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11 June 1981

China Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

(FOUO 3/81)

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY STRESSED IN MILITARY COMMAND SCHOOLS

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 18 Aug 79 p 1

[Article: "Strive to Cultivate Commanders Who Meet the Requirements of Modern Warfare"]

[Text] In order to strengthen the teaching in military academies and schools of modern science and technology, and to cultivate more commanders who meet the requirements of modern warfare, the General Staff Department recently held a meeting on the teaching and research of modern military science and technology in all PLA academies and schools. The meeting was attended by leading cadres and instructors from 43 command academies and schools. The meeting made a preliminary investigation of the way education is being carried out on modern military science and technology in the academies and schools, in order to make a good beginning in spreading the study of modern military science and technology throughout the PLA.

During the period of the meeting, the personnel at the meeting spent 21 days' time on studying the topics of nuclear weapons, guided missiles, artificial satellites, lasers, night vision techniques, electronic warfare, military systems engineering, operations research, electronic computers, and command automation. Everybody unanimously reported that the study had broadened their horizons and increased their knowledge and that big results had been gained, so that when they return to their organizations they will have a clearer idea of how to teach.

The comrades at the meeting held that the developments of science and technology are being widely applied on the battlefield, and that it can be affirmed that the size and scope of a future war will be unprecedentedly large, the conditions on the battlefield will be more complex and will change even more. All these things, they said, will impose even higher demands on organizational command. If a commander does not have a fixed amount of knowledge about modern science and technology and does not have the capacity for organizational command in conducting operations under modern conditions, then it will be difficult for him to master warfare and he will not be able to win a victory. Therefore, to cultivate a large batch of commanders and technically talented persons who possess knowledge about military science, who are able to master and use modern weapons and equipment, and who are able to skillfully organize and command forces in modern warfare, is a strategic measure for raising the modernization level of our armed forces and is also an urgent, arduous task for the command academies and schools must truly realize the importance of launching education on military science and technology,

conscientiously put it on the daily agenda, and plan, arrange, and take measures for it. They must adopt measures to improve the organizational leadership and teaching capability of the leading cadres and instructors of these academies and schools. They must vigorously organize manpower and material to get a grip as quickly as possible on the teaching of military science and technology.

The meeting also studied the problems of the content, time, teaching structure, and teaching guarantees for the teaching of modern military science and technology in the armed forces' academies and schools, for which it put forward some opinions and suggestions. The meeting held: The content and time for teaching science and technology should be put into a teaching outline, and the content must be differentiated based on the different training targets; in the command academies and schools, the study of cultural education and of science and technology should be integrated, with the latter being paramount; if ordinary structures cannot specially arrange to take responsibility for the teaching of science and technology, the responsibility for the teaching of various topics can be separately borne by the teaching and research sections concerned, but the academies and schools that are cultivating cadres at the division level and above can, after permission is granted, set up structures for teaching science and technology; and with the regard to the problem of teaching guarantees, besides the solutions devised by the academies and schools at various levels, the General Staff Department will provide a unified solution of the problem of new-type weaponry and equipment, teaching films, and jointly using models and wall charts. The departments concerned will conscientiously study and solve the above problems.

During the meeting, He Zhengwen, deputy chief of staff [of the PLA General Staff Department] and Tao Hanzhang [7118 3352 4545], deputy director of the Military Academy, gave speeches.

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

JI'NAN UNIT FORMS COMPLETE SET OF TRAINING PROGRAMS

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 15 Aug 79 p 2

[Article by Wang Lifeng [3769 4539 1496], Wang Xiaoling [3769 2556 3781], Guan Jinwu [7070 6210 2976], and Gu Guangcheng [0657 0342 2052]: "To Carry Out Training Effectively It Is Necessary To Formulate a Complete Set of Programs"]

[Text] Not long ago, a General Staff work team and leading comrades of the Ji'nan Units led responsible persons of units concerned to a certain unit to observe part of a complete set of training programs on the topics of the "three attacks and three defenses." They held that this approach was correct and feasible and that it was an effective way to improve training quality.

Why Do We Want Complete Sets?

Party committees at all levels in this unit have all along been fairly attentive to military training. Last year, in line with the spirit stressed by the Military Commission [of the CCP Central Committee] of "giving prominence to training in the three attacks" and "strengthening training in the "three defenses," the committees arranged the training content, stipulated the time for completion of the training, and vigorously imposed demands on the training. Who would have thought that, when examined at yearend, most of the companies had just gone through the motions of training in the "three attacks and three defenses" and that some of them had even not completed the training in the prescribed time. What was the problem: Four leading comrades assigned by the party committees led a work team to carry out investigation and research in the unit. A great number of facts showed that the cadres and fighters of the companies wanted to be trained effectively in the "three attacks and three defenses," and only owing to the fact that some of the training contents and methods did not meet the requirements of modern warfare, and that for some training contents the upper levels did not have enough time to put forward specific methods for organizational implementation so that there was a shortage in instructional written materials, equipment, and personnel, the companies did things haphazardly and the "three attacks and three defenses" training could not be carried out properly. At the beginning of this year, when the unit's party committee was studying how to shift the focus of its work so that education and training would be at the center, it got in touch with reality and conscientiously discussed the problems existing in the unit's "three attacks and three defenses" training. The members of the committee unanimously held that training in the unit and education in a school were the same, i.e., there must be a complete set of training

programs for the contents of instruction, the methods of implementation, the supply of equipment, the ranks of instructors, and the standards of examination, and that only if each is linked to the other can the training be done rapidly and with high quality. Everybody decided to start by formulating a complete set of training programs and thus effectively carry out training in the "three attacks and three defenses."

How Does One Form a Complete Set?

How was a complete set to be formulated? First of all, the party committee organized leading cadres at all levels to engage in study so that all of them became clear about the importance of effectively carrying out "three attacks and three defenses" training, and about the task of and demand for formulating a complete set of training programs; following this, the committee formed joint work teams that separately went to three companies, where one training topic was assigned to one squad or platoon, which acted as an experimental point for the topic. For example, in attacking tanks, what training contents and skills does a fighter need to study and master? How many classes should these contents be divided into? How much time is needed for each class? Who is qualified to teach each class? What standards should be attained? After this research, teaching plans were written and put into practice. During the practice, the leaders and the masses linked up with each other in both doing the work and appraising it through discussion. After finding methods, the squad or platoon became a demonstration unit and demonstrated the instruction throughout the company, allowing all members of the company to appraise the instruction through discussion. Then it was again enriched and revised, and finally examined and revised by the joint work team. Of the prototypes produced by this experimental point training, 22 were formed into a complete set. Afterward, an on-the-spot meeting was held at which the cadres and backbone elements observed a training demonstration of the complete set of programs, so that the results of the experience gained at these points were brought to their attention.

Through this work, enthusiasm was aroused throughout the unit for the complete set of training programs for the "three attacks and three defenses." And once the masses got moving, many problems that they had previously thought hard to solve were keenly welcomed and solved.

Were there no teaching materials? Everybody was bold in practice, "you compile one set, I will write several articles," and very quickly 29 sets were compiled and a total of over 1,700 copies were distributed to the squads.

Was there a shortage of instructors? The leaders at all levels did not rely upon others but set to work themselves. They conducted 49 training classes for 1,921 cadres and teaching backbone elements.

Were there no equipment or sites? The party committee allocated funds and materials. After it distributed 450 pieces of 10 kinds of antitank equipment, everybody set to work, using indigenous methods in place of foreign ones, to level hilltops and fill in ditches, and in less than half a year had solved this problem.

Originally, because some of the topics in the "three attacks and three defenses" training did not have specific standards, some comrades felt that the "standards

were soft" and no one could tell whether the training was good or not. In line with the demands of actual warfare, everybody set standards one by one, so that the next training session would have goals and the upper level had a basis for its examinations.

Now the training programs for the "three attacks and three defenses" topics form a complete set, and all training detachments basically have reached a point at which there are teaching materials to learn from, instructors to teach, models to view, equipment and sites for training, and standards for making appraisals.

The Advantages of a Complete Set of Training Programs

More than half a year of practice has proven that there are many advantages in a complete set of training programs, and of them three are most obvious:

1. It is systematic and regular. Originally, because this or that was lacking, and there was no complete set, and there was not well-planned arrangements and strict demands on the leadership, the next training session had nothing to follow and each person was forced to go his own way and everyone was "fighting as a guerrilla." The result was that the training plan was constantly changing and the essential movements were of a wide variety. Now, the key elements in training--teaching materials, equipment, sites, and standards--are unified, and the entire training is conducted like it would be in a regular school, i.e., it is planned, it is in proportion, and it progresses in an orderly fashion.

2. Training quality is assured. Because the training content, methods, and materials approximate actual warfare, the antiaircraft training is not abstract and the antitank training is substantive, so that the "three defenses" are not just paper exercises. This has changed the "soft standards" that some comrades saw in the "three attacks and three defenses" into hard standards. Wen Zhaoyue [3306 0340 1971], commander of the 7th Company of a certain regiment, gave me a statistic: Last year, the days kept in reserve and the after-class time were devoted to training in firing, throwing hand grenades, and operating instruments. This year, because the cadres had scope and the fighters had time for training, 90 percent and more of the comrades conscientiously trained in the "three attacks and three defenses" during the days kept in reserve and the after-class time, and thus the quality of the training improved markedly. For example, in mine-laying training, the company, on average, exceeded the regular standard of excellence by 57 seconds.

3. The longstanding situation in which at the squad level and below the training topics were shifted about has been done away with, and the tactical and technical levels have been raised from top to bottom. Previously, the cadres at all levels spent their time training individual soldiers and squads, and from the beginning of each year they put off their own training, which did not suit the requirements of combat preparedness. This year, after the training programs were formed into a complete set, there were people to teach all the classes and all levels were assigned to teach, so that the leaders at all levels were released for their own training and they had the energy and time to give combined arms training to cadres, headquarters, and those at the battalion level and above.

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AIR FORCE UNITS TEST TRAINING REFORM

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 17 Aug 79 p 1

[Article by Du Yuqing [2659 5940 7230]: "Meet the Demands of Modern Warfare, Firmly Grasp Flight Training Reform"]

[Excerpts] The Air Force recently held a training reform on-the-spot meeting at a certain air division, at which the experiences of 17 experimental-point units were popularized and the problem of how to further carry out well training reform was studied.

In the past, Air Force flight training basically continued to use the set of methods devised by the Soviet Union in the 1950's. Following the development of the situation and the improvement of weapons and equipment, some training contents and training methods no longer met the demands of modern warfare and urgently needed to be reformed. The Air Force party committee has paid full attention to this problem. At the beginning of the year, the committee, relating to actual conditions in the Air Force, put forward tentative plans for the training reform and decided on experimental-point units for the reform. The principal responsible comrades of the Air Force personally examined and approved the training reform plan, regularly understood its implementation, and timely discovered and solved problems in the reform.

Each experimental-point unit, proceeding from the requirements of actual warfare, carried out training in daylight under low-visibility weather conditions, in nighttime under complex weather conditions, in landing with two engines, in landing without lights, and in operations with a tactical background, as well as training in the "four fast's" (fast takeoff, fast muster for flight, fast contact with and attack on the enemy, and fast return to base), so that the flyers and flying cadres are able to operate under all sorts of complex conditions, to attack accurately, to understand tactics, and to exercise command, thereby improving the units' fighting capacity. (2) We must carry out the reform based on present conditions, putting the focus on the tactical and technical levels of flyers. We must, through conscientious research on the performance and principal tactical measures of enemy aircraft, conduct training with simulated enemy aircraft against a tactical background, summing up a set of methods that overcome the enemy's weak points with our strong points, so as to raise everybody's confidence in an operational skills for defeating the enemy.

Training reform is also a profound ideological revolution. Each unit paid full attention to doing good ideological work during the reform. The units principally solved problems in three aspects: One was to solve the problem of the idea of being afraid to take risks. Some comrades had set training reform against flying safety, worrying that the carrying out of the reform would cause plane crashes. After the leaders of each experimental point unit clearly stated the advantageous conditions and goals of the training reform, everybody realized that the goal of the reform is to make the training better conform to objective laws and better meet the requirements of actual warfare. If the reform is carried out well, the training will be more scientifically organized, the technical and tactical levels of the flyers will be raised, and thus safety will be reliably insured. At the same time, the leaders educated everybody to understand that the reform probes and blazes new trails so that there is a possibility of new problems arising. This is not strange: in science, for any invention or progress a certain price must be paid. Our responsibility is to see that each training item is done as carefully and as well as is possible and to try to reduce unnecessary losses. The second problem to solve was the idea of passively waiting. They educated everybody to rely on the equipment and facilities on hand, to learn assiduously and study with great effort, and to enthusiastically carry out and support the training reform. The third problem to be solved was the idea of fearing hardship and fatigue. Each experimental-point unit made a point of educating everybody to establish the idea of hard military training. The goal of the reform is to amek the training better conform to the demands of actual warfare. The requirements of actual warfare mean great difficulty and require great strength, and we must firmly complete our missions. Owing to the fact that the party committees at all levels strengthened their ideological leadership over training reform, the cadres and fighters maintained a vigorous fighting morale.

After over 7 months of practice, the Air Force training reform has already displayed its superiority: flying time has greatly increased, and flying is not delayed by weather; the time for second takeoffs is shortened; prominence is given to tactical training, so that the flyers and flying cadres are able, under all sorts of complex conditions, "to operate, attack accurately, understand tactics, and exercise command" and the fighting capacity of the units has been markedly improved; the time that the ground crew is on the airfield is shortened, which has lightened the labor strength needed; aircraft utilization rate and aircraft maintenance have been improved, so that the number of aircraft sorties has increased by 60 percent and the aircraft maintenance capacity has been approximately doubled; and the political education of flying and ground personnel, the study of occupational techniques, and the time for CCP and CYL activity has been better insured than in the past. The cadres and fighters reported: "This reform of the training is in the right direction, its approach is feasible, its effect is marked, and it is a model for combat preparedness."

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ARTICLES ON MEETING DEMANDS OF MODERN NAVAL WARFARE

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 19 Aug 79 p 2

'Enlightening Exercise'

[Article by Yu Lansheng [0151 5663 3932] of the North [China] Sea Fleet Headquarters: "Looking at the Weak Points in Training From the Angle of an 'Enlightened Exercise'"]

[Text] Recently our unit organized an exercise at sea, one part of which was electronic jamming, which partially reflected electronic jamming in naval warfare under modern conditions. Because the body of cadres have basically not been trained in electronic jamming during peacetime, the commanders and radar personnel on the warships were at a loss under conditions of a radar blackout. The comrades said that this operation at sea under modern conditions was an "enlightening exercise."

Thus "enlightening exercise" enlightened the comrades of our organization to consider the following questions: What are the new features of naval warfare under modern conditions? Do the units pay full attention to these new features? On what level is the training now? Analyzing these questions, we could not but see that, with regard to the new features of naval warfare, the greater part of the units are still in the state of being enlightened and some are even still in the state of ignorance. This problem should draw a high degree of attention at all levels.

In modern warfare, in addition to electronic jamming, a guided missile attack is an important feature. Attacks by various types of guided missiles have already become the main patterns of attacks by Soviet warships and warplanes. How to defend against or evade guided missile attacks and how to lower the probability of guided missile hits have become a new topic for our operations at sea and a key point of our training. However, in the current anti-guided missile training, many units have not touched upon this problem, and some of them even think there is no way at all to defend against guided missiles with the equipment on hand, and, because of this, defense against guided missiles has become a weak point, even a gap, in training.

A modern navy is the epitome of the three service arms: in the air there are torpedo-carrying aircraft, on the sea there are all types of warships and under the sea there are submarines, and coastal defence has coast-to-ship guided missiles,

making modern naval warfare three-dimensional. Therefore, raising the capacity for coordinated operations will unite and combine the service arms so that a "fist" can be formed in operations at sea. In the past several years, the basic training of units has been greatly strengthened, but the training at sea in tactical coordination has remained at a low level, and there have been many preset and map school assignments but few live exercises. Even if there are some exercises at sea, the movements were coordinated at rigidly set times and places so that the exercises were carried out according to a fixed pattern. This was very far from meeting the demands of modern naval warfare. Defense against atomic warfare and chemical warfare is also one of our weak links in training. Therefore, if we want to make our training meet the demands of modern naval warfare, turning weak points in the training into strong points, we must change the guiding ideology behind the training, and from top to bottom strengthen research on the new features of modern naval warfare. If we do this we will not lose out in a future war.

This "enlightened exercise" also forced us to seek methods based on the equipment on hand and to answer new questions posed by modern naval warfare. Practice proved that only by being bold in practice and daring to innovate can training focusing on the new features be carried out well. For example, when beginning to train in resisting electronic jamming, the units had no way to set about this task. After searching, many units have summed up many good methods, e.g., the radar uses methods of irregular fanned-out searches and concealed tracking, shortening the time for sending out search waves and reducing the opportunities for enemy reconnaissance to discover the radar, etc. All these methods are fairly effective. In fact, in a modern local war, like the October 1973 Middle East Naval war, owing to a solid foundation of peacetime training, The Israeli Navy's guided missile ships in two battles successfully evaded the attacks by guided missiles launched by Egyptian and Syrian guided missile ships and with small-caliber fast-firing cannot shot the guided missiles out of the sky. The Egyptian and Syrian guided missile ships lacked the ability to conceal themselves from attack and had not been trained in resisting electronic jamming, so that during these battles they suffered heavy losses. From this we can see that the idea that nothing can be done with the equipment on hand is harmful. We must bestir ourselves, establish confidence, and vigorously study the new features of modern naval warfare, search for new ways to reform training, and improve our training.

Shortcomings in Training Examined

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 19 Aug 79 p 2

[Article by Chen Shungen [3088 7311 2704] of the Naval Political Department: "Where Is the Pace of Training Reform Slow?"]

I once covered a story on two headquarters organizations, where, discussing training reform, I encountered two different situations. One situation was that the discussions were convincing and the questions dealt with causes. Originally the commander of this unit was not very anxious about the unit's training quality. He made training the central work and went all out in studying the unit's training problems, and also personally led the naval formations in many exercises at sea. From the map training assignments of the headquarters organization to attack

training at sea, he worked with the organization and trained with the unit. For the new problems of resisting electronic jamming and anti-guided missile warfare, he sought some ways of coping with the Soviet Navy's special mixed formations. However, in the other headquarters organization, when talking about training reform, many comrades shook their heads and said that it was "hard to do." Where was the difficulty? The difficulty was that those who held primary responsibility in the headquarters organization did not put their main effort into grasping training. They did not take part in any of the unit's several exercises at sea but put their deputies in charge of these exercises. In the exercises many problems appeared, which the commander did not pay attention to, and the organization and unit became very worried. This illustrates a problem: if some of those who hold primary responsibility in the administration of the armed forces make an effort to grasp training and some do not, there will be great differences in the quality of training in units. In some units of the navy, much is said about training reform and little is done, and this is the problem.

If those who hold primary responsibility in the administration of the armed forces do not grasp training, this will cause many difficulties in the carrying out of training reform by organizations and units. Generally speaking, some major reforms can be effected just at the nod of the head by one holding primary responsibility. However, owing to the fact that those holding primary responsibility do not concretely grasp training, in a given unit's training, with regard to existing problems, tendencies that need to be corrected, new situations that arise, major reforms, and strategic and tactical research, they don't know what is going on and do not put forward good positions on the reform, and the opinions put forward about the reform by the units are like stones dropping into the sea, i.e., they disappear forever. And for some things about which the situation has changed, they issue repeated injunctions for the unit to train in these things, which causes the unit's training to cover old ground and makes it difficult for enthusiasm to be aroused for training reform in the unit and organization.

To stress the grasping of training by those holding responsibility in the administration of the armed forces is especially important for the technical arms of the navy.

Naval warfare under modern conditions involves scientific knowledge concerning electronics, navigation, optics, guided missiles, and meteorology, and imposes higher demands on naval commanders at all levels than on those in other branches of the armed forces. However, we cannot but see that the foundation of some commanders is not very solid, and there is not much remaining from what they had learned in the past. Some cadres have taken part in naval warfare, but the scale of warfare at that time was small and the enemy's weapons were backward. But our future adversary is the modernized fleet of a superpower with respect to which our experience is insufficient. The new conditions of modernized naval warfare urgently require that the principal commanders at each level personally grasp training and relearn things, study the equipment functions and the operational methods of both the enemy and ourselves, continually recognize the new features of modern naval warfare, and in peacetime leadership training obtain the right to speak at and in wartime command obtain the capacity to engage in modernized naval warfare. The quicker these ideas and actions are passed along, the quicker will be the pace of training reform in the units.

Port, Coastal Training

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 19 Aug 79 p 2

[Article by Yang Liren [2799 4409 0088], chief of staff of a certain mosquito boat detachment: "A Training Slogan That Should Be Restored"]

Early in the initial period of the building of the navy, the training slogan "arduous training in ports and along coasts means precision training at sea" was raised, and many warship units set up port and coast training sections in order to lay a solid foundation for training at sea. However, in the past several years this traditional effective training method has been discarded. After the "gang of four" was smashed, every unit stressed hard training at sea. Obviously, this was good, but there appeared another phenomenon, viz, the units' time and frequency in the pursuit sea training made them neglect arduous training in ports and along the coast. Of the many port and coast training sections, some became shorthanded and merely decorative. Thus, the warships at sea went around in circles and the training was not very effective.

Practice proves that arduous port and coast training not only provides the foundation for training at sea but also is a fairly big topic for studying and tackling difficulties. Our detachment has a mosquito boat battalion [dadui 1129 7130] that, with regard to the training topic of attacking radar, could never solve problems in this regard owing to its limited time at sea. Last year a port and coast radar teaching and training section was set up, which brought together many outstanding radarmen who simulated a guided missile attack at sea. Thus, the difficulties in this topic were overcome.

By advocating "arduous training in ports and along coasts means precision training at sea," fuel will be saved and the wear and tear on instruments and main engines will be reduced, thus being advantageous for the maintenance of the navy's combat effectiveness.

At present, the port and coast training sections of foreign navies have been developed to a relatively modernized level. We should make a point of assimilating the advanced methods of foreign armed forces, and, along with innovations in naval equipment, gradually set up some "training centers" and training points" to improve the equipment used in automated and simulated training, and thereby enhance the role of the training sections.

Problems Affecting Training Reviewed

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 19 Aug 79 p 2

[Article by Yu Guangxin [0060 1639 2450], deputy section head in the political department of a certain fleet: "Temporary Shortage of Technical Mainstays Affects Training Quality"]

Naval warship units commonly encounter a problem in training: the temporary shortage of technical mainstays, the insufficient number of training instructors, and

the low level of cadres assigned to provide instruction seriously affects the improvement of training quality. The reasons for the temporary shortage of technical mainstays, besides being the disruption and destruction of Lin Biao and the "gang of four," are problems in our work. One problem is carelessness in selecting and promoting technical mainstays; the second problem is that technical mainstays are handled recklessly, with some units not treasuring technical mainstays who have genuine talent and rashly demobilizing or specializing them or changing their occupations; and the third problem is that the technical cadres have no outlet, with some technical cadres who have been in their posts for a long time, owing to the remuneration for their posts being lower than that of administrative workers who had joined up at the same time as they did, commonly not keeping their minds on technical work, so that the leadership has to transfer them to another post. All of this has created a weakness in the technical ranks.

The navy is a highly technical branch of the armed forces. In order to conform to this feature, foreign navies pay full attention to fostering and accumulating technically talented persons. For this reason, the Soviet armed forces put into effect the warrant officer system. Warrant officers are not military officers, but they enjoy a status and material remuneration close to those of military officers, and they are usually assigned to such posts as chiefs of noncommissioned officers, team leaders in ordnance, torpedo, or electromechanical departments, and radar team leaders. The French Navy also pays full attention to keeping technically talented persons, and their time in such posts as chief of noncommissioned officers or department heads can be longer than that of a ship captain and their remuneration is comparatively high.

The training departments of many units have put forward the idea that improving unit training quality is not only a question of reforming the training content and methods but also a question of how the leadership and political departments at all levels handle technical cadres. The solution of the problem of insufficient technical strength in a given unit should be listed as an important item on the daily agenda. The promotion, transfer, and handling of technical mainstays must proceed from what is of benefit to the unit's training and operations, must be done through long-range plans and strict checkups, so that the unit from beginning to end will maintain a technical contingent equal to any task. Looking at the actual situation, there are in the cadre establishment, system, and treatment now in effect many difficulties for keeping technical cadres, and their treatment is ripe for necessary reforms. For example, couldn't technical cadres not be restricted by their posts and their grades and their remuneration be increased and improved according to their length of service? Can't the service age of technical cadres on warships be taken into consideration and restrictions on this age be appropriately relaxed? The navy and the army are different; to train a technical commander requires a fairly long time. The maximum service age of a destroyer captain or a submarine captain is 40, but this is precisely the period when they are most technically skilled and most highly experienced. Obviously, a reform of the cadre system will have a bearing on the overall situation and needs to be comprehensively considered by the Military Commission [of the CCP Central Committee], but all levels should pay full attention to the problem of how to maintain technical strength.

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

SECOND ARTILLERY LEADERS STUDY FOR MODERNIZATION

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 28 Aug 79 p 1

[Article by staff reporter Chen Jinsong [7115 6855 2646]: "Leading Cadres of 2d Artillery Resolutely Study Modern Military Knowledge"]

[Text] The leading cadres of the 2d Artillery, who are resolutely studying modern military science and technology and the specialized knowledge pertaining to their service arm, in a little over a year have obtained marked results.

Since March of last year, the leading cadres of the 2d Artillery have set aside half a day's time every week for studying modern military science and technology including specialized knowledge pertaining to their service arm, and have set up a name and attendance system. On the study day, normally no meetings are arranged, no appointments for talks are made, and no documents are read, so that they can concentrate on study.

For over 1 year, the leading comrades of the 2d Artillery invited leaders and scientists and technical personnel of the professional departments of the organization and research institutes to lecture on the function, features, structure, and difficulties in training of several pieces of weaponry and equipment of this service arm and on general management knowledge, as well as specialized basic knowledge such as military meteorology, earth cartography, and data computation. They were briefed on the present state of development of foreign armies' weapons and equipment, and, relating this to the reality of the units, studied the application in their service arm of Comrade Mao Zedong's strategic and tactical thought. Many leading comrades left their own units and went to training grounds, where they observed equipment and drills, held symposiums, and modestly requested instruction from basic-level cadres and fighters. In the past several months they also, side by side with cadres at and above the organizational department head level, studied modern scientific and technological knowledge pertaining to electronic calculators, automated command, electronic warfare, infrared rays, and lasers. In every class session, two persons with primary responsibility in military administration remained laymen and arrived on time to attend the class. After class, some leading comrades went to the training departments to get reprints of the lecture course materials, and, relating to the features of their service arm, further studied and digested what they had learned. They said: We older comrades shoulder a very heavy burden on the march toward the modernization of national defense. If our

minds are not regularly stocked with some new things, we will not be able to keep up. The masses responded: "The senior officers have set a good example for us. We youths must even more wholeheartedly and intensively study for modernization."

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

AIRBORNE DIVISION TRAINS NEW FIGHTERS IN SEPARATE REGIMENT

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 30 Aug 79 p 1

[Article by Li Yunqi [2621 0061 6386] et al: "A Certain Airborne Division Achieves Initial Success in Trial Setup of Regiment for Training New Soldiers"]

[Text] The specific method is: Take a given regiment, retain its original organizational system, cadres, and squad leaders, and send its veteran cadres, as an organization, to another infantry regiment. Take the new soldiers in other regiments and concentrate them in the given regiment for training, and then after a period of 1 year has passed since the new fighters had entered the ranks, send them back to their original units.

A certain airborne division, starting in March of this year, started an experimental point for carrying out a reform of its training system, and has already obtained initial success. The division leadership took the new fighters in the infantry regiments of the division and concentrated them in an organizational system regiment for training, while another infantry regiment concentrated its energy on training veteran fighters, thereby solving the problem of training new and veteran soldiers by "cooking them in one pot" and "cutting with one stroke of the knife," and accelerating the pace of training.

This division's reform of its training system was arranged by the higher level, and the specific method is: A regiment retains its organizational system and all the cadres, squad leaders, cooks, and the four kinds of personnel in company headquarters (clerical and ordnance personnel, communications personnel, medical personnel, and supply personnel) of the regiment, and the regiment's veteran fighters are put, as an organizational unit, into another infantry regiment (in this way, if war should break out, they can rapidly return to the parent organization), and the new soldiers of the other regiments are concentrated in the one regiment for training. One year after the new soldiers had enlisted, they are returned to their original unit. Over 5 months of practice has proved that this reform has many merits.

It is of advantage in increasing the degree of difficulty in training veteran fighters. In the past, when new and veteran fighters were mixed together and the time and content of their training was the same, "the new soldiers got more than they could handle and the veteran soldiers didn't get enough to satisfy them."

Year after year, the unit's training was stuck at the level of "firing by the numbers and tactics being confined to the squad." This year, after the new and veteran fighters began to be trained separately, the veteran fighters did not start from the point at which new fighters began training, and difficulties in technical and tactical training were added. Once firing began they carried out applied training, and, proceeding from the requirements of actual warfare, practiced individual gun battle fire at night. Every veteran fighter trained in firing the four kinds of weapons of a company. During the firing, they changed the "three fixed" (fixed distance, fixed rear sight, and fixed aiming point) to the "three nonfixed"--(self-estimation of distance, self-setting of the rear sight and self-firing of the aiming point)--simulating their actions under conditions of the "three defenses." Their training focuses on attacking tanks. They train in attacking tanks with the five weapons commonly used by infantry, including rocket launchers, mines, and bangalore torpedoes. The artillerymen and rocket launcher soldiers set a standard of hitting the target with their first round, and the first-round hit rate has reached 80 percent and above, with the highest being 96 percent. They also have assimilated the experiences of the war of self-defensive counterattack against Vietnam, training in burying and removing mines and in learning how to read and use maps, in using natural objects to distinguish directions, and in moving accordingly to the azimuth. Parachute training now covers low-attitude and formation jumps. Tactical training starts with company-level topics. At the end of July, the tactical topics of company and battalion attacking and defending had been completed, and company-level tactics had been reformed so that the tactic of making attacks on infantry primary was changed to the tactic of making attacks on groups of tanks primary. Before the end of October, the tactical training topics had been completed and the divisional airborne tactical training exercise had been carried out. The fast rate of progress and the good quality of this training had not been seen in the division's training records for many years. The officers and men said: This time the problem of giving the veteran soldiers enough training to satisfy them was solved.

It is advantageous for strengthening the basic training of new fighters. In former years, when the new and veteran soldiers were mixed together, the cadres and mainstays could not put all their energy into training new soldiers, and they also could not hold up the rate of progress for the new fighters. This was detrimental to the basic training of the new fighters. Now that the regiment for training new soldiers has been formed, from squad leader to regimental commander, from company to organization, the key points stand out and the guiding ideology is clear-cut, so that they concentrate their energy on getting a good grip on the basic training of new soldiers. Moreover, owing to the fact that the troops are of the same kind, that the training topics are of the same kind, that the training time and safeguards are of the same kind, it is easy to unify the teaching methods, to unify examinations and checkups, and to organize revolutionary competitions. For every new training topic, the regiment brings its cadres and mainstays together for group training in teaching methods so as to improve the cadres' ability to be teachers. Up to the first 10 days of August, 9 of these group training sessions had been held, with a total attendance of 580. After the training in every topic is completed, according to the standards for examinations and checkups, those who meet the demands advance to the next topic, step by step laying a firm foundation in basic training and thus universally improving the quality of the training topics.

The rate of excellents in practicing light weapon firing was raised by 20 percent over that of last year; the training in attacking tanks and in the "three defenses" increased in difficulty; in parachute training, every new fighter completed 12 jump missions, from unarmed to full pack, from daytime to nighttime, from high altitude to low altitude, from familiar level terrain to unfamiliar complex terrain, and from single aircraft jumps to formation jumps. The frequency and difficulty of the training exceeded those of former years.

It is advantageous for giving prominence to the key point--cadre training. Although this division in the past frequently shouted that cadre training was the key point, owing to the fact that the troop training was "tactics at the squad level," the cadres' capacity for organizational command could not be improved. This year, after the reform of the training system, tactical training was carried out from the company straight up to the division, and in this way commanders at each level had the opportunity to temper themselves in the tactics of organizational command at their own level. Now, cadres at the battalion level and below learn tactical organizational command at their own levels, and the company and platoon cadres also learn how to command at the next higher level and their test results, on average, have been good or better. At the same time, after the new and veteran soldiers were trained separately, the cadres did not need to consider training both of them as they did in former years and the time for their own training was insured. Since the beginning of this year, the division has conducted every month a training session for senior officers of the division and its regiments and for the divisional headquarters, and the regiments have a training session every month for cadres at the battalion level and below, each session lasting 7 days, each session lasting 5 to 7 days, thereby strengthening the study of enemy armies and the mastery of the knowledge pertaining to the service arms of our army. The senior officers of the division and its regiments now have a good idea of the main establishment and operational features of enemy units at the division level and below, and the cadres at battalion level and below have a good idea of the main establishment and operational features of the enemy units at battalion level and below. Cadres at all levels have a good idea of the establishment equipment, and principles of using the service arms under their command, viz, communications, antichemical warfare, engineer, and artillery. Staff officers and cadres at battalion level and below have learned how to use the two radio communications instruments--the walky-talky and the transmitter-receiver--and have become proficient in the skills of reading and using maps and of advancing according to the azimuth. He Guanglei [0149 0342 4320], 1st Battalion commander, and Yang Zhaoli [2799 0340 0448], deputy commander of the 3d Company, of a certain regiment both said with deep understanding: Having been trained this way, if once we have an airborne combat mission, we will be more realistic in commanding our units in combat.

After this airborne division reformed its training system, some problems arose, e.g., how the basic-level cadres of the new soldier training regiment are to be selected, etc, that are awaiting study and solution in later practice.

Scientific Training Reform

Special Project 20 Aug 79 p 1

[Editor's postscript: "Training Reform Can Become More of a "Scientific Experiment"]

[Text] The first edition of this paper on 21 March published as its lead item a set of proposals for reforming training. Today, we happily see that a certain airborne division has already experimented with this problem by setting up a trial-going new soldier training regiment. Although this method awaits further tests in practice, it is, in the final analysis, a gratifying step forward for a solution of this problem. Training new and veteran soldiers together, like "cooking in one pot," was felt to be a longstanding, big, and difficult problem. To reform the training system by providing separate training for new and veteran soldiers was an idea that had long been discussed informally. Why was the solution of this problem so slow in coming? One important reason was that this solution remained at the level of meetings and was verbalized but not put into practice.

Some comrades, once they heard talk about changing the training system, shut their eyes and thought that this reform would not be feasible and that reform was difficult to do, "study, study and again speak," and so in a twinkling 3 or 5 years, 10 or 8 years passed. Now, in training, some proposals and plans for solving this longstanding, big, and difficult problem are stuck at this point. The enthusiasm of the great numbers of officers and men for reforming training is very high, their demands are very urgent, and they have proposed many suggestions and plans. How should we deal with these opinions of the masses? The best support for the enthusiasm and creativity of the masses is to do things as this certain division (airborne) did. After receiving approval from the higher authorities, within the scope of its powers, it made some "scientific experiments" in a planned way. Practice is the sole criterion for testing truth. In the last analysis, what opinions are good? What methods are feasible? How can training be advantageous to raising the fighting capacity of units? The answer is: by not being hindered in practice from distinguishing right from wrong, making tests and correcting errors, seeking solutions, and afterward accepting or rejecting suggestions and then spreading the accepted suggestions over a whole area from one point. In this way the enthusiasm of the leadership and the enthusiasm of the masses will be combined, the revolutionary spirit and the scientific attitude will be combined, and we will be able to quicken the pace of training reform, so that the training will soon be put on the right track.

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

AIR REGIMENT IMPROVES TRAINING BY STUDYING ENEMY AIRCRAFT

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 31 Aug 79 p 1

[Article by Jin Zhifu [6855 1807 4395]: "Become Familiar With Enemy Aircraft Performance, Rigorously Train in Aerial Combat Skills"]

[Text] A certain regiment of the [PLA] Air Force has earnestly studied enemy aircraft, thus strengthening its training focus and obtaining good results in training.

At the beginning of this year, this regiment switched to tactical training. At the beginning, owing to the fact that its study of enemy aircraft was insufficient it only thought of making more flights, which divorced tactical training from the demands of actual warfare. For example, the tail cannon on an enemy bomber is strong in firepower and long in firing range, but some flyers still chose the method of hot pursuit for attacking the bomber. This made the regimental party committee think: if we want good tactical training, we must earnestly study enemy aircraft; otherwise, the training will be like "a blind man riding a blind horse," effort will be wasted and the training will not be useful in actual warfare. Therefore, in tactical training, they organized the unit to earnestly launch activities of studying enemy aircraft. In the regiment time was focused, and they asked departments concerned at higher levels and comrades who had taken part in air force tactical training to come to the unit and brief it on the enemy's battle array, the performance of his main long-range bombers, the performance of his guided missiles, the performance of his main fighter planes, and his tactical methods. They hung on walls all sorts of wall charts pertaining to enemy aircraft for the comrades to refer to during their study, and also in timely fashion transmitted to the flyers materials on the enemy's situation issued by higher levels. During the study, when a question was encountered that could not be made clear, they conscientiously organized everyone for a discussion until the question was understood. When the flyers were studying the tactical features of enemy missile-carrying aircraft, the committee focused the study on the features of the guided missile's movement in flight under specific conditions, e.g., the speed of the guided missile when fired from the aircraft is slow at first and fast later, gradually picking up speed; the enemy guided missiles are adapted for operating at a fixed distance and not for close combat; the target hit rate for the guided missiles is high at a high altitude and low at a low altitude; the guided missiles on enemy aircraft are guided by radar, and a target higher than the enemy aircraft is easily hit while a target lower than the enemy aircraft, because surface interference to its radar is great, cannot

be easily hit, etc. On the basis of a detailed study of these features, they studied the tactical measures we should adopt, viz, close combat, flying at low altitudes, and flying lower than the enemy aircraft in order to deal with them. The flyers reacted by saying: This kind of training has a definite object in view so that there are definite tactics in mind to use and not use.

After realizing the enemy's strong points and weak points, there appeared in this regiment this situation: a certain type of enemy aircraft is fast, can decelerate well, and turns quickly; a certain type of our aircraft can circle well. During a training drill, our plane always circled the enemy plane, getting on its tail so that it could not turn and shake off our plane and was docilely hit. The regimental party committee analytically studied this situation and came to the conclusion that in this peacetime training only the enemy's weak points were selected for our attack and this did not provide the training required by actual warfare. Therefore, the committee adopted the method of lecturing on specific examples of battles and discussing the understanding gained by experience, leading everyone to a clear recognition of the enemy's cunning and the complexity of a future war. They maintained the scientific attitude of seeking truth from facts, by both considering our strong points and the enemy's weak points, and also by paying full attention to the enemy aircrafts' strong points and our aircrafts' weak points. Once, our plane got on the tail of an "enemy plane" and was getting ready to attack when suddenly the "enemy plane" made a quick turn and slipped away. Owing to the fact that our plane's radius of turn was large it was suddenly rushing toward the "enemy plane's" front and had lost the initiative. Focusing on the weak points of our equipment, the flyers here, through their study, have come up with some methods for solving this problem, have rigorously trained in tactical techniques, and have improved their fighting capacity.

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

TANK REGIMENT DECIDES MAN, NOT EQUIPMENT, IS KEY TO VICTORY

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 31 Aug 79 p 2

[Article by Ping Mingqing [7458 2494 7230]: "Make Full Use of Existing Equipment To Acquire by Training Modern Combat Skills"]

[Text] "Is it that the existing equipment does not suit people's military level, or is it that people's military level does not suit the existing equipment?" The officers and men of a certain tank regiment of the Beijing Units through discussion came to this conclusion: people's military level does not suit the existing equipment. On the basis of a unified understanding, they vigorously took measures to raise the unit's military level and fully brought into play the combat power of the existing equipment. Recently, the higher authorities held an on-the-spot meeting to introduce their experience.

In the past, some comrades, thinking that our tanks were not as good as the advanced tanks of some developed countries, did not put sufficient effort into studying and mastering the existing equipment. Focusing on this mood, the regimental party committee educated everybody to become clear about two questions: First, even if our existing equipment is not as good as that of some developed countries, viewing the situation as a whole, our armed forces have developed into a combined arms forces of all branches, and we also have a considerable number of aircraft, tanks, and guided missiles. Historical experience has confirmed that if only we bring into full play people's subjective initiative and display the power of existing equipment to the maximum we can with inferior equipment vanquish an enemy with superior equipment. Second, although some of our existing equipment is not completely suited to modern warfare, even more important than this is that our technical and tactical levels and our command capabilities are not completely suited to the existing equipment. For example, the tanks we are equipped with can climb slopes up to 30 degrees, but some tank drivers do not even try to drive their tanks up slopes of 25 degrees; the stabilizer on our tanks performs well but many gunners have a very low hit rate when firing from a moving tank; and some comrades have still not mastered driving with the aid of night-vision instruments, communicating by countering radio jamming, and firing antiaircraft machineguns. Through analysis, everybody saw that even though our tanks are not very advanced, there are much knowledge and many techniques that we have still not become proficient in and mastered, and that we must expend a great deal of effort, under complex conditions, to drive tanks, fire their machineguns and cannons accurately, and keep their communications functioning.

In order to resolve this contradiction, viz, people's military level not being suitable for the existing equipment, they adopted the following measures in training:

1. They made the training more difficult so that the proper role of the existing equipment was brought into full play. Formerly, when this regiment was training in tank driving in mountainous terrain, it only stressed safety and did not dare to make the training more difficult in line with the tank's performance ability, so that the majority of the drivers had never driven their tanks over a slope of 25 degrees or higher. Contrasting the experience in the war of self-defensive counter-attack against Vietnam, when certain tank detachments climbed steep slopes of 30 degrees or more to catch the enemy unawares and wipe him out, the officers and men of this regiment deeply felt that the driver training in the past could not bring into play the tank's proper ability to perform and did not provide the genuine skills required by actual warfare. Therefore, based on the tank's performance capability, they crash-built a training ground for tank driving in mountainous terrain with a maximum upward slope of 30 degrees and a maximum downward slope of 35 degrees and more, in order to provide a good site for insuring that driving techniques are improved.

During the training, some drivers did not dare to drive their tanks over this kind of strategic and difficult mountainous terrain. Dong Xizhen [5576 6932 3791], deputy political commissar of the regiment, volunteered to give everybody a demonstration of this difficult task and explain its essentials. When deputy political commissar Dong had driven a tank up to the summit, the misgivings in the minds of the cadres and fighters were removed. Seeing the deficiencies in their own techniques, they put more effort into their training. Now most of the drivers have mastered fairly well the techniques of driving tanks in strategic and difficult mountainous terrain.

2. Using existing equipment, they mastered the skills of operating advanced devices. In the past, this regiment, from top to bottom, did not dare to use some fairly modernized equipment on the tank and some equipment was always "forbidden." For example, a tank's stabilizer is a modernized important component part of its cannon control system. When the cannon is fired while the tank is moving, it automatically maintains a selected firing angle for the cannon and is more convenient and accurate than a hand-held sighting device. However, in the past several years, most of the companies have not been trained to operate the stabilizer. In addition to practicing with it in tanks, each battalion and company repaired and removed from storage in warehouses moving frameworks for stabilizers and organized drills simulating riding in a tank, thereby continually raising the firing hit rate of gunners in moving tanks. At the same time, they tightly grasped training in driving tanks with the aid of the infrared ray night-vision instrument and mastered fairly well the laws and characteristics of making observations with night-vision instruments; they found out how to calculate the distance to a target by use of the sighting lens calibrated in mils, and raised the first-round hit rate from the original 30 percent to 69 percent. Thus, the proper role of the existing equipment was given play.

3. They reformed tactical training so that it reflected the tank's mobility and flexibility in combat. They resolutely changed the past simplified tactical

training ground for tank detachments so that it could simulate the developing process of a battle. During the tactical training, they practiced with unplanned forms, crossing untraversed places, and carried out unplanned intense activity. When organizing the comprehensive training for tank platoons moving in a fixed direction against a tactical background, from the choice of ground and the enemy's situation and setup to the organization and practice of battle exercises, they broke with the old ways of the past in order to seek an approximation of actual warfare. In order to reflect the features of modern warfare, viz, its large element of surprise and the short time in which to prepare for combat, when practicing this training topic, the platoon leader would not see the terrain beforehand, the gunners would not have fired over the ground beforehand, and the drivers would not have seen the line of march beforehand. At the beginning there is an emergency muster, and, with only using sandtable assignments, they are given one simple briefing on the enemy's situation, the mission, and the line of march, and the principal conditions are observed, judged, directed and fought out while on the march so as to give full play to the commanders' subjective initiative and to the tank's mobility and flexibility.

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

PARTY MEMBERS SPUR TRAINING IN GUIDED MISSILE REGIMENT

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 1 Jul 80 p 1

[Article by Jiang Huazhou [1203 0553 6999] and Guo Qingsheng [6751 1987 3932]:
"Party Members of a Certain Guided Missile Regiment Greet '1 July' With Outstanding
Achievements" in "Displaying the Exemplary Vanguard Role of a Communist Party
Member"]

[Text] Since the beginning of May, a certain regiment of a guided missile unit has organized its party members to launch competitive activities of "comparing enthusiasm, technique, and contributions in greeting '1 July' [the anniversary of the founding of the CCP] with outstanding achievements," thereby further displaying the exemplary role of the party members.

In this regiment, the average training examination mark of party members was 92, and in the speciality of launching guided missiles, 85 percent of the party members were classes as "live wires," thereby spurring on the unit's education and training and the completion of tasks. At the beginning of May, the regimental party committee appealed to the regiment's party members to greet "1 July" with outstanding achievements, convened a mobilization and oath-taking rally for competition in "striving for excellence," and formulated competition items and standards for units and individuals. During competition, a great number of party members, with a keen enterprising spirit and sense of honor, striving to be first, aimed high and reported victories bought with hard work. A total of 22 party members who took part in the specialized training of the 2d Launch Battalion studied hard and assiduously. Each of them skillfully mastered his own speciality, with the result that they obtained, on average, the good mark of 93 in the regiment-wide uniform examinations. In order to improve his ability to fix breakdowns, Jiang Yuejin [5592 6460 6651], a technician and Communist Party member, set aside a little time each day to draw electrical circuits in his mind so that he thoroughly memorized the operational principles/chart for the three large instruments that control a guided missile. In May the 5th Transport and Repair Company received the task of being the regiment's "service center" for working on machinery parts. Time was tight, and the work was new and fairly difficult. Tan Jongjiang [6223 3163 3068], deputy secretary of the party branch and company commander, led a work team, with party members as its backbone elements, to work without letup day and night in their worksheds, and in 7 days and 7 nights completed the task ahead of schedule. In 2 months, the company completed the task of repairing and processing over 3,200 parts of machines and vehicles. Compared with the past, one person did the work of two.

In the "striving for excellence" competition, the cadres and party members marched in the forefront with daring and energy. Regimental commander Liu Zongshun [0491 1350 5293] was a veteran comrade of over 30 years of service. In May he gave up a chance for recuperation and held a work team to stay at the 6th Battalion in order to gain firsthand experience, which brought new improvements to the battalion's work. Deputy regimental commander Ge Dongsheng [5514 2639 0581], a young cadre, in leading the training, emancipated his mind, was bold in making inquiries and resolved many difficulties. The unit conducted operational training by simulating the accident of a leak in the main fuel valve during a missile launch. Deputy regimental commander Ge led comrades of the technical section in examining blueprints, looking over materials, and attacking the difficulties involved one by one. Chen Guangjun [7115 1639 0193], commander of the 4th Battalion, during the stage of basic-level training, personally answered, one by one, 32 review questions assigned by the regiment. During the day he taught lessons and in the evening he patiently gave individual supplemental instruction to the fighters, which led the battalion to obtain first place in the regiment-wide examinations.

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

CADRES MUST STUDY WARFARE IN MILITARY ACADEMIES

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 3 Jul 80 p 3

[Article by Fang Hang [2455 5300]: "'Learning War From War' and 'Learning War From Schools'"]

[Text] Forty years ago, Comrade Mao Zedong, when summing up the experience of the second revolutionary civil war, unequivocally put forward the slogan "Learn war from war." This slogan of Chairman Mao Zedong's reflected the objective reality at the time and was absolutely correct. Encouraged by this slogan, countless cattle herders and peasants who had never attended school and frail scholars who, although they had attended school, knew nothing about military affairs were tempered on the battlefield and became outstanding military commanders; CCP "clodhoppers" who had not been schooled defeated great numbers of graduates of the Japanese and KMT officer schools and army universities. A long period of testing in the practice of warfare proves that this slogan is an objective truth.

Now, our army has been shifted from a war environment to a peace environment for nearly 30 years. How should we regard this slogan of Comrade Mao Zedong's? Must we take learning war from war to be the only or the principal path for raising the troops' tactical and technological levels and the cadres' command capabilities, and repudiate or ignore other paths? Obviously, we cannot do this. When Comrade Mao Zedong raised this slogan, our party had not yet seized state power, the party leadership's revolutionary armed forces were for a long period of time in a war environment, battles were frequent, and there was great mobility. Not only were there no conditions for running a large group of military academies, but also it was very difficult to conduct regular military training. Just as Chairman Mao said in "The Struggle in the Chingang Mountains"; "The average soldier needs 6 months' or a year's training before he can fight, but our soldiers, though recruited only yesterday, have to fight today with practically no training to speak of." The history of proletarian revolutions proves that, in order for armed revolution to oppose armed counterrevolution, the unarmed revolutionary people must often "raise a bamboo pole to serve as a standard for revolt" and cannot, in a calm and unhurried fashion, learn military affairs before engaging in armed struggle. "Often it is not a case of first learning and then doing, but a case of doing and then learning"--this proposition was determined by objective conditions in a revolution. After the entire country was liberated, conditions completely changed. We had our own state power and turned to peaceful construction, and the entire armed forces set up all sorts of military academies. Under these

conditions, not to conduct peacetime training well and not to make learning war from schools the principal method would obviously be a departure from today's reality. Any theory whatsoever emerges under specific historical conditions, and for its scope of applicability, one cannot ignore changes in historical conditions and apply it mechanically; if we were to cling to this theory as rigidly as before, not train and learn war from schools, then there would be no way to raise the troops' tactical and technological levels and the commanders' command capabilities, and we would not be in a position to improve the troops' military qualities.

As a matter of fact, even in a war environment, we cannot slacken the necessary military training of the troops, and, when conditions make it feasible, our cadres must pursue advanced studies in military academies, which will help them to systematically sum up their war experiences and to improve their military theory and command capabilities. Many high-level commanders in our army have pursued advanced studies in schools and first began to learn war from schools. Comrade Zhu De attended military lectures in Yunnan, Comrade Peng Dehuai attended the Hunan Military School, comrades Liu Bocheng and Nie Rongzhen studied military affairs in the Soviet Union, and Comrade Xu Xiangqian attended the Whampoa Military Academy. In the initial period of our army in the Jinggang Mountains, even if conditions were extremely difficult, our army paid a great deal of attention to setting up academies, and Comrade Mao Zedong trained lower ranking officers to be a body of instructors in order to train cadres and raise their military level. When the Red Army on its Long March victoriously reached northern Shaanxi, he opened the Red Army University, the name of which was later changed to the Chinese People's Anti-Japanese Military and Political University. Comrade Mao Zedong personally gave lessons there, and every base set up branches of the university. Many commanders who matured in war studied at these schools. Some high-level cadres of our army before joining up had a very low educational level and were completely ignorant of military affairs, but afterward they were able to master military theory, and this was an important reason for their brilliant command capabilities. We must also see that in the past the warfare our army was engaged in was done by one service arm. A fighter only had to understand how to fire, charge with the bayonet, and throw hand grenades before he went into battle. Our army's equipment was inferior; and not all of the enemy's equipment was advanced. The demands made on the commander's command capabilities were also comparatively simple. Over the past 30 years, military science and technology have developed swiftly, there have been big changes in strategy and tactics, and the surprise factor in warfare has increased. The scale and forms of combat are also different from those of the past. Our future target of operations is not only highly modernized in technology and equipment but also possesses comparatively high military qualities. To be a commander in a future war, one must be good at mastering and controlling modern weapons and equipment, be familiar with the knowledge of how to use each armed branch and service arm, and master the command techniques for combined arms military operations. All of these things are brand-new subjects for the great number of our cadres, and also cannot be all learned during a short period of warfare. As early as the initial period of World War II, Comrade Stalin pointed out: Military schools must extensively apply the experience of modern warfare in training command cadres in new techniques. Every major country in the contemporary world considers military academies the cradle for commanders in modern warfare, considers the good running of military academies an investment in winning a future war, and give priority to them in armed forces instruction. In a future war, we must defeat a modernized

enemy. If in peacetime we do not tightly grasp the military training of the troops, do not train cadres in military academies, do not send a large group of outstanding cadres to school for advanced studies, and wait until after war breaks out and then make up lost lessons on the battlefield, then we will not only pay a considerable price but also suffer a setback in the war. This has been proved by practice in countless wars.

Learning war from war and learning war from schools--the two methods are consistent with each other. In learning war from war, most of what is obtained is perceptual knowledge that has specific limitations and must be raised to the level of rational knowledge. The military theory, tactics, and techniques studied in our military academies all stem from war and are the systematic summation of war experiences. They break through the individual's limitations, have theoretical forms and are improvements. Comrade Mao Zedong has said: "Experience is necessary for a cadre, ... but modestly taking in other people's experience is also necessary. If one on each and every occasion waits for one's own experience, or else clings to one's own views and rejects those of others, this is sheer narrow empiricism. In our wars we suffered many losses from this." ("Selected Works of Mao Zedong," vol 1, p 197) Only when an individual's direct experience is integrated with the indirect experience of other people and foreign lands can he avoid one-sidedness and have comparatively complete knowledge. We often use the phrase "has found a hundred battles" to describe a person's combat experience. For one person, it is not easy to "have fought a hundred battles." However, we must not say that in the entire history of war, in the history of modern war, a "hundred battles" are too few. War is a changing process, and its theory also develops. No matter how much rich experience any one person has, he cannot set limits to truth and needs to learn from the experience of other people and foreign lands. The basic principle is that a person with experience in warfare also needs to pursue advanced studies in school.

In short, under new historical conditions, we certainly must run the academies well. The great number of our army's cadres must study in schools to raise their tactical and technological levels, to improve their educational capabilities for command and control, in order to meet the requirements of a future war.

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LEADERS ASKED TO PUT THEMSELVES IN SUBORDINATES' SHOES

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 3 Jul 80 p 3

[Article by Zhong Jie [6988 3381] and Xian De [6343 1795] in the "Random Talks on Work Methods" column: "If I Were a Subordinate..."]

[Text] A comrade who for a long time had worked in a leading organization, when hearing at a report meeting his subordinates talk of disasters and pile up their opinions, began to take exception and thought that they lacked the overall point of view. Afterward, when he left his organization to work in a unit, he got a taste of the suffering of these "disasters," all day long being tied to a conference table or being unable to extricate himself from piles of documents, and his view changed. A proverb says: "Those who ride horses don't understand those who go on foot." It looks as if the bureaucratic work style of certain higher authorities is largely related to the fact they usually do not dismount from their "horses" and "go on foot"--learning through their own personal experience about the working and living conditions of their subordinates. One effective method for washing away the dirt of bureaucratism is to change places and put oneself in somebody else's position so that one will think more about one's subordinates.

Comrade Liu Shaoqi earlier on raised this question. At the beginning of the 1960's, bureaucratism, formalism, and red tape grew in some of our units, so that the lower levels were constantly coping with them. Focusing on this situation, Comrade Shaoqi, while inspecting the Guangzhou Units in 1964, made this suggestion to all those attending a symposium of leading cadres: You "divisional political commissars and directors of divisional political departments should act as company political instructors for several months, ... a divisional political commissar will see how many forms for statistical tables and reports come down from upper levels by filling them in himself. Each one of them must be filled in. It will not be permitted to not fill in every one, and if a form is not filled in he will be 'spanked.' He will then know that this matter is not easy, and not just know how to issue forms for statistical tables and reports without knowing the difficulties of filling them in." This suggestion of Comrade Shaoqi's for curing those who suffer from bureaucratism is a good prescription.

The source of knowledge is practice. People in practice, owing to the fact that the conditions in their positions and environments are different, have different feelings about, attitudes toward, and methods of dealing with problems. As the saying goes: "If you don't manage household affairs, you don't know how expensive

daily necessities are." There is a definite reason for leaders holding one meeting after another and issuing this or that kind of document, statistical tables and reports as if this were "work." They little imagine that, in this way, the lower levels are made to suffer. Just think, with everybody floating on the surface or being soaked in meetings, how can they build up the units? That the harm in this way of doing things stems from the leaders' positions is often not easy to discover. If the position is changed and the leader becomes the led, and for a month takes part in 10-odd days of meetings and fills in several tens of statistical tables and reports, then he will have a different impression of things. At the least, the abovementioned comrade will not persistently put the blame on his subordinates. Some service trades in the localities are now launching "if I were a subordinate" activities, as are some news publishing units. This makes people think: Couldn't this activity be introduced into leadership work, letting our leading cadres take part in the "if I were a subordinate" activity, so that they could think of how to do good leadership work from the angle of those they lead?

When we prepare to get some things we need and things we don't need from our subordinates, if we think "if I were a subordinate," then we will comprehend the suffering brought by a "boom in red tape" and, thus, consciously reduce the number of documents.

When we prepare to use the subterfuge of being engaged in "research, research," and kick the "ball" back, if we think "if I were a subordinate," then it will be as if we were seeing the worried looks of our subordinates who are running busily back and forth to deal with a matter, and, thus, we will "show mercy to those under our feet" by making a prompt decision that will solve the problem.

When we prepare to make a long empty speech composed of a torrent of words, if we think "if I were a subordinate," then we will comprehend why the lower levels have the mood of "fearing neither heaven nor earth, and only fearing a long talk given by a leader," and thus will consciously "keep it short when we have something to say, and let it go when we have nothing to say."

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If everybody does things this way, bureaucratism and red tape will gradually be reduced and the efficiency of work will continually be improved, so why not go ahead with it?

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NAVAL ACADEMY MAKES MAJOR EFFORT TO IMPROVE TEACHING CONTENT

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 4 Jul 80 p 2

[Article by He Wei [0149 0251], Zhao Changchun [6392 7022 2504], Li Xing [2621 1630] and Chen Shungen [3088 7311 2704]: "Using the Results of Military Academic Research To Enrich Teaching Materials"]

[Text] All military teaching and research sections of the naval academy, proceeding from the reality of our armed forces, having an eye on future developments and on reforming the teaching content, have made courses in electronic warfare and guided missile warfare the key courses. By the end of May, over 10 research results had been written into the teaching materials.

The outstanding problem in the naval academy's teaching is that its teaching materials are out of date, and many of them being products of the 1950's. Therefore, the broad masses of instructors relied on their own strength and, while being busy in teaching courses, after over 2 years of arduous effort wrote between 10 and 20 new teaching materials, including problems concerning the initial stage of naval warfare, new tactics for torpedo-carrying aircraft to break through defenses, and attack procedures by combined arms military forces at sea, that enriched the teaching content and have been welcomed by students at the academy and by unit commanders.

There are three distinct features in the naval academy's innovated teaching content. First, the academy broke with the past method of "making small repairs and patching up," and made a big effort in academic research and worked hard to renew the teaching content. A certain type of torpedo-carrying aircraft was a piece of equipment made in the 1950's. Today, when there has been a big development in the enemy's ship-to-air guided missiles, how could this aircraft of ours break through enemy warship defenses? The original teaching materials only discussed principles in this regard, and after the students heard them their thirst for knowledge remained unquenched. With the support of many comrades of the air arm teaching and research section, instructor Zhao Jixin [6392 4949 9515] consulted close to 2 million words of reference materials concerning the ground-to-air and air-to-air guided missiles of various countries, spending on this research 11 month's time, and finally found a weak point in ground-to-air guided missiles. Grasping this chink in the enemy's tactical use of guided missiles, he brought forth from his research a new tactic for our aircraft to break through defenses. For this students praised him.

Second, the academy took combat regulations as its basis but did not allow itself to be completely fettered by them, daring, according to the requirements of actual warfare, to study new situations and solve new problems. For example, in a certain combat regulation, the calculation of the hit probability rate of ship-to-ship guided missiles was a product of the end of the 1950's and did not reflect current reality. The instructors freed themselves from this fetter and in half a year's time produced by research a comparatively scientific method of making this calculation, and also wrote the results of their research into the teaching materials for wide adoption by units.

Third, the academy both based itself upon the present and fixed its eyes on future developments, introducing Chinese and foreign advanced military science into the realm of tactics so as to lay a good foundation for training qualified commanders suited for future wars. With regard to headquarters work, the academy carried out a conflict simulation between two sides based on a map of calculated manpower, and also started a new course topic on electronic computer simulation of tactical conflict, feeding several hundred operational plans that the enemy could adopt into a computer, and let the students and the machine "battle" against each other, thereby solving the problem of improving the students' capacity for coordinated operations under conditions other than actual combat.

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DIVISION PRACTICES CLOSING GAP IN LINE MADE BY ATOMIC WEAPONS

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 4 Jul 80 p 3

[Article in "Training Notes" column by Chen Xiangmin [7115 0686 3046]: "Seal the Opening"]

[Text] Following a deafening explosion, two mushroom clouds gradually rose in the air. In the "red force's" defensive position there immediately appeared a "gap" of about 2 kilometers in frontage and about 5 kilometers in depth. In a moment, amid a cloud of dust, a concentrated mass of "blue force" tanks swarmed like a flood toward this "atomic breach." At nearly the same moment, powerful artillery fire from the "red force" raked the enemy concentration. This fierce fight between a force ripping open a gap and another force trying to seal the gap was a scene during a field exercise conducted by a certain division of the Shenyang Units in order to study positional defense under conditions of atomic warfare.

Blocking the Opening--Sealing the Opening

After half an hour of a fierce firefight, the "blue force" tank group still occupied the "atomic breach" and was continuing to develop in depth. The "red force" had sustained heavy casualties and had been forced to withdraw into its defense works [ellipses as published]

Looking at this made me think of a problem. During the conventional wars of the past, our army was able to occupy a breach in our line before the enemy could, and by the method of "blocking up" could repulse over 10 enemy assaults in succession, thereby insuring that the enemy would not break through the breach. Today, when the enemy employs an atomic breakthrough, the gap ripped open is very big and the motorized assault that the enemy relies on is very fast. Our army's capacity for mobility is low, and the units concealed in deep or covered areas have great difficulty, under conditions of atomic warfare, in occupying the breach in our line before the enemy does and thereby blocking the enemy's assaults. Blocking the opening should be changed to sealing the opening.

Everybody Must "Stitch Up" the "Tear"

The sealing and countersealing "battle" was truly fierce. The "red force" artillery pieces carried out fierce blocking fire; the attack planes carried out plunging fire and the bombers busily dropped bombs; the rocket and mine-laying vehicles

rapidly laid mine clusters, and the infantry following the tanks boldly and powerfully leapt forward... .. [ellipses as published]

I set aside my binoculars and commented to a comrade beside me: In the past we dependent on an infantry detachment to block the breach in our line, but now the "blue force's" two tactical atomic bombs have ripped open a breach many times larger than the breaches of the past, and the attacking enemy is a torrent of steel armor supported by the artillery and air arms. The "red force" cannot depend on some infantry to seal up this opening alone.

Expressing these views, I thought of the dispute between two views centering on how to seal up an "atomic breach" that occurred before the exercise. One view held that after the enemy had carried out an atomic attack, the infantry concealed in the defense works in the breach who had not been killed or wounded only needed 7 or 8 minutes to leap into position and seal up the opening in front of the breach. The other view stated: The "blue force" has a strong capability for coordinated operations. The small number of infantry that we maintain in the forward position cannot seal up an opening of this size. The correct method is to depend on the entire strength of all our service arms to seal up the opening behind the "atomic breach."

With each party sticking to its own opinion, the practice of today's drill rendered a judgment--"when everybody adds fuel the flames rise high," i.e., everybody must "stitch up" the tear."

Artillery Played the Leading Role

During this coordinated operation to seal up an "atomic breach," our artillery rendered the chief service. According to what the comrades said, the artillery played the leading role in this drama. When I drove a vehicle to the command post of a certain artillery regiment in order to find out about their experience, the commander told me: "We realize one point, viz, skip the books."

Originally, according to teaching materials, when artillery was carrying out blocking fire against enemy tanks, it should stop firing when the enemy tanks got to within 1,000 meters of our defensive forward positions. From practice the artillery regiment discovered that this did not suit reality very well, because at this range the antitank weapons of our infantry in the defense position cannot reach the enemy or display their maximum power, and it is easy for a firepower gap to be created. From the enemy's point of view, his tanks at this stage of their movement are precisely at a point when their cannon fire is most effective. When sealing up the "atomic breach" this time, the artillery regiment decided that when the enemy tanks had reached 600 or 400 meters from our defensive forward positions it would carry out its last blocking fire. Practice proved that this change, besides enabling the artillery to score hits on the enemy tanks, also enveloped the enemy tanks in smoke so that it was hard for the enemy to see us while we could see them, thus creating advantageous conditions for annihilating the enemy.

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MILITARY RESEARCH MUST NOT BE OVERSIMPLIFIED

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 4 Jul 80 p 3

[Article by Jiang Fangran [1203 2397 3544]: "'Military Affairs' Cannot Be 'Oversimplified in Discussion'"]

[Text] Everybody is fairly familiar with the armchair strategist Zhao Kuo, and knows that he was a military bookworm and an embodiment of those people who do not know how to meet an emergency. According to the "Historical Records," Zhao Kuo "talked about military affairs and said there was nothing in the world he could not do," so that even his father, Zhao She, could not defeat him in theoretical problems. But Zhao She never held Zhao Kuo in high regard. Kuo's mother was unclear about Zhao She's reason for this and asked him about it. Zhao She said: "War is a deathtrap and Kuo oversimplifies it in discussion." Zhao She was a famous general of the state of Zhao and had led the army that crushed the Qin army at Eyu. Having abundant experience in war, he realistically understood its difficulties and dangers. He knew full well what consequences would be produced by oversimplifying the discussion of military affairs, so he predicted "It is assumed that Zhao will not make Kuo a general, for if it does then the one who will destroy the Zhao army will be Kuo." The result was as his father had anticipated. This Zhao Kuo, who oversimplified military affairs, later led troops in battle against the state of Qin. Owing to the fact that he treated complex battle conditions lightly, on the battlefield he fell into the trap set by the Qin general, Bai Qi, and his "food supply line was cut and his army split in two" by the Qin army. After over 40 days of hunger, he died in a hail of arrows and the several hundred thousand-strong Zhao army that he had commanded was slaughtered by the Qin army. In history, Zhao Kuo is not the only person who was disastrously defeated because of oversimplifying military affairs. King Fu Jian of the Early Qin dynasty, before attacking the Eastern Jin dynasty, was warned by a subordinate: The adversary "occupies the natural barriers of the Changjiang River and can make use of his people," while in Qin the "soldiers are exhausted after many battles and the people fear the enemy" and you cannot easily go on the attack. Fu Jian recklessly said: My million-strong army will attack Jin like a strong wind sweeps before it the autumn leaves. Owing to Fu Jian's underestimation of the enemy, 70 to 80 percent of his huge army of 900,000 men were killed. The mica-ornamented carriage he was riding in was lost and he fled in panic back to Chang'an.

The lessons of the ancients are valuable reference lessons for us. Military struggle and the use of military forces in war is a science. If any person whomsoever

does not take a conscientious attitude toward it, but takes war to be a trifling matter and looks upon it as something easy to do, then it will be hard for him to avoid suffering the merciless punishment of war--disastrous defeat, and even the complete destruction of his army.

It is very beneficial for us to understand this point. Our army is now enthusiastically launching, from top to bottom, academic research on military affairs, and in particular the military command personnel and training personnel discuss military affairs all the time. When studying the enemy's and our own situation, they are considering hard, strict, and most difficult things, but they still "oversimplify the discussion!" This problem has definitely not been completely solved. With regard to a future war, do we study how to fight a three-dimensional, nuclear war or only prepare to fight a conventional war on the ground? Some comrades stress the latter and not the former; when envisaging the enemy, should we see that he is really a "true tiger" or "iron tiger" who has first-rate weapons and equipment, very strong fighting capacity, and skill in commanding combined arms operations, or is really a "paper tiger" who is isolated, whose equipment is not strong, whose fighting capacity is low, and whose command is clumsy? Some comrades discard the former view and take up the latter one. Again, some comrades, when studying certain methods of fighting only abstractly and in terms of principles discuss how to fight, taking all conditions to be perfect, and do not carefully consider and calculate specific, particular difficulties and whether the operation is feasible given the tactical and technical performance of various weapons; some comrades consider as already solved problems on which tests are being made or on which the results of tests are still a matter for controversy, consider weapons with which only one individual unit is equipped to be weapons that the entire army can be equipped with, and say that difficulties which actually have not been resolved are problems that are being solved, etc. All this shows that it is extremely necessary not to "oversimplify the discussion" of "military affairs" and that attention should be drawn to this point.

Obviously, when I say here that "military affairs" cannot be "oversimplified in discussion," I certainly do not want people to deliberately exaggerate the difficulties and complexity of war, but I am advocating an atmosphere of study in which war, the enemy, and oneself are looked upon as they really are, and that one face up to reality and tackle problems with originality. There is this sentence in "Sunzi's Art of War": "War is a matter of vital importance to the state, the province of life or death, the road to survival or ruin." All comrades engaged in military research should treat war with caution, and they certainly cannot treat it lightly.

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TROOPS MUST BE WELL EDUCATED IN REVOLUTIONARY OUTLOOK ON LIFE

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 5 Jul 80 p 1

[Commentary: "Strengthen Leadership, Do Not Just Go Through the Motions"]

[Text] Education on the revolutionary outlook on life has already begun on a wide scale in every unit of the army. The important problem at present is to strengthen leadership and not to just go through the motions, truly promoting this education in a thorough way and obtaining results.

How can we insure that this education is not just going through the motions?

The key is leadership. The leaders of many units fully understand the importance and urgency of education on the revolutionary outlook on life. They personally take command and pitch in this work, going deep to investigate and study, finding out the troops' ideas, staying at lower levels and making them experimental points, summing up and popularizing the experiences of advanced units and solving in a timely fashion the problems encountered by the basic-level units in this education. Many leading comrades also personally take over classes and expound the basic principles of this outlook on life to the cadres and fighters, join with the fighters in informal group discussions, solve difficult problems that arise among the masses and study with the basic-level cadres methods to improve this education. In these units, the education is done in a solid fashion and has obtained big results, and the general mood and spirit of the troops are changing. Leaders of some units also grasp education on this outlook on life, but the measures they take are not vigorous enough. They stop after they have made ordinary arrangements and appeals, so the results are comparatively ordinary. There are also leaders of a small number of units who have an insufficient understanding of the importance of this education, do not conscientiously study and analyze the thinking of their troops, do not concentrate their efforts on helping the basic-level cadres to improve the methods of this education, do not truly resolve the contradiction between work and study, and do not timely adjust the contradiction when politics and education "clash," so that time for this education is not insured, and the personnel do not thoroughly carry it out and actually just go through the motions. The abovementioned situation shows that the key to whether education on this outlook on life is carried out well is leadership. Only if the leaders really regard this education seriously and energetically set about grasping it can it be carried out well; otherwise, if the leaders do not regard it seriously, do not grasp it tightly or neglect to grasp it at all, then it will be easy to let things slide and just go

through the motions. Whether we can truly carry out well education on the revolutionary outlook on life has a bearing on the progress in maturation of a great number of young cadres and fighters, on building the thinking and work style of the troops and on whether their fighting capacity can be heightened. Leaders at every level must be determined and must make great efforts to grasp this education thoroughly and to obtain results.

They must continue to grasp well education on "fostering proletarian ideology and eliminating bourgeois ideology," and overcome the influence of feudal thinking, overcome ultra-individualism, anarchism, bourgeois liberalism and other nonproletarian ideologies. They must correctly and painstakingly analyze the state of the troops' thinking and make a point of drawing clear demarcation lines. They must expound policies and they must not oversimplify. This is the problem that must be mastered in leadership.

The education certainly must "loose some arrows," and the "arrows" cannot be "air to air." The purpose in carrying out education on this outlook on life is to help the cadres and fighters to correctly solve some philosophic problems of life, such as why people live and how they should live. However, the outlook on life is always concretely reflected in people's statements and actions when doing things. Different units and various personnel under all sorts of different conditions will have different problems. When a unit is specifically conducting education on a certain special topic, it must center it on the overall goal and focus on universal trends. It must also start from the unit's reality, and with a specific focus, through solving the unit's current problems, make clear the basic principles of this outlook on life. To be separated from a unit's reality and abstractly lecture on the outlook on life easily turns into an "air-to-air" situation. That is to say, the situation in each unit is different, and the education should have different foci, and different objects of education should have different emphases. The same foci for education on ideals and future prospects cannot be the same for a special technology detachment as it is for an ordinary combat company. The situation in this company and in another one are also not the same, and the education also cannot be of one form. With regard to cadres and fighters, veteran soldiers and recruits, and soldiers from the cities and from the rural areas, their experience is different, the problems they face are different, their way of thinking about and looking at problems are different, and so there must be differences in the education. The key points in each emphasis must be prominent and suit the different objects so that problems will be solved by suiting the remedy to the case. If there are no points of emphasis, there will be no focus. If one does not proceed from the unit's reality and, with regard to the arrangements made by the higher authorities for the content of this education, rigidly move, shift and follow these arrangements, "indiscriminately cooking in one pot" the objects of the education, then the result will be that the remedy will not suit the case and answers will not be given to the questions raised by actual life. The result of all this can only be that the education will turn back on itself and that problems will turn back on themselves and not be solved.

The instruction in this education must be given carefully; it cannot just repeat what the books say. The establishment of the revolutionary outlook on life is "capital construction" for the thinking of young cadres and so the people responsible for this education must certainly give instruction carefully. This education

must be likened to a construction project, in which, first of all, there must be conscientious examination and careful design. In conducting this education, we certainly must go deep into reality, find out the way the objects of this education think in their hearts, and see, in the final analysis, where the "nub" of their thinking lies, and afterwards conscientiously study methods to carry out this education. Many young cadres and fighters don't understand very well many basic principles concerning this outlook on life, and so it is necessary to inculcate them with some fundamental theory and knowledge. However, the main principles must be expounded so that everybody will like to listen to them, and the inculcation of these principles must be done with particularly careful methods; forcible inculcation will not do. This demands that the educators themselves, first of all, thoroughly understand the principles; they must not hastily start work without this understanding. In teaching, lectures must be given on these principles, as far as possible using vivid examples to illustrate the philosophy of life, applying the principles to affairs, going from the near to the far and from the shallow to the deep, providing inspiration and guidance and making the education interesting and absorbing. In addition to conducting classes, the instructors must adapt the teaching to the traits of youth and carefully organize all sorts of lively, rich, varied and healthful activities, such as telling stories of the revolution, reading ideologically self-cultivating books, making film reviews and learning from heroic model personages, to draw everybody into thinking about the meaning of life, engaging in discussions on all sorts of special topics, inquiring into the purpose of life, tempering their revolutionary will, and cultivating beautiful sentiments, thereby allowing the masses to educate themselves. The simplification of education--thinking that education is equivalent to teaching classes, that teaching classes is equivalent to reciting texts, not looking at the object of the education, repeating what the book says, and expounding the text in a stereotypical fashion--is an unsuitable method and should not be used.

Integrate intensive education with regular education. Owing to the fact that for many years there has not been a systematic carrying out of education on this outlook on life and that we are now beginning to supply these classes as a supplement, with a relative concentration of time and personnel, it is necessary to carry out the education in a planned and systematic manner. However, it is a long-term task in political and ideological work to do this and to resist the corrosive influences of the bourgeoisie, the feudal and other exploitative classes. It is a lifetime matter for any one person to establish firmly and securely the communist outlook on life, and one is never too old to learn and reform. This problem cannot be solved by attending one or two classes. Therefore, we certainly cannot be satisfied and say that with one period of concentrated education the time for this education is finished and the education on this outlook on life is finished. We should make the education on this outlook on life penetrate every aspect of political and ideological work, and in peacetime cultivate it and make it a regular feature. This education must be integrated with education on the party's line and its general and specific policies, with education on the work "General Political Knowledge," and with the activities to learn from heroic models like Lei Feng, Lu Shikai and others so that everybody, by understanding the fundamental viewpoints of Marxism and with knowledge of the party's line and its current policies, will further solve the problems of the individual's outlook on life, and, by studying the maturation process of advanced personages, take the path and follow the methods of being a revolutionary. Leading cadres at all levels should set the

example, playing the leading role in studying and implementing "Some Guiding Principles for Inner-Party Political Life" and in discussing the revised draft of the party's constitution, and, by their own actual behavior, influence and spur on the young cadres and fighters to conscientiously use the fundamental principles of the communist outlook on life to study and handle well all sorts of problems that they themselves encounter, starting with themselves, starting now and starting bit by bit, to establish step by step the revolutionary outlook on life.

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YOUNGER OFFICERS SUPERVISE TRAINING IN GUANGXI BORDER DIVISION

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 5 Jul 80 p 1

[Article by Su Jing [5685 7231] and Wu Shibin [0702 0013 2430]: "A Certain Guangxi Border Defense Division Liberates Its Thinking, Young Officers Shoulder the Heavy Burdens of Training"]

[Text] A certain Guangxi border defense division has liberated its thinking and has freely and boldly let nine young divisional regimental officers "sing the leading role" in organizing military training. In the June comprehensive examination throughout the division, the scores in every training subject were the highest in history.

These young officers were all promoted one after another to their present ranks during the war of self-defensive counterattack against Vietnam, and their average age is 34.8 years. How could their intelligence and wisdom be fully displayed? The party committees of the division and its regiments let them mount the stage and "sing the leading role" and temper themselves by maturing through practice. The veteran comrades who in the past had been assigned to supervise training one by one took the initiative to act as their "staff officers" and "advisers," supporting them in boldly setting about this work.

The support of the veteran comrades greatly inspired these young officers. Wu Wenbing [0702 2492 3521], 35, commander of an artillery regiment, became acquainted with the training conditions in all companies of his regiment and with the good conditions of the artillery pieces. Then, based on the problems that existed, he brought these problems to the attention of the cadres and fighters and asked them to think of ways of reforming the content and methods of the training. In the first half of this year, the regiment completed its training mission a month ahead of schedule. Seven of these nine young officers in the division had some experience in probing into and finding out about the reforming of training content and methods, and they made a contribution to troop training. These young officers respect the veteran comrades and humbly listen to their opinions, and continually enhance their own ability. Li Shengping [2621 516B 1627], chief of staff of a certain regiment, after completing each training topic, on his own initiative listened attentively to the opinions of the "old generals" in the regiment, so that as soon as one "battle" was accomplished, it was summed up and another step forward could be taken. He did a solid job of training, working steadily and making good progress, for which a divisional notice of commendation was circulated.

In the half year, this group of young officers have rapidly matured at their individual posts, and marked changes have begun to take place in military training throughout the division. As of 20 June, they had completed the training mission for the first half of the year 23 days ahead of schedule. On examination, the companies who were trained received a general appraisal of excellent in their first and second sessions of live-ammunition firing practice. The upper-level organization held three on-the-spot meetings of artillery and infantry soldiers at which it fully disseminated these training experiences.

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NAVAL BASE SURVEYS ISLAND-DOTTED OPERATIONAL SEA AREA

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 5 Jul 80 p 2

[Article by Huang Yaonian [7806 1031 1628]: "Leaders of a Certain Naval Base Survey and Become Familiar With an Operational Sea Area"]

[Text] From 28 May to 4 June, the principal leading comrades of a certain naval base, at the head of some organizational cadres, in a naval ship went to an operational sea area, where they surveyed and became familiar with 36 islands, 19 sea routes, and over 50 harbors and anchorages. Each person put in order a copy of operational worthy materials, and changed the "lifeless sea chart" hanging on the wall into a "living sea chart" in their minds.

The comrades of the base were extremely conscientious in their on-the-spot survey and did not let a single island or reef escape their notice. On the fringe of one cluster of islands was an islet rising about 20 meters above the water. In order to gain a clear understanding of the islet, political commissar Liu [0491] humbly requested instruction from a master navigator, inquiring in detail about the islet's position, area, and military value, and did not stop his inquiries until he was perfectly clear on these points. They paid particular attention to islands and harbors that possessed important operational value. A certain island is a forward-position stronghold and its strategic position is extremely important. Commanded Liu [0491] and the other comrades changed from the ship to a small boat and went to the island. There they requested instruction from the comrades of the army garrison force and called on local fishermen so that they became perfectly clear about the island's docking facilities, harbors, and river branches.

Comrades of every professional department taking part in the survey, besides becoming familiar with this operational sea area, focused on the requirements of their respective departments work. Comrades of headquarters laid emphasis on becoming clear about which harbors ships could lay at anchor in, which harbors could berth which types of ships, etc. The logistics and the equipment-technical departments conscientiously studied how to insure naval operations. Sun Houkun [1327 0624 0981], deputy head of the ship repair department, during the survey made notes on over 20 civilian shipyards in the islands. He also drew a sketch map of their positions and equipment and put all his materials in order so that, when preparing against war, naval ships at sea could be repaired close by and the power of a people's war would be fully brought into play.

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WARGAME EXERCISES SHARPEN SHENYANG COMMANDERS' SKILLS

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 6 Jul 80 p 1

[Article by staff correspondent Yuan Zhanxian [5913 0594 0341] and Gan Yongping [3927 3057 1627] and by staff reporter Li Kun [2621 0981]: "Commanding Officers Forced To Pit Their Command Skills Against Each Other"]

[Text] From 23 to 27 June, in a certain mountainous district, veteran regimental commander Dong Cai [5576 2088] and young regimental commander Zhenfeng [5514 2182 1496], who joined the army in the 1960's, at the head of their respective regiment's staff personnel, carried out a military exercise in which "red" and "blue" forces were pitted against each other, from the sand table to the field, and which closely simulated actual warfare. This was the fourth exercise of a similar nature carried out by a certain division of the Shenyang Units since the beginning of this year.

Look: these two new and veteran commanders who engaged in battle, regardless of whether meeting in combat in sandtable exercises or attacking and defending in field combat, followed developments in the situation that were hard to predict, thought hard about strategems, and each one used "unexpected tricky moves" and sharply contended with each other. Whoever discovered some traces of the other side would vigorously press forward steadily, but the side which had suffered a setback would not give the slightest indication of weakness and would try in every possible way to regain the initiative. Over 100 comrades at the army and division level who are leaders or commanding officers in combat training, and who had come to observe and study this exercise, unanimously held that a commander without true command ability could not carry out this kind of unplanned confrontational exercise. In the past, this division, with regard to the key problem of cadre training, although thinking of some methods, all along had insufficient ideas about its solution. In particular, the improvement in training a commanding officer's capacity to command at his level was never stressed, which resulted in the command capacity of some senior officers not being up to standard and being fairly far from the actual requirements of command at their levels. Therefore, the phenomenon occurred of "the staff officers grading the training exercises and the senior officer just initialing their documents." How could we as rapidly as possible improve the commanding officer's command ability at his own level? The leadership of the division organized headquarters comrades to look through many written materials. They discovered that many foreign armies lay great stress on training that pits

commanding officers against each other. The leadership then organized the senior officers and the headquarters of several regiments to carry out a confrontational drill. Even if this experience was insufficient, it effectively tested and tempered the commanding officers' capability for command and promoted their initiative for strengthening their own training. The regimental commanders who had taken part in the confrontational exercise all felt: Carrying out confrontational exercises in which commanding officers at the same level are organized to "wrestle" with each other forces them to compare in the field their ideas, intelligence, and capacity for command. If in ordinary times, we do not work hard to improve our command level, then we will not pass the test when we engage in a confrontational exercise.

This year, the division made the confrontational training of regimental senior officers and headquarters the focal point of its cadre training. The leadership organization of the Shenyang Units gave this training much attention, and timely sent a work team to the division to plant an "experimental plot" and to provide concrete help and guidance. The commanding officers became keyed up, and a pressing situation was immediately created. Dong Cai, veteran commander of a certain regiment, after this training topic was assigned, who had always felt he had a good idea of how things stood, took his bedroll to his office. On the four walls of his office he pasted charts and diagrams showing the establishment, equipment, and capabilities of all weapons of our army and the enemy army. When he had time he studied them, imposing on himself the task of memorizing each day some relevant data concerning foreign armies. In order to clarify a certain command problem, he often bent over his desk and studied until deep into the night. Ge Zhenfeng, the young commander of a certain regiment, although becoming a regiment commander in 1978, he had previously spent many years in staff work for training and had several times taken part in organizing big training exercises, and had once led a whole regiment on a training exercise, but he still approached the task gingerly. With regard to the division's decision to carry out a confrontational exercise, Ge Zhenfeng felt more under pressure than he ever had before. In order to increase his analytic and judgmental capacity, he started work early and knocked off late, using all the time that could be used to read some military research materials on our army and foreign armies, to repeatedly improve his knowledge of an enemy regiment's tactical thought and operational principles and to study systematic materials and some publications on the Egyptian-Israeli wars. In particular, he took notes on matters concerning the analyses and judgments of commanders, and in the period of a little over 3 months had written over 20,000 Chinese characters of study notes.

The command ability of all commanders who took part in the confrontational exercises, after "wrestling" with their opponents, no matter whether they were new or veteran, had attended academies or not, markedly increased. In their own words, this "bout of wrestling" was better than 10 "fights on paper."

In the last third of June, the leadership organizations of the Shenyang Units held an on-the-spot meeting at this division in which it called on all senior officers and headquarters of the units to immediately launch confrontational training.

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DIVISION PRACTICES STRATEGIC MOBILITY ON CHANGJIANG RIVER

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 8 Jul 80 p 1

[Article by Yu Jianhua [0151 1696 5978], Chen Qingfa [7115 1987 4099], Liu Shengfu [0491 4141 4395], and Dai Hui'an [2071 1920 1344]: "A Certain Division Carries Out an Experimental Transport Drill on the Changjiang River"]

[Text] Editor's note: A certain division has carried out strategic battle mobility transport drill on the Changjiang River, thereby filling a gap in our military training and indicating that this unit's training level is being developed in breadth and depth. It appears that this "gap" exists in varying degrees in each service arm and each unit. In the original training topics that can be just touched upon, owing to a lack of practice, this topic has been a gap for a long time; in the training topics that need to be popularized, owing to the topic having been confined to only a small number of experimental points, it was also a gap for the greater part of the units. All these units are waiting for our makeup lessons. Military training is a kind of scientific experiment. We should bear in mind the continual developmental changes in weapons and equipment and in modes of operation, focus on the new topics that these changes present to us, continually experiment and probe, and discover and open up new areas in training.

On 20 June, a flotilla formed of several tens of 10,000-ton class ships, fully loaded with infantry, artillery, vehicles, tanks, and horses, sailed through towering columns of water straight down the Sanmen Gorge. A certain division's water transport experimental drill was just here being intensively carried out.

How to use large rivers to carry out strategic battle mobility and transport combined arms forces--this is still a gap in our army's training. In 1975, the division put forward a plan for waterway transport training, but it was never put into practice. This year, it again put forward this training plan, and the general headquarters listed it as a key item in this year's training.

This drill occurred right in the middle of the flood season. The water mark was changing rapidly and there were many dangerous conditions on the river; the reference materials and data required were lacking; the division had no idea at all of how to conduct a series of training measures that would insure coordination; the

object of the transport was a complete combined arms force of "vehicles, horses, and artillery," and the ships used were leased locally and many of the local cadres, technicians, and workers were to assist in the training, and also the drill would be carried out with tactical conditions in the background. These conditions posed great difficulties in organization and command and in all kinds of safeguarding work.

Confronted with this brand new topic and enormous task, the leadership organizations of the division appealed to the troops: Emancipate your minds, be bold in making innovations, and pool the wisdom and efforts of everyone in order to fill this training gap and accelerate your contributions to preparing well to counter an aggressive war. They formed a joint loading command post with representatives of the port offices and the (? Changjiang River Navigation Corps) [Chang Hang Jun 7022 514A 65112, and together reconnoitered the navigation route. They also organized cadres at platoon and above levels to learn about water transport from local comrades, to gain an understanding of the functions of all kinds of ships, and to become familiar with docking conditions. The officers and men, under a high temperature of over 40 degrees [centigrade] and in complete battle dress, tried to gain experience in water transport. They trained in daytime in loading and unloading, and also at nighttime without illumination; they trained on fixed docks and also on temporarily erected docks; they trained in transporting across water under normal conditions and also under conditions of an enemy air raid, atomic attack, chemical warfare attack, and a mine blockade. In this way, they tentatively found out the relevant data and work sequences needed in organizing and commanding a combined arms force for strategic battle mobility on an inland river, probed into questions of mutual coordination and combat safeguards in transporting across water infantry, artillery, and tanks as well as engineer, signal, antichemical warfare and other special detachments; accumulated experience, during the hottest part of the year, in transporting a long distance across water personnel and horses, providing life safeguards such as food, accomodation, heat protection, and sickness prevention and carrying out administrative management; researched the political and ideological work for troops while being transported a long distance across water; and summed up the experiences in, when using local ships for transporting troops under tense conditions, military-civilian cooperation.

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SACHEL CHARGES CAN BE EFFECTIVE AGAINST TANKS

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 8 Jul 80 p 2

[Article in "How To Highlight Training in the 'Three Attacks and Three Defenses'"
column: "A Few Words in Fairness to the Use of Satchel Charges in Attacking Tanks"]

[Text] Editor's note: In the final analysis, can satchel charges be used in attacking tanks? The answer to this question can neither be a simple affirmation nor a simple negation. With regard to the training topic of attacking tanks with satchel charges, it is unnecessary to spend a great deal of time in large-scale and special training, but to look upon the topic as not being of the slightest usefulness and to not give it any consideration is not necessarily correct. The correct attitude is to employ the dialectical method and impartially evaluate the function of satchel charges, thereby putting this training topic in a satisfactory position. This column is publishing two articles that present some views on this topic and welcomes everybody's continued presentation of their opinions.

[Subarticle by the 7th Company of a certain regiment of the Ji'nan Units: "An Indispensable Supplementary Method"]

Our company is an advance detachment of infantry in training in attacking tanks. Since the beginning of last year, the company has thrown satchel charges at real tanks no less than 300 to 400 times. Here, thinking of our training practice, we would like to say a few words in fairness to satchel-charge attacks on tanks.

In the beginning, our understanding as a group was not very clear-cut: with a tank's high speed, fierce firepower and thick armor so that when it comes it is like a great host, if satchel charges are exploded, they are inadequate at a distance and one cannot be sure of getting close, so that to train with satchel charges is a waste of effort. For this reason, we launched a discussion. We raised these questions: "If it were not for steamed dumplings, would you want to eat steamed bread?" "If there were no tractors, could you discard pickaxes?" Everybody drew up the balance sheet on the basis of the company's four kinds of weapons for attacking tanks--rocket launchers, bangalore torpedoes, mines, and satchel charges--and, naturally, calculated that the rocket launcher is the most advanced weapon. With the company having these several weapons, we should think

of other methods of attacking tanks. According to comrades of the military training department, their experiments on the efficacy of satchel charges in attacking tanks had proved that a fixed amount of satchel charges thrown at certain places on a tank can have a definite effect. For example, they can cut tank treads, demolish a tank engine, damage a tank's gun turret and the joints on its body, etc. Even if the explosive does not destroy, it can shock or stun those inside, or at least slow the movement of the tank. Through the discussion they came to the conclusion: "Having many skills does not inhibit the individual," and that having one more hand is always stronger than having one less hand. In coming days in dealing with enemy tanks, the rocket launcher is the principal weapon and the satchel charge and bangalore torpedo are the supplementary weapons. This is always better than to come under an attack and look on helplessly.

According to a proverb, a foot has its shortness and an inch has its length. Comparing a tank with a satchel charge, each has its long points and short points. In training in dealing with tanks, we often discover that although they have many strong points they also have not a few weak points, and they certainly do not have unlimited supernatural power and cannot be vanquished. For example: 1. Tanks are somewhat fast, but this speed is restricted by the type of terrain and road, and they move slowly at times. 2. Although a tank's firepower is strong, it has many blind angles of observation that hamper its firing, and there are times when it is helpless. 3. A tank's front and two sides are strongly protected, but the armor of its engine's ventilating ducts is thin, the tank's gun turret and body are not firmly joined, and the tank's tread is exposed--all these things can easily be damaged by an explosion.

In comparison with the tank's abovementioned "weaknesses amid strengths," the "satchel charge" has many "strengths amid weaknesses." First, the demolitioner is not restricted by the type of terrain or road, and can, with mobile and flexible tactics, get close to and blow up the tank; second, the demolitioner presents a small target and thus can easily take cover, and he has a wide field of vision for observation; and third, he can use all sorts of measures to slow the tank's speed, disrupt a formation of tanks, and create an advantageous opportunity for throwing his satchel charge. In addition to setting up positions with pits and wooden stakes, we often construct a net-shaped position. Practice has proved that after a tank enters a net-shaped position, its speed is immediately slowed, and, the tankers, besides raising the hatch and throwing handgrenades at or crushing the infantry in the position, have no other "tricks"; we can then, by making use of the trenches, from all quarters and under cover, close in on the enemy and throw satchel charges.

If training in the skill of satchel-charge attacks on tanks is done well, it will be useful in war; on the contrary, if the training is not done well, losses will be sustained. Therefore, peacetime training must certainly approximate real warfare and we cannot by any means deceive ourselves about this. At the beginning we repeatedly trained in attacking stationary models of tanks. After training to a point at which "each satchel charge hit the target," we trained in attacking real tanks. When all the trainees saw this tall and big armored weapon coming up with its clanking noise, they were a little tense, and many comrades did not throw their satchel charges accurately. What were we to do? Our solution was more training. All the trainees, for 3 hot summer days, crawled, climbed, rolled, and

attacked, repeatedly practicing advancing in a crouched position, quickly stopping and drawing fire, rapidly throwing satchel charges, quickly withdrawing, and lying down and taking cover, thereby acquiring masterly skill through intensive training. When examined by the upper levels, the cadres and soldiers of the company, in throwing satchel charges at three moving tanks, attained an accuracy rate of 80 percent. At the same time, based on the shape of each vital part of a tank, we also improved the forms of the satchel charges, making seven kinds of satchel charges including those in the form of two linked poles, the form of a ship's deck, and the form of the Chinese character 'man' [ren 0086], and thus increasing the power of satchel charges in attacking tanks.

[Subarticle by the advance antitank squad of a certain regiment: "Don't Underestimate Its Power, Don't Deny Its Weak Points"]

Since the beginning of last year, our squad has been the regiment's advance squad in the mission of training in satchel-charge attacks on tanks. With real tanks as the target, each squad member has thrown satchel charges not less than 400 times. We think that the power of a satchel charge cannot be underestimated, but that its weak points are obvious, and we should speak clearly on this issue in the spirit of seeking truth from facts.

If a tank moves fast, a satchel charge cannot hit it. In the first stage of our training, a tank was driven at its first and second levels of speed, and we, in general, were able to hit it. When the tank increased to the fourth level of speed, we, jumping up from our original distance, could not even touch it: as the tank rushed past, the satchel charges were thrown too late. Subsequently, we changed our tactics, advancing our jumpoff time so as to get a good lead time for throwing the satchel charges. Who would have thought that the tank would move as if it were a bullet, so that the satchel charges when thrown did not roll in front of the tank but were knocked upside down. Still not admitting defeat, we had six comrades whose technical expertise was fairly good carry out "bombing in waves." The result was that when the tank circled them several times, the six comrades only scored one hit with a satchel charge. Having lost this game, we understood: With regard to a tank being driven at high speed over open terrain, satchel charge attacks on tanks are fundamentally ineffective. In this kind of situation, we certainly cannot act recklessly but must think of ways to slow the tank's speed before attacking.

When there are many tanks, satchel charge demolitioners cannot be relied upon. With a periscope, all comrades of our squad can clearly see a target over 20 meters away, but the tank's machinegun and cannon can also score hits. According to foreign military briefing materials, when Soviet tanks mass for advance, the distance between them is usually from 50 to 100 meters, and in battle formation this distance is usually 70 to 150 meters. They can cover each other in turn and form a criss-cross network of fire. Under these conditions, a tank's blind angle is not a blind angle for another tank. Our satchel charge demolitioners when exploding their satchel charge are subject to surprise fire attacks from one or more tanks, and even from one or more directions. If you cannot get close to a tank, there is the possibility of being killed or wounded by fire from the tanks. During our training, we frequently asked the tankers for their comment and appraisal. They told us that

it was no good to use the same method of attack on a group of tanks that we used on a single tank, but that we must first attack the tank formation, or choose advantageous terrain or opportunities before we attacked.

Moreover, in various countries of the world, tank-manufacturing technology is developing fast. Some advanced tanks have composite armor and their tracks are protected, so that an ordinary satchel charge cannot do significant damage. During our training, we realized: It is not very difficult to throw a satchel charge weighing 6 kilograms or less, but if this weight is increased a little then it becomes very difficult. However, we know that it usually takes an explosive charge weighing 8 kilograms to pierce 60-mm armor, and that the two sides of the T-62 tank, which is what Soviet units are universally equipped with, is 70 to 120 mm thick; the new T-72 tank's armor is even thicker. This makes it difficult to carry out satchel-charge attacks on these tanks, because if the charge is small the blast will not do sufficient damage, while if the charge is large it cannot be thrown. If we cannot destroy the tank by the blast and only rely on the blast to inflict casualties on enemy personnel by its shock effect, then obviously its effect is diminished. Based on our adversary's equipment, we must carry out innovations and make improvements on satchel charges so that they will better meet the requirements of a future war.

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ANTI-AIRCRAFT DIVISION MECHANIZES FOOD PREPARATION

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 9 Jul 80 p 2

[Article by staff correspondents Wei Xuding [5898 2485 1353], Xing Laizhao [6717 0171 6856], and Li Peijin [2621 1014 6855] and staff reporters Sun Li [1327 4539], Mao Wenrong [3029 2429 2051], and Hong Zhonglin [6575 0022 2651]: "Let the 'Commander of the Vanguard Unit' Truly Be in the Vanguard"]

[Text] "Food and fodder should go ahead of troops and horses"--this was the wise remark of an experienced person early in the pregunpowder era. However, owing to the fact that our backward mess methods did not keep pace with the development of weapons and equipment, the "commander of the vanguard unit" often could not be in the vanguard, and the provisions for field mess work did not meet the requirements of modern combat and training. A certain anti-aircraft artillery division of the Beijing Units worked hard to mechanize its mess work in order to take the path toward resolving this contradiction (for details see the 25 June edition of this newspaper). On 21 June, we again paid a call on the party committee members of the anti-aircraft artillery division and asked them to brief us on some ways of thinking about and understanding from experience of mechanizing mess work.--

The Suffering Caused by the Dereliction of Duty by the "Commander of the Vanguard Unit"

Question: Why did you, the divisional party committee, think of mechanizing mess work?

Answer: We were "driven to join the Liangshan Mountain rebels," i.e., forced to do something desperate. Since our division was formed it has carried out many mobile operational missions. In mountain and forest regions, the unit's position would shift 3 or 4 times in 1 day, and, with their pots, bowls, ladles, and basins in a big heap, the mess personnel were always so busy that they couldn't sit down. If they ran into stormy days and nights, their bodies were covered with mud and water and their faces with ashes. As a consequence, the food was not cooked and the troops had to shift their positions on empty stomachs. The difficulties in cooking food by burying pots on the vast Gobi Desert sands need not be raised. The mess personnel angrily said: "There is something strange about the sand in the northwest: a cooking pit is covered over faster than it can be dug and iron spades just rub against a smooth surface. Therefore, we must tighten our belts." During a severe winter north of the Great Wall, the frozen layer of earth can be as

thick as 90 centimeters. A pickaxe blow leaves white imprints, and sometimes for a whole day a cooking pit cannot be scratched out of the ground. Even if it is finally dug, when a fire is lit the frozen earth melts and the cooking pit collapses. These "sufferings" make us feel deeply that the old method of cooking food by burying pots cannot be continued. We have been put on notice by the advanced battlefield cooking methods of some countries, and this makes us determined to mechanize food preparation.

Question: How could you think of doing this yourselves without waiting for the upper levels to distribute the necessary equipment?

Answer: In the beginning, everybody was not in complete accord on whether we should start this work ourselves. Afterward, we were in accord: If we want to do this, we must immediately get to work on it and we cannot wait. Our country is large, its population is huge and its foundation is poor. If everybody were to sit and wait for "food that is prepared by others," how many years or months would we have to wait? Modernization is a matter for the entire party, entire country, and entire army, and only if we start to work from top to bottom can the pace of modernization be quickened. Facts before our eyes teach us that if we had sat and waited with folded arms, it is highly possible that we would have nothing now. We did not passively sit and wait, and now the entire division is basically mechanizing food preparation. Practice has made us realize that modernization will not come if we wait until the equipment is distributed to us, and even less if we just wish it, but only if we set to work.

From Where Did They Summon the "God of Wealth"?

Question: The mechanization of food preparation requires money and materials. This is a practical difficulty. How did you resolve it?

Answer: A materialist is one who is particular about conditions and who speaks in terms of conditions. To innovate requires the expenditure of some money. For our mechanization of food preparation, the upper level gave us some money and truly supported us in a big way, but the major part of the outlay was borne by ourselves.

Question: Where did this money come from?

Answer: We carried on the old traditional method of our party and our army: broadening the sources of income and reducing expenditures. In these past years, we all along grasped agriculture and sideline production and would not let go of it. From the beginning in 1977, we further mechanized agricultural and sideline production so that there were few soldiers engaged in this production, its cost was low, and its output high. We also made great efforts to handle well the pig raising, vegetable planting, and small workshop operations of companies, and this gradually enriched the unit. In this way, with the unit prospering and its resources becoming substantial, we had the possibility of taking money from this production income for food preparation mechanization. If the unit was so poor that it had to beg and could only give consideration to filling the troops' bellies, how could it give consideration to mechanization of food preparation?

In making innovations, we must both spend money and pay attention to practicing thrift, so that in the days of prosperity provisions are made for the days of poverty. In making the innovations, we did things simply and thriftily, did the job with local methods, repaired and utilized old or discarded things, and as far as possible did a lot with little money. Local salvage stations became our "materials storehouse." For example, a certain regiment bought a steel plate, for which it paid 7 or 8 yuan, to replace the outer casing of the distributor box on its bread oven; and the head of this regiment's logistics department rushed to the salvage station and bought an item being sold at a reduced price of 4 fen per jin, only spending a total of 1 jiao 4 fen.

More Participation by a Batch of "Self-Taught Experts"

Question: Obviously it will not do for you not to have the technical personnel to operate your advanced cooking instruments. Where did you obtain these technical personnel?

Answer: We mainly depended on some "self-taught experts" in the repair department. It is said that mechanization of food preparation is a matter for which the military supply department is responsible. But more than half the people in this department are former mess personnel and mess officers, and they really don't know much about machinery. Our method was to break through the boundaries between military occupations, and to transfer from the ordnance repair side "crack troops and good generals to join in the battle." At the beginning, some comrades of the repair department felt that their function was to repair vehicles and artillery pieces and that to deal with this "plaything" all the time was to "ignore one's proper occupation." We pointed out to these comrades that the purpose of repairing vehicles and artillery pieces was to prepare against war and that was also the purpose of mechanizing food preparation, insuring that the troops would be strong and win victories, so how could they say that this was not their "proper occupation." While solving this problem of understanding, we also got a tight grip on mechanizing the repair and maintenance of vehicles and artillery pieces. For example, in the past, 3 or 4 days were required to perform second-level maintenance on one type of foreign tractor trucks, but now only 6-8 hours are sufficient. In the past, 4 days' time was needed to change the grease on a type of small antiaircraft gun, and now only 4 hours are needed. Not only is the speed fast but the quality is up to standard. This greatly increased our maintenance capacity, so that repair personnel were released to make innovations on cooking instruments, and neither the reform of cooking instruments nor the repair of ordnance equipment suffered.

What Is Important Is That "Rear Services Not Be in the Rear"

Question: Why was your mechanization of food preparation able to spring up so rapidly everywhere?

Answer: one basic reason that this work was able to spread fairly rapidly throughout the division was that the party committee put rear services work in the proper position so that "rear services were not in the rear." We thought that in modern warfare it is hard to move even an inch without rear services. In practice, we continually drew benefit from rear services. And speaking of food, we grasped

agricultural and sideline production, reformed cooking instruments, improved the troops' life, strengthened the fighters' physiques, and directly promoted education and training. Here is one very obvious example. In the past, when mess work was not done well, it weakened the physiques of the cadres and fighters so that whereas originally a little over 20 persons could pull an artillery piece up a slope, a little over 40 persons could not pull it up. The situation is different now. With the improvement in mess work, the strength of the troops is adequate and their morale is high. The political cadres have reported that, with better living conditions, political work is half again as good as it was. Therefore, in a certain sense, by grasping rear services we grasp political work and combat effectiveness. Rear services work has a place on our party's daily agenda, and there is time set aside for it and people put in charge of it. Division commander Deng Guozhong [6772 0948 1813] has always grasped the rear services very tightly, and if he does not see results he does not let go; he has in succession stayed at two regiments as his selected grassroots points in order to grasp the mechanization of food preparation. Political commissar Wang Maolu [3769 3148 3873] is fully involved in rear services construction. Once he led a work team to the grassroots point of a certain regiment, and, by taking as his point of departure the grasping of ideology and the grasping of an organized group, rectified the rear services ranks in a down-to-earth manner, which caused the regiment's rear services to make rapid progress and to become a model for the whole division.

With regard to leadership methods, we paid attention to using the experience of selected units to promote work in the entire area, and popularized this model. Every year we organize 3 or 4 big inspections of rear services work, organize mutual inspection and learning from each other, exchange experiences, and organize exhibits of achievements, thereby creating a situation in which people try to overtake each other in friendly emulation and in which the work is done faster, so that if you don't have learning you are forced to learn and if you are not moving you are forced to move.

Finally, the comrades of the party committee of this antiaircraft artillery division unanimously indicated that although the mechanization of food preparation had obtained specific results, this was only a beginning. The mechanization of food preparation must further develop in the direction of miniaturization, portability, multipurpose use, and the linking up of parts to form a whole. At the same time, we must also get a good grip on the modernization and gearing up for combat of other rear services occupations, so that rear services work will truly be able, under any conditions, to be set in motion, win initial successes, provide supplies, and send relief.

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TROOPS GUARD VITAL STRETCH OF VIETNAM BORDER RAILROAD

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 9 Jul 80 p 2

[Article by Zhou Nanyou [0719 0589 0645] and Wu Jinhua [0702 6855 5478]: "Speed Along, Frontier Defense Train"]

[Text] In the motherland's southwestern outpost on our side of the Vietnam border in the Bazi River zone, each day a train loaded with construction goods and materials, its iron wheels rolling and its steam whistle blowing, speeds past the eyes and gun muzzles of the Vietnamese army, rushing toward strategically important Hekou. Every time the people of Hekou unload the train's goods and materials transported from all parts of the motherland, how can they not praise the officers and men of the Yunnan border defense units who have the mission of protecting by arms the railroad line?

Yunnan's Kunming-Hekou railroad line goes from the Bazi River to the Hekou railway station, following all the way the river marking the border between China and Vietnam--below the Nanxi River bed, an over 10-kilometer railway section is separated from Vietnam only by water, and at its closest point the distance does not reach 100 meters. The section is completely exposed to the eyes of the Vietnamese army. The Vietnamese army continually creates incidents on our border, frequently firing rifles and cannons, blowing up our railroad, and making surprise attacks on the train. Once the train had no choice but to stop running along this stretch of the railroad, and the normal production and life of the masses of people in the border area were seriously threatened. In order to defend the motherland's honor and to insure the supply of goods and materials needed for the life of the border inhabitants in the Hekou area, this stretch of railroad absolutely must be kept open to traffic.

Such being the case, the burden of defending the railroad's security falls on the shoulders of the heroic border defense units. They resolutely smash with their iron fists the savage arrogance of the Vietnamese army. Not long after the work of repairing the railroad began, one day the Vietnamese army dispatched four special agents to try to slip across the Vietnam border and destroy the railroad that we were just then repairing. After the 5th Company discovered this, they immediately moved to our side of the border river. As the Vietnamese soldiers crossed the river and came ashore, our cadres and fighters shouted: "(Luo song kong ye) (Vietnamese for: Lay down your arms and we'll spare your lives)!" The Vietnamese soldiers opened fire and stubbornly resisted. Our border defense fighters, filled

with rage, counterattacked and killed one and wounded two of the Vietnamese soldiers. The other one, seeing that the situation was far from good, turned and ran in a bid to slip away by swimming, and he fell into our 7th Company's defense area. Squad leader Li Fawen [2621 3127 2429] of the 7th Company, who was then on point duty, quickly seized a machinegun from a new fighter's hands and shot dead this scoundrel engaged in a Vietnam border provocation.

This small victory dealt a blow to the rampant arrogance of the aggressors, but they refused to give up their evil designs. From August of last year, after the Kun(ming)-He(kou) railroad line had been formally opened to traffic, every time the train passed, the Vietnamese soldiers would get into position and pull back their rifle bolts with a clicking sound. Their commanding officer would stick his head out from his shelter in search of an opportunity to stage a provocation. But, seeing our border defense fighters carrying loaded rifles and standing in combat readiness along the railroad line, the Vietnamese did not dare to act recklessly.

Although the time taken by each train in passing over this stretch of railroad was very short, the border defense fighters guarding the stretch had to stand guard, patrol, and entrench day and night. When the train was about to pass, all of them would be sent out to provide armed protection, and the cadres and soldiers had to be on duty over 10 hours every day.

This zone is in the curved-shape tropical climate zone, and every summer the outside temperature is usually above 50 degrees [centigrade]; in the patches of cogon-grass, ants, mosquitoes, and leeches form in throngs. Nobody knows the amount of suffering that the cadres and soldiers endure to guard the people's train from being blocked! After a considerable period of time here, some comrades have ringworm on their bodies, and some even develop ulcers on parts of their skin, but they never say a word about their sufferings. Li Xianwen [2621 7341 2429], a fighter of the 5th Company, developed a skin ulcer in his hip region so that he could not bring his feet together and could walk only with extreme difficulty. The comrades-in-arms in his squad and the company commander on several occasions tried to persuade him to stay in the barracks and rest. His answer was in the affirmative, but when the company's entrenching party set out, he quietly followed in the rear. Once, Kui Zhaosheng [1145 3564 3932], a deputy squad leader of the 6th Company, led three fighters to a certain place where they entrenched themselves. At 8 o'clock that night, a Vietnamese soldier stealthily crossed the border river in an attempt to infiltrate across our border and carry out a harassing attack and cause destruction. After the enemy had clambered ashore, he hid behind a large tree from where he could observe anything stirring around him. Just then, new fighter Huang Zhishu [7806 2655 2855], who was sharp-eyed and quick-moving, raised his rifle and pulled the trigger. Simultaneously with the report of the rifle, the Vietnamese soldier tumbled into the river.

... .. [ellipses as published]

The steam whistle blows and the wheels roll; the people's train rushes forward ...
... [ellipses as published]

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DIVISION OF SHENYANG UNITS BENEFITS FROM NIGHT TRAINING

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 9 Jul 80 p 2

[Article by Chen Xiangmin [7115 0686 3046]: "Putting Into Practice a Night Training System Leads to Outstanding Successes"]

[Text] A certain division of the Shenyang Units has put into effect a week-long night training system which unites the night training of the organization and its detachments [fendui 0433 7130] and which has produced marked results.

In the past, the quality of the division's night training was comparatively low. In order to change this state of affairs, the division's leadership conscientiously heeded the opinions of the lower levels and decided to put into practice a system of week-long night training. Every month, after the daytime training topics are completed, each regiment arranges in a unified fashion a week's night training and completes 7 nights of training. In this way, the daytime and nighttime training topics are organically integrated and the night training of the organization and its detachments is unified. Since this training began 4 months ago, the night training week system has been maintained, the participation rate has reached over 87 percent, and the results of tests in each regiment have all been markedly successful.

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FLEET DETACHMENT PRACTICES NIGHT LANDING OPERATIONS

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 9 Jul 80 p 2

[Article by staff correspondent Xu Nengrong [1776 5174 2837] and staff special correspondent Zhang Ming [1728 7686]: "Breakthroughs Beginning To Be Made in Difficulties Connected With Night Landing Training"]

[Text] A certain landing ship detachment of the East [China] Sea Fleet, from the first 10 days in May until the middle 10 days of June, engaged in night landing training, and began to make breakthroughs in long-existing difficulties in fleet training.

Night landing training is a weak link. Some warship captains, when encountering ships passing through their navigational sea lanes at night, are forced to drop anchor and wait for the dawn, not daring to again sail forward. But, during a future war against aggression, military personnel, tanks, and vehicles must be swiftly and in a concealed manner transported to frontline islands, and this frequently will involve nighttime navigation and landing. Therefore, this detachment made night training a key topic for breakthroughs, and first of all drew from each ship its captain or first mate and brought them together in one group for training in nighttime landing operations. After this period of training, the captains or first mates all had mastered the positions of sea lanes, islands, and reefs and the navigational objectives and sea patterns, had learned about radar-guided navigation, and had exercised their capacity for night landing operations. They went back and forth along these sea lanes 16 times and made 26 night landings, covering a range of over 1,000 nautical miles. All of them completed their missions in fairly good fashion.

After the warship captain training class was over, the unit launched night training. The detachment dispatched three landing ships to carry out 20 days of night navigation training in dangerous sea lanes, thereby changing the past state of affairs in which they could not sail independently at night in unfamiliar sea areas and raising to a new level the training of the entire detachment.

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ARMY SETS QUALITY STANDARDS FOR NIGHT TRAINING

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 9 Jul 80 p 2

[Article by Hong Wei [3163 1218], Yun Feng [0061 1496], and Nan Hai [0589 3189]:
"A Certain Army Links Up the Parts of Night Training To Form a Whole"]

[Text] On the night of 18 June, in a quiet and secluded valley deep in the recesses of Yan Mountain, the "bang, bang, bang" of rifles shattered the still night sky. It was here that the quality standards on-the-spot meeting of nighttime basic training by a certain army of the Beijing Units was being held.

This army began to formulate its quality standards for nighttime basic training at the beginning of April this year. Before this year's nighttime training began, the leadership comrades of this army analyzed the previous night training. They saw that one important reason for the fact that for a long time there had not been a breakthrough in night training was that in the night training topics there was not the comparatively clear-cut quality standards that there were for daytime techniques and tactics, so that inspections of the results of the unit's training were not good and it was highly necessary to formulate a standard for assessing the quality of night training in order to raise the level of this training. In order to make the assessment standard match the unit's reality, the leadership comrades went to the 1st Company of a certain regiment, a company that was fairly good in night training, and practiced with the cadres and fighters there. After 9 successive revisions, they formulated assessment standards for 15 training topics, and thus linked up the parts of the nighttime training content to form a whole.

This army has compiled a book made up of its outline, teaching plan, and assessment standard for night basic training and has issued it to all infantry detachments [bubing fendui 2975 0365 0433 7130]. In the second half of the year, the army will again organize a checkup before all the infantry detachments begin their training in accord with these standards.

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WORK ON PROBATIONARY PARTY MEMBERS TIGHTENED

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 9 Jul 80 p 3

[Article by Liang Huarong [2733 5478 2837], Zhang (?Lu)mei [1728 7216 2734], and Zheng (?Wen)hua [6774 4489 5478]: "Promoting to Full Party Member Strictly According to Party Member Standards"]

[Text] The party committee of a certain division of the Guangxi border defense units has strengthened the ideological education of, and has done well the work of promoting to full members strictly according to the standards for party members, those probationary party members who were enrolled during the war of self-defensive counterattack. This has made this batch of probationary party members be able to correctly look upon their past glory, to establish the idea throughout their lives of struggling for the cause of communism, and to work hard to become qualified party members.

Last year, during and after the war of self-defensive counterattack against Vietnam, this division enrolled a batch of probationary party members. In April of this year, one after another, these probationary party members entered the period of becoming full members. In order to do well the work of promoting these comrades to full party members, Wang Chengben [3769 2052 2609], secretary of the division's party committee, led a work team to the companies to carry out investigation and research. From their investigation and research they saw that the behavior of the great majority of the comrades in this batch of probationary party members had been good, and many of these comrades had again been awarded for rendering meritorious service. However, there were also some comrades who had developed feelings of arrogance in claiming credit for themselves, thinking that they had fought in the war and shed their blood and had rendered meritorious service, and that being a party member was not something they had to run after. Therefore, they became lax about ideological reform and were unable to put the strict demands upon themselves that the standards of a communist party member require. And there were others who did not keep their minds on border defense, holding the idea of "not making a mistake and waiting for 1 year, after which I will become a full member and be demobilized," and their work became commonplace and their role as models was not strong. The division's party committee analyzed the cause for the emergence of this problem as mainly being the lack of a profound understanding of the nature of the party and the standards for party members. Therefore, they decided to use the opportunity of promoting them to full members to provide a supplementary lesson in this regard. Separately, they went to eight companies and made them their educational

experimental points and conducted rotational training classes, focusing on the ideological problems and blurred understanding of the probationary party members. They organized them to study the party's basic knowledge and to study the revised draft of the party constitution, "Some Guiding Principles for Inner-Party Political Life" and Comrade Liu Shaoqi's "How To Be a Good Communist." They also guided them in launching the "three discussions and three checkups" activity: discussing the party's nature, mission, and program, and checking up on whether they themselves are ideologically prepared to struggle for communism throughout their lives; discussing the eight obligations that party members must carry out and checking up on which of these obligations they have themselves carried out and which they have not; discussing the deeds of proletarian revolutionaries of the older generation and of model communist party members such as Jiao Yulu, Lei Feng, and Lü Shicai, and checking up on the disparities between these people and themselves. Everybody was greatly moved by this education. Many comrades said: Being a qualified party member is not easy, and we cannot lower the standards of party members.

On the basis of this ideological education, the division's party committee one by one tested and judged the probationary party members who had arrived at the time for becoming full party members, promoting to full party member each one who was qualified. For comrades who temporarily failed to meet the qualifications for becoming a full party member, they extended the probationary period and also did good ideological work for them. One platoon leader was proposed for party membership after the war. He thought he had already attained his desire and that he would be leaving his border defense post a little early, and so he did not keep his mind on his work. Based on his behavior during his probationary period, the party branch decided to extend his probationary period for half a year. At first, he could not figure out the reason for this, but after studying in a rotational training class and having many heart-to-heart chats with the leaders, he understood that there was a specific disparity between himself and the conduct demanded of a party member and that the party branch's extension of his probationary period was correct. He decided to henceforth temper himself continually and strive to become a qualified party member. From then on, he inspired revolutionary enthusiasm, and, no matter whether it was military training or patrol duty and combat preparedness work, he zealously led the platoon to complete its missions. The comrades said: "Our platoon leader is just like a party member!"

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TEACHING REFORMED AT INFANTRY SCHOOL OF FUZHOU UNITS

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 10 Jul 80 p 2

[Article by Yi Caizi [2496 4857 6327], Sun Qingru [1327 3237 0302], and Chen Shijin [7115 0013 6855]: "School Director Wang Linde Vigorously Carries Out Teaching Reform"]

[Text] Wang Linde [3769 2651 1795], director of the Infantry School of the Fuzhou Units, has vigorously carried out teaching reform based on the characteristics of modern warfare. Everybody has praised him: "The old school is not bound by old conventions, and the one with old experience also pays attention to new developments."

Wang Linde has held leadership posts at the army, division, and regiment level. He also has done leadership work in schools for over 10 years and has considerably rich experience in combat, training, and teaching. In order to obtain the right to speak about reforming leadership teaching, he was not satisfied just to look at data and listen to reports but regularly went to offices and made deep investigations of reality. At the end of December of last year, when he was making an investigation of Class No 12, the class was studying the subject of platoon attacks. Director Wang proposed to the training department that, on the basis of the originally formulated training plan, practice with live ammunition and live soldiers be added to the curriculum, and that, besides a platoon's own weapons, it be reinforced with an 82-mm recoilless rifle and a heavy machinegun, and also have tank and engineer support. He inspired all of them to develop their insight and be conscious of this problem, viz., although, under present conditions, a reinforced platoon does not have so many service arm weapons as this and the students being trained today are platoon leaders, they could be company or battalion commanders tomorrow; moreover, weapons and equipment are always undergoing continual innovation, and the fact that they are not available today does not mean that they will not be available tomorrow. To reinforce the school's existing equipment with some weapons of other service arms and let these basic-level commanders tentatively try to find out a few skills in commanding combined arms operations will be of advantage to them after they graduate when they are organizing their units for combined arms training. The instructors unanimously recognized that they should work as one to complete the reinforced platoon attack exercises of several classes of students. The students happily said: The exercises this time broadened our horizon by giving us a little taste of combined arms training.

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Although school director Wang is very busy, he pays a great deal of attention to studying knowledge pertaining to modern warfare and the advanced experiences of foreign armies, continually bringing up to himself topics for teaching reform. After reading books, periodicals, and articles which have any bearing whatsoever on military technology and foreign military data, he carefully turns what he has read over in his mind and ponders it for a time, thinking about what instructional significance it has for the reform of the school's teaching. Recently, after reading articles and materials on the "tactical airlift by helicopters of a Soviet motorized infantry battalion," he turned the following thought over and over in his mind: With the developing trend by the Soviet and American armed forces to switch from surface mobility to air mobility by helicopter, what tactical measures in our positional defense should be changed? He brought this question to the tactics teaching and research section, and requested that it, focusing on changes in foreign military weapons and equipment, inquire into what methods we should take to counter them.

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ARTILLERY SCHOOL, REGIMENT HELP EACH OTHER IN TRAINING

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 10 Jul 80 p 2

[Article: "Artillery School and Local Artillery Regiment Engage in Mutual Assistance and Learning"]

[Text] An artillery school has concluded a teaching contract with a local artillery regiment under which this year it will train for the regiment nearly 100 of its cadres and key members, and, taking the regiment as its "experimental plot," will use the new experience and results in the unit's training to guide the reform of its teaching.

At the beginning of this year, Zhou [0719], head of the artillery school's training department, taking with him four comrades from his office, held research consultations with leading comrades of the local artillery regiment. They concluded a teaching contract under which it was determined that the artillery school would conduct a course of lectures and make academic reports on military affairs relevant to the unit, and would notify the artillery regiment of these activities so that it could participate, and also train, in batches, the regiment's cadres; the artillery regiment will act as an "experimental plot" for the artillery school, positively helping the school to improve its teaching.

In April, Man Yi [3341 3015], political commissar of the artillery regiment, led 29 command cadres at the regiment, battalion, and company levels and staff personnel to the artillery school for training in commanding firing by battalions and groups. The artillery school selected as their instructors for this kind of firing persons with over 20 years of teaching experience. From drawing board school assignments and preparatory elements to the laws of firing, from the carrying out of individual missions to the coordination with infantry and tanks, the instructors carefully explained and gave guidance on and demonstrated the school assignments. They made just as strict demands on the artillery regiment's cadres as they did on their formal students, issuing to them the same teaching apparatuses

and setting and checking for them the same school assignments. After 20 days of training, all the cadres had markedly improved in theoretical and actual school assignments, and scored average marks of good or above on their tests.

In May the artillery regiment gathered together 17 battle-position cadres and instructors of the regiment's rotational training unit for training at the artillery school in battle-position duties, with emphasis on the five major elements that affect firing precision, including gun correction, aiming operations, and battle position placement, in order to raise the battle position commanders' technical level and their command capability. In order to solve the problem for the cadres of synthesizing school assignments and training, the artillery school rendered positive help to the artillery regiment in fitting out an electrified firing classroom by providing to the cadres for training purposes 12 new-type firing control instruments. The artillery school has now trained cadres for the artillery regiment in 4 school terms, and cadres throughout the regiment have all received one session of rotational training.

The artillery has also positively supported the artillery school's teaching. For every live-ammunition firing exercise and every upper-level test, it notifies the school in good time so that it can observe and provide guidance. In the past, the school made curved-fire guns the primary topic and its research on hitting mixing tanks with directly aimed guns was insufficient, so the regiment, on its own initiative, offered its experience in this respect. Recently, the regiment received the mission of demonstrating to the school's graduates 10 special kinds of firing, including timed-fire calibrated firing, flare firing, and ricochet firing.

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ALL PARTY MEMBERS MUST SET GOOD EXAMPLES FOR MASSES

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 10 Jul 80 p 3

[Article by Ji Nan [4764 2809]: "Party Leadership and the Exemplary Role of Party Members"]

[Text] In upholding and improving party leadership, there are many problems to solve, among which it the important problem of fully bringing into play the vanguard exemplary role of Communist Party members. This is a basic condition for our party achieving political leadership over the broad masses.

For the party to exercise its leadership, first of all it must formulate a correct line and policies and clearly point out to the masses the objective of struggle. However, having a correct line certainly does not mean it can be accepted by the broad masses and be thoroughly implemented. At this time, it is just as Comrade Mao Zedong pointed out: "The proletariat, in particular its vanguard--the communist Party--should muster up its boundless enthusiasm and loyalty, and become models of realizing these concrete objectives." ("Selected Works of Mao Zedong," vol 1, p 242) If there are no vanguard exemplary actions by party members, then the carrying out of the party's line and policies is often just empty talk.

The broad masses usually do not know about a party by its slogans but mainly by the actual behavior of the great numbers of its members, and on this they decide their own attitude toward the party. The CCP has become the core of leadership for the people of all nationalities in the country, and it was precisely the exemplary behavior of the great numbers of our party members, in advancing wave upon wave and struggling courageously, that attained this. Our party's older generation of proletarian revolutionaries spared no effort and fought all their lives for the Chinese people's interests. The broad masses of people, from this kind of exemplary behavior by the party members, gradually came to know our party, to give it their wholehearted support, and to conscientiously accept its leadership. However, there is no need to be reticent about the fact that, owing to the destruction caused by Lin Biao and the "gang of four," there exists within the party some unhealthy tendencies and that the vanguard exemplary role of some party members has been weakened. This has led some of the masses to have misgivings about the party and has hindered their firm faith in the party. This is a topic on which it is very worthwhile for every one of our party members to examine his or her conscience.

At present, some comrades, when the question of strengthening their leadership role is raised, more often than not think of issuing directives and making demands as if party leadership just meant ordering people about. In fact, this is a complete and deliberate misinterpretation. Stalin said: "Leadership--this does not amount to writing resolutions and issuing directives." ("Complete Works of Stalin," vol 11, p 52) Lenin and Stalin on many occasions referred to leading the masses with the exemplary role of party members as being the basic law of leadership. Comrade Mao Zedong once said: What is called the party's leadership is not making slogans and shouting them all day long, and it is also not arrogantly wanting other people to obey us, but it is, with the party's correct policies and our own exemplary work, to persuade and educate the masses so that they will be willing to accept our suggestions and act together with us.

Our party represents the interests of all nationalities in our country, therefore, the party's leadership of the masses, in the final analysis, starting with the awareness of the masses, consciously struggles for their interests and does not drive them into blindly following the one in power. For over 50 years, our party has never advocated ordering the masses to do this or that. Its basic method is: on the one hand, to patiently carry out propaganda among the masses in order to mobilize them; on the other hand, through the influence of the leading role and exemplary behavior of party members, to spur the masses to advance. Practice proves: a fine example has boundless power, and the exemplary role of party members is the most authoritative leadership. With regard to a Communist Party member, especially a comrade who holds a leadership post, if he does not play his exemplary role, then no one will listen to what he says or to the appeals he makes. At present, in some units not a few documents are issued and not a few appeals, so why is the masses' enthusiasm not aroused? One reason is that in these units the exemplary role of party members is not brought into full play, even to the extent of not being brought into play at all.

There are other comrades who think that the exemplary role of party members needs to be brought into play on questions of major policies and that in life it is of "no importance" if they seek a few special privileges. This view is mistaken. A Communist Party member's exemplary role should be reflected in every aspect. Party members not only should set examples in carrying out the party's line and its general and specific policies, but also should set examples in learning, abiding by discipline and law, and uniting internally, and this means that they should, in the aspect of lifestyle, be models for the masses. Many proletarian revolutionaries of the older generation acted in this way and thus were held in high esteem by the masses of people. On the contrary, if a Communist Party member cannot be a good model in his life, he also cannot be a good leader of the masses. If there are many shortcomings in your life that everybody talks about, how can the masses completely accept you?

Some comrades think that playing an exemplary role and strengthening party leadership is a matter for the higher-ups and that an ordinary party member does not play much role in it. This viewpoint is also somewhat one-sided. The posts of leading cadres are high and their responsibilities are great, and their exemplary role is truly more influential. But, playing the Communist Party member's exemplary role is a common demand on every Communist Party member. Every party member

lives among the masses, and all of his actions affect the masses. The size of his role is not completely decided by the height of his post. Lei Feng and Lü Shicai were both ordinary party members, but their exemplary behavior played an enormous role in raising the party's prestige and strengthening the party's leadership. If the tens of millions of party members play the vanguard exemplary role to the same high degree as did Lei Fang and Lü Shicai, there will be an enormous force for leading the people of the whole country to advance. We certainly must do as Lenin said: "Try hard to enhance the title and role of a party member, enhance them again and again." ("Complete Works of Lenin," vol 6, p 458)

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

CITIZENS EXHORTED TO BECOME INVOLVED IN COUNTRY'S AFFAIRS

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 10 Jul 80 p 3

[Article by Wang Yihua [3769 5030 5478]: "Those Not in the Position Should Also Get Involved"]

[Text] "Those not in the position should not get involved" is a lesson from antiquity.

But even in ancient times many things showed its inadequacy as a lesson. Many people are familiar with "Cao Gui's Debate" in the "Zuo Zhuan." Cao Gui, a close-cropped commoner who was "not in the position," disregarding advice "to be concerned about food and let other things go," took the initiative to propose a scheme to his monarch during the battle to counterattack the invading army of Qi, with the result that a great victory was won. Again, during the last years of the Eastern Han dynasty when rival warlords were contending for power, Zhuge Liang, who still lived in a thatched cottage and obviously was not in "the position," clearly saw the overall situation and devised a scheme for dealing with the general trends in the three divisions of China. Thus, he was able to help Liu Bei to capture the western Shu state [present-day Sichuan]. Further, during the last years of the Yuan dynasty, the scholar Zhu Sheng, who had taken refuge deep in the mountains and also was "not in the position," was sought out by Ming Taizu [Zhu Yuanzhang, founding emperor of the Ming Dynasty] and asked about a general program for China. His reply was: "Build high altars, store large amounts of foodgrain, and postpone proclaiming yourself emperor," pointing out to Zhu Yuanzhang the correct strategic policy. If Zhu Sheng had scrupulously abided by the lesson of antiquity that "those not in the position should not get involved" and did not involve himself in the slightest with worldly affairs, it is to be feared that when Zhu Yuanzhang asked him for a general program, Zhu Sheng would only have stared at him dumbfounded!

It looks as if we should replace "those not in the position should not get involved" with "those not in the position should also get involved." This is especially important in our socialist era. This is because our socialist cause is the common cause of hundreds of millions of people, and is definitely not just the cause of certain leaders who are "in the position." And to be citizens of the socialist state--the masters of our society--is to be in an even more sacred and lofty "position." And, being in this position," to "get involved," masterminding schemes for the socialist cause and taking part in the management of the state,

has naturally become our right and duty. In our era, "making the world one's own responsibility" is not like it was in the old era, when only a small number of heroes and worthies shouldered this responsibility, but is the responsibility of all the people. According to recent newspaper reports, Liang Jiale [2733 0857 2867], of the power supply equipment repair and assembly plant under the Tianjin Electrical Power Bureau, although an ordinary worker "not in the position," actively "got involved," with the attitude of a master, by writing a letter to TIANJIN RIBAO, entitled "If I Am the People's Representative..." in which he put forward a series of sharp criticisms and suggestions on municipal management and construction. After publication of the letter, it drew the close attention of the leading comrades of the departments concerned in Tianjin municipality and led to the solution of many "old, big, and difficult" problems. This spirit of Liang Jiale's, during our country's construction of the four modernizations, is extraordinarily valuable and should be carried forward. At present, there are still some people who, looking at the country's difficulties and the many problems that need to be solved, take the attitude of "those who are not in the position should not get involved" and remain unconcerned, and are even full of grievances and express themselves with freezing irony and biting satire, as if they were not PRC citizens and had no obligation at all to "get involved." This kind of feeling should be corrected as, otherwise, they will not be in the "position" of masters in our society.

"Those not in the position should also get involved," and naturally the leaders "in the position" should even more "get involved." It will not do to not have two-way cooperation. If there were the involvement of Liang Jiale but no positive action by the leaders of the departments concerned in Tianjin municipality, then, involvement or no, the problems would have remained. Our leading cadres seek talent with eagerness and they should widely adopt the good ideas put forward by those not in the position and make every effort to put the ideas into practice. If "those not in the position also get involved" becomes a common practice among the masses, our country will certainly become even more dynamic and prosperous.

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'THREE DON'T POLICY' DOES NOT PRECLUDE IDEOLOGICAL, POLITICAL WORK

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 10 Jul 80 p 3

[Article by Hai Xiao [3189 0876] and Wang Fa'an [3969 3127 1344]: "The 'Three-Don't Policy' Is Not Liberalism"]

[Text] The "three-don't policy" and liberalism are two fundamentally different things. But, in actual work, a small number of comrades have mixed them up. For example, when we stress "don't label people, don't cudgel people, and don't seize on people's mistakes or shortcomings," they adopt a liberal attitude with regard to certain mistaken ideas and unhealthy tendencies, viz., don't resist, don't educate, and don't guide. This is an expression of lax ideological and political work and should be corrected.

Why has this phenomenon appeared? The main causes are a lack of the correct understanding of the "three-don't policy" and a failure to understand the relationship between the "three-don't policy" and the strengthening of ideological and political work.

The "three-don't policy" was put forward by Comrade Mao Zedong in 1962 in his speech at the enlarged central work conference (7,000-person conference). Its goal was to implement the principle of democratic centralism, to develop democracy inside and outside the party, and to create a good democratic atmosphere. In order to resolve all kinds of ideological differences among the people, one can only adopt the method of democracy, the method of discussion, and the method of persuasion and education in line with the formula "unity--criticism--unity" and convince people by reasoning; and one cannot adopt the simple brutal method of seizing on people's shortcomings or mistakes, cudgeling people, and labeling people, and overwhelm people with one's power. This proposition has been repeatedly proved in our party's history. But, during the period that Lin Biao and the "gang of four" were running rampant, labeling people, cudgeling people, and seizing on people's shortcomings or mistakes were unprecedentedly rife and seriously damaged the party's and state's normal political life. Today, our party Central Committee has reaffirmed that we must strictly carry out the "three-don't policy" of not seizing on people's mistakes or shortcomings, not labeling people, and not cudgeling people. This is an important measure for eliminating the influence of Lin Biao and the "gang of four," for restoring and perfecting democratic life inside and outside our party, and for upholding democratic centralism. Some comrades set the carrying out of the "three-don't policy" in opposition to the strengthening of ideological and

political work, and think that if we stress the "three-don't policy" that they can slacken ideological and political work, or think that if we stress the strengthening of ideological work they can indiscriminately label people, indiscriminately cudgel people, and indiscriminately seize on people's shortcomings or mistakes. These two views are obviously incorrect.

The purpose of implementing the "three-don't policy" is to use correct methods in place of incorrect methods, i.e., to use democratic methods to put into practice the method of seeking truth from fact in place of simple brutal methods in order to solve ideological problems among the people. Without the slightest doubt, this will restore the good traditions of our party's and our army's ideological and political work, and will strengthen this work and cause it to be done better; it certainly will not abolish or weaken this work. In our party's ideological and political work, we depend on truth to obtain the masses' support, on laying out facts and expounding principles to convince people by reasoning. The basic method is to convince people by reasoning, and we do not depend on forcing people to submit. Labeling people, cudgeling people, and seizing on people's shortcomings or mistakes is totally incompatible with the fine traditions of our party's ideological and political work. To implement the "three-don't policy" will not only not weaken or abolish ideological and political work, but, on the contrary, it is precisely under the guidance of this correct policy that this work will be put on the right track. Only if we conscientiously implement the "three-don't policy" and eliminate the vile influences of Lin Biao and the "gang of four" can we truly do good ideological and political work. Some comrades have very little understanding of our army's fine traditions in ideological and political work, and during the 10 years of great turmoil, they looked upon the ultraleft line of Lin Biao and the "gang of four" as the party's ideological and political work. Therefore, when they hear of implementing the "three-don't policy" they take it to mean that they do not have to grasp, and grasp well, ideological and political work; when they hear that ideological and political work must still be strengthened, they take it to mean that they can disobey and not implement the "three-don't policy." These are both gross misunderstandings and show that ideologically they have not made a clear distinction between the fine traditions of our party's ideological and political work and the line of Lin Biao and the "gang of four."

To implement, the "three-don't policy" is definitely not to abolish active ideological struggle. To put politics in command and let ideology take the lead is an important principle. Today, when the emphasis of our work has shifted, ideological and political work must be suited to the new tasks of the new era, insuring that the party's line and its general and specific policies are implemented, insuring that there is a correct political orientation, and insuring that each task is successfully completed. To this end, we must carry out education on the four basic principles, the party's line and its general and specific policies, the revolutionary outlook on life, the basic theories of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, and general political knowledge. We must also resist the influence of all kinds of "left" or right mistaken ideological trends, resist the corrosive influence of the ideology of the bourgeoisie and all exploiting classes, and carry out active ideological struggle in order to consolidate and expand the proletarian ideological position and to shrink the marketplace for all sorts of unhealthy trends and evil practices. The purpose of implementing the "three-don't policy" is to correctly carry out ideological struggle, to guard against mixing up the two kinds of

contradictions, and to guard against using simple and brutal methods in dealing with ideological problems of all kinds. The purpose is definitely not to take a laissez-faire attitude toward mistaken ideological behavior and to abandon active ideological struggle. Different ideological contradictions occur constantly. If we were to abandon positive ideological struggle and let mistaken ideologies and tendencies develop, then the healthy body of the party would be corroded and the cause of socialism would be damaged.

Criticism and self-criticism is one of our party's three great work styles. It is like a person washing his face every day or a room being swept regularly. If there were no criticism and self-criticism, we would be tainted with political dust. But, for a long time, Lin Biao and the "gang of four" went all out for "overthrowing everything," using the vile methods of seizing on shortcomings or mistakes, cudgeling, and labeling in place of regular criticism and self-criticism within the party and among the people. Influenced by Lin Biao and the "gang of four," some people never engaged in self-criticism and would not permit others to criticize them in the slightest degree; and they especially seized on others' shortcomings and mistakes, seized on trifles, grabbed them and would not let go, exaggerated them, and put people in a deathtrap. With this kind of vile atmosphere in vogue for a time, the result was that everybody did not dare to engage in criticism or self-criticism, and the party's good work style of criticism and self-criticism was discredited. We should now thoroughly dispel this unhealthy atmosphere. It must be understood that to implement the "three-don't policy" certainly does not mean that we do not want criticism and self-criticism. On the contrary, only by conscientiously implementing the "three-don't policy," and, in dealing with ideological problems, not seizing on shortcomings or mistakes, not cudgeling, and not labeling, can healthy criticism and self-criticism be developed on a foundation of awareness. And only through comradely criticism and self-criticism aimed at helping those criticized and proceeding from the desire for unity can we effectively resolve all sorts of ideological contradictions, employ the correct ideology to overcome mistaken ideologies, correct shortcomings, make full use of results, resist unhealthy trends and foster healthy trends, and with one heart and mind unitedly give impetus to the advance of our cause.

Making concrete analyses of concrete things is the spirit of Marxism. To solve ideological problems, it is necessary to learn how to make scientific analyses. Why do some comrades, in dealing with ideological problems sometimes take a simple brutal attitude and sometimes take a liberal attitude? One important reason is that they have separated themselves from making concrete analyses by seeking truth from facts. In the past, Lin Biao and the "gang of four," stemming from their goal of usurping the party and seizing power, went all out for "line analysis," saying that "class struggle is everywhere" and "everything is related to the program and line." They said all problems in work and problems of understanding were problems of class struggle and problems of line struggle. They said problems among the people were problems between the enemy and ourselves. This kind of idealist metaphysics has nothing at all in common with Marxism's scientific analysis. Some of our comrades were influenced and became habituated to this metaphysical method and became fond of going to extremes. In dealing with ideological problems, the taking of a simple brutal attitude and the taking of a liberal attitude are two extremes. In reality, the phenomena in the ideological realm are complex. Only if we are

good at making concrete analyses of concrete problems will we be able to distinguish what phenomena are correct and what phenomena are mistaken, what phenomena are ordinary problems of ideological understanding or ordinary problems in work, and what phenomena are problems of line or general and specific policies, or problems of class struggle, will we be able, based on the different natures of the problems and on their reasons for emerging, to adopt different methods, handle problems with discrimination, correctly solve problems, and attain the goal of clarifying thinking and uniting the comrades.

In the new historical period, in order to promote the stable and united political situation, to promote the construction of the four modernizations, and to improve our army's combat effectiveness, we must, from beginning to end, uphold the "three-don't policy," vigorously strengthen ideological and political work, and display the powerful might of political work.

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

FURTHER EXPLOITATION OF STRATEGIC NONFERROUS METALS URGED

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 10 Jul 80 p 4

[Article by Yu Zhijie [0205 1807 2638], engineer of the Earth Minerals Department [Dikuang Si 0966 4349 0674] of the Ministry of Geology: "Our Country Possesses Rich Strategic Natural Resources--Nonferrous Metals"]

[Text] "Grasp the steel rifle and insure national defense"--this soldier's stanza vividly testifies to the close relationship between steel and national defense. But a soldier with a steel rifle needs bullets, and bullet jackets cannot be manufactured without copper, bullet noses cannot be manufactured without lead. Thus we can also see the close relationship between copper and lead and national defense. People call steel, iron, etc, ferrous metals and copper, lead, etc, non-ferrous metals. Both kinds of metals are important strategic materials.

Nonferrous metals comprise a large family of several tens of metals: copper, lead, zinc, aluminum, tin, magnesium, tungsten, molybdenum, nickel, titanium, cobalt, antimony, gold, silver, platinum, etc. They are multihued, bright and colorful. Each has its strong points, and they have many uses. Copper, as a good conductor of electricity, is a material that is indispensable for communications equipment. Aluminum, magnesium, and titanium, by virtue of their light weight, are necessary for the manufacture of aircraft, bullets, and artificial satellites. Uranium, which is radioactive, is the principal source of energy for atomic bombs and nuclear submarines. In iron and steel production, only if many small parts of certain non-ferrous metals are added to the production process can the steel products greatly increase their strength and their wear-resisting, corrosion-resisting properties, and thereby even better serve economic construction, national defense construction, and the people's life.

Owing to the special importance of nonferrous metals to national defense construction and national economy, all countries in the world pay the fullest attention to the development of the nonferrous metals industry. Particularly over the past 10-odd years, the amount of nonferrous metals required by advanced countries has rapidly increased, and thus the search for and exploitation of the natural resources of nonferrous metals has been greatly accelerated. The general trend of development is that the more technology progresses, the greater the amount of nonferrous metals that is required. Some people assert categorically that the metallurgical industry of the future will be in the nonferrous metals era. The superpowers, for their arms expansion and war preparations, have already formulated

plans for amassing strategic reserves of nonferrous metals under conditions of both conventional warfare and nuclear warfare. Our country is one of the richest countries in the world in nonferrous metals resources. Its proven deposits of tungsten, tin, antimony, zinc, vanadium, titanium, and lithium are the greatest in the world; its proven deposits of copper, lead, aluminum, molybdenum, nickel, mercury, etc, are in the front rank of the world. Rich nonferrous metal deposits are found everywhere in the motherland, north and south of the Changjiang River, inside and outside the Great Wall. In particular, the ores in common use--copper, lead, and zinc--are distributed in every province (autonomous region) throughout the country. As for the ore that is used in the greatest quantity--aluminum--there are producing areas in about 10 provinces (autonomous regions) in north, central-south, southwest, and east China. In the southern part of our country, all the river drainage areas and the mountain range zones truly deserve to be called treasures. For example, one-third of the country's copper deposits are located along both banks of the middle and lower reaches of the Changjiang River, and 80 percent of the country's tungsten ore is concentrated in the Nanling mountain range area. The great scope of our country's nonferrous metals ore is rarely seen anywhere in the world. For example, the [character illegible] Jihua iron mine's associated titanium deposit exceeds the sum total of any one country's titanium deposits; in Hunan, the tungsten ore of Shizhuyuan and the antimony ore of Xiguang Mountain are unmatched in the world; in Gansu, the vulcanized copper and nickel of the Jianchuan nickel mine occupies second place in the world; Jiangxi's Dexing copper and Xizang's Yulong copper are both especially large deposits, of which there are not many in the world.

As early as over 6,000 years ago, our country could smelt brass. Our country's longstanding history of nonferrous metals exploitation made an important contribution to the development of world civilization. Today, our country is still an important nonferrous metals-producing country in the world. Yunnan's Gejiu, called the "tin-capital," is a world-famous tin-producing area; Dayu in southern Jiangxi is the largest tungsten-producing area in the world; Hunan's Xikuang Mountain is the world's largest antimony-producing area; the cinnibar (from which mercury is extracted) in Tongren Prefecture of eastern Guizhou enjoys a high reputation in the world; the lead and zinc of Shuikou Mountain in Hunan, the bauxite (the raw material from which aluminum is refined) of Shandong and Hunan, etc, are well known at home and abroad. Our country has not only built a group of extremely large-scale mining enterprises, but also has, in places like Shenyang and Shanghai where electric power is abundant and there is a fairly good technological base, newly built or expanded many metallurgical enterprises, thereby greatly developing and improving the quantity, variety, and quality of our country's nonferrous metal products. Our country can now smelt all the other 60 nonferrous metals discovered in the world, and some of them, besides satisfying the amount required domestically, can be exported in large quantities.

Along with the quickening pace of the construction of the four modernizations, our country's required amount of nonferrous metals has increased on a great scale. This poses an even more glorious but arduous task upon geological work on nonferrous metals and upon the metallurgical industry. At present, the growth rate of proven mineral deposits cannot meet the demand of the fast-developing construction of the four modernizations, and the production level of the nonferrous

metallurgical industry is comparatively low. In the period of national economic readjustment, by tapping latent potentialities and other measures, these weak links will be strengthened and our country's nonferrous metals resources will be better exploited and utilized.

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

WITNESS REPORT ON OPERATIONS OF JAMMING RADAR STATION

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 6 Feb 81 p 3

[Newsletter by Wang Changyan [3769 7022 3508], Song Fanwu [1345 0416 2976] and Qu Jucheng [2575 5112 2052]: "Silent Air Defense Combat--A Sketch of a Combat Exercise by a Ground-to-Air Electronic Jamming Unit"]

[Text] In the morning gloom, we drive to a certain locality to observe a combat exercise conducted by a special anti-air force unit--a ground-to-air electronic jamming unit. This is a new branch of the armed forces. Knowing nothing about its combat life and its tactics, we are eager to meet it.

When we walk into the field command post, the exercise already began. The air warning radar station reports that four groups of "enemy" bombers, totaling more than 30 aircraft, are detected at a distance of 200 kilometers, flying from different angles toward our target or protection. The commander immediately gives order, "All jamming detachments, "class 1," quick!"

Looking away from the command post, all we can see are the rolling dark clouds. The visibility is poor. In the grassy wilderness quite far from the command post, the various jamming stations quickly complete their preparations. The jamming antennae are turning incessantly. Quietness rules the combat field.

Suddenly, an urgent report is received by the command post from the warning radar station: "Our radar is discovered by the 'enemy' bombers. Their electronic jamming aircraft have started jamming operations against our radar. Our countermeasures ineffective, targets lost." Obviously, by playing this trick the 'enemy' aircraft attempt to take the initiative to use their electronic jamming planes to provide cover for their attack.

Anticipating this trick by the "enemy," the commander immediately orders No. 1 hidden radar, situated at another direction, to activate its equipment to take over the work of the jamming radar station. In the meantime, he orders the radar station being jammed to continue its operations to confuse the "enemy" and cover up the operations of the No. 1 hidden radar. Witnessing this drastic change and the utilization of both the truth and falsehood at the same time, we recall a remark by Sun Zi, "In combat, the side upholding the truth will win by surprise; the side which is good at surprising is able to last as long as heaven and earth and remain as inexhaustible as a big river."

Departing from the command post, we come to the site of No. 081 counter-measure station. All the comrades of the station are busy at work under a station master. Based on the distant information provided by the command post, they are carefully scanning the skies in search of targets. The station master says: "Reconnaissance and anti-reconnaissance constitute the vanguard battle fought with electronics. At present, all the enemy bombers are equipped with electronic detection devices, enabling them to carry out reconnaissance against ground targets. For this reason, to fulfill our aim of concealing ourselves in approaching the enemy and applying our counter-measure to prepare for a surprise attack, my electronic counter-measure detachment as a unit of an attacking nature must avoid early discovery by the enemy, must keep our high power transmitters under strict control, and must carry out scanning operations in a concealed manner and tracking operations with low power transmitters."

At this junction, we can see the counter-measure operators are adroitly turning their wheels with hands scanning back and forth, watching closely for each and every tiny change on the fluorescent screen. Suddenly, a flickering wave appears on the screen. No. 1 operator reports: "Bearing, 240 degrees, elevation angle 5 degrees, distance 120 kilometers, enemy aircraft discovered." "Good, track them carefully," the station master orders, and immediately reports to the command post. As the cunning "enemy aircraft" attempt to carry out a surprise attack at low level, we counter with tracking them without their knowledge. The law of adjusting one's action according to changing circumstances is applied wonderfully well in this particular jamming and counter-jamming warfare.

The "enemy aircraft" are approaching. 100 kilometers, 90 kilometers... A voice is heard from a transmitter in the "enemy aircraft" formation, "Attention, approaching target, everything normal, keep our distances, be ready for action."

At this junction, the commander of the jamming unit resolutely issues an order for "attack," "No. 081 radar, open overwhelming transmitter!" "No. 081 radar understands," is the reply.

"Clack," a high tension switch is thrown on, and a red light blinks. A powerful electromagnetic wave shoots skyward at the rate of 300,000 kilometers a second toward the "enemy aircraft." Following the order of the commander, the other stations also switch on their equipment. Bundles of powerful electromagnetic pulses form so many electronic jamming barriers. Under the powerful jamming of these pulses, the fluorescent screens in the aircraft are turned into masses of clouds, covering up all the land targets. All the pilots might as well be blindfolded. What can be heard from the transmitters of "enemy aircraft" are the shouting voices: "This is 01. Bad jamming" "This is 02, Terrible jamming. Counter-measures ineffective." All the "enemy aircraft" are so incapacitated that they turn tail to return home.

At the end of the combat exercise, the commander of the jamming unit says: "What are in our hands are not guided missiles or anti-aircraft guns, and we cannot shoot down the enemy aircraft with a big bang. Nevertheless, this non-explosive combat means occupies an important position in modern air defense."

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

HOW TO FIGHT AN ENEMY WITH SUPERIOR WEAPONS

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 6 Feb 81 p 3

[Article by Huang Peiyi [7806 1014 5030] of Nanjing Senior Army School: "The Magic Means to Diminish Enemy Superiority in Equipment"]

[Text] In a future anti-aggression war, it is undeniable that the enemy will enjoy superiority in weapons and equipment, at least at the start. Nevertheless, the actual effectiveness of a weapon or a piece of equipment does not solely lie in its performance.

Due to many influencing factors, a rifle may hit bull's eye one after the other in the hands of one, but far off the mark in the hands of another.

On a battlefield, there are more factors influencing the effectiveness of weapons, such as the nature of the war, the manner of combat, the tactics, and the will power as well as the confidence, courage, commanding ability, mastery in the use of weapons, and ability to take advantage of weather and topographical conditions of the combatants concerned. Although the Soviet forces which invaded Afghanistan have used the most advanced conventional weapons, yet by taking best advantage of the topographical conditions the Afghan guerrillas are often able to have the aggressor's modern tanks and helicopters cornered and destroyed through the application of many crafty tricks. On the other hand, the native rifles, native cannons, swords and arrows can serve as the most deadly weapons.

From this it can be seen that the quality of a weapon is not necessarily in direct proportion to its effectiveness. Under certain circumstances, a superior weapon may lose its superiority, while an inferior weapon may change its inferiority. In our study of the ways and means to win battles with inferior weapons against superior weapons, we should pay attention to the ways and means to take full advantage of and bring about such circumstances.

Advanced tactics and outstanding commanding ability are effective means to diminish the superiority of enemy weapons.

For instance, through the application of deception, skillful tricks and lightning action, it is often possible to surprise the enemy, sinking him into chaos, making it impossible for him to use his weapons effectively.

For another instance, if the enemy can be forced to combat us under unfavorable conditions, the superiority of his weapons will be greatly diminished. Tanks and armored cars find complex topography their most deadly enemy, and so will aircraft find bad weather conditions. Although admittedly we are at great disadvantage in fighting at a distance against an enemy equipped with such advanced weapons, yet the situation may reverse itself in close-quarter combat.

For still another instance, through application of the trick of "pulling the firewood from under the pot" such as destroying the oil, food, and ammunition supply of the enemy, we can reduce the enemy war machines into a heap of idle iron.

In a modern war, particularly during the initial period, it is of unneglectable importance to take full advantage of defense works and favorable topography to fight a defensive battle. (Klausevetz) said: "As a form of combat, defense is better than offense," and "If one fights against an army unit, it is easier to engage it in defense than offense." This is because the defenders can hide themselves behind defense works, wait in readiness, and open fire first, thereby making it easier to bring the superiority of their weapons into full play as compared to the attackers. Actual experience in World War II shows that a tank hidden in defense works is able to destroy two to three enemy tanks of the same category. Instances of this type are many.

One of the most fundamental experiences in past wars is to apply advanced tactics and outstanding commanding ability to diminish the superiority of enemy weapons and finally defeat the enemy. In his battlefield life over 20 decades, Napoleon frequently defeated his superior enemies with inferior force, relying mostly on his advanced skirmish tactics and his outstanding commanding ability, not on superior weapons, to claim hegemony in Europe. In the 15 years when France was under the rule of Napoleon, there was little or no improvement in the French armament, and French weapons were always inferior. In many major battles, the French soldiers used only the old-fashioned flint-igniting rifles. There was no noticeable improvement in French cannons either in regard to their caliber or range. Only many years after the death of Napoleon did France adopt rifling cannons. Although ours is no longer the Napoleon era, yet even the highly industrialized United States, in the face of the superior conventional weapons of the Soviet armed forces, is known to have issued the following instructions: "Only with superior tactics, strict training and outstanding command can we win superiority in certain important respects."

The revolutionary war history of our army in the past several decades is a history of defeating superior enemies through the adoption of advanced strategy and tactics and the development of outstanding commanding ability. In future anti-aggression wars, this excellent tradition of our army will continue to play a most important and realistic role. Although it is impossible for us to radically change our interior armament in a short period of time, it is absolutely possible for us to develop and bring about an advanced tactics in keeping with the special characteristics of today's warfare, and raise the commanding ability of our cadres at the various levels through strict and hard training. In this way, we shall be able to bring the effectiveness of our weapons into full play and diminish the effectiveness of enemy weapons to the maximum extent, thus reversing our inferiority to superiority, and the enemy's superiority to inferiority, enabling us to seize the initiative in combat and defeat the enemy in battles.

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

PLA IDEOLOGICAL PROBLEM ARISING FROM POLICY CHANGE

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 7 Feb 81 p 3

[Article by the Writing Group of the Propaganda Section of the Political Department of PLA Beijing Units: "Strengthen Education on the Line, Principles and Policies of the Party During the Period of Big Change"]

[Text] After the Third Plenum of the 11th CCP Central Committee, on the basis of the actual situation in China the Party Central Committee set a majestic goal for the socialist modernization of the country and adopted a new line and a set of new principles and policies, marking a great historical change in our country. In this great change, what should we do to reorient the ideology of our cadres and fighters of the PLA according to this change, and direct them to firmly carry out the Party principles and policies? We are faced with a most important task: strengthen ideological and political work and pay attention to the education of PLA members on the line, principles and policies of the Party.

A period of big change is often accompanied by a period of active thinking. During this big change, to meet the needs of the new situation in a realistic manner and turn chaos to order, our Party has adopted a string of new political, economic and cultural policies. Some of these policies are what prevailed prior to the "great cultural revolution," some are somewhat modified, and others are completely new. As the line, principles and policies of the Party involve the vital interests of everyone, their change must have provoked the people into thinking. In the past two years, there has been some change in thinking among PLA members, showing that their thinking has changed in close accordance with changes in policy and system, such changes as shifting the focus of work to economic construction, adopting a new policy to invigorate the economy, readjusting the national economy to a further extent, reforming the system of leadership of the Party and the state, discontinuing the system of promoting cadres directly from the fighters, and imposing strict control over the admittance of new Party members. All these changes have aroused all sorts of reactions in the minds of the cadres and fighters. Some people say that it is a matter of course that during a period of quick change and active thinking, numerous ideological problems and rapid changes in thought will occur. To handle this situation, it is necessary to do a good job in education concerning the line, principles and policies of the party and provide ideological guidance with much foresight. It is true we have many political tasks and there are many things to be done in political education, but we must attach first importance to education concerning the line, principles and policies of the Party.

Following the continual development of events, and the continual adoption of new policies and measures, this education should be carried out according to the ideological reactions of the masses. Only in this way can we carry out our ideological and political work actively instead of passively, and focus our attention on the main problem.

Is it true that, as held by some comrades, a person's attitude toward the line, principles and policies of the Party is so abstract and beyond comprehension that education to change it is a matter of little consequence? No, a person's political stand can always be detected from his words and deeds and from his conduct in daily life and in his work. This is not something beyond one's ability to comprehend. When the adoption of a new policy is reported, how do you judge it? Is the new policy good or bad? Do you stand for it or against it? Do you want to ignore it or seriously study it to master its spirit? After hearing the report on it, do you want to push it to the back burner, or readjust your work and conduct accordingly? There is nothing wrong and actually it is quite common for one to, at one time, misinterpret, challenge and criticize a new measure. The problem lies in whether you express your views concerning it through proper channels and whether you continue to study it and humbly observe its application to reality, or elect to criticize it wantonly in an irregular manner without giving any consideration to the places and listeners concerned. Upon hearing someone who comes forward with such criticism in an irresponsible manner in violation of the discipline, do you react by ignoring it and echoing some of the wrong views without knowing if they are correct, or rather take action to stop such irresponsible criticism and courageously refute the erroneous views? Facts show that our stand toward the line, principles and policies of the Party is a thing directly affecting whether or not they are correctly understood and resolutely carried out. This is a very serious and important issue reflecting whether one's political stand is in harmony with the Party Central Committee. Although the Leftist practice of frequently elevating a view or an act of a person to the level of principle and line, so that the person could be intimidated by the political label coming to him is a practice deserving our criticism, yet we must not turn a blind eye to the political stand of others, thus ignoring our most important responsibility in the ideological and political work of the Party, even to the extent of taking no action against the adoption of liberalism toward the line, principles and policies of the Party.

What is the significance of the mastery of the party line, principles and policies toward army building? This is an important question which must be clarified. Some comrades hold that many of the principles and policies adopted by the Party since the Third Plenum of the 11th CCP Committee are in relation to the economy and construction, and have little to do with the PLA, as they involve only matters to be taken care of by local authorities. It is true that military work and economic work are two different things, and it is impossible to require our cadres and fighters to master the economic policy of the Party as thoroughly as the personnel in the economic field. Nevertheless, insofar as the PLA constitutes a part of the society, economic construction has a direct bearing on national defense construction, and our cadres and fighters come from different localities and maintain close relations with these localities,--particularly in the case of basic-level cadres below the battalion level and the fighters whose hearts rest with their families in their native villages which are directly affected by the change of the economic policy of the party--any ideological disturbance among the cadres and fighters

arising from their failure to correctly comprehend the economic policy of the Party will adversely affect their training and control in the PLA. From this it can be seen that education in the PLA on the principles and policies of the Party is as indispensable to army building as the training and control of troops. We must not say that there is no criterion to judge the degree of success in education concerning the line, principles and policies of the Party, and that such education is a "soft target." In reality, it is a "solid target." Viewing this education from the angle of putting politics in command and attaching first importance to ideology, we can actually say that it is a target of primary importance.

Although the broad masses of our cadres and fighters are in enthusiastic support of and willing to share the same fate with the Party and socialism, it should be seen that many of our comrades are so deeply influenced by the Leftist ideology in the past many years that it is impossible for them to completely change their way of thinking. These comrades are so used to consider problems from the Leftist viewpoint that they cannot understand and even have misgivings about the prevailing policy of the Party. Some of them are worried about the Party from a Party member viewpoint, and for this reason they make no effort to hide their views. In such cases, if we do a good job in education concerning the line, principles and policies of the Party and provide timely guidance to these comrades, it is not difficult to correct their miscomprehension. In fact, by conducting education concerning the line, principles and policies of the Party, many PLA units have succeeded in emancipating the minds of an overwhelming majority of the comrades, enabling them to know the truth and catch up with the march of times. On the other hand, if we fail to carry out such education in good time, and if some of the comrades are so simple-minded, so stubborn in their thinking, and so cornered in their views that they are unable to unshackle themselves from their ideological confinement, it is possible for them to deteriorate from misinterpreting the Party policy to harboring doubt about socialism and the leadership of the Party, thus turning a mere question of miscomprehension into a question of political stand, causing them to develop a feeling of antagonism toward the Party. This is a problem of principle involving whether or not we can lead the PLA properly, whether or not we can stabilize our armed forces, and whether or not our Party can assume absolute leadership over the PLA. It is utterly wrong to take the view that "it does not matter" and "it is not a big deal" for PLA members to hold views at variance with the Party policy.

The key to the work of strengthening education concerning the line, principles and policy of the Party lies in leadership. It is of first importance for the leading cadres to adjust their thinking and working method according to the tide of history and to the "change." Some cadres tend to wish that everything would remain so peaceful and quiet. They complain about the quick changes, about the big change in propaganda through mass media, about the failure of the higher authorities to forewarn them about certain changes, and about the difficulty encountered in ideological work, but never about their own failure in adjusting their way of thinking according to the changing events. We are now in the midst of a period of big change. To meet the demands of the objective development of events and the earnest aspirations of the broad masses of the people, the Party has reiterated its new political line, ideological line and organizational line, and a string of new principles and policies. In view of the damages done by the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counterrevolutionary clique in the past 10 years and done by the Leftist

ideology over a long period of time, causing so many problems and so much difficulty to us, how can we refuse to take action to reverse the situation and bring about a reform? Only through reform can we realize our hope and make progress. For this reason, a correct attitude lies not in complaining about the change, but rather in adjusting ourselves according to the change. This change requires that we conduct our ideological education with greater results. To accomplish this goal, we should adopt a form of education and a work method which are more inspiring, more appealing and more realistic, so as to enable the line, principles and policies of the Party to win greater and more popular support. To meet the requirements of this change, we leading cadres should, first of all, to master the line, principles and policies of the Party ourselves, and not be satisfied with the mere promulgation of documents and the style of merely going through the motion. The Party committees should free themselves from the shackle of daily routine and concentrate their efforts on intensively popularizing the line, principles and policies of the Party. This is a new assignment to improve the leadership of the Party under new conditions. It should particularly be seen that the reason the Party, the state and the PLA adopt many reforms and important measures during the period of big change is to eliminate bureaucratism, prerogatives, and irregularity in our work. The success in this task has a direct bearing on the ideology, work style and personal interests of us leading cadres. We should carry forward our revolutionary spirit and our hard struggle style of work without giving any thought about our personal gains and losses, but be ready to sacrifice our own personal interests to turn ourselves into promoters rather than obstacles of the reform. By readjusting our attitude, our ideology and our leading methods according to the march of times, we shall most assuredly be able to improve our education concerning the line, principles and policies of the Party, and direct the PLA to contribute to the work of promoting and protecting the four modernizations.

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

PLA REGIMENT CARRIES OUT POLITICAL EDUCATION

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 20 Feb 81 p 1

[Newsletter by Jun Zheng [0971 6774]: "A Regiment Does Good Job in Basic-level Political Education"]

[Text] At a PLA political work conference, a delegate of a certain regiment of the PLA Wuhan units spoke on the experience of that regiment in carrying out basic-level political education. His speech was much appreciated by the participants in the conference.

In the past few years, the Party and the PLA have carried out reforms on many systems. Such reforms have made certain impacts in the minds of some of the cadres and fighters of that regiment. The Party Committee of the regiment has tried its utmost to reorient the ideology of the cadres and fighters to keep in harmony with the line, principles and policies of the Party Central Committee, in the spirit of holding itself responsible to the Party for army building. Since 1980, members of the Party committee of the regiment have done the following in the field of education: directing the cadres and fighters to correctly comprehend the line, principles and policies adopted by the Party since the Third Plenum of the 11th CCP Central Committee and to correct their misunderstanding and biased views; directing the cadres and fighters to adhere to a high moral standard, keep their revolutionary color, and combat bourgeois decadent ideology; and directing the cadres and fighters to subordinate their personal interests to the interests of the revolution and oppose extreme individualism. During a certain period in the past, influenced by certain bad tendencies in the society, some comrades have started to pursue certain unhealthy interests. Some cadres were afraid to do anything about it for fear of criticism by others. In view of this situation, the Party Committee clearly pointed out that no matter what the criticism from others, one should stand firm and carry out education beneficial to army building. The Party committee then directed members of the regiment to study Comrade Mao Zedon's report at the Second Plenum of the 7th CCP Committee, and review the outstanding traditions of hard struggle of the army, with good results. When Ma Guomin [7456 0948 3046], a demolition hero of the regiment, received love letters from young women of many localities, he kept his high revolutionary moral standard and continued his friendship with his first sweetheart whom he came to know before he won the hero title. The Party Committee of the regiment praised Ma Guomin for his conduct for the education of others.

The leading cadres of the regiment continued the practice of plunging deeply into the masses to study their trend of thought, personally assisting in solving problems for the troubled comrades. Tan Pingbang [6007 1627 6721], Commissar of the regiment, knew the members of the regiment so well that he was able to identify each member with regard to which company he belonged and what problems he had. A fighter of the Second Artillery Company of the regiment was criticized for discipline violation, and he was so angry that he adopted a wrong attitude. A leading cadre of the regiment made efforts to educate him on many occasions, and he finally raised his political consciousness and corrected his attitude. Since 1979, through painstaking efforts the Party committee reformed 35 backward fighters of the regiment without any political mishaps.

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

STRATEGIC POLICY OF POSITIVE DEFENSE ANALYZED

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 20 Feb 81 p 3

[Article by Hao Junjie [6787 0193 2638], Division Commander: "Experience in the 10-Year Civil War and the New Historical Conditions--On My Comprehension of the Strategic Policy of Positive Defense"]

[Text] One is invariably reminded of the experience of the 10-year civil war when talking about the strategy of positive defense. In summing up the experience in that period, Comrade Mao Zedong once defined and differentiated the concepts of positive and negative defense on the basis of objective reality and military principles, laying the corner-stone for the adoption by our army of the positive defense strategic policy and providing the basis for us to analyze the guideline in our strategy. However, ever since Lin Biao and the "gang of four" advanced modern superstition by deifying Comrade Mao Zedong, his concept, definition and principle of positive defense have become the "watershed" and "touchstone" for us to differentiate the two military lines, and the absolute criterion to define and examine a strategic and tactic means. No matter what are the actual conditions, all positive defenses must be totally in conformity with the experience of the civil war in that 10 years, be it with regard to the construction of defense works or the application of tactical principles. Otherwise, it would be considered as negative and wrong. This way of thinking has impeded the development of military ideology over a period of time. Today, it is necessary for us to deepen our comprehension about positive defense strategic policy through analyzing our historical experiences.

To study the guiding rules in war, it is important to note their development and characteristics. Comrade Mao Zedong very carefully analyzed the characteristics of the Chinese revolution during the 10 years of civil war, as follows: First, China was a big semicolonial country whose political and economic development was uneven and which underwent a revolution from 1924 to 1927. Second, the enemy was strong. Third, the Red Army was weak. Fourth, there was the Communist Party leadership and the land revolution. These objective conditions, some favorable and some unfavorable, dictated that the Red Army might be able to grow and defeat its enemy but could not do so quickly, and that if things went wrong it might face defeat. Under such harsh and trying class struggle conditions, the crucial point of the fate of the Red Army lay in its ability to break the enemy "encirclement and suppression." The main problem in doing so was to preserve its strength, wait for the best opportunity to break the enemy, defeat the enemy and develop its own force. This situation dictated the adoption of positive defense in battle,

centering on guerrilla warfare, and mobile warfare fought in guerrilla style: "you fight your battle, and I fight mine," "fight when I am winning, retreat when I am losing," and "all 'retreats' aim at 'to fight another day.'" It also dictated that the policy of positive defense was fighting a defensive war strategically but an offensive war tactically, and a protracted war strategically but a quick-decision war tactically, and luring in the enemy to wipe out his units with superior force one by one. These were the precious experiences of the Red Army gained through bloodshed in the 10-year civil war. These experiences fully demonstrated their power and value in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and in the War of Liberation. Undoubtedly, they still remain the text-book instructions for our commanders and fighters to carry on, study and use as reference today.

"Like other laws, the law of military operations is an objective truth reflected in our mind." In studying the science of military affairs, we cannot do without summing up, studying, and referring to the practice and experience of the battles fought "yesterday." The most important thing is to notice the change and development of events. A radical change has taken place between the yesterday of the 1930s and today of the 1980s. During the 10-year Civil War, the Red Army fought to break the "encirclement and suppression" in order to gain growth and development of itself and its revolutionary bases. The war to be fought today and tomorrow is to defend the sovereign territory, independence and dignity of our country and nation. The strategies and tactics of positive defense based on these two different concepts cannot be the same. Besides, following the quick advancement of modern sciences and technology in the past half century, new generations of weapons and equipment have developed for armed forces, and both the enemy and ourselves have changed a great deal from their old selves of the 1930s. This tremendous change in technology must give rise to changes and even revolutions in combating methods. From this it can be imagined that the frame of positive defense of the olden days has been broken by its new contents today. It is obviously impossible to apply the old experience gained in the 10-year Civil War to the new historical conditions without modifications. We can by no means interpret Comrade Mao Zedong's positive defense concept in a stand-still and mechanical manner. For instance, we must re-interpret and re-comprehend the meaning of luring in the enemy, a controversial problem in early wars. Generally speaking, luring in the enemy was an important tactic in positive defense for a weaker army to defeat a stronger army. In the past, we generally considered the tactic of luring in the enemy as an integral part of positive defense, as if there could be no positive defense without first luring in the enemy. In reality, however, the main point of luring in the enemy is to lure the enemy with some sweets to a battlefield more advantageous to us for wiping him out. "Before taking something, one must yield something," as a saying has it. In future wars, however, the goals of the enemy would invariably be areas of critical political or economic value to us, such as key points in topography or large and medium-size cities serving as political and economic centers or strategic positions. We must not use them as "sweets" to lure in the enemy. In preparing our battlegrounds today, we have not considered to set our battleline at the border, but have established a defense line at strategic positions with favorable topography at certain depth on the way of the main attack of the enemy. This principle of preparing ourselves to combat at key positions is embraced in the luring in the enemy tactic. In view of the fact that North China, Northeast China and Northwest China are all noted for their rough topography,

making them easier to defend than to invade, and that our strategic inland areas are on the plain, making them easier to invade than to defend, if we again apply our old method of luring in the enemy by "reducing the size of the mess hall ostensibly but increasing the strength of our forces secretly," and go so far as to abandon our good battlegrounds which we have prepared for over 20 years in favor of our inland soft belly, we would be helping the enemy to fulfill his strategic attempt.

With the progress of history, we may have to change many of the things which we promoted in the 10-year Civil War. Conversely, some of the tactics which we opposed may today be worthy of our recomprehension and adoption. In the past, the Red Army fought battles without any battle lines, made mobile attacks in the main, and refrained from defensive battles in fixed positions. It was not because we had any preference about mobile warfare, but simply because under the objective conditions we had no better method to defeat the enemy. In fighting anti-aggression wars in the future, however, during the initial period we must adopt the "fortress tactics" which we had opposed in the past, in order to defend our strategic points such as cities and important military targets in the same way as Stalingrad was defended, so that we can take advantage of our defense works to deal with the enemy. This is the concrete application of the positive defense concept under new historical conditions.

In reality, the strategic policy of positive defense was different in content at different war times in the past. In the first campaign against "encirclement and suppression," the policy was "luring in the enemy with open arms." In the third campaign against "encirclement and suppression," it was "avoiding the brunt of enemy attack to hit his weak points." During the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, the national strategic policy was "fighting a protracted war" while the strategic policy of the Eighth Route Army was "fighting a guerrilla warfare without giving up mobile warfare under favorable conditions" or, to put it another way, "fighting a mountainous guerrilla warfare independently." In 1939, the strategic policy of the New Fourth Army as advanced by Comrade Zhou Enlai was, "consolidating our position in the south, combating the enemy in the east, and developing our territory in the north." In 1942, the strategic policy advanced by Comrade Chen Yi was, "fighting a guerrilla warfare in unity and independently." During the War of Liberation, we adopted the strategic policy of concentrating our main efforts to wipe out the effectives of the Guomindang without paying too much attention to the preservation of our territory. During the first phase of the Resist-America Aid-Korea War, our strategic policy was "fighting mainly a mobile warfare in coordination with some positional warfare and guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines," and during the second phase of that war, the phase of strategic defense, we changed our strategic policy to "protracted warfare with positive defense." From this it can be seen that the positive defense we refer to is not a fixed style.

A war is the supreme method to settle political, economic and military contradictions between the enemy and ourselves. As these contradictions would continually change, so would the methods to settle them. Summing up the experiences of the 10-year Civil War, Comrade Mao Zedong emphatically said: with regard to the guerrilla nature of the Red Army, "it would surely become a shameful thing to be abandoned in the future." He also said, "with the change of technical and

organizational conditions, the Red Army would enter a new stage in its growth, its combat orientation and battle lines would be relatively fixed, and it would be engaged more in positional warfare..." The great arena of future wars will provide a wide universe for us to gallop our horses, and countless "virgin lands" for us to explore. For this reason, to fully carry out the strategic policy of positive defense, it is necessary not only to study history and use past experiences as reference, but also to study reality and develop new theories, principles and concepts of positive defense.

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

COUNTERATTACK WITH SMALL DETACHMENTS SUGGESTED

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 20 Feb 81 p 3

[Article by Xiong Zhishan [3574 1807 6365] of Shijiazhuang Senior Army School: "It Is Best to Use Small Detachments To Carry Out Counterattacks"]

[Text] "Of the 114 counterattacks conducted in 70 defensive battles in the Resist-America Aid-Korea War, only nine were carried out with troops of more than four companies, and the other 105 counterattacks were carried out by detachments smaller than a battalion." This was the simple statement in the book "A Study of Problems Encountered in the Positional Offensive and Defensive Battles of Our Army." This statement shows that in defensive battles, it is best to carry out counterattacks with small detachments. Under current conditions where our army is still inferior in its technical equipment, in a defensive battle fought by a regiment (or a battalion), it is all the more necessary to study the characteristics and functions of counterattacks with small detachments.

1. If the enemy enjoys superior fire power, to carry out a counterattack with a selected small detachment will make it possible to fulfill the goal of the counterattack more easily, because as the target is small, so will be the casualty. For instance, at the Jixiongshan defensive battle, a certain regiment of the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) carried out eight counterattacks, of which six were conducted by selected small detachments (the biggest of which was composed of six squads), winning relatively large victories at low cost. In the two counterattacks conducted with larger detachments (one composed of two companies and the other six companies), although we did succeed in wiping out some of the enemy troops which had penetrated our positions, we paid with more casualties from enemy fire because of the larger targets formed by larger numbers of troops who moved slowly.

In modern defensive battles, the enemy will enjoy even more superior fire power in his attacks. For instance, a motorized infantry division will have a standard number of 638 tanks and artillery pieces with a basic amount of 1,354.5 tons of ammunition. A division on the main line of attack will be complemented with 6-8 atom bombs, too. On the main line of attack, each one kilometer of battle front will be bombarded by from 150 to 200 artillery pieces, firing at the rate of 20,000 shells per 30 minutes, or 30-50 percent heavier than the bombardment of Shangganling by the U.S. forces in the Korean War. To carry out a counterattack against such an attack with such superior fire power, it is all the more necessary to keep the counterattack force small to reduce casualty and to win bigger victory at smaller cost.

Generally speaking, a counterattack should be conducted with a concentrated force to enjoy a superiority in force at the point of counterattack. Some comrade may ask, "would it be possible to gain such superiority in a counterattack with a small detachment?" Yes, it is possible, if we make efforts to do so. On an occasion when enemy troops in relatively large numbers penetrated our forward positions at several points at the same time, to enable a small detachment to enjoy superiority in force at a given point, members of our detachment in the forward positions should take advantage of their defense works to open fire. In the meantime, members of the obstruction detachment should quickly lay mines with rockets, open anti-tank trenches, activate controlled mines and take other actions to cut the enemy mass into small pieces, so that they can be gulped up one by one by the small mobile detachment, thus wiping out all the penetrated enemy force.

2. It is easier for a small detachment to conceal itself and take the best opportunity to take action. Judging by our combat experience gained at the Resist-America Aid-Korea War, the smaller the counterattack force, the easier it is to conduct counterattacks at daytime. In the case of the 114 counterattacks stated in the aforementioned book, 75 percent of the counterattacks were carried out in daytime. Because of the application of night vision equipment, night counterattacks should be carried out with the same care with regard to taking cover and keeping a high speed in action. In view of the fact that a small detachment is small as a target, fast in its movement, easy to take cover in approaching the enemy, and capable of seizing the best opportunity for action both in daytime and at night, it is best suited for use in modern defensive battles.

To enable a small detachment to take advantage of the best opportunities in action, it is necessary to prepare it with many alternatives with regard to the direction and method of counterattack. In the course of action, the detachment must be resolute in carrying out the counterattack. In the light of our available equipment and current tactics, it is suitable for a regiment or a battalion in a defensive position to use small detachments for launching counterattacks when the detachments in forward positions are unable to beat back the enemy attack.

3. After success in the counterattack, it is easy for a small detachment to quickly withdraw or take cover to protect itself at its new position. Our combat experience at the Resist-America Aid-Korea War showed that after we succeeded in our counterattack, the enemy would often reply with artillery or air force fire. For instance, in its counterattack at an unnamed height northwest of Height 60.1 while defending the Huachuan area, although the first battalion of a certain regiment of the CPV wiped out more than 100 enemy troops and took more than 50 U.S. soldiers prisoner, its slow move in withdrawing enabled the enemy to inflict heavy casualties on us with gun fire and recapture his fallen position.

In modern defensive warfare, counterattacks will be met with even more prompt, more accurate and more ferocious enemy gun fire. For this reason, a small detachment should be faster and more courageous in its action, such as withdrawing from occupied territory or taking cover to protect itself in its new position. The slightest faltering may cause it to lose everything it has gained.

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

DECEPTION IS REGARDED AS BEST TACTIC

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 20 Feb 81 p 3

[Article by Huang Peiyi [7806 1014 5030]: "The Best Tactic Is to Apply Deception"]

[Text] All famous militarists are noted for their good tactics. Although each tactics is different from the other, they have one thing in common: the application of deception to confuse and defeat the enemy.

The following are the reasons why the militarists at home and abroad, in olden times as well as today, took delight in the application of deception to win their battles:

1. Deception can fool the enemy, cause him to disperse his forces and diminish his superiority in force. Sun Zi said: "When the enemy can be observed by us, but not us by the enemy, then we can fight in greater concentration." Liu Bowen said: "In fighting an enemy, if his force is greater, then we should establish illusory forces to reduce his superiority." Both remarks talked about the application of deception to distract the enemy. Napoleon was noted for his ability to use a small force to distract the enemy, making it possible for him to use concentrated force against enemy's dispersed force.

2. Deception makes it possible to launch surprise attacks. (Klausevetz) said: "Only a person who can divert the attention of his opponent can launch a surprise attack." To divert the attention of an opponent, one must be good at deception. Chinese ancient works on tactics had the following to say: "make believe you cannot do what you can," "make believe you will not use what you will," "make believe you have to reach far to get something nearby," "make believe you can reach what is beyond your reach," "make believe you have what you don't have," and "make believe you don't have what you have." All these aim at concealing your capacity. They are effective means to launch surprise attacks.

As "deception" is so important, almost all books of value on military affairs take "deception" as a wonderful tactics. In war, there is a wide field for deceptive action, and both sides would try its best to "make believe" and "deceive." It is often the side which can apply deception better can fool the enemy and not be fooled, can take the initiative in combat, overrun enemy positions, defend his own positions securely, and turn danger into safety. As a legend has it, Zhuge Wuhou deceived Sima Yi into withdrawing his troops from an "open city." On the other

hand, a commander who does not know how to apply deception is often fooled by the enemy, so much so that he cannot use his superior force effectively. From this it can be seen that deception is a most important factor for winning the initiative in battlefields, and the ability to apply deception is an important yardstick to measure the ability of a commander to apply tactics.

It must be pointed out that following the continual application of advanced sciences and technology to military operations, it has become more and more easy to identify deceptions, and the commanders are required to improve their ability to do so. This makes it necessary to advance the art of deception to higher levels. During World War II, on the African battlefield the British forces were fooled by Rommel who made believe that he had a fleet of forward marching tanks by installing propellers on trucks to blow up the sand, and on the Soviet battlefield, the German forces were fooled by the Soviet troops who used wooden tanks equipped with roaring noise-makers. These means of deception may be easily found out in future wars, so great efforts should be made to improve the make-believe measures so that they can stand the enemy reconnaissance and scrutiny with the most advanced scientific equipment. On the other hand, one must not give too much credit to the ability of enemy spying devices, feeling that insofar as the enemy has an espionage satellite overhead, he must have learned every move we have made. But in reality, all the data collected by a spying device must still be studied by men, and all combat arrangements must still be made subjectively by the commandants concerned. All these take time to accomplish. If only we can use our head to come forward with more deceptive tricks, we would still be able to fool the enemy. This was proven by the fact that during the fourth Mid-east War, the Egyptian force was able to secretly concentrate large numbers of men and large quantity of equipment right under the watchful eyes of the Israeli troops and the U.S. espionage satellite to launch a surprise attack.

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