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4 June 1982

MEMORANDUM

West Berlin: Linchpin of the Alliance

The nature of the Berlin problem has not changed in the past decade. Berlin was initially -- and remains potentially -- the most important point of East-West confrontation. Miniconfrontations still occur in the city, although they rarely attract public notice, and the United States is still the only Western power that can cope effectively with Soviet political threats. [Redacted]

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-- The Quadripartite Agreement (QA) in force for a decade, has resulted in a lower level of confrontation over Berlin. Accomplishments resting on the QA are welcomed by the Berliners, who remain skeptical about Soviet and East German motives. [Redacted]

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-- The Soviet challenge to the Berlin order has focused mainly on West Berlin's links to West Germany. The city's ties to the West were expanded despite strong Soviet representation after 1971, but Bonn, reacting to the Soviet complaints, backed away from further challenges to the Soviets after 1978. East-West relations in Berlin have been relatively calm in recent years. [Redacted]

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- [redacted] 25X1
- The Soviets are reluctant to alter their current policy of avoiding frictions with the West in Berlin. Growing political instability in Eastern Europe, however, could cause Moscow to revert to a militant, anti-Western policy that would include pressures on West Berlin. Even so, the Soviets would still probably refrain from challenging the US presence in Berlin directly. [redacted] 25X1
- By defending German national interests in Berlin, the Western Allies continue to demonstrate to Bonn and the German public the merit of the alliance. This preserves the community of interest which underlies West Germany's participation in the defense of Western Europe. West Berlin thus is a linchpin of the alliance. [redacted] 25X1
- The other powers engaged in Berlin have not significantly altered their approach to the problem during the first decade of the QA. The United Kingdom and France remain satisfied to be involved with the superpowers on equal terms and appreciate the influence their Berlin roles give them in Bonn. East Germany is the state least sympathetic to the era of lessened confrontation. [redacted] 25X1
- High-level US visits to West Berlin highlight our essential contribution to protection of the city and show that the United States has not forgotten its responsibility for Germany as a whole. Because the Soviets understand this, they cooperate officially with such public events so not to dramatize the need for US protection. [redacted] 25X1
- The Social Democrats, who had long dominated West Berlin politics, were ousted last year by the Christian Democrats under Richard von Weizsaecker. His Christian Democrats' government has performed effectively. It promises to revitalize the city and make an SPD return to power difficult. Von Weizsaecker will be able to cooperate easily with the United States and with the Ostpolitik of the Schmidt government. [redacted] 25X1
- Social problems have replaced East-West confrontations as the main challenge facing West Berliners. West Berlin seems to be accommodating the counterculture of its many young radicals, but is only beginning to grope with the problem of a large and growing foreign population at a time when the native population is aging and diminishing. [redacted] 25X1
- Negative economic trends, especially loss of population and industrial jobs, continue to plague West Berlin. Although federal subsidies enabled the city in recent years practically to match West Germany in economic growth, the outlook for 1982 is poor. [redacted] 25X1

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INTERNATIONAL

Origins of US Role Confrontation between the United States and the USSR after World War II soon focused on Berlin. Disputes among the victor powers over policy toward defeated Germany led in 1948 to a Soviet attempt to blockade the city, which was countered by the US-led airlift to Berlin. Of the Western nations engaged there, only the United States had the power to offset and thus to resist effectively Soviet pressures on the city; this is still the case. [REDACTED]

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Despite differences among the Western Allies and fears in Western Europe that the United States might refuse involvement in the European power game, Soviet pressure and US initiatives in the early postwar years gradually led the Western powers to close ranks behind US leadership in defense of what developed into the Western -- including German -- position in Berlin. This coalescence gave an important impulse to the formation in 1949 of the NATO alliance. [REDACTED]

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The US commitment to defend Berlin shared by France and the United Kingdom, and an emerging unity of purpose in the early 1950s between the infant West German state and NATO contributed significantly to Bonn's decision in 1955 to accept a military role in the defense of western Europe. NATO in return associated itself with the Three Power determination to maintain the security and welfare of Berlin. [REDACTED]

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The power balance around Berlin was again tested during the Soviet challenge of 1958 that led to the Berlin Wall (1961) and ended, in effect, with the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.<sup>1</sup> Once more Berlin was the focal point of world interest and the essential role of the United States as protector and alliance leader was spotlighted. [REDACTED]

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After the Cuban crisis came a period of rapprochement between the United States and the Soviet Union. While the focus of US interest shifted to Southeast Asia, Soviet policy continued to seek full separation of West Berlin from West Germany. This caused recurring tensions in Berlin until March 1969, when the East Germans strongly urged Moscow to prevent a meeting in West Berlin of an assembly to elect Bonn's federal president. The Soviets resisted this pressure, and the crisis was defused when

<sup>1</sup> The "Khrushchev ultimatum" of November 1958 informed the Western Allies that the USSR intended to transfer all its functions and responsibilities connected with Berlin to the government of East Germany. This set off years of military bluff and political struggle over Berlin. While the West concentrated on protecting its position, the East Germans with Soviet backing built the Berlin Wall and thus staunched the flow of refugees to the West that had threatened the viability of the East German state.

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Moscow, on the day before the presidential vote, announced that bloody encounters with Chinese troops had occurred along the Ussuri River. Former Chinese Vice-Premier Chou En Lai later asserted that Moscow had provoked the Ussuri clashes in order to cover its backdown in Berlin. [redacted]

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Berlin and Ostpolitik. In October 1969, the newly installed Bonn government of former Governing Mayor of Berlin Willy Brandt declared its readiness to recognize East Germany as a separate state, thus initiating the accelerated Ostpolitik so widely identified with detente. By recognizing East Germany and guaranteeing not to contest its eastern border (the Oder-Neisse line) in an eventual German peace settlement, West Germany accepted the Soviet position on the boundaries of postwar Europe. In return, Moscow arranged for East Germany to relax some of the travel and communication restrictions that it had imposed during 20 years of struggle to stabilize the East German state. Without this improved access to their fellow Germans, the West German electorate would not have accepted the Brandt Ostpolitik.

The West Berliners, who had been exposed more frequently to East German harassment because they are the main users of the transit lines to West Germany and who had been excluded from East Berlin and East Germany after the Wall was built in 1961, became main beneficiaries of the relaxation of restrictions on travel and communications. The East German government again admitted West Berliners to its territory and contracted to facilitate the transit traffic between West Berlin and West Germany. The contracts struck were German, but they were concluded under the aegis of the Quadripartite Agreement (QA) in which the victor powers (France, the United Kingdom, the USSR, and the United States) reaffirmed their positions on Four-Power control of Berlin. The QA took effect in 1972. [redacted]

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Impact of the QA. The QA did not dispel the threat to West Berlin. It did perform the feat of combining the conflicting views of East and West in a document acceptable to both. As a result, clashes over uncodified issues became a contest of QA interpretations, and this has helped to reduce disputes to a lower level of confrontation. The media lost interest in Berlin as confrontations between tanks were replaced by tedious arguments among lawyers. [redacted]

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Although West Berliners welcomed the increased opportunity to visit and telephone relatives and friends in East Germany as well as the improvements in transit traffic to and from West Berlin, on the whole Berlin opinion -- as revealed in polls and editorial comments -- remains skeptical about the ultimate achievements of the Ostpolitik. The still aggressive and insecure character of the East German regime is a more immediate problem when viewed from West Berlin rather than from further away. Revocations by that regime of the "humanitarian alleviations" -- for example, East Berlin's imposition in 1980 of

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a steeply increased currency exchange requirement for visitors -- are a much greater burden and the Eastern disposition to contest West Berlin's ties to West Germany are a continuing threat. [redacted]

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Continuing Soviet Pressures. Soviet defense of East German actions against Allied military patrols since the QA have made clear that Moscow still rejects the Western Allied claim, as occupiers of Berlin, to unimpeded access to East Berlin. Serious harassment of US, UK and French patrols in the eastern part of the city occurred in 1977. A firm and unified Western response moved the Soviets to abandon this pressure and, instead, to increase the frequency of their military patrols in West Berlin. With Soviet approval, acknowledged to US officials, East Germany controllers at Checkpoint Charlie are currently harassing selected US diplomatic passport holders -- delaying their passage sometimes for more than an hour -- when they seek to cross into West Berlin at the international crossing point. [redacted]

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In September 1981, the Soviets attempted to use helicopters to block the landing paths to airports in West Berlin for a hijacked Polish airliner. This unprecedented breach of Berlin flight rules brought strong Western Allied protests. Although the Soviets still insist that such landings, if not opposed, encourage international terrorism, they did not repeat the blocking operation when other Polish aircraft were diverted to West Berlin last February and April. [redacted]

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Pressures have been exerted also on the access routes to West Berlin. The Soviets at times allowed the East Germans to tighten transit procedures on grounds that West Germans were misusing the transit routes for political purposes -- for example, by sending busloads of youths to West Berlin to join demonstrations against the Wall. In such incidents, each side alleged the other had violated the transit agreement concluded under the QA. [redacted]

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The main focus of Soviet pressure, however, has been West Berlin's ties to West Germany which, according to the QA passage favored by the West, are to be "maintained and developed." Bonn initially set out to develop those ties, misjudging the depth of Moscow's objection to any expansion of the official West German presence in West Berlin or to any new European Community links with the city. Citing their version of another QA clause -- that West Berlin is not a part of West Germany and is not governed by it -- the Soviets used threats, protests and propaganda to resist West German efforts to enhance ties to West Berlin.\* The

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\*In their protests, the Soviets distort QA meaning on Bonn-West Berlin ties, interpreting what the Western Allies regard as a statement of continuing exclusion from full integration with the West German government to a prohibition of any ties whatsoever.

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sojourns in West Berlin of political representatives from Bonn and of foreign leaders on official visits to West Germany continue to draw Soviet protests. [redacted] 25X1

Despite Soviet objections, some new links between West Berlin and the West have been established. West Berlin's inclusion in the first elected European Parliament drew the loudest Soviet protests and threats, but Western Allied backing for this action was firm and the Soviets quieted down after the election. A branch of the EC patent office was opened in West Berlin and a new office of the West German Interior Ministry the Environmental Protection Office (EPO), was established there in the mid-1970s, but only after serious international friction. [redacted] 25X1

The dispute over the EPO arose because Bonn, perhaps testing (we speculate) the extent to which the QA authorized expansion of its links to West Berlin, announced -- without coordinating with the Western Allies or previously informing the Soviets -- that the office would be located there. The Soviets bitterly resisted, but the EPO was nevertheless opened when the Western Allies, after settling their quarrel with Bonn over failure to consult, affirmed that their interpretation of the QA supported the West German action. Moscow has continued to object whenever an environmentalist from the West Berlin office shows up at an international conference. [redacted] 25X1

The struggle over the EPO influenced modifications in policy toward Berlin that became apparent during the late 1970s. The Bonn government, once it became aware of Soviet determination to contest its links with West Berlin and thus of its need for Western Allied support, expanded its consultation with the Allies on Berlin and all-German matters. Bonn backed away gradually from marked increases in its official presence in West Berlin and, except for the unavoidable dispute over West Berlin's role in the European Parliament, there have been no serious confrontations of this type since the Brezhnev visit to Bonn in 1978. [redacted] 25X1

#### How Other Engaged Powers See Berlin

Aside from the US, there are five powers engaged in the Berlin problem: the USSR, the United Kingdom, France, and West and East Germany. The record of their actions, private consultations and public statements since the QA went into force has made clear that their attitudes on Berlin have not changed significantly during this period.

West Germany - Bonn recognizes that the QA has not resolved basic political differences, but it emphasizes the practical improvements the QA has permitted, including expansion of West Berlin's ties to West Germany. [redacted] 25X1

Chancellor Schmidt's inner-German experts still assume the Soviets and East Germans want to sever West Berlin's ties to the West and make the city dependent on the East. To minimize

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pressure, the Bonn government now avoids expansion of its offices in West Berlin because such expansion was the focus of the most determined Soviet protests. In order to contend more effectively with Soviet pressures, West Germany has since the EPO dispute expanded its cooperation with the Western Allies on Berlin policy. [redacted]

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United Kingdom - Berlin continues to offer the United Kingdom a "place at the high table" of world affairs and a lever to influence Bonn's policy in all areas. British governments have long displayed anxiety, however, over the risks of the power confrontation in Berlin; London thus speaks warmly of the QA's accomplishments. Quick to suspect Bonn of provocative actions in Berlin, Britain remains the ally in Berlin consultations most anxious to avoid difficulties with the Soviets over the city, but it is nevertheless sensitive to West Germany's political equity there. [redacted]

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France - French officials attach special importance to France's share of supreme authority in Berlin. Paris' role there affords it a unique opportunity to deal with the United States and the USSR on equal footing, maintaining the distinction between wartime victor and loser, and enables France to influence West Germany more than its power might otherwise permit. France stands ready to take a hard line with the Soviets, especially where Allied rights and responsibilities on such issues as transit are concerned, and does not shrink from lecturing Bonn on its limits in Berlin. [redacted]

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Soviet Union - The Soviets appear to prefer the mini-confrontations of the QA era to the grander Berlin crises of yesteryear, but they still must cope with East Germany's persistent demands for greater sovereignty and its opposition to any increase of Bonn's role in West Berlin. East Berlin objected to West Germany's expansion of ties to West Berlin during the 1970s, and the sharp Soviet protests make clear that Moscow felt the heat. There were hints [redacted] that Soviet Ambassador Yefremov, who was transferred to Vienna in 1975, had to leave East Berlin because he was perceived to be a poor enforcer of Eastern QA interpretations. He was replaced by his predecessor in East Berlin, Pyotr Abrasimov, a negotiator of the QA, whose thunder and expertise failed to keep West Berlin out of the European Parliament. We believe the Soviets have concluded that the vehemence of their complaints in this period did, however, induce Bonn to forego additional West German offices in West Berlin. They seem to calculate that the ensuing absence of dispute over Berlin assists Soviet efforts to argue for detente and to distract Bonn from its alliance engagements. At present, therefore, Moscow almost certainly wants calm in Berlin. [redacted]

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East Germany - West Berlin remains a bone in the throat of East Germany, the power most dissatisfied with the QA. The time of political freebooting before the QA offered the East Berlin regime more advantages than the QA regimen, with its flood of West German visitors and communications, its denial of the powers

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of sovereignty (such as the ability to harass transit traffic to West Berlin) and its ban on longstanding East German political claims (for example, that West Berlin is East German territory). From the East German perspective, it must often appear that detente is a game the Soviets play with West Germany at East Germany's expense. [redacted]

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Beginning in 1979, with public Soviet approval, actions by East Germany started to reverse the liberalization introduced during the detente era. The large increase in the currency exchange levy on visitors to East Germany imposed in October 1980 sharply reduced the flow of West German visitors. This trend away from the cordial relations that are supposed to characterize detente, it is generally believed, reflects the regime's insecurity about its internal problems rather than Soviet inspiration, and it probably would have advanced further without the need still to accommodate to overall Soviet policy. [redacted]

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Social Problems - In the 1960s West Berlin became a center of youthful German radicalism and anti-establishment activity. The city attracts West Germans who seek to avoid conscription and these young men provide material for street demonstrations and radical movements at West Berlin universities. Problems of public order resulting from this anti-establishment ferment received attention throughout West Germany, in part because West Berlin was at that time the scene of early terrorist actions. During the 1970s, the radicals became tamer and the terrorists chose West Germany instead of West Berlin as their main battleground. Radicalism at the West Berlin universities receded. But the activists army never fully demobilized. It provided, in the 1980-81 disorders, recruits for the squatters movement. Many young dropouts joined cooperatives that encouraged "alternative" lifestyles stressing crafts and environmentalism. In the election of May 1981 an Alternative List of young "reformers" gained 7.2 percent of the vote and 9 city assembly seats. [redacted]

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The toughest social and political challenge facing West Berlin in the 1980s is the surge of foreign residents. In 1970, unskilled foreign workers and their families, who had immigrated to West Berlin in the 1950s and 1960s, totalled about 100 thousand, less than 5 percent of the city's population. Although recruitment of foreign workers stopped in 1973 and resumed only briefly thereafter, their number has grown to 230,000, 12 percent of West Berlin's population today. Of these, 140,000 are Turks, considering the "guest workers" least able to assimilate the German culture. The increase comprises mainly relatives of established "guest workers" and persons taking advantage of West Germany's liberal asylum law. [redacted]

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Unemployment and the increase of foreigners in a population that is aging and declining as a whole have stimulated anti-foreign feelings. Governing Mayor von Weizsaecker announced that he favors inducements for foreigners to return home and believes

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that those who remain should become German citizens, but US officials familiar with the problem believe few "guest workers" would opt for either course. The problem is more intractable because the Germans resist the notion of their society becoming a "melting pot." [redacted]

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West Berlin, a city famous for experiments will produce further sensations and occasional disorders, although it has by and large managed to incorporate the young radicals and reformers. Their counterculture is tolerated, even represented in the city assembly. Their potential for popular support is limited, however, because Berlin's citizens are hard-nosed, skeptical of utopians or pacifists, and profoundly pro-West. The media in West Berlin are predominantly conservative. [redacted]

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But the city is only beginning to grapple with the problem of a sizeable foreign population, and this issue will be the main test of the von Weizsaecker administration. The von Weizsaecker government's attempt in 1981 to restrain immigration of relatives of West Berlin residents, although probably approved by the native Berliners, caused much uncertainty among the foreign community, especially the Turks. [redacted]

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West Berlin Economy Loss of population, loss of industrial jobs and lack of investment have long restricted growth of the West Berlin economy. The city's postwar isolation and loss of importance to the German community make it difficult for business and industry to recruit and hold top executive leadership. Careers in the isolated city are less challenging now than when embattled Berlin was a center of world interest. [redacted]

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Economic decline of West Berlin is resisted through a variety of programs, such as intense promotion of tourism, federal subsidies and special tax breaks designed to stimulate business and industry. Despite improvements in access to the city since the signing of the QA, the negative political factors -- continued East German and Soviet challenge to West Berlin's link to the West and dwindling emphasis of the city's role as future capital of Germany -- helped to assure that the adverse long-range trends continued during the past decade. [redacted]

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But these trends were not sharp and are partly attributable to the recessions of the 1970s in West Germany, which takes 70 percent of West Berlin's industrial production. Aided by gradual expansion of the federal subsidy, per capita output in West Berlin grew at a 3.3 percent annual rate during 1970 - 1981, only marginally less than the rate in West Germany. [redacted]

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With West Germany experiencing a prolonged slump, West Berlin's economy stagnated in 1981. Seasonally adjusted unemployment rose to the highest level since the early 1950s. With continuing high interest rates, reduced government spending and weak domestic demand, the prospects for West Berlin in 1982 are not bright and a further rise in unemployment seems certain. [redacted]

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Berlin SPD Decline At the point when the Berlin of detente ceased to attract world interest, the city had already entered a decline of political leadership. Coincidentally, the new focus on West Berlin's youthful demonstrators, on the large foreign community, and on what seemed to many Berliners as revealed by both their private and public comments as creeping provincialism tended to offset for many residents the improvements in travel and communication gained through the QA. [redacted]

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By the end of the decade, the squatters movement protesting Germany's urban housing shortage was firmly established in downtown West Berlin. Its activists resisted eviction, clashed with police, and vandalized commercial establishments when the police tried to control them. In early 1981 the issue of public order combined with a corruption scandal to topple the West Berlin government, a coalition of Social Democrats (SPD) and Free Democrats (FDP) modelled on the Schmidt government in Bonn. [redacted]

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Efforts were made to resuscitate the West Berlin social/liberal coalition. One of Schmidt's most talented cabinet members, Hans-Jochen Vogel, was brought from Bonn to provide new leadership. But time had run out on the SPD in Berlin, for generations a stronghold of the German left. Since the distinguished mayoralty of Ernst Reuter, West Berlin's leader during the blockade, the SPD had gradually fallen into the hands of mediocre leaders. The decline had already been signalled during the 1970s when the SPD, like other West Berlin parties, started to import political leaders from West Germany, thereby acknowledging the absence of homegrown successors to Reuter and Brandt. [redacted]

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The 1981 election returned a strong plurality for the Christian Democrats and ushered in the government of Richard von Weizsaecker, who had come from Bonn two years earlier to lead the West Berlin CDU. [redacted]

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Rise of the CDU. Until von Weizsaecker's arrival, like the SPD the West Berlin CDU had seemed neither intellectually nor organizationally prepared to govern the city. Its local leaders, conservatives nostalgic for the Adenauer era and profoundly skeptical of all Ostpolitik seemed at most to aspire to enter the Bundestag in Bonn. They did not win control of West Berlin so much as inherit it because of SPD disarray. [redacted]

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The CDU is nevertheless in charge, its plurality in the city assembly buttressed by the votes of enough Free Democrats to win key votes. In its first year the von Weizsaecker administration has given indications that it can revitalize West Berlin. It restored a measure of public confidence in law and order while showing an ability to make practical compromises on economic issues. [redacted]

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Meanwhile the SPD, still the party of West Berlin's bureaucracy, continues to register poorly in opinion polls.

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Vogel, who turned down a recent offer to rejoin the Schmidt cabinet, seeks to rally the SPD mainly by playing to the disaffected left, a tactic which seems likely to help von Weizsaecker and the CDU consolidate their power. Unless the SPD is unexpectedly rejuvenated, West Berlin will be governed for some time by the CDU. [redacted]

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The Governing Mayor. Von Weizsaecker is known for his intelligence and moderation; he is more liberal than the CDU hierarchy in West Berlin. Widely respected in all West German parties, he was once a candidate for the federal presidency and therefore was a natural choice when the West Berlin CDU needed a leader of national reputation. To complete his cabinet (Senat), von Weizsaecker imported other West German politicians with energy but little proven administrative ability. So far he has controlled the Senat tightly, and it has performed effectively. [redacted]

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Von Weizsaecker's talent as a political executive had not been tested before he became Governing Mayor. He is not a partisan scrapper nor a source of ideological inspiration to his party. But he is widely respected, knows what he wants, and has already demonstrated that he can run city hall. There is already speculation among West German political leaders that the CDU may need his talents in Bonn. [redacted]

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The conservatives in the West Berlin CDU are pleased to have von Weizsaecker at the helm, although he does not share their hard line views on Ostpolitik. On the contrary, he is inclined to cooperate with the Schmidt government on relations with East Germany.\* Foreign policy remains von Weizsaecker's main interest and he [redacted] sees himself as a man, like Brandt before him, with a future beyond Berlin. A longtime friend of the US, von Weizsaecker is an articulate defender of the Atlantic alliance who has argued publicly that the US can be relied onto defend Europe "if we do not give them the impression that we are leaving the risks in the world's trouble spots entirely to them." [redacted]

Outlook

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The Governing Mayor's views assure that US interests in West Berlin will be respected by his government. Von Weizsaecker has made a point of showing appreciation for US forces in the city. His approach to Ostpolitik, generally positive but skeptical,

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[redacted] Schmidt and Foreign Minister Genscher worked behind the scenes against partisans in their ranks who wanted to oppose establishment of the von Weizsaecker government because it lacks a majority. This demonstrates the leaders view of the need to keep West Berlin governable.

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will elicit understanding from the Berliners and should facilitate cooperation with the Schmidt government. To the extent that West Berlin can influence events, this will minimize disputes over issues such as the West German official presence in West Berlin. [redacted]

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US interests are still served by public events, including Presidential visits, that reaffirm and highlight the essential US contribution to maintaining the existence of a free West Berlin. They are useful reminders that the power balance in Europe remains unaltered by detente and that the United States has not forgotten its responsibility for Germany as a whole or for the Central European stability so desired by the European nations. The impact of ceremonial displays of US power in West Berlin is understood by the Soviets, whose immediate concern will be to avoid the sort of East-West frictions that dramatize the need for US protection of West Berlin. [redacted]

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During almost four decades, the US presence in Berlin has become a symbol of American determination to maintain a strong position in Europe in order to guard the balance that emerged on the continent following World War II. The Soviets have not seriously challenged that position in a decade. They continue to avoid unnecessary friction in Berlin with the West and especially the West Germans. Moscow will be reluctant to depart from this policy, especially while the political decision on NATO's INF modernization program appears to hang in the balance. [redacted]

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Further disorder in Poland, however, could lead to political instability in other areas, including East Germany, and such unrest would probably cause the Soviets to turn to a militant anti-Western policy as one means of justifying the imposition of harsher controls to restore order. Even if the Soviets should revert to a more aggressive, anti-Western line which includes pressure on West Berlin, we believe they are unlikely to mount the sort of fundamental challenge to the US presence in Berlin that they did in the depths of the Cold War. [redacted]

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If Berlin should again become a pressure point for the Soviets, such a shift would renew popular and official appreciation for the United States as the only ally powerful enough to cope with such Soviet tactics and Western unity would benefit. The United States and other Western Allies, by representing all-German interests in Berlin, continue to demonstrate to Bonn and the German public the merit of the alliance, thereby preserving the community of interest that engages West Germany in defense of Western Europe. Berlin is thus a linchpin of the Western Alliance. Western protection of the former German capital not only reinforces West Germany's relationship to NATO but also nurtures political understanding with the Berliners, who rely on the United States more than other Europeans and who judge Bonn's efforts to improve ties to Moscow with skepticism as well as sympathy. [redacted]

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