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The Philippines' National Democratic Front: Redefining Its Role in Domestic Politics

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An Intelligence Assessment

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*EA 86-10036
LDA 86-10921
August 1986*

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The Philippines' National Democratic Front: Redefining Its Role in Domestic Politics

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An Intelligence Assessment

This paper was prepared by [redacted]
[redacted] the Office of East Asian Analysis and
[redacted] the Office of Leadership Analysis.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, South East Asia Division,
OEA, [redacted]

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**The Philippines'
National Democratic Front:
Redefining Its Role in
Domestic Politics**

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Key Judgments

*Information available
as of 15 July 1986
was used in this report.*

The Communist Party of the Philippines' National Democratic Front (NDF) miscalculated badly when it decided to boycott the February 1986 presidential election—a move that left the NDF politically isolated from the Aquino coalition that ousted Marcos. To regain support among Filipinos and further the Communist Party's revolutionary agenda among non-Communist groups, we believe the NDF will pursue a two-pronged strategy of public reconciliation with the new government combined with continued covert efforts to foment political unrest:

- Reconciliation, embodied in a new NDF policy program released last February, avoids militant rhetoric and stresses economic reform in a bid for the support of moderate Filipinos. In addition, the NDF will probably launch a political party to field candidates for local elections expected early in 1987.
- As in the past, efforts at destabilization will probably take the form of strikes, rallies, demonstrations, and propaganda work through penetration of legal groups—including political, human rights, student, labor, and religious organizations—and by influencing the Philippine media.

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We believe the NDF is well placed to advance political instability if the government of President Aquino should falter. It remains a cohesive and highly disciplined organization that can marshal many assets to challenge the authority of the government:

- On the domestic front, the NDF tries to establish its own front organizations and to infiltrate and gain control over legal activist groups. This complex web of leftist groups constitutes a large and vocal grassroots support base.
- Internationally, the NDF maintains an extensive support network that generates propaganda and serves as a conduit for funding from expatriate Filipinos and sympathetic political groups. By sponsoring travel for NDF cadre, the international commission also aids the flow of radical ideology back to the Philippines.

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As the Aquino government grapples with the realities of governing, we believe the NDF will try to exploit several key issues:

- The US role in the Philippines and, in particular, the presence of the US bases by stepping up the theme of Philippine nationalism and sovereignty in NDF propaganda material.
- The foreign debt problem, by urging the new government to take a tougher stand in negotiations with international creditors.
- US and other foreign influence over the economy, by pushing for drastic curtailment in the activities of multinational corporations in the Philippines.
- The high level of unemployment and declining living standards by fomenting strikes and becoming involved in labor disputes, such as NDF participation in the strike by civilian workers at the Subic Bay Naval Base last April.

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From the perspective of the United States, the key question is whether the NDF will develop the capacity to destabilize a key Asian ally. We believe much depends on the practical political skills of the new government. If Aquino can move ahead with political and economic reform, the NDF probably will find its public appeal seriously eroded and permanently weakened. Support for the NDF and its many groups seems to be a fallback position for many Filipinos who are not attracted to Communist ideology but nevertheless want political and economic reforms. Thus, the NDF would face increasing difficulty staging the public demonstrations that have been a major factor in establishing its political clout.

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The Philippines' National Democratic Front: Redefining Its Role in Domestic Politics

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The Challenge to the Revolution

The rise to power of President Corazon Aquino and her centrist coalition has set back the radical left's long effort to gain political supremacy in the Philippines, in the view of most observers. One of the potential losers is the shadowy National Democratic Front (NDF), established by the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) in April 1973 with the primary task of forming a broad coalition of forces to oppose the Marcos government and the more tightly held agenda of overthrowing the political system. Communist Party documents demonstrate that united front activities—under the leadership of the NDF—are an integral part of the CPP's long-term strategy, which suggests that the revolution will ultimately be won in the political arena rather than in an outright victory by the party's military wing, the New People's Army (NPA). The purpose of this paper is to assess how the NDF functions and the degree to which it has developed the capacity to achieve the party's objectives.'

A Profile of the NDF

The NDF has an impressive ability to infiltrate legal opposition groups and influence the antigovernment press. The assassination in 1983 of Marcos rival Benigno Aquino bolstered the NDF by politicizing many Filipinos, including much of the urban middle class, students, teachers, laborers, and members of the Catholic clergy. Disillusioned with the traditional political structure as a vehicle for reform, many of these new activists joined the emerging "cause-oriented" or issue-based political groups working in a loose coalition referred to as the "parliament of the streets." The rise of these legal activist organizations provided the NDF with the perfect environment, in our view, for coalition building. According to the US Embassy, by 1985 the NDF had grown to approximately 6,000 hardcore urban activists, with a grassroots following of several million Filipinos.

The NDF at Home . . . In theory, the NDF is the highly organized and disciplined political arm of the CPP. Divided into a number of commissions, it is directed by the CPP Central Committee and charged with organizing sectors of Philippine society such as workers, women, and youth (see figure 1). The NDF's primary function is to act as the party's agent in attempts to establish and control often unwitting legal front groups. In principle, these NDF-infiltrated groups lose all but a few vestiges of their political autonomy and are reduced to pawns of the CPP.

The available evidence suggests that the actual workings of the NDF are murkier than party propaganda would indicate.

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groups that constitute the NDF participate in a collegium with shifting ties and allegiances (see figure 2). The degree of ideological unity among members of this collegium, in our judgment, varies between hardcore Marxist ideologues and more moderate nationalists and reformers. Some evidence suggests that relations between NDF-affiliated groups, moreover, are characteristically Filipino—based almost exclusively on personal relationships—and suffer as personal alliances change.

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In our judgment, the nebulous character of the NDF's de facto political network results in ambiguous lines of authority between NDF cadre and front group leaders. Moreover, distinguishing between individuals and groups under the control of the NDF and those fueled by genuine nationalism and support for reform is extremely difficult because specific issues are often supported by both the Communist and non-Communist left. Aquino's open political style makes such identifications even more problematic by downplaying ideological differences between members of her coalition.

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
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Figure 1
National Democratic Front
Functional Organization



a Formation began in 1980 - it is probably in place at this time.
b New as of April 1985.
c Probably only holds observer status.

The complex web of leftist groups within the NDF—some of which have only a handful of members—poses practical obstacles for unified control by the CPP Central Committee. The NDF-controlled umbrella group Bayan, for instance, is generally believed to have over 500 member organizations. Even the relatively minor NDF-influenced women's organization Gabriela claims to have 47 constituent organizations (see appendix A). Some of these, in turn, belong

to other alliances or have satellite groups of their own. As with any loose partnership, the formal affiliation of these groups does not necessarily indicate doctrinal agreement on all issues. [redacted]

... and Abroad. To support its domestic programs, the NDF has established organizational ties overseas. Headquartered in Utrecht, the Netherlands, the NDF international commission led by Luis Jalandoni is believed to have established an extensive support network with representatives throughout the world—including Japan, Hong Kong, Australia, Mexico, the United States, and several West European nations (see figure 3, map). These regional “offices” are primarily responsible for generating propaganda material to influence foreign governments and draw support from expatriate Filipinos. They are also involved in providing a conduit for funding from sympathetic political groups and arranging speaking tours for visiting NDF officials—over the last several years this has included trips to the United States, Sweden, Greece, and Italy. We have no evidence that the CPP/NDF receives any direct financial or material support from the Soviet Union or any other foreign government. [redacted]


[redacted] the NDF's foreign ties also aid the flow of radical ideology back to the Philippines, where politics is traditionally non-ideological. The almost constant stream of NDF cadre traveling overseas allows exiled radicals to influence NDF policymaking. In addition, widely available school textbooks compiled by an educational group that includes members of leftist religious orders use the example of the “US-Somoza dictatorship” as a tool for analyzing forces for change in Philippine society (see inset and appendix C). [redacted]

What the NDF Can Do. The NDF has influenced Philippine politics through strikes, demonstrations, and propaganda. During the Marcos era, the NDF's capabilities were felt most dramatically through violent protest activity nationwide and the continual linking of grievances against the Marcos government with attacks on the United States—particularly the US military presence at the Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Field. [redacted] for example, NDF activity was largely

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Figure 2
The Communist Party of the Philippines
Domestic Political Network



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responsible for the increase in protest activity from an estimated 467 incidents in 1982 to 1,451 in 1984. For its part, the CPP's publication *Ang Bayan* in January 1986 linked party involvement in the labor sector to a 30-percent increase in strike activity between 1984 and 1985. Protests widely believed by Filipinos to have had CPP and NDF involvement include the massive demonstrations in Manila and Cebu in September 1983, the shutdown of the Bataan Export Processing Zone in 1983, the Bataan nuclear power plant protest in 1985, the Manila transportation strike

of 1984, the escalating protest activity in Negros Occidental throughout last year, and the series of general strikes in Davao City.


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The NDF has also made inroads in the public school system and the press. Influence in the schools has been through the NDF-affiliated Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT), which has organized over 30,000 schoolteachers—particularly in the Metro Manila area—for strike activity. NDF attempts to

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Figure 3
Communist Party of the Philippines/National
Democratic Front Foreign Propaganda Network



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gain a higher public profile have met with considerable success through wide public exposure in the foreign and domestic press—including the Philippine newspapers *Malaya*, *Mr & Ms*, and *Business Day*, and the Philippine Catholic Church-sponsored *Veritas*. In the spring of 1985 the NDF held two widely publicized press conferences in the Zamboanga Peninsula and the Bicol region southeast of Manila with foreign journalists. This was followed by an exclusive *Newsweek* magazine interview with alleged NDF head Antonio Zumel and the release of NDF policy statements in the local press. Interviews with CPP, NDF,

and NPA figures—including rebel priest Conrado Balweg—in the Philippine press have, we believe, increased public sympathy and identification with the radical left.

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Growing public dissatisfaction with the Marcos government and its local officials also opened the way for extensive NDF penetration of the countryside. The NDF's tactical objectives have been to raise the political consciousness of the peasants through "village teach-ins" and identifying potential recruits for

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The NDF and Nicaragua

Citing historical and cultural similarities between the two countries, NDF propaganda often compares the Communist struggle in the Philippines with that which characterized Nicaragua under Somoza, and it uses the Sandinista regime as the model for a Communist government in the Philippines. Although we have no evidence that the Sandinistas offer financial or material support to Philippine Communists, many NDF members—particularly church and peasant activists—have informal ties to Nicaragua that facilitate the exchange of doctrine and political and military tactics.

government. Antonio Zumel has been quoted repeatedly in the Philippine press suggesting the CPP and the NPA might be willing to negotiate a cease-fire. In April 1986, moreover, Communist Party founder Jose Maria Sison urged Aquino to allow “multiparty” participation in the political process, suggesting also that she appoint members of the radical left to the Constitutional Commission.²

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In our judgment, the NDF’s strategy for cooperation also includes plans to infiltrate the government and influence key policymakers. The Philippine press reported in March 1986, for example, that the radical left has already named a number of high-level officials—including Labor Minister Augusto Sanchez, Presidential Executive Secretary Joker Arroyo, Customs Commissioner Wigberto Tanada, Minister of Social Services and Development Mamita Pardo de Tavera, and Deputy Justice Minister Silvestre Bello—as “sympathetic” targets for NDF influence. In addition, Sison recently announced the formation of a new legal party to operate under the NDF that is tentatively called the New Democratic Party. According to press reports, Sison hopes to recruit a leftwing sympathizer—such as Jose Diokno or Lorenzo Tanada—as party leader to provide the NDF with another outlet for legal coalition building and developing grassroots support.

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the NPA. [] the NDF has successfully infiltrated local labor unions and universities in many areas of the country and provided the catalyst for antigovernment demonstrations. []

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Efforts To Recapture Momentum

[] the CPP leadership is hotly debating whether to attempt to co-opt the new government, to continue an aggressive campaign of antigovernment propaganda and support for armed struggle, or to develop a compromise policy incorporating both strategies. It is still too early to determine which faction in the leadership will prevail in the dispute over party strategy. Nevertheless, we believe recent developments suggest the CPP will adopt a two-pronged approach that allows the NDF to seek rapprochement with Aquino while the party mounts covert efforts to destabilize the government.

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The NDF is also adopting a soft-sell strategy to increase its credibility. One of the NDF’s first responses to Marcos’s ouster last February was the release of a new “eight-point program” to replace the “12-point program” of January 1985. In our judgment, the new program represents a significant softening of the rhetoric of revolution used during the Marcos years. Highly charged expressions such as “overthrow” and “people’s war” are conspicuously absent. Objectives have been reordered, moreover, to highlight moderation and tolerance; for example, the

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² Aquino named 48 delegates to the Commission, which convened in early June. According to US Embassy and Philippine press reports, the only presumed NDF member on the Commission is peasant leader Jaime Tadeo. []

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The Reconciliation Route. On the surface the NDF appears to be positioning itself as an ally of the new

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NDF Policy Programs**January 1985 12-Point Program:**

1. *Unite the Filipino people to overthrow the tyrannical rule of US imperialism and the local reactionaries.*
2. *Wage a people's war to win total, nationwide victory.*
3. *Establish a democratic coalition government and a peoples' democratic republic.*
4. *Integrate the revolutionary armed forces into a single revolutionary army.*
5. *Uphold and promote the free exercise of the peoples' basic democratic rights.*
6. *Terminate all unequal relations with the United States and all other foreign entities.*
7. *Complete the process of genuine land reform, raise rural production through cooperatives, and modernize agriculture.*
8. *Carry out national industrialization as the leading factor in economic development.*
9. *Guarantee the right to employment, raise the people's living standards, and expand social services as soon as possible after establishing democratic state power.*
10. *Promote a patriotic, scientific, and popular culture, and ensure free public education.*
11. *Respect and foster the self-determination of the Moro and Cordillera people and all ethnic minorities.*
12. *Adopt and practice a revolutionary, independent, and peace-loving foreign policy.*

February 1986 Eight-Point Program:

1. *Uphold and promote the free exercise of the peoples' democratic rights.*
2. *Complete the process of genuine land reform, raise rural production through cooperatives, and modernize agriculture.*
3. *Guarantee the right to employment, raise living standards, and expand social services.*
4. *Terminate unequal treaties with the United States, and renegotiate foreign investments and loans on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.*
5. *Implement a program of national industrialization.*
6. *Promote a patriotic, scientific, and popular culture, and ensure free public education.*
7. *Respect and foster self-determination for the Moro people and the Cordillera people, and all ethnic minorities.*
8. *Maintain a nonaligned, independent, and peace-loving foreign policy.*

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reassignment of "uphold and promote free exercise of the people's democratic rights" to the number-one position is followed by popularly supported proposals for economic reform. In addition, the 1986 program deemphasizes the military aspects of NDF policy and ties to the NPA.

The Hidden Agenda. At the same time, the NDF will probably continue more active—and possibly violent—efforts to destabilize the Aquino government. In

our view, the NDF will pursue basically the same tactics that have contributed to past successes—gaining strength and supporters through the infiltration of legal political, labor, and church organizations and demonstrating its clout by organizing rallies and strikes protesting specific grievances (see appendixes A and B). Taking their cue from the 1986 program,

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we believe NDF agitators are likely to use the following issues in the months ahead as the basis for action against the Aquino government:

- *The United States Military Role in the Philippines.* The presence of the US bases at Subic Bay and Clark Air Field will continue to be a target for NDF attack on the grounds that these facilities compromise Philippine sovereignty. Growing public concern over the safety of the nuclear power station on the Bataan Peninsula may also result in an antinuclear focus to protests over the US military activities. As in the past, reports of abuses of civilians by the Philippine military will afford the NDF an opportunity to criticize US military aid programs.
- *US Economic Ties.* US economic aid will be criticized as Washington's method for exerting undue influence over Manila's policies. The NDF will also continue to criticize the activities of American multinationals in the Philippines—by claiming they exploit native workers and hamper the growth of indigenous industries—and will support continued CPP/NPA efforts to exact “revolutionary taxes” from these corporations, sabotage their activities, and harass their employees.
- *The Labor Sector.* If rates of unemployment and underemployment—which we currently estimate at 50 percent—are not brought down, and living standards do not show signs of improvement over the next year, the NDF will step up already high levels of labor unrest. The NDF-influenced KMU, for example, was involved in the labor dispute at the Subic Bay Naval Base last April.
- *The Agricultural Sector.* The NDF will continue its work with rural unions such as the National Federation of Sugar Workers (NFSW) and the Alliance of Central Luzon Farmers as it presses the Aquino government for land reform. The NDF will exploit any failure of the Aquino government to deliver on its election promise to dismantle the coconut and sugar monopolies.
- *Foreign Debt.* The NDF, which has made explicit in its policy program that it supports renegotiation of

the Philippines' \$26 billion foreign debt, will probably criticize the Aquino government if it does not take a “tough stand” with international creditors.

- *Military Reform.* The NDF will try to capitalize on any reports of military abuse of civilians to undercut the government's credibility with the public and create further divisions between Aquino and the military. The NDF is also likely to demand investigations of past abuses by military and defense personnel—including Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and Chief of Staff Fidel Ramos.
- *The Presence of the Elite in the New Government.* In addition to singling out Enrile and Ramos, the NDF will exploit any suggestions of impropriety by members of the Aquino government—particularly individuals such as Vice President Salvador Laurel and Minister of Finance Jaime Ongpin, who have been longtime members of the political and business establishment.

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Although US support—including close diplomatic ties and economic assistance—is clearly seen by Aquino as critical to the survival of her government, it could also form the basis of a new NDF propaganda campaign. Such a campaign would probably involve a reworking of the Communists' theme of the “US-Marcos Dictatorship”—a charge to which Aquino might feel vulnerable in light of Washington's perceived role in the fall of the Marcos government. For her part, Aquino may take a more contentious stand on some bilateral issues—such as the bases issue and economic aid—to publicly demonstrate her independence from Washington. Such a stance would not, in our view, necessarily be a reaction to NDF propaganda and indicate anti-American sentiment, but instead might reflect Aquino's recognition of rising Filipino nationalism.

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Assessing the Future Threat

The NDF's impressive political network is not sufficient to pose a near-term threat to political stability. The NDF, in our view, was weakened by a number of

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Bayan: A Case Study of NDF Infiltration

The Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (New Patriotic Alliance), generally abbreviated as Bayan (Nation), was organized in early 1985 by leftist activists within the anti-Marcos opposition. It was originally conceived—and publicly heralded—as a broad-based umbrella organization that would bring disparate antigovernment groups into a coalition that ultimately would be transformed into a political party of the left. To this end, Bayan brought together most of the important cause-oriented groups active since the Aquino assassination and largely incorporated other predecessor umbrella groups—JAJA, ATOM, CORD, and NAJFD. []

From the beginning, Bayan was an arena for power struggles between Communist and non-Communist elements—each assuming it would in time co-opt the other. The Communists, however, moved quickly to assert their dominance. Their firstline strategy was to allow moderate elements to believe they were in charge while moving to ensure radical domination behind the scenes. This was done by allocating nominal leadership positions to the non-Communists and exacting adherence to pro-Communist organizational procedures in return. These procedural arrangements consisted of stacking decisionmaking bodies—such as Bayan's national and regional commissions—with CPP/NDF cadre or sympathizers. []

NDF infiltration of Bayan proved particularly successful in the provinces—where local cause-oriented groups often have fewer options for creating tactical alliances. Using funds collected from Bayan affiliates and mobilizing their memberships—usually students and workers—the NDF has organized protest activities and strikes in provincial cities such as Bacolod, Iloilo, Cebu, and Davao. These provincial demonstrations, often involving crowds of 20,000 or more, have received national media attention and led to confrontations with local government authorities. During 18-20 June 1985, for example, Bayan staged a mass demonstration to protest the licensing of the nuclear power plant in Bataan Province; a well-executed series of marches, rallies, roadblocks, and human barricades virtually shut down the province for three days. In September 1985, on the anniversary of the imposition of martial law, a Bayan-organized rally in Escalante in Negros Occidental Province ended in violence when police fired into the crowd, killing at least 25 demonstrators and wounding more than 50 others. Bayan's success in the provinces, drawing as it does upon the CPP/NDF's grassroots power base, in our view, reflects the real strength of the radical left and its ability to dominate antigovernment activities. []

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tactical mistakes in the waning days of the Marcos regime. Strong-arm tactics by NDF members to dominate the legal anti-Marcos opposition umbrella group Bayan in May 1985, for example, resulted in a walkout of many prominent members of the moderate left, including Jose Diokno, Agapito Aquino (the President's brother-in-law), and human rights activist Sister Christine Tan. In our judgment, the Communists' tactics also alienated many political fence sitters—including some journalists generally sympathetic to the radical left—and contributed to the coolness between Aquino and the radical left that has continued since she came to power. []

election undercut critical sources of NDF support and continue to threaten internal stability []

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[] In our view, the NDF's influence with radical leftist sympathizers was weakened by the boycott decisions. The NDF was unable to prevent a 79-percent voter turnout in 1986 and an 89-percent turnout in 1984. Moreover, the voter participation in Metro Manila—an NDF stronghold—during the February presidential election reached 70 percent despite government fraud and disenfranchisement. []

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The NDF's decisions to boycott the February 1986 presidential election and the 1984 National Assembly

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The State of Play on Key Reform Issues

Aquino's record on reform thus far is mixed. She is vulnerable to claims that she has been excessively authoritarian because she has unilaterally replaced the Supreme Court, disbanded an elected parliament, postponed scheduled elections for local government officials, and replaced duly elected local officials with her own appointees. On other issues, she has made some progress. []

[] *The armed forces has created an independent board led by respected retired officers to investigate charges of corruption and human rights abuses during the Marcos administration. Although these reforms have been generally well received by Filipinos, many civilians are skeptical about the efficacy of in-house military investigations, according to Philippine press reports.* []

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Agricultural Monopolies. *The government is moving ahead with the dismantling of the coconut and sugar monopolies by freeing up marketing restrictions—such as allowing the export of copra. There is little political resistance to further liberalization, and most economic observers expect slow but steady progress in the months ahead.* []

Land Reform. *There has been no progress on implementing the sweeping land reform many Filipinos believe was promised by Aquino during her election campaign. In the months ahead, however, we expect to see some movement toward resurrecting and expanding the Marcos government's modest land reform program to include some coconut and sugar lands. Efforts to improve the Ministry of Agrarian Reform's monitoring of corruption in the agricultural sector could take the edge off calls for sweeping land reform—a move Aquino probably believes is too politically costly to undertake.* []

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Constitutional Reform. *Aquino established a Constitutional Commission in May 1986 that includes representatives from her coalition, the former Marcos government, and the Catholic Church. We expect infighting to slow the progress of the commission, but, if the deliberations produce a draft constitution that is approved in a national plebiscite later this year, and local elections are held by the end of 1986 or early in 1987, we believe at least minimum expectations for progress will have been met. The formation of a Commission on Good Government, which is charged with trying to retrieve the wealth of Marcos and his associates, has also bolstered the perception that Aquino is committed to "cleaning up" abuses of government officials, according to Philippine political observers.* []

The Insurgency. *In March 1986, Aquino released virtually all political prisoners jailed during the Marcos regime including several leading CPP/NPA figures—a move with great popular appeal but one that has caused friction between the President and the military. The military has been ordered by Aquino not to conduct any offensive operations against the NPA while conditions for a cease-fire and amnesty program are negotiated over the next several months. In the meantime, however, continued NPA attacks have accounted for over 1,000 casualties among the Communists, civilians, and members of the military since Aquino took office.* []

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Military Reform. *Aquino has retired almost all of the Marcos-appointed generals—often political allies promoted on the basis of favoritism—and has replaced them with professional officers, according to*

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In view of the large voter turnouts in the last two elections, we believe the NDF faces an uphill battle so long as Aquino is in power. Support for the NDF, in our judgment, is a fallback position for many Filipinos who are not attracted to Communist ideology but who want political and economic reform. For this reason, we are fairly confident that the moderate-radical balance will tip further against the NDF if Aquino's government can begin the process of reform and is able to show some improvement in the economy. In addition, Aquino's continued popularity—88 percent of the participants in a March 1986 public opinion poll registered their support—could lay the groundwork for erosion of the NDF's power base. []

- Increased public dissatisfaction over the pace of reform.

Under these circumstances, we believe the NDF would be able to exploit disillusionment and mobilize large numbers of supporters in antigovernment demonstrations. In addition, the belief that the Philippines' experiment with a non-Communist alternative to Marcos had failed would further polarize the political spectrum by weakening the political center and strengthening the radical left. []

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Although defections from the top NDF leadership are unlikely, we believe Aquino has an opportunity to woo less ideologically committed midlevel officials by giving them a stake in the success of her government, possibly by including them in agrarian reform or local social programs. Much more likely, however, in our view, is the chance that some supporters of the NDF will be satisfied by reforms—including the dismantling of agricultural monopolies, a cease-fire and amnesty program for insurgents, and improvements in military civilian relations—provided that these are not too long in the making and that the government does not lapse into traditional patterns of favoritism, corruption, and abuse (see inset). []

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If the Aquino government falters and there is little progress on reform over the next year, however, the NDF's political network could enable it to make significant gains. The developments that would improve the NDF's fortunes include:

- A serious breakdown in cooperation between members of Aquino's coalition government.
- Continued economic stagnation.
- Aquino's resorting to Marcos's authoritarian tools to maintain political control—particularly the widespread arrest of political dissidents, harsh crackdowns by the police and military on demonstrators and strikers, and restrictions on the press.

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Appendix A

Cause-Oriented Groups and the NDF

The NDF has focused much effort on infiltrating and co-opting cause-oriented interest groups. Constituting most of the Philippine left, these groups include literally hundreds of human rights, legal aid, and church groups; labor, student, and teachers unions; and other professional organizations. The term cause-oriented has a unique and exclusive meaning in the Philippines; it is used to describe those groups on the left that have openly, actively, and militantly identified themselves with political reform. "Umbrella group" refers to a coalition or federation of groups sharing similar political objectives. []

Umbrella Groups

ATOM (August Twenty-One Movement)

Key Personalities: Agapito "Butz" Aquino (founder)

Named after date of Benigno Aquino's assassination ... organized by his brother ... target for NDF infiltration while affiliated with CORD ... promoted boycott of 1984 National Assembly elections ... split in 1985 over participation in Bayan; Butz Aquino and moderates pulled out to join Bandila. []

Bandila (Moderate People United in Vision and Spirit)

Key Personalities: Butz Aquino, Teofisto "Tito" Guingona

Organized in August 1985 by moderates who pulled out of Bayan in protest against CPP heavyhandedness ... intended as a non-Communist alternative ... hopes to resist CPP/NDF infiltration ... nationalistic program emphasizes social and economic justice ... opposed to US bases ... has had little success diminishing the influence of Bayan ... not well organized outside Manila. []

Bayan (New Patriotic Alliance)

Key Personalities: Lorenzo Tanada, Leandro Alejandro, Loretta Rosales, Rolando Olalia

Currently the primary NDF front ... organized during March-May 1985, conceived as broad-based leftist coalition ... claims to have over 500 affiliated groups and a membership of 1.5 million individuals ... actual membership probably no more than half that ... CPP/NDF seized control at opening congress; many moderates subsequently withdrew ... well organized nationwide ... split over participation in February 1986 election. []

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CORD (Coalition of Organizations for the Restoration of Democracy)

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Key Personalities: Lorenzo Tanada, Jose Diokno, Leandro Alejandro, Butz Aquino

Formed in early 1984 as umbrella group for organizations supporting boycott of National Assembly elections ... later became long-term anti-Marcos coalition ... during late 1984 and early 1985 strained by internal disputes and CPP/NDF infiltration ... eventually collapsed; replaced by Bayan. []

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JAJA (Justice for Aquino, Justice for All)

Key Personalities: Jose Diokno, Butz Aquino, Sister Christine Tan

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First major cause-oriented umbrella group ... formed shortly after 1983 Aquino assassination ... organized demonstrations and protest rallies ... leftist tilt, strong NDF presence ... moderates eventually began to pull out ... largely replaced by CORD in early 1984. []

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NAJFD (Nationalist Alliance for Justice, Freedom, and Democracy)

Key Personalities: Leandro Alejandro, Alexander Padilla, Lorenzo Tanada, Teofisto Guingona

Multisectoral, anti-Marcos umbrella group organized in late 1983 ... presumably created by CPP/NDF, but many members claim independence ... drew upon

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groups that had boycotted 1981 presidential election . . . ultimate goal is formation of "democratic coalition government" . . . most moderates have withdrawn. []

Labor Organizations

KMU (May First Movement)

Key Personalities: Rolando Olalia

Leading militant trade union federation . . . heavily infiltrated by CPP/NDF . . . has numerous union affiliates nationwide . . . claims one-half million members but probably has fewer than 100,000 . . . launched in May 1980 . . . has successfully organized mass-action strikes . . . close ties to leftist umbrella groups; currently a Bayan affiliate . . . has support of Labor Minister Augusto Sanchez. []

NSFW (National Federation of Sugar Workers)

Key Personalities: Luis Jalandoni, Roberto "Bobby" Ortaliz

Organized in 1971 on sugar-growing island of Negros . . . closely tied to leftist elements within Roman Catholic Church . . . claims 45,000 members . . . strong CPP/NDF presence . . . KMU affiliate . . . organizes mass-action strikes and public demonstrations. []

Student/Teachers Organizations

ACT (Alliance of Concerned Teachers)

Key Personalities: Loretta Ann Rosales, Raul Segovia

Teachers organization closely affiliated with both the NDF and Bayan . . . founded by Loretta Ann Rosales . . . believed to have organized 30,000 teachers out of a total teaching force of approximately 470,000 . . . involved in demonstrations and labor disruptions with the KMU and LFS. []

Kaakbay (Movement for Philippine Sovereignty and Democracy)

Key Personalities: Jose Diokno, Sister Christine Tan

Middle-class grouping of progressive intellectuals, professors, and students . . . largely consists of Diokno's personal following . . . formed in late 1983, originally conceived as leftist but non-Communist . . . has since been infiltrated by CPP/NDF . . . has factionalized over participation in various cause-oriented umbrella groups. []

LFS (League of Filipino Students)

Key Personalities: Leandro Alejandro, J. V. Bautista

Student arm of the NDF . . . founded in 1977 to succeed banned KM as primary "legal" student group . . . well organized at University of the Philippines and nationwide . . . active in militant trade unions . . . key element in street demonstrations, strikes, and protest rallies . . . recently challenged by moderate student groups. []

KM; "Patriotic Youth" (Kabataang Makabayan)

Key Personalities: Jose Maria Sison

Original CPP student front group . . . founded by Sison in 1964 . . . staged violent antigovernment rallies during late 1960s and early 1970s . . . banned since the outset of martial law . . . still active as underground counterpart to LFS . . . provides core leadership to LFS, infiltrates other student groups. []

Church Organizations

CNL (Christians for National Liberation)

Key Personalities: Sister Mariani Dimaranan, Sister Christine Tan, Luis Jalandoni

Underground church arm of the CPP/NDF . . . organized by Father Edicio de la Torre in 1972 . . . coordinates activities of radical priests and nuns . . . promotes Communist strain of liberation theology . . . aids and abets members of Communist NPA . . . outlawed by the Marcos government. []

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TFD (Task Force Detainees)

Key Personalities: Sister Mariani Dimaranan

Monitors human rights abuses and promotes release of political detainees . . . organized by radical elements within the Catholic Church during martial law . . . closely linked to CNL . . . often cited as reliable source by Amnesty International and other worldwide organizations . . . largely controlled and funded by CPP/NDF . . . generally ignores NPA atrocities.

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Other Organizations**Mabini (Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity, and Nationalism, Inc.)**

Key Personalities: Augusto Sanchez, Renito Saguisag, Joker Arroyo, J. V. Bautista

Leftist human rights lawyers' group founded in 1979 . . . provides free legal aid to and defends dissidents, terrorists, Communist sympathizers, and political prisoners . . . infiltrated by CPP/NDF . . . close ties to cause-oriented groups . . . critical of US bases . . . several members hold influential positions in Aquino government.

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Gabriela (General Assembly Binding Women for Reforms, Integrity, Equality, Leadership, and Action)

Key Personalities: Loretta Rosales, Maita Gomez, Lidy Nakpil

Umbrella group of militant women's organizations . . . claims approximately 50 affiliates . . . heavily infiltrated by the CPP/NDF . . . somewhat factionalized over participation in 1986 presidential election.

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Appendix B

Prominent Players in the NDF Network

NDF cadre and their associates usually wear many organizational hats. Individuals often hold underground positions within the CPP/NDF structure in addition to one or more "legal" positions in front groups. The following are profiles of key activists with NDF ties that typify these multiple posts and cross-cutting affiliations. []

Leandro "Lean" Alejandro

Affiliation: CPP/NDF, Bayan, LFS, NAJFD

Born: 10 July 1960

Radical student activist . . . former student council chairman at University of the Philippines . . . secretary general and key hardliner in Bayan . . . leader of street demonstrations . . . arrested and detained during early 1985 . . . married to Lidy Nakpil of Gabriela. []

Jose Virgilio "J.V." Bautista

Affiliation: NDF, LFS, NAJFD, Bayan

Born: circa 1958

Former radical law student, now a junior partner in law firm of Labor Minister Augusto Sanchez . . . chairman of Bayan's Electoral Struggles Commission; public spokesman for the boycott campaign . . . probably a candidate member of the CPP . . . former secretary general of LFS . . . arrested with Alejandro in 1985 . . . former editor of UP student paper. []

Jemma Cruz

Affiliation: NDF

Born: NA

NDF representative in Mexico City . . . former beauty queen . . . close friend of Maita Gomez. []

Sister Mariani Dimaranan

Affiliation: TFD, CNL

Born: NA

Militant Franciscan nun . . . member of Presidential Human Rights Committee . . . often makes TFD fundraising trips to Europe and United States . . . 25X1
member of Bayan's International Relations Commission . . . onetime detainee. [] 25X1

Jose "Pepe" Diokno

Affiliation: Kaakbay

Born: 26 February 1922

Former senator, now leftist civil rights lawyer . . . head of Presidential Human Rights Committee . . . strident nationalist and critic of US bases . . . active leader in JAJA, CORD, and Bayan, but left each to avoid being manipulated by Communists . . . detained for two years during martial law. [] 25X1
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Maita Gomez

Affiliation: NDF, Bayan, Gabriela

Born: circa 1947

Suspected NDF operative; involved in overseas propaganda work . . . daughter of a wealthy landowner . . . "Miss Philippines" beauty queen in 1968 . . . close friend of Jemma Cruz . . . went underground during martial law . . . escaped from detention in 1974, 25X1
turned herself in for health reasons in 1981. [] 25X1

Luis "Louie" Jalandoni

Affiliation: NDF, CNL

Born: NA

Former priest and founder of NDF . . . currently 25X1
NDF representative in Utrecht, the Netherlands . . . key overseas fundraiser for CPP/NDF . . . helped organize NFSW in 1971 . . . detained during 1973-74, then went underground . . . fled to Europe in 1979 . . . married to an ex-nun. [] 25X1

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Secret**Horacio "Boy" Morales**

Affiliation: CPP/NDF

Born: 11 September 1943

Best known personality in—and alleged former head of—the NDF . . . former executive vice president of Development Academy of the Philippines, prestigious government think tank . . . defected and joined the CPP/NDF in 1977 . . . apprehended and imprisoned in 1982 . . . released by Aquino in March 1986 . . . M.A. in economics from the University of Oklahoma.

Rolando Olalia

Affiliation: KMU, Bayan

Born: NA

Lawyer, militant labor leader . . . succeeded his charismatic, Marxist father as head of KMU and National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU), KMU's core affiliate . . . vice president of Bayan; was acting chairman during February 1986 election . . . reportedly disillusioned with Bayan hardliners, disclaims Communist elements in KMU . . . has ties to Labor Minister Augusto Sanchez.

Alexander "Alex" Padilla

Affiliation: Bayan, NAJFD

Born: NA

Human rights lawyer . . . secretary general of NAJFD . . . son of former senator and current Bayan vice chairman Ambrosio Padilla . . . member of Bayan's International Relations Commission . . . former UP student activist . . . Marxist-Leninist ideologue.

Meynardo Palarca

Affiliation: KMU

Born: NA

KMU international representative and suspected NDF operative . . . made speaking tour of United States and Canada in fall 1985 . . . secretary general of Center for Nationalist Trade Unions in Mindanao (CENTRUM), largely a grouping of KMU affiliates.

Loretta Ann "Etta" Rosales

Affiliation: CPP/NDF, Bayan, Gabriela

Born: NA

Longtime NDF operative and alleged CPP Central Committee member . . . professor, leader of Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) . . . member of Bayan's Popular Struggles and People's Welfare Commission . . . often serves as intermediary between CPP/NDF hardliners and moderate leftists . . . married to Mabini lawyer Antonio Rosales.

Augusto "Bobbit" Sanchez

Affiliation: Mabini

Born: 6 August 1932

Aquino's Minister of Labor and Employment . . . one of the most radical members—and a former chairman—of Mabini . . . close ties to CPP/NDF but reportedly has resisted the party's recruitment efforts . . . formerly active in Bayan . . . member of the National Assembly during 1984-86 . . . brother was Consul General in Chicago during 1975-86.

Raul Segovia

Affiliation: NDF, ACT

Born: NA

Founding member and secretary general of Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT).

Roland Simbulan

Affiliation: NDF, LFS

Born: NA

NDF international operative; associated with Philippine Support Group based in Sydney, Australia . . . professor of political science at University of the Philippines . . . author of *The Bases of Our Insecurity*, a vehement attack on US bases in the Philippines . . . reportedly the son of NDF operative Dante Simbulan, head of Washington-based Church Coalition for Human Rights.

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Secret**Jose Maria "Joma" Sison**

Affiliation: CPP

Born: 8 February 1938

Founder of the Maoist-oriented CPP in 1967 . . . was CPP chairman until his arrest and imprisonment in 1977 . . . released by Aquino in March 1986 . . . organized numerous Communist groups while a student and professor at the University of the Philippines during the 1960s . . . now trying to reestablish his ties to the CPP . . . has announced the formation of a political party, the "New Democratic Party." [redacted]

Jaime "Jimmy" Tadeo

Affiliation: NDF, Bayan

Born: circa 1938

Activist head of Alliance of Central Luzon Farmers since 1981 . . . alleged CPP member . . . currently a member of the Constitutional Commission, where he is pushing radical agenda . . . former agricultural extension bureaucrat . . . detained briefly after leading anti-Marcos demonstration in early 1985 . . . alleged ties to Sandinistas in Nicaragua. [redacted]

Sister Christine Tan

Affiliation: TFD, NAJFD, JAJA, Kaakbay

Born: circa 1930

Radical nun, liberation theologian . . . militant human rights activist . . . founding member of JAJA and Bayan; withdrew from Bayan in June 1985 . . . privately admits Communist sympathies but denies CPP membership . . . has reportedly provided sanctuary for NPA guerrillas . . . went underground in 1980 after a warrant was issued for her arrest . . . from a wealthy business family. [redacted]

Lorenzo "Tanny" Tanada

Affiliation: Bayan

Born: 10 August 1898

"Grand old man" of the anti-Marcos movement . . . also a leading anti-American, antibases, and antinuclear activist . . . willing to be manipulated by Communists . . . leading member of NAJFD, JAJA, and CORD . . . currently chairman of Bayan . . . took leave of absence to support Aquino during her campaign, returned to Bayan in March . . . cited as possible leader of new "Organization of the National Democratic Front" . . . Harvard- and Oxford-educated lawyer . . . senator for 24 years. [redacted] 25X1

Antonio "Tony" Zumel

Affiliation: CPP, NDF

Born: 10 August 1932

Journalist and CPP Central Committee member . . . widely believed to be head of the NDF . . . heads the CPP's Propaganda Commission and edits *Ang Bayan*, the party newspaper . . . president of the National Press Club of the Philippines during the 1960s . . . went underground when martial law was declared in 1972 . . . brother to Brig. Gen. Jose Maria Zumel, former military aide to Marcos. [redacted] 25X1

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Appendix C

Sample Teaching Material Prepared by Philippine Leftists

A Preliminary Political Survey of Nicaragua in the 1970s
Under the Joint US-Somoza Dictatorship

Political Grouping	Classes and Social Strata Represented	Economic Role and Interests	Organizations and Political Parties	Political Goal and Program	Ideology	Machinery and Activities
The Somoza clique	Landlords, big comprador-bourgeoisie	60-percent control of country's economy Serve US imperialist interest while enriching themselves	Liberal Party National Guard	Repressive fascist dictatorship to preserve and expand rule	Colonialism Fascism Feudalism	The State machinery, especially the National Guard, responsible for acts of repression in cities and countryside
The plantation owners and the old gentry	Old type landlord—72 percent of all holdings under 10 acres are on lease	Exploit peasantry through leasehold and wage slavery Promote agricultural exports of Nicaragua	Conservative Party	Legal opposition to Somoza clique aiming at a share of wealth and power; goal: to remove Somoza and take his place	Not anti-imperialist Anti-Somoza but not essentially antifascist	Parliamentary opposition and other legal forms of action
Other bourgeois-compradors	Comprador-bourgeoisie	Serve as partners of TNC in industrial and trade activities				
Pellas-Chamorro, Montelegre-Callejos families		Ties to Bank of America and other business interests Aspirations blocked by Somoza, properties seized	UDEL—the "twelve" progressive liberals (May 1974) FAO—broad opposition that united the UDEL, Democratic Conservative Movement, Labor Unions	Essentially anti-Somoza and supportive of the "twelve" in United States whose campaign against Somoza aimed at removing US support for Somoza and winning such support for themselves	Liberal, democratic, anti-fascist, not clearly anti-imperialist	Parliamentary and extraparlimentary forms of protests, urban mass actions, media, and other forms of propaganda
Marginalized bourgeoisie	National bourgeoisie and sections of comprador	Economically marginalized and oppressed by Somoza's actions	Social Christian Party and the pro-Moscow Nicaraguan Socialist Party, both of which joined UDEL and later the FPN			FSLN—leading force of the liberating movement, responsible for mass organization of the rural and urban poor, engaged in armed struggle in the countryside and cities; won Nicaragua's liberation
Middle class	Petty bourgeoisie (small capitalists intelligentsia; rank-and-file religious, white-collar workers)	Economically oppressed by the Somoza clique Aspirations blocked by Somoza's monopolization of economy	The MPU and later the FPN, which are broad alliances that included even the leftwing class parties (conservatives et al) FSLN—Sandinista National Liberation Front			MPU- and FPN-conducted urban mass actions and propaganda supporting armed struggle joined urban insurrections that led to victory
Farmers and farm workers	Peasantry—125,000, of whom 52,000 had less than 7 acres Farm workers—109,000	Oppressed and exploited by landlords through rent and wages even during the export boom		Overthrow US-Somoza dictatorship through armed struggle and mass struggles	Anticolonial/anti-imperialist, antifeudal, and antifascist (National Democratic) Marxist	
Workers and urban poor	Less than 85,000 industrial proletariat 80,000 social and municipal workers 20,000 workers in wholesale trade	Exploited and oppressed by wages, prices, crisis Did not profit from export boom in chemicals, food-stuffs, textiles, and electrical equipment				

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