

REAGAN, Ronald W. FOREIGN POLICY  
COUNCIL. INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE  
(1980 Campaign)

Drafts and Papers

INTELLIGENCE RESTRUCTURING SUGGESTIONS

by

Ray S. Cline

Executive Director of World Power Studies  
The Center for Strategic and International Studies  
Georgetown University

Former Deputy Director for Intelligence, CIA  
Former Director of Intelligence and Research,  
Department of State

The United States must rebuild its intelligence system, damaged in recent years by excessive criticism and official restraints, so as to provide national policymakers with sufficient advance information to protect our national security, promote our international interests, and develop foreign policies supportive of our friends and allies abroad. We must have early warning of political or military shifts in the world balance of power that might be adverse to the United States and its international alliance system. For these purposes prompt steps should be taken to improve U.S. intelligence:

- 1) Reorganize the U.S. intelligence community, stressing a tripartite structure of equally strong military, foreign policy, and national (strategic) intelligence components.
- 2) In the reorganization eliminate the acronym "CIA" which hostile propaganda has made a liability abroad.
- 3) Enlarge and strengthen the clandestine agent collection component of the intelligence system so as to establish

a world-wide network of human sources reporting on politics, economics, and strategic intentions as well as military strengths.

4) Make the senior U.S. intelligence officer, now called the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), a Cabinet level advisor to the President and an ex officio member of the National Security Council; he should be responsible for supervising and coordinating the budgets, the professional management, and the operational programs of the intelligence community's several component agencies. These agencies would report to the President only through the DCI; he should not be in day-to-day administrative command of any one component; he should have authority to appoint and replace the directors of the component intelligence agencies, and he should be held responsible by the President and the Congress for the overall effectiveness and the total objectivity of all intelligence.

5) Establish under the DCI one overall national director of research, analysis, and estimates, supervising independent competing but coordinated centers of military, foreign policy, and other national (strategic) research. This whole confederal research organization should be separated administratively from clandestine (illegal) operations. The substantive findings of the research and analysis centers should be made available to the entire Congress and the public, subject to concurrence of the DCI, by the overall

director of research, analysis, and estimates insofar as the absolute requirement of protection of intelligence sources and methods permits. Directors of the specialized competing centers should have the right to forward to the President, the National Security Council, and the Intelligence Oversight Committees of the Congress independent or dissenting conclusions but could not release their findings to the entire Congress or to the public except with the consent of the overall director of research, analysis, and estimates and the concurrence of the DCI.

6) Set up separate technical and human-source intelligence collection agencies as independent commands in various government departments as most appropriate, each having a director responsible for their operations. The directors should report to the DCI, who should supervise and coordinate their programs, budgets, and operational effectiveness. When intelligence officers operate abroad, especially when they are engaged in setting up human-source intelligence networks, they should be provided the best official or unofficial cover that can be devised by the DCI and negotiated with cover organizations and institutions.

7) The DCI should maintain a small psychological strategy and covert action staff under the National Security Council. The chief of this staff should be responsible for recommending to the President through the DCI, and with the concurrence of the director of the central human-

source intelligence collection agency, feasible covert programs abroad when these are in the U.S. national interest; the chief of the psychological strategy and covert action staff would be responsible directly to the DCI for providing strategic guidance and monitoring the planning and carrying out of covert actions when approved by the President; he should not, however, be in the line of command between the DCI and the chief of the human-source intelligence agency, which should be tasked explicitly to carry out covert action programs abroad under strategic guidance approved by the DCI and the President.

8) Drop the elaborate charter developed by the Senate Intelligence Committee, make some modest definitional and functional changes in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, to allow for the restructuring here suggested, and modify Executive Order 12036 accordingly.

9) Repeal the Hughes-Ryan amendment requiring multiple reporting to Congressional committees on covert action programs, leaving only the Senate and House Intelligence Oversight Committees responsible for monitoring covert action as well as other types of intelligence programs.

10) Pass legislation making it a crime to reveal the identity of clandestine intelligence officers assigned abroad under cover or knowingly to reveal secret intelligence sources or secret intelligence methods.

These ten suggestions for restructuring the intelligence community will improve analytical and operational intelligence capabilities if the President, the members of the National Security Council, and the Congress support the importance of the tasks outlined above and provide the necessary funds for the highest quality of professional personnel and technical equipment.