

NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD

RM-79-1335

9 May 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy to the DCI for Resource Management

FROM : Walter Elder
Secretary

SUBJECT : Status of NSCID's

The attached analysis of NSCID's completes the memorandum, "Status of DCID's," dated 4 May 1979.

[Redacted Signature Box]

WALTER ELDER

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Attachment:
As Stated

NSCID 1 Basic Duties and Responsibilities

Synopsis: This directive, effective February 1972, describes the intelligence effort of the United States as a national responsibility which must be organized and managed to exploit to the maximum the resources of the government and to satisfy the intelligence requirements of the NSC and the departments and agencies.

The DCI is authorized and directed to coordinate the foreign intelligence activities of the US.

A National Security Council Intelligence Committee (NSCIC) is established: to give direction and guidance on substantive national intelligence needs; to provide a continuing evaluation of intelligence products from the consumers' viewpoint. The NSCIC members are: SAP/NSA (Chairman), AG, DCI, UnderSecState, DepSecDef, and Chairman, JCS.

The DCI will discharge four major responsibilities:

- planning, reviewing, and evaluating all intelligence activities and the allocation of all intelligence resources,
- producing national intelligence required by the President and other national consumers,
- chairing and staffing all intelligence community advisory boards and committees, and
- establishing and reconciling intelligence requirements and priorities within budgetary constraints.

To carry out these responsibilities, the DCI is authorized and directed to do a number of specific things. These include:

- preparation of a consolidated program/budget,
- issue DCID's as detailed implementations of the NSCID's.

NSCID 1 Contd.

- formulate policies on arrangements with foreign governments, and
- develop and review security standards and practices as they relate to the protection of sources and methods.

An Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee (IRAC) is established. It consists of the DCI (Chairman), senior representatives of State, Defense, CIA and OMB.

The United States Intelligence Board (USIB) is established to advise and assist the DCI on the following:

- establishment of appropriate intelligence objectives, requirements and priorities;
- production of national intelligence,
- supervision of dissemination and security of intelligence material,
- protection of intelligence sources and methods, and
- policies on arrangements with foreign governments.

The USIB membership is: DCI (Chairman), DDCI (Vice Chairman), Director INR/State, Director, DIA, Director, NSA, representatives of Treasury, AEC, and the FBI. The DCI may invite others to sit with USIB as appropriate.

There is a section entitled "National Intelligence" which defines national, departmental, and interdepartmental intelligence. Procedures are set forth governing the dissemination of national intelligence to the President, the NSC, other elements of the government, foreign governments, and international organizations. The directive prescribes that a national intelligence estimate shall be prepared when an impending crisis situation may call for immediate action by the President or the NSC.

NSCID 1 Contd.

The DCI shall ensure the development of policies and procedures for the protection of intelligence sources and methods. Each department and agency shall remain responsible for protection within its own organization. They will investigate their own unauthorized disclosures. The DCI is directed to establish a review procedure for all classified intelligence information proposed for release.

Finally, there is a section entitled Community Responsibilities which sets objectives for the DCI to attain as essential to the efficient and effective functioning of the Intelligence Community. It calls for responsiveness to requirements, authoritative and responsible leadership, a more efficient use of resources, elimination of inefficient, unnecessary or outmoded activities, and improvement of the quality, scope, and timeliness of the Community product. The DCI shall call on departments and agencies to ensure that the Intelligence Community is supported by the full knowledge and technical talent available in or to the government. He shall have intelligence continually reviewed as a basis for improving its quality. He shall take measures to facilitate the development of compatible referencing systems. The CIA and other elements will provide central reference facilities as a service of common concern.

There is a section covering the assignment of personnel to CIA. Community elements will provide each other with mutual assistance. Agencies will not duplicate each others' activities.

The DCI will be provided with all necessary information from within the Executive Branch.

Departments and agencies will take steps to control and limit undesirable publicity about intelligence activities.

Comment: Not only has time passed (taking the NSCID and IRAC into oblivion), but also EO 12036 has superseded and surpassed this NSC directive.

There is an adequate specification of the DCI's duties and responsibilities in the Executive Order. There is a hortatory tone about NSCID 1 which can only benefit from rescinding the directive.

NSCID 2 Coordination of Overt Collection Activities

Synopsis: This directive, effective February 1972, establishes overall policies and objectives for the interdepartmental coordination of overt intelligence collection activities not covered by NSCID's 4, 5, and 6.

The DCI shall ensure that collection and reporting activities avoid undesirable duplication and provide adequate coverage.

State will collect political, sociological, economic, scientific and technical information. DOD will collect military intelligence, including related scientific, technical, and economic intelligence. The CIA may collect intelligence overtly as a by-product of its assigned missions and functions provided that it does not duplicate other assignments and is coordinated with State.

The senior US representative abroad shall coordinate collection activities not covered by other NSCID's.

Information collected abroad will be given to the responsible field representatives abroad for onward transmission. The original collector may send the information to his own headquarters.

The CIA will be responsible for exploitation within the US of non-governmental individuals and organizations; for monitoring of foreign radio and television propaganda and press broadcasts; and the exploitation of foreign language publications.

Comment: These are all services of common concern which, under EO 12036, may be assigned by the DCI to various components of the Intelligence Community.

DCID's (or a single one) would seem adequate unless there is a jurisdictional quarrel which requires NSC intervention to settle.

NSCID 3 Coordination of Intelligence Production

Synopsis: This directive, effective February 1972, establishes overall policies, objectives, categories of intelligence, and allocations of responsibility for the coordination of intelligence production activities.

Basic intelligence is defined, and the CIA is assigned responsibility for maintaining an outline of the government's needs in this area. Production and maintenance responsibilities will be allocated among CIA and other Community components according to their qualifications. Basic intelligence will be compiled and maintained in National Intelligence Surveys (NIS) to cover foreign countries, areas, or broad general subjects in accordance with NSC-approved instructions.

The DCI will be responsible for coordinating production, maintenance, review, publication, and dissemination of the NIS's. Government departments and agencies will be called on to contribute as required.

Current intelligence is defined, and the CIA and other Community components are authorized to produce and disseminate such intelligence to meet their own needs. CIA-produced current intelligence is intended primarily to meet the needs of the President, the NSC, and other high-level consumers.

The directive reiterates the definitions of departmental, interdepartmental, and national intelligence (taking these definitions from NSCID 1).

To ensure the effective use of capabilities in producing intelligence of common concern, the following primary production responsibilities are delineated:

- State shall produce political and sociological intelligence on all countries and economic intelligence on Free World countries,

- DOD shall produce military intelligence, including scientific, technical, and economic intelligence pertinent to DOD missions,

NSCID 3 Contd.

- CIA shall produce economic, scientific, and technical intelligence and other such intelligence as required to discharge the DCI's statutory responsibilities, and

- Production of intelligence on atomic energy is a responsibility of all USIB representatives and is to be coordinated through the JAEIC structure.

Should there be an intelligence requirement established for which there is no existing production capability, the DCI with the advice of USIB shall decide which agency will take it on as a service of common concern.

Comment: This NSCID, which does not accurately reflect the real state of intelligence production as it existed prior to, during, or since 1972, has been superseded by EO 12036.

There is a requirement for a general DCID on production since DCID 1/1 has been rescinded. The new DCID would provide the basic charter for production. The DCI's authority is adequately set forth in EO 12036.

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NSCID 5 US Espionage and Counterintelligence Activities Abroad

Synopsis: This directive, effective February 1972, defines espionage and counterintelligence, and makes the DCI responsible for the following:

- ensuring centralized direction through prior, comprehensive, and continuing coordination of authorized clandestine activities.

The DCI shall, after appropriate consultation:

- establish the procedures necessary to achieve such direction and coordination,
- coordinate all authorized clandestine activities,
- make arrangements, by mutual agreement, for cover support, and
- resolve disputes arising in the coordination of clandestine activities abroad.

The CIA has primary responsibility for clandestine activities abroad and will provide the following services of common concern:

- conduct of espionage to meet national needs,
- conduct of clandestine counterintelligence,
- liaison with foreign intelligence services, and
- maintain a central index of counterintelligence information.

Other departments and agencies may conduct supplementary espionage and counterintelligence activities.

The DCI, after consultation with the Secretary of State, will ensure that the senior US representative overseas is appropriately advised on clandestine activities affecting his area. Senior military commanders will be kept advised on a comparable basis.

NSCID 5 Contd.

In active theaters of war where US forces are engaged or when the President so directs, the entire CIA espionage and counterintelligence organization conducting espionage operations in or from a theater shall be under the direct command of the US Theater Commander in accordance with agreements separately reached between the DCI and the Secretary of Defense. If there are exceptional political, diplomatic, or other implications, the CIA may conduct independent operations which shall be coordinated by the DCI with the Secretaries of Defense and State.

The DCI and the Secretary of Defense shall establish general procedures for coordinating liaison on clandestine activities between US military commanders and foreign services.

The DCI shall make appropriate policy recommendations for NSC consideration on the overall US counterintelligence effort overseas. He shall also provide for coordination of counterintelligence activities abroad with those conducted by departments and agencies with domestic counterintelligence responsibilities.

Comment: Once the charter for espionage was worked out, the primacy of the DCI and CIA in espionage has been maintained. It has been subjected to severe tests over the years. There is a basic dichotomy underlying this and other intelligence directives which stems from the view, on the one hand, that peacetime intelligence operations are intended to preclude war. On the other hand, there is the view that peace is but a preparation for war and that intelligence assets should be honed towards that end.

A major difference today is the separation of counterintelligence as a distinct discipline under the aegis of the SCC(CI).

EO 12036 states that CIA will conduct espionage under the direction of the NSC. This is a service of common concern, according to NSCID 5. EO 12036 charges the DCI with promoting services of common concern by designated organizations. If "direction by the NSC" boils down to direction by the PRC(I), then it can be argued that the DCI has adequate authority to control espionage operations by his own directive series. It is possible to argue this issue in favor of NSC control through an NSCID, and such a proposition is more than likely. It's one of those touchy ambiguities which, in any event, should not be allowed to interfere with what has been an effective working arrangement for more than 30 years.

NSCID 6 Signals Intelligence

Synopsis: This directive, effective February 1972, is the basic charter for the National Security Agency and will remain so if charter legislation is not forthcoming. The essential points are also included in EO 12036.

SIGINT, COMINT, and ELINT are defined.

Consistent with his responsibilities as set forth in NSCID's 1, 2, 3, the DCI shall:

- establish appropriate objectives, requirements, and priorities to guide all US SIGINT activities,
- review the needs and performance of SIGINT activities in preparing a consolidated program budget,
- establish policies and procedures for the conduct of SIGINT relations with foreign governments, and
- establish policies and procedures for the protection of SIGINT.

The Secretary of Defense is designated the Executive Agency of the Government for the conduct of SIGINT activities and for direction, supervision, funding, maintenance, and operations of the National Security Agency. The Director, NSA, shall report to the Secretary of Defense and shall be the principal SIGINT adviser to the SecDef, the DCI, and the JCS.

The NSA is established under the Secretary of Defense with a commissioned officer as director and a civilian deputy. The Director, NSA, shall produce SIGINT in accordance with objectives, requirements, and priorities established by the DCI. No other organizations shall engage in SIGINT activities except as provided for in this NSCID.

To centralize and consolidate the performance of SIGINT functions, there is established a Central Security Service under the Director, NSA, to perform SIGINT functions previously performed by various Military Departments and other US government elements.

NSCID 6 Contd.

The NSA shall not engage in the production of finished intelligence.

Nothing in this directive shall interfere with the unique requirements for clandestine operations covered by NSCID 5. Those SIGINT activities which are specifically designated by the DCI to be integral to clandestine operations shall be conducted under the provisions of NSCID 5.

The Director, NSA, shall conduct SIGINT activities as required to support electronic warfare activities.

Nothing in this directive shall interfere with the unique responsibilities of the FBI in the field of internal security, including intercept and processing activities.

Comment: NSA is cited in EO 12036 and its responsibilities are set forth in adequate detail.

There have been major changes in the way requirements are established and the Collection Tasking Staff will probably have a primary interest in updating the directives structure.

NSCID 7 Critical Intelligence Communications

Synopsis: This directive, effective February 1972, establishes communications for the transmission of critical intelligence as defined by the DCI.

The Secretary of Defense shall be the Executive Agent.

Comment: Under DCID 7/1, effective May 1976, Executive Agent responsibility for the CRITIC program is delegated by the Secretary of Defense to the National Security Agency.

EO 12036 directs the DCI to establish uniform criteria for the determination of relative priorities for the transmission of critical national foreign intelligence and to advise the Secretary of Defense concerning the communications requirements of the Intelligence Community for the transmission of such intelligence.

An NSCID does not seem to be needed.

NSCID 8 Photographic Interpretation

Synopsis: This NSCID, effective February 1972, confirms the establishment (in January 1961) of the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) as a service of common concern provided by the DCI.

The Director, NPIC, shall be designated by the DCI with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense. Community departments and agencies shall jointly provide appropriate personnel and other support for NPIC.

The NPIC shall not engage in the production or dissemination of finished intelligence.

Community components shall continue to be individually responsible for their own interpretation and production needs.

Comment: This NSCID was evolved in the light of experience with U-2 and early satellite photography and was intended to prevent the proliferation of interpretation facilities.

Photographic interpretation is not mentioned in EO 12036, but it is clearly understood as a service of common concern which may be reconfirmed in a DCID rather than an NSCID.

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