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# **Indonesia's Presidential Succession: Two Generations in the Running**



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**A Research Paper**

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*EA 86-10045  
November 1986*

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# **Indonesia's Presidential Succession: Two Generations in the Running**

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**A Research Paper**

This paper was prepared by [Redacted]  
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Southeast Asia Division, OEA, [Redacted]

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*EA 86-10045  
November 1986*



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**Indonesia's Presidential Succession:  
Two Generations in the Running**

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**Summary**

*Information available  
as of 1 November 1986  
was used in this report.*

The timing of the Indonesian presidential succession will determine which generation of military leadership inherits power. If 65-year-old President Soeharto were to die or become incapacitated in the next few years, someone from his own military generation—the “Generation of ’45”—would probably replace him. But if, as we expect, Soeharto renews his office in 1988 and serves another five-year term, younger officers would become the front-runners.

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The younger officers—the initial graduates of Indonesia's premier military academy—share many of the values of the Generation of '45, such as an overriding emphasis on internal stability, a strong aversion to Communism, a pro-Western outlook, and a wariness of Muslim extremism. Nonetheless, some key differences between the generations exist. The younger generation is better trained and more professional than its predecessors. Younger officers lack the close ties of their elders to the civilian population and show less interest in political matters, and they have had less exposure to foreign influences and are more insular and nationalistic. These differences are likely to affect domestic policies and foreign relations.

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This Research Paper profiles two leading presidential contenders, one from the older and one from the younger generation of Indonesia's military leadership, and discusses how each typifies his peers. Our purpose is not to determine the probable winner in the presidential succession competition. Rather, it is to examine to what extent the younger leaders differ from their seniors in political outlook and how such differences might affect Indonesia's future policies. Although it is difficult to predict how a successor would deal with issues once in office, we believe his background, his military career, and the characteristics of his generation can shed light on his leadership prospects and his perspective on key issues. In Indonesia's case, such projections are important because domestic and international conditions in the next decade may be considerably different and, perhaps, more difficult than they are today.

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Two possible presidential contenders, Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs Surono and Major General Sugiarto are, in our view, typical of the older and younger generations, respectively. Surono probably would continue most of the Soeharto regime's political and economic policies, in our judgment. However, Sugiarto's concern about military professionalism could accelerate the trend toward greater civilian participation in government. Even so, we believe younger officers such as

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Sugiarto would be more authoritarian than their predecessors and less tolerant of civilian politicians—a mind-set likely to thwart the long-term prospect for democratization of Indonesia. Under either leader, the military would continue to dominate politics and to rely on force to maintain political stability. [redacted]

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In the foreign policy arena, we believe it is unlikely that the younger generation officers would depart radically from the policies of the Soeharto regime, but they are likely to be more assertive in promoting Indonesia's nonaligned image and more activist on Middle East issues because of their pro-Arab bias. They are also likely to be more insular in dealing with the West, and with the United States in particular, even though we believe they would continue to value the US strategic presence in Southeast Asia as a counterweight to China and the Soviet Union, and to look to Washington as a preferred source of military equipment. [redacted]

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**Indonesia's Presidential Succession:  
Two Generations in the Running**




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**A Question of Timing**

The generations of Indonesia's military leadership are separated by only a few years in age, but each has been shaped by distinctly different aspects of the nation's history. Soeharto's "Generation of '45" is the group of officers who commanded and fought in Indonesia's war of independence against the Dutch (1945-49). This corps of officers has deeply affected all aspects of Indonesian society from the late 1950s to the present and has led the government since 1965. As the members of the elder Generation of '45 have retired from active duty, many have been appointed to senior positions in the bureaucracy. Most of the top military positions are now occupied by the small group of about 40 officers known as the Bridge Generation. These officers—who fought in the revolution as very young men and were commissioned during the early-to-middle 1950s—will retire from active duty within the next several years. As the group's name implies, the Bridge Generation spans the gap in the officer ranks between the Generation of '45 and the New Generation officers who are moving into the upper- and middle-level officer ranks. These younger officers—the initial graduates of Indonesia's own military academies in the early 1960s—are the country's first postrevolutionary generation and closest to being military technocrats.



Because of the dominant political role of the military, the timing of the Indonesian succession will determine which generation of military leadership inherits power—a matter of potentially great importance to the United States. If President Soeharto were to leave office soon, someone of the Generation of '45 or the Bridge Generation would probably succeed him and continue his policies. Soeharto, however, shows no intention of retiring and has not designated or groomed a successor, nor is there anyone, in our judgment, who appears to have a clear advantage, a plan, or the ultimate ability to carry it off.<sup>1</sup> Moreover,



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Soeharto has stated his intention to turn power over to the younger generation and has initiated generational change within the military leadership. If, as we expect, Soeharto renews his office in 1988 for another five-year term, the current top contenders probably would be out of the running, and the younger generation of military leaders would become front-runners.

**Commitment to Core Values . . .**

The senior Indonesian leadership has labored to instill the younger officers with their basic institutional and political values, and the younger officers appear to have accepted these values, [redacted]

[redacted] Like their elders, New Generation officers place overriding emphasis on maintaining political stability, because, as junior officers in the early 1960s, they saw political parties tearing the country apart. In addition, [redacted] he New Generation appears to have subscribed to Armed Forces Commander Murdani's view that the liberal democratic thought espoused in the West is incompatible with Indonesian culture. They thus distrust civilian political institutions and see no alternative to continued military control, at least for now. [redacted]

The younger officers share their seniors' strong aversion to Communism and their generally pro-Western orientation, and are strong nationalists, suspicious of all foreigners. For example [redacted]

[redacted] that most officers go along with the military's ban on contact with foreigners without prior approval. Although most officers of both generations are nominal Muslims, they believe extremist Muslim states are a serious subversive threat. For this reason security officials maintain close surveillance of diplomats and visitors from the more radical Islamic states, and last year Jakarta forbade Indonesian students from traveling to extremist Muslim countries—Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, and Algeria. On the other hand, [redacted]

[redacted] Muslim fundamentalism has not made any appreciable inroads into either generation of the officer corps. [redacted]

Personal loyalties—particularly to superiors—persist as a major factor in appointments to senior positions in the military and the government, [redacted]

**What Makes a Potential Successor?:  
A Candidate's Checklist**

*In our judgment, Soeharto is concerned with his place in history and aims to bequeath to the nation a strong system of government to ensure the continuity of his policies. We believe that there are some qualifications for which he might look in choosing a successor from either generation. The successor must be:*

- A nominal Muslim. *Indonesian Muslims have numerical superiority—nearly 90 percent of a population of more than 170 million—but most do not rigorously apply the prescriptions of Islamic law to daily life. Islam is melded with traditional Javanese mysticism, Buddhism, and Hinduism, forming a strain of Islam that generally lacks the doctrinaire aspects of some Middle Eastern varieties.* [redacted] *only about 20 percent of the central island of Java is orthodox.*
- Javanese. *A little more than half of the Indonesian population is ethnically Javanese. The Javanese—particularly those from Central Java—dominate the government and administration.*
- An Army general with major command experience. *Influence within the military-bureaucratic hierarchy, and the loyalty of both the retired and active military are essential. For their part, Indonesia's senior field commanders consider major command experience the primary prerequisite for the presidency.*
- Able to protect and administer the spoils. *Soeharto would stress personal loyalty and expect his successor to protect the considerable financial interests of his family and associates. Senior officers would expect to protect the system of financial benefits they have gained by virtue of their positions.* [redacted]

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[redacted] In our judgment, this emphasis on loyal connections is an outgrowth of the late 1950s and early 1960s and the chaos following the 1965 coup attempt, when the military was factionalized and infiltrated by Communist sympathizers. Likewise, younger officers whom Murdani knows well or with whom he has been impressed have had a significant advantage in rising to the top. The key patron for the most sensitive positions, however, is President Soeharto, who considers the top military posts too important for officers not meriting his total confidence and trust. [redacted]

been detailed to specialized or prestigious assignments, such as military aide to the president or commandant of cadets at Magelang. To gain valuable foreign experience, some highly regarded officers have also served as attaches, in the UN detachment to the Middle East, and in the armistice force in Vietnam from 1973 to 1975. Finally, combat experience—such as fighting the East Timor insurgency—is another factor figuring heavily in the advancement of New Generation officers. [redacted] 25X1

**... But Differences Based on Experience**  
New Generation officers nevertheless have had different career experiences than those of the Generation of '45 and, in our judgment, do not share all attitudes or attributes of their elders. For these younger officers, training at certain service schools was crucial for promotion and continued military development. [redacted]

This preparation, in our judgment, has produced a group of officers who are better trained and more professional than their predecessors and have generally shown less interest in civil matters. Despite their indoctrination in Indonesia's revolutionary history, many New Generation officers question the applicability of the military's dual-function role to current conditions. [redacted]. For example, many resent the military's having to provide officers to manage bureaucratic and economic positions, and a number of field-grade officers have said they would like to curtail these assignments.<sup>3</sup> [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] Most New Generation officers are graduates of Indonesia's own service academies, which were established in the late 1950s; the General Military Academy at Magelang, Central Java, is the most important. Selection to Indonesia's staff and command school has also been an important requirement for advancement [redacted] the emphasis at these schools is on political indoctrination in the military's dual-function role (*dwi fungsi*), the state ideology (*Pancasila*),<sup>2</sup> the Constitution, the values of the Generation of '45, and economic development. [redacted]

Nor do the rising officers share the close ties to the civilian population that the older officers developed during their revolutionary experiences, when they relied on the assistance of villagers. The younger generation has had to fight in Sumatra, Timor, Western Java, and Sulawesi, commanding conventional forces against guerrilla bands that were to some extent supported by a hostile populace. Thus, the younger generation's attitude toward the general population is not as favorable as that of its predecessor, [redacted] 25X1

In addition to attending these schools, leading officers have been rotated through key midlevel military assignments. [redacted] these steppingstone posts have included battalion and brigade commands, military province commands (KOREM), and top staff positions, such as the operations chief and chief of staff of the Army area commands (KODAMs). Promising officers also have

Also, the younger generation has had more limited contact with foreigners than the Generation of '45, [redacted] Unlike their [redacted] 25X1

<sup>2</sup> *Pancasila* is the government's essentially secular, nebulous ideology encompassing five principles: belief in one God, humanitarianism, national unity, democracy, and social justice. The first principle, belief in one God, is intended to accommodate Muslims, Christians, Javanese mystics, and any other adherents of a Supreme Being, while maintaining the reality of a secular state. [redacted]

<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, the military owns a large number of enterprises, ranging from timbering to manufacturing plants. The profits from these operations provide a substantial share of the operational funding requirements of the Armed Forces of Indonesia (ABRI), [redacted] are expected to use these funds to provide for their troops. [redacted] 25X1

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**ABRI's Dual Function**

Billboard proclaims "ABRI from the people, for the people. The country's firm defense and security will guarantee national development."



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Since 1966—following the aborted Communist coup—the Armed Forces of Indonesia (ABRI) has emerged as the country's premier political institution, forming the base of power for Soeharto's rule. Under *dwi fungsi*, or dual function, ABRI is recognized as having a role both as defender of the nation and as a sociopolitical force in national development. In 1982 the government for the first time gave dual function a firm legal basis by passing legislation expressly stating that ABRI is both a military and a social force, and conferring formal legitimacy on the wide-ranging powers exercised by the armed forces. Soeharto continues to stress *dwi fungsi* in his public addresses, emphasizing that the armed forces should never lose sight of their role as "guardians and pacifiers" of the people, and that the dual function would be maintained indefinitely.

ABRI personnel are assigned as Cabinet ministers, ambassadors, members of the legislature, corporation executives, mayors, and even university rectors. Although management of the economy is left largely to civilian technocrats, military officers head such major public entities as the state oil company (PERTAMINA), the State Logistics Bureau (BULOG), and the state tin company. The military provides manpower and managerial personnel to government enterprises and institutions, including agricultural estates and even labor unions. Military officers hold some two-thirds of the governorships, and for more than a decade ABRI officers on assignment have exercised a major role within Golkar, the government-sponsored political organization. In the Cabinet reshuffling following his reelection in 1983, Soeharto appointed active or retired military officers to 15 of the 37 positions in his Cabinet.

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elders, who studied or traveled extensively abroad, New Generation officers usually travel overseas for relatively brief periods only. They seem to be less influenced by Western values. As a result, they have limited understanding of how the rest of the world operates and are much more isolationist. [redacted] Furthermore, [redacted] has sought to reduce foreign military contacts within the officer corps and has restricted some types of overseas training in the belief [redacted] are inappropriate for Indonesian conditions and needs. The military personnel sent abroad now tend to be those in technical fields, who have limited policy- or decision-making responsibilities. [redacted]

**Two Typical Candidates**

We consider Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs Surono Reksodimejo and Major General Sugiarto to be typical of the older and younger generations, respectively (see chart at the end of the report). Both are representative of their generations in terms of career experience, and they possess the qualifications that Soeharto might look for in a successor. [redacted]

**Surono: In the Soeharto Mold.** US officials have long considered General Surono, 63, a darkhorse presidential candidate or interim president should Soeharto leave office suddenly. A trusted and respected friend of the President, Surono's background is similar to Soeharto's. According to US Embassy observers, he has broad support among the active and retired military and in his home province of Central Java—the politically dominant region of the country. Surono shares this power base with other potential successors, but he has the advantage of coming from the regular Army tradition, unlike others such as State Secretary Sudharmono or Murdani, who lack troop command experience. [redacted]

Surono is a nominal Muslim whose faith is apparently sincere enough to be acceptable to mainstream Muslim organizations, without troubling other government and military officials who distrust Muslim

<sup>4</sup> Of the top three younger generation officers, none have received training abroad. [redacted] Try Sutrisno has traveled only briefly overseas (including to the United States), while the foreign experience of Sugiarto and Maj. Gen. Edi Sudradjat has been limited primarily to participation in Indonesian force contingents to the Middle East and Vietnam. [redacted]

aspirations. Like other leaders of his generation, Surono probably perceives the most immediate near-term threat to Indonesian unity and stability to be that posed by Islamic fundamentalists. He has supported the Soeharto regime's efforts to undercut the political influence of Islamic groups, and we believe he would probably continue this policy as president. Commenting on the domestic unrest in late 1984, when local activists whipped up popular discontent by denouncing government repression of Islam, Surono identified the regime's greatest problem area as the Muslim segment of society that strongly opposes the legislation requiring all public organizations—including religious groups—to adopt *Pancasila* as their sole organizing principle.<sup>5</sup> Surono has stated that the government would prefer disunity among the various Islamic groups, but claimed that it is also sensitive to their dissatisfaction, especially their distrust of Murdani, a Catholic. [redacted]

Surono's quiet, understated, leadership style is genuinely admired by the Javanese, according to Embassy officials, and has helped him to avoid running afoul of the Soeharto family and other powerful figures.

[redacted] Surono's relations with other senior ministers are good and are helped by his apparent lack of presidential ambition.<sup>6</sup> US Embassy officials report that Surono is also one of the few Indonesian generals who has not used his position for self-aggrandizement. For this reason, we believe he would not be subject to accusations of corruption by the public or press, but he could still be counted on by Soeharto to protect the First Family's extensive

<sup>5</sup> The legislation, in our judgment, is intended to stifle virtually all legal avenues of Muslim political expression. [redacted]

<sup>6</sup> Obvious ambition, [redacted] is more likely to hinder than help one's presidential chances, for Soeharto feels uncomfortable having ambitious men in influential positions. [redacted] Furthermore, because of the strong tendency in Javanese culture for subordinates to defer to their seniors, we believe it would be unusual to see succession candidates reveal any policy stand that differs significantly from that of the current leadership. [redacted]

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business interests. Although Surono's unaggressive style is part of his staying power, it could, in our view, be a disadvantage to him in the maneuvering of the military elite that will almost certainly accompany the succession. [redacted]

**Sugiarto: The Man To Watch?** Major General Sugiarto, 50, is a member of the first Magelang class (1960) and one of the rising stars of the New Generation. [redacted]. Currently Armed Forces Assistant for Personnel, US officials consider him a leading candidate to be named Chief of the General Staff later this year. He has a strong power base among his contemporaries and subordinates, who, [redacted] see him as a good leader with the capacity to become president. [redacted]

A staunch Soeharto loyalist, Sugiarto is well liked and respected by the President, [redacted]. Both are natives of Central Java, and when Soeharto visits his home province he often has Sugiarto at his side. Although not known as a "Murdani man," Sugiarto is loyal to Murdani as his commander in chief. [redacted] personally chose Sugiarto to be Assistant for Personnel, although [redacted] Sugiarto's selection reflects Soeharto's decision, and [redacted] Sugiarto was named to provide a counterbalance to Murdani. [redacted] owes his meteoric rise to his association with Soeharto and is not beholden to Murdani. [redacted]

A nominal Muslim, Sugiarto, in our judgment, would be inclined to continue the Soeharto regime's inflexibility regarding Muslim issues. Like his elders and his contemporaries, Sugiarto probably has been greatly influenced by Indonesian history, and he believes that the extremism of Iran and Libya is incompatible with the Indonesian experience. [redacted]

**The Shape of the Future**

**Probable Continuity.** Whichever generation succeeds Soeharto, we expect the military to retain its command of Indonesian politics well into the next decade because of the government's strong support for

ABRI's political role, ABRI's desire to protect its economic interests, and the lack of any effective political opposition. In our judgment, a successor from either generation is likely to continue to depend on the military to control political opposition and maintain internal stability as financial austerity reduces the government's ability to alleviate social problems.<sup>7</sup> The Soeharto regime is almost certainly confident that the reliability of the military and security forces and the regime's control of institutions would allow it to cope with any outbreaks of popular unrest. We judge that under a Generation of '45 successor, such as Surono, the government would continue to ride out low oil prices and slower economic growth with financial austerity, because it probably would perceive the risk of widespread disturbances as low. [redacted]

On the other hand, we have no evidence that younger generation officers will be better able to manage Indonesia's economic needs, or have an economic agenda of their own. Some senior Indonesian officials and officers privately question whether the younger officers have the dedication and sensitivity to handle the nation's complex political and socioeconomic problems. [redacted] Indeed, some observers believe that they may be even more shortsighted and inflexible than their elders. Nor do we have any indication that there will be less government intervention in the economy—which we believe would improve Indonesia's chances for economic recovery—under a New Generation successor [redacted] the younger officers consider the technocrats less disciplined than themselves and more inclined toward self-interest, views that we believe would reinforce the need for close military oversight of economic policy. [redacted]

<sup>7</sup> We calculate that because of soft world oil prices, economic growth will, at best, average no more than 3 to 4 percent for the remainder of the decade. This will coincide with a period of rapid labor force growth, resulting in sharp increases in an already severe unemployment-underemployment problem. Unless there is a dramatic rebound in oil prices, which we believe is unlikely, the urban unemployment rate could exceed 50 percent by the mid-1990s. [redacted]

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We believe that the [redacted] conflict of interest, and favoritism that pervade economic decision making in Indonesia are also likely to continue under either generation. One Embassy observer believes that, over the long term, the younger generation would probably become as corrupt as the older. So far the younger officers have not had the same kinds of pressures or opportunities as the older officers, but as they move into more senior—and potentially more lucrative—positions, we believe they are more likely to be tempted, especially if official pay scales remain low. [redacted] many military officers depend on some form of under-the-table income to survive financially. [redacted]

**Possible Change.** If, as we expect, the New Generation's emphasis on military professionalism continues, the gradual trend toward greater civilian participation in the government—perhaps with a growing nominal role for the government political party (Golkar)—could accelerate under a New Generation successor.<sup>8</sup> The reservations of younger officers about *dwi fungsi* could also affect the extent of the military's political role, but practical considerations will probably play the largest part in any move toward greater civilian participation. [redacted]

[redacted] ABRI recognizes that, as military reorganization decreases the number of its officers and a declining economy limits its resources, it must concentrate the armed forces' political resources on the more traditional security-related ministries and a few key posts in other ministries. [redacted]

[redacted] also speculate that greater civilian participation in government notwithstanding, a New Generation successor may be more authoritarian than his predecessors, even draconian. [redacted]

[redacted] they argue for maintaining a tight rein on dissident groups and other elements, such as students. If this attitude is pervasive, in our judgment, it would result in much stricter political controls than exist at present. [redacted]

<sup>8</sup> The two other officially sanctioned parties, the United Development Party (PPP) and the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), are not likely to emerge as viable parties, in our view. The PPP and PDI owe their current disorganization and leadership disarray in part to ABRI manipulation, and ABRI undoubtedly will continue to interfere in these organizations to render them powerless while giving them the appearance of credibility. [redacted]

The element most likely to be affected by a more repressive regime is political Islam, which we expect to become a more turbulent force. We believe Muslim dissidents may well try to incite broader opposition by coupling their complaints with widespread social and economic grievances, which we expect to intensify through the rest of the decade because of Indonesia's poor economic prospects. Thus far, the Soeharto government's crackdown on the radical Islamic opposition has bought it time to deal with these frustrations. When Soeharto departs the scene, however, we believe tensions could erupt into spontaneous Islamic unrest, and the New Generation may be forced to deal with hostilities the Soeharto regime has merely driven underground. [redacted]

**Implications for the United States**

Under a Generation of '45 successor, relations between Indonesia and the United States would remain about the same as they have been under Soeharto. There is little evidence that New Generation officers would radically depart from the foreign policy of the Soeharto regime, or of a Generation of '45 successor. Their strong anti-Communist view suggests that they are unlikely to develop significantly closer ties to either China or the Soviet Union. Officers of both generations have complained to US officials about what they see as preferential treatment by the United States toward China on a number of issues. They are especially concerned about US assistance for China's military modernization, particularly in the field of high technology. Surono has commented that Washington is the "worst offender" [redacted]

[redacted] as the major long-term external threat to regional security. The Indonesians are concerned that as China's modernization program progresses and it becomes stronger economically, China will become a serious export competitor with Southeast Asia and may attempt to exert greater political influence in the region. [redacted]

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**US-Indonesian Relations**

*Under Soeharto's rule, Jakarta's approach to foreign relations has been pragmatic, moderate, low profile, and quietly pro-Western. Jakarta champions a practical approach to Third World causes, avoids controversial issues and groups or governments that it considers radical, opposes politicization of international conferences, and often strives to tone down anti-Western rhetoric at such conferences. Consequently, Indonesia has a reputation as a moderating influence in ASEAN, OPEC, Islamic, and Third World forums. Jakarta is cautious about participating in international meetings that have a superpower orientation, but US Embassy officials report that some opposition elements criticize the regime for working too closely with Washington.* [redacted]

*Indonesia's regional interests have broadly paralleled those of the United States, and Soeharto appears intent on maintaining solidarity with ASEAN in dealing with Vietnam about Cambodia.* [redacted]

*In addition, Indonesia's economic ties are overwhelmingly to the West and Japan. Washington's interests are served by Indonesian petroleum exports*

*to Japan, and the United States absorbs one-fifth of Indonesian exports and is Indonesia's largest market for textiles. About one-fifth of Indonesia's total imports come from the United States. However, Indonesia's uncertain economic prospects threaten both American economic and political equities. At the end of 1985, Indonesia's medium- and long-term debt to the United States totaled about \$5 billion—\$3.3 billion owed to the private sector and \$1.7 billion to official US Government agencies. Although US banks continue to give Jakarta high marks for its pragmatic financial management, we believe a restricted flow of new credit could precipitate a debt crisis as early as mid-1987.* [redacted]

*Despite Indonesia's political and economic leaning toward the West, Jakarta often shows ambivalence toward the United States. Jakarta's perceptions of Washington's role in the Philippines crisis reflect this attitude. According to US Embassy officials, many Indonesians consider the US role as interference in Philippine internal affairs, but at the same time credit Washington with ending the crisis peacefully.*

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Because we expect that the current fundamental policies would endure under a New Generation regime, the major differences between it and one headed by a Generation of '45 successor would most likely be in style and tone. In our judgment, rising New Generation leaders believe that Indonesia—by right of its size and strategic location—is entitled to exert a greater leadership role in regional and international forums. Thus, we believe they would be more assertive than their predecessors in promoting Indonesia's non-aligned image and Indonesian interests in both bilateral and international economic affairs, such as in

negotiations over commodity exports, access to developed-country markets, foreign investment, and economic aid. At the same time, New Generation leaders might be more insular and formal in dealing with the West—the United States in particular—and apt to react strongly to perceived slights over matters such as Indonesia's not being accorded due deference in bilateral dealings. [redacted]

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The security interests of New Generation leaders would continue to focus on Southeast Asian rather than on broader concerns, however. In our judgment, they would seek to promote closer, but quiet, cooperation with their Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) counterparts in military and security affairs, building on the base that has been established in recent years. Like their predecessors, we believe the New Generation leaders would base their relations with the United States largely on their perception of the US commitment to the region and Indonesia. Jakarta probably will continue to value Washington's strategic presence in Southeast Asia as a counterbalance to the USSR and China. [redacted]

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[redacted] Indonesia shares US concern about Soviet activity in the South Pacific, but can do little to stop it, so it will continue to rely on the United States to ensure regional security. Nonetheless, New Generation officers are almost certain to remain opposed to any formal security ties to the United States that would compromise Indonesia's nonaligned image. [redacted]

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Indonesia: Two Possible Presidential Candidates



**Gen. (Ret.) Surono Rukmodinejo**  
**Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs (POLKAM)**  
 Surono holds a position of considerable symbolic importance, but probably has little ability to influence executive decisionmaking directly. He is responsible for coordinating the policies of the Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs, Justice, and the Information Departments handling internal affairs, and the intelligence and narcotics agencies. At POLKAM's monthly meetings, the department ministers and their senior staffs discuss the problems and policy objectives of each department and attempt to bring the departments into greater congruence with overall government objectives. US Embassy officials report that Surono has been effective in his role, and has thereby increased the importance of POLKAM as a policymaking body.

Key Assignments	30	40	50	60	70	80	
1972 Surono	1947-48 Commander 1st Infantry Battalion of Indonesian Army	1948-49 Commander 1st Infantry Battalion of Indonesian Army	1949-50 Commander 1st Infantry Battalion of Indonesian Army	1950-51 Commander 1st Infantry Battalion of Indonesian Army	1951-52 Commander 1st Infantry Battalion of Indonesian Army	1952-53 Commander 1st Infantry Battalion of Indonesian Army	1953-54 Commander 1st Infantry Battalion of Indonesian Army
1954-55 Sugiaro	1954-55 1st Army Command and General Staff College of Lembang	1955-56 1st Army Command and General Staff College of Lembang	1956-57 1st Army Command and General Staff College of Lembang	1957-58 1st Army Command and General Staff College of Lembang	1958-59 1st Army Command and General Staff College of Lembang	1959-60 1st Army Command and General Staff College of Lembang	1960-61 1st Army Command and General Staff College of Lembang



**Major General Sugiarto**  
**Armed Forces Assistant for Personnel**  
 By functional designation in the military command structure, New Generation generals Sutrisno and Sudradjat take precedence over Sugiarto, but some observers consider Sugiarto's role of personnel arbiter as the most strategic job in the Armed Forces of Indonesia (ABRI) at a time of generational change. In this position, Sugiarto is responsible for controlling future appointments and promotions for personnel in ABRI—a position once used by Armed Forces Commander Mardani to handpick officers loyal to him. Sugiarto has already filled in many of the boxes on ABRI's revamped organization chart with contemporaries of his in the first couple of Magelang classes.

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