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Growing Muslim Discontent in Indonesia: The Implications for Stability

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A Research Paper

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April 1986*

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A Research Paper

This paper was prepared by
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may be directed to the Chief, Southeast Asia
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**Growing Muslim Discontent
in Indonesia: The Implications
for Stability** []

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Summary

*Information available
as of 7 March 1986
was used in this report.*

The resurgence of Islam in the past few years has manifested itself in Indonesia in increasing mosque attendance, newfound religious fervor, and the strengthening of the more doctrinaire Shia sect of Islam. The Soeharto regime's response has been to intensify efforts to undercut the political influence of Islamic groups—a process that began when Soeharto consolidated control in the 1970s. Recent legislation requiring all public organizations—including religious groups and political parties—formally to adopt the secular state ideology is, in our judgment, intended to stifle virtually all legal avenues of Muslim political expression. In addition, authorities have begun to crack down on militant preachers in the mosques—where the government previously tolerated free speech as a safety valve. []

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Despite this government pressure, the radical fringe—although still in the minority—is rapidly growing. We believe that much of the violence in 1984 and 1985—ranging from rioting to arson and bombings—can be traced to Islamic radicals. We also believe that increasing numbers of moderate and nominal Muslims resent the government's heavyhanded restrictions on Islamic political activity. []

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In our judgment, however, an Iranian-style surge of fundamentalist opposition is not likely soon. Indonesian Muslims—most only nominally religious and subscribing to the less doctrinaire Sunni form of Islam—lack cohesion, leadership, and a tradition of effective involvement in politics. They will have to overcome these major handicaps in order to exercise a significant political role—a prospect we judge to be unlikely in the foreseeable future. For now, moderate Muslim leaders—realizing they are ill prepared to confront the regime—are resigned to forgoing political action, concentrating instead on religious training and organization in preparation for the post-Soeharto era, when they believe their chances to achieve political gains will be better. []

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In the event that Islam did become a stronger and permanent political force in Indonesia, it would complicate relations with the United States. Jakarta is already at odds with Washington on such issues as UN votes involving the Middle East and Israel, and such differences might well increase. Indonesian Muslims also might seek to promote representation in Indonesia by Middle East elements, such as the PLO and Libya, thus reversing Jakarta's current policy of keeping such militant influences at arm's length. []

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In the meantime, we believe radical Islamic elements will continue trying to whip up antigovernment sentiment by exploiting religious and political grievances as well as other frustrations among Indonesians—such as poverty, regime corruption, and the economic dominance of the Chinese. Indonesia's bleak economic prospects increase the likelihood of spontaneous Islamic unrest—possibly appearing as sporadic mob violence triggered by a minor incident or encouraged by antigovernment speeches—particularly as low oil prices increasingly limit Jakarta's economic policy options to implementing more financial austerity. 

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
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The Rising Tide of Islam . . .

Since Indonesia declared independence in 1945, authorities have been concerned that a resurgence of Islamic militancy could threaten the stability of the ethnically and religiously diverse archipelago. The current military leadership in particular remembers combating Muslim-led secessionist revolts in the 1950s and early 1960s. Government apprehensions have been heightened by such incidents as the 1981 hijacking of an Indonesian airliner by a radical Muslim group, and by the spate of antigovernment activity in 1984-85, according to the US Embassy [Redacted] (See appendix C for details.) [Redacted]

The current leadership—though not in principle anti-Islamic¹—regards the more strident versions of Islam [Redacted] as a handicap to economic development. The government has sought to confine Islam to nonpolitical activity so that it will not become a focus of opposition to authority. The leadership is particularly apprehensive that radical Islam in the Middle East could fuel domestic extremism both by example and through direct support. Jakarta's announcement in August 1985 banning Indonesian students from traveling to "extremist" Muslim countries—Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, and Algeria—we believe reflects concern about the threat of "foreign" Islamic influence to Indonesia's security. [Redacted]

President Soeharto's policies, nonetheless, have not prevented the Islamic revival that has swept much of the Muslim world from reaching Indonesian believers at the grassroots level. [Redacted] mosque attendance, religious devotion, and the appeal of radical doctrine are increasing, and this has been confirmed by Indonesian Home Affairs Minister Rustam to US Embassy officials. Several foreign press and academic observers with long experience in Indonesia note substantially increased adherence to the five pillars of Islam in previously apathetic areas

¹ Most officials are at least nominally Muslim. [Redacted]

of the Javanese countryside.² According to US Embassy [Redacted] sources, the number of prayer halls has increased, as have religious publications, radio lectures, and private instruction. Observers also note that mystical Islamic sects appear to be expanding, and that more Indonesians are making the hajj to Mecca and are paying the *zakat* (tax) to benefit the poor. [Redacted]

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Although most of the evidence is anecdotal, we believe the following broad characterizations of Islamic activity are valid. [Redacted]

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Youth: Vanguard of the Revival. A number of Islamic leaders in Java—the most populated and politically dominant island in the Indonesian archipelago—are concerned about growing radicalism among Indonesian youth, particularly the urban and educated.

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Improved educational and travel opportunities have broadened their exposure to developments elsewhere in the Islamic world and—according to US Embassy officials—increased their receptivity to foreign ideas. In addition, US Embassy [Redacted] sources report that in recent years Indonesian youth have sharply increased participation in mosque activities—including affiliated study and social groups—near a number of universities. We believe this trend in part results from the ban on campus political activity, which has driven such activity underground. An Embassy source in Medan, Sumatra, for example, indicates that local students are increasingly active politically, meeting in small study groups to discuss political and economic issues, particularly the failings of the current system. [Redacted]

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² The five pillars of Islam mandated by the Prophet Muhammad are: (a) a verbal declaration of God's uniqueness and the primacy of the Prophet Muhammad; (b) performance of daily ritual prayer; (c) contribution of alms; (d) fasting during the month of Ramadan; (e) and making the pilgrimage (hajj) to Mecca. [Redacted]

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Islam in Indonesia: An Overview

Despite their numerical superiority—nearly 90 percent of a population of more than 170 to about 175 million—Indonesian Muslims have failed since independence to achieve a dominant role in national politics. Upon coming to power following the 1965 Communist coup attempt, Soeharto initially curried—and gained—the support of Islamic organizations to eradicate Communist and other leftist elements. For their part, Muslim politicians saw this as an opportunity to secure a prominent political role for Islam. By the early 1970s, however, Soeharto had consolidated his position and began to curb Islam as a political force. In 1973 he forced the four Muslim parties to consolidate into the United Development Party (PPP), a coalition that has remained faction ridden, ineffectual, and effectively controlled by the regime. [redacted]

Islam in Indonesia is diverse, embracing a majority of nominal Muslim moderates and disparate fundamentalist minorities. Islam initially arrived in the outer islands—such as West Sumatra, Kalimantan, and Moluccas—via the Malaysian Peninsula in about the 13th century, where smaller ethnic groups tended to convert to stricter forms of orthodox Islam. On the main island of Java, however, Islam melded with traditional Javanese mysticism, Buddhism, and Hinduism, forming a strain of Islam that generally lacks the doctrinaire aspects of some Middle Eastern varieties. Although most Javanese regard themselves as Islamic, they generally do not rigorously apply the prescriptions of Islamic law to daily life. [redacted]

According to US Embassy observers, almost all serious Muslims favor a greater political role for Islam, but they differ on how to achieve that goal. Most reject creation of an Islamic state, and many—particularly the Javanese—oppose the application of strict Islamic law, believing it would create civil

strife. Most would prefer a state in which Muslims would exercise a greater role in policymaking and in which Islamic principles would be reflected in government law and regulations. [redacted]

Orthodox Muslims are in the minority and do not control any major Islamic institutions. It is impossible to assess what proportion of Indonesian Muslims are devout, but knowledgeable observers estimate that only about 20 percent of the population of the central island of Java is orthodox. [redacted]

Despite their growing frustration with the regime's authoritarianism and its disregard for their religious sensitivities, the nominal Muslim mainstream and most of the orthodox minority remain wary of radicalism and continue to at least passively support the government. Local Muslim leaders in Java—speaking to US Embassy officials—have indicated there is only a handful of extremists among their devout, but politically inert, constituencies. Leaders of established Muslim organizations—such as the NU, the HMI, and the Muhammadiyah—believe they must continue to support the government for the present because the current system is preferable to a less tolerant fundamentalist Islamic state espoused by the radical right. [redacted]

In addition, many in the nominal Muslim majority have benefited from the political stability and economic progress of Soeharto's New Order regime and do not want to see that stability threatened by civil unrest. Most middle- and upper-class Indonesians—whose livelihoods depend directly or indirectly on the state—at least tacitly support present policies. The masses generally accept the regime's authority and feel positive toward Soeharto, according to Embassy and other observers. [redacted]

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At the same time, established student organizations, such as the Indonesian Students' Association (HMI) and the Indonesian Islamic Students' Movement (PMII), continue to attract and train young Muslims. Because it is risky to carry out political protests, senior HMI and PMII members instead prepare students for the future by training them in the ideology of Islam and increasing their awareness of political and social problems, according to Embassy sources. Traditional Islamic *pesantren* (boarding schools) are another important setting for religious activity. Most of these schools—estimated by foreign observers to number 15,000 and concentrated in Java—draw their students locally. US Embassy sources indicate the schools appear to be increasingly active in local social and political affairs. [redacted]

The Role of the Radicals Rising. Although Indonesia's Shia community remains insignificant numerically, US Embassy sources indicate that Shia ideas are increasingly popular among urban, middle-class youth who admire the Ayatollah Khomeini's independence in dealing with the non-Muslim world. According to these sources, Indonesians with religious training in Iran are organizing "cells" of university-age youths to rigorously study Shia doctrine. Trainees are instructed to hide their affiliation and to await unspecified action. Embassy sources also indicate that Indonesian youths home from studies in Egypt and Saudi Arabia have formed small Islamic Brotherhood groups throughout the islands similar to those abroad. These appeal primarily to lower-middle-class and poor students. [redacted]

[redacted] Indonesian authorities and Islamic leaders acknowledge that several clandestine Shia groups, their leaders posing as Sunnis, are active in East Java. [redacted] [redacted] arrested and interrogated several Muslim clerics in religiously traditionalist East Java who reportedly admit secret Shia cells are locally active and that one—the "Aggressive Islamic Youth Movement"—was involved in several terrorist bombings in 1984 and 1985. This group appears to have been responsible for recent threats against the US Consulate in Surabaya. [redacted]

External Influences Modest. Foreign influence appears to have had limited responsibility for fueling recent Muslim unrest. [redacted] the Iranian Embassy in Jakarta does maintain extensive ties to a number of mosque, student, and teachers' groups. Iranian officials have distributed pro-Khomeini literature and cassettes extolling the Iranian revolution and the Shia sect, funded underground religious publications, and sponsored unspecified training in Iran for youth leaders. This literature, however, appears to have limited appeal to the Indonesian public, according to US Embassy observers. [redacted]

[redacted]

Jakarta's Strategy—Legislating Harmony
During his 20-year tenure, Soeharto has systematically pursued a strategy of legal maneuvering. [redacted]

[redacted] to contain Muslim and other potential opposition groups. The regime appears to have capped this strategy in 1983 by legislating that all social and political organizations—including religious groups—must formally endorse the secular state ideology (Pancasila) as their primary ideological and organizational principle. By forcing public or formal compliance with Pancasila, Jakarta hopes legally to eliminate the basis for ideological conflict. [redacted]

[redacted] Subsequent legislation in mid-1985 extended this stricture to include all mass organizations—including religious, professional, and cultural groups. In his public speeches, Soeharto equates opposition to Pancasila to an attack on the constitution and government itself, and the new law

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Pancasila

Indonesia's state ideology (Pancasila) was first enunciated by Sukarno at the time of independence in 1945 and incorporated into the constitution as a unifying, ideologically neutral symbol for the geographically, ethnically, and religiously diverse nation. It is a vague credo of belief in one god, humanitarianism, national unity, democracy, and social justice, intended by its architects to ensure Indonesia's evolution as a secular state. During the Sukarno era, overtly political organizations were forced to accept Pancasila, but other groups were required only to avoid violating its principles. [redacted]

After coming to power, Soeharto initially retained the doctrine to enforce social harmony and to head off any Islamic resurgence to fill the political vacuum left by the defunct Communist Party. In recent years, however, he has become preoccupied with forcing universal acceptance of the secular state ideology.

Soeharto—[redacted] [redacted] offended both Muslim and non-Javanese sensitivities in a speech in 1982 that extolled the Javanese origins of Pancasila and denigrated the role of Islam. [redacted]

In promoting Pancasila, Jakarta stresses traditional consensus politics and communal harmony rather than "foreign" concepts of majority rule, individualism, opposition, and criticism. The Soeharto regime—the self-appointed arbiter and enforcer of Pancasila—regards alternative ideologies and opposition to the secular state doctrine as an attack on the government itself and a threat to stability. [redacted]

empowers authorities to police compliance with Pancasila and to disband offending groups. Muslim and other organizations have had little alternative but to bow to government pressure, and one after another they have endorsed the state ideology. [redacted]

Anatomy of a Riot

Piqued by the United Development Party congress's formal acceptance of Pancasila in August 1984, Muslim resentment escalated sharply. There was a surge of antigovernment propaganda, including mosque speeches, cassette tapes, pamphlets, and posters. In a slum neighborhood of Jakarta's Tanjung Priok port district—an area of high unemployment, crime, and with a concentration of immigrants from the more fundamentalist outer islands—local activists whipped up popular discontent by denouncing the regime's repression of Islam and criticizing the ties of Soeharto, Murdani, and other key officials to financial kingpins in the widely hated Chinese business community. [redacted]

The public mood deteriorated further following reports that security forces desecrated a mosque while removing anti-Soeharto posters. After police arrested four activists, a mob of 1,500 to 2,000 people formed, and several Chinese shops were looted and burned. Demonstrators then marched on the police station to demand the release of the arrested activists. Outnumbered security forces opened fire, killing numerous demonstrators—including a well-known local community leader—and wounding many more. Officials acknowledged that troops firing automatic weapons killed 30, [redacted]

[redacted] The strong show of military force, however, contained the disturbance and prevented its subsequent spread to other cities, in our judgment. [redacted]

... While Brandishing the Stick

The Soeharto regime is intolerant of any challenge to social order and has repeatedly demonstrated its readiness to use force.³ The Army, for instance, has

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long been deployed throughout the country primarily to maintain order, and it responded decisively to the September 1984 riot.⁴ [redacted]

vaguely worded law requires only the possibility that one's words or actions "might" be used by others to cause unrest or to challenge Pancasila. In one case, a Muslim primary school teacher was sentenced to 12 years in prison for holding an "illegal" course in Islamic values in which he distributed a subversive leaflet and played recordings of antigovernment speeches. [redacted]

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Jakarta's extensive security apparatus—most of it under the control of Armed Forces Commander Murdani—further reinforces control of domestic Muslim opposition, enabling authorities to penetrate and monitor most potential opposition groups of significant size—including student, labor, religious, and political organizations. The common knowledge of this surveillance capability intimidates many would-be critics and dampens dissent. [redacted]

. . . and Using the Carrot

Soeharto continues to counterbalance his hard line with a co-optive and conciliatory approach toward accommodating moderates. Soeharto and other key officials often appear at major sessions of various moderate Islamic organizations, for example. In addition, the Department of Religion has for years subsidized religious pilgrimages and the construction and operation of mosques and Islamic schools. Such government largesse has gone a long way in securing acquiescence of many local Muslim leaders whose prestige has benefited. US Embassy sources indicate that a number of such co-opted leaders are content to pursue strictly religious and social programs and to forgo political activity. In a recent meeting with Soeharto, for instance, one such leader of the Muslim organization Muhammadiyah—playing to his audience, in our judgment—said the group's primary function was to be a bridge between the government and the Muslim community. [redacted]

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Before the recent unrest, Jakarta permitted substantial freedom of expression in the mosques as an outlet for public frustrations. Since then, authorities have tightened the reins on religious expression. [redacted]

[redacted] security officials have stepped up surveillance of individuals, organizations, and mosques suspected of antigovernment extremism. Jakarta, moreover, has followed up with publicized arrests, prosecution, and stiff sentencing of dozens of suspects—including some half dozen hardline Muslim preachers—allegedly involved in antigovernment activities. Among those prosecuted were three prominent members of the dissident Group of 50—Muslim preacher A. M. Fatwa, former Trade and Industry Minister Sanusi, and retired Army General Dharsono—in connection with the 1984 disturbances.⁵ [redacted]

Authorities have occasionally conceded to Muslim sensitivities on nonvital issues. In the early 1970s, for instance, in the face of vigorous Muslim protest, Jakarta backed away from a controversial marriage bill that would have created a nationally uniform marriage and divorce law replacing Islamic regulations. Several years ago authorities eased off when the United Development Party (PPP) balked at pressure to replace its religious symbol—the Ka'bah shrine in Mecca—with a secular emblem. In 1983, Soeharto's replacement of the Minister of Religion—a military general widely resented by the Muslim community—with a popular, Muslim-educated civilian, Munawir Syadzali, appealed to Muslims, according to US Embassy observers. [redacted]

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Officials also have prosecuted numerous individuals under the 22-year-old Law on Eradicating Subversive Activities. [redacted]

[redacted] convictions are easily obtained because the



⁵ The Group of 50 is a small opposition group composed primarily of prominent retired government, military, and political party officials who have become disenchanted with the Soeharto regime. They have been largely ineffective and lack a popular following, but the Group has sought to capitalize on recent disturbances to criticize the government. [redacted]

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In addition, Jakarta avoids offending domestic sensitivities in conducting its foreign policy, tending to support the Muslim consensus on Middle East issues.⁶ Authorities also limit missionary activities by other religions among Muslims and periodically crack down on gambling, prostitution, pornography, and other manifestations of what Muslim critics denounce as the erosion of traditional values by secularism. And Jakarta continues to reassure moderate Muslim leaders that Pancasila and other restrictions do not threaten—and presumably safeguard—Islam's religious role. Immediately after the Tanjung Priok riot in 1984, for example, the regime dispatched leading military figures—including General Murdani—to call on key Islamic organizations as a gesture of deference and to assure them the government's crackdown was aimed only at radical elements. [redacted]

The Dangers Ahead

Institutional Outlets Shut . . . We believe Indonesian Islam—for now—is unable to be politically effective. Government manipulation, lack of cohesion, and splintered leadership stand in the way of aspirations by some in the Muslim community to translate Islamic numerical superiority into political influence, and there is no Muslim consensus on a future strategy. Most dissatisfied Muslims agree—according to a number of Islamic leaders and US Embassy observers—that they cannot yet effectively challenge the regime. As a result, they have turned their frustration inward and concentrate on religious training and organization in anticipation of a change in the political climate.⁷ [redacted]

Compounding their problem is the fact that the few established Muslim political institutions continue to erode. Since its inception in 1973, the PPP leadership has remained preoccupied with infighting rather than



⁷ This debilitating lack of cohesion in part reflects the unstructured character of Sunni Islam—in contrast, for instance, to the more doctrinaire Shia sect. Sunnis have no central organization, leadership, or common focus, no imam or national leader who can speak authoritatively for the community. In addition, numerous regional and theological cleavages further divide Indonesian Muslims against themselves. [redacted]

formulating and advancing party goals.⁸ In national parliamentary elections, it has routinely won only about 30 percent of the vote—half that of the government's political machine (Golkar)—and it has no members serving in the Cabinet. [redacted]

Government success at manipulating Islam was especially evident in August 1984 at the PPP's first national congress since its formation in 1973, when it bowed to government pressure and formally adopted Pancasila as its sole ideological principle. As a result of this and other government manipulation, the PPP has begun to disintegrate. The Nahdatul Ulama (NU), formerly the PPP's main component, has quit the party—ostensibly to focus on religious, educational, and social functions. In mid-1985, the Syarikat Islam faction similarly bowed out. [redacted] religiously devout rank-and-file members of these groups—particularly idealistic youth—resent their leaders' having caved in repeatedly and readily to government pressure. [redacted]

. . . While Frustrations Grow. In our view, Soeharto is tightening control at a dangerous time—when both Islamic consciousness and economic frustrations are growing. US Embassy observers indicate that—with few exceptions—almost all Muslims have complaints about Soeharto's New Order regime. We believe that Jakarta's imposition of a secular state ideology flouts Muslim sensitivities and has angered even some moderates who generally support the government and oppose an Islamic state. Although open dissent has tapered off since early 1985 in response to Jakarta's crackdown, increasing numbers of Muslims appear to be frustrated over the regime's disregard for their religious sensitivities, according to US Embassy observers. [redacted]

Many orthodox Muslims and non-Javanese resent Pancasila as another step by the Javanese elite toward cultural dominance by supplanting Islamic values

⁸ By the early 1970s President Soeharto had sufficiently consolidated his position that he could start to curb the Islamic parties. In 1973 he forced the four Muslim parties to consolidate into the United Development Party, a coalition that has remained faction ridden and ineffectual. [redacted]

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with their own beliefs, [redacted]
This view is reinforced by Soeharto's appointment of several loyal Christians to key military and other sensitive positions, according to US Embassy observers. For instance, Armed Forces Commander Murdani—a Catholic—is in charge of maintaining order. Admiral Sudomo, a Protestant and former head of internal security, is now Manpower Minister, responsible for keeping labor under control. [redacted]

Although outwardly quiescent, growing numbers of students are frustrated and cynical about inequities of the current political and economic system—particularly the widening income gap, the regime's restrictions on political expression, and their own limited employment prospects. According to US Embassy observers, many students also resent what they regard as Jakarta's overly close ties to the West and want an alternative political and economic strategy for Indonesia. [redacted]

Popular resentment is also building over the regime's [redacted] connections with the financially dominant—and widely hated—ethnic Chinese business community, [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] During 1984 and early 1985, radical Muslims played on this resentment in mosque speeches and posters highlighting Soeharto's and other key officials' ties to prominent Chinese businessmen. Subsequently, several businesses affiliated with the Soeharto family and its Chinese partners were the targets of arson and bombings. [redacted]

[redacted]

. . . *But.* We believe the regime's crackdown on the radical Islamic opposition—and conciliatory rhetoric toward moderate Muslims—have bought it some time to deal with Muslim and broader social and political frustrations. At the same time, the recent unrest, in our judgment, appears to have strengthened Soeharto's resolve to force compliance with his program. Moreover, we expect Jakarta to maintain its firm approach toward political Islam and other potential opposition elements in this period prior to parliamentary elections in 1987 and the presidential election in 1988. There is a danger, of course, that regime overconfidence and inflexibility could cause Jakarta to misstep, provoking a localized outbreak like the one in 1984. It is also possible, although less likely, in our judgment, that the present strategy will lead Soeharto to push too hard in reacting to an antigovernment incident, thus polarizing the Islamic mass. [redacted]

In any case, we believe Muslim dissidents may well try to incite broader opposition by coupling their complaints with widespread social and economic grievances, which we expect to intensify through the rest of the decade as a result of falling oil prices, financial austerity, and the poor prospects for employment.¹⁰ Radical Muslims might also seek to make common cause with regime critics among moderates, intellectuals, youth, and leftist remnants. Because Islam is one of the few social institutions in Indonesia extending to the grassroots level, this would be a feasible strategy. Consequently, we believe that the discrediting of existing Islamic political institutions and leadership in the eyes of many moderates, radicals, and particularly youth will accelerate a turn to religious and social organizations—such as mosque-affiliated study and youth groups—as vehicles for expressing political views. [redacted]

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After Soeharto, we believe the balance between Islam and the government security apparatus could tilt somewhat toward Islam. Under an orderly presidential succession, we anticipate that any likely successor to Soeharto would come from the military and would be inclined to continue Soeharto's basic political and economic policies. Should Soeharto depart the scene unexpectedly, however, or should the transition of power be contentious, then existing widespread Islamic, social, and economic frustrations could erupt.¹¹ In such an event, it is possible that a successor might appeal to the Muslim mainstream for support, particularly if his authority was contested. An insecure successor or leadership, for example, might seek to downplay ties to the West—and the United States in particular—or adopt a more activist posture on Middle East issues. [redacted]

Implications for the United States

In Indonesia's conduct of foreign policy, efforts to accommodate domestic and Middle East Muslim sentiments and play up Third World credentials continue to put Jakarta at odds with Washington on such issues as UN votes involving the Middle East and Israel. Such differences might well increase should Soeharto or a successor feel compelled to shore up the regime's image among Indonesian Muslims. [redacted]

For its part, any radical Muslim opposition probably will continue denouncing the Soeharto government's ties to the United States. In addition, Indonesian militants will criticize Washington's Middle East policy and champion the cause of radical regimes such as Libya and Iran. The US Embassy in Jakarta, for instance, has received several apparently bogus telephone and letter threats from fringe elements. [redacted]

We believe the Soeharto government's efforts to choke off legitimate Muslim opposition increase the likelihood that the April 1987 parliamentary election—and that body's pro forma election of the president in 1988—will be criticized at home and abroad, particularly in the wake of the recent focus on

[redacted]

the Philippines. [redacted]

[redacted] Jakarta, however, will be quick to reject any foreign scrutiny or criticism of its political process as intrusion into its internal affairs, in our judgment. [redacted]

In the event that Islam becomes a stronger and permanent political force in Indonesia, we believe it would have far-reaching effects on Southeast Asia as a whole and would complicate relations with Washington. Indonesian Muslims—at about 155 million, the largest Muslim population in the world—probably would develop more active contacts with Muslims in Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines, thus expanding their own influence in the region. In our view, this probably would have important consequences for policymaking in these countries. Indonesian Muslims also might seek to promote representation in Indonesia by Middle East elements—such as the PLO and Libya—which they currently lack. [redacted]

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Appendix A

Selected Indonesian Islamic Organizations

United Development Party (PPP)

Key Leader: John Naro, Chairman

Until recently, the PPP was a loose coalition of four Muslim political parties forced to amalgamate by Soeharto in 1973. The party has remained factionalized and ineffectual. In the past year, the PPP has begun to disintegrate as several constituent elements have withdrawn. Naro—a career politician and advocate of Pancasila—owes his position to Soeharto's backing rather than constituent support. [redacted]

Nahdatul Ulama (NU)

Key Leader: Abdurrachman Wahid, General Chairman

Founded in 1926, the NU is Indonesia's largest Muslim organization, with approximately 12 million members concentrated in East and Central Java. Its style of Islam incorporates traditional Javanese values and beliefs, including elements of mysticism and magic. The NU has traditionally avoided confrontation with the government, and, like most other groups, has bowed to Jakarta's pressure to accept Pancasila. The NU recently withdrew from the PPP, ostensibly to forgo politics to concentrate on religious, educational, and social activities. [redacted]

Indonesian Muslim Party (Parmusi)

A minor constituent of the PPP, Parmusi is the successor to the Sumatra-based Masyumi Party, which was banned in 1960. Soeharto allowed the Masyumi to resume activity in 1968 under the new name. Unlike other PPP elements, Parmusi has no separate organizational structure outside the PPP party framework. [redacted]

Syarikat Islam (PSII)

After breaking off from the former Masyumi Party in 1947, the Syarikat Islam steadily lost political influence, and subsequently was incorporated into the PPP. It retains scattered support in West Java, southern Sumatra, and Sulawesi. Syarikat Islam left the PPP in mid-1985. [redacted]

Muhammadiyah

Key Leader: M. Imaduddin Abdubrachmin

Organized in 1911 to provide "modern" Islamic education, Muhammadiyah now organizes schools, universities, hospitals, orphanages, and other social services throughout Indonesia. Its leadership is currently split between moderates and hardliners, the latter headed by M. Imaduddin Abdubrachmin, a protege of Mohammad Natsir. Previously opposed to Pancasila, the Muhammadiyah accepted it at its national congress in December 1985, despite the objections of some members. [redacted]

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Islamic Brotherhood

A new group led by Indonesian youths who have studied in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, where they were influenced by local Islamic Brotherhood movements. There are reportedly numerous small brotherhood groups scattered throughout Java, Sumatra, and Sulawesi, all allegedly with links to the "Ikhwani Ul-Muslimin" (Islamic Brotherhood of Islamic Solidarity). The group reportedly appeals to lower-middle-class and poor students. According to US Embassy officials, some members of the Muslim think tank/publisher, LP3ES, including "Tempo" and "Kompas" contributor Fachri Ali, have ties to the brotherhood. [redacted]

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Korps Muballigh Indonesia (Indonesian Preachers' Corps)

Key Leader: Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, Chairman

The Korps appears focused on opposing the regime, and has affiliate groups in most major cities. The NU general chairman indicates the Korps has the potential to become a serious antigovernment group if it can upgrade its communications. Authorities are currently prosecuting several members on charges of inciting the 1984 riot in Jakarta. [redacted]

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Komando Jihad (Holy War Command)

According to US Embassy reporting, Komando Jihad was a code name used by Indonesian authorities and the press during 1980-81 for several radical Muslim groups. In late 1981, Admiral Sudomo, then head of the Security Command, told Muslim ulamas—who regarded the government's use of the term Komando Jihad as an attempt to discredit all Muslims—that no such group existed and that Jakarta would cease using the name. Since 1984, however, the government has revived the term and prosecuted several alleged members for subversion.

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Solidaritas Islam

A collective name for a number of radical groups that became active in 1984. Such groups may be tied to the Islamic Brotherhood, since "Solidaritas Islam" is one possible vernacular rendition of the Brotherhood's Arabic name. Authorities suspect the group of various acts of violence, including the Jakarta riot. The group's leadership reportedly comes from more radical elements of the Indonesian Muslim Students' Association and the Islamic Students' Association. Security officials claim small cells of five or six members form to conduct a specific attack and then disband.

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Appendix B

Selected Dissidents

Lt. Gen. (ret.) H. R. Dharsono: Previously an ambassador and Secretary General of ASEAN, Dharsono is the highest ranking former official convicted by the Soeharto regime. His sentence—10 years in prison for involvement in antigovernment meetings and the “white paper” following the 1984 riot—is intended as a warning to the moderate opposition and others that open dissent will be at a high cost. [redacted]

H. M. Sanusi: 66, formerly parliamentarian and Minister of Trade and Industry, and past leader of the Muhammadiyah, recently sentenced to 19 years in prison for allegedly financing the bombing of two banks and a Chinese store in Jakarta in 1984. In 1980 Sanusi and 49 other prominent government, military, and intellectual figures signed the “Petition of 50” urging democracy. [redacted]

Andi Mappetahang Fatwa: a 46-year-old Muslim dissident recently sentenced to 18 years in prison for antigovernment sermons and meetings. Previously arrested and fired from the government in 1978 for antiregime remarks and again detained the following year. [redacted]

Tony August Ardie: A well-known Muslim firebrand. Ardie, 31, was sentenced in December 1985 to 17 years in prison for antigovernment statements before the Tanjung Priok riot. A spellbinding orator, Ardie was imprisoned in 1983 for 9 months following dissident sermons and challenging a government ban on female student’s wearing the traditional Muslim head covering. [redacted]

[redacted] Some fundamentalists—particularly youths—reportedly regard him as a martyr. [redacted]

Sjafruddin Prawiranegara: 74, leader of the Korps Muballigh, and formerly head of the now-banned Masyumi. He was arrested for involvement with the Group of 50’s “white paper” criticizing the government’s account of the 1984 riot. In recent years he has preached sermons sharply denouncing the regime, and in 1983 publicly accused the military of killing a

student during a confrontation. Despite the lack of evidence of the death, the incident heightened public tension. [redacted]

M. Imaduddin Abdubrachmin: A well-known Muslim activist and leader of the hardline faction of the Muhammadiyah. Formerly a lecturer at the Bandung Institute of Technology and active at the affiliated Salmon mosque, he was detained for 14 months for involvement with student unrest in 1978. Abdubrachmin has toured the Middle East. He is currently studying in the United States. [redacted]

Mohammad Natsir: 76, a member of the Group of 50, is considered to be Indonesia’s most prominent radical Muslim preacher. He was detained by security officials in connection with the October 1984 Bank Central Asia bombings in Jakarta. Since then, Indonesian authorities have prohibited him from making speeches, and have closely monitored his activities. Natsir, who calls for the formation of an Islamic state, is most influential among hardline Muslims, and reportedly has strong ties to Islamic elements in the Middle East. He does not have an official congregation or following, however, because it is too risky for individuals to be closely associated with him. [redacted]

Abdurrahman Wahid: 45, chairman of the Nahdatul Ulama (NU), is one of the most prominent of the younger Muslim leaders. Wahid is outspoken on the need for government to improve the economic position of Muslims. He has called for government-funded cooperation between Chinese and Muslim businessmen, but the appeal was regarded by the major Jakarta newspapers as too dangerous to print. Wahid has also openly condemned the corrupt business practices of the Soeharto family. But, at the same time, he criticizes Indonesia’s Muslim leaders for failing to eliminate the occasional violence between religious groups. [redacted]

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Appendix C**Chronology of Recent Unrest****1984**

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|--------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 12 September | Tanjung Priok riots in Jakarta. | Violent confrontation between Muslims and security forces. Many casualties. |
| 4 October | Bombings of Chinese-owned bank and shop in Jakarta. | Bank Central Asia owned by key Soeharto business associate. |
| | Bombing of bank, Pontianak, Kalimantan Barat (West Kalimantan). | Another branch of Bank Central Asia. |
| 17 October | Bombing of Super Mei Factory, Jakarta. | A Chinese-owned business. |
| 22 October | Fire at Sarinah department store, Jakarta. | Owner has ties to Soeharto's son. Cause probably accidental. |
| 29 October | Fire at Chinatown restaurant and nightclub complex. | Owned by associate of Soeharto's son. Cause undetermined. |
| | Fire and explosions at Marine ammunition depot, Jakarta. | Extensive damage. Origin unknown. Previous fire occurred in July. |
| 2 November | Department store and movie theater fires, Yogyakarta. | Possible bombing by competing Chinese businessmen. |
| 5 November | Threat letters to US and Australian Embassies. | First threat on US Embassy since spring. |
| | Telephone threat to shopping/apartment complex. | Residence of several US Embassy personnel. |
| 8 November | Undetonated bomb discovered at Pertamina headquarters. | Followed a telephone threat. |
| 11 November | Fire destroys offices at Kartika Plaza Hotel, Jakarta. | Origin unknown. Hotel controlled by group of generals. |
| 13 November | Fire destroys government offices, Sarinah department store complex, Jakarta. | Origin unknown. |
| 14 November | Bomb hoax, American Express offices, Arthaloka Building. | Followed telephone threat. A prominent Jakarta office building. |
| 24 December | Christian Seminary bombed, Malang, Jawa Timur (East Java) | Probably reflection of local religious frictions. |

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| 21 January | Nine bombs damage Borobudur Temple, Jawa Tengah (Central Java). | Most prominent and revered cultural landmark. |
| 31 January | Fire destroys Sultan's Palace, Surakarta Central Java. | A cultural and spiritual landmark. |
| 12 February | Nighttime fire destroys warehouse complex, army barracks, and 117 houses. | Cause of fire undetermined. Five persons injured. |
| 13 March | Bandung munitions depot explosion. | Several military personnel killed. |
| 16 March | Bus explosion, East Java. | Seven killed, others injured. Radicals transporting explosives. |
| 18 March | Threat letters to Jakarta nursery schools for Western dependents. | Possible threat by competing businessmen. |
| 10 July | Fire destroys police-owned 9-story shopping complex, Central Java. | 360 stores destroyed in early morning blaze. Arson threats received. Explosions heard. |
| 20 July | Fire destroys Indonesian state radio station, Central Jakarta. | Two persons killed. Cause undetermined, possibly old wiring. |
| 27 September | Fire damages national radio station, Banjarmasin, Kalimantan Selatan (South Kalimantan). | Extensive damage. No evidence of arson. Cause undetermined. |
| 7 October | Fire damages Ministry of Religion building, Jakarta. | Second major fire in two years. Possible retaliation. Nearby shantytown, including red-light district, recently razed by security officials. |
| 20 October | Fire destroys textile factory complex (Batik Keris), Surakarta, Central Java. | Possible insurance arson. Soeharto family member major shareholder. Cause undetermined. |
| 9 December | Explosions and fire at state television station, Jogyakarta. | Cause undetermined. |
| 30 December | Fire severely damages state television station, Jakarta. | Cause undetermined. Possibly set to disrupt Soeharto's annual New Year's address. |



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