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The Quaintness of the U.S. Intelligence Community: Its Origin, Theory, and Problems

Once upon a time there was no "Intelligence Community" in the United States. Suddenly there appeared an "Intelligence Community." Today we have the "U.S. Intelligence Community."

When first heard by insiders familiar with the secret, secretive, and fractious members of this so-called community, the name caused them to snicker. Later, American historian Henry Steele Commager thought the community "quaintly" named.[1] British scholar Zara Steiner, discussing the British community – the term having become internationalized – said the name suggests "harmonious interplay between agencies and government control." She called it "a velvety term" that might be "quite misleading."[2]

Ms. Steiner and many others have probably also wondered when, how, and why such a name ever came into use. Perhaps they even wondered whether it referred to anything more than a polite fiction or a pious hope. Possibly the continued unexamined use of the term actually masked the Achilles heel of American intelligence.

Perhaps these questions have never been asked before because the so-called community's best known member, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), has been the cynosure of all eyes, both friendly and hostile, and has by force of events shaped and monopolized the writing of contemporary American intelligence history. Perhaps we would find revealing approaching this history from a different perspective; that of *the* Intelligence Community (IC).

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THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES THAT GREW AND GREW

Again, once upon a time there was no "Intelligence Community" in the United States. Of course, intelligence existed – whenever men or peoples are in conflict, there is intelligence, however unrefined it may be. But the intelligence services that existed were ephemeral – wartime utilities such as General George Washington's clandestine New York "Culper" spy ring in the American Revolution, General Winfield Scott's "Spy Company" in the Mexican War and Lafayette Baker's self-described, inflated U.S. Secret Service Bureau in the Civil War. But for half of U.S. history since its founding, no permanently established intelligence organization existed. But in time they came, one by one, like so many Topsys.*

They first appeared in the military services. These, in tandem with their European counterparts in the nineteenth century, gave the word "intelligence" its modern meaning and organizational growth. The first to do so in the U.S. was the Navy, which established the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) in the Bureau of Navigation in 1882. ONI, always fated to fight for function, money, and status, moved ahead in 1915 when it was made subordinate to the new Chief of Naval Operations.

By 1885 the U.S. Army, not to be outdone by the Navy, set up its intelligence service, the Division of Military Information, which was established in the Military Reservations Division of the Miscellaneous Branch of the Adjutant General's Office. From this lowly beginning it became by the end of the Great War the Military Intelligence Division (MID), also known as G-2, one of four divisions in the War Department General Staff. By 1939, G-2 and ONI thought they had firm control of intelligence as a military and naval preserve.

By this time, they had also formed a pragmatic alliance with another "Topsy," the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Originally named the Bureau of Investigation, the FBI had been established in the Department of Justice in 1908 because of the department's need to have its own investigators. During World War I, its responsibilities were greatly broadened when, at the request of the Department of State, it took on overseas investigations of actual and suspected cases involving spies, subversives, radicals, enemy aliens, etc. Such activities brought the bureau into the counterintelligence field. This necessitated its chief, J. Edgar Hoover, to carry on liaison with the G-2 and ONI chiefs, who also had counterintelligence responsibilities dealing with the security of information personnel, bases, and equipment. By the

*"Grew like Topsy" is a popular Americanism meaning to grow haphazardly, unsystematically, or in a disorganized manner. Topsy was a young black slave girl in Harriet Beecher Stowe's *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, who, when asked about her origins, replied that she had "just growed."

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/04/19 : CIA-RDP03B00637R000300350002-0

outbreak of World War II, G-2, ONI, and the FBI were the Big Three of American intelligence and counterintelligence.

But always looking over their shoulders was the State Department. Logically, this probably should have been the first department to set up an intelligence service, but it wound up being the last to do so. Like the Molière character who was surprised to discover that he had been speaking prose for 40 years, State did not discover until 1945 when it picked up the research and analysis function of the former Office of Strategic Services (OSS) that its diplomatic and consular corps and its numerous secret agents – and here one should add many presidential or executive agents – had been gathering political intelligence since 1789. Even so, State was always protective enough of its primacy in foreign affairs to keep an ever watchful, often superintending, eye on others' dealings in foreign matters.

Like State, the equally old Treasury Department had been in the intelligence business long before it knew it. Its responsibilities for collecting, accounting for and disbursing public monies very early on involved it in investigating and uncovering violations of the relevant laws. In the process of doing so it picked up much important foreign information, developed a corps of special agents who were often envied, and even borrowed or hired, by other departments. By 1939 a half dozen outfits were established – the Coast Guard, Secret Service, Bureau of Narcotics, Customs Service, Alcohol Tax Unit, and the Internal Revenue Service – whose operations produced many intelligence byproducts.

To catalogue the fifty or so government agencies, such as the Agriculture, Commerce and Interior departments, the Postmaster General, and the Signal Corps, which by 1939 had been or still were involved in collecting and producing small amounts of intelligence, would indeed be tedious. By this time the national intelligence stage was dominated by the Big Three with State in its superintending and Treasury in its supporting role. My focus is the relationship among themselves and with the president.

About that only three points need be made. First; each intelligence unit, with its own requirements, operations, methods, traditions, ambitions and especially secrets, was a sealed world of its own. Second; each unit, organizationally, was but a part, usually a small part, of a much larger organization whose chief was a cabinet officer and from whom it sought recognition and support. Third; each unit had a chain of command, which led through its secretary to the president, the ultimate customer and patron. Thus they stood – behind their secretaries, independently, side by side, eyes on the president. They stood in a line, in a linear lineup.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/04/19 : CIA-RDP03B00637R000300350002-0

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/04/19 : CIA-RDP03B00637R000300350002-0

THE CIA: A REAL MOUSETRAP

Was there never a suggestion for making a better mousetrap, a better way of organizing American intelligence? Yes, whenever there was big trouble, especially a war, but even then it usually ran into the stiffest opposition.

Both world wars revealed the weakness of the linear lineup of the intelligence services. The eruption of war between modern armies and navies on a large geographical plane inevitably produced an information explosion that far exceeded the handling capacities of the small, peacetime services, each doing its own thing. When information – reports and requirements – began cascading at electric speed, there followed backlogs, duplication, confusion, complaining, and other evils abhorrent to tidy minds.

In that situation the problem was quickly diagnosed as a lack of coordination among the services, and the proposed mousetrap was a clearinghouse to sort out the information. Thus, in 1915, Secretary of State Robert Lansing, much exercised about the "great amount of information" flooding government agencies on German and other subversive agents, had President Woodrow Wilson designate State, because of the diplomatic questions involved, the central office to which all such information should be sent. Lansing's estimate of the extra work thus taken on by State was so slight that he thought he might need only "a thoroughly trustworthy stenographer" and "if the work is unusually heavy, a filing clerk."[3]

Lansing's office apparently threatened no one. In fact, two years later, with the United States in the war, Treasury Secretary William G. McAdoo thought Lansing's clearinghouse inadequate. He pointed out that the Secret Service, the Bureau of Investigation, the Post Office Inspection Service, as well as Treasury's revenue and customs agents, were all reporting on crimes against the U.S. He said they were often "crossing wires." Hence he urged the president to establish a Bureau of Intelligence, in State or Treasury, to handle the old, as well as the new, problems brought on by American belligerency. But the Post Office and the attorney general were so opposed to what struck them as so much poaching that McAdoo, swearing "I don't care three straws about organizing" the new bureau, withdrew his suggestion.[4]

At war's end another critic accused the federal agencies of inefficiency, incompetence, lack of centralization, and mutual jealousy. This was William A. Pinkerton, head of his late father's well-known detective agency, which had been employed by the government in the Civil War but not in the Great War. Pinkerton told the International Association of Police Chiefs in 1919 that what was needed in the war and then was "a central government agency force [*sic*] of Federal detectives" to centralize and weave together all the

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information coming in, and thereby cope with such German agents as Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff and Franz von Papen.[5]

Not for another decade would someone propose a better mousetrap, and surprisingly enough that would occur in the untroubled spring of 1929. That was the year Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson made intelligence history by banning the reading of other gentlemen's mail. In that year, John A. Gade, a former naval attaché turned banker, gave his advice to military officials in New York. Gade had been impressed by what he wrongly saw as a very efficient "wheel of British intelligence" whose "central hub" and far-reaching "spokes" gathered and produced vital intelligence for Britain's leadership. Gade, with his vivid imagery in mind, said the British wheel should be duplicated in Washington, but Washington judged the idea "nothing to be gained and many difficulties to be overcome." Gade's advice would not have received even as much consideration as it did had it not been expected he would communicate it directly to President Herbert C. Hoover, for whom he had worked in Belgium during the war.[6]

But another decade passed before the problem reached the presidential level. This happened in 1938 when the country's sensational Guenther Gustave Rumrich trial hit the fan. So much squabbling occurred among the many services involved in the apprehension of Rumrich's confederates in a German spy ring in America that leading defendants found safety in flight. The presiding judge publicly castigated the government's "protective agencies" for their "carelessness" and "ineptitude."[7]

The press, watching this fiasco, repeatedly asked Roosevelt when these agencies would be coordinated. Finally, having waved his wand, FDR announced on 9 December: "That has been done; [coordination] is working."[8] What he meant was that he had been told by his attorney general that the Big Three had "a well defined system which is functioning as well as present funds permit." That system involved the heads of the three agencies being "in frequent contact" and "operating in harmony."[9] How premature that reassurance was is manifested, as we shall see, by the fragmentation of today's counterintelligence services. Even so, the Rumrich fiasco had significance for the country, the services, and the president. It marked the first time that coordination of the counterintelligence services had become a matter of public presidential concern and action. For the services it crystallized the interdepartmental committee as the cherished mode of coordination, a mode that left everything in their hands. It was FDR's introduction to the problem of managing, first, his counterintelligence and, then, his information and intelligence services.

But before Roosevelt turned to his intelligence services, they toyed with two proposals reminiscent of those of Lansing, McAdoo, Pinkerton, and Gade. These came early in 1941 when the U.S. government was feeling the

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impact of the information explosion of World War II, and when rumors had begun to circulate about the ambitious plans of Col. William J. Donovan for coordinating the government's intelligence. The first proposal, appearing in March, was an Army idea for a joint military and civilian intelligence committee modeled after the British Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), which was only then beginning to be effective. An American JIC, however, was initially rejected and then endorsed only after Donovan was made Coordinator of Information (COI) in July and not activated until after Pearl Harbor – when it finally received promised office space!

The second proposal, another for getting a grip on the flood of information reaching Washington, arrived in April, also from the Army. This involved eight agencies, many papers and charts, and several meetings. The conferees almost summarily rejected the old idea of a clearinghouse. Smelling a fishing expedition, State was happy with the status quo. Treasury and Navy saw no need to change the existent relationship. So what did they all do? They agreed each would maintain its own office for the exchange of information, and they accepted a common definition of "Secret," "Confidential," and "Restricted"![10]

Never had the mountain's laboring more truly produced a mouse. No wonder that FDR, ignoring the eight agencies, struck out in a new direction in July. Then he established not a new committee but a new organization, indeed the country's first central intelligence agency. This he did when he established COI, later restructured as OSS, under Colonel Donovan. But Roosevelt never did give Donovan the real power to do the COI job, and hence the coordination job was not done.

Even so, the job and Donovan were so unwanted by the Big Three and others that they bitterly opposed him and COI/OSS throughout the war and connived in OSS's abolition at war's end. That left them where they had always wanted to be: untrammeled by any outside coordinator, especially by the likes of Bill Donovan, now a major general.

While they had also driven Donovan back to his Manhattan law practice, they had not fully reckoned with the plan he had left behind. This had called for a permanent peacetime central intelligence service; something they had never, never, wanted. Still, they had been driven by the Pearl Harbor syndrome, the force of Donovan's argument, the prospect of the Cold War, and by a new war-born appreciation of intelligence to come up with two counterproposals.

The first came from the State Department, which was now eager to take on the intelligence job and was egged on in this regard by the Bureau of the Budget, which wanted no new agencies established. State put forth a Rube Goldberg contraption consisting of three cabinet secretaries at the top, the

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inevitable secretariat, two advisory groups, three coordinating committees, eleven intelligence committees, and eight counterintelligence committees.

The second counterproposal came from the Army and Navy – actually from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) – which had found the Donovan plan too strong for the national system to digest but found the State plan dismayingly weak. Hence, with nothing on their drawing boards but a modification of the Donovan plan, they picked it up, changed it again, and made it their own JCS plan. What they thought they had done was subject the proposed CIA to the control and direction of the three secretaries and the chiefs of the intelligence services so that intelligence was left securely in their hands. However, they had accepted the unacceptable, a new agency.

When confronted with these two choices, President Harry S Truman, nine months in office, had little difficulty picking the second. He did so officially on 22 January 1946, when he established what he thought was the new permanent American intelligence system. It had three components: a National Intelligence Authority (NIA) consisting of the secretaries of State, War, and the Navy and a representative of the president; a Director of Central Intelligence (DCI); and a Central Intelligence Group (CIG). But this CIG consisted of people, money, and facilities provided by the agencies the DCI was charged with coordinating! The new system lasted a year and a half.

No fret, however; the groundwork had been laid. Truman's original choice was reworked, incorporated in the National Security Act of 1947, worked on by Congress, and turned into something significantly different. When the act became law in July it still had three components, but with changes: the NIA became the National Security Council (NSC) with expanded functions and with the president in charge; the DCI was now made a civilian post – though still open to a military man – and the CIG became the Central Intelligence Agency, which now had its own law, boss, personnel and money. Here at last was a real mousetrap – or so it seemed.

Never in the considerable government discussion and newspaper coverage of the creation of this new intelligence mousetrap had anyone ever spoken or written of an Intelligence Community. Likewise, the reader who has come this far in this narrative will have noted that never in the years between 1882 and 1946 had anyone ever used that "quaint" or "velvety" term. Whence did it come?

THE COMMUNITY: AN AFTERTHOUGHT

The answer lies in the arrival of the CIA, an event that revolutionized the American intelligence establishment.

CIA was no longer an idea, a proposal, not even a bad dream. It was not even a mere exchange office, a clearinghouse, a post office. Least of all was

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it a committee. Instead, it was a hard fact; a legal, political, bureaucratic fact; a substantial reality of people, functions, and powers subject to presidential direction. It was different from everything else, as its name clearly shows.

CIA was, and is, not a staff element, a section, a division, or office within a major governmental department – as were and are all the other services – but an "agency" as independent as any other cabinet-level department. It was established not by a low-level bureau chief, not even by a cabinet officer, not by a presidential directive but by an act of Congress and the president – after a constitutional provision the most substantial of foundations. Second, as an "intelligence" agency, CIA gave unprecedented significance and visibility to the concept, activity, and profession of intelligence. Never in American history had intelligence, including espionage and ultimately covert action, been made the primary stuff of an independent government agency. Never had an intelligence agency been so publicly established – and located at the presidential level. Never had any intelligence service – ONI, G-2, State intelligence, the FBI's intelligence division, etc. – won such quick public recognition as did CIA. Intelligence had come of age.

Finally, it was not merely another service, another addition to the linear lineup. Quite the contrary; it was the "central" agency, and its director headed "central" intelligence. As such it could not be visualized as standing on a straight line. In fact, its establishment destroyed that line. There had to be a different lineup, a different image.

What comes more quickly to mind than the circle; the symbol, amusingly enough, of perfection and eternity? Since CIA was clearly a center, it had to be central to the other services, which necessarily occupied the periphery. Shades of John A. Gade! It dawns upon us that CIA and the DCI are "the central hub" and the other intelligence services so many "spokes" in this new "wheel" of U.S. intelligence. That Gade unknowingly anticipated the future is evident in CIA's regular use of the circle (a pie chart) as a way of representing today's Intelligence Community. While Gade foresaw it, he never received his footnote in history.

Gade never received it, because no one knew of him, and because no one had cared about these questions, which, admittedly, are rather historical and speculative and even, perhaps, fanciful. More to the point, everyone intimately affected by the appearance of CIA on the intelligence scene had more important subjects to think about than naming the thing of which history would show they were becoming members. Those subjects were two: turf and conflict, and out of them would come the name that now captures us.

While CIA's name readily suggests a circle, it was a long time before CIA and the other intelligence agencies could think of themselves as an agreeably

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cozy little sewing circle. During the CIA's first year of existence, conflict over turf threatened its sense of oneness. CIA had battles with the FBI over South America, with G-2 over clandestine operations, with State over its authority over CIA personnel abroad, and with all agencies over the preparation of national estimates. Charges of intelligence failures touched Rumania, Bulgaria, Finland and Colombia. Allegations of friction, jealousy, lack of cooperation, duplication, distrust, resentment, etc. characterized CIA's relations with the other intelligence services. All in the first year! No wonder that in that year CIA had its first outside investigation.

Because of CIA's position and high visibility there was then and in succeeding years steady discussion in government circles and in the press of relations between CIA and the other services – in those years G-2, ONI, the new Air Force's A-2, the FBI, and intelligence units in State, Treasury, and the Atomic Energy Commission. The talk was of CIA and the other services – the various intelligence units, the old-line agencies, the FBI and military and naval intelligence, etc. In retrospect, there must have been some yearning for a briefer way of referring to these outfits. As it was, the talk went on for years: eight to be precise. Then, in 1955, with conflict still persisting and people still talking about CIA and the others, the second Hoover Commission on the organization of the executive branch of the government almost unthinkingly tossed off a brief parenthetical phrase that at one and the same time created the community and coined its name. Here, with emphasis added, is the history-making phrase:

> The machinery for accomplishing our Intelligence objectives, *hereafter called the Intelligence Community when referred to as a whole*, includes the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Council, the National Security Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Intelligence sections of the Department of State, of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, and of the Atomic Energy Commission.

Voilà! There it is! The name – curiously enough, only partially capitalized – and the definition. All tossed off parenthetically, without explanation, elaboration, fanfare or pride of accomplishment. Unlike the CIA, whose birth was planned, programmed, officially proclaimed and publicized, the Intelligence Community was unobtrusively slipped into history, like an afterthought.

WHAT'S IN A NAME?

Why was the afterthought – whatever it was and is – called a "community"? There were, after all, any number of possibilities. Why not "circle," why not

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/04/19 : CIA-RDP03B00637R000300350002-0

"wheel," why not "system," why not even "machinery," the word used by the Hoover Commission? A score or more of possibilities lay at hand in *Roget's Thesaurus*, and all of them were as accurate as community.

The word, cheapened today through indiscriminate use, has had a long and respected meaning. Since the time of Aristotle, Cicero, and St. Augustine, it has always identified a human group bound together by affection and love. In the nineteenth century Frederick Tönnies introduced the distinction between *gemeinschaft* (community) and *gesellschaft* (association). The gemeinschaft was epitomized by the family, the primary community whose members served one another with love and loyalty to the death. The *gesellschaft* was a coldly calculated collaboration actuated by self-interest. In simple terms, a person stuck to his community – family, tribe, ethnic group – through thick and thin, but he cut and ran when his corporation's stock went down or he did not make CEO. Surely the intelligence agencies – jealous of their turf, distrustful of one another, loath to share information close-chested in their operations – hardly had the stuff of community. Why then so "quaintly" named?

The answer, admittedly speculative, lies in the times. In the postwar West, particularly in the United States, the air was full of community talk. The wreckage of the war had moved people to try to rebuild, or try once again to build, an international community; and the rivalries and antagonisms that had wracked Europe in two world wars had also moved them to try to build a new European community. To that end the Western community established the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951; debated the establishment of the European Defense Community and the European Political Community in 1952-1954; signed the European Economic Community treaty in 1957; established the European Atomic Energy Community in 1958; and in July 1959 many African states proposed the establishment of the Community of Independent African States. Community talk was so much in the air in the late forties and fifties that sociologist Robert Nisbet in 1953 could write a book titled *The Quest for Community* (New York, Oxford University Press).

Quest it was. What was sought was a healing of wounds, an end to animosities, the establishment of friendly, productive relations. What was sought was making friends out of enemies. What was sought was community; oneness, wholeness, togetherness. Additionally, what was needed was a name to capture the ideal. What more appropriate than community? Was it not such thinking, however vague, that moved some unknown scribe on the Hoover Commission to think that naming the warring services a community might help make them one?

Be that as it may, the name stuck like glue. It soon replaced all references to CIA and the "intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/04/19 : CIA-RDP03B00637R000300350002-0

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Government," as the 1947 act referred to them. Next it was capitalized: then the Intelligence Community became the U.S. Intelligence Community. Last June the country observed "National Intelligence Community Week."[12] Next it was borrowed at home and abroad. The U.S. military, with their many intelligence services, now have their "military intelligence community."[13] The British also now have their own intelligence community, which, we are told, was actually established in 1936 – before the term was even in use![14] Nor is that the only case of reading history backward: another writer has characterized Sir William S. Stephenson, better known as Intrepid, as "one of the most effective members of the intelligence community in the Hitler war."[15] Finally, former Attorney General Griffin Bell really internationalized the term recently when he deplored the bad effects of American leaks on "the international intelligence community."[16]

The definition, if that is what it is, has also stuck. In 1976, in the first of three executive orders on intelligence, President Gerald Ford stated very simply that the term "*Intelligence Community* refers to the following organizations," which he then identified by name.[17] Subsequent orders, by President Jimmy Carter in 1978 and Ronald Reagan in 1981, took Ford's definition for granted. The only differences lay in the naming and describing of the various members. The definition, unlike many definitions, has had no challengers.

However much the name and definition were glued in place, the thing itself never attained what might be considered proper government recognition. It never managed to get into the government's own blue book, the *U.S. Government Manual*. This is the 940-page compendium of basic information about every separate government entity. It abounds in agencies, boards, commissions, committees, departments, services, etc., but it knows nothing of communities. Yes, there is the Intelligence Community Staff, to which we are coming, but there is no community: no intelligence community in particular.

The reason is very simple. It is not there for the same reason that the American military intelligence community, the British community, Bell's community and many other newly-sprung communities are not listed in any manual comparable to our blue book. They are not legal and bureaucratic realities in which rights and duties inhere. They are not subjects and objects of action. They are only names applied loosely to other entities that are the real movers and shakers.

WHAT IS IT?

In this country, what is called the Intelligence Community does not exhaust the intelligence scene. Indeed, it is but one of three parts of what, for want

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of a name, might be called the American intelligence structure. The president is at the top, followed by the NSC and several NSC intelligence committees of which the Director of Central Intelligence is a member. Second is a quartet of overseers. These are the two select intelligence committees of the Senate and House, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), which is an outside monitoring group, and the Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB), who are outsiders looking for illegalities and improprieties within the community. Then comes what is properly (or improperly) called the community.

What, then, is the community? Assuming it may be called an "it," let it be described initially as standing between nothing and something. It is the collection of those entities loosely knitted together by a number of committees chaired by the Director of Central Intelligence or his appointee. The objective of the knitting is the effective and efficient conduct of the intelligence and counterintelligence functions of the United States government.

As Jeffrey Richelson says in *The U.S. Intelligence Community*, the exact number of those entities, the first element of our definition, is "somewhat ambiguous or misleading."[18] Thus, CIA's pie chart shows twelve in number: CIA, State, Department of Energy, Treasury, FBI, DIA, NSA, Army intelligence, Navy intelligence, Air Force intelligence, Marine Corps intelligence, and "offices [in Defense] for collection of specialized national foreign intelligence";[19] but President Reagan's executive order lists thirteen, all on the CIA list plus "other offices" for missions and responsibilities assigned the Secretary of Defense.[20] The vagueness of "offices" on both lists is disconcerting, probably intentionally so. In any case, no wonder Richelson winds up with a total of twenty-seven, including the Federal Research Division in the Library of Congress![21]

However uncertain their number, more uncertain are figures for employees and budgets. Guesses put the former well over 100,000 and the latter at $10,000,000,000. What is most important about these totals is that 80 to 85 percent of them are under the control of the Department of Defense and have been so, in one way or other, since 1947. These Defense elements, constituting an intelligence community within an intelligence community and fronted by the Secretary of Defense, do not readily lend themselves to outside direction.

Now come those committees, the least well-known element in the community. Historically, they are an immediate outgrowth of the efflorescence of intelligence activity in World War II. The blooming saw an expansion of old activities, the establishment of new intelligence units in old-line agencies, and the proliferation of committees to handle the voluminous new interagency business. The committee system, like intelligence itself, had taken

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such hold during the war that at war's end it was merely revamped to meet the needs of the Cold War leadership.

Today it is more than revamped: it is elaborate. Thus, there is an Intelligence Community Staff (ICS), popularly known as the IC Staff, under the control of the DCI. It has four staffs of its own – a secretariat, counterintelligence, planning and policy, and program and budget; eight committees – information handling, critical intelligence problems, foreign intelligence priorities, imagery, security, signals intelligence, human intelligence, foreign languages; and a legislative liaison. Then there is the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) chaired by the DCI. It has thirteen committees paralleling some of the above and also including technology transfer, economic intelligence, scientific and technical intelligence, atomic energy, and weapons and space systems. The DCI also chairs the National Intelligence Council (NIC), which has several analytical groups producing intelligence estimates, and the Intelligence Producers Council (IPC). Still other committees involve the Secretary of Defense and the DCI.

What must be said about this network of committees is that little is known about them either inside or outside the community. True, the IC Staff budget is publicly appropriated. Still, unless insiders are directly involved with any committee, they know and care less about it. Outsiders know less of these committees – of their membership, agenda, products, arguments, obstacles, defects, successes and failures. Indeed, the public generally is ignorant of them. Yet they are the mechanisms by which the DCI rationalizes the work of the baker's dozen of independent intelligence services in the community.

That brings us to the DCI, who runs these committees. He has command authority over the CIA, the ICS, and the NIC – the last two of these amounting to a few hundred people. He has no command authority over, for instance, the 80 to 85 percent of the community's personnel and resources controlled by various units of the Department of Defense. What pull he has with them rests upon presidential exhortations, which are words in the wind, and upon executive orders, which are as changeable as the executive's mind. The Church committee concluded in 1976 that the DCI "lacked real authority" to do his job.[22] In short, the DCI has much less authority to run the Intelligence Community than any other intelligence chief has to run his own agency.

A curious thing about the community is the short shrift that is given to the committees, in particular in the charts and figures of the Intelligence Community. Mention has been made of the community's three parts, but in the writer's opinion there is none that does justice to all elements thereof, least of all to the committees. Thus, the top echelon – president, NSC, etc. –

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get full treatment. The second group – PFIAB, IOB, but not the House and Senate committees – are included with the first. The third – the Intelligence Community – commonly appears as it does in CIA's pie chart: namely, the member agencies, the DCI, and the IC Staff – but not its subordinate staffs and committees. These only appear, as they do in books by Richelson, Ray S. Cline, and Scott D. Breckinridge, in isolation.[23] Never do the three parts – with or without the ICS committees – appear as a unit. Perhaps their unity is not evident!

Were people to pay more attention to these committees, which are after all the links between the DCI and the services, he or she might see the remarkable, and ironical, resemblance between today's Intelligence Community and that 1945 State plan, which was labeled a Rube Goldberg contraption.[24] That plan called for a score of committees run by an executive secretary answerable to the cabinet secretaries and their intelligence chiefs. What we have had since 1947 is a score of committees run by a DCI who had had to bargain endlessly with cabinet secretaries and their intelligence chiefs! True, the intervening years have seen some increases, as we shall see, in the DCI's power in the community, but at root the situation has not been much better than what State envisioned in 1945. The only difference is that the fellow running the committees has, since 1947, been spending most of his time on a different job: namely, running a powerful new agency!

What, then, is the Intelligence Community? Originally, the Hoover Commission in 1955 precisely, and perhaps presciently, defined it as "the machinery for accomplishing our intelligence objectives" and equated that machinery with the individual intelligence services. Since then the machinery has been supplemented by new committees, staffs, and councils. The services are, of course, those "spokes," and the committees, with the DCI, are the "central hub" of the "American wheel of intelligence" as recommended by John Gade in 1929. The whole has been another Topsy.

Topsy, however, is considerably less than an independent entity, a self-standing organization, a force to be reckoned with. On the other hand, it is considerably more than nothing; it is more than a pious hope and a polite fiction. Somewhere between nothing and something, it is a working arrangement, a *modus vivendi*, a way of doing business, which the country's intelligence services have tolerated, generally begrudgingly, sometimes agreeably, as a bureaucratic inevitability.

Still, it is not a community. Though its parts are well cemented together by the cult of secrecy shrouding intelligence, it lacks that sense of oneness, of wholeness, and togetherness that constitutes a community. If there is any sense of community in the intelligence structure, it is in the individual agency where people have their careers and place their loyalties. Were the

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so-called community to be dissolved or greatly rebuilt, no tears would be shed – except by those few who lost jobs or prestige. On the other hand, were CIA, the FBI or NSA abolished, the grief would be genuine and widespread. No, the "machinery" is not a community, not even an association, only an arrangement. Misnaming it only misleads the public and perhaps masks its basic problem – that of the DCI – to which we must now return.

WHAT TO DO WITH THE DCI?

When CIA was established in 1947, its position as the "central" agency was immediately challenged. The other departments and agencies argued that because CIA had both operating and producing functions it was a departmental agency like themselves, but because it also was the central coordinating agency it was coordinating itself as well as others and was therefore a judge in its own case. According to arguments, since the CIA was both a central and departmental agency, it was (in the language of John Gade) both hub and spoke and hence had a conflict of interest.

Of course CIA came up with a rejoinder. It was an old one, the two-hat defense. It said that the DCI wore two hats, one as head of CIA and the other as head of the Intelligence Community. That answer scored no points with the generals, admirals, and diplomats who pressed the charge. They rebutted that no matter how many hats there were there was only one head, and that was CIA's head. In contests like this there is no dearth of counterarguments; so CIA refined its two-hat theory.

The agency found help in congressional action and in the Hoover Commission report. In 1953 Congress authorized the appointment of a Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (D/DCI), and in 1954 the Clark Task Force of the commission recommended that the new D/DCI run the agency and that the DCI, then Allen Dulles, run the community. Even though it did not work out that way – Dulles, reversing the recommendation, chose to run the agency and leave the community to his deputy – CIA could defend its objectivity on the ground that two persons ran the two entities. That, however, was transparent sophistry since the deputy was merely the alter ego of his chief, and thus the two hats were still worn by the one head.

The challenge to CIA had a very important twofold effect. First, it brought to light a hitherto unappreciated distinction between the DCI and CIA. This had been inherent in the old Central Intelligence Group where the group was but borrowed people assigned to the DCI. The distinction was carried over in the 1947 act where the DCI, already in existence, was merely described as "the head" of the new CIA. However, so much emphasis was placed on the new agency – indeed, it was even given the powers formerly assigned the DCI – that the latter seemed relegated to a subordinate posi-

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tion. This subordination was now ended by the development of the two hat argument. The DCI was seen as somewhat separate, or separable, from CIA – a view that, as will be seen, will not go away.

The second effect of the challenge was to knock out CIA as the "central" agency. Whatever its name and whatever its centralized functions, CIA today is not the center of even CIA's pie chart. It is on the periphery, one of a dozen spokes. It has had to yield the center to the DCI and his community staff, which are thus the hub of the wheel.

Nevertheless, neither chart nor theory has altered reality or disposed of the argument and the continuing problem of managing the community. The CIA, however sidelined, has been the indispensable institutional base without which the DCI, as presently empowered, is impotent. Because of this relationship, with its advantages and disadvantages, the DCI, however community-oriented he might be, has had to spend the bulk of his time and energy on agency affairs, and with little power to run the community he had little incentive to do so.

No wonder, then, that the DCI has been periodically exhorted to get on with it. The Clark task force, the first to push him, recommended the establishment of a chief of staff to run the agency. Then in 1956 and 1958 the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities (now PFIAB) echoed the recommendation, and in 1960 it raised for the first time the possibility of separating the DCI and the CIA. Then in 1962 a president got into the act. John F. Kennedy sent the new director, Dulles's successor John A. McCone, a letter exhorting him to run the community and let his deputy take care of the agency. A similar presidential exhortation was sent in 1965 by President Lyndon B. Johnson to McCone's successor, Vice Adm. William F. Raborn, Jr. Then in 1971 President Richard M. Nixon made an abortive effort to supplement the now familiar exhortation to the DCI with some presidential authority over the intelligence community's budget, but that would not come until 1976.

Meanwhile, the community continued to be neglected. No one ran it from 1947 to 1955. Under Dulles the relationship between agency and community was that of liaison, and that pattern persisted in the McCone and Helms years. There were stirrings in the early seventies, in the directorships of James R. Schlesinger and William E. Colby, when the Nixon directive was producing changes in the Intelligence Community Staff and the production of finished intelligence, and when considerably more time and effort were being devoted to the IC problem. Nevertheless, from 1947 to 1976 the DCI had no more real authority to manage the community than he did in 1947.

The later seventies were something else. In December 1974, a sensational article in *The New York Times* on alleged CIA misdeeds subjected the agency to an unprecedented period of public investigation, abuse, and

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reform. One result – an effort to defend, regulate, and improve the agency – was a 1976 executive order in which President Ford made the DCI chairman of a three-man committee charged with the preparation of the administration's intelligence community budget. While still not statutory authority, it was a significant presidential codification of recent budgetary developments. The money power proved to be an opening to such other community areas as collection and analysis.

Nevertheless, another result of the public scrutiny was a re-examination of the DCI's job. Thus, later in 1976 the Church committee, which said the DCI "lacked real authority" to do his job, further observed that the job was "burdensome in the extreme," that his two roles were "competing, not complementary roles," and that they "differ considerably." It concluded that a separation of them "may prove a plausible alternative."[25]

Still later that year, a former top CIA official came forward with a specific plan for reorganizing both CIA and the community. In his book *Secrets Spies and Scholars: Blueprint of the Essential CIA*, and despite its reference to CIA in its subtitle, Ray Cline proposed among other ideas abolishing the agency and replacing it at its Langley headquarters by a new central analytical center. He further proposed that the DCI be elevated by legislation to cabinet status and be given "broad supervisory control over all intelligence activities." His proposals, repeated in his 1981 edition, would leave a small, diffused clandestine service reporting to a White House staff under the DCI.[26]

If President Ford's executive order was a significant boost to the DCI's community role, it paled in comparison with what was tried by Admiral Stansfield Turner when he succeeded George Bush as DCI in 1977. From the outset, Turner, who had his mandate from Carter and Vice President Walter Mondale, sought to discipline the agency as well as enhance the community. The latter objective was demonstrated on his first day in office when his installation was made not an agency but a community affair. As community representatives gathered in CIA's auditorium, it looked to agency personnel like occupied territory. Almost the next day Turner initiated and publicized his regular hurrying from his Langley office to his community office in downtown Washington.

As quickly, he began his reorganization of CIA and the community. He renamed the old ICS the Budget and Evaluation Staff. Under Helms, this had been staffed entirely by CIA people, but Schlesinger made it a genuine interagency group. This provided the DCI with a community perspective. It gave him community data and points of view – community thoughts. In a sense it gave him a new head; the two-hatted DCI had become two-headed. Turner now added two more heads; one in charge of a new National Intelligence Tasking Center and the other in charge of the new National Foreign Assess-

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ment Center. As DCI he thus had these three community organizations and CIA reporting to him. A later wiring diagram, showing slight changes, showed Turner commanding three teams – one "pink," one "blue," and one mixed. The first was his community team, the second his agency team, and the third a mixed agency-community team to which CIA ostensibly lost partial control of two of its four directorates. Never in the history of the agency had it been so denigrated and the community so exalted.

Even so, the community and the DCI's role therein were not substantially or permanently affected by Turner's largely cosmetic changes. In his *Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition*, written after he was replaced in 1981 by William J. Casey, Turner not only recounted his successes and failures but also prescribed some changes. Echoing the Church committee, he said the DCI's two roles "conflict" and should be separated. There should be, he wrote, a new Director of National Intelligence to whom the CIA director would report.[27]

Turner's successor, representing a new Republican president, was something else. Casey was an OSS veteran with respect and affection for the CIA. He sought to restore agency morale, had no use for Turner's teams, simplified his own chain of command without relinquishing his control of the community budget, and won community-wide respect. So far, Casey's successor, William H. Webster, the former FBI director, has undertaken no new community management initiatives.

Meanwhile, the last word publicly spoken on the question of what to do with the DCI shows that the question will not go away. It came last 27 October when Sen. Arlen Specter (R., Penn.) said on the Senate floor that the job facing the intelligence agencies was so "demanding, complex and interdependent that their management and leadership can no longer be accomplished by a Director of Central Intelligence who also must manage a large agency such as the CIA." Hence he was introducing legislation calling for the separation of the DCI's agency and community jobs.[28] His action shows we are back in 1954 when the Clark task force first addressed the problem. Will the jobs be split apart?

THE FUTURE

First, let us briefly balance the books on the community. When President Reagan last June observed "National Intelligence Community Week," he saluted both the men and women "serving with our intelligence services" and everyone involved "in paying tribute to the intelligence community." The Senate resolution, also recognizing "the selfless dedication of our Nation's intelligence personnel," emphasized the importance of intelligence as the country's "first line of defense." The House, for the second year in a row, refused to act on the resolution.[29]

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/04/19 : CIA-RDP03B00637R000300350002-0

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/04/19 : CIA-RDP03B00637R000300350002-0

More substantial, but less public, words of praise for the community are heard from speakers addressing, for instance, meetings of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO), a strong pro-intelligence organization. Thus, in 1985 a former CIA official now with Hughes Aircraft and a member of PFIAB, Dr. Albert D. Wheelon, spoke of the "enormous progress" made in the community since he left it in 1966. The former deputy director for science and technology credited the community with "a stability and a collaboration unknown in his time."[30]

Another speaker, the director of NSA, Lt. Gen. William E. Odom, assured an AFIO audience in 1987 that the "community is healthy,... is healthy and robust." But he had to admit that "serious problems do exist." Mentioning one, he declared that

> The intelligence community is institutionally fragmented. It is spread out through several executive departments. Its biggest customer is the military. For that reason, it is intertwined with the military services. Getting this fragmented community to operate effectively with the military is not easy.

Elaborating on the need for cooperation, he concluded that "The trend in this regard is good, but there is a long way to go."[31]

Other recent criticism of the community has come from the House intelligence committee, which did a study of counterintelligence and security as a result of the espionage explosion of 1985. Last year it criticized the community for being insensitive to "the importance of counterintelligence concerns, an attitude often reflected in internal agency budgetary and policy prioritizations." It too focused on fragmentation:

> Moreover, despite some recent improvement, the fragmented components of the counterintelligence community remain uncoordinated, divided and turf-conscious in virtually every substantive area, ranging from simple information-sharing...to policy formulation and counterintelligence operations.

With no reference to FDR's 1938 coordination of these same fragmented services, the committee urged the DCI and others "to undertake all possible measures" to protect the country against espionage.[32]

Also, there are many complaints and recommended changes, some stemming from last year's Iran-Contra hearings and some of older pedigree. Thus, in addition to Senator Specter's proposal there has been new or renewed talk about establishing a joint congressional intelligence committee, having CIA's inspector general and general counsel confirmed by the Senate, and giving the General Accounting Office authority to audit the agency's spending — something it gave up decades ago!

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Pluses and minuses exist. On the one hand, there is no doubt – thanks to the passage of time, the change of people, the sharing of common experiences, successes and failures, and the consequent development of new attitudes, as well as to the basic good sense and patriotism of personnel – that the community is a more fraternal organization than ever before. On the other hand, the fact that an NSA director and the House committee can both deplore the persisting fragmentation of the community, the result of the inherent dominance of centrifugal forces in the community, surely points to a fundamental structural weakness that spawns vulnerabilities, lessens community effectiveness and invites enemy exploitation. That situation may well invite another Pearl Harbor.

Will a separation of the DCI's two roles remedy the situation? That is quite arguable, but it is not an argument that can be settled here. There is a more immediate question: Will anything be done to make our Topsy worthy of its "quaint" name? The answer here is a "probably not." The record of the thoughtless emergence and inadequate strengthening of the community – four decades of inadequate management by an overburdened and weak director – suggests that only a grossly shocking event or a national emergency, rather than rational deliberation, will produce significant structural changes.

Pessimistic as that forecast may be, it rests also upon a truth expressed by some forgotten nineteenth century Frenchman that the rate of moral progress in the world is an abuse of the patience of God.

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Kenneth Strong's assertion in his *Men of Intelligence* (p. 46) that pre-World War London had no "central independent Intelligence organization" for producing broadly-based estimates. See also Christopher Andrew, n. 18, *infra*.

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