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# **Inter-Korean Proposals and Dialogue: An Analytical Chronology**

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*EA 85-10094  
May 1985*

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# **Inter-Korean Proposals and Dialogue: An Analytical Chronology**



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This paper was prepared by   
 Office of East Asian Analysis. Comments  
and queries are welcome and may be directed to  
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**Inter-Korean Proposals  
and Dialogue:  
An Analytical Chronology** [ ]

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**Overview**

*Information available  
as of 22 April 1985  
was used in this report.*

North and South Korea will be no closer to their respective goals for a reunified nation as they mark the 40th anniversary of their division this year. The gap between the two societies and political systems continues to widen, making most outside observers view "peaceful reunification" as unrealistic.

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Emotional and political attachment to the idea, however, remains strong on both sides of the Demilitarized Zone. The two Koreas held unsuccessful talks during 1972-73 and 1980; last year, they embarked on their third round of direct public discussions. It is a halting dialogue so far and progress is elusive.

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***Motivations in P'yongyang***

Kim Il-song's determination to reunite the peninsula under his leadership has been the prime objective of North Korean foreign and domestic policy. The record attests to P'yongyang's considerable efforts, ranging from the outright attack on the South in 1950 and attempts on the life of two South Korean presidents to a fitful dialogue with the South during the 1970s.

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A number of considerations appear to be behind P'yongyang's current interest in negotiations. North Korea has been trying over the past year to engage the United States in direct contacts through a tripartite formula involving South Korea. The North Koreans want to negotiate an end to the US troop presence in South Korea—long viewed as the key deterrent to a North Korean attack on the South. The North takes the view that on military matters the United States exercises ultimate authority in the South, hence the need for direct discussions with Washington:

- North Korea reads into Washington's position the prospect for tripartite discussions in the future if the inter-Korean dialogue gets under way on nonmilitary issues.

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In our view, other considerations play a role in P'yongyang's thinking as well, including developments that appear to be working against the North's interests:

- Seoul's economic success and close ties to the United States give it most of the economic and political cards, and P'yongyang may feel compelled to renew discussions in an effort to regain some initiative.

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- P'yongyang may also feel it is losing ground in the region, particularly as China improves its ties with Japan and the West. Greater flexibility in the Sino-Soviet relationship is another new element in North Korea's operating environment. [redacted]

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As Kim Il-song, 73, moves ahead with his 12-year campaign to groom his son, Kim Chong-il, to replace him, internal developments appear to be playing a role as well. [redacted]

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[redacted] the elder Kim may feel obliged to implement potentially controversial foreign policy changes before passing the baton. On the economic side, North Korea ended its 1978-84 Seven-Year Plan considerably short of its goals. This can only aggravate P'yongyang's concern over the growing economic gap with the South.

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[redacted]

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### *... And in Seoul*

South Korea has been far more willing to meet North Korean initiatives head-on since President Chun took office in 1980. Once North Korea indicated its interest in discussions during the delivery of flood relief in September last year, Seoul almost immediately produced three proposals of its own. President Chun appears to have a good grasp of the emotional attachment to the idea of a reunified Korea and of the political advantages that accrue to him when he leans forward on the issue:

- Seoul's positive approach toward opening up a dialogue with the North helps strengthen Seoul's standing among allies and friends, especially in Washington and Tokyo.
- South Korea undoubtedly has its eye on other considerations, including international gatherings such as the 1986 Asian Games and 1988 Summer Olympics, which it wishes to stage with broad participation. To the extent that Seoul appears forthcoming toward P'yongyang, it diminishes potential Communist obstacles to attending those events in Seoul.

[redacted]

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Even so, Seoul fears that the risks in fostering dialogue may be greater than the potential gains:

- It is particularly concerned that a North Korea that is seen as less threatening will parlay talks with the South into direct contacts with the United States.

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- Seoul both fears a lessening of the US security commitment and opposes any warming of US–North Korean relations without something in return from P'yongyang's Communist allies in Moscow and Beijing. [redacted]

### ***Cross-Recognition Proposals***

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South Korean concern that efforts to reduce tensions not benefit North Korea disproportionately, in our view, underlies Chun's interest in cross-recognition—a plan calling for Chinese and Soviet recognition of Seoul in exchange for US and Japanese recognition of P'yongyang. Chun seems to realize that full diplomatic recognition of the two Koreas by the major powers is an unrealistic objective at this stage and is advocating a two-tiered process beginning with Japan and China, bringing in the United States and the Soviet Union later:

- Recently he has proposed a more modest beginning in which Japan and China initiate overt and reciprocal trade links with the two Koreas. [redacted]

In focusing first on China and Japan, Chun is seeking to capitalize on China's unofficial contacts with South Korea and at the same time to slow Japanese moves toward North Korea:

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- China's growing contacts with South Korea are especially evident in nonpolitical areas. In 1984, trade between Seoul and Beijing—most of it still indirect—rose to an estimated \$675 million. The two sides have dealt on an official level to handle hijacking incidents over the past two years, and South Korean athletes and officials now regularly attend international gatherings in China.
- Opposition parties and business interests in Japan have increased unofficial contacts with North Korea over the past six months, and there are signs of behind-the-scenes efforts that could lead to an exchange of private trade offices between the two countries. [redacted]

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### ***Outlook***

Both sides held preliminary discussions in November 1984 on potential economic and humanitarian exchanges. The defection of a Soviet diplomatic trainee to the South at Panmunjom in late November prompted the North to postpone the next set of discussions scheduled for December. In January, P'yongyang again postponed contacts using the pretext of the

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annual US-South Korean military exercise Team Spirit. With the winding down of Team Spirit in early April, P'yongyang indicated its willingness to resume the dialogue:

- Official economic talks, which could lead to some low-level trade, are set for 17 May in Panmunjom.
- Semiofficial Red Cross talks, due to convene on 28 May in Seoul, and thereafter to alternate between the two capitals, will focus on issues regarding divided families.

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
The months since the current round of talks began have brought changes in South Korean domestic politics that could affect the way Seoul and P'yongyang negotiate. With the emergence of a confrontational opposition in South Korea, domestic politics have entered a new period of tension and uncertainty. The leadership in Seoul probably will develop a more defensive mentality and heighten its suspicion about P'yongyang's intentions. For its part, the North will be carefully reading developments in the South for any openings it might exploit:

- North Korea's proposal early this month for interparliamentary contacts, which would embrace South Korean opposition politicians, is an early indicator of this approach.
- Seoul may yet respond favorably, if only to be seen as flexible, but it will view such talks as having no utility and chiefly increasing the likelihood of polarizing domestic debate over its approach to the inter-Korean dialogue.

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### Chronology

#### 1945-66: Emergence and Consolidation of Separate Governments

National division, abortive efforts to reunify the peninsula under UN formulas, and finally Kim Il-song's bid to reunify Korea by force during 1950-53 give way to a period during which the two Korean states consolidate themselves politically and economically. South Korea, emphasizing "economic construction first, reunification later," lacks as fully articulated a reunification policy as North Korea. P'yongyang floats proposals for a confederation of the two Koreas and pursues a strategy of strengthening North Korea's political, economic, and military might while attempting to build an underground Marxist-Leninist political organization in the South.



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
#### Inter-Korean Developments

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#### Operating Environment

##### 15 August 1945

Korea liberated from Japanese rule; Soviet forces occupy area north of 38th Parallel, US forces occupy area south.



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##### 1945-47

Five-power trusteeship plan and US-Soviet Joint Commission on Korea founder in face of opposition by non-Communist elements.



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##### 14 November 1947

UN Resolution to hold elections throughout Korea in May 1948; UN Temporary Commission on Korea is set up to supervise the elections, but Soviets deny access to North Korea



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##### 10 May 1948

Elections held in South Korea to select a Constituent Assembly, which convenes on 31 May, elects Syngman Rhee speaker, and drafts a constitution that it promulgates in July



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##### 24 July 1948

Syngman Rhee inaugurated South Korean President



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Inter-Korean Developments

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**15 August 1948**

Republic of Korea proclaimed.

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**9 September 1948**

North Korean Communists establish the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in P'yongyang.

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**11 December 1948**

UN General Assembly declares the Republic of Korea the sole legitimate government on the Korean Peninsula.

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**30 May 1950**

General elections held in the South for the 2nd National Assembly.

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**7-19 June 1950**

North Korea floats series of peaceful proposals regarding joint meetings and assemblies with South Korea; in retrospect, a "peace offensive" prior to the military offensive the subsequent week.

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**25 June 1950**

North Korea launches an invasion of the South. UN Security Council calls for immediate end to hostilities and withdrawal of North Korean forces.

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**7 July 1950**

UN Security Council establishes unified UN command under a US commander in chief; 16 UN members contribute forces to the command.

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**2 November 1950**

China intervenes on the North Korean side.

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**27 July 1953**

Armistice ends Korean war. Seoul fails to sign.

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**Inter-Korean Developments**

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1954-57

P'yongyang issues series of proposals on steps toward reunification that are packaged together in August 1960.

14 August 1960

Kim Il-song proposes North-South Confederation (see appendix A). Elements parallel North Korean proposals made during 1954-57.

14 August 1960

South Korean students call for united front to pave way for "nationwide" general elections; they urge new Prime Minister Chang Myon to pursue a positive unification policy.

24 August 1960

Prime Minister Chang calls for UN-sponsored elections to unify Korea. (see appendix A)

5 May 1961

South Korean National Student League for Unification of the People calls for march to Panmunjom on 20 May for North-South student conference.

27 October 1953

US-South Korean mutual defense treaty signed in Washington.

April-June 1954

Geneva Conference on Korean Question ends without progress (see appendix A for proposals).

**19 April 1960**

**South Korean student protests spark ouster of President Rhee.**

**16 May 1961**

**South Korean Maj. Gen. Park Chung Hee seizes power in military coup.**

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23 October 1962  
Kim Il-song repeats 1960 confederation proposal.

[redacted]

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January-July 1963  
North and South Korean sports delegates discuss joint team for the 1964 Olympics without success.

[redacted]

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15 October 1963  
Park Chung Hee elected President in South Korea.

[redacted]

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10 December 1963  
P'yongyang proposes nonaggression pact, standing committee for cultural exchanges, conference of North-South representatives.

[redacted]

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3 June 1964  
South Korean normalization talks with Japan spark student protests; Park declares period of martial law.

[redacted]

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3 November 1964  
Park Chung Hee states opposition to any unification formula except UN-sponsored elections.

[redacted]

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22 June 1965  
South Korea-Japan Basic Treaty signed

[redacted]

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8 September 1966  
P'yongyang calls for North-South conference of political parties and social organizations to discuss unification without outside interference; demands nullification of UN resolutions.

[redacted]

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2 November 1966  
President Johnson visits South Korea

[redacted]

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**1967-69:  
Confrontation**

North Korea shifts to more militant tactics, pursuing a military buildup in earnest while seeking to generate political instability and guerrilla warfare in the South. DMZ incidents rise from 50 in 1966 to 629 in 1968. The North launches its unsuccessful raid on the Blue House and seizes the USS Pueblo.

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Inter-Korean DevelopmentsOperating Environment**21 January 1968**

North Korean commandos attempt to attack the presidential mansion in effort to assassinate Park.

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3 May 1967

Park reelected in South Korea. 

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23 January 1968

North Koreans seize USS Pueblo. 

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1 March 1968

Seoul establishes the National Unification Board to handle North-South relations.

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4 November 1968

North Korean commandos infiltrate east coast and terrorize a village.

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15 April 1969

North Korean fighters down US EC-121 reconnaissance plane.

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25 July 1969

President Nixon states intention to reduce US military presence in Asia.

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21-22 August 1969

Nixon-Park summit in San Francisco. 

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20 September 1969

UN General Assembly passes pro-South Korean resolution on Korean unification.

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21 November 1969

President Nixon, Japanese Prime Minister Sato note common "vital interest" in South Korean security in joint communique.

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<u>Inter-Korean Developments</u>	<u>Operating Environment</u>
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**5-7 April 1970**  
 Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai visits North Korea, repairs Sino-North Korean relations in aftermath of Cultural Revolution.

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**12 June 1970**  
*The New York Times* reports plans to reduce US troops in Korea; plan is officially announced 4 July; US-South Korean discussions open 11 July.

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**1970-73: Era of Dialogue**

As detente unfolds, both Koreas exhibit concern that improving relations among the major powers might lead to some form of political arrangement imposed from the outside. The two sides float initiatives leading to humanitarian contacts through the Red Cross societies, while secret political talks in both capitals culminate in the joint communique of 4 July 1972. Deep distrust and differing goals cause the dialogue to peter out after several more sessions in the fall of 1972. Lower-level contacts, however, continue within the Red Cross channel until 1978 and the South-North Coordinating Committee channel until 1975.

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Beyond merely seeking to head off an outside settlement, both sides see the dialogue as a means to pursue their own ends:

- For P'yongyang, the talks allow it to showcase its reunification policy, both to the South Korean people and the world at large. The contacts also hold out the prospect that reduced tensions might induce the United States to withdraw its troops from the South. Meanwhile, P'yongyang keeps its options open by engaging in a secret military buildup and digging infiltration tunnels.
- Seoul, by contrast, approaches the dialogue seeking to limit damage to its position—externally by not ceding the reunification field to North Korea and internally by preventing domestic opponents from exploiting the issue. Park Chung Hee ultimately uses the dialogue to consolidate and then extend his power at home under the Yushin Constitution.

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<u>Inter-Korean Developments</u>	<u>Operating Environment</u>
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**15 August 1970**  
 Park Chung Hee calls for peaceful North-South competition; asks P'yongyang to renounce use of force as prelude to North-South contacts (see appendix A).

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11 January 1971

Park's New Year's address warns South Koreans of dangers of public discussion of reunification.

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24 December 1970

South Korean National Assembly legalizes trade with nonhostile Communist countries.

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18 January 1971

UN Secretary General U Thant calls on divided countries to enter United Nations.

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3 February 1971

South Korean opposition leader Kim Dae Jung visits Washington; proposes four-power agreement to guarantee security of peninsula.

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6 February 1971

South Korea and the United States agree to US troop reduction.

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12 April 1971

P'yongyang issues eight-point proposal for "peaceful reunification" that calls for a North-South political consultative meeting involving representatives from political parties and public organizations (see appendix A).

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27 April 1971

Park elected to third term; narrowly defeats Kim Dae Jung amid allegations of widespread voting fraud.

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16 July 1971

President Nixon announces plans to visit China in 1972.

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8 July 1971

Seoul announces willingness to have direct contacts with P'yongyang and diplomatic relations with nonhostile Communist states, including China and the USSR.

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**6 August 1971**

**Kim Il-song announces willingness to meet with Park and hold North-South meeting of political parties and social organizations.** [redacted]

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**12 August 1971**

South Korean Red Cross proposes talks to discuss separated families. North Korean Red Cross accepts proposal in principle. [redacted]

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**20 September 1971**

**North and South hold first session of preparatory Red Cross talks, which lead to 37 more contacts through June 1972.** [redacted]

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**27 October 1971**

North Korean Red Cross delegation proposes agenda for full-dress talks, including mutual visits, letter exchanges, and notification and reunification of divided family members. South responds with own six-point agenda proposal on 3 December. [redacted]

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**6 December 1971**

**Park declares state of national emergency in South owing to "changing international and domestic situation," particularly developments in North-South dialogue.** [redacted]

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**10 January 1972**

Kim Il-song tells Japanese press that a peace treaty between North and South should be concluded to replace armistice agreement and that armed forces on both sides should be cut if US troops are withdrawn. Kim also calls for political negotiations to resolve the unification question. [redacted]

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**17 February 1972**

Red Cross delegations agree to hold working-level meetings to finalize agenda and procedures for full-dress talks. [redacted]

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**May 1972****North and South Korean presidential envoys exchange secret visits in P'yongyang (2-5 May) and Seoul (29 May-1 June).** 

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5 June 1972

Red Cross working-level talks produce agreed agenda for full-scale meeting. 

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**4 July 1972****Joint communique between the two Koreas reveals secret visits, agreement to pursue unification independently and peacefully, to avoid slandering each other or launching armed provocations, to undertake various exchanges, to install a Seoul-P'yongyang hotline, and to establish a South-North Coordination Committee (SNCC).** 

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19 August 1972

North Korean political parties and public organizations call for conference of political parties and people of North and South to broaden discussions on reunification. 

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**August-September 1972****Seoul-P'yongyang linked by phone on 18 August; ceremonial full-scale Red Cross meetings held in P'yongyang on 30 August and Seoul on 13 September.** 

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October-November 1972

Full-scale Red Cross meetings continue in P'yongyang (24 October) and Seoul (22 November). North and South hold SNCC contacts in Panmunjom (12 October) and P'yongyang (2-4 November); these lead to first full-fledged meeting in Seoul on 30 November and agreement to set up a permanent SNCC secretariat. 

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**17 October 1972****Park declares nationwide martial law in South; unveils restrictive Yushin Constitution.** 

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Inter-Korean DevelopmentsOperating Environment

31 October 1972

Kim Il-song makes secret visit to China. 

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21 November 1972

South Korean referendum held on draft Yushin Constitution. 

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13 December 1972

Park lifts martial law in South Korea 

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**27 December 1972****Yushin Constitution promulgated in South. North also announces new constitution, establishing post of president as head of state and designating P'yongyang the national capital, vice Seoul.** 

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5-7 March 1973

Seoul announces the first infiltration of North Korean agents since the 4 July communique and unprovoked North Korean shooting of two South Korean soldiers in the DMZ. 

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15-16 March 1973

Chilly atmosphere pervades 2nd SNCC meeting in P'yongyang; South Korean proposal for step-by-step approach toward reunification and North Korean alternatives for a peace treaty and mutual force reductions reveal widening gulf. 

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March-May 1973

5th full-scale Red Cross session held in P'yongyang (21-22 March), 6th session held in Seoul (9-10 May).

6 April 1973

North Korean assembly adopts letter to US Congress and other governments calling for end to US obstruction of dialogue, withdrawal of US troops, and end to military aid to South Korea. 

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18 May 1973

North welcomes proposal by South Korean opposition party to reorganize SNCC into all-nation consultative organization. P'yongyang reiterates call for political consultative conference.

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12 June 1973

3rd SNCC meeting held in Seoul.

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**1973-79: Competing Proposals**

As the dialogue stalemates, each side floats proposals intended to engage the other's allies. Park declares an open-door policy of pursuing contacts with Communist nations and proposes dual entry into the United Nations. North Korea rejects Park's proposals, instead bidding for US attention by proposing a peace treaty with Washington. A US proposal for cross-recognition of the two Koreas by the major powers makes no headway. The Carter administration puts troop withdrawals in the picture, Park on the defensive, and North Korea hopeful of a breakthrough. Chinese-US normalization is the backdrop to a new but ultimately fruitless exchange of competing proposals from North and South. The United States and South Korea float a proposal for tripartite talks, only to be rejected by the North a few months before Park's assassination.

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Inter-Korean Developments

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23 June 1973

**Park Chung Hee declares special foreign policy for peace and unification; endorses dual membership in international organizations and an open-door policy toward nonhostile Communist countries.**

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23 June 1973

**P'yongyang charges that Park's statement overrules North-South joint statement of 4 July 1972. North rejects dual UN entry; announces Kim Il-song's five principles for reunification:**

- **Withdrawal of US troops, end to arms race.**
- **Conclusion of North Korea-US peace treaty.**
- **North-South cooperation and conference of political and social organizations.**
- **Establishment of unified Koryo Federal Republic.**
- **Entry into United Nations as single entity.**

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**Inter-Korean Developments**

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11 July 1973

Red Cross talks stagnate after North Korea rejects proposal for reciprocal visits to grave sites.

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28 August 1973

**P'yongyang withdraws from SNCC meetings, citing Park's 23 June statement and Kim Dae Jung's kidnaping. Intermittent working-level contacts in SNCC channel continue until 1975—and in Red Cross channel until 1978—but no substantive progress results.**

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16 November 1973

P'yongyang demands suspension of special foreign policy and release of imprisoned Communist sympathizers as precondition for resumption of SNCC talks.

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18 January 1974

Park proposes North-South nonaggression pact; rejected by North on 26 January.

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29 May 1974

Red Cross representatives agree to resume working-level sessions on 10 July.

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**Operating Environment**

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8 August 1973

South Korean dissident Kim Dae Jung is kidnaped in Tokyo.

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January 1974

Park declares emergency measures Nos. 1 and 2, prohibiting opposition to constitution (8 January), and emergency measure No. 3 against actions disrupting the economy (14 January).

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23 March 1974

**P'yongyang proposes peace treaty between the United States and North Korea.**

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4 April 1974

Park proclaims emergency measure No. 4 aimed at controlling student unrest.

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Inter-Korean Developments

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21 June 1974

International Red Cross on behalf of South Korea proposes that senior Red Cross delegates resume meetings in Geneva. North rejects outside interference.

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22 June 1974

**Park states four-point proposal for reunification:**

- Normalization of SNCC and Red Cross talks.
- Conclusion of North-South nonaggression pact.
- Mutual admission to the United Nations.
- Seoul to pursue open-door policy without regard to ideology

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10 July 1974

First working-level Red Cross meeting at Panmunjom. North calls for reaffirmation of five principles in North-South joint statement, and rejects outside interference.

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15 August 1974

Park narrowly escapes assassination attempt by North Korean agent at Liberation Day ceremony; Mrs. Park is killed.

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15 August 1974

**Park's Liberation Day speech includes three-point proposal for reunification:**

- Conclusion of North-South nonaggression pact.
- Dialogue and exchanges to build mutual trust.
- Korea-wide democratic elections to achieve reunification.

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15 November 1974

Seoul announces discovery of North Korean infiltration tunnel

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29 May 1975

P'yongyang says it will not participate in 11th SNCC vice cochairmen's meeting scheduled for 30 May.

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**Inter-Korean Developments**

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**June-November 1975**

North takes harsher tone in Red Cross working-level meetings. On 14 November North Korean Red Cross publishes statement accusing South of actions aimed at "completely wrecking" the talks. Rallies in South Korea call for mutual visits to ancestral graves (14-24 November).

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**3 July 1975**

North demands, on anniversary of 4 July joint statement, that Seoul reject US interference, demand US troop withdrawal, and eliminate political control measures. P'yongyang also states that sincere dialogue will be possible only when a "patriotic democratic figure" takes office in South, but in subsequent statement on 14 July North claims that door is not closed to negotiations with Seoul authorities.

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**27 December 1975**

Park revokes emergency measure No. 3 on economic stability.

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**31 March 1976**

Seoul proposes meeting of chief delegates to discuss deadlocked Red Cross talks. P'yongyang rejects proposal on 7 April

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**22-23 July 1976**

US Secretary of State Kissinger proposes four-way talks to discuss Korean question. Seoul urges P'yongyang and Beijing to accept.

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**18 August 1976**

North Korean soldiers attack UN Command tree-cutting squad at Panmunjom, killing two US officers.

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**30 August 1976**

P'yongyang severs North-South hotline.

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Inter-Korean Developments

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30 September 1976  
Secretary Kissinger in UN speech proposes  
North-South meeting in preparation for four-  
way talks.

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12 January 1977  
Park offers food aid to North, states nonopposi-  
tion to US troop withdrawal if nonaggression pact  
is concluded.

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1 February 1977  
North rejects proposal by South's SNCC co-  
chairman to discuss nonaggression agreement.

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11 February 1977  
P'yongyang rejects Seoul's offer to hold eighth  
full-dress Red Cross meeting in Panmunjom if  
P'yongyang cannot agree to meeting in Seoul.

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19 March 1978  
P'yongyang postpones working-level Red Cross  
talks indefinitely.

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23 June 1978  
Park proposes civilian consultative body on  
North-South economic cooperation.

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23 October 1978  
Japan-China Peace Treaty signed.

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1 January 1979  
US-Chinese relations normalized.

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19 January 1979  
Park calls for resumption of North-South talks  
without preconditions.

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23 January 1979

North Korea proposes four-point program for opening a National Congress.

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**February-March 1979**

**P'yongyang's fielding of Democratic Front for the Unification of the Fatherland representatives to hold discussions with Seoul's SNCC delegates shows North Korea's lack of interest in negotiations; discussions fail.**

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**1-10 July 1979**

**During summit meeting in South Korea, the United States persuades a reluctant South Korea jointly to propose tripartite discussions with North Korea; Park also calls on the North to resume Red Cross talks.**

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**26 October 1979**

**Park Chung Hee is assassinated by KCIA Director Kim Jae Kyu.**

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**12 December 1979**

**South Korean Maj. Gen. Chun Doo Hwan leads successful coup against Army command.**

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**21 December 1979**

**South Korean Interim President Choi Kyu Ha calls for resumption of North-South dialogue.**

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11 January 1980

South Korean Amateur Sports Association proposes sports exchanges with North and joint teams for international competitions.

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**1980: A Short-Lived Thaw**

North Korea sees Park's departure as a new opportunity and tests the waters by proposing prime-ministerial talks as well as a conference on reunification. This marks the first time either Korea uses the official name for the other side. As Chun Doo Hwan emerges as the South's new strongman, P'yongyang clearly loses interest in dialogue and working-level meetings grind to a halt in September. [redacted]

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Inter-Korean DevelopmentsOperating Environment**12 January 1980**

**North Korean Premier Yi Chong-ok proposes meeting with South Korean Prime Minister Shin Hyon Hwack; first use of official title for Republic of Korea; North Korean Vice President Kim Il sends letters to South Korean leaders proposing conference on reunification.** [redacted]

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**24 January 1980**

South Korean Prime Minister Shin proposes working-level meetings to arrange prime ministers' conference; first working-level session held at Panmunjom on 6 February [redacted]

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**17-27 May 1980**

**Nationwide martial law is declared in South Korea following demonstrations against military government; Kim Dae Jung is arrested; the Army quells riots in Kwangju.** [redacted]

25X1

**27 August 1980**

**Chun Doo Hwan retires from South Korean Army, is elected President by National Assembly.** [redacted]

25X1

**12 September 1980**

South Korean Red Cross chairman urges North Korean counterpart to resume plenary meetings. [redacted]

25X1

**24 September 1980**

**North Korea unilaterally suspends working-level contacts for prime ministers' meeting.** [redacted]

25X1



Secret

**1980-83: The Battle for the Initiative on Reunification**

Kim Il-song launches a new campaign for a confederal republic at the Sixth Korean Workers' Party conference in October 1980, and an assertive Chun moves quickly to eclipse the North Korean initiative by proposing a summit meeting the following January. Chun elaborates on this proposal and a year later offers 20 confidence-building measures. For both sides, these proposals remain the keystone of their unification policies. [redacted]

25X1

From P'yongyang's perspective a number of developments erode its position during this period: the return of South Korean political stability and economic performance; stronger US-South Korean relations; and Seoul's diplomatic successes—extending even to growing informal contacts with China and the Eastern Bloc. Chun's visit to Burma in October 1983 presents the North with an opportunity to remove the South Korean leadership, but the assassination attempt in Rangoon fails and North Korean culpability becomes evident [redacted]

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**Inter-Korean Developments**

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**Operating Environment**

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**10 October 1980**

Kim Il-song presents proposal at Sixth Party Congress to form a Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo (see appendix B) but refuses to discuss idea with Chun government. [redacted]

25X1

**12 January 1981**

Chun's New Year's policy statement proposes North-South summit without preconditions, P'yongyang rejects proposal. [redacted]

25X1

**2 February 1981**

Presidents Reagan and Chun hold summit in Washington. [redacted]

25X1

**6 February 1981**

P'yongyang rejects UN Secretary General Waldheim's support for Seoul's proposed North-South summit proposal. [redacted]

25X1

**5 June 1981**

Chun repeats summit offer; suggests sports, academic, and cultural exchanges as "trustbuilding measures." [redacted]

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**Inter-Korean Developments**

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**Operating Environment**

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**19 June 1981**South Korean Olympic committee proposes forming joint team for 1984 games. 

25X1

**6 August 1981**North Korean political parties and social organizations propose conference with counterparts to accelerate unification. South Korean Government leaders are not invited. 

25X1

**30 September 1981****International Olympic Committee selects Seoul to host 1988 Summer Olympics.** 

25X1

**25 November 1981****Asian Games Federation selects Seoul as site for 1986 games; P'yongyang withdraws candidacy shortly before voting.** 

25X1

**22 January 1982****Chun's New Year's policy statement unveils formula for North-South reconciliation (see appendix B); invites P'yongyang to participate in consultative conference for national reunification to draft a unification constitution.** 

25X1

**1 February 1982**Seoul proposes 20 pilot projects to build trust between South and North. P'yongyang rejects idea on 10 February. 

25X1

**12 August 1982**South Korean Red Cross urges North to resume Red Cross meetings on problem of separated families. 

25X1

**15 August 1982**Chun announces that Koreans living in any Communist country can freely travel to and from South Korea. 

25X1

Secret

Inter-Korean Developments

Operating Environment

13 October 1982  
Soviet press, cultural officials visit South Korea for first time to attend international conference.

[redacted]

25X1

19 October 1982  
Chinese pilot flies his MIG-19 into South Korea and defects to Taiwan.

[redacted]

25X1

1 January 1983  
Kim Il-song tells Japanese reporter it is inconceivable that China or the Soviet Union could recognize the "illegitimate" authorities in Seoul.

[redacted]

25X1

11 January 1983  
Chun and Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone hold summit in Seoul; announce agreement on Japanese economic assistance package to South Korea; Chun raises cross-recognition issue with Nakasone.

[redacted]

25X1

18 January 1983  
P'yongyang proposes "working-level" meeting between North's political parties and social organizations and counterparts in the South, including the ruling Democratic Justice Party

[redacted]

25X1

1 February 1983  
Seoul proposes North-South conference of representatives of government, political parties, and social organizations to discuss summit meeting and "other issues."

[redacted]

25X1

6 February 1983  
South Korean Foreign Minister Lee and Secretary of State Shultz discuss cross-recognition. Secretary Shultz on 8 February moots four-power cross-recognition as possible tension-reducing measure.

[redacted]

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**Inter-Korean Developments**

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**Operating Environment**

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- 26 February 1983  
Asian press carries reports that the United States is to relax diplomatic guidance on contacts with North Koreans.  25X1
- 11 March 1983  
South Korean Unification Minister states South and North must compete in development race "to win the right" to decide unification issue.  25X1
- 5 April 1983  
Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Qian Qichen rejects cross-recognition idea in remarks to Japanese reporter.  25X1
- 9 April 1983  
Kim Il-song asks Egyptian President Mubarak to convey P'yongyang's desire for direct dialogue with the United States to Prime Minister Nakasone.  25X1
- 26 April 1983  
Seoul announces preparation of draft constitution for a unified Korea.  25X1
- 12 April 1983  
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kapitsa publicly rejects cross-recognition idea.  25X1
- 27 April 1983  
Seoul says P'yongyang's teams welcome to play at 1986 Asian Games and 1988 Olympics.  25X1
- 1 May 1983  
Interparliamentary Union confirms annual meeting in Seoul in October.  25X1
- 9 May 1983  
South Korean and Chinese officials conclude unprecedented direct negotiations to resolve hijacking of Chinese airliner.  25X1

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Inter-Korean Developments

Operating Environment

July 1983

South Korea broadcasts monthlong program to reunite South Korean families separated since the Korean war. [redacted]

25X1

6 July 1983

South Korean Red Cross proposes resumption of North-South talks on divided families. [redacted]

25X1

24 July 1983

P'yongyang agrees to reconvene Red Cross meetings if South Korean Red Cross demands US troop withdrawal and Chun's resignation. [redacted]

25X1

7 August 1983

Chinese pilot flies his MIG-21 into South Korea and defects to Taiwan. [redacted]

25X1

1 September 1983

Soviets shoot down Korean Airlines jet over Sakhalin Island. [redacted]

25X1

28 September 1983

Deng Xiaoping meets with Secretary Weinberger in Beijing; discussions touch on Korea. [redacted]

25X1

9 October 1983

Chun narrowly escapes North Korean assassination attempt in Rangoon; 17 South Korean officials killed. [redacted]

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Secret

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**1984-Present:  
Tripartite  
Talks and a  
Fitful Dialogue**

A North Korean bid for tripartite talks with Washington and Seoul emerges through the Chinese virtually at the same time as the Rangoon incident. Over the next year, North Korea presents an image of flexibility on the question as it presses for a favorable response and seeks to repair damage to its international image. The goal, to engage the United States directly and remove US troops from the South, remains constant. [redacted]

25X1

North-South dialogue resumes when P'yongyang proposes discussions to field a joint team to the Los Angeles Olympics. The short leadtime and South Korean distrust of North Korean motivations work against progress during the three meetings held. North Korea announces it will join the Soviet-led boycott of the 1984 Summer Olympics as Kim Il-song is on a trip to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, presaging greater attention by P'yongyang to its relations with Moscow. A few months later, a North Korean offer of flood relief and Seoul's acceptance of that offer set the stage for a new round of economic and Red Cross contacts. P'yongyang carefully paces the two sets of talks with an eye on the larger goal of tripartite talks. Seoul's attention, meanwhile, is increasingly distracted by domestic political problems and tensions in its relations with Washington that could make it less willing to take political risks in its dealings with the North. [redacted]

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Inter-Korean Developments

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Operating Environment

11 October 1983

China forwards to the United States a North Korean proposal for talks with Washington on Korea; proposal is billed as being without preconditions [redacted]

25X1

6 November 1983

China reports both Burma's announcement blaming the North Koreans for the Rangoon bombing and P'yongyang's official denial of the charges. Moscow reports only the North's denial. [redacted]

25X1

7 November 1983

Washington retracts more relaxed guidance issued 30 September on US contacts with North Korean officials. [redacted]

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**Inter-Korean Developments**

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**Operating Environment**

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**6 December 1983**

Chinese pass to US officials a North Korean proposal for tripartite talks. [redacted]

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**10 January 1984**

P'yongyang publicizes its talks' proposal after it is leaked in the South Korean press [redacted]

25X1

**11 January 1984**

Seoul and Washington indicate two Korean sides must resolve inter-Korean questions directly. Seoul does not reject tripartite publicly but prefers broader multiparty format that would include China. [redacted]

25X1

**24 January 1984**

North Korean Premier Yi Chong-ok sends letter to "Seoul authorities" urging participation in three-way talks. [redacted]

25X1

**9 February 1984**

Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang at press conference says, "China has not thought about participation in talks and the DPRK has not suggested our participation." [redacted]

25X1

**14 February 1984**

South Korean Prime Minister Chin Iee-Chong calls on P'yongyang to apologize for Rangoon bombing and urges summit meeting. [redacted]

25X1

**7 March 1984**

P'yongyang passes letter at Panmunjom; claims it is not wedded to particular talks format, but language casts Seoul as a junior partner. [redacted]

25X1

**10 March 1984**

South Korean Prime Minister Chin restates Seoul's support for North-South talks or an expanded multiparty formula. [redacted]

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**Inter-Korean Developments**

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**19 March 1984**

South Korean news agency Yonhap cites a Foreign Ministry source that Seoul will not take part in three-way talks even if North Korea apologizes for Rangoon and promises to treat the South as an equal. [redacted]

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**Operating Environment**

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**23-26 March 1984**

Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone visits China. Premier Zhao Ziyang tells Nakasone that South Koreans will be allowed to visit relatives in China; Chinese previously had permitted a small number of Chinese to visit relatives in Korea. Hu Yaobang urges development of Japanese-North Korean ties, with China as possible go-between; Nakasone offers only "humanitarian contacts." [redacted]

25X1

**27 March 1984**

Hu Yaobang tells North Korean press delegation he will visit North Korea in early May. [redacted]

25X1

**30 March 1984**

P'yongyang proposes joint team for Los Angeles Olympics in letter passed at Panmunjom. Seoul agrees, but raises Rangoon incident. [redacted]

25X1

**9 April 1984**

North and South Korean Olympic committee representatives meet for two hours, break up after South raises Rangoon, 1978 kidnaping cases. [redacted]

25X1

**10-28 April 1984**

Both sides accuse other of scuttling sports talks. P'yongyang demands that Seoul not raise political issues. Sides finally agree to resume discussions on 30 April. [redacted]

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**29 April 1984**

P'yongyang, Moscow announce Kim Il-song will visit the Soviet Union in late May. [redacted]

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**Inter-Korean Developments**

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**Operating Environment**

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**30 April 1984**North and South Korean representatives trade charges at second round of sports talks. 

25X1

**4 May 1984**Hu Yaobang arrives in P'yongyang. 

25X1

**8 May 1984****Moscow announces it will boycott Los Angeles Olympics.** 

25X1

**25 May 1984**North and South Korean sides again trade accusations at third meeting to discuss joint sports team. 

25X1

**2 June 1984****On final day for applications to Los Angeles Olympics, P'yongyang announces it will not participate; cites concern over safety of athletes and stalled North-South sports talks; does not refer directly to Soviet boycott.** 

25X1

**22 June 1984**Japanese press reports Kim Il-song's message to Nakasone via Sihanouk on 31 May. Kim states intention to reduce tensions, not invade South, and seriousness about tripartite talks. 

25X1

**25 June 1984**Zang Xianshan, Vice President of China-Japan Friendship Association, tells Japanese Socialist Party delegation that China would be in no position to support North if it launches attack on South, but would intervene if South launched the attack. 

25X1

**1 July 1984****Kim Il-song returns from six-week trip to Soviet Union, Eastern Europe; heir-apparent Kim Chong-il achieves new visibility during father's absence.** 

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**Inter-Korean Developments**

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**Operating Environment**

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<p>6 August 1984 Seoul circulates aide-memoire that all but rejects any talks' format other than two way. <input type="checkbox"/></p>	<p>5-10 August 1984 North Korean Premier Kang Song-san visits China on his first venture abroad as Premier; focus is on economic relations and media treatment suggests some differences exist. <input type="checkbox"/> 25X1</p>
<p>17 August 1984 Seoul proposes sports talks be resumed. <input type="checkbox"/></p>	<p>13 August 1984 President Chun releases to Taiwan the hijackers of a Chinese civil aircraft that landed in South Korea in May 1983. <input type="checkbox"/> 25X1</p>
<p>20 August 1984 <b>Chun, in annual press conference, proposes inter-Korean trade talks get under way.</b> <input type="checkbox"/></p>	<p>25X1</p>
<p>24 August 1984 South Korean Unification Minister presses Chun's proposal for trade; says a North Korean apology for Rangoon not a prerequisite for inter-Korean talks; emphasizes South Korean desire for two-way discussions. <input type="checkbox"/></p>	<p>25X1</p>
<p>25 August 1984 <b>North Korea rejects Chun's call for trade talks.</b> <input type="checkbox"/></p>	<p>25X1</p>
<p>27 August 1984 P'yongyang rejects Seoul's proposal to renew sports talks; insists on South Korean apology for failure of discussions during the spring. <input type="checkbox"/></p>	<p>25X1</p>
	<p>6-8 September 1984 Chun visits Japan; says Tokyo would be an acceptable venue for his 1981 proposal to meet Kim Il-song. <input type="checkbox"/> 25X1</p>

Secret

Secret

Inter-Korean Developments

Operating Environment

**8 September 1984**

**In wake of torrential rain in South Korea, North Korean Red Cross offers relief to flood victims in the South.** [redacted]

25X1

**12 September 1984**

**South Korean dissident Kim Dae Jung announces he will return to South Korea by the end of the year.** [redacted]

25X1

**14 September 1984**

**South Korea accepts North's offer of flood relief; details are ironed out during contacts on 18-20 September.** [redacted]

25X1

**18-22 September 1984**

**Japanese Socialist Party leader Ishibashi visits P'yongyang; Kim Il-song transmits messages of flexibility on tripartite talks, suggests flood relief contacts could lead to other exchanges with South Korea.** [redacted]

25X1

**19 September-9 October 1984**

**North Korean Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam travels to the United Nations; first such trip since 1977.** [redacted]

25X1

**24 September 1984**

**P'yongyang reports meeting between Kim Chong-il and Soviet Ambassador; first sign that Moscow acknowledges the younger Kim's special status.** [redacted]

25X1

**25 September 1984**

**South Korean media, days before the flood relief transfer, leak news of North Korean Army redeployments closer to DMZ.** [redacted]

25X1

**29 September-4 October 1984**

**Transfer of flood relief goods from North to South takes place without incident; both sides agree to reactivate hotline (active 1972-76; 1980).** [redacted]

25X1

Secret

Secret

Inter-Korean Developments

Operating Environment

4 October 1984

South Korean Red Cross proposes both sides resume humanitarian contacts suspended since 1973; Seoul also proposes sports talks be resumed.

25X1

6 October 1984

Hotline between the two Koreas resumes operation.

25X1

9 October 1984

South Korea unveils monument to victims on first anniversary of Rangoon bombing; Chun's statement calls for North Korean apology.

25X1

12 October 1984

South Korean Deputy Prime Minister sends letter to North Korean counterpart proposing trade, joint ventures.

25X1

15 October 1984

North Korea and Japan sign fisheries pact in P'yongyang.

25X1

16 October 1984

P'yongyang agrees to Seoul's trade proposal; sets 15 November as date for first session of economic talks.

25X1

25X1

30 October 1984

North Korean Red Cross accepts proposal to resume humanitarian contacts; proposes 20 November as meeting date to iron out arrangements for full plenary session in P'yongyang.

25X1

Secret

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Inter-Korean Developments

Operating Environment

12-27 November 1984

Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kapitsa visits North Korea to conclude border treaty; Soviet, North Korean media acknowledge his meetings with Kim Il-song on 20th and with Kim Chong-il on 23rd.

25X1

15 November 1984

First session of economic talks allows both sides to showcase their approaches: P'yongyang wants joint ventures and trade to proceed simultaneously; Seoul prefers trade contacts broadening into cooperative efforts.

25X1

20 November 1984

Preliminary Red Cross contact occurs at Panmunjom; both sides working toward next plenary in Seoul.

25X1

23 November 1984

Soviet diplomatic trainee visiting North Korea succeeds in defecting to South Korea but sparks a DMZ firefight. North Korea, South Korea trade recriminations in ensuing days.

25X1

27-29 November 1984

P'yongyang radio announces postponement of economic talks, set for 5 December, inevitable because of tense atmosphere, but holds out some hope that discussions could resume in January.

25X1

30 November 1984


P'yongyang, Beijing announce Kim Il-song made an unofficial visit to China during 26-28 November; issue of resuming the inter-Korean dialogue high on the agenda; some differences emerge in media treatment.

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Secret

Inter-Korean Developments

Operating Environment



25X1

11 December 1984  
China relays a letter from North Korean Foreign Minister Kim to Secretary Shultz; letter attempts to inject new life into tripartite proposal by suggesting Beijing as a venue.

25X1

14 December 1984  
P'yongyang radio broadcasts North Korean proposals that economic discussions resume on 17 January and Red Cross plenary meeting be held in Seoul on 22-25 January.

25X1

1 January 1985  
Kim Il-song's New Year's statement emphasizes progress in North-South talks; pledges patience in awaiting favorable response to tripartite proposal.

25X1

4 January 1985  
Seoul, through UN Command, notifies North Korean side of dates for annual US-South Korean Team Spirit military exercise; reiterates longstanding invitation for North Koreans and Chinese to observe.

25X1

7 January 1985  
P'yongyang media campaign condemning Team Spirit reaches authoritative level when Kim Il-song characterizes the exercises as an affront to peace in a banquet he hosts for visiting Portuguese Communist leaders.

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Secret

Inter-Korean Developments

Operating Environment

7 January 1985

Coordinated US-South Korean response to 11 December proposal passed to Chinese in Washington; Chinese Ambassador eventually accepts the response, which takes form of letter from South Korean Foreign Minister to Chinese counterpart. In essence, the response emphasizes inter-Korean contacts progressing further before multiparty talks ensue. [redacted]

25X1

9 January 1985

**P'yongyang uses Team Spirit to postpone Red Cross plenary; hints it will suspend next economic contact set for 17 January unless both sides hold vice ministerial meeting to overcome the Team Spirit "obstacle."** [redacted]

25X1

9 January 1985

Chun's New Year's address calls for progress toward high-level political discussions between two sides; establishment of liaison offices in respective capitals [redacted]

25X1

16 January 1985

**North Korean Vice Premier postpones economic meeting set for the next day; blames United States, South Korea.** [redacted]

25X1

3 February 1985

Diversion of US-manufactured helicopters to North Korea is revealed, creating new tensions in US-South Korean relations. [redacted]

25X1

8 February 1985

**Dissident Kim Dae Jung returns to South Korea. Airport fracas involving Americans leads to resentment against US interference.** [redacted]

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Inter-Korean Developments

Operating Environment

**12 February 1985**

**South Korean parliamentary elections give opposition leadership to New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP) backed by Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam; campaign underscores Chun's extreme unpopularity.** [redacted]

25X1

**6 March 1985**

**Seoul lifts remaining political bans, including that on Kim Dae Jung, and releases Kim from house arrest. NKDP president calls for Chun's early resignation.** [redacted]

25X1

**12 March 1985**

**Kim Il-song's message to new Soviet leader Gorbachev praises North Korean-Soviet friendship, solidarity.** [redacted]

25X1

**25 March 1985**

**Seoul urges resumption of economic talks on 18 April, convocation of Red Cross session in Seoul on 15 April.** [redacted]

25X1

**22-28 March 1985**

**South Korea negotiates with Chinese over return of Chinese naval vessel taken over by two mutineers in South Korean territorial waters. Seoul returns vessel and crew in exchange for official, properly addressed apology; South Koreans fessesse whether mutineers were attempting to defect.** [redacted]

25X1

**27 March 1985**

**Soviet skaters tour South Korea. First Soviet visit since KAL shootdown.** [redacted]

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Inter-Korean Developments

Operating Environment

**4 April 1985**

**North Korea proposes to hold Red Cross talks in Seoul on 28 May and resume economic talks on 17 May. Seoul accepts.**

25X1

**9 April 1985**

**North Korea proposes interparliamentary talks with South Korea to work out a nonaggression pact outside tripartite forum; sends letters to speaker of the National Assembly and all party presidents.**

25X1

**16-23 April 1985**

**North Korean Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam visits Soviet Union. P'yongyang takes lead in publicizing joint communique; break with long-standing practice of not issuing joint communique provides further evidence of North Korea's efforts to strengthen ties with Moscow.**

25X1

**18 April 1985**

**North Korean press delegation visits Japan at invitation of JSP; first visit since Rangoon incident.**

25X1

**19 April 1985**

**Seoul calls for resumption of North-South sports talks.**

25X1

**22 April 1985**

**South Korean diplomats visit China for first time to attend international conference.**

25X1

**25-27 April 1985**

**Chun Doo Hwan makes official working visit to Washington.**

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Secret

**Appendix A****Historical Proposals****April 1954**

Post-Armistice Geneva Conference (ended without progress).

**North Korea**

- Establish All Korea Commission (AKC); equal representation for P'yongyang and Seoul.
- Elections for All Korea National Assembly supervised by AKC.
- All foreign troops to withdraw within six months.

**South Korea**

- Establish elected national legislature; representation proportional to population.
- Supervision of elections in North by United Nations; in South under existing South Korean Constitution.
- Chinese forces to withdraw before elections.
- UN forces to remain until political stability is restored.
- UN guarantee for integrity and independence of unified Korea.

**August 1960****North Korea** (14 August—eve of 15th anniversary of liberation)

- Loose confederation based on all-Korea elections; alternately, with full autonomy for both sides.
- Establishment of Supreme National Committee to coordinate cultural and economic development; alternately, lower-level Joint Economic Committee.
- Withdrawal of US forces; mutual force reduction to 100,000 men each.

**South Korea** (24 August)

- Unification through free and democratic elections under UN supervision.
- Creation of unified committee *after* elections.
- Economic and cultural exchanges *after* elections.
- Unified Korea must preserve democracy and civil rights.

**1970-71****North Korea** (12 April 1971)

- Conference of all political parties, North and South, to discuss confederation.
- Confederation as transitional step, leaving separate social systems intact prior to complete reunification.
- Offer to begin North-South talks at any time at Panmunjom or in third country.

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- Resignation/ouster of Seoul government headed by Park Chung Hee as precondition to negotiations (dropped after President Nixon visited China).
- Withdrawal of US troops.

**South Korea** (15 August 1970—25th anniversary of liberation)

- Gradual removal of North-South barriers.
- Peaceful competition in various fields.
- Nonopposition to North's presence at UN debate on Korea issue if P'yongyang accepts UN authority.
- Dialogue conditional on end to North Korean provocations and P'yongyang's renunciation of efforts to overthrow Seoul government.



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**Appendix B****Current Proposals****North Korea**

Formation of a Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo (DCRK), announced by Kim Il-song at the Sixth Party Congress of the North Korean Workers' Party, October 1980.

**Initial Steps**

- Democratization of South Korean politics.
- Repeal of South Korea's anti-Communist laws.
- Conclusion of a US-North Korea peace treaty and withdrawal of US troops from the South.
- A North-South conference of representatives of political parties and social organizations to discuss formation of the DCRK.

**Organization of the DCRK**

- Creation of a Supreme National Federal Assembly with equal representation for North and South.
- Creation of a Standing Committee under the assembly to serve as a united government of the confederal state.
- Recognition and acceptance of the ideologies and systems of North and South.
- Separate regional governments in North and South with local autonomy within the limits of the interest and demands of the entire nation.

**Administrative Guidelines for the DCRK**

- Adherence to independent national policies.
- Pursuit of democracy and great national unity.
- Economic cooperation toward an independent national economy.
- Cultural and educational cooperation.
- Traffic and communications between North and South.
- Pursuit of economic well-being for the entire people.
- Creation of a combined national army.
- Coordination of foreign activities.
- Peaceful, nonaligned foreign policy; friendly relations with all countries.

**South Korea**

Peaceful Reunification Through National Reconciliation and a Democratic Process (Chun Doo Hwan's New Year's policy statement, January 1982).

**Initial Steps**

- A North-South summit meeting to discuss reunification issues without preconditions.

**Secret****Provisional Agreement on Basic Relations**

- North-South relations to be based on equality and reciprocity, pending unification.
- North and South to renounce violence and resolve problems through dialogue and negotiation.
- North and South not to interfere in each other's political order and social institutions.
- North and South to maintain existing armistice arrangements pending measures to end military confrontation.
- North and South to open their societies to each other progressively—including free travel and cooperation in technical, cultural, and economic fields.
- North and South to respect each other's treaties until unification is achieved.
- North and South to appoint plenipotentiary envoys to deal with liaison issues.

**Unification Formula**

- Formation of a Consultative Conference for National Reunification (CCNR) to draft a unified constitution.
- Democratic referendum throughout North and South to ratify the constitution.
- Democratic general elections under the constitution to form a unified government.
- Establishment of a unified democratic republic pursuing the ideals of nationalism, democracy, liberty, and well-being.



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