



**Directorate of  
Intelligence**


~~Secret~~

*Em*



25X1

*Refers to*  
*Al?*



25X1

# **The Chilean Communist Party and Its Allies: Intentions, Capabilities, and Prospects**



25X1

**A Research Paper**

~~Secret~~

*ALA 86-10024  
May 1986*

*Copy* **183**

**Page Denied**



**Directorate of  
Intelligence**

**Secret**






25X1

# **The Chilean Communist Party and Its Allies: Intentions, Capabilities, and Prospects**



25X1

**A Research Paper**

This paper was prepared by   
Office of African and Latin American Analysis, with  
a biographic contribution by  Office  
of Central Reference. It was coordinated with the  
Directorate of Operations. 

25X1

25X1

25X1

Comments and queries are welcome and may be  
directed to the Chief, South American Division, ALA,



25X1

*Reverse Blank*

**Secret**

*ALA 86-10024  
May 1986*



Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

**The Chilean Communist Party and Its Allies: Intentions, Capabilities, and Prospects**

[Redacted]

25X1

**Key Judgments**

*Information available as of 1 April 1986 was used in this report.*

Terrorism and violent demonstrations by the revolutionary left threaten to undermine the US goal of encouraging an orderly transition to democracy in Chile. We believe that President Pinochet will continue to use the far left's campaign of violence to try to maintain military support for delays in political liberalization and harsh policies ostensibly aimed at rooting out subversion. Many informed observers suspect that he wants to remain in power after his term expires in 1989, and [Redacted] the Communists and their domestic allies believe that this intransigence is fueling political polarization, which they see as benefiting their long-term strategy of armed struggle. The most serious threat to US interests would occur if, after several years, the revolutionary left achieves its ultimate goal of fomenting an all-out insurgency in Chile, as this could lead to civil war or insurrection in which the Communist-dominated left might gain power.

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

The Communist Party of Chile (PCCh) is the largest, most cohesive, and influential far-left group in Chile. Despite regime repression, the PCCh has grown steadily in recent years and [Redacted] currently has about 50,000 active members, including its youth wing. While many of its top leaders are in exile—its aging Secretary General lives in Moscow—the party closely follows their directives and has not experienced serious internal dissension. Closely allied with the PCCh is the terrorist Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR), which, since its creation in late 1983, has carried out a steadily ascending wave of bombings and other violent actions. We estimate it currently has about 1,000 activists. Another group, the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), a pro-Castro organization, suffered sharp losses in clashes with the security services in late 1983 but is reportedly rebuilding with the aid of Cuba, Libya, and Nicaragua, and probably now has about 400 to 500 militants in Chile. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

We believe that the PCCh and the FPMR have the capability and the will to increase significantly the pace and scope of their campaign of violence over the next few years. Already, [Redacted] Chile leads the world in number of terrorist incidents—although to date there have been relatively few casualties. We expect more frequent and lethal terrorist incidents during 1986 and 1987, involving attacks on military personnel, installations, and government buildings, as well as stepped-up

25X1

Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

bombings against civilian targets. Attacks on US companies and US-related facilities probably will rise only moderately, since [Redacted] the Communists do not view these installations as primary targets. The MIR probably will attempt several sensational terrorist actions against senior officials and possibly against US Embassy officers or facilities during the coming months. [Redacted]

25X1  
25X1  
25X1

We believe that the Communists are convinced that their expanded armed actions will promote political instability and undermine public confidence in the government to the point that the PCCh will become widely perceived as the Pinochet regime's most effective opponent. [Redacted] the Communists also want to foment numerous protests and widespread civil disobedience throughout 1986 to prepare the way for a national strike. They probably calculate that these activities will enhance their standing with the moderate opposition, frustrated by Pinochet's intransigence over a transition to democracy, and with a general public that appears increasingly disenchanted over the debilitating effects on living standards caused by slow economic growth. We agree with the US Embassy's prediction that 1986 will almost certainly be a year of confrontation between the political opposition and the regime and that the Communists will play a leading role in these activities and spark considerable violence. [Redacted]

25X1  
25X1  
25X1

In the past few years, the Soviet Union, Cuba, and radical states such as Libya have provided greater levels of material support, guidance, arms, and training to the Chilean revolutionary left. [Redacted] this increased support derives from Moscow's and Havana's calculations that conditions are ripe in Chile for a sustained effort by the left to forcibly oust Pinochet from power, although both capitals evidently expect this to happen only after several years of "armed struggle." [Redacted]

25X1  
25X1  
25X1  
25X1

[Redacted]

[Redacted] several West European countries and South American democracies such as Argentina are favorably disposed toward anti-Pinochet groups in general and are tolerating activities within their borders by the Chilean far left. [Redacted]

25X1  
25X1

In our opinion, the security services' ability to curb terrorism and control antiregime protests will be a key factor affecting near-term prospects for the revolutionary left. While US Embassy [Redacted] reporting


25X1

Secret


Secret



25X1

demonstrates that the services effectively have prevented large-scale violent protests and patrolled upper-class neighborhoods, they recently have had great difficulty curbing slum violence and have failed to deter the rising wave of terrorist bombings. We also believe that the security services have poor intelligence on the main revolutionary leftist groups, especially the PCCh and the FPMR. 

25X1

As a result, we doubt that the security services will be able to prevent far-left groups from continuing their sustained campaign of violence over the next two years. Moreover, we believe that their resources will be strained to the limit if, in the meantime, the moderate opposition parties also stage frequent civil disobedience actions and mass protests. On balance, however, we do not believe the Communists and their allies will undermine the Pinochet regime during 1986, and are convinced that the security services would quickly defeat the far left in any direct military engagements. Nevertheless, a substantial threat to political stability in Chile could develop over the medium to long term if the transition to civilian rule remains stalled and the far left continues to lay the foundations for an all-out insurgency. Under these circumstances, we think that Pinochet's chances for remaining in power would become shaky and that a period of full-scale armed confrontation between the far left and the security forces would become increasingly likely. 

25X1





**Secret**

25X1

**Contents**

	<i>Page</i>
<b>Key Judgments</b>	iii
<b>Introduction</b>	1
<b>Background</b>	1
<b>Communist Party Organization</b>	3
<b>Party Leadership</b>	5
<b>Communist Strategy</b>	6
<b>Wooing the Moderates</b>	6
<b>Preparing for Insurgency</b>	8
<b>The Communists' Terrorist Allies</b>	9
<b>Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front</b>	9
<b>Movement of the Revolutionary Left</b>	11
<b>The Role of External Actors</b>	14
<b>Cuban and Nicaraguan Guidance</b>	14
<b>The Soviet Role</b>	16
<b>Western Europe and South America</b>	17
<b>Prospects</b>	19
<b>The Most Likely Case</b>	19
<b>Alternative Scenarios</b>	21
<b>Implications for the United States</b>	22

25X1

25X1

25X1

**Secret**

Secret

25X1



Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.

707698 (B00136) 5-86

25X1

Secret

Secret



25X1

### The Chilean Communist Party and Its Allies: Intentions, Capabilities, and Prospects



25X1

#### Introduction

Chile today appears to be in the throes of what for US policymakers has by now become an all too familiar drama: an authoritarian but basically pro-Western regime seeking to hold at bay pressures for a return to democracy while facing a challenge from the radical—and increasingly violent—left. Moderate Chilean opposition parties are struggling to maintain a fragile unity, rightist groups are distancing themselves from President Augusto Pinochet, and economic stagnation threatens to undermine support from key middle-class and business sectors—all against a backdrop of escalating violence fomented by the country's radical left. Informed observers predict that Chile will soon experience accelerating political polarization, growing social ferment, and widening international isolation—trends that the left stands ready to encourage and exploit.



The paper focuses on the Chilean far left—mainly the Communist Party and its terrorist allies—the group that may hold the key to the way events play out in the country and how US interests are affected. It examines the leadership and organization of the Communist Party, its recent activities and goals, its relations with other radical leftist groups, and its sources of foreign support. It also assesses the ability of the Chilean security services to combat the activities of the revolutionary left and the circumstances under which these activities might threaten Pinochet's power in the near or medium term. Finally, the paper analyzes the implications for the United States of escalating leftist-sponsored violence, even if it does not immediately threaten the stability of Pinochet's regime.



#### Background

President Pinochet confronted the first major challenge of his decadelong rule in 1983. Declining living standards generated widespread popular discontent, which political parties and organized labor exploited to press for economic revitalization and a speedy return to democracy. These groups staged a series of



"Pinochet: Fit for a Long Bout?" South, the Third World Magazine ©

25X1

increasingly violent monthly mass protests which, according to the US Embassy, caused senior military officers to press Pinochet to moderate his hardline policies. The President made a few cosmetic concessions that temporarily defused the crisis, but, when it became clear in 1984 that he would not accelerate the transition to civilian rule, the opposition once again organized protests that have continued to this day.



25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

**The Role of Far Leftist Parties Prior to 1980**

Numerous studies portray the Communists as the prime movers behind the creation of the Popular Unity coalition, which elected Socialist Salvador Allende to the presidency in 1970 with a narrow plurality of the vote. The Communist Party of Chile (PCCh) was the best-organized entity in the coalition and during the Allende period increased its membership from 90,000 to 120,000, according to assessments by the US Department of State. It placed party leaders in key ministries, dominated the largest labor organization, and expanded its congressional representation. Nevertheless, the Communists lagged the Socialists in voter appeal, essentially because of President Allende's popularity.

The Socialists, however, were plagued by factionalism that offset their showing at the polls and undermined their efforts to build support among labor and other key sectors. The Castroite, violence-prone Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) supported the government but was not in the coalition. It did not develop mass support and probably had no more than a few thousand members in 1973.

**Regime Crackdown.** One of the principal objectives of the military leaders who ousted Allende in September 1973 was to eradicate Marxism from the Chilean political scene. The new junta "recessed" all political parties and banned and vigorously repressed all Marxist groups. Because the Socialists lacked a

disciplined structure and had almost no underground apparatus, they suffered more than the PCCh and MIR and effectively ceased to function as a party. Communist leaders concentrated on keeping the PCCh's clandestine structure intact, although the party's headquarters was burned, its records destroyed, its media outlets closed, and its labor arm dissolved. Some PCCh leaders were killed right after the coup and many more were detained or exiled. The PCCh acknowledged publicly that as the result of the regime's crackdown party membership shrank to about 10,000 to 25,000 active members and sympathizers in the mid-1970s. Meanwhile, several thousand party members living abroad, along with most of the top leadership, carried out a variety of support functions, including propaganda activities and fundraising, according to reporting from several US embassies.

The military high command was especially eager to destroy the MIR believing that its clandestine terrorist apparatus posed a direct threat to the new regime. Many of the Movement's top leaders were killed in armed clashes with the security forces, which also broke up the training centers and potential guerrilla bases the MIR established during the Allende years. Within several months of the coup, the MIR was reduced to only a few hundred militants in scattered terrorist units. Some of its leaders and members escaped into

25X1  
25X1

25X1

25X1  
25X1  
25X1

Radical leftist parties capitalized on the turbulent political climate to emerge from clandestinity and regain some of their former influence. The Communist Party of Chile (PCCh) was especially active, moving rapidly to help organize the monthly protests and to seek a formal accord with moderate parties for a broad opposition front, according to the US Embassy. The PCCh's refusal to renounce violence, however, spurred the moderates to form the Democratic Alliance (AD) coalition, a broad opposition grouping dominated by the Christian Democrats and stretching from the moderate right to the center left. The

Communists then created the rival Popular Democratic Movement (MDP), which encompassed most radical leftist parties—including the hardline Almeyda Socialist faction, the MIR, and several small violence-prone groups—and reconfirmed the PCCh's commitment to armed struggle, according to press reports

25X1  
25X1

[Redacted]

Secret

Secret

exile, most settling in Cuba. [redacted] these elements, with the aid of the Castro government, operated a support network involving training, some arms shipments, and modest financial aid for MIR groups still functioning in Chile throughout the 1970s. [redacted]

**The Left's Staying Power.** Despite the regime's crack-down, the far left demonstrated considerable resiliency throughout the 1970s. This was especially true of the PCCh, which by the end of the decade appeared to be revitalizing its internal organization. [redacted]

[redacted]

By 1979, dozens of PCCh figures returned from abroad while recruitment drives bolstered the party's ranks, according to press and academic studies. [redacted]

From 1973 to 1980, the Communists repeatedly condemned those who favored violence as the only way to overthrow the regime, often clashing publicly with the MIR on this issue. The PCCh's insistence on peaceful methods and ostensible support for a democratic system produced few concrete gains, however, [redacted]

The Socialists remained hopelessly divided and were

basically inactive within Chile, according to academic studies. Meanwhile, the moderate Christian Democrats turned down all PCCh overtures and sought to avoid any taint of association with the Communists, [redacted] The MIR continued to conduct sporadic violence, staging several spectacular terrorist actions during 1980. [redacted]

The government responded to these attacks by toughening its "state of emergency" and, [redacted] resorted more frequently to arbitrary actions against its opponents. In August 1980, the regime held a national plebiscite on a new constitution that would give Pinochet a new eight-year presidential term, with the possibility of reelection in 1989. It also codified the regime's restrictions on political activities and made permanent the ban on all Marxist and other "subversive" groups. The plebiscite outcome—67 percent in favor—dealt a major psychological blow to the regime's opponents, especially Communist leaders who espoused peaceful political methods [redacted]

[redacted]

In late 1980, exiled party chief Corvalan announced that the PCCh would now follow an anti-Pinochet strategy employing "all forms of combat, including acute violence." [redacted]

In late 1983, the PCCh reportedly supported the creation of a new terrorist group, the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR), which was primarily responsible for the sharp escalation in violence during 1984. Pinochet imposed a state of siege in November of that year, pleasing Communist leaders in exile who hoped [redacted] that he would continue to "overreact" by cracking down indiscriminately against his opponents, thereby strengthening the PCCh's prospects for being accepted in a broad opposition front. [redacted]

**Communist Party Organization**

US Embassy reporting makes clear that the PCCh is the largest, most cohesive, and most influential far-left group in Chile. It is organized in the classic pattern of Communist parties worldwide [redacted] At the top is a Central Committee, from which is drawn a nine-member Political Commission that oversees a network of functional and

25X1  
25X1

25X1  
25X1  
25X1

25X1  
25X1  
25X1  
25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1  
25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1  
25X1  
25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret



"Who's Next?"

Analisis ©

regional directorates, local committees, and cells comprising three to five persons each.

The party and all of its components are proscribed under the 1980 Constitution.<sup>3</sup> Consequently, while it has functioned more openly in recent years, [redacted] the PCCh has kept much of its apparatus covert and highly compartmented.

[redacted] the party retains substantial financial resources and is one of the few Chilean parties with a sizable salaried staff.

The US Embassy [redacted] sources emphasize that the party is well organized nationally, has grown steadily in recent years, and is actively

<sup>3</sup> Nonradical political parties are technically illegal, but since the emergence of the mass opposition movement in 1983 the regime generally has tolerated open activities by parties covering the spectrum from the far right to the moderate left. [redacted]

cultivating youth, labor, professional, and other key sectors. [redacted] PCCh membership reached 30,000 in 1985—up from an estimated 15,000 to 20,000 a year earlier—and its youth wing numbered 20,000. The majority of the membership is located in Santiago and other large urban areas. [redacted]

(The PCCh when last fully legal before Allende's overthrow in 1973 numbered up to 120,000 members and at least twice as many sympathizers. [redacted])

The PCCh's major recruitment gains in recent years have been among jobless and underemployed youth, as well as among university and secondary level students. [redacted] The US Embassy notes that the left accounts for about 30 percent of politically active Chileans under age 30, and that the well-organized and well-financed PCCh youth wing is gaining popularity on university campuses and in slum neighborhoods. Student factions affiliated with the political opposition have defeated progovernment slates in every university student election since 1983, and in most cases Communists were either on the winning ticket or ran a close second. [redacted] the Communists recently have stepped up their activities among secondary-level students, organizing, for example, several rallies at high schools that produced clashes with the security forces. [redacted]

25X1  
25X1  
25X1  
25X1  
25X1  
25X1  
25X1  
25X1  
25X1  
25X1  
25X1  
25X1  
25X1  
25X1  
25X1  
25X1  
25X1

Secret

Secret

Despite the high priority the PCCh assigns to rebuilding its strength in organized labor, the US Embassy estimates that no more than one-fifth of union leaders are Communists while 20 percent are progovernment and 40 percent are Christian Democrats. The Communists, however, exercise strong influence on the main opposition umbrella labor grouping, the National Workers Command (CNT), which during the past three years has frequently collaborated with the moderate and far-left opposition in staging protests.

[redacted]

25X1

[redacted] the party so far has failed in its efforts to recruit members and form cells within the armed forces. The PCCh has also tried for several years to undermine military loyalty to Pinochet through a sustained propaganda campaign [redacted]. Nevertheless, we share the views of the US Embassy and the US defense attache that to date this effort has had virtually no impact on the military's attitude toward the Pinochet regime or appreciably lessened the antipathy toward the Communists that pervades the armed forces. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

[redacted]

[redacted]

**Party Leadership.** [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] the overall policy of the PCCh is directed from abroad by Secretary General Corvalan and other exiled leaders—who number nearly half of the Central Committee. The party's internal leaders frequently travel overseas to meet with Corvalan and other exiled Central Committee members [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

[redacted]

Secret

Secret

**Luis Corvalan**



Secretary General, Communist Party of Chile

*Corvalan, who has led the PCCh for more than 25 years, was jailed and exiled after the 1973 coup. He has lived in Moscow since the mid-1970s but travels frequently to Cuba and elsewhere in Latin America. Consistently loyal to Moscow, Corvalan is the main channel through which the Soviets guide the PCCh, [redacted]. He has publicly defended his party's support for armed struggle and made the original announcement on adoption of this strategy in a speech from Moscow in September 1980. [redacted] he periodically meets with representatives from nonradical Chilean parties and invariably affirms that violence is the only way to oust Pinochet. Corvalan's age—he is in his midseventies [redacted]—casts doubt on his future role as a political leader. [redacted]*

Since its founding in 1922, the PCCh has not suffered from significant internal divisiveness or splintering, [redacted] There has been some dissension recently over how vigorously to pursue armed struggle, but [redacted] for the past two years a majority of the internal leaders and virtually all of the exiled officials have advocated a steady increase in violence. [redacted] debate on this subject persists, especially because the Communists continue to be shunned by moderate opposition groups because of their espousal of violence. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] In press interviews [redacted], however, top internal and external leaders have again reaffirmed the commitment to armed struggle, which suggests to us that the proviolence group remains in the ascendancy. Moreover, [redacted] we view these debates not as heralding an impending split but as safety valves that enable the party hierarchy to control PCCh strategy while placating dissident views by allowing fairly open internal discussion over tactical matters. [redacted]

**Communist Strategy**

The PCCh pursues a two-pronged approach designed to increase pressure on Pinochet while rebuilding its own political influence, according to the US Embassy. The Communists have shown considerable tactical flexibility in the recent past—reflecting, in our view, their recognition that they are unlikely to topple Pinochet in the near term—while adroitly exploiting the ambivalent attitude of many moderates toward the party. [redacted]

**Wooing the Moderates.** The overt element in Communist strategy involves working through the Communist-led far-left coalition, the MDP, to lure the nonradical parties, including several in the AD coalition, into a joint campaign to accelerate the

[redacted]

A US Embassy source reports, however, that a generation gap has developed and that most of the key internal Central Committee members are in their midthirties, while Corvalan and his exiled companions, as well as the “old guard” leaders still in Chile, generally are in their sixties or older.

[redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X6

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret



Secret

*"While Chile Burns, Pinochet and the Cardinal Take Tea"*



Analisis ©

transition to civilian rule. US Embassy reporting emphasizes, however, that many Chileans distrust the MDP's public claims to support pluralism and democracy and are concerned that the PCCh's fundamental objective is to install a Communist dictatorship in Chile. Nevertheless, some leaders of moderate parties hesitate to sever contacts with the PCCh or accept the regime's insistence that the party remain formally proscribed (under any future government), maintaining, according to the US Embassy, that this would only reinforce the Communists' commitment to violence. These politicians argue that, because the Communists traditionally attracted about 15 percent of the vote in elections before 1973 and have basically withstood the regime's repression, they should play a role in the transition. These moderates apparently believe—unrealistically, in our view—that once Pinochet is ousted the Communists will abandon violence and revert to their pre-1973 adherence to democratic and parliamentary procedures. Moreover, we judge that, on balance, the Communists' democratic rhetoric appeals to some middle-class and labor groups, intellectuals, and others who still think of the PCCh as having a legitimate place in an open political system of the pre-1973 mold. [redacted]

Spokesmen for the opposition moderate parties have repeatedly urged the PCCh to renounce armed action and join them in a broad anti-Pinochet coalition. [redacted]

25X1

[redacted]

25X1

[redacted] the PCCh has welcomed the moderates' overtures but refused to abandon armed action.

25X1

[redacted]

25X1


The dedication of the PCCh and other far-left groups to violence contributed to their exclusion from the "national accord," a document calling for a speedy and orderly transition to civilian rule that 11 mainstream parties—ranging from the right to the democratic left—and the Catholic Church promulgated in

25X1

Secret

Secret

**Jaime Insunza**



*Member, Communist Party Central Committee*

*Jaime Insunza, about 40, represents the younger generation of leaders who are directing the Communist party's armed struggle strategy. Insunza helped direct the PCCh youth movement in the early 1970s, by 1980 was a member of the Central Committee, and later became the first president of the Communist-dominated Popular Democratic Movement coalition. In 1984 the government briefly expelled him from Chile.*

*He occasionally surfaces as a PCCh spokesman, promoting cooperation among all opposition parties against the regime. We believe, however, that Insunza is an important leader of the hardline PCCh faction that favors all-out violence to topple Pinochet.*

August 1985. [redacted] the accord's proponents refused to collaborate with the Communists in sponsoring antiregime protests in early September, correctly fearing that they would spawn violence. The PCCh, for its part, has reacted cautiously to the accord. [redacted]

[redacted] it does not want to antagonize its signatories and become further isolated [redacted]

[redacted] In fact, in late November the AD and MDP jointly staged a

massive peaceful demonstration in Santiago to support the accord, which was judged by most of the press as the largest antiregime protest since 1973.

[redacted]

[redacted] Nevertheless, [redacted] PCCh

leaders believe that such peaceful protests will not bring the regime to the negotiating table, and that popular support is building for the PCCh's thesis that Pinochet can only be ousted through violence.

[redacted]

**Preparing for Insurgency.** The party's covert strategy is dedicated to Pinochet's violent overthrow. [redacted]

[redacted] since the shift to "armed struggle" in late 1980, the PCCh has revitalized its ties to other far left groups and has backed both their terrorist actions and those of the new FPMR. The Communists intensified this approach when Pinochet declared the state of siege in November 1984. [redacted]

[redacted]

The Embassy [redacted] report that through its campaign of violence the PCCh hopes to promote greater polarization, with the Communists gaining stature as the proponents of the only "viable" strategy to topple Pinochet. The party also wants to foment increased political instability that will ultimately undermine support for the President among the armed forces. The Communists evidently realize that to try to carry out a full-scale insurgency would be counterproductive at present, but are persuaded that steadily

25X1

25X1  
25X1

25X1

25X1  
25X1

25X1  
25X1

25X1  
25X1

25X1  
25X1

25X1

25X1  
25X1  
25X1

25X1  
25X1

Secret

Secret

increasing terrorist actions will provoke Pinochet into hardline measures that will eventually create the conditions needed to drive him from office. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] expansion of the party's military wing reportedly created pressure from rank-and-file militants to take bolder actions against the regime. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] the US mission noted that attacks on security service personnel increased during late 1985. In addition, the PCCh accompanied violent demonstrations in Santiago in early November by a series of coordinated bombings that caused major damage to the heavily guarded main power grid in central Chile, reportedly demonstrating greater preparation and improved technique on the part of the terrorists. [redacted]

\* For a full discussion of external support to the Chilean left, see the section, "The Role of External Actors." [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] the party—despite its weakness in organized labor—is also working toward a general strike, which PCCh leaders calculate would facilitate more frequent armed actions, promote mass agitation, and, in the long run, lead to a prolonged "popular struggle" with insurrectional characteristics. [redacted]

**The Communists' Terrorist Allies**

There are two main Chilean leftist terrorist groups, the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR) and the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), in addition to several minor organizations, [redacted]

[redacted] Although relatively small, the FPMR and MIR are responsible for placing Chile at the top of the Latin American terrorist chart in total number of incidents over the past two years. Moreover, they appear to represent an increasingly intractable problem for the Chilean security services. Nevertheless, we are not certain whether Communist and other leftist party leaders exercise full control yet over the terrorists—despite government claims to the contrary. [redacted]

**Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front.** Since its creation in December 1983, the FPMR has become the largest and most active far-left terrorist group in Chile, [redacted]

[redacted] The US Embassy notes that there was a fourfold increase in terrorist bombings in 1984 over 1983—735 compared to 139—and a further surge in 1985—to 865—the bulk of which were carried out by the FPMR. The front's favorite targets have been electrical power grids—it frequently blacks out Santiago and much of central Chile—railway lines, commuter buses, and public [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret



"Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front Interview" La Segunda ©

establishments in major cities, but most of these bombings have been staged in a way seemingly calculated not to cause widespread civilian injuries.

The FPMR also has bombed government buildings and police or military installations, and about 50 of its bombings in 1984-85 were directed at US-related facilities, such as binational cultural centers, American firms, and—once—a car outside the US Consulate in Santiago. Moreover, the front has attacked police stations and patrols, a military airfield, and even the presidential palace on one occasion. According to the US Embassy, 10 members of the security services were killed and another 30 wounded by terrorists in 1985, most probably at the hands of the FPMR.

[Redacted]

The US Embassy adds that PCCh leaders backed the FPMR primarily out of fear of losing control over the party's activist and radical youth, who were already cooperating with elements of the MIR in terrorist activities.

[Redacted]

Whatever the degree of control the PCCh is able to exert over the FPMR, we are convinced that party leaders assign the front an important role in their armed campaign against the Pinochet regime.

[Redacted]

Only a few spokesmen for the front have surfaced in press interviews. One of them claims that the FPMR is run by a nine-person national directorate independent of any political party or coalition, and that the front consists of commando units located in major urban areas, the bulk of whose members are youths without any previous political background or military training.

[Redacted]

by late 1985 it had grown substantially, and we estimate that it currently

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

**Andres Pascal Allende**



*Secretary General, Movement of the Revolutionary Left*

*The nephew of former President Salvador Allende, Andres Pascal Allende, 41, has led the MIR since 1974. Fleeing Chile in 1976, he settled in Cuba and has traveled to the Soviet Union and throughout the world seeking financial support and training for his terrorist group.*

[Redacted]

*Pascal Allende's strident calls for all-out war against Pinochet have isolated his movement from the moderate political opposition and provoked sharp disagreements with Chilean Communist leaders over the pace of antiregime violence. The MIR leader,*

*has been widely criticized for his flamboyant revolutionary rhetoric and constant militant posturing.*

comprises at least 1,000 militants—about half in Santiago and the rest in other urban areas. [Redacted] in recent months the front has staged more sophisticated and lethal terrorist actions

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

there have been several recent instances when FPMR units reportedly have temporarily established control over parts of Santiago's slums and given political indoctrination and weapons training to local residents. These units have engaged in gun battles with the security forces, sometimes forcing the latter to retreat. These clashes have occasionally been reported even in the Chilean press, thereby—in our view—adding to a growing popular perception that the FPMR is willing and able to confront the security forces, at least in poor neighborhoods.

**Movement of the Revolutionary Left.** The MIR—founded by Castroite students in 1965—is the oldest and historically the most violence-prone terrorist group in Chile. The US Embassy notes that even though the security services ruthlessly repressed the MIR after the 1973 coup—only an estimated 100 to 150 activists remained in the country by the early 1980s—it nevertheless committed the great majority of antiregime terrorist incidents until late 1983. These ranged from “armed propaganda” actions, such as distributing milk from hijacked delivery trucks to slum dwellers, to the murder of police and government officials.

[Redacted]

the pace of the group's terrorist activities remained low during 1984 and most of 1985. It has concentrated on restructuring, infiltrating cadres back into Chile, and developing closer ties to other far-left groups, especially the PCCh.

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X6

25X6

Secret

Secret

**Capabilities of the Security Services**

The Chilean security services have demonstrated uneven effectiveness in meeting the increased armed threat from the left, in our view. Judging by reporting from the US Embassy [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] they have been most successful in preventing repetitions of the large-scale violent demonstrations in downtown Santiago that had threatened public order during 1983, and in protecting senior officers and government officials. In addition, heavy police patrolling of upper-class neighborhoods and of Santiago's subway system has apparently helped to forestall more frequent terrorist actions in these areas.<sup>a</sup>

25X1

25X1

[redacted] the security services are frequently hard pressed to contain antiregime violence by far-left groups in Santiago's slums. Moreover, as the US Embassy has noted, the security services have not been able to curb the escalating wave of bombings or other armed actions by far-left groups over the past two years. We also believe that the services' intelligence on the major leftist groups is very poor. They have been often caught unaware by potentially major terrorist actions, [redacted]

[redacted] the services have failed to detect most of the weapons shipments from Communist countries that have entered Chile over the past 2 to 3 years. For instance, none of 12 weapons shipments from the La Paz safehouse raided by Bolivian authorities was intercepted by Chilean security personnel, even though the arms entered Chile via six distinct infiltration routes over a 24-month period.

25X1

25X1

25X1

<sup>a</sup> The US Embassy reports that Chile's internal security apparatus is composed of the National Intelligence Center (CNI); the Investigations Police, a plainclothes force; the Carabineros—a 28,000-member militia-type national police force—and several military intelligence units. All are under the jurisdiction of the Defense Ministry, except the CNI, which is technically under the Ministry of Interior but is staffed by military officers. In anticipation of large demonstrations, the security services often are backed up by units from the 58,000-strong Army. [redacted]

25X1  
25X1

25X1

[redacted]

the FPMR as the leading terrorist group. According to the US Embassy, the rebuilding process altered the MIR's membership, which had previously been heavily middle class and middle aged. The reorganized MIR [redacted]

25X1

By late 1985 the MIR had partially revitalized its apparatus within Chile [redacted]

[redacted] in our view, had become a more militant—though perhaps less well trained—terrorist organization. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

[redacted] and was preparing to compete with

Secret

Secret

[Redacted]

according to the US Embassy. A special judge appointed to clarify the case indicted 14 Carabineros for the killings. These developments led to the firing of the commanding Carabinero general, the dismissal of numerous senior officers, and the reorganization of Carabinero antisubversive units, according to the US Embassy.

25X1  
25X1  
25X1

[Redacted]

When leftist terrorists staged several lethal attacks on Carabineros in October 1984, Pinochet imposed the state of siege, which lasted until May 1985. During that period, the security services conducted mass sweeps of slum neighborhoods, temporarily detained over 8,000 persons, sent hundreds of individuals to internal exile, and frequently resorted to torture, according to the US Embassy.

The US Embassy then forecast that infighting among the security services would become more bitter and hamper counterterrorist operations. The new Carabinero commander confirmed to US officials at the end of 1985 that morale had plummeted and that his force was stretched to the limit.

25X1  
25X1

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1  
25X1  
25X1

the state of siege caused no appreciable slackening in the intensity of leftist terrorist bombings.

Chilean authorities are especially confident that in any direct confrontation the security forces would decimate the far left—a judgment that we share. Moreover, while many officials regard the bombings perpetrated to date as little more than harassment, they continue to support Pinochet's harsh policies and see no alternative to continuous repression of the revolutionary left.

25X1  
25X1  
25X1

Carabinero morale suffered under the state of siege as the force bore the brunt of the expanded enforcement measures without higher manpower levels or extra equipment. The situation in the force deteriorated further in mid-1985 because of a scandal over the slaying of three Communists by a suspected police death squad,

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

Secret

Secret



"Carabineros—Protecting God, Country . . . and Santa" *Revista Carabineros de Chile* ©



"Carabineros in Action"

*Analisis* ©

ripe for revolution, that Pinochet's power is weakening, and that it supports efforts by leftist revolutionaries to mount an insurgency over the next few years. In February 1985, Cuban President Castro even acknowledged to US officials—through a senior aide—that Havana is supporting "insurgents" in Chile with arms, supplies, and training.

25X1

### The Role of External Actors

In the past few years, and especially since the outbreak of vigorous anti-Pinochet protests in 1983, the Soviet Union, Cuba, and such radical states as Libya have increased their support—arms, training, funds, and guidance—to Chilean far-left groups advocating armed struggle.

Meanwhile, a number of governments in Western Europe, Latin America, and elsewhere are permitting anti-Pinochet activities by Chilean far leftists within their territories.

only a few thousand of the estimated 1 million Chileans living abroad are politically active, but that the best organized and most energetic belong to the PCCh and allied groups that seek foreign aid to oust Pinochet through violence.

**Cuban and Nicaraguan Guidance.** The general thrust of Cuban policy toward Chile is clear, in our view.

Havana has frequently indicated publicly that "objective conditions" in Chile are becoming

[Redacted]

25X1

At the same time, Castro has advocated that the Chilean far left continue trying to forge links to moderate opposition groups to be in a position to exploit the Pinochet regime's eventual downfall.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1


25X1

Secret



**Page Denied**

Secret



latter's top leaders live in Havana and many MIR members have been trained in Cuba prior to serving in Nicaragua, Angola, and elsewhere—Cuban officials probably help formulate a good deal of the MIR's tactics. [redacted]

25X1

The ties between the Sandinistas and Chilean radicals date from the mid-1970s, when exiled MIR militants and other leftists took part in the anti-Somoza struggle [redacted]. In recent years, substantial numbers of MIR militants relocated from Cuba to Nicaragua, working in several government agencies and serving as military advisers in the armed forces. Sandinista officials occasionally have criticized the Pinochet government publicly and endorsed the Chilean far left's campaign of violence. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

[redacted] the Sandinistas have offered training, arms, and other aid to the MIR and several minor terrorist groups. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

[redacted] Nevertheless, we believe that, while contacts between the Sandinistas and Chilean subversives are increasing, Managua still provides considerably less assistance to the radical left than does Havana. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

**The Soviet Role.** [redacted]

25X1

25X1

[redacted] the PCCh is rigidly committed to Soviet policy guidelines, and we believe that the PCCh receives advice on a systematic basis from Moscow. [redacted]

25X1

25X1



25X1

[redacted] We believe, however, that because of Havana's longtime ties to the MIR—the

25X1

Secret

Secret



25X1  
25X1

**Western Europe and South America.** [redacted]


25X1  
25X1

[redacted] several Western European nations—especially Sweden, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, and West Germany—support the efforts of both Chilean leftists and moderates to oust Pinochet and have given exiled Chilean political activists safehaven and various types of financial assistance.

[redacted] several European political parties and foundations fund and maintain close ties to a wide variety of Chilean parties. The US Embassy adds that financial aid from abroad is increasing and has also gone to Chilean research centers, human rights groups, and trade union organizations, many of which are influenced by Communist and other far-left groups. While the Embassy notes that several million dollars are contributed to these entities annually, we have no breakdown on the amounts that may be funneled to the far left. [redacted]

25X1

25X1




25X1

Secret

**Secret**



25X1



Chilean opposition groups have also benefited from the return to civilian rule in several South American countries during the past 2 to 3 years. The new democracies' publicly expressed distaste for Pinochet and the generally more open political climate in the region have created more favorable conditions for exiled leftists operating from countries neighboring Chile. For instance, there is [redacted] easier movement through Argentina, Bolivia, Peru, and other countries into Chile by radical leftist and

25X1

25X1

**Secret**

Secret

terrorist operatives. [redacted]

[redacted]

the next two years to prepare for an eventual insurgency against Pinochet. We believe that the PCCh and the FPMR are able and willing to press this effort vigorously, even though what we know of Communist thinking suggests that the party does not expect to topple the dictator any time soon. Nevertheless, in our view, the party believes that in the long run—perhaps by 1989—it can spark civil war in Chile, or, at a minimum, a prolonged period of armed confrontation that would force the military to oust Pinochet. The Communists probably calculate that playing a key role in driving him from power would enable them to dominate the post-Pinochet era, especially if the military agrees to a quick return to civilian rule. Nevertheless, even if Pinochet's military support remains firm in the face of sustained armed action by the Communists and their allies, we judge that the PCCh leaders will persist in their insurrectionary strategy, believing that in time a strengthened revolutionary left will defeat the military in battle. [redacted]

25X1  
25X1

25X1

[redacted] in recent months an organization known as Democratic Chile has emerged as the largest and most active anti-Pinochet exile grouping in South America. Based just across the Chilean border in Mendoza, it is reportedly supported by various leftist Argentine political parties and the local Argentine provincial authorities. Democratic Chile coordinates both moderate and leftist exile groups in Argentina, channels funds to anti-Pinochet forces within Chile, and generates assistance from other countries. [redacted]

Consequently, we expect the incidence of terrorism, especially that of the FPMR—which probably will come under full PCCh control—to increase during 1986 and 1987. We also expect terrorism to become considerably more lethal, involving more attacks on military personnel, installations, and government buildings. In addition, we believe there will be more frequent terrorist actions in middle- and upper-class neighborhoods in Santiago, as well as against businesses, banks, and probably the public transportation system, resulting in more civilian casualties. US companies and other foreign-owned establishments may come under somewhat more frequent attack, although we doubt that they will become a primary target for terrorist bombings, since—despite ample opportunity—the far left has shown little inclination so far to attack them on a major scale. [redacted]

25X1

25X1  
25X1

25X1  
25X1

**Prospects**

**The Most Likely Case.** Our central conclusion is that the revolutionary left in Chile will systematically escalate armed attacks against the security forces and organize a continuing series of violent protests over

In our view, the Communists also see armed actions as promoting political instability and sowing doubts among the population concerning the capabilities of

Secret

Secret

the security forces. They probably want to give party and FPMP militants returning from training abroad ample opportunity to use their new skills, to continue pressing the overtaxed Carabineros and other elements of the security services, and to provoke Pinochet into further hardline policies, thereby accelerating political polarization. They clearly look upon a polarized political atmosphere as beneficial to their long-term strategy, in our opinion. [redacted]

The Communists are also likely to promote other forms of violence, such as protest actions by students and slumdweller and general civil disobedience designed to lead to a national strike. In our judgment, however, the PCCh's success in this area will more directly depend on popular support and the attitude of moderate opposition parties than in the case of terrorism. The US Embassy reports that the Communists and their allies are pleased over Pinochet's intransigence regarding a dialogue on a transition to civilian rule and are lobbying with the national accord sponsors for closer collaboration in a series of antiregime protests this year. Consequently, we agree with the Embassy that 1986 will almost certainly be a year of confrontation between the political opposition and the regime on various fronts and that the Communists will play a leading role in assuring that anti-Pinochet demonstrations are accompanied by considerable violence. [redacted]

We believe that, although the Communists have largely overcome the isolation they faced when they were excluded from the national accord last August, it is highly unlikely that they will be admitted to the accord in the near future. [redacted]

[redacted] the moderate opposition is currently reluctant to ally formally with the PCCh. The moderates realize that this would preclude an accommodation with Pinochet or with the strongly anti-Communist armed forces, and they also basically mistrust the Communists. In our view, however, the Communists are now confident that their advocacy of violence as the only viable tactic against the regime will slowly gain currency among moderate parties and much of the general public. We also believe that their expectations are realistic in several respects. For instance, if, as we expect, Pinochet continues to refuse an accelerated timetable for a transition to civilian rule, many

nonradical political groups will become frustrated over their limited options and be tempted to work with the PCCh. In addition, we judge that sluggish economic performance this year and in 1987 will further weaken popular support for the regime and could catalyze spontaneous mass protests—as occurred in early 1983—which the Communists and their allies would almost certainly exploit to promote violence. [redacted]

The PCCh leadership has so far not heeded proposals by extremist elements in the party to assassinate Pinochet or other top officials. Nevertheless, US Embassy [redacted] indicates that Pinochet's and other senior officials' security precautions probably would not deter a serious terrorist assault against them. In fact, a rocket attack on the presidential palace in mid-1985 reportedly failed only for mechanical reasons, and twice last year terrorists exploded small bombs at sites where the President was to appear. [redacted]

We doubt, however, that any such plans would be implemented unless there is a dramatic downturn in the PCCh's political fortunes later this year, such as a sudden decision by Pinochet or the armed forces to negotiate a transition timetable with the moderate opposition. The Communists almost certainly would be excluded from these negotiations and, faced with renewed political isolation, might assassinate Pinochet or other senior officers to derail the transition talks and promote political instability. [redacted]

We believe, however, that the MIR may be more inclined than the PCCh to murder senior officials, calculating that this would refurbish the group's reputation as a major terrorist organization. Moreover, history demonstrates that this group has the determination to conduct political murders. The number of MIR activists in Chile is increasing, and [redacted] many have received

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

sophisticated military training abroad. The MIR bombed a Carabinero bus in early February resulting in numerous casualties. [redacted]

[redacted]

A decisive factor affecting prospects for the revolutionary left will be the security services' ability to counter violence and control antiregime demonstrations, in our view. [redacted]

[redacted] the services will probably contain street protests over the next year, they have yet to curb terrorism, including acts against the security services themselves. Moreover, we question their ability to counter a more sustained campaign of violence by the PCCh and FPMR, especially if other opposition groups join the Communists in staging frequent civil disobedience acts and antiregime protests.

[redacted]

On balance, however, we believe that—barring assassination—the far left will not seriously threaten the stability of the Pinochet regime over the next year. Moreover, we are convinced that the security forces would easily defeat the far left in any direct confrontation. Nevertheless, if there is no progress on a transition dialogue by the end of 1986, we believe that the far left's plans to mount an insurgency will become more feasible. Consequently, in our view, the longer the Communists are able to carry on an intensifying armed struggle, the poorer Pinochet's prospects become for avoiding challenges from the military and, ultimately, of staying in office beyond 1989. [redacted]

**Alternative Scenarios.** We see two alternative scenarios regarding prospects for the revolutionary left in Chile over the next two years, but believe that either has only an outside chance of occurring. The first is an all-out Communist military offensive—perhaps by early 1987—involving a sharp escalation of armed attacks on military and police establishments, systematic efforts to disrupt the electricity supply to Santiago and to cripple railway and port links, and sustained bombings in upper-class sections of the capital. In addition, the PCCh and the FPMR might take control

of slum neighborhoods and fight to hold them against the security forces, hoping to establish permanent guerrilla enclaves. Finally, the far left might attempt to kill large numbers of senior military and government officials, and even Pinochet himself. [redacted]

25X1  
25X1  
25X1

We believe that the PCCh is currently too cautious to embark on such a risky venture, and would do so only out of desperation if excluded from a peaceful transition to civilian rule negotiated by the moderate opposition or because of miscalculation by overconfident hardline party elements. The Communists almost certainly realize that failure would subject them to massive repression. They also probably know that defeat would severely damage their public standing and that most other political forces would repudiate their actions, leaving them more isolated than ever. In addition, we believe that Communist leaders think that their party still is too small and its armed contingents too weak to challenge the military in a direct conflict. [redacted]

25X1  
25X1

25X1

25X1

The second scenario involves a Communist conclusion that armed struggle cannot topple Pinochet and that, therefore, the party should revert to its pre-1973 peaceful approach. Thus, the party might respond to moderate appeals to play a "constructive" role by ceasing violence and working to engage the regime in a dialogue on a transition to civilian rule. We believe, however, that the Communists remain convinced that Pinochet will not step down voluntarily, and that they must use force either to oust him or show the military that the country is ungovernable under Pinochet. Consequently, we believe that the Communists would be reluctant to abandon violence because, in their view, this would strengthen Pinochet's power. Nevertheless, if Pinochet were to decide to resign—a highly unlikely prospect, in our view—the Communists probably would be thrown into some disarray and might decide to halt, at least temporarily, their violent activities. Thus, they might decide that any other policy would be counterproductive during a period of general euphoria brought on by Pinochet's stepping down. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

**Implications for the United States**

We believe that escalating leftist violence in Chile adversely affects US policy goals because it reduces the prospects for an orderly transition to democracy. Even if the left's armed struggle does not seriously threaten political stability for the next two years, US interests will most likely suffer. Continued leftist terrorism would probably frustrate Washington's efforts to encourage negotiation on a transition formula and buttress moderate opposition unity since Pinochet almost certainly would capitalize on the violence to rally military support for his harsh policies and justify his contention that political liberalization is impossible until the subversives are eliminated. [redacted]

An all-out Communist-led insurgency against Pinochet would, in our view, harm US interests much more seriously, because it could lead to civil war on the Central American pattern. Not only would the Chilean Communists stand a good chance of reaching power by violent means, but Soviet and Cuban standing would be greatly enhanced by the prospects of establishing a new Marxist-Leninist state in Latin America and the consequent blow to Washington's influence throughout the region. Moreover, the Soviets and Cubans would almost certainly attempt to duplicate their success in Chile by expanding aid to selected revolutionary groups elsewhere on the continent. [redacted]

US interests would benefit in the short run if Pinochet were to unexpectedly defeat the far left and dramatically reduce terrorism because this would, at least temporarily, reduce political instability. But while such a victory would deprive Pinochet of his chief justification for continued repression, he might try to portray a success against the far left as giving him a mandate to run for the presidency again in 1989. Thus, he might claim that he needed another term to complete the economic and political rebuilding of the country before it could return to civilian rule. In such circumstances, US interests in Chile would suffer in the long run because, in our view, the root causes of polarization and eventual political instability would persist. [redacted]

We believe that the most favorable development from the US perspective would be a decision by the Pinochet regime to work with the moderate opposition on accelerating the transition to democracy. Such a move would be greeted enthusiastically by the opposition parties and the general public and, in our opinion, would constitute a major setback for the far left. The latter might try to derail the transition through sensational terrorist actions, but the vast majority of Chileans would condemn such tactics. Moreover, the government could further isolate and discredit the far left by ignoring violent provocations and pressing ahead with transition negotiations. We believe that, as the return to civilian rule neared, the Communists and their allies would have little chance of either mounting an insurgency or playing a significant role during the initial phases of democratic government. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret



**Page Denied**

**Secret**

**Secret**