of the disposition of current and future shipments of documents received in Washington from the Korean War front and arrangements to process these materials. The shipments received from Korea in 1951 had been sent to the Federal Records Center in Alexandria, Virginia; they consisted of four shipments of documents

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and one shipment of other documents

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captured between 29 October and 28 November 1950. G-2 proposed that rather than awaiting implementation of ASDIC, an ad hoc joint panel should be established to arrive at ways and means of exploiting these five consignments. Such a joint panel would operate in conformance with the principles laid down for ASDIC, including FDD representation of the State Department and AEC on the ad hoc panel. 910/ With ASDIC still only a paper organization, this procedure was followed.

At the end of 1953, with Korean hostilities already a matter of history, ASDIC, unlike ASPIC and JMIA, still awaited activation. Since none of the original service representatives who had worked on ASDIC were any longer available, all having been reassigned, the Army's Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 requested a new study on ASDIC. Completed on 15 December 1953, it recommended authorization for the ASPIC directorate to serve as a standing committee to handle matters pertaining to ASDIC until the latter's activation and to handle current matters concerning document exploitation. It also reviewed various earlier recommendations, for instance, that ASDIC would be primarily a civilian organization in order to permit use of physically handicapped individuals and those beyond the age of military service, that it would be administered by

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military officers, and that it would be located at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland. Since the last of these recommendations had been submitted in mid-May 1953, active planning had come to a standstill. 911/

The recommendation of the December study was implemented the following spring. In a memorandum to the other two services and CIA, the Army's Gen. Trudeau pointed out that ASPIC, under the designation of the Army Security Center (ASC), already existed and all three services and CIA were represented. He stressed the logic of having this group continue the planning for ASDIC until the latter should become operational and recommended formation of an interim standing committee for this purpose under Army chairmanship. 912/ Allen Dulles concurred on 30 March 1954 and appointed the Contact Division's  then Assistant Director of the ASC, as the CIA member of the committee. 913/

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With the planning for ASDIC proceeding at a snail's pace  felt it would not be activated until after the outbreak of hostilities in any event 914/), FDD on 11 June contributed a detailed five-page memorandum to the Director of the ASC from John Bagnall, successor to  as CIA representative on the ASDIC Planning Committee. Drawing on experience gained

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in the course of World War II document processing and in the early development of FDD, Bagnall made a number of recommendations pertaining to document receipt and routing, ASDIC organization (including suggestions for a special document corps and establishment of an Armed Forces Foreign Language Institute), and operations. 915/

At a combined meeting of the ASC Directorate and the Planning Committee for ASDIC at Fort Meade on 7 October 1954, G-2 solicited comments from the service representatives on the idea of activating ASDIC immediately on an austere basis. Since this was for purposes of making recommendations to JIC, of which CIA was not a member, the Agency's views were not requested, but the A-2 representative asked for these nonetheless because -- in his words -- "CIA had the only effective group of linguists." He was therefore concerned as to the extent of CIA participation. The gist of Bagnall's reply was that it was the Agency understanding that ASDIC would be activated only in the event of hostilities. Not knowing what CIA personnel and commitments would be at that time, he felt constrained not to make a pledge now. In the event of war he believed the CIA commitment would initially be limited, and that the Agency contingent would operate with a small

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nucleus until the flow of materials had increased to a point where greater participation was warranted. Bagnall questioned the G-2 member on what documents ASDIC would process if activated immediately. He did not know. Bagnall recommended CIA take the position that it saw no reason for ASDIC activation, 916/ and in this the AD/O concurred.

The pressure on G-2's part to activate the documents organization, even if on a limited scale, persisted. In April 1955 Bagnall reported to Carey that he had heard rumors of the imminent activation of ASDIC by the Army, despite the absence of Air Force and Navy support. Carey discussed the problem with James Reber of the DCI's planning staff, but Reber pointed out that CIA was in no position to counsel G-2 on the advisability of activation since, paradoxically, the Agency did not become an official advisor until ASDIC was activated. 917/

On 26 May 1955 Bagnall attended an armed services meeting called by JIC to consider the Army proposal to bring ASDIC into being. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 had requested activation "as soon as possible" for the following reasons: for planning purposes; for training purposes; to exploit military documents currently available; and

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to provide a nucleus for an orderly transition in case of war. On being asked to comment, Bagnall cited the inconsistencies in the G-2 position, particularly in connection with the captured documents which G-2 said required exploitation. These materials, he informed the group, had either been or were now being processed by FDD on a regular basis in conformance with earlier agreements. The result of the meeting was to return the proposal for further consideration by G-2 with the suggestion that an Army Document Intelligence Center rather than a full ASDIC activation might be sufficient for the present. 918/ Despite what had transpired at the 26 May meeting, the Army did not change its mind but wanted this action as early as possible. 919/

Apparently JIC's opposition to the Army request served to delay the activation issue and thus helped to prevent a dilution of FDD control over document exploitation activities within the IAC. For the nonce the issue rested. In 1956 Bagnall was designated as the CIA Assistant Director of ASDIC and a number of FDD officers were earmarked for transfer to the Center on D-day, 920/ but beyond this the project languished.

In 1959 the ASDIC issue was once more revived as a subject of concern for the intelligence community when USIB directed its committees, including the Committee on

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Exploitation of Foreign Language Publications to prepare emergency planning papers by 1 December 1959. On 11 March 1959 CIA was asked to present a paper to the Joint Interrogation Planning Commission (JIPC), Security Center, US Army Intelligence Center, on CIA's concept and planning for participation in the ASDIC operation in event of an emergency. Subsequently, a paper prepared by Bagnall and concurred in by State and AEC was forwarded on 9 April to the Army with DD/I approval. 921/ The paper was essentially a review of earlier directives and memoranda of agreement whereby the CIA relationship with ASDIC had been established, but in the final paragraph the FDD chief introduced a new concept. The early proposals on staffing had foreseen the major personnel load borne by the armed services with a representative CIA contingent. In his 9 April memorandum to JIPC, Bagnall suggested that, in view of the availability in FDD of a highly trained staff of several hundred intelligence officer-linguists and ancillary support personnel, a substantial portion of the FDD staff-in-being be immediately detailed to ASDIC in the event of activation so as to provide its operational nucleus until such time as the armed services were able to provide their quotas. This nucleus would be charged with the management and conduct of professional

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activities in ASDIC, that is, the immediate organization of the screening, exploitation, and professional training activities of the Center. 922/ What, in effect, the memorandum proposed was the conversion of FDD per se from a peacetime to a wartime status and a continuation of the division's common-concern function under emergency conditions.

The issue was broached once again later in the year following a CEFLP meeting in September where the exploitation of foreign-language publications and other foreign documents was discussed. On 28 October Bagnall reported to the AD/O the JIPC chairman's proposal that in an emergency ASDIC be given responsibility for all document exploitation. As CIA representative, Bagnall countered this idea with the statement that it would make more sense to take an existing organization like FDD and in an emergency charge it with responsibility for captured documents. The JIPC chairman indicated this concept had already been rejected by the JCS on the grounds that FDD would be unable to shift its priorities so as to give military documents first attention. Bagnall disputed this contention and called attention to the fact that the division had in the past frequently shifted priorities to meet changing needs.

Bagnall further reported that on 1 November his CEFLP

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would start drafting the paper requested earlier by USIB on emergency planning for document exploitation activities. There were essentially three approaches to this problem, *viz*:

(1) ASDIC established as the central document exploitation activity with a core of FDD personnel; (2) FDD charged as the central document exploitation activity augmented by assignment of military linguists; and (3) ASDIC established to exploit captured documents and FDD continuing with overt publications. The FDD chief saw specific merits in all three approaches and in this connection proposed for the first time combining ASDIC and ASPIC as a joint center in the interest of conserving scarce linguistic talents. He concluded his exposition with the recommendation that the Agency adopt the position that centralized exploitation for intelligence of all types of foreign-language documents in an emergency was sound and that CIA, which already had the function of providing services of common concern, logically should undertake centralized exploitation. He expressed willingness, however, to have the Agency support ASDIC in this function if the JCS rejected his recommendation on military grounds. 923/

Bagnall's recommendations received the strong support of J.W. Moreau, Chief of OO's P&C Staff. 924/ At an OO Staff meeting on 4 November Bagnall discussed his proposal for

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granting an existing organization like FDD responsibility for all document exploitation in an emergency but cited the objections from the military on this. He reported that a counter plan had been received proposing the use of ASDIC for captured documents and FDD for all other documents, with a core of FDD personnel in ASDIC -- his point 3. Carey expressed his preference for approach 2, but the meeting participants agreed that if this were not obtainable, Bagnall should hold out for proposal 3, with FDD assisting ASDIC to the extent of providing a limited number of personnel subject to recall by the DCI. 925/

The division of labor presented in the latter proposal was substantially accepted as the basis for ASDIC-FDD cooperation in any future emergency, and Bagnall spelled this out in a 30 November 1959 memorandum to the Executive Secretary, USIB. 926/

By May 1960 the suggestion of a combined ASDIC-ASPIC organization, first advanced by John Bagnall in his 28 October memorandum, had been discussed by the JIPC. As a result, the committee considered a plan for an organizational arrangement which came to be known as the United States Armed Services Exploitation Center (USASEXC) as an alternative to plans for separate ASDIC and ASPIC installations. Because these two

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organizations would be at the same location and engaged in similar work, utilizing manpower whose training and talents were somewhat alike and often in short supply, the JIPC recommended their union under a single headquarters. The CIA would furnish one of four deputy directors, 927/ and the initial staffing plan called for [ ] people from CIA. 928/

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On 6 July the pros and cons of the new plan, which had already been approved by the three services, were discussed by Carey, Bagnall, and [ ] the current CIA member on the JIPC. The three agreed that [ ] of FDD would replace [ ] of CD as the CIA member, a change made formal on 3 August, and it was further decided that CIA would insist on the DCI having control of CIA assignees to USASEXC and its components, 929/ an escape clause designed to prevent too rigid control by the military of CIA options in the arrangement. Later in July Bagnall, with Carey's approval, prepared a formal concurrence in the ASDIC/ASPIC plan, 930/ and the new organization was subsequently established on paper for activation in the event of a crisis. Its purpose was to serve as a headquarters for ASDIC and ASPIC, which would conduct actual operations. The total CIA complement in the combined organization was to be [ ] individuals, including [ ] professionals and [ ] clericals from FDD. 931/ The FDD

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complement of 83, or one-third of the division's surviving members in the event of a surprise nuclear attack, was to be phased into ASDIC according to the following schedule: 50 percent by M+30 days, 100 percent by M+60 days. In contrast, the armed services phase-in would be as follows: 5 percent by M+30 days, 10 percent by M+60 days, 50 percent by M+90 days, 75 percent by M+120 days, and 100 percent by M+180 days. 932/

With USASExC established, the first of several ASDIC/ASPIC training seminars was conducted at Fort Holabird, Baltimore, Maryland, during the period 11-22 June 1962. Four OO officers were designated as participants. [redacted] attended as CIA monitor for the JIPC and [redacted] served as instructors in document exploitation, and [redacted] [redacted] conducted the session pertaining to the composition and functions of the CIA element in ASPIC. 933/ The following year, the JIPC, which prior to this time had had the responsibility for planning the activation of ASDIC and ASPIC, was deemed superfluous in light of the USASExC formation, and therefore, effective 31 July 1963, this commission was dissolved. 934/ In order to maintain relations with USASExC, [redacted] were designated as CIA contact officers for ASDIC and ASPIC, respectively. 935/

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The Operation Alert exercises of the 1950s and 1960s, the USASEXC training sessions in 1962 and later, and the dissolution of the JIPC in 1963 in general marked the completion of war emergency planning so far as FDD was concerned. The administrative detail involved and the time expended on the formulation of plans was considerable. Their utility and benefit to the Agency as a whole and to the division specifically are difficult to assess and perhaps only in a real emergency would the answer to the question of their practicality and usefulness be forthcoming. They did, however, represent planning exercises which in the atmosphere and under the circumstances of the Cold War were regarded as essential and therefore had to be worked out and executed.

B. Vietnam Support\*

The Foreign Documents Division became involved in Indochina and Vietnam even prior to 1950 when, in the absence of any effective Vietnamese language capability, it

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\* In writing this section of the history the author has relied heavily on a paper prepared in 1964 by [redacted] Asia Branch, FDD, entitled "Role and Support of the Office of Central Reference in the Agency's Activities in Vietnam, 1950-1964," as part of the OCR contribution to the Agency project on Vietnam under the program of the Historical Staff, O/DCI, established by [redacted]. Unless otherwise indicated, the information recorded in the following pages represents a paraphrasing and updating of the subject paper.

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translated or exploited French, Japanese, and other foreign-language documents and publications dealing with the area to meet operational and intelligence information requirements. The evolution of FDD's subsequent support role necessitated the creation of an effective language capability through recruitment and training, the furnishing of extensive specific translation service to CIA and to other USIB members, the initiation and development of an ever-expanding intelligence information reporting program (initially on all Indochina but after 1955 almost exclusively on North Vietnam), and the rotation of staff officers overseas

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1. Development of Vietnamese Language Capability

Prior to 1950 FDD lacked the capability to handle Vietnamese language requirements, but with the outbreak of the Korean War and the worsening of the situation in Indochina the division took steps to develop a limited proficiency. The first effort consisted of self-study by two staff officers, both Japanese linguists. Formal training began in 1952 with the assignment of one of the officers to a six-month course conducted by NSA. Following the Geneva Conference in July 1954 and establishment of the Communist regime in Hanoi, FDD anticipated the growing intelligence interest in the area and recruited and trained two additional staff officers,

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raising the total number of Vietnamese linguists available in 1955 to four. In 1958 two more were added (and one lost by transfer to OCI), partly to cope with the increasing requirements for classified translation service and partly in anticipation of implementing an agreement with DDP/FE to begin rotating FDD personnel to the [redacted] on a regular and continuing basis. These anticipations were fulfilled and subsequently necessitated the training of three additional linguists in 1962 and 1963. Despite personnel losses due to transfer, reassignment, or other causes, on the eve of the increased US involvement in Vietnam following the Tonkin Bay incident in 1964, FDD had three staff linguists on duty at headquarters, two [redacted] and a third on duty with the DD/P's Technical Services Division (TSD) pending early transfer to Saigon. In emergencies, the division was able to draw on the services of one additional staff officer not then assigned to the Vietnamese operations.

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## 2. Headquarters Translation Service

From 1950 on, many, and at times all, staff officers attached to FDD's Vietnam desk were assigned to servicing specific requests from Agency components and USIB members for translation of classified documents on both North and South Vietnam. FDD normally gave such requests priority over all


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other operations. Hundreds of requirements of this type were serviced after 1950 but only a few of the more significant items can be mentioned here.

In the early 1950s the division translated a major six-volume military topographic study of Vietnam prepared during World War II by the Saigon headquarters of Japan's Southern Army. This project was of major interest to ORR's Geography Division and to the Army Map Service (AMS).

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4. Intelligence Information Reporting Program

Almost since its inception in 1947 FDD had been reporting all types of basic and current intelligence

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information on Vietnam and Indochina. Prior to 1955 the division had to rely heavily on French and other non-Vietnamese language publications and reports for information on Indochina. Considerable basic data, for example, was derived from World War II Japanese military studies of the area. To the extent of its capacity, FDD did exploit Vietnamese publications from Hanoi and Saigon as well as Viet Minh publications collected in the course of French military operations or through clandestine and other means. *Nhan Dan*, official daily organ of the Vietnamese Lao Dong (Communist) Party was exploited by FDD as early as 1950. This activity led to such exploitation products as a 1955 FDD report titled "A Survey of Viet Minh Anti-West Propaganda in the Hanoi Press" and another titled "Survey of French Communist Propaganda in Indochina." 939/

Following the Geneva conference in July 1954, which confirmed Communist authority north of the 17th parallel, the division not only increased its Vietnamese T/O to cope with the rising demands for specific translation service but also decided to regularize and expand its reporting program. Hence, in 1955 as part of the newly devised FDD scheduled reporting program, it launched the *Monthly Report on Continental Southeast Asia*, which was predominantly on

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Vietnam and was drawn largely from Vietnamese rather than French-language sources. Between 1954 and 1956 Overseas Chinese in Vietnam were reported on through FDD's quarterly report *Overseas Chinese Activities in Southeast Asia*, and beginning in 1956 the division included North Vietnam in its world-wide coverage reported in the FDD publication *East-West and Intra-Orbit Travel and Contacts*.

Because after 1955, except for clandestine collection and FBIS-monitored broadcasts, the FDD program had become almost the only source of information on North Vietnam, the division decided in 1955 to concentrate on that area, a policy which was maintained from then on. This decision was further justified by the fact that US facilities in Saigon -- the American Embassy, the US Information Service (USIS), Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), and FBID -- were able adequately to fulfill collection requirements for South Vietnam.

In response to consumer interest, the monthly report on Southeast Asia had by 1959 become almost exclusively a report on North Vietnam and in recognition of this reality, it was superseded by the *Monthly Report on North Vietnam*. With increasing frequency this report included intensively collated materials on such specific topics as national

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and provincial rice production, export trade facilities and organization, military unit identifications (for NSA), and party organization and leadership (for OCI, BR, and OSI).

In 1960, again in response to consumer needs, FDD replaced this report and during the next three years disseminated the information collected on North Vietnam through a variety of topical- or subject-oriented reports covering the Asian Bloc or the international community. These included the monthly reports on Communist revisionism and dissidence and reviews of Communist theoretical journals discussed earlier in this history, as well as weekly Bloc military reports, a weekly economic report on Communist Asia, a special weekly card-file type report of data on industrial plants and service facilities in Communist Asia -- primarily for ORR and IR but also for NSA and the Army -- and a semi-monthly report on the external economic relations of Bloc countries. In March 1962 FDD initiated the *Review of the Asian Bloc Press*, a weekly or, as source receipts permitted, a semi-weekly report. In the interest of rapid dissemination, the information collected for this review was published directly from tapes dictated by the FDD officer. From mid-1963 on, FDD resumed publishing all intelligence information on North Vietnam under one cover, the *Weekly Report on North Vietnam*.

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The establishment of the USJPRS in 1957 greatly increased FDD's capability to support the Vietnamese effort, largely by permitting it to concentrate its internal capabilities on classified materials, specialized reporting, and overseas personnel rotation to support DD/P operations. The new translating facility enabled FDD to draw upon Vietnamese linguistic talent throughout the United States and resulted in a greatly increased volume of unclassified translation on Vietnam which was disseminated not only to the intelligence community but to academic institutions as well. By 1964 JPRS was publishing information on Vietnam (mostly North Vietnam) at the rate of almost 4,500 pages per year and this rate was subsequently increased with the build-up of US involvement.

The initiation of JPRS activity was accompanied by an FDD attempt to center the Vietnamese press scrutiny function, which since 1951 had been shared with FBID's Saigon Bureau, exclusively in FDD. John Bagnall cited the undesirability of fragmentary reporting with its high risk of duplication and recommended that all reporting of press and periodicals be done by a single component, an arrangement which would be more comprehensive and orderly. 940/ An earlier letter, in October 1957, from  Chief, Saigon Bureau, to the Acting Chief, FBID, prompted by an OO effort to

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assign much of the Vietnamese press coverage to FDD had stated, however, that separating monitoring from scrutiny would be extremely difficult and that questions of procurement involving Communist periodicals would mean long delays if FDD had to await delivery in Washington. He suggested that FDD be assigned to exploit journals. The FBID position on press scrutiny was enhanced in January 1958 when the DD/P, responding to a critique by the Inspector General that it was not taking sufficient advantage of FBID's capabilities, asked FBID to increase its exploitation of the North Vietnamese press. 941/ Thus, the split responsibility for Vietnamese press coverage continued and with it the uneasy FDD-FBID cooperation on procurement and exploitation coordination. With the establishment of JPRS in 1957, which increased FDD's capability to cope with a much larger translation work load, the press scrutiny function at the Saigon Bureau was gradually curtailed. Thereafter for the most part only press materials requiring on-the-spot handling were done there.

FDD reporting on Southeast Asia was buffeted again in 1964. In April 1964 Thomas Hughes, Chief of INR/State, addressed a strongly worded memorandum to the DCI concerning deficiencies in information on North Vietnam which had become apparent in the course of work on a recent National Intelligence Estimate.

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All aspects of the problem were covered but exploitation of press material, which, with radio intercept, he characterized as the major, and often the only, source of political and economic intelligence on the enemy, was strongly criticized as erratic and slow. He attacked FDD activity in this field and deplored the reduction in coverage by the FBIS press scrutiny unit in Saigon and the transfer of this responsibility to FDD. He recommended that this change be reversed, that the FBIS unit be expanded and more fully used for current sources, and that only the remaining, more basic material, be left to FDD and JPRS. 942/

The FDD reaction to the Hughes blast was defensive but the division accepted the valid criticisms in the memorandum in good grace and took steps to rectify the shortcomings cited. However, [ ] recently appointed Chief of FDD, indicated that some of Hughes's comments were less than accurate and in other instances they did not take into consideration problems which were beyond FDD control, such as procurement and staffing. However, in the interest of better service to the community, [ ] advocated that Hughes's recommendations be adopted, contingent, however, upon the solution of the procurement and staffing problems in Saigon. He further suggested that an arrangement be made for

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assigning FDD personnel to the Saigon Bureau similar to that used in the period 1953-1961 in respect to the German Bureau. 943/

The upshot of the Hughes memorandum and its reverberations in the Agency was a reappraisal of CIA collection and reporting efforts on North Vietnam. In response to a request from the Critical Collection Problems Committee, a number of meetings were held under the aegis of the Collection Guidance Staff to carry out inter-Office planning directed at developing the most efficient procurement and processing of North Vietnamese publications. As this affected FDD, it led to a tightening up of the division's operations, with the result that sources were received and reports issued on a much more timely basis. 944/ Augmentation of the Saigon staff was not regarded as practical in that the three North Vietnamese publications available in Saigon constituted less than six percent of the overall total received in Washington, and in 1964 only one North Vietnamese newspaper *Hoc Tap*, was exploited in the field, yielding an average translation of four to six of the eight to ten articles in the source. Of this number only two to four were included in the *FBIS Daily Report* and the rest were sent for JPRS publication in Washington. 945/

During the period 1950 to 1964 FDD, in conjunction with JPRS after 1957, produced a total of approximately 16,700 pages

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of ad hoc exploitation on Vietnam and the rest of Indochina. In the same period, FDD's production also included an estimated 3,500 pages of scheduled serial reports and 3,700 pages of specific translation service. Since this was accomplished with a limited staff and the JPRS contribution did not become effective until 1957, it would appear that the division contribution to the Vietnam effort from a quantitative standpoint was highly significant. In terms of quality, even the INR complaint of 1964 had no quarrel with FDD support. It simply wanted more current service. This fact, plus favorable comment from time to time from elsewhere in the USIB community, leads to the conclusion that FDD contributed, if not a crucial, at least a highly useful form of support to the overall CIA effort on Vietnam.

C. The Sputnik Flap: A Dissemination Problem

In October 1957 the Russians surprised the world by launching Sputnik I, the first artificial earth satellite. The event was followed in the United States by a rash of public criticism, directed largely at the intelligence community for its failure to forecast this major technological breakthrough. Some critics asserted that indications of the impending launch were to be found in the pages of Soviet technical journals "gathering dust on the shelves of the Library of

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Congress."

The Foreign Documents Division was promptly directed by Allen Dulles to implement a procedure whereby its regularly issued abstracts of Soviet open source S&T publications would be made available to the public. Thus, in July 1958, after more than a decade of classified bi-weekly issues, the FDD *Periodical Abstracts*, appropriately modified, went to the "newstand." For the next year and a half, retitled *Scientific Information Report* (SIR) and bearing the seal of the Central Intelligence Agency on its cover, it was sold to the public by the Office of Technical Services, Department of Commerce. It was one of the few CIA publications ever to be openly purchasable.

In the following pages are recounted the developments which led to the "opening up" of the products of FDD operations to the public and the problems attendant to the dissemination of these reports for general use. Of interest also, in this connection, was the issue of "overclassification" and the alleged deprivation of the scientific community of so-called "open" sources as a result of misdirected government zeal.

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Even before the Sputnik crisis arose to disturb US

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scientific complacency, the subject of intelligence support for the scientific community had been broached. Early in September 1957  recently returned from the USSR, had stressed to the DAD/NE, William P. Bundy, the need for a US abstracting service for Soviet and other foreign S&T literature. He had been greatly impressed by the Soviet knowledge of US literature; conversely, many of his questions had led the Soviets to comment that all the answers were available in their literature. He expressed the thought that US industry might be willing to provide financial support for a central service. 946/

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The Sputnik launch triggered a barrage of articles in the US press stressing the general theme of US unpreparedness in the face of the new and spectacular Soviet space achievement. Many of these, emphasizing the "disclosure" that the facts relating to Soviet research on satellites were readily available in open Russian sources, flatly stated that the government had simply failed to search out this information and pass it on to the scientific community. A *New York Times* article on 25 November 1957 was typical of such reports. 947/ It announced, for example, that thousands of Soviet scientific reports were collecting dust on the shelves of the Library of Congress for lack of a program to translate them. It went on

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to say that some 1,200 Soviet scientific journals were being published each year, of which about 200 were of major importance, but only some 30 were being translated under US government sponsorship. As a result, American scientists were ignorant about scientific progress in the USSR and much time and money were wasted in duplicating work already performed. The reason for this state of affairs, the article continued, was the lack of personnel and money for the government to do the work. The Soviet Union, in contrast, had in 1952 established the All-Union Institute of Scientific and Technical Information in Moscow with a permanent staff of 2,300 translators, abstractors, and publishers, supplemented by a part-time staff of 20,000 translators and abstractors. In the United States, on the other hand, the Commerce Department's Office of Technical Services, the "only United States Government counterpart of the Soviet institute," had a staff of only 35 persons for indexing and abstracting scientific reports.

The *Times* article made no mention of the USJPRS, then six months old, although an earlier item on the same theme in the *Baltimore Sun* had done so, 948/ and the new organization had been referred to in a number of articles at the time of its establishment. Security barriers, of course, prevented the *Times* and others from knowing of the work of the

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intelligence community, through FDD, in the field of scientific translation.

The *New York Times* was quite accurate in citing the lack of money and manpower as the primary reason for insufficient progress in foreign source exploitation. The advent of Sputnik had no effect on FDD's internal personnel complement. The T/O remained fixed at  despite the furor over the Soviet accomplishment and was in fact reduced to  at the beginning of 1959. However, the establishment of the JPRS more than compensated for this. A similar situation pertained to the FDD budget.

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In its statement that 1,200 Soviet scientific journals were published each year with only 30 of the major ones translated by the United States, the *Times* article was somewhat misleading. The reader was left with the impression that all 1,200 journals were readily available, while in fact the number of titles listed as available for purchase by the Soviets themselves was considerably less than this. In 1957 only 325 S&T journals were included on the official list. 949/ Of the titles available at the end of 1957, approximately half were subscribed to by FDD as worthy of S&T exploitation.

From the US standpoint the problem as outlined in the *New York Times* was not as bleak as the article seemed to

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indicate. It is true that more could have been accomplished if additional people and money had been made available to FDD. To a considerable extent the initiation of the JPRS operation helped resolve this troublesome situation. The primary problem was, however, not the failure of intelligence organizations to produce Soviet scientific information but rather the barrier between the intelligence community and the public, an intentional one in view of the security aspects involved. The intelligence establishment was producing all or most of the information desired by US scientists. The question, after Sputnik, was how to get it to them.

FDD took a first step in this direction during a meeting on 28 October 1957 between John Bagnall and two officials from the Commerce Department's Office of Technical Services. The meeting was primarily a get-acquainted and coordination session, in the course of which was outlined the organization Commerce proposed to establish as a translation clearing house to republish available abstracts and translations and also provide translations of additional articles recommended by a scientific advisory board.  had been approved for this purpose in the FY-1959 budget and more would be requested. Bagnall supplied figures on the volume of available unclassified Soviet S&T literature but pointed

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out that CIA's interest in seeing that information on Soviet research reached US scientists was indirect and that a memorandum to this effect had been given to the National Science Foundation. When asked for advice on good commercial translation agencies, Bagnall mentioned USJPRS, without disclosing its sponsoring organization. 950/

The Sputnik flap gradually gained momentum and the problem of disseminating the Agency's S&T output to the outside moved to higher levels. In November Bagnall worked with OSI and OCR to draw up a memorandum for the DCI on what CIA was producing from Russian scientific publications, and at the end of the month he briefed the DCI and his deputies on the overall picture of the exploitation of Soviet scientific materials in the United States. In the course of the briefing Bagnall revealed that of 65,000 to 70,000 S&T pages produced by the government each year, the CIA had prepared 30,000 pages of translation annually since 1951, the NSF and National Institutes of Health (NIH) together produced approximately 20,000 pages, the Air Force turned out 10,000 to 15,000 pages, and other government agencies, mainly AEC, accounted for 5,000 pages. In addition, commercial firms and academic institutions had produced an estimated 5,000 pages. He pointed out that, consistent with Agency policy and good

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security practices, FDD used every device possible to make its translations available to those who wanted them. About 90 percent of CIA translations were furnished to industry and the public through NSF, which distributed them with Agency identification removed and also made them available through the Special Libraries Association Translation Center (SLATC). All JPRS translations were unclassified and issued through OTS and NSF. NSF- and NIH-sponsored translations were available on subscription and Air Force translations were disseminated through OTS. Other government and non-government translations were available to scientists through the SLATC. 951/

On 10 December 1957 Bagnall accompanied Allen Dulles in an appearance before the Killian Scientific Advisory Committee to brief its members on CIA exploitation of Russian scientific publications. At the meeting Dulles and Bagnall presented figures on dissemination and exploitation based on the data Bagnall had reported in November. Considerable interest was created among the committee members by reference to FDD's *Scientific Information Report*, a publication classified "Confidential" in order to protect possible revelation of national intelligence objectives. To their request that this report receive wider dissemination, Dulles responded that this could probably be done by working through the

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NSF. The DCI revealed to the committee the work of JPRS and also the fact that FDD translations were openly available through deposit with the John Crerar Library in Chicago. Following further discussion on related matters, Dulles proposed that the committee work out a plan to give expanded dissemination to CIA-produced unclassified literature and to set up controls to avoid duplication. He further suggested that Bagnall work with Dr. Burton W. Adkinson of the NSF on this point. 952/

Bagnall met with Adkinson on 12 December. Their meeting resulted in the formation of a working group chaired by Adkinson and consisting, besides Bagnall, of members from the Air Force, Department of Commerce, AEC, and NSF. The group was charged with developing a program for making the results of Soviet scientific publication exploitation by government offices more generally available to industry and the scientific world. Designated the NSF Working Group on Russian Scientific Literature, it held its initial meeting on 16 December. 953/

Thus, some three months after the launching of the first Soviet satellite, considerable progress had been made in implementing plans for disseminating that part of the Agency S&T translations which heretofore had been withheld

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from public use for security reasons. Criticism of government classification policy in connection with this material continued, however. On 20 January 1958 Dr. Lloyd V. Berkner, President of Associated Universities, Inc., appeared before a House Committee to appeal for Congressional support of a program for S&T exploitation and dissemination. In the course of his presentation Berkner stated that US access to Russian scientific literature was poor and that the translation of foreign language, particularly Russian, literature into English was weak. He criticized the fact that a number of government agencies (unnamed) were translating open foreign scientific literature but were restricting circulation of such translations by security classification. This, he said, often resulted in the processing of the same scientific article by different agencies, and he cited one instance where a Russian paper had been translated seven different times -- a wasteful and ineffective procedure. He found it difficult to understand the advantage to be gained by security classification of open literature. 954/

The Berkner testimony proved disconcerting to the DCI and other Agency officials, particularly in view of the wide publicity given it by the press. George Carey took action to counter the report. Fearing repercussions as a result of

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the accusations that the government was over-classifying Russian scientific literature, he called on Bagnall to report on the number of translated S&T pages released to the public in 1957 and the number withheld. Bagnall reported 32,000 pages had been produced, a figure likely to run to 35,000 in 1958. Of the 1957 total, 8,000 were in the *SIR*. In addition, roughly 2,000 pages per year were put out in the report *Activities in the Arctic and Antarctic*, classified "For Official Use Only." Bagnall felt the two reports could be downgraded to "Unclassified," but to do so would require certain changes in format. 955/

At the DCI's insistence, measures were taken to identify the alleged oft-translated "secret" source referred to by Berkner. The item was subsequently disclosed to have been a book on acoustics written by a Soviet author. Through a search of its DEX file, FDD found the 195-page book to have been translated by a Cleveland flight laboratory in 1950 and listed as "Unclassified." Extensive inquiry among government agencies resulted only in disclaimers of their having ever translated the book. 956/

Stung by the Berkner criticism, the Agency moved ahead in the matter of downgrading the classification of FDD reports. On 20 January 1958 Carey discussed with Robert Amory,

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the DD/I, various steps which might be taken to arrange wider circulation of the reports and requested Bagnall to prepare a memorandum on this subject. The matter of downgrading the *CTS* was also discussed and Bagnall offered the solution of issuing two versions of the publication, one unclassified and the other a classified supplement. He solicited and received the concurrence of the IAC members and the other contributors to the *CTS* on this proposal. 957/

By 24 January the Agency had made the following arrangements: classified and unclassified versions of the *CTS* were to be issued and wider distribution of each version was to be explored; the *SIR* was to be redesigned along lines of scientific disciplines and away from its intelligence-oriented format and would be issued unclassified; and 12 other FDD reports would be issued unclassified and attributed to the CIA, with the possibility that other reports might be issued in this form in the future. Adkinson was enthusiastic about these moves and requested Dr. Killian to request the Secretary of Commerce to provide funds for wider distribution of the reports. 958/ Approval of these actions was granted by Amory on 31 January and distribution of the reports commenced in February.

A question now arose regarding the handling of requests

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for copies of reports other than the normal IAC quota distributed by OCR. It was decided that Bagnall would investigate the possibility of the Commerce Department using its own cover on the reports with credit given to CIA in a preface. In this way it was hoped that requests for copies would go to OTS rather than to the Agency, a hope which was generally, but not totally, realized. The Agency received letters from time to time requesting information on how to receive released translations. These were always referred to OTS. 959/

The attendant publicity resulting from the declassifying of the FDD reports and subsequently from Commerce's request to the House Appropriations Committee for funds to set up a translation clearing house led once again to a flare-up of press comment, which had died down in the weeks following the first impact of Sputnik I. An Associated Press (AP) release appearing on 30 January 1958 under the title "U.S. to Release Flood of Soviet Science Data" reported that the government had decided to let down all bars and release for public use 50,000 Russian scientific documents a year, the bulk to be made available by the CIA and the Air Force. What was disturbing about the article was the alleged statement of a "source close to the Government" that CIA had expressed a desire to get rid of the job of translating and abstracting Russian

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literature and turn it over to some one else. 960/ As a result, Commerce requested clarification of the CIA position on the translation of Russian scientific works. Assurance of continued CIA activity in this field and in support of OTS was furnished by the DDCI, Gen. Cabell, who declared the AP dispatch to be without foundation. 961/

Despite all the effort expended, there was by the end of February 1958 still no central point in government to which industry and scientists could go to obtain unclassified government translations of interest to them, and frequent letters were received from requesters on how this could be done. In the Agency's case the queries were usually referred to OTS, but the latter was having its problems. In March the House Appropriations Committee turned down the Commerce Department's request to be made the distribution point for unclassified translations. As a partial solution, JPRS made arrangements with the Library of Congress, which agreed to act as a repository and to make the JPRS translations available to the public for a nominal fee. 962/ OCR had also received many requests for FDD's unclassified material. Therefore, Bagnall and Paul Borel, the AD/CR, developed a form letter directing inquiries to the Creer Library, from which photostats of the material on deposit could be obtained. 963/

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Meanwhile, a related problem, already foreseen, begged for solution. This pertained to the predictably large volume of requests for copies of unclassified reports following the press publicity. Bagnall reported on 20 March that after only one issue of the declassified *CTS* considerable interest was being shown in wider distribution. He feared this could mushroom into proportions detrimental to CIA reproduction facilities. The present distribution of the *CTS* to IAC agencies was 384 copies and the total to the government was 444. With declassification, the Agency received a variety of informal requests which included, for example, 60 additional copies for the Department of Agriculture for land grant colleges and 125 extra copies for subcontractors of the AEC. Bagnall could envision a distribution of thousands for this one report. He requested a policy decision on whether unclassified reports could be limited to 500 copies and whether encouragement to recipients to use their own reproduction facilities was in keeping with the DCI's interest. 964/

concluded that the best solution, in light of the fact that it was not strictly an FDD problem, was for some other government agency, such as OTS or the Library of Congress, to handle the reproduction and dissemination. He felt that funds would probably be available from Congress for

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a central government clearing house by the beginning of FY-1959. In the interim he instructed Bagnall to limit issuance to 500 copies. Since neither the *CTIS* nor JPRS reports were copy-righted, there was nothing to prevent recipients from reproducing them and making wide secondary distribution. 965/

On 6 June 1958 the AD/CR directed a memorandum to the DCI for approval. It was designed to establish CIA policy on dissemination of Agency translations and related reference aids and included three points, as follows: CIA would make available to the public the maximum amount of its own and sponsored unclassified translations; attribution to CIA would not be prohibited but would be avoided, particularly with reference to external translations (e.g., JPRS); and CIA, with some exceptions (e.g., dissemination by Contact Division), would not distribute its materials directly to the public but would cooperate with interested government agencies to effect dissemination through their channels (e.g., the Library of Congress, NSF, Commerce Department). Again with minor exceptions, CIA would not print or underwrite reproduction of copies disseminated to the public. 966/ The proposed policy was approved by the DCI the next day. On 2 July the AD/CR followed up his policy proposal with a memorandum to the AD/O outlining the manner in which the policy was to be

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implemented. In essence, it was a statement of OCR prerogatives in the dissemination function. 967/

The Sputnik flap had by now progressed to still higher levels, and with the flood gates open, so to speak, following the declassifying of FDD reports, pressures increased for the release of information to an increasingly broad group of requesters. This created problems, as we have seen, and necessitated the use of larger amounts of government funds to help ease the burden. As a result, FDD became involved at the Congressional level.

With respect to the distribution of unclassified scientific reports, in April the Commerce Department appeared before the Commerce Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee on behalf of FY-1959 funds for OTS, and, at the Department's invitation, CIA representatives, including John Bagnall, were present to answer questions pertaining to the translation and dissemination of foreign-language documents. At the meeting, held on 28 April 1958, the CIA officers were asked several questions which they answered without difficulty. In the course of the session, the generally low level of knowledgability by the Congressmen on the subject under discussion was quite apparent. Some of the Subcommittee members seemed to have closed minds; those, however, who

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sought to ascertain the facts appeared to be in the majority. 968/

CIA representatives, including FDD officers, made two more visits to Capitol Hill in the spring and summer of 1958 to testify before Congressional committees studying the general problem. The upshot was favorable action by Congress on the general question of disseminating IAC translations and specifically on the Commerce request on behalf of OTS, and on 1 July the new clearing house, with an assist from ATIC, FDD, and JPRS, was ready to begin operations. FDD agreed to furnish the mats of the S&T sections of the *CTS* and to continue to do this for the next six months. Thereafter the division would provide copies of DEX cards of unclassified S&T translations produced. It was agreed that the OTS clearing house would phase into indexing, reporting, and dissemination of S&T translations as rapidly as possible during the first six months of FY-1958 and that FDD would cease these functions, except for maintenance of DEX files, as soon as OTS was doing the job. 969/ However, after a trial period it was determined that FDD's discontinuance of these functions had not proved feasible. For a variety of reasons, such as incompleteness of the OTS files, unsatisfactory search results, incomplete source coverage, inaccurate information, and inordinate delays, members of the intelligence community found the OTS service unsatisfactory

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and FDD continued to perform the *CTS* function. 970/

Meanwhile, considerable progress on the dissemination of Soviet S&T intelligence to the public had been made and a workable methodology devised. On 15 October 1958 OTS announced plans for the publication of *Technical Translations*, a semi-monthly report, the first issue of which was due for release in January 1959. Continued cooperation of FDD in this venture was requested 971/ and assurances given that it would be granted.

On 1 April 1959 George Carey, in what amounted to a review of the year that had elapsed since FDD had first declassified its S&T reports in compliance with the DD/I order, gave an accounting of what had been accomplished. His report revealed that FDD was regularly issuing eight publications without classification, control, or caveat.

1. Scientific Information Report -- Published by OTS. Dissemination had increased from 175 to 223 copies per issue in the USIB community. In addition, OTS serviced 175 subscriptions.

2. Consolidated Translation Survey -- Dissemination to USIB agencies had increased from 316 to 529 copies. Expressions of interest had been received from a broad cross-section of science, industry, and education.

3. International Geophysical Cooperation Program -- Soviet Bloc Activities -- Dissemination rose from 150 to 174 to government recipients and OTS issued 190 copies by subscription. The report had been quoted in scientific writings: for example, *Missiles and Rockets* had used numerous articles from it; the

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*US Medical Journal* had quoted from it at least twice; the *Washington Evening Star* had similarly used it in its science columns.

4. USSR Industrial Equipment (Transportation, Construction, Power Machinery)

5. Transportation, Communications, and Electric Power in the USSR

6. Activities in the Arctic and Antarctic

7. USSR Materials and Materials Processing Equipment

8. USSR Electronic and Precision Equipment 972/

Commerce Department had decided against reproduction and dissemination to the public of the last five unclassified reports on grounds that they were not "technical." However, their government dissemination had increased some 20 to 25 copies each since declassification.

Carey's statement of accomplishment was supplemented by a CEFLP report furnished in August 1959 in compliance with a request from USIB for information on the S&T exploitation and dissemination problem. The report, issued 28 August, revealed that in contrast to the 65 and 150 S&T journals available in 1947 and 1950, respectively, 440 were available and processed by USIB agencies in 1959. Production from this material had averaged 41,450 pages per year from 1950 through 1958; however, the 1959 annual rate had risen sharply, to approximately

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148,000 pages, with about one-fourth of this amount provided by CIA. By 1 January 1959, more than 330,000 pages of translation from Soviet S&T publications had been made available to the US scientific community through the cooperation of NSF, the Library of Congress, and OTS. 973/ The trend in S&T production and dissemination by FDD/CIA and the rest of the community in the following years continued to rise.

At the beginning of this section of the chapter it was indicated that the *SIR*, perhaps the main FDD contribution to resolving the Sputnik flap, was declassified in 1958 and put on the "newstand." At the end of 1960, having served its purpose, it was once again classified and returned to the confines of the intelligence community. This action was taken in order to restore the report's orientation to intelligence needs. By this time the report had outlived its usefulness on the outside and the US scientific community was well served by other programs such as those sponsored by NSF and NIH. Moreover, the number of subscriptions for the report entered with OTS had declined drastically. Therefore, John Bagnall recommended on 5 October that the unclassified version of the *SIR* be terminated and four series of classified scientific information reports be established in its place.

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The OTS Director agreed to discontinuance of the report provided it be continued to the end of 1960 to complete existing subscriptions. 974/ Bagnall's request was sent forward by Carey and on 8 November 1960 the DD/I approved discontinuance of the report effective at the end of the year.

This change may be said to have marked the symbolic end of the Sputnik flap as it related to FDD. The effects of the decisions made and the changes implemented as a result of this significant event remained, however. Conscious of the value of its translations and exploitations to science, industry, and education and at the same time mindful of the recurrent derogations by outsiders that the government was either "neglecting" foreign literature or was "over-classifying" it, the division continued to make as much of its unclassified product available to legitimate users as was feasible. This effort was considerably simplified by the development, concurrently with the Sputnik affair, of FDD's field unit, the United States Joint Publications Research Service.

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CHAPTER THIRTEEN

Expansion of Service:

The US Joint Publications Research Service

A. Establishment of the Organization

The US Joint Publications Research Service, FDD's field component, was the division's third attempt to solve the chronic translation problem which had plagued the organization since early in its history. Unlike the two translation units which had preceded it, the Translation Division in the period 1948-1949 [redacted] the new component was from the start a successful undertaking and continues at the time of this writing (1973) to contribute a valuable service to the intelligence community. Like the earlier projects, not to mention FDD itself, JPRS suffered pangs of birth and growth, experienced the frustration of trial-and-error, made mistakes, and underwent adjustments to accommodate

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to changing conditions before it had attained a mode of operation suited to the purpose for which it was established. As it eventually evolved, it was a much larger operation by far than either of the earlier two. Nonetheless, once the project had been initiated its development was eased considerably by the experience which FDD had gained from having worked on the formulation of the Translation Division [redacted] It was, in effect, built on past mistakes.

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The USJPRS was established to augment FDD facilities in order to permit the expansion of documentary exploitation and translation into areas of information hitherto untapped by the division because of personnel limitations. It was designed to serve as an extension of FDD to fulfill requirements for unclassified translation and thereby leave the division free to concentrate on the exploitation function and the translation of classified materials. This had, of course, also been the reason the Translation Division [redacted] [redacted] had been set up. However, in each of the earlier instances, the experiment had proved less than successful in coping with the work, in the case of the Translation Division because of personnel ceiling limitations.

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[redacted] for security and managerial reasons.

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Thus a new approach to the problem was sought in formulating the JPRS operation.

JPRS was the product of necessity. The increasing load of unclassified source material since the early period was not matched by a concomitant increase in FDD personnel to do the work and, as mentioned several times before in this history, it soon became evident that extraordinary efforts would be required to complete it. Failure to do so would compel the division to curtail its common-service function. The Translation Division was established in December 1947 to accomplish the task, but the fact that the manpower to do it, 44 translators in all, was derived from FDB itself placed an immediate limitation on the number of people who could be assigned to the project and doomed the undertaking almost from the start. Primarily for this reason, but also for others, the Translation Division was abolished in mid-1949.

Project UT, initiated two years later, was a considerable improvement over the earlier Translation Division concept in that it recognized the potential presented by the large number of individuals with multi-lingual competence concentrated

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in the Washington area who, while not clearable for full-time CIA employment, were fully adequate to handle the Agency's heavy unclassified translation load. Many of the individuals contacted were particularly valuable because their professional background enabled them to combine a technical competence with their linguistic work. This provided a unique and very beneficial service to the Agency. The theory was good and was worked to some advantage for a period of six years, but Project UT in the long run had to be termed a failure and was discontinued. The reason was twofold -- poor management practices in the organization itself and the lack of proper control by the Agency.

After the lessons of these experiences, the formation and development of the USJPRS by the division was a logical next step forward. The pressure of the growing volume of foreign-language source material [redacted]

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[redacted] underlined the fact that a component organized along similar lines was badly needed to help the division cope with the load. FDD, therefore, undertook the task of devising a successor organization,

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[redacted] A broader stage was selected. It was reasoned

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that if the division could be assisted by the contributions of an area rich in linguistic talent such as Washington, D. C., the benefits to be derived from expanding to other centers in the country, either by direct contact or through the mails, would be many times greater. The USJPRS therefore represented the culmination of a progression toward a large-scale translation program which, despite problems of growth and development, removed the major obstacle -- translation volume -- from the division's path in fulfilling its common-service function. The organization which was devised to carry out the program became FDD's first large-scale field activity.

The concept of contractual arrangements for unclassified translation, which was to be the basis for the system, was not new. At the urging of the State Department and of some CIA Offices 975/ the arrangement had been employed as early as 1955 for projects of special nature -- for example, coverage of such topics as "petroleum" and "rail transportation" for ORR -- and as a result, the division had hired several semi-cleared contract employees -- never more than half a dozen -- on an annual basis to perform this work. By mid-1958, after the JPRS program was well established, this program was phased out and some of the erstwhile FDD contract employees were

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picked up by JPRS. The previous system of contracting had been very limited, while the new program was set up on a much larger scale. How much larger is illustrated by the fact that in late 1964 the JPRS had under contract  individuals in the United States, not by any means all engaged in translation at any one time, but nonetheless available if the need should arise. 976/

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Community demands for increased translation service and FDD complaints of inability to keep up with the load were a common refrain almost from the beginning. With the approval of NSCID 16 and the formation of SEFLP in 1953, discussions of the problem were placed on a more formal and organized basis. These exchanges finally culminated in a report drawn up on 7 August 1956 by John Bagnall, as chairman of SEFLP, to the parent of the subcommittee, the Advisory Committee on Foreign Language Publications, in which he reviewed the former's work on Soviet Bloc publications in the past two and a half years. Despite close cooperation and effort on the part of the member agencies to help reduce the translation load by redefining and "pinpointing" priority requirements, Bagnall reported that current exploitation facilities were insufficient to meet the needs of the community for

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information from foreign-language sources in the wake of the relaxation of Soviet controls over export of publications. For example, in 1956, 510 titles were released compared with 270 in 1953, and this increase in quantity was combined with an improved quality of information in the Soviet publications. Bagnall therefore requested ACFLP backing for an expanded exploitation program. 977/

The 7 August initiative was carried a step further the following month when, on behalf of the subcommittee, Bagnall submitted another memorandum to the ACFLP through the AD/O expanding his views on the problem at hand and presenting a variety of proposals to solve it. Briefly stated, the FDD chief felt that the problem could be met in either of two ways, by expansion of FDD facilities or by external contractual arrangements. Going into detail, he offered some six variations of these methods and put them in the form of proposals. Two of them, involving the expansion of the FDD work force, were immediately dismissed in view of current government policy to allocate work to private enterprise where possible and to avoid increases in government employment. The remaining four involved combinations of contractual arrangements between the division and translation corporations or private

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individuals. All were considered and in three instances rejected as too expensive or too difficult to control.

Bagnall finally settled on the sixth proposal, which provided for a combination of an FDD field office and individual contracting, and recommended its review and adoption by the Advisory Committee. Its cost, he felt, was reasonable --

-- and it was easiest to control, direct, and coordinate from FDD headquarters. 978/

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The Bagnall study was submitted through channels and Proposal 6 was approved by the DD/I and the Acting DCI in late December. 979/ The document was then sent in project form to the Project Review Committee (PRC) on 30 January 1957. It proposed the establishment of domestic FDD field offices and through them contractual arrangements with well-qualified private individuals for the exploitation of overt published foreign-language source material. New York City was selected as possessing the best potential for initiating the operation. It was proposed that a small office staffed by FDD headquarters personnel be opened there, and that it would recruit, subject to security clearance, linguistic specialists. Quality control would be maintained by FDD headquarters officers and source material not available in

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New York would be provided by FDD. In the matter of a security cover it was felt that inasmuch as the service would be for the benefit of all IAC agencies, the requirements would be so diverse that the fact that part of the work was performed for the Agency would involve no compromise in CIA security. The contract employees were to be witting of the fact that they were employed by the US government, but CIA connection with the enterprise would not be disclosed. It was anticipated that operations at the new field office could begin a month after approval of the project. 980/ The PRC approved the project as submitted on 13 February 1957, and it was signed by the DCI on 1 March. 981/

With the JPRS project now fully approved, FDD was ready to launch its first full-scale venture in field operations. On 21 March 1957 Bagnall submitted a request — approved on 8 April — to delete six positions, consisting of a chief, a deputy chief, an administrative assistant, and three case officers representing the Soviet, East European, and Communist Far East areas, from the FDD headquarters T/O in order to establish the New York Field Office staff. 982/ Eight days later  recently returned from Saigon and now designated chief of the new field operation,

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of the S&T Branch, designated deputy chief in New York,

[redacted] of the East Europe Branch, and [redacted]

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[redacted] an administrative assistant from the Reports Branch,

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departed for New York to open the new field office. [redacted]

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of FDD's Far East Branch was also a member of the charter

contingent but did not immediately accompany the group to

New York. On 9 August 1957 [redacted] was assigned to

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the New York office to fill out the T/O there. Quarters for

the field office had been procured through the General

Services Administration, and on 1 April 1957 the USJPRS

opened for business in the Morgan Annex of the Post Office

Department at 31st Street and 9th Avenue. This location

proved temporary and later in the year the organization

moved further uptown to a building at 205 E. 42nd Street.

The fledgling field office was an operational success

almost from the start and, after an initial period of acclima-

tion, progress in establishing a "stable" of translators was

rapid. By the end of April JPRS had made 153 potential-

contract contacts, [redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted] Two contracts were approved before the end of

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the month. 983/ By the end of June contracts had been signed

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with 42 linguists, and numerous reports were already completed and in the process of publication. 984/ The latter was accomplished with the assistance of PSD, which arranged for publication of the reports by the New York branch of the Government Printing Office (GPO). The number of linguists under contract by the end of July had risen to 61 and potential-contract contacts by field representatives for this month alone amounted to 435. 985/ Thus, the project mushroomed rapidly into a sizable operation. In December 1957 a second clerical position was authorized for the New York office to help with the increasingly heavy workload.

Contacts with potential employees for JPRS were made in a variety of ways. The most difficult problem at the beginning was publicizing the operation. This was for the most part accomplished by direct advertisement in the daily press and in appropriate trade journals and newspapers. Also effective were visits by field representatives from JPRS and Contact Division to potential sources of linguistic specialists such as educational institutions and research centers in the New York area. As the operation expanded, the hard sell became less necessary. In time, many potential JPRS contract employees were recruited by word-of-mouth,

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that is, by those already working for the organization.\* The quality of applicants varied widely, ranging from those poorly versed in a foreign language and with little or no professional experience to excellent multi-linguists with hard-to-find specialties. Needless to say, the latter were at a premium. Often a specialist with native fluency in one or more foreign tongues would apply but had to be rejected because of his poor command of the English language. All applicants were carefully screened and only those who met the qualification standards set by FDD were placed under contract. Hiring determinations were made through interviews and a variety of language tests. The tenure of the contractors with JPRS varied considerably, some remaining for only a matter of months, the majority staying for longer periods -- two, three, or four years -- and a few continuing with the operation for many years. Tenure was often determined by the employee's

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\* Problems in recruitment and clearance were sometimes magnified by physical distance of the applicant from Washington or New York. Perhaps the extreme instance of this difficulty was the case of a Navy lieutenant whose contract for JPRS work took six months to approve. The reason: he was stationed in Antarctica.

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earning capacity. Some with high qualifications considered and used JPRS work as a full-time job, but the majority regarded it as part-time employment.

With the success of the New York office assured and the soundness of the entire contractual concept in the JPRS form apparently proved, FDD and OO began to give thought to expanding the operation. The establishment of JPRS also hastened the end of FDD's already rapidly fading Project UT. On 3 May 1957 George Carey applied the *coup-de-grace* by suggesting its discontinuance and the conversion of the translation service into the Washington office of the USJPRS, a move which he felt would entail no difficulty and would result in a more efficient and economical operation. 986/ Carey's suggestion was submitted in the form of a project plan and was approved on 8 May 1957. A T/O similar to that of the New York office was established, 987/ and on 16 August 1957 the Washington (later termed the District of Columbia [DC]) office of the USJPRS opened at 1636 Connecticut Avenue, N. W., with [redacted] previously Chief of the FDD Eastern Europe Branch, as head of the new component. He was assisted by a contingent of four staff officers and an administrative assistant, namely, [redacted]

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connection with [redacted] assignment, the USSR Branch's Biographic Section in FDD, which he had headed, was dissolved and its function transferred to the new District of Columbia (DC) office.

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The commencement of operations at the office in Washington in many respects paralleled that of its New York counterpart. However, as a beneficiary of JPRS/NY's experience, brief though this was up to this point, the Washington group was able to establish a routine rather quickly and to avoid many of the mistakes and pitfalls encountered by their New York colleagues. The first contract was signed on 27 August, an event expedited through prior processing of the applicant's papers in New York. Thereafter, with the use of recruitment methods similar to JPRS/NY, the number of contract employees moved steadily upward. Again, contacts with nearby educational, cultural, and research institutions were initiated and maintained to assure a steady flow of applicants. A unique and important source of supply for the Washington office was the Society of Federal Translators, an organization of more than 100 members, [redacted]

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[redacted]

From the single applicant signed at

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
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the end of August, the number under contract by the end of September had increased to nine, 988/ and this figure had risen to 58 by 31 October 1957. 989/ As had been done earlier with JPRS/NY, an imprest fund was established on 6 September 1957 for the DC office to serve as a funding source for daily operations.

B. Its Operations

By the fall of 1957 the USJPRS, with two field offices, was in full operation in carrying out its mission to augment FDD's services. The full growth of the organization's structural order had not yet been reached -- a third field office would be opened in the future -- but JPRS was beginning to settle into a routine of established operational procedures.

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JPRS accepted material from all parts of the government. The bulk of items for translation was, however,

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submitted through JPRC by CIA components, and the greatest volume was sent by FDD itself. This material consisted of articles and extracts of articles selected on a daily basis by FDD officers from the large volume of sources available to them. These items were translated by JPRS contract employees, were collected by staff officers at JPRS, and, as the scheduled-reporting procedures gradually evolved, were incorporated in the appropriate reports and periodically published.

Quality control of the JPRS product was instituted early. A high-grade product was assured in two steps: initially, by measuring the qualifications of applicants through the medium of a uniform language test for each language in which they claimed competence and, thereafter, by a continuing review on the part of FDD officers of translations performed by the contractors. The latter method was later refined by requiring contractors to complete a special translation approximately once a year in their language and field of competence and basing their continued employment by JPRS on the results of this exercise.

Although JPRS reached a plateau of stability relatively soon, this status was not achieved easily and the new organization encountered many and varied problems, particularly in

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the initial period of operations. Some proved easy to work out, others remained nagging irritants for extended periods of time, and still others were never fully solved.

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Another potential complication was the matter of pay rates, but this proved less serious than might have been expected. It did, however, remain a source of some irritation and surfaced periodically. Complaints were levied from time to time by individual, usually professional, translators against JPRS. The issue in these cases generally had to do with the alleged low pay rates offered by JPRS which, it was contended, deprived JPRS translators of "fair" rates of compensation and represented unfair competition to those employed by other translation organizations. Illustrative of this is an excerpt from the newsletter of the Washington-based Society of Federal Linguists, Inc., in rebuttal to an article on JPRS appearing in the 11 August 1965 issue of the *Wall Street Journal*. The excerpt read in part as follows: "The alleged lack of good translators is caused not by any shortage of translators, but by the sweat shop practices of JPRS. The pay scale is so low that most good translators prefer not to work for this organization." 991/

It was true that JPRS pay rates were in general somewhat lower than those offered by other agencies in government and perhaps even some commercial firms. JPRS made every

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effort to keep costs at a minimum as a matter of policy, in large part to stay within its budgetary limits and at times to conform to the necessity for budget cuts, but in general the rates represented reasonable compensation. In 1963, for example, the scale ranged from a low of \$7.00 to a high of \$25.00 per 1,000 foreign-language words, the rate depending upon the difficulty of substantive text and the language involved. 992/ With few exceptions the applicants appeared satisfied with the basic JPRS pay rates of \$7.00 to \$9.00 per 1,000 foreign words. A number of them referred to the State Department rate of \$15.00 per 1,000 words or the Patent Office's \$10.00 per 1,000, but they seemed willing to work at the lower JPRS rate, apparently preferring a comparatively steady flow of work at a lower rate to sporadic jobs at a higher one. 993/ The drawback of lower pay rates was no deterrent to the flow of applications. In fact, in two instances soon after the opening of the Washington office employees at other government agencies elected to resign their jobs to work for JPRS despite cautionary statements that JPRS could not guarantee full-time or continuing employment nor provide the benefits inherent in Civil Service status. 994/

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From the beginning, editing became the bane and bottleneck of the JPRS operation. In Washington at least, applicants willing and competent to undertake editing were invariably government-employed at an hourly rate. 995/ Government policy at this early point in JPRS's existence forbade the employment of such applicants at hourly rates. The sole criteria was to be page count, that is, service payment not related to time. Editing, however, could not be calculated on a page basis and for this reason created an apparent conflict. According to the CIA General Counsel, there was no objection to the hiring of government employees by FDD on contract as long as this employment did not conflict with their regular job. He suggested that payment related to a time basis could well create a question of dual compensation for government employees, 996/ but Bagnall assured him that FDD would use such employees only for work not compensated on the basis of time. 997/

The "dual compensation" concept was not limited solely to the method of paying government employees but in fact created a serious roadblock to JPRS hiring practices in general, especially so far as the DC office was concerned. On 21 August 1957, while JPRS/DC was in the process of

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formation, OP disapproved for legal and administrative reasons a request submitted by John Bagnall earlier in the month to permit the hiring of CIA, including FDD, employees for JPRS translation work outside their normally assigned duties and on their own time. 998/ This request was based on the fact that the division would derive considerable benefit from the use in JPRS of highly qualified linguists in CIA, many of them not directly involved in language work.

For the next four months the question of contracting FDD employees for JPRS translation hung fire, but in mid-January 1958 Bagnall again revived the subject and on the basis of his appeal the AD/O requested a review of OP's 21 August decision with a view to its retraction. To bolster his request he pointed out that piece work contracts with full-time government employees was not a new practice and that FDD officers were in fact not prevented from doing translation work for other government agencies. 999/ Finally, on 28 April, conceding that the situation involving FDD and JPRS was an unusual one and advising close and effective FDD control over the arrangement, OP acceded to the FDD request and granted permission for JPRS use of FDD employees. 1000/ Many of the latter took advantage of this dispensation and the system

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worked well. The new JPRS, badly in need of competent translation manpower, received a windfall of highly qualified contract workers, and FDD officers benefitted from an added source of income. Moreover, the latter brought to this work not only a high level of language competence but also an intimate knowledge (not publicized) of intelligence requirements. To the best of the author's knowledge the arrangement was never abused.

The addition of the FDD linguists to the JPRS contract roster, together with the normal increase in new contractors, considerably enlarged the translation potential of JPRS. In July 1958 [redacted] former Deputy Chief of the USSR Branch who had succeeded [redacted] as Chief, JPRS/DC, following the latter's return to FDD headquarters, reported a total of [redacted] on contract with the two JPRS offices, a build-up which had created a budget squeeze. By the end of FY-1958 this group of translators had built up a production level of 12,000 English-language pages per month. 1001/ The production increase was in part due to an expansion of service within the community following establishment of the two offices. Soon after this event several overtures had been received from interested agencies outside CIA for use of JPRS translation service, and it had been announced that the service would be

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available for departmental translation needs on a reimbursable basis at cost. As a result of this, arrangements were made for the inter-agency transfer of funds for these services. 1002/ Among agencies using the service were NIH, AEC, the Bureau of Mines, and the Bureau of Standards. The arrangement was encouraged and exploited not only to provide the service for which JPRS had been established

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Throughout its growth period and periodically thereafter, the problem of funding was an endemic fact of life for the organization. Requests for additional funds with the approach of each new fiscal year were common phenomena, particularly as the Agency sought ways and means to cut expenses during periodic economy drives. With the recurrent threat of attrition of headquarters funds, special arrangements, such as fund transfers from other sources, had to be made at times to enable JPRS to continue full-scale production. When these failed, a cutback, usually temporary, in JPRS operations had to be resorted to. For the most part, however, the organization continued to operate normally and to expand. Where possible, measures were adopted within JPRS itself to cut costs. For example, in

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June 1958 OTS, in connection with the Sputnik crisis discussed earlier, offered to reproduce all JPRS S&T reports. This represented an annual saving of \$15,000 to \$20,000 over current GPO charges. 1003/ This was carried a step further later in the year when FDD acquired printing equipment from OTS, at no cost to CIA, and these facilities were operated at the New York office at a cost of 50¢ per page compared with the GPO charge of \$2.20. In fact, as a result of this acquisition very little JPRS printing was thereafter done at the GPO. 1004/ Another example of economy in JPRS was the introduction during the latter months of 1959 of the use of a "Gestefax" reproduction machine which resulted in considerable savings over GPO costs in the reproduction of illustrations. In October 1959 alone this saving amounted to \$1,300. 1005/ By measures such as these JPRS was able to cut expenses to a minimum and thereby to offer its services to the community at bargain rates, considerably below those of other translation enterprises. Despite such measures, however, the threat to JPRS funding did not cease and at almost every annual budget session the organization appeared to be fair game for the budget cutters.

The success of the JPRS project up to this point was reflected in the nomination in 1959 of  for

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the Intelligence Medal of Merit for his outstanding performance of duty since April 1957 in organizing and supervising the New York field office, an assignment which had called for great ingenuity, patience, and adaptability. In March 1960 the award was presented by the DCI to  the first FDD officer to receive this honor. 1006/

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With the success of the JPRS operation assured and the New York and Washington offices providing a service of approximately 125,000 pages a year, FDD took a further step to provide comprehensive coverage for the benefit of the community. At the same time, in certain area and language combinations it was becoming apparent that FDD was beginning to scrape the bottom of the barrel for good people to supplement the New York and Washington JPRS rosters. One of the general areas concerned was that of oriental languages. Consequently, on 27 January 1960 George Carey submitted a proposal for a new West Coast JPRS field office in the San Francisco area to take advantage of the large number of educated Orientals and major scientific research and development centers in the area. He anticipated that this office could be established without additional positions or funds for FDD and suggested the deletion of three positions from FDD and the establishment

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of the new office's T/O on the basis of these slots. 1007/ The proposal was approved by the DD/T on 29 January and by the Management Staff a week later, and on 20 June 1960 the new facility was opened in the Appraisers Building in San Francisco.

Selected as the first Chief of the West Coast office was

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[redacted] then Deputy Chief of FDD's USSR Branch,

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with [redacted] in the New York office as his deputy. [redacted]

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remained in this position until August 1961 when he was

appointed Chief of JPRS/DC in place of [redacted] His

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position as Chief of the San Francisco office was then taken

over by [redacted]

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To carry the account of managerial changes in JPRS to a conclusion, [redacted] headed JPRS in Washington until late 1964

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when he returned for assignment to FDD headquarters. As

before, he was succeeded in March 1965 by [redacted] who

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was in turn replaced in San Francisco by [redacted]

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Meanwhile, in October 1960 [redacted] had taken [redacted]

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[redacted] place as Chief, JPRS/NY, a position he held until

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his retirement in 1966. [redacted] was briefly replaced by

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[redacted] but when [redacted] left JPRS in June 1966

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to assume the post of [redacted] was trans-

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ferred to Washington to take his place. [redacted]

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took over as JPRS chief in New York and held this position until the unit was closed down in 1968.

Operations in San Francisco got under way promptly and by the end of the first month the new unit already had tested 150 linguist applicants. 1008/ With establishment of all JPRS field offices completed, the overall organization by August 1960 had approximately  under contract for part-time service to translate unclassified materials. 1009/ This figure was eventually to increase by 1964 to a peak of  1010/ The growth of the organization was further reflected by a general increase in annual production figures. To illustrate, during FY-1958, its first full year of operation, JPRS produced a total of some 38,000 English-language pages. 1011/ This figure increased to 128,000 in the following year, 1012/ dropped briefly to 109,000 the next year, 1013/ but then, following establishment of the San Francisco office, rose steadily until the organization produced 268,000 pages in FY-1963. Some 35 percent of this FY-1963 volume was S&T material, as opposed to 70 percent in the first year of operation. 1014/ The production rise reflected an increasing awareness of the facility's existence among government agencies, both inside and outside the

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intelligence community, and growing demands for its services. At the same time it offered FDD an open-ended method of meeting its requirements for unclassified translation and thereby provided relief from much of the pressure which had beset the division earlier.

To facilitate the activities of JPRS and, in light of budgetary pressures, to effect economies where and when possible, the effort to improve the organization's methods and procedures continued. In October 1960 the JPRS operational headquarters was shifted from New York to Washington to afford closer control by FDD. At the same time, to cut costs the printing operation of JPRS/NY was gradually phased into the DC office during November 1960, and the printing of all JPRS reports became a function of JPRS/DC. In May 1961 arrangements were made to move the JPRS printing facility from the DC office at 1636 Connecticut Avenue in order to centralize all JPRS reproduction activity, including photographic work, in the old Providence Hospital at 225 D Street, S. E. This move was essentially completed in January 1962 following receipt of all reproduction equipment from New York.

The relocation of the JPRS/DC reproduction facilities at the Providence Hospital building proved very temporary. With the vacating of the old CIA buildings in Potomac Park

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following completion of the Headquarters Building in Langley, JPRS took the opportunity to consolidate all its activities in the Washington area in one location by arranging to occupy one of the vacated CIA structures [redacted]. The AD/O expressed concern over the fact that such a move might identify JPRS with CIA, as the building had long been known as a CIA facility, but he was assured by John Bagnall that other non-CIA agencies were moving into buildings vacated by CIA and that security was therefore not a factor. 1015/ The move was accomplished at the end of June 1962, but it was not to be the last. In April 1964 JPRS received notification that [redacted] was scheduled for imminent demolition. This necessitated still another move, and space for the organization was obtained in another temporary structure -- this one of World War I vintage -- and at the end of June 1964 JPRS was relocated in Temporary Building "E" on the Mall in Washington.

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In March 1962 the other field offices completed moves to new and better quarters, the San Francisco office from the Appraisers Building to 214 Front Street and the New York office from the third to the ninth floor in the premises on 42nd Street. In the fall of 1964 the San Francisco office was

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once again relocated, from the Front Street address to federal property at 100 McAllister Street in San Francisco.

Other changes in operations and facilities were introduced. As part of the overall FDD program of improved fiscal control of its production, the JPRS translation and exploitation programs were converted into funded projects. Designed to bring about a closer regulation of expenditures, this change went into effect at the start of FY-1962. In this connection, a program of serialized reports was developed under which items of similar informational content were placed and issued under uniform titles. This arrangement simplified production procedures and also served to categorize translations for the benefit of consumers. By 1963 these reports, all open to subscription by the public, numbered 67. 1016/ The funding process was in general applied to these subject breakdowns and thereby served to simplify the organization's bookkeeping.

On 29 March 1963 approval was obtained to convert JPRS publication facilities from a rather unsatisfactory mimeograph method to an offset-printing operation. Action was therefore taken to acquire three multilith presses and several related

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items of equipment, the introduction of which resulted in an improved JPRS product as well as in reduced costs for labor and materials. By this time JPRS was completely self-sufficient in all aspects of reproduction.

Although the general theme in JPRS operations and administration was one of progress and improvement, the organization continued to encounter problems. One of these, involved a recurrence of the earlier debate concerning the employment of FDD officers as JPRS contractors and was triggered by a survey of FDD and JPRS conducted in the summer of 1960 by a staff of the General Accounting Office (GAO). The staff issued a final report on its review in early 1961.

Briefly stated, the GAO report was highly critical of the FDD-JPRS relationship and emphasized the need to strengthen FDD's administrative control of the JPRS operation. The review alleged a failure on the division's part to provide adequate safeguards in the expenditure of government funds. Specifically, the report criticized the FDD employee-contractor relationship, implying that as practiced it resulted primarily in benefits to FDD contractors rather than to the government. Moreover, FDD control of this

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relationship on an arms-length basis had not been effective, so that translation material had been transmitted directly to FDD employees under JPRS contract rather than through JPRS desk officers. This practice was in conflict with the understanding under which permission for JPRS employment of FDD officers had been originally granted. In light of this, the GAO staff recommended that the case of JPRS employment of FDD officers be reexamined and, if still justified, that stronger controls be initiated. In addition, other recommendations, pertaining mainly to tighter fiscal and administrative controls on the part of FDD over JPRS activities, were submitted by the staff. 1017/

John Bagnall on 24 February submitted a memorandum to the AD/O in which he rejected out of hand the contentions and recommendations of the GAO staff. He regarded many of the statements in the report as misleading or, in numerous cases, completely false. It was Bagnall's belief that implementation of the GAO recommendations would require the addition of 22 positions to FDD headquarters and the JPRS field offices and would result in unacceptable work delays due to the voluminous paper work engendered and to disruptions of the smooth-running relationships between JPRS and other government agencies. 1018/

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The Bagnall rebuttal of the GAO report received sympathetic support at higher levels in OO and the Office of the DD/I, 1019/ and it was forwarded through channels with the result that on 7 April 1961 Lawrence K. White, the DD/S, addressed himself to the problem. In a memorandum to the GAO staff, Col. White expressed his agreement with the staff recommendations calling for stronger fiscal control but not with those aspects criticizing FDD-JPRS operational procedures. 1020/

The White memorandum did not immediately solve the matter and a lengthy session between Bagnall and CIA's Technical Accounting Staff followed. GAO expressed reluctance to accept all the answers in Col. White's memorandum, but by May, White's initiative and the FDD-OO counter-attack had begun to weaken GAO resistance and the battle was largely won. The GAO backed down and withdrew its full report and ended the review with the bland statement that in FDD the staff had found certain "administrative deficiencies which have been corrected." 1021/ FDD took early action on those GAO recommendations supported by the DD/S — *viz*, formalization of JPRS employment of FDD officers, the conversion of contract personnel working in the DC

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office to employee status (a status broadened in 1965 to provide leave and insurance benefits for JPRS non-staff employees), and formalizing the accountability of contractors through a signed voucher system 1022/ — but by and large the final outcome was the maintenance of the original FDD-JPRS working relationship. The total result of the GAO review was, with some exceptions, not a major change of the system but rather a tightening up and elimination of loose ends.

Because of the peculiar nature of JPRS staffing, that is, the use of uncleared, unwitting contractors doing what, at least from the FDD standpoint, was the production of raw intelligence, one of the major JPRS problems pertained to the procurement and retention of personnel. This took a variety of forms, some of which have been mentioned earlier in this chapter. While no full clearance was required on potential contractors, each applicant was subjected to a name check to prevent potential embarrassment to the Agency. On occasion contractors already employed by JPRS, sometimes for as long as a year or two, were subjected to a subsequent name check which resulted in disapproval of their contract by OS. This in turn led to embarrassment in JPRS in that a logical excuse had to be furnished to the individual affected.

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This was often difficult to do. Not infrequently such releases created operational difficulty for JPRS since some of the contractors lost in this way possessed valuable linguistic and/or substantive talents which were hard to replace. On this basis JPRS would, where justified, appeal the contract cancellation order. Sometimes the order would be rescinded; more often, it was not.

A related personnel problem faced by JPRS was that of dual government employment, already touched on earlier in connection with contracting FDD employees. In September 1964 a similar instance arose in connection with employment of military personnel. In this case an enlisted man at Fort Detrick, Maryland, had requested employment with JPRS but, on advice of the legal officer at the fort, had been rejected. Consulted in the case, the General Counsel's Office/CIA held that there was no legal bar to such dual employment for civilians but in the case of the armed services it was presumed that military personnel were on duty 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Outside employment such as that offered by JPRS would therefore be in conflict with their regular duties. 1023/ In a memorandum to the Chief, FDD, on 12 October,  the JPRS chief, objected

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vigorously to the interpretation of the legal advisor at Fort Detrick that the JPRS contractual arrangement with active duty military personnel was illegal and deplored the effect on this ruling, if upheld, on JPRS operations. 1024/ [redacted] agreed with [redacted] judgment on the case and its detrimental effects on JPRS recruitment, but, in the interests of avoiding the publicity for the Agency likely to ensue if the matter were followed up, decided against making an issue of it. The enlisted man in question was therefore informed of his rejection based on the ruling of the legal advisor, and there the matter rested. 1025/

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In the overall, JPRS operations were eminently successful. Despite the fact that some consumer dissatisfaction with the levels of accuracy and selection of JPRS reports was encountered in the early stages, mainly from consumers within the Agency, most problems of quality were eventually resolved. The service provided by the organization was particularly appreciated by groups in the academic world who found the material put out in great volume by JPRS a source hitherto untapped in such measure. As a result, the organization was the recipient of frequent praise in a variety of academic journals and often received favourable mention at meetings

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of learned societies. JPRS was frequently and liberally cited in articles of a research nature. Commendation from CIA and other IAC (USIB) agencies was less in evidence, the service rendered by JPRS perhaps being taken too much for granted, but even here the volume and availability of JPRS output was much appreciated.

C. Its Relations With Consumers

As an overt organization, ostensibly created to serve the translation needs of a variety of government agencies,

the JPRS, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] came into daily

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contact with a large number of individuals and institutions, government and non-government alike, who were interested in and sought access to the products of its operations. From the start JPRS distributed its translations to outsiders.

In September 1957 JPRS/NY began publication of *Abstracts in Physics and Chemistry*, which it made available to a number of consumers, including government offices, educational institutions, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] — a total at that time of 22 external and 7 internal contacts. 1026/ The other JPRS offices had similar contacts. For example, in September 1958

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alone the Washington office received inquiries from sources

as diverse as

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[Redacted]

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1027/ Indeed, requests for JPRS

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translations were received even from individuals behind the Iron Curtain — in at least two instances in 1965 from authors whose books had been translated by JPRS. In each case complimentary copies were sent. 1028/ By the end of 1963 the organization was sending one or more JPRS reports to 60 non-government subscribers, including individuals or organizations in

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

as well as the United States and the United

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Nations. 1029/

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

JPRS sought

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out and encouraged these contacts.

Early in its existence the JPRS was the subject of a number of references in the US press. This type of publicity was not actively encouraged but neither was it rejected, and in the light of the wide coverage in the period after Sputnik I on the alleged neglect by the US government of

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Soviet sources "gathering dust" in American depositories, it was inevitable that the new JPRS should be mentioned. In November 1957 the *Baltimore Sun* referred to support of USJPRS in New York by government agencies to get translations of foreign scientific literature, 1030/ and in January 1958 a rather extensive article devoted entirely to the new organization appeared in the trade journal *Products Engineering*. 1031/ The effect of this publicity was to create increased demands for JPRS S&T translations and it also served to publicize the role of JPRS/NY as a potential employer for would-be translators.

As the JPRS product became better known in the course of time, it was not an infrequent phenomenon for members of Congress to contact the organization for one reason or another. These requests ran the gamut from positive to negative. Some were simply petitions for assistance in the translation of brief items. Still other Congressional contacts dealt with inquiries by the legislators on behalf their constituents. Occasionally, JPRS was asked for copies of its reports. One such instance involved requests in 1965 from Senators Robert Kennedy and James Eastland for a translation completed earlier by JPRS of an important book on Soviet social science which

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
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had been well received in government circles and elsewhere, even to the extent of rating reviews in the *New York Times* and *New York Herald Tribune*. 1032/ The JPRS relations with Congress were for the most part good and often resulted in positive contributions to the work of that body.

JPRS exposure to the public view was considerably increased when the organization was nominally absorbed in early 1958 by the Office of Technical Services (OTS) of the Department of Commerce. At that time, in the wake of the orbiting of Sputnik I by the Soviet Union and the creation of OTS by the US Department of Commerce to facilitate the dissemination of S&T translations produced by government agencies, [redacted]

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Thus from 1958 on, JPRS was from a public standpoint a subdivision of OTS. After OTS had readied its dissemination facilities in 1959, S&T translations produced by JPRS were cited in the OTS monthly listing and made available to all government offices and to the general public. [redacted]

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The overt nature of the JPRS operation and its affiliation with the public dissemination activities of OTS had an undesirable side effect, one which FDD and JPRS would have preferred avoiding although under the circumstances it was not possible to do so. As had been the case with the Project UT earlier, the JPRS overt translation function placed it in direct competition with the many commercial translation firms in the country, and as a government-sponsored operation the organization appeared to exercise a monopoly of the lucrative government translation field. As one might expect, this situation created considerable bad feeling among those affected and led periodically to threats of law suits or appeals to Congress. All of the various instances of this nature cannot be covered here, but one or two examples can be given to illustrate the difficulties involved.

In January 1961 the commercial translation firm of Royer and Roger complained about competition from JPRS for government business. John Bagnall discussed the problem with



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commitments resulted from this meeting but, in reporting back to George Carey, Bagnall expressed the opinion that JPRS could discourage business from government agencies outside the intelligence community and merely give such agencies a list of commercial companies who could do the work. Carey expressed concern over the possibility of complaint from the affected agencies if JPRS refused to accept their work, but Bagnall felt it important to avoid serious criticism of government competition with commercial firms. 1033/ No binding decisions were made, however, and JPRS continued to accept work from all government agencies.

A similar instance of complaint by a commercial firm went beyond mere discussion between the firm and JPRS and actually reached the Congressional level. In July 1963 the Commerce Department was enjoined to appear before the staff of the Joint Committee on Printing (JCP) of the Congress to answer charges made by [redacted]

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[redacted] of "irregularities, neglect, and waste" in the printing and distribution of JPRS reports.

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[redacted] then JPRS Chief, John Weber of OTS, and two Commerce Department publications officials answered the summons. They briefed the three JCP staff members present

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on the JPRS mission and the manner in which it was conducted and persuaded them of its validity. The outcome of the incident was a letter from Senator Carl Hayden, the chairman of the JCP, denying the charges and allegations of the company. 1034/

These examples illustrate a recurrent threat to the JPRS operation,

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In instances of a similar nature where the complainant approached JPRS — or, if the FDD-JPRS connection was suspected, even FDD — he was generally referred to the Director of OTS as the proper official with whom to discuss the matter.

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Despite these and other problems the relationship of JPRS with the public sector progressed satisfactorily and in this respect the tie-in with OTS proved rewarding. The original arrangement, which grew out of the furor created by the Soviet scientific spectacles of the late 1950s, had been concerned exclusively with the dissemination for public use of S&T translations. In the course of time, however, the question arose regarding an even broader dissemination policy, that is, the distribution of non-S&T JPRS products.

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In January 1960 the Joint Committee on Contemporary China (JCCC) and its parent organization, the Social Science Research Council (SSRC), approached JPRS/NY concerning the release of the JPRS report *Communist China Digest* to various university libraries. Since the total requirement was for only 30 to 40 copies, OTS expressed disinterest in undertaking the distribution. 1035/ Meanwhile, SSRC approached NSF for support in disseminating government reports -- particularly JPRS reports in the social sciences -- to the academic world, and NSF agreed to underwrite the proposal. 1036/ The SSRC insistence on including JPRS social science reports in the program was underlined by an NSF survey which revealed that 83 percent of translations produced government-wide in the social science field were issued by JPRS. 1037/

Preliminary plans were made for the release of social science publications by JPRS to the SSRC, but in the meantime OTS, in view of the expanded distribution contemplated, had reconsidered the question and had decided to handle dissemination of the reports. Following further discussion with NSF, this arrangement was approved. 1038/ By April plans were more clearly defined and the SSRC selected 56 institutions of higher learning to which the reports were

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to be offered, two-thirds of the cost to be subsidized by the recipients themselves. 1039/ The program was further expanded when agreement among JPRS, the SSRC, and OTS was reached in December 1960 to extend coverage to social science reports on Slavic areas on the same basis as the Communist China reports. 1040/ Some delay was encountered before the financial details were worked out, but on 1 July 1961 the expanded program was under way. 1041/ It continued until mid-1962 when NSF and the SSRC decided that commercial firms could provide the reports at reasonable cost. The firm selected to undertake the sale of the social science reports, [REDACTED] 25X1  
[REDACTED] was, however, unable to provide the hard xerox 25X1  
copies desired by the recipient institutions at the cost paid under the earlier arrangement and therefore raised their price to three times the original cost. The popularity of the JPRS social science reports is attested to by the fact that despite the increased price, 32 of the original subscribers agreed to purchase full runs of the reports, 1042/ an indication of their value to scholars. To assure the

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availability of this material to the academic community at a reasonable rate, the arrangement for commercial sale was abandoned and FDD held consultations with OTS resulting in an agreement, to be effective 1 February 1963, whereby JPRS would henceforth handle subscriptions and sale of all its reports, both social science and S&T, thus enabling any university or private scholar to purchase copies of them at reasonable cost from JPRS. 1043/

The chapter just concluded has related only the highlights of JPRS development and made no attempt to treat the subject in exhaustive detail. The reason is obvious. To a large extent FDD's history after 1957 is also the history of JPRS, since the latter was virtually an extension of the division. In speaking, for example, of FDD production, one must keep in mind that JPRS as well as internal FDD output is meant; in fact, the quantity of JPRS production far exceeded that of work done internally. The reader is therefore reminded that in other chapters of this volume many of the facts set forth as pertaining to FDD should be assumed to have reference to JPRS as well.

JPRS's success after 1957 as a solution to the problems connected with FDD's common-service function are

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readily evident from the foregoing account. Despite some criticism of the operation by the intelligence community, particularly in the early period, 1044/ it was in the long term well received and soon justified its existence, financially as well as operationally. Though established primarily to serve the intelligence community, the JPRS, as this chapter makes clear, was also a boon to the industrial and academic communities, a fact attested to by numerous citations. Its major contribution was that it solved the problem of translation volume by attacking it on a large-scale, reasonably well-regulated basis. The processing of foreign-language documents on this scale had not been done in the United States prior to 1957.

As of the time of this writing, the JPRS operation still functions. It was somewhat curtailed in 1968 when, as a result of budget cuts, the New York office was discontinued and its functions and assets transferred to Washington. This move, however, had little effect on the volume of translation produced by the organization.

Through JPRS, FDD had achieved excellent results in solving its long-standing problem of translation volume, but, not content to rest here, the division continued to

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seek still better ways to fulfill its mission. Productive as the mass-translation effort of JPRS was, there was a limit to the rate of speed at which a human being could turn out translated copy. The division therefore turned to experimentation with machine methods to determine whether an even faster means of translation could be developed. The progress of this experiment is the subject of the next chapter.

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## CHAPTER FOURTEEN

Man Versus Machine:FDD and the Automatic Language Processing Experiment

In August 1963 an article in the *Los Angeles Times* opened with the following passage:

Several weeks after Sputnik I stunned the world, Congress discovered the Soviets had broadcast they were going to launch an earth satellite in various technical journals published months before. No one had gotten around to translating them until after the event. Now, six years later, the United States is still trying to close this "intelligence gap" with machine translation of voluminous Russian scientific writing. The results have been mixed. 1045/

Though the accuracy of this statement was somewhat suspect, it is indicative of the fact that machine translation (MT), or automatic language processing (ALP), as it is also known, was largely a child of the post-Sputnik trauma. As a matter of fact, that event was by no means the motivation which triggered the evolution of MT; it only provided impetus to the development of automatic translation systems already under way and broadened concern with the problem among research and development (R&D) groups. Interest in machine translation had

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already been evident several years earlier -- in fact not long after World War II -- when some of the "think factories" established in that period began consideration of this development among many others.

In approaching the subject of automatic language processing, the reader is reminded that CIA's connection with MT goes well beyond FDD's direct involvement. The interplay among Agency components, the role of other government agencies, the NSF, universities, and private research organizations in this controversial field is of such complexity as to defy treatment in summary form. What is set forth in this chapter therefore represents the problem as seen wholly from the FDD point of view. A fuller treatment is beyond the scope of this history.

CIA was directly involved in MT from 1956 to 1966 through two projects, the Georgetown University General Analysis Translation Project (GAT) and the FDD project employing the IBM MT/Stenowriter system. Organizational and individual responsibilities for the projects were shifted about and were never completely centralized, a situation which may have increased the level of objectivity with which the projects were viewed. It unquestionably introduced elements of friction within the CIA projects which paralleled the partisan strife among MT researchers elsewhere.

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Those higher echelon CIA officers most closely associated with the effort were [redacted] Paul Borel, John Bagnall,

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[redacted] Deputy Assistant

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Director for Central Reference (DAD/CR) (1957-1962), served as project officer for GAT from 1956 to 1962. Borel, Assistant Director for Central Reference (AD/CR) (1957-1963) and ADD/I (1963-1966), also served as chairman of the Committee on Documentation of the United States Intelligence Board (CODIB) and thus had a dual responsibility. As head of OCR he had the MI project as part of his operating budget; as CODIB chairman he was responsible to USIB for coordinating all community programs in information processing. Bagnall, Chief, FDD (1947-1963) and DAD/CR (1963-1965), was the official most directly involved in carrying out CIA's translation program and coordinating community translation efforts. In a sense, it was to Bagnall that the Agency had to look for an ultimate arbiter to decide when MI programs approached competitive status with the human translators in his charge.

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[redacted] chairman of the Automatic Data Processing Committee (ADPC) (1961-1963) and Assistant Director for Computer Services (AD/CS) (1963-1965), was responsible for acquiring, budgeting for, and

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operating the IBM language processor. [redacted] Chief, FDD

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(1964-1967), had the primary task of testing and evaluating the MT project based on the IBM system.

To put the level of Agency effort in proper context, from FY 1956 through FY 1965, the US government, through DOD, NSF, and CIA, spent some \$20 million on MT research, of which CIA accounted for [redacted] (not including costs incurred internally for testing the GU output or to conduct the IBM-based project).

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The CIA position during this period was that the development of an MT capability was highly desirable and that the Agency would support such a program. It recognized, however, that an undertaking of this nature had implications which transcended the interests of CIA and those of the intelligence community. It was therefore considered preferable that an organization with broader responsibilities than CIA be prevailed upon to take the initiative to push a comprehensive MT program. CIA identified its own immediate need as a usable product, that is, one which might well produce a translation far short of perfect but nevertheless highly useful. In return for an early MT capability to formulate such a product, the Agency was willing to leave the achievement of broader results to a longer-range program.


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A. FDD and the Georgetown Project

The nature of the FDD operation dictated that, once the decision was made that CIA would underwrite the MT project, the division's early participation in it was assured. As a result FDD was closely associated with the project's Georgetown phase almost from its beginning until the end of the CIA sponsorship in 1963. The GAT Project during all of this period was under the direction of Dr. Dostert, director of the Georgetown University Institute of Languages and Linguistics (GUILL). Dostert's primary preoccupation for the project's duration appeared to be, first, the search for a patron to underwrite his undertaking and, second, having found one in CIA, to shepherd it through to a successful conclusion by the regular infusion of periodic subsidies. In a lengthy 27-page report in August 1952 Dostert had outlined in considerable detail the steps required to accomplish a feasible MT.

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capability. As presented, the project was to be completed in three phases, and Dostert estimated that the total cost would not exceed [redacted] Phase I would entail the expenditure of [redacted] Phase II [redacted] and Phase III [redacted] the financial support for each phase to be requested only as the preceding part was successfully completed. Dostert was convinced that with this support MT would be an accomplished fact in about six years. 1047/

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Prof. Dostert's enthusiasm and considerable confidence in his system and methodology were apparently infectious. CIA officials, anxious to make an early start in the new venture and convinced that the GAT system as elaborated by Dostert showed more than ordinary promise, demonstrated a ready and perhaps unwarranted willingness to make the initial investment in the yet untried system. In retrospect it is difficult to fault the decision because in the initial stages of MT development the project appeared to offer an easy solution to a vexing problem -- an ever-increasing translation volume -- and many of the difficulties which were to arise in the course of development could not yet be foreseen.

Before a commitment to proceed was made, however, the comments of those likely to be affected by the decision, including OO, were solicited by OIC. The AD/O requested the

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opinion of FDD as a potential major user of the new system, and on 22 December 1952 John Bagnall forwarded an analysis to Carey. His conclusions were for the most part negative. He questioned the advisability of supporting a concept which could very possibly lead into a blind alley and even if successful would be severely limited. It would only translate one language and, within this, only five highly specialized fields. It would, moreover, apply exclusively to scientific translation and made no provision for other disciplines. Its relationship to intelligence needs, he felt, was only incidental. In view of these factors, it was Bagnall's opinion that in terms of the project's potential contribution, the subsidies requested were excessive. He therefore recommended to Carey that, if official concurrence was not requested, OO apply a "pocket veto" to the project. If, on the other hand, an official position was required, he recommended non-concurrence with a statement to the effect that the feasibility and practicability of the concept should be more fully demonstrated and the objectives be much more inclined toward general intelligence usefulness before CIA agreed to the contract. 1048/ Carey submitted the Bagnall analysis to Dr. Claude Hawley, coordinator of external research in OIC, and posed the question whether the exploratory

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phase could not be underwritten by the NSF, the Ford Foundation, or some non-government enterprise. 1049/

Despite the negative OO-FDD response to the OIC solicitation, consideration of the Georgetown proposal as well as of others continued. Among the latter was one submitted in May 1953

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which requested Agency authorization to proceed with the first stage of development of a translating machine. The cost of the 12-month period of research was set at  Following study of the proposal, FDD again recommended rejection to the DAD/O on the basis of cost and of the quality and efficacy of the final product likely to result from the  project. 1050/

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Meanwhile, Dr. Dostert continued his R&D program at Georgetown and submitted periodic progress reports to CIA on the project. In addition, he conducted a number of demonstrations for the purpose of presenting certain preliminary and basic processes involved in the MT field. One elaborate demonstration, based on 250 words from selected Russian sentences, was conducted on 7 January 1954 in New York City by GULL in collaboration with members of the science and research staff of International Business Machines (IBM), which was providing the machine support

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for the GAT Project. Bagnall attended this, in company with ten other CIA officers. Dostert claimed his group had succeeded "in a modest way," in producing a machine which would require neither pre- nor post-editing. He stated that further research would concentrate on developing a "core language" to be supplemented by specialized language and would be adapted to the IBM 701 Electronic Data Processing (EDP) Machine. Bagnall pointed out in his subsequent report to the AD/O the small results to date -- only 250 words -- after nine months of intensive work but, on the other hand, he judged Dostert's estimate of three years minimum to develop a machine for practical operation as unduly pessimistic. 1051/

Dostert continued periodically to submit proposals to CIA and held weekly seminars at GULL at which he presented progress reports on MT development at Georgetown. In March 1957

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Chief of FDD's Linguistic Support Staff, was named

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FDD representative to these meetings and attended regularly, sometimes in company with John Bagnall and other Agency officials. The seminars permitted FDD to contribute its share of linguistic expertise to the general fund, but the meetings were of benefit mainly as a means of helping the division keep abreast of progress in the MT field.

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Concurrent with its interest in the GAT Project, FDD continued its activity in other phases of MT research. In June 1956, for example, the division prepared samples of Russian articles and their English translations for transmittal to the Rome (New York) Air Force Depot to be used in testing a mechanical translator. 1052/ In April 1958 FDD submitted its judgment on a Harvard automatic translation project, suggesting that for technical reasons it would not attain the level of research on MT so far completed at Georgetown. Bagnall believed MT development would benefit if the anticipated Harvard research were coordinated with the work done by Georgetown and the Ramo-Wooldridge Corporation, another firm engaged in MT R&D. 1053/

Meanwhile, CIA, which had been actively encouraging MT research at Georgetown since 1952, finally made the decision to provide financial assistance for this purpose, and in May 1956 the DCI granted to GULL the first allotment of funds, to be shared with NSF. In the next four years the Agency

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1054/ During this time the GAT Project, using general-purpose computers (the IBM 704 and IBM 705), evolved various possible techniques for MT. 1055/

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Test demonstrations of the GAT Project were conducted periodically and it was expected that by spring 1960 Georgetown would have an operational Russian-to-English capability in organic chemistry. Already in June 1959 Paul Borel had expressed the view that it would soon be possible to move from a research into a developmental phase in selected languages and disciplines, further progress depending upon the availability of money for the preparation of glossaries, a relatively expensive operation. 1056/

This optimism notwithstanding, and though some progress had been achieved and continuing research and experimentation appeared justified, the GAT Project was having problems. What was worse, these difficulties were compounded by apparent dissension within the Georgetown research team over which of two different experimental approaches to concentrate on.

The dispute was not the only inkling of problems in the project. In June Bagnall expressed the belief that the many difficulties relating to CIA's support of MT research were coming to light and that the cost factor was a major consideration. Despite Dostert's sanguine prediction of a translation capability in a year's time for Russian organic chemistry materials, Bagnall was pessimistic. 1057/ As future events would prove, his fears that this would entail excessive costs were not exaggerated.

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Another factor was the limitation on materials which could be processed. In late 1959 at the first meeting of the new CIA Advisory Committee on Mechanical Linguistics (ACML) the point was made that for the foreseeable future newspapers and materials in the social sciences presented too many complexities for MT. Moreover, in the scientific fields where MT was considered feasible, it would still be uneconomical, in terms of machine time, to translate any items of less than 3,000 words. Use of the machine was therefore questioned since most items needed in intelligence work were under this figure. 1058/

Despite this gloomy picture the Agency was still determined to move ahead with the project. As the reader will recall, this was the post-Sputnik period and the pressure for output of S&T materials in light of Soviet advances was great. The volume of available Russian S&T literature had greatly increased in recent years, and the annual available output was estimated to be about 780 million words, of which about 53 million were now being translated annually, most of it by the government or under government contract. Of this volume, CIA accounted for over nine million words. 1059/ Combined with this was the fact that by now the Agency was heavily committed to the GAT Project and there was thus a natural reluctance to pull out. The decision was therefore made to move ahead.

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A review of MT developments within CIA later in 1960 had an apparent dampening affect, and as a result an earlier GAT request for [ ] to carry on further MT research and to key-punch 125 million words was considerably scaled down.

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In June 1960 the ACML endorsed and the Project Review Committee approved the allocation of [ ] to GU to determine the operational feasibility of large-scale MT. 1060/ FDD's part in this phase of the project was to consist of providing it with 2,500 pages of Russian economic text and the approved translation of this material for purposes of lexical abstracting. In addition, the division would select 6,000 pages of Russian material in the other disciplines. The translations resulting from this input were eventually to be post-edited by FDD and made available for the intelligence community and for public sale. 1061/

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By March 1961 FDD had completed Phase I of its contribution to the GAT Project and had selected and prepared more than four million Russian words with their parallel English text in not five, but eight scientific disciplines. The division was now ready to move to Phase II, which called for supplying six million words in these disciplines. 1062/ This task was

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completed early in May and was not only fulfilled but overfulfilled, that is, nine million Russian words against the initial request for six million. 1063/

The solidifying of facts and figures and the greater reliability of statistics on MT in the GAT Project, as the undertaking moved along, further strengthened Bagnall's resolve to urge the Agency to move more slowly before committing funds.

With the approach of the new fiscal year  the Acting Assistant Director of Central Reference, proposed in May 1961 that GAT be continued for another year with  in CIA funds. Bagnall, however, as a member of the Advisory Committee, proposed that prior to granting this approval a report of the previous year's accomplishments be submitted to the committee. FDD had been assigned the task of post-editing the trials and keeping track of cost and time, human-versus-MT, but so far the division had not even received the translation results of the material which it had fed to the project, much less post-edited the material. Moreover, Bagnall reported that to the best of his knowledge no free run material had yet been used, yet the plan for FY-1962 called for expansion into seven new fields involving the translation of more than 30,000 pages. 1064/

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Members of the ACML were apparently impressed by the appeal for greater caution, and the FDD Chief scored a point at the 7 June meeting of the committee when it was agreed to insert a paragraph in the GAT Project compact providing for FDD post-editing of the Georgetown product and a report on the qualitative analysis of the run plus a cost analysis of the entire operation.

[redacted] consented also to change the recommendation providing funds to indicate that the AD/CR would approve the program in principle, subject to review by the committee in the first quarter, and would release [redacted] to Georgetown (approximately one-fourth the total budgeted for FY-1962) pending this review. 1065/

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On 15 June Bagnall further elaborated on his misgivings concerning the GAT system. In notes directed to Carey he deplored the meagre yield from the [redacted] which had so far been spent on the project. With preliminary figures he demonstrated that at this stage of development MT would cost 50 percent more than human translation, that is, \$14.40, before typing, versus \$9.50 per 1,000 words. 1066/ At this point Bagnall's skepticism appeared justified.

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Even these preliminary figures did not appear excessive in retrospect. The first results of MT destined for post-editing according to the procedures designed to evaluate the

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current status of the art were received from GU by FDD on 24 July. They consisted of 550 pages translated from two Russian books on economics. The post-editing was completed by FDD and JPRS at the end of August. This exercise plus more recent cost figures for MT received on the GAT Project revealed a disparity of \$21.50 versus \$9.50 per 1,000 words in favor of human translation. Moreover, the cost of post-editing MT work was in excess of performing this operation for human translation, and the time spent in each instance was the same despite earlier anticipation that the MT post-editing, though costlier, would be faster than post-editing of human translation. 1067/

With the new figures in hand, the ACML met on 20 September 1961 under Bagnall's acting chairmanship to consider the advisability of continuing support of the GAT Project. In view of the unfavorable state of the MT product, the committee agreed to recommend to the PRC that support, in the amount of funds  be continued until 1 January 1962 providing that GU halt production and concentrate instead on research to improve the quality of output. 1068/ On 26 October the PRC approved the recommendation. 1069/

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With the future of the GAT Project somewhat at loose ends, discussion followed as to its disposition. In this connection Paul Borel approached [ ] and informally suggested to him that, in view of the fact that the FDD mission was more closely related to the GAT undertaking than was OCR's, OO assume responsibility for the project. [ ] demurred. In discussing Borel's proposal with Bagnall later on, he expressed the opinion that OCR was attempting to "unload" a highly controversial project on OO. Bagnall suggested that the proper solution was to turn it over to NSF, though he doubted that the Foundation, which, he felt, had come to regard the GAT Project with disfavor, would be amenable to this shift in responsibility. 1070/

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On 1 November, at [ ] request, John Bagnall wrote a tart memorandum on the subject of allocating responsibility for GAT. He expressed disappointment in the original CIA approach to the problem and stated that he found it difficult to understand why the Agency had not assigned it to FDD in the first place. He suggested that it may have been Dr. Dostert's "unilateral, histrionic argumentation" against Agency language specialists controlling the project that had swayed this

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decision.\* Continuing, Bagnall deplored Agency sponsorship of pure research, this being rather one of the functions of NSF, and reiterated his advice to turn the project over to the latter. On another tack he charged that the government was simultaneously supporting both CIA's GAT Project and the Air Force-financed IBM MT Project, which were in competition with each other. Citing the large amounts of money being expended by the Air Force-IBM combination on the one hand and the insufficiency of funds available for FDD's regular functions on the other, he again advised dropping the GAT Project and suggested concentrating on the IBM operation. If this advice were not followed and if GAT were transferred to FDD, he expressed his inclination to turn it over to NSF or at least to implement a sharp reduction in the funding of the project commensurate with its results. 1072/

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\* An indication of Dostert's feelings about linguists involved in MT came to the fore at a subsequent meeting, on 9 February 1962, attended by GU, NSF, DOD, and CIA representatives. In the course of the meeting he touched briefly on the "fallacy" of having translators involved in evaluation since they "have an obsessive fear" of being replaced by a machine. In response to a query by [redacted] one of the CIA members present, Dostert somewhat apologetically retracted this remark and offered instead the comment that linguistic analysis of MT was certainly required for stylistic purposes. 1071/

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On 14 November 1961, as acting chairman of the ACML, Bagnall essentially repeated to the DD/I the contents of his 1 November memorandum to  stating that the Air Force-IBM MT system was superior to the GAT and recommending cessation of CIA support for the latter at the end of 1961. However, he advised continuance thereafter of evaluation of all MT research and support of that which promised to be of value to the Agency. 1073/

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Meanwhile, the question of continued CIA assistance to the GAT Project had generated considerable heat between the supporters and detractors of the venture. At issue was a quarrel between OO and OCR in which the latter challenged John Bagnall's method of arriving at cost figures in his analysis of the GAT Project. 1074/ Although OCR persisted for a time in continuing the dispute, 1075/ OO refused to be drawn further into the quarrel and there the matter rested. Bagnall, however, continued to issue figures on the GAT Project severely critical of that system. On 31 January 1962 he reported to the ACML that further computations on the basis of available facts had made it obvious that MT under GAT could actually cost as much as \$28.29 per 1,000 words. Time computation for this number of words, involving input, translation, and post-editing, amounted

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to 317 to 360 minutes for GAT compared with 192 for human translation. 1076/ Bagnall was pushing the issue hard.

The question of OCR-versus-FDD funding of the GAT Project remained open into February 1962. The OO-FDD position continued to be that the MT project should not be under OCR. However, the only two places in the Agency for its logical assignment appeared to be FDD or the CIA Automatic Data Processing Staff (ADPS), and [ ] was strongly opposed to having the division saddled with the complications inherent in the project, especially at this late date when its termination was pending. 1077/

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The issue pertaining to continued CIA sponsorship of the GAT Project had by now reached the critical point. On 26 February Bagnall reported to Carey his contention that, based on random examples, the output of the Air Force-IBM system was not only far better than the GAT but had actually reached an acceptable stage. He therefore strongly urged CIA to commence negotiations with the Air Force and IBM for use of their system and to abandon the Georgetown scheme. 1078/

On 14 March 1962, following discussions between OO and ADPS; Bagnall and [ ] the ADPS Chief, addressed a memorandum to Paul Borel in which they offered the recommendation -- among others -- that the GAT project be phased out as of 30 June 1962, that Chief, FDD be named responsible officer to monitor MT

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research on CIA's behalf and be designated CIA representative on the Interagency Committee on Machine Translation Research (ICMTR), and that FY-1963 funds be transferred from GAT to FDD to be used in conducting the MT activities of the Agency. 1079/

The final decision to terminate the GAT Project was reached on 29 March at a meeting chaired by  of the DD/I's Office and at this session Prof. Dostert was informed of the projected discontinuance of CIA support for GAT effective 1 July 1962. 1080/ Dostert threatened an appeal but this proved little more than bluster and the project gradually drew to a close.

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In a letter of 29 May 1962 the DDCI informed the president of Georgetown University of the CIA decision to discontinue Agency support but agreed to the payment of legitimate liquidation costs to assist in the phase-out program. In return the Agency requested a full report on the project's accomplishments from inception to the date of termination. 1081/

The originally proposed 90-day cut-off date proved to be overly optimistic and negotiations concerning conclusion of the project continued. Eventually, however, the final date was set at 31 March 1963 and after CIA had subscribed a closing allotment, including payment for an unauthorized deficit of

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incurred by GAT, plus some further procrastination on the part of GU, the project was discontinued. 1082/

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B. The Division Turns to Private Industry

Mechanical translation involved the development and employment of machines for the performance of a function of considerable usefulness to the government. While private research establishments, including educational institutions, were in a position to engage in and offer the results of research in the theoretical aspects of language patterns and relationships, they were seldom equipped with the engineering know-how or facilities to produce the hardware which permitted them to transpose their theoretical computations to a practical operational level. It was therefore only a matter of time after the government decision to enter the MT field that private computer firms and other producers of related hard- and software should be working in close collaboration with government agencies interested in the products of their manufacture.

In connection with the GAT Project, CIA and FDD had not been directly associated with private industry. In this case Georgetown University had handled its own contacts with outside firms. But already in the course of its liaison with GU, FDD was investigating the offerings of computer

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manufacturers and R&D organizations to determine the feasibility and practicability of their products.

Contacts with computer firms were made as early as the end of 1955 when John Bagnall was approached by a representative of Ramo-Wooldridge Company, contractors for the Air Force, who discussed with him the methodology in handling information from foreign-language sources with a view toward machine development. 1083/ Other firms followed with presentations of their own, in some instances offering hard figures on costs and methods. In a few cases the preliminary discussions showed promise of feasible methods but oftentimes the cost proved prohibitive, far surpassing the cost of human translation. Of the early contacts, none gave promise of yielding a satisfactory solution to the problem. Thus, for the moment, the Agency's hopes rested with the GAT Project.

FDD's first direct exposure to MT development by International Business Machines, the firm with which it was to be closely associated in ALP/MT development during the next few years, occurred in February 1960 when John Bagnall, as chairman of CEFLP, attended an IBM presentation on the state of the art. IBM, which had been working on the problem for a considerable period in the past, had resumed MT development under an Air Force contract in September 1959

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and had attained an estimated speed of 100,000 words per hour. The translations from this operation required post-editing. At the CEFLP meeting following the visit to IBM, the cost differential between MT and human translation was examined. In Bagnall's view the cost would be similar if all phases of the MT process, such as feed-in and post-editing, were considered. 1084/

At the following month's meeting Bagnall distributed examples of the IBM MT for examination and informed the committee of a study currently under way in FDD to determine the best combination of substantive and linguistic qualifications required by individuals to post-edit the MT material. At this and at the previous meeting of the committee the problem of developing a character recognition device (mechanical reader) designed to do away with the laborious manual key-punching operation was also considered and the developments to date of RCA and Baird Atomic, Inc., were examined. 1085/ This phase of MT was an important one from the standpoint of speeding up the process and, as subsequent progress indicated, proved difficult to solve.

On the basis of the initial contacts, on 20 April 1960

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addressed a formal request to the DCI to present a proposal

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to CIA for establishment of an automatic translation facility. 1086/

In a reply ten days later Allen Dulles commented on the fact that the CIA-supported GAT Project to date had proved sufficiently encouraging to justify a large-scale operational feasibility test and therefore expressed agreement with the proposal.

As a result a meeting was arranged for 5 May. 1087/

In connection with the negotiations now under way, in March an estimate of overall annual translation service required by all USIB components had been coordinated by Bagnall and turned over to  for a study being made on behalf of IBM relative to MT needs. 1088/


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On 25 May 1960, in company with other members of CODIB and the CODIB Subcommittee on MT, John Bagnall attended a demonstration, one of many in which he and other FDD officers were to participate in the next few years, at the IBM Research Center at Mohansic, New York, and was impressed by the progress achieved through IBM's approach. His enthusiasm, however, was not generally shared by other committee members. The consensus appeared to be that it was desirable to compare various systems in a large-scale feasibility test rather than to zero in on one at this point. The CODIB would therefore take no position at this time on funds for the IBM proposal. 1090/

In 1961 CIA became involved in research related to an operation which impinged at least indirectly on the ongoing MT program and thereby affected also FDD operations. This concerned investigation in the employment of computers as an aid to intelligence operations and resulted in the establishment of the Automatic Data Processing Staff. In the course of its development and activity, and not long after

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it was set up, the ADPS engaged in the formulation of a system which came to be designated as Project CHIVE, the name given to a computing development program for the DD/I (a similar program was under way for the DD/S). As defined by the DD/I, the principal tasks of Project CHIVE were three in number, as follows: to establish a computer center for the DD/I; to implement selected computing and data processing applications in direct support of DD/I intelligence officers; and to conduct a study on a system's designed effort to satisfy future DD/I needs, primarily in the areas of document retrieval and automated information systems. 1091/

In terms of the new CHIVE system's effect on FDD, in May 1961 John Bagnall foresaw the application of electronic data processing as feasible in at least three fields of operations, that is, the CTS index, the cataloging and retrieval of information for FDD special research reports, and machine translation. Since EDP hardware was employed in MT systems, it appeared likely that FDD would ultimately utilize the Center's facilities for MT. 1092/ This appraisal of CHIVE application in MT operations eventually proved to be true.

To relate the FDD function to the new project's development, a number of briefings of ADP Staff and IBM personnel were conducted during June 1962, and in November

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[redacted] were designated as the FDD representatives to work with the evaluation group of Project CHIVE in determining the feasibility of utilizing the IBM Stenowriter System\* in FDD to produce Russian-English MT as well as to print out from stenotype input human translations from languages other than Russian. 1093/ Throughout the life of CHIVE, FDD remained in close touch with the project and contributed whatever it could toward what was hoped would be its eventual success.

Meanwhile, CIA and FDD continued the search for a solution to the MT problem and in this connection made contact with numerous firms and institutions engaged in trying to solve it. A CIA paper issued in March 1962 listed some eleven such organizations engaged in language-processing research alone, 1094/ while many others worked on the development of peripheral equipment, such, for example, as the character recognition machine referred to earlier. By November 1961 Sylvania had joined RCA and Baird Atomic in offering its version of this device for inspection. 1095/

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\* In the Stenowriter System trained stenotypists prepared machine-shorthand tapes of dictated English translations of foreign-language text. The stenotapes were converted to magnetic tapes via a so-called Steno Mark Reader. The magnetic tape was then fed to a processor which, in conjunction with a Steno dictionary, produced a printout of the English text.

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Of the firms which offered their services in the MT field at this time, many were technically and financially ill-prepared to enter it. Their claims were frequently extravagant and were soon refuted when they were asked to produce results. Their hope appeared to be to secure a government subsidy, followed by extended experimentation but with no realistic conception of the pitfalls likely to be encountered in the MT field. This was, of course, not true of all. A good many were legitimate companies, well-financed and possessing adequate or better technical facilities, which desired to expand their activities outside already well-established fields. CIA, anxious to take advantage of new and recent advances in computer technology, in MT and in other phases, gave all who desired it a hearing.

With the GAT Project encountering difficulties and showing few signs of becoming a viable system, CIA-FDD sought help elsewhere. Gradually the Agency's choice narrowed down to the tentative selection of IBM, a well-established firm experienced in computer technology, to carry on its MT experimentation. As mentioned earlier, IBM was already engaged in this work for Georgetown University and the Air Force. Moreover, Bagnall, as part of the CODIB group, had visited the IBM Research Center, so that IBM activity was not unknown to FDD.

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On 29 June 1962, accompanied by [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] of FDD, John Bagnall again visited New York and

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received a further briefing at IBM. In his report to OO he described MT as the initial step to be accomplished; research in this field was planned by IBM in three stages, namely, an automated dictionary, syntactic analysis, and semantic analysis. To date the first step had been completed with a dictionary of 200,000 Russian words. The second step was now in process and could take two years or more to complete. Bagnall also reported that the reader scanner manufactured by Baird Atomic had failed to work and that IBM was seeking to correct its faults and at the same time attempting to develop a better one of its own. Moreover, IBM was fabricating a Russian-language stenotype facility which would enable a stenotypist to type the Russian phonetically, and the resulting tape could then be fed into a machine for translation into English. IBM was also working on Chinese translations in connection with MT. In addition, the firm had developed a stenewriter system which could transcribe steno tapes. IBM did not volunteer cost figures for the various machines but said the company was matching Air Force research funds dollar for dollar. 1096/

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With the decision all but made to base the CIA MT and ADP program on IBM research, planning moved rapidly forward.

On 18 October 1962 IBM Corporation, [REDACTED]

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submitted to ADPS and FDD a formal proposal to install a stenewriter in FDD at an approximate cost of [REDACTED] This system would apply the techniques of high-speed transcription of stenotype to a system for converting translated dictation into printed documents. It was capable of servicing 28 stenotypists working full time at 150 words per minute. An advantage of the system was that it was a general-purpose language processor which could be used for other applications such as language translation. 1097/ In the event that the system was approved and installed, it was Bagnall's expectation that ten stenotypists would be needed for the FDD part of its input. He expected to train FDD's present staff, if possible, through IBM facilities. When the system had attained its full capacity, he believed the division's output would not consume the full time of the system and suggested that Contact Division and FBID consider adaptation of their reports to the stenewriter, 1098/ an invitation which FBID subsequently pursued when in May 1963 that organization arranged to be included in the first phase of the environmental study in order to determine its applicability to the Daily Report. 1099/

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With the IBM proposal in hand, CIA proceeded as rapidly as possible to take some form of concrete action with regard to the overture. On 14 November the group studying the proposal again visited the IBM Research Center, where certain questions were discussed and the firm demonstrated its present stenotype code-to-English translating capability. As it turned out, the quality of the product was far below that which IBM had claimed, in its proposition, to be able to develop. Still, it was recognized that the potential of the system was such that continued improvement could be anticipated. The Air Force and IBM had collaborated over a period of several years in developing the AN/GSQ-16 lexical processor and an MT capability, and FDD at this time judged this Russian-to-English MT, with a reasonable amount of post-editing, to be competitive with its human translation effort. The division was thus in favor of negotiating the contract as it had been proposed by IBM. In its initial planning FDD expected to operate the AN/GSQ-16 in the MT mode about five hours and in the stenewriter mode about two hours per day. With this operation it hoped to achieve a number of advantages, *viz*: eliminate FDD's dependence on contractual help for Russian-to-English translation; speed up the translation function and increase the volume; provide a standard terminology in

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the translated product; and provide a saving of 18¢ per page of edited Russian-to-English text. Thus, in terms of this high-flown anticipation and based on the results of the 14 November visit and the ensuing discussions,  of the ADPS evaluation group, in his report of 4 December 1962 to the ADPS chief, recommended that the Agency contract with IBM to perform a study of the DD/I requirements for CHIVE, as well as MT and stenewriter, appropriate to the capabilities of the AN/GSQ-16 and, based on the results of this study, to proceed with IBM to develop and apply the appropriate capabilities of the machine for DD/I applications.  further recommended that the AN/GSQ-16 be initially located in the DD/I Computer Center but later on moved to FDD when a satisfactory operational MT and stenewriter capability had been proven. 1100/

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Despite knowledge of pending, though relatively minor, complexities before the system could become operational, FDD and ADPS approached the new project with high hopes. Bagnall seemed to feel that the present IBM MT system was far enough advanced so that it could be used with a minimum of post-editing. It would take approximately 15 months to acquire and install the machines and by that time the system was likely to be further improved by IBM. It had now been

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determined that the cost figures of the IBM Stenowriter System including the MT capability would amount to [redacted] [redacted] the rise over the originally quoted figure attributable to the need for standard IBM components required to complete the basic system over and above the special hard- and software cited earlier. With the MT added, Bagnall anticipated that he could use the machine full time and possibly even on a shift basis and thereby double or triple the present FDD Russian output. He presumed the machine would therefore be installed in the FDD area of the Matomic Building but was warned by [redacted] of possible opposition to this from the building owner due to the need for special air-conditioning and reinforcing of floors. 1101/ This prediction proved true and partially for this reason but mainly because of ADPS opposition to a dispersal of computer systems within the Agency, all such systems were eventually centralized at Headquarters and all FDD MT experimentation involving machine use was conducted off FDD premises.

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
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By the end of 1962 CIA had completed all phases of the study on the IBM proposal at the operating level and the review had come out favorably. The next steps involved running the proposal through the management cycle where the project would be weighed, in terms of priority, with others.

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As this was going on, certain management changes occurred at IBM which, from the Agency standpoint, required some adjustment and a certain amount of delay. Immediately pertinent was the resignation of the research director,



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IBM's Vice President in Charge of Research and Engineering, on 6 February 1963 visited the Agency with other IBM officials to acquaint the people there with the nature of the change and to assure them of his company's continued support in the pending project.

Not long after, on 10 April,




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letters to Bagnall and  informing them that ITEK had submitted to the Agency a proposal for automatic translation equipment. The new offer was broad in scope and dealt with what ITEK could supply in the way of equipment, the theory of its approach to the problem, and its treatment of information retrieval, steno transcription, and language translation. 1102/ This development threatened a new delay in the attempt to get work started on the Automatic Language Processing System.

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Meanwhile, on the following day Bagnall and [redacted] submitted a joint request to the CIA Comptroller to allocate the sum of [redacted] in FY-1963 to ADPS to procure MI/stenographer equipment from IBM for FDD use. The memorandum presented a general review of progress to date, enumerated the likely benefits to be derived from the equipment, which would be installed by IBM within 15 months of the contract's signature, and promised a tripling of FDD's current Russian output or, at the current production level, a saving of [redacted] thus in effect paying for the equipment in less than two years' time. 1103/

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The Budget Division's views on the FDD-ADPS bid were expressed on 25 April in a cautious, somewhat critical memorandum to the Comptroller. In it [redacted] the division chief, following a review of the system and a visit to the IBM research laboratories, posed certain unanswered questions, pertaining to such matters as: a more careful approach by FDD and IBM to the serious personnel training and retention problems; greater attention to workload priorities; possible technological obsolescence, based on IBM's own statement that it was working on improved models and on the possibilities of better systems by other firms (for example, ITEK), thus suggesting a lease system in preference to purchasing; and the need for more tangible proof concerning the estimated

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speed-up rate of three-to-one over the present translation process. Despite these questions, [ ] judged the project sufficiently promising to warrant consideration of a limited approach, that is, negotiation of a systems contract with IBM permitting answers to some of the foregoing questions with deferral of a final decision until applications and problems had been more clearly defined. 1104/

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The Comptroller's admonishment for a more careful assessment resulted in further study of the problem by FDD and ADPS. In the course of this, Bagnall on 2 July 1963 gave a presentation to the ADPS group on the current status of MT in which he reviewed the three major MT systems that had been under development for years, the GAT, the Thompson-Ramo-Wooldridge (TRW), and the IBM (for the Air Force) systems. The cost of the three per 1,000 words ran approximately \$22, \$16, and \$10, respectively. They differed primarily in the extent to which sophistication of a syntactic nature had been introduced, ranging from the most ambitious in the GU system to the least in the IBM arrangement, which was essentially a mechanical dictionary. Bagnall favored the latter as the best and most practical at this time. All systems required post-editing; however, a translator employing the IBM method could triple his output. To provide input for this system, 13 flexowriters were needed. 1105/

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Prior to the 2 July conclave, in response to discussions with members of the Comptroller's Office, ADPS had prepared a single set of system specifications and on 10 June had submitted copies to IBM and ITEK requesting return comment. Both firms submitted revised proposals on 26 June and discussed them with ADPS to iron out moot points. A comparative evaluation and recommendation was then prepared jointly by ADPS and FDD. This paper revealed the total fixed price of the IBM system to be [redacted] including the cost of the flexowriters. On a 12-month lease arrangement, the outlay would be [redacted] plus the initial cost of the flexowriters and a steno mark sensor unit. Approximately 70 percent of the rental would be available toward later purchase. The ITEK system, on the other hand, had a total fixed price of [redacted] with a lease arrangement of [redacted] but with almost the entire amount available toward a purchase option. The ADPS-FDD recommendation in favor of IBM was based on the factor of less capital risk for CIA plus greater IBM experience in the MT field. 1106/

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On 9 July 1963, at the request of the CIA Executive Director, the Automatic Data Processing Committee reviewed the proposals. Certain hazards were considered, but in view of the urgency for progress in the MT field these risks were

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accepted. The committee thus concurred in the ADPS-FDD proposal and recommended the following: that IBM be selected as the contractor; that 13 flexowriters be procured with FY-1963 funds; and that ADPS seek to negotiate a lease arrangement with IBM (effective FY-1965) and initiate procurement of a special-purpose steno mark sensor at a cost of [redacted] (effective FY-1964). 1107/

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With final approval imminent, FDD, in preparation for the receipt of the ALP system and in anticipation of the use of the Air Force's AN/GSQ-16, initiated orders for 13 flexowriters modified for Russian punch-tape input. However, the project was not out of the woods yet. In the first place the CIA Comptroller, John A. Bross, in reviewing the estimate, expressed concern over two items, namely the lower cost figure proposed by ITEK and the portent of the departure earlier of

[redacted] an acknowledged MT authority, and some of his associates from IBM to join ITEK. It was his feeling that CIA should proceed very slowly with this program. 1108/ His misgivings appeared further bolstered when at the end of August ITEK, anxious to secure the contract, sharply reduced its bid from [redacted] which placed its total estimate considerably below the IBM bid. However, at this same time IBM had offered its steno

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mark sensor unit on a lease basis and also made the unit subject to a 70-percent purchase option rate, which made the IBM proposal still the more desirable financially. Moreover, ITEK had never built computers and the vast experience of IBM in this field added immeasurably to the attractiveness of that firm's offer. [redacted]

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recently appointed to the new CIA position of Assistant Director for Computer Services, indicated his strong inclination toward adopting the IBM system, but by 4 September the Comptroller had still not committed himself. 1109/

The log jam was finally broken on 10 September when

[redacted] the Budget Officer, with the Comptroller's approval, informed [redacted] that the Budget Division favored the

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IBM proposal, and on 13 September IBM was so advised. 1110/ Formal notification of this fact was issued on 29 November 1963, and IBM was informed that as soon as the firm had drawn up the required formal standards and specifications for the project, CIA would issue a letter of intent to enter into an agreement for lease of the ALP System for a minimum of one year. [redacted] of OCS was designated the authorized representative for the Agency. 1111/

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C. MT Experimentation in Other Languages

Greatest emphasis in the MT field during the early 1960s had for obvious reasons been on the machine translation of Russian-to-English text, but simultaneous effort of somewhat lower intensity had also been expended on the application of MT methodology to other languages, in particular to Chinese. Already in January 1960 John Bagnall reported that the University of Washington was doing research in machine translation of Chinese scientific material to English and had expressed the need for \$50,000 a year for a pilot project and twice this amount for a full-scale research undertaking. 1112/ On 26 May 1960  of FDD's Asia Division had conferred with the staff of the RCA research installation in Camden, New Jersey, regarding that firm's development of Chinese MT. RCA proposed, with sufficient subsidy, to produce acceptable MT within one year's time. 1113/ By 12 March 1962 FDD had also carried out an evaluation of a Chinese MT system proposed by a California firm known as Pan Technical Systems, Inc. 1114/ In mid-1962 IBM was working on Chinese translations for the purpose of developing a mechanism whereby a typist could be trained to input the Chinese ideographs by recognizing certain key features of the characters, an operation which could be accomplished without language training. 1115/ The need for experimental work on MT in other languages was emphasized in

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October 1962 by Bagnall in a briefing of the Air Force Science Advisory Board's Ad Hoc Committee on Machine Translation concerning CIA's current views on MT in which he recommended accelerated research in languages other than Russian since the latter comprised only 7.5 percent of the estimated volume of literature requiring processing. 1116/

Research and experimentation, primarily in Chinese MT, paralleled on a lesser scale that carried on in Russian during 1963 and involved the development of an experimental Chinese translation system. Later in the year the compatibility of the Chinese Photocomposer with the IBM Automatic Language Processor was examined, 1117/ and on 31 January 1964 the first meeting was held between IBM and FDD regarding a program to create a Chinese dictionary for MT. At this and at a subsequent session on 27 February plans for a joint effort on the problem were discussed, and IBM agreed to submit about mid-March a cost estimate for a two-year schedule of development of a "pin-yin"\* translation system. 1118/

A program was developed but never implemented and the February negotiations marked the high point as far as CIA and FDD experience with Chinese MT was concerned. Its further

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\* Romanized Chinese characters.

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development was likely to hinge on the success of the FDD experimentation with Russian MT then pending. On 14 May 1964 Joseph Becker, the AD/CS, informed IBM that budgetary restrictions for FY-1965 would limit current CIA investment in ALP to the funds allocated to the ALP proposal on a Russian MT capability then being negotiated with IBM. He indicated, however that CIA interest in automatic processing for Chinese and other languages was a continuing one. 1119/

As a footnote to the foregoing, representatives of ITEK Corporation in July 1964 informed John Bagnall, then DAD/CR, of its current research in both Chinese and Russian MT. A year later, on 13 August 1965, ITEK briefed CIA officers, including several from FDD, on its progress in two years of theoretical work in Chinese MT for the Air Force and announced the scheduling of a practical demonstration of the system in October. The ITEK representatives were informed that CIA was interested in following ITEK developments but that the Agency was not funding any further research in MT at that time. 1120/

Meanwhile, FDD and the Agency considered MT applications in languages other than Russian and Chinese, but this effort proved relatively short-lived. In early 1963, encouraged by the apparent progress in ALP experimentation for Russian, the Agency adopted a policy of broadening MT research to

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languages such as Spanish, French, and those of Eastern Europe. By June 1964 FDD had laid the groundwork for the development of dictionaries in anticipation of possible ALP system adaptation. This included, in addition to the Chinese, files in French and Spanish produced as by-products in the course of normal operations including upwards of 30,000 and 1,500 carded entries, respectively. In addition, smaller efforts had been expended in Portuguese, Polish, and other languages. 1121/ The Agency policy to expand MT research to other languages resulted in July 1964 in an FDD decision to prepare a paper defining the need for MT in the Romance languages and, on the basis of the conclusions reached, making recommendations on what course to follow. 1122/

The proposed FDD paper was some time in the formulation, but finally in late fall  submitted the draft of the proposal addressed to John Bagnall, the DAD/CR. In it he emphasized the urgent need for a system of machine-aid for human translation of foreign-language documents because of increased translation demands and recruitment difficulties but recommended that such a machine-aid system be limited to French and Spanish. 1123/

This memorandum, prepared for Chief, FDD's signature, was never signed. Instead, it was attached to a  to Bagnall memorandum of 4 December 1964. By now, though the

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testing of the IBM ALP system was not yet completed, [ ] 25X1  
[ ] was beginning to have reservations about the consider- 25X1  
able sums of money so far spent and the meager results attained  
in the experiment. He explained to Bagnall his reluctance to  
sign because he felt further CIA investment in any disciplines  
or languages was unjustified until the practicability and  
feasibility of MT had been further tested. The years of  
research and massive sums so far spent had still left the  
future of the undertaking uncertain. Feasibility tests in  
other languages, he felt, were consequently unwise. He there-  
fore proposed instead for FDD to shift the investment of  
available resources to human translation but to continue to  
observe MT R&D programs in other languages sponsored by NSF  
and private commercial firms. 1124/ This action ended further  
pursuit of an MT capability in non-Russian languages so far  
as FDD was concerned.

D. FDD-Air Force Cooperation

FDD exposure to the MT operation in the late 1950s and  
early 1960s during the period of its support of the GAT Project  
and the initial IBM overtures, was limited largely to theory  
and experimentation. At the same time, however, while the  
division was only just in the process of getting its feet wet,  
its Air Force counterpart, the Foreign Technology Division,

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had moved ahead and in cooperation with IBM had established an MT facility based on the AN/GSQ-16 machine with which it was regularly producing Russian S&T translations.

Some collaboration with the Air Force in connection with MT had already been initiated in October 1961 when FDD was provided with some random MT text from the Air Force-IBM project through George H. Pughe, Jr., of AID in the Library of Congress. John Bagnall reported having found this material so readable that post-editing was accomplished at approximately one third the cost of editing the GAT product. 1125/

This brief experiment and subsequent analysis in 1962 of the utilization of the AN/GSQ-16 machine in FDD operations proved so promising that in July 1963 Bagnall entered into general agreement for cooperative use of the Air Force's prototype AN/GSQ-16 machine for Russian translation. The machine was expected to arrive at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base near the end of August and to be in operation sometime in October or November. In a letter to FTD on 26 July, Bagnall spelled out his ideas for a *modus operandi* relative to FDD-FTD cooperation in its utilization. He estimated that FDD would forward to FTD about 90,000 words a day for translation, tape-punched for direct input. For this purpose the division would use flexowriters compatible with the

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Air Force system and would airmail the tape daily. Bagnall indicated he was also investigating the possible use of a leased wire for direct tape transmittal. It was agreed that after the machine runs were returned from FTD, this output would be post-edited through the facilities of JPRS. To carry out this work, it was estimated that FDD would require 13 flexotypists. The machines required for their use were already on order from IBM and were expected to arrive at FDD sometime in November 1963. Since FTD had expressed a willingness to train the flexowriter operators at Dayton, Ohio, the division planned to send two or three of the operators there for at least a week of instruction. On their return to Washington this training would then be passed on to other trainees. 1126/

Beginning 23 September 1963,  Chief of the Support Branch's Publications Section in FDD, received two weeks' training at Wright-Patterson AFB in the operation of the Cyrillic keyboard flexowriters. Shipment of the latter to FDD had begun in October, and on 26 November when all had been received, the full-time training of the 13 flexotypists was initiated in the division. This number was reduced by approximately one half in June 1964 and only the best trainees were retained in the job.

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As projected in 1963 in cost comparisons between human and machine (the AN/GSQ-16) translation using the factors of input, translation, and post-editing, FDD estimated a current expenditure of \$12.00 per 1,000 words compared with \$9.60 for human translation but anticipated that, with an increase in MT utilization to three times the projected current production, this figure for the AN/GSQ-16 would be cut back to \$8.40 per 1,000 words. 1127/ The total annual saving in the use of the stenewriter mode, involving costs for salaries, equipment, and supplies, was expected to be about \$190,000 and for the MT mode about \$167,000, a total of \$357,000. 1128/ These enthusiastic projections reflected an ignorance of intangibles which, when corrected later on, led to more reasonable assessments.

Meanwhile, a continuing series of exchanges of personnel on a higher level took place between Washington and Dayton to coordinate the operation. Finally, with arrangements pertaining to security, training, and procedures completed, FDD was ready to begin its first full-scale experiment in processing MT text. The division expected to start forwarding the Russian punched tapes on a daily basis after 6 January 1964 and hoped to achieve the 90,000 words per day rate very soon. In light of its other commitments FDD

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headquarters was not in a position to meet the post-editing goal of up to 45,000 words a day for FTD. Bagnall therefore reported to the Air Force that FDD had "contracted" with JPRS in the Commerce Department to carry on this work and requested FTD to send the tapes directly there. JPRS estimated a turn-around time of four to five days per 100 pages once the project got under way. 1129/

MT operations finally commenced on 17 January when the first substantial shipment of 45,000 words was sent to Wright-Patterson, and by March post-editing in JPRS was in full swing with material from FTD being received almost daily. During March 1964 JPRS post-edited a total of approximately 370,000 words. 1130/ In April the task of post-editing the FTD MT output was assigned to the New York and San Francisco offices of JPRS in addition to D.C.

By May 1964 post-editing by the three offices had risen to some 533,000 words for the month, but there was at this time already a hint of problems related to the conversion of translators to post-editors which the project had made necessary. In May, however, this difficulty appeared to be temporarily resolved due to a marked improvement in materials received from FTD as the result of a new and improved vocabulary disk having been obtained from IBM for use in the

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AN/GSQ-16 machine. The improvement in quality of the translated output helped to lessen JPRS qualms about the need to convert sufficient translators into post-editors to keep pace with the flow of materials being received. The problems still remained, Bagnall reported, but they looked somewhat smaller. 1131/

Another difficulty came to light the following month in the course of a liaison trip by FDD and OCS officers to Wright-Patterson, when dissatisfaction was expressed with JPRS service and FTD proposed discontinuing its use and doing all post-editing in-house. Such a step would, however, have no effect on FTD processing of FDD input. 1132/ In fact, the threat to discontinue JPRS support was never carried out. Despite problems, the work continued and by mid-1964 FDD had tape-punched more than three million Russian words of input, 1133/ resulting in the production of 1,735,000 words of Russian-English MT by FTD. This material was subsequently issued by JPRS/OTS to the community in the form of 207 S&T reports. 1134/

The end of the FDD-FTD cooperative effort on MT came finally as a result of the culmination of FDD's negotiations with IBM relative to the firm's ALP system development for the division. This was brought about when, after a period

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of experimentation, FDD contracted with IBM for a one-year test of the new ALP system, scheduled to begin in August 1965. Since it would comprise an MT mode as well as other language-processing capabilities, the system required modification of the FDD flexowriter equipment, making FDD tapes incompatible with the AN/GSQ-16. Consequently, FDD input to FTD equipment would gradually decrease as individual machines were modified.

During the life of the agreement with the Air Force, the operation had achieved some success in terms of quantity. Between 17 January 1964 and 28 February 1965 FDD had sent approximately 9,561,000 words of Russian to FTD for MT processing and had reimbursed JPRS for post-editing some 4,127,000 words of Russian MT submitted by FTD.  expressed appreciation for past FTD cooperation and stated that in the next 30 days FDD proposed to send to Wright-Patterson approximately another 300,000 words for processing. There would be no further shipments after 15 April. 1135/

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E. The Outcome

1. Development of the System

By the beginning of 1964 Agency (FDD)-IBM coordination in establishing an ALP system had reached a critical point. The two sides had reached an understanding that IBM would

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proceed to develop such a system and estimated that it would take about 15 months to accomplish this assignment, and the Agency, through its Budget Division, had committed itself to underwriting the effort, but so far no contract had yet been signed. This awaited further progress.

It became the task of FDD, in cooperation with ADPS and the new Office of Computer Services (OCS), to monitor the project from here on in, to conduct tests to determine the reliability and feasibility of the projected system, and finally to pass judgment and submit recommendations in respect to the Agency's commitment to the final product. The immediate problem facing all parties concerned was to establish the ground rules under which coordinated activity was to be carried out. This involved a number of factors, such as, for example, mutual agreement by CIA and IBM on the standards and specifications for ALP, proper security clearance for IBM employees who would be intimately associated with the application of the ALP system to active intelligence requirements and methods, the orientation and familiarization of IBM personnel on current procedures and planned activities for ALP, the same for CIA personnel in connection with IBM hardware and development procedures, the determination of data characteristics developed by IBM in the past few years and their application to intelligence needs, and,

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finally, the determination of input and output formats and coding.

All these factors were dealt with as expeditiously as possible although hitches here and there required adjustments and adaptations. The experience gained by the division since its initial involvement with MT proved very valuable and its continued interest and planning for more than a year in anticipation of the steno/MT system had prepared its personnel for appropriate assignments. For example, in the preparation of Russian input data FDD personnel were already familiar with the Data Preparation Procedure employed for the AN/GSQ-16. Further, FDD now had a Cyrillic typist-instructor and 13 other clericals familiar with Cyrillic keyboard and flexo-writer operation. Six of these had reached a proficiency of 5,000 words per day and the training of the remainder was continuing.

Despite these pluses, there were also many minuses. Not the least of these was the need to convert the mentality of the division staff, still largely wedded to the inviolability of the human-translation concept, to one based on machine-oriented translation -- in other words, to dispel the normal fear of the individual of being replaced by the machine. This, more than any other single aspect, made the

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undertaking difficult from the start.

Simultaneous with the development of the ALP system and the preparations for its testing, efforts continued to provide for the formal financing of the system and to conclude arrangements for leasing it. These arrangements were initiated on 9 March 1964 by Joseph Becker, AD/CS. In his memorandum Becker identified the ALP as a computer system capable of performing two major types of operations, the stenewriter mode, whereby the ALP would automatically transcribe data from machine shorthand to English, and the machine translation mode, in which the ALP would automatically translate from Russian to English. If the system served its intended purpose, Becker anticipated that the Agency would extend the lease arrangement or purchase the hardware. 1136/

The request for funds was approved by the DDCI on 1 April 1964. 1137/ Becker then requested the Director of Logistics to negotiate with IBM for acquisition of the ALP system for the Agency. It was specified that the rental period would begin about May 1965 after the system had been developed and accepted. 1138/ The signing of the contract with IBM was finally consummated on 18 June 1964 and it was anticipated that a test of the Automatic Language Processor system for use in producing FDD reports would be effected on or about 20 August 1965.

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However, even before the contract had reached the point of final signature a planning conference was arranged for the period 29 April to 1 May 1964 in the course of which Agency (OCS and FDD) and IBM personnel met to organize implementation management and to exchange system functional and environmental data. At this meeting it was decided that overall management and direction of ALP system implementation for the Agency would come from OCS with  assigned as Project Director. FDD, as user of the system, would provide product standards, manage data preparation operations, and evaluate the product. Following introductory remarks and a review of the system to date, the conference participants were formed into working groups and for the balance of the conference discussed problems and exchanged information on the various aspects of the project. 1139/ The meeting proved fruitful and set the tone for a cooperative relationship between the Agency and IBM for the long haul ahead.

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This conference was only the first of many of a similar nature conducted in the next few months. On 10 June a meeting was held at which the post-editing of steno output was discussed because of the continued concern about the estimated four-percent machine error, compounded by human input errors. The group considered four alternatives, *vis*: to post-edit;

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to educate the community to accept, temporarily during development, a poorer product and not post-edit; to duplicate the present operation during the period of development; or to post-edit on a selective basis, depending on the verity of output in areas of information, and issue the rest unedited. It was decided that semi-automated post-editing,\* as presently conceived, would be a burden rather than a help and would be impractical. 1140/ This left only resort to human post-editing, but the problem of method was not yet resolved at this point and discussion on the matter would continue.

Meetings held 14-15 July 1964 at FDD and on 17 July at Kingston, New York, took up a variety of questions related to the project. Sessions such as these between the CIA ALP Staff and IBM representatives became from this time on until the end of the project a frequent and regular occurrence.

An issue of some concern early in this period pertained to the recruitment and training of a category of clerical personnel in FDD whose participation in the undertaking was vital to its success. These were the stenotypists who prepared the input tapes needed to make the system function. On 29 June, in a memorandum to the AD/CR,

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\* That is, use of a visual tape reader to facilitate the stenotype process.

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stated that the matter of setting up a stenotype training program for FDD personnel was originally delayed pending assurance of an IBM-CIA ALP contract. In retrospect this delay appeared to [ ] to be a good thing in that the FDD plan, as conceived, was subject to potential disruption on the part of the trainees for a variety of reasons such as the possibility of resignation, transfer, leave, inability to assimilate training, etc. [ ] estimated that had the training of 15 selected clericals been started six to eight months previously, ten would have been lost. Now, however, [ ]

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[ ] had suggested as an alternative the hiring of trained stenotypists from the Washington-based Stenotype Institute.

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Feeling the [ ] proposal to be more realistic and economical than the earlier plan, [ ] recommended accepting it. 1141/

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Practical though the suggestion appeared to be, John Vance, the AD/CR, showed reluctance to make a full commitment to this arrangement and regarded [ ] statistics as overly pessimistic. Vance therefore on 8 July recommended reliance on both methods, training and recruitment, and ordered that the in-house training effort continue. 1142/ On 9 July

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[ ] citing the target date of 15 August 1965 and the minimum period of 13 months required to train a stenotypist, urged speedy implementation of the training program and again

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proposed use of the Stenotype Institute as a source of stenotype operators. 1143/ On 14 August it was resolved to establish immediate contact with the Institute to explore recruiting and training possibilities. 1144/ At the same time, in-house training of stenotypists, ten in number, continued.

Work on other aspects of the ALP system meanwhile progressed at a feverish rate. On 17 July a meeting was held between OCR, including FDD representatives, and OCS to review the status of the ALP project and to come to some understandings as to the objectives to be pursued.  outlined developments to date, including information on the use of a modified Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT) system for schedule control. In the course of the meeting Avram pointed out that although acceptance criteria for the steno mode as written in the contract called for a non-machine-attributable error rate of four percent, OCS, working with IBM, had set as an objective a reduction of two percent by the end of the rental year. 1145/

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During the period 25-27 August another series of meetings pertaining to ALP was held at which information was exchanged and a number of decisions made. 1146/ In connection with Russian MT, IBM reported several improvements in its program for processing Russian in the ALP system. It was

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agreed that FDD would furnish two Russian lexicographers on or about 1 October [redacted] were subsequently selected) for training in Russian MT lexicography at the IBM Research Center at Yorktown Heights, New York, and that they would thereafter be employed full time in this function at FDD in coordination with two IBM counterparts doing similar work at the IBM Center. It was anticipated that the combined effort of these men would result in the coding of 20,000 additional dictionary entries by March 1965. IBM expressed some doubts that this could be done but were assured by [redacted] that FDD would not require 20,000 new entries and that those required could be coded in the time available.

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CIA also arranged to supply two steno-to-English lexicographers on or about October under an arrangement similar to that for the Russian lexicographers. These were furnished by OCS. Their function was to code some 25,000 new entries into the steno dictionary by March 1965.

It was stressed that for the steno system to work effectively, it was necessary that each FDD report be put through the system by the intelligence officer in the sequence and format in which it was to be printed and as a single package rather than in bits and pieces. That is, it was to be sent forward for machine translation in "pre-packaged" form.

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This would require the preparation of standardized format instructions which would be reproduced in the steno record and cause the printer to reproduce the report in the desired format. The added burden on FDD linguists, it was agreed, would be formidable. It was decided that a program of indoctrination and training for the linguists would have to be initiated to ensure effective introduction of the steno system.

The meeting resulted in several recommendations including the early introduction of an ALP dictation manual to be used by FDD officers to instruct and guide the stenotypists. The first of these was issued on 8 July 1964 and a revised version on 12 April 1965. It was also resolved to commence passing "pre-packaged" reports through the FDD stenotype transcription system soon after 1 January 1965.

In the next few months further consultation on the ALP system followed, designed to refine the system and to overcome unresolved problems. On 16 November OCS and FDD ALP personnel met to consider the steno and MT costs under the ALP system. At this meeting the respective costs under two different approaches based on actual FDD experience were studied and OCS and FDD figures were reconciled. The costs of the respective approaches had amounted to \$9.80 and \$9.91 per 1,000 English words. As a matter of comparison  of FDD

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presented figures for FY-1963 showing that the overall cost of human translation from all languages via contract amounted to \$9.77 per 1,000 words. 1147/

With the approach of the new year the ALP Staff began to formulate and refine the so-called Acceptance Test Standards which were to serve as the basis on which would rest the final decision as to the acceptance or rejection of the IBM ALP system. In early December it was decided to use FDD personnel to carry out the following functions: flexowriting 180,000 words of Russian input test; post-editing of the translated equivalent of the 180,000 Russian words; stenotyping of 340,000 words of English text; and comparing the 340,000 words of steno-mode printout with the original text. The staff anticipated that this effort would require the services of a large number of FDD personnel for about two days but felt that the time would be well spent. 1148/

The ALP Acceptance Test Criteria were established at a meeting on 16 December 1964 between CIA and IBM representatives, and on the basis of this document, it was proposed that IBM develop the formal Acceptance Test Standards prior to 1 June 1965. The Test Criteria were subsequently issued on 18 March 1965 and the test itself was designed to be conducted for each mode, steno and MT, in two phases, a quality/format test and a quantity test. 1149/

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Other concerns relating to ALP, such, for example, as the problem concerning the handling of proper names in MT, were dealt with as 1964 drew to a close. Then on 19 January 1965 IBM reported that the construction and assembly of the ALP hardware at Kingston and elsewhere, including the 1401, Language Processing Unit (LPU), photostore, Steno Mark Reader (SMR), tape drive, and their components, were proceeding on schedule. By mid-February, it was stated, the Research Language Processor (RLP)-3, a more sophisticated computer than the heretofore-employed Air Force Mark II and currently in use as an exhibition model at the New York World's Fair, would be programmed with the ALP program. This device would then be used to debug the ALP programs. When the RLP-3 was returned to the Fair, debugging and programming would be transferred to the ALP, which, it was contemplated, would be sufficiently assembled by that time. A cut-off date of 19 March 1965 was set for dictionary entries and lexicographic contributions from CIA. IBM and OCS were cooperating in coding the steno dictionary, and this operation was on schedule. Moreover, OCS was continuing its work on homograph resolution with promising results, and discussion on the ALP System Acceptance Test Criteria and the revised versions of the dictation and flexowriter manuals continued and necessary changes were made.

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IBM announced that the entire ALP system would undergo system testing in Kingston during May-June 1965. In this connection the firm requested that FDD provide an unspecified amount of steno record input during the testing period. 1150/

The ALP Staff and the two sponsoring Offices had approached the new year with high hopes and enthusiasm relative to the promise held for the new ALP system, but it was from about this time on that a feeling of uneasiness pervaded that part of the community concerned with progress in the project, and doubts were expressed and questions asked concerning one or another aspect of the undertaking. One of these, of relatively minor import, was the question, already raised earlier, about the location of the equipment. FDD, as the primary user, continued to question the decision to locate control of the equipment in OCS. The last time the issue was revived was in January 1965 when  posed the question why the SMR should not be located in FDD and thus eliminate the need for special cassettes to transfer the material to Langley. The ALP Staff answered that there was no obstacle to this arrangement provided space and environmental conditions in Key Building, to which FDD was to move in April 1965, met IBM specifications. However, it would create problems of coordination between Key and Headquarters. Moreover — and more important — OCS had been

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charged with hardware maintenance, and the SMR, as an integral part of the ALP system hardware, should therefore be located within OCS. 1151/ This exchange appeared to settle the problem once and for all.

Considerably more significant and serious was the "static" heard from those concerned with the MT post-editing function, which at this time still pertained partially to the feed-back from the Air Force MT operation but was phasing in now with the ALP system activity. In early February 1965 a reading was taken among the JPRS offices, upon whom the post-editing chore mainly rested, to determine the status of their experience with this activity. The reports received in answer to the query were uniformly discouraging. In general, the contract translators assigned to the job were unhappy about MT work and preferred not to handle post-editing. In the beginning those who undertook the work did so to please the staff officers at JPRS. Their attitude had, however, changed. It was not only the low rate of compensation that repelled them; they considered the work to be below their professional standards for translation. Without exception every translator insisted he could do the work faster by direct translation. In many cases he had, in effect, to perform a "re-translation" of his project, a result not only of machine error but of human error as well,

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such as purely typographical errors, omitted passages, misinterpretation of Cyrillic letters on the part of typists and flexotypists, etc. Basically, however, the problem was economic. The post-editors, working at the rate of \$3.00 per 1,000 words, were in some instances recompensed at less than \$1.00 per hour. For this reason many of the contractors refused to do the work or, to assure a reasonable return, were doing it so rapidly that the resulting product was below standard. Some were even giving up their contracts and refusing to work for JPRS. The consensus among the JPRS chiefs was that only by raising the post-editing rate -- to something like \$5.00 or \$6.00 per 1,000 words -- or improving the machines could the situation be improved. 1152/

In answer to the complaints  speaking for the Joint Publications Research Committee, the JPRS control at FDD headquarters, replied that the original post-editing concept was not to get a "polished" translation but an intelligible one. He held out hope for an improved ALP output over the outdated AN/GSQ-16 machine and dictionary used by the Air Force. He felt that to raise post-editing rates to five or six dollars was poor business in face of the possibility that the MT product would be considerably improved by September 1965. 1153/

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The second part of the JPRS chiefs' suggestion, improvement of the machine, appeared then to be the only hope, but by now cracks in the facade of confidence on this score were beginning to appear. An ALP project status meeting, with

[redacted] among those

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in attendance, was held at Kingston on 28 May 1965. The feeling of doubt is epitomized by the opening words in the report on this meeting, *viz*: "Our meeting started on the high note of viewing the new ALP equipment completely fabricated as it will be delivered to CIA on or about 15 July. Unfortunately the impressions made by this viewing of deluxe equipment were to lose some of their luster in the later developments of the day." 1154/

The SMR was in the final test stage and appeared to be an excellent and easily operated piece of equipment. Unfortunately, the CIA attendees were disappointed to find that the steno dictionary for CIA use was not yet complete, and the test performed by using an alternate dictionary gave a poor impression of output. They were assured, however, that, with the CIA dictionary, results would be satisfactory within the four-percent error limit set by the specifications. The steno disk and program were complete, but the core program could not be completed for the meeting. IBM hoped to have this operable by the end of the week.

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The LPU was in the unit test stage and no problems were being encountered. The photostore, however, was a week late in testing, but a prototype was being used for system debugging work. The programming for the Russian MT process-word technique was behind schedule by about three weeks and perhaps more. An indication that there was real trouble here was the fact that IBM was preparing a 1401 program for use of the bi-directional system with the new Russian dictionary. IBM suggested using this for a period of two months after the beginning of the acceptance test following which the process-word system would be effective. Use of the bi-directional system in ALP would reduce the speed of throughput by about 50 percent.

The final unpleasant surprise of the day came when the IBM programmer demonstrated that the 8,000-character core storage of the 1401 was insufficient to accommodate the program required to operate the ALP. The core was already at capacity at this time and more core storage -- at additional rental -- was required.

At a subsequent closed meeting the CIA ALP staff members concluded that interim use of the bi-directional Russian MT system for two months would not be critical to the FDD operation and that some equipment trade-off would be possible to compensate for the additional cost of the added core storage.

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They agreed that the problem, being more machine- than language-related, was largely that of OCS rather than OCR (FDD).

In light of the 28 May revelations, the likelihood of IBM meeting the scheduled 15 July delivery date appeared bleak indeed. On 15 June another ALP status meeting convened to explore the situation. 1155/ The same group, but with  replacing  represented the division. At this meeting the IBM group had little to report on successful software progress. More discouraging, however, was the intelligence that the updated steno disk had been run the week before and shown a throughput of 40 words per second with a 7.5 percent error rate, two percent of which was attributable to dictionary deficiencies. The outlook in regard to MT software, IBM reported, was about the same with results termed "sparse but not black."

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The fact that throughput and quality problems existed in the steno mode in addition to the MT problem aired earlier at Kingston came as a new surprise to the CIA group. There was no hesitation in declaring a 40 words-per-second throughput with a 7.5-percent error rate to be unacceptable.

With the developmental phase of the ALP Project obviously lagging and the pieces of the puzzle failing to fall into place,

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IBM begged for more time to bring the system in both modes up to acceptance specifications.

After some discussion the CIA representatives reluctantly agreed to a two-month delay of delivery to 15 September 1965 with acceptance scheduled for 15 October on the grounds that it would allow for benefits to CIA in providing additional training time. However, they reserved committal on acceptance of the delay pending referral to a higher echelon.

On 12 August, approximately a month before the scheduled delivery of the ALP system hardware, the Agency ALP Staff and IBM convened a final ALP status meeting. 1156/ The firm had achieved some success in meeting the specifications criteria, but problems continued to plague the system. For example, samples of steno-mode output derived from input provided by IBM from samplings of FDD publications were displayed. These samples were considered "correctable" and showed an error rate ranging from 3.5 to 4.5 percent, at least an approximation of the maximum rate called for in the specifications. On the other hand, input derived from classroom tapes of FDD steno trainees resulted in unusable output, indicating that the trainees had not yet achieved productive skill. Only one was rated by IBM as having "acceptable" proficiency. By this time, the machine and program error rate had been reduced to

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1.0 to 1.5 percent, dictionary deficiencies appeared to account for 1.7 to 1.8 percent, and the remainder of the total 3.5 to 4.5 percent was attributed to human input.

IBM further reported that the SMR product test had been completed, that the software was now in products testing, and that by the end of August the process-word program would be identical in its development to the bi-directional. Further, the date for shipping the equipment to Washington was set for 13 September and acceptance testing would begin on 4 October. The ALP system was thus finally set to enter its final phase.

## 2. Testing and Termination of the Project

The ALP system hardware was delivered to CIA as scheduled on 15 September 1965 and its installation and checkout was implemented during the period 15 September to 4 October 1965. During the period of the acceptance test which followed, all ALP system hardware functioned satisfactorily.

The ALP system *in toto* was tested for acceptance by the Agency during the period 4-15 October. The objective of the tests was to ascertain whether the delivered ALP hardware and software produced an output which met the speed and quality criteria specified in the ALP contract as detailed in the ALP Acceptance Test Procedures, which had been formulated and

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issued on 18 March 1965. This paper, following periodic revision as required, was distributed in final form during September 1965 and generally the test was conducted as stipulated.

Three teams of personnel worked during the test period, as follows: Russian MT -- two CIA (FDD) and two IBM; steno-English -- two CIA (OCS) and two IBM; and hardware-software (Computer Center) -- two CIA and five IBM (engineers and programmers). From the standpoint of direct FDD participation in the test, [redacted] represented the division. During the period 5-12 October they, in cooperation with the IBM representatives, reviewed in detail approximately 20,000 words of the 66,000-word Russian text comprising the acceptance test material for the ALP MT mode.

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The method of review consisted of a word-for-word comparison of English translations of identical Russian text, produced by the AN/GSQ-16 equipment in April 1965 and ALP on 4 October 1965. Discrepancies between the two translations were noted, tabulated, and characterized insofar as possible as to type and cause. [redacted] in company with their IBM counterparts, conducted two tests. In the quantity test for Russian MT they processed some 20,000 words at a rate of 28.4 words per second, or 8.4 words better than the acceptance threshold. The quality test yielded output "at least

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as good" as the FTD product. Similar tests with equally encouraging results — giving the respective figures of 60.4 and 5.4 words per second for quantity and an error rate of less than the specified four-percent for quality — were conducted for steno-English transcription by the OCS people, so that in his final report on the acceptance tests, [ ] was able to state that the results produced by the ALP system in both the Russian MF and steno-English modes were within all thresholds set by contractual agreement. 1157/

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With the system judged acceptable, the stage was set for the next phase, the year-long pilot project which was planned to test the suitability of the ALP system for Russian MF and the steno-English mode within the context of FDD operations. As we have seen, much work had preceded the performance of the acceptance tests in October 1965. The first serious ALP production work for FDD began in November 1965, and the initial effort was directed at the stenotype production of the division's Latin America Report and at machine translation of selected Russian textual material. In order vigorously to test the utility of this pilot system for full-scale and permanent operation after the test period, an effort was made to collect appropriate operating statistics for both the conventional and ALP systems during the period of pilot

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operation. In addition, some reports were processed in parallel through both systems in order to make a more direct comparison.

The year which followed proved a difficult one for those involved in or affected by the experiment, analyst and consumer alike. A rigorous regime of record keeping was initiated and all pertinent reports had to be carefully "pre-packaged" in conformance with closely controlled format criteria. For this reason special caution had to be exercised to avoid error, not only in translation itself but in the method and order of preparation as well. This was made necessary by the fact that from the time the translator/analyst released his material for stenotyping, the report would not be subject to his review until after publication. It is not difficult to perceive that under this rigid system pressures grew and nerves frayed over the long pull. To analyze the impact of the ALP system on FDD personnel, FDD management solicited frank comments from its people. One officer, doubtless expressing the feelings of the majority, stated his belief that personal elements were slowly becoming less and less important in the FDD intelligence production cycle. He objected principally to the rigid format of the system and to the plethora of instructions requiring preparation over and above the intelligence report itself. 1158/

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There appeared to be a general tendency among division personnel to regard the ALP system as essentially a clerical and reproduction function 1159/ and, despite management's assurances to the contrary, this feeling persisted.

Nor were the feelings outside FDD pertaining to ALP any better. There was no improvement in the post-editing problem after October 1965 over what it had been earlier. In a random sample of 34 contractors whose opinions were solicited on the efficiency of MT and post-editing during the period 1964-1966, two offered positive opinions, seven expressed no opinion but merely gave suggestions for improvement, and 25 gave negative reactions, some mild, others vehement.\*

The reaction to the ALP product by consumers of FDD reports was no less discouraging. In a typical response, one user stated his view that, despite remarkable progress, MT was not yet sufficiently refined to permit its use. The MT product was post-edited but this appeared to serve primarily

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\* Sample comments of the many received were the following:

"Refer almost constantly to original Russian text."

"As a professional translator want professional pay. Slave wages."

"So many English errors that it is completely unusable."

"Its only virtue, speed, is negated by post-editing and therefore meaningless."

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to "smooth out" awkward construction without necessarily achieving the precise meaning of the text. With this possibility of inaccuracy the reader could be led astray and therefore felt obliged to rely on the original text if he read Russian (thus negating the "speed" offered by MT) or, if not, to accept the machine version. 1160/ Other responses were similar.

Even before the performance of the ALP acceptance tests in October 1965 CIA management had begun to have misgivings about the feasibility of the ALP system as a solution to the CIA translation problem. Within FDD itself [ ] had from time to time warned against overcommitment to MT in light of its still primitive state of development, and [ ] doubtless expressing the thoughts of the other FDD branch chiefs, had recommended the lowest priority in the division budget for ALP funds. 1161/ To examine this facet further, it is necessary briefly to retrace our steps to a point several months earlier.

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In April 1964, at the instigation of the Joint Automatic Language Processing Group (JALPG),\* a committee to study the application of computers in the automatic processing of

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\* This Group, whose membership was made up of Burton Atkinson, NSF, L. Robert Dailey, DOD, and Paul Borel, CIA, the CODIB chairman, had been formed earlier in order to provide for a coordinated federal program of research and development in the MT area.

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language data, including mechanical translation of foreign languages, had been organized by the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences. This committee, composed of linguists, mathematicians, and computer specialists and chaired by Dr. John R. Pierce of Bell Telephone Laboratories, was designated the Automatic Language Processing Advisory Committee (ALPAC).

At an ALPAC meeting held 9-10 December 1964 a brief statement was made by the chairman on the committee's attitude relative to CIA's place in MT research. Its general tenor was that CIA as a "mission oriented organization" should stay completely out of this field because of the long odds against chances of achieving success. John Bagnall, DAD/CR, declared that, discouraging as this advice was, it confirmed his own thinking on the then-proposed ALP system, that no further MT research be bought but that the Agency simply purchase the existing state of the art. The gist of this was included in his recommendations in a report on the meeting to Paul Borel, the Assistant Deputy Director/Intelligence (ADD/I). 1162/

At the request of John Vance, the AD/CR,  25X1  
 as FDD Chief, subsequently reviewed the Bagnall recommendation and agreed with its premise.  advised that OCR 25X1  
 interest in MT and in machine-assisted translation (MAT)

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remained high but that investment in the systems should be limited to time and to the expenditure of moderate sums to sample commercial and other government agency operational systems. 1163/

The Bagnall recommendation and the [redacted] comment on MT had their effect. On 4 January 1965 Vance discussed them with Paul Borel, and three days later the latter reiterated the general CIA policy of not funding outside MT research on an individual project basis. 1164/

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The general trend of OCR and FDD management's discouragement and declining interest in continuing FDD's involvement in MT was evident, but official corroboration of what was assumed -- that the system embodied in the pilot project was a failure -- was needed. This took the form of a detailed analytical study performed by a private research firm called

[redacted]

which was engaged by CIA

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in mid-1966 to carry it out.

[redacted]

in effect, was requested

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to perform an autopsy on the body before the patient was

quite dead. The study was made by

[redacted]

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and was issued in September 1966, just before the end of the pilot year devoted to the ALP system.

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The [ ] report gave a negative appraisal of the system and doubtless provided the final element in the official decision to discontinue it in FDD. [ ] stated that the study of the present operating systems had shown that ALP provided no improvement over the conventional (human translation) system in terms of cost, manpower requirements, or translation response time. In fact, for the anticipated annual work load of 20 million Russian words of translation and 100,000 pages of transcription, the ALP system compared with the conventional method would cost an additional \$206,650 a year, require an additional 16 people, and introduce an average of ten days additional delay for finished translations. Even with contemplated improvements, the ALP system would cost more than the conventional one.

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[ ] pointed out that the ALP method as then conceived was too large for current FDD needs, in fact four times too large, and was therefore at a considerable economic disadvantage. If other major applications were found, the costs could be reduced but the relative staffing and response times would not be affected. He concluded by suggesting the possibility of developing a language-processing system using general purpose computer equipment that would be a significant improvement over the system then in use. Exploration of this

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possibility would best be done in a research environment without direct responsibility for any FDD production work. 1165/

The [ ] report was well received, and it was agreed by all concerned that it bore out what had been suspected all along, namely, that the ALP system in its present form was not the answer to problems related to FDD operations and that it should be relegated back to the research community until its faults and weaknesses had been eliminated.

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With this in mind [ ] on 12 October 1966 issued a succinct memorandum to all members of FDD reporting, in effect, the results of the [ ] study, thanking the staff members for their cooperation in the experiment, and announcing termination of the ALP project effective 14 October 1966. 1166/

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This officially ended the long-term experimentation in machine translation in FDD.

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