O(A 63-245

ER 10-159

box 6
cong Reb Fider

13 January 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

Congressional Relations 1958 SUBJECT:

- 1. This memorandum is primarily for information, but contains certain recommendations and suggestions on the handling of Congressional relations which you may either wish to discuss further at a deputies meeting, or refer to the DD/S or the General Counsel for advice. These suggestions are based on approximately four and a quarter years of experience during which time Legislative Counsel reported to me. I believe that they reflect my accumulated impressions of how to handle our relations with Congress.
- 2. To my mind the single most important objective in our relations with Congress during this session is to establish a wider knowledge among the members of Congress of our general competence. Most of our difficulties with the Congress stem from the fact that those committees which do meet with us have disseminated little or no information about their reactions to our work. This lack of further dissemination has been based upon the concept that even the fact that hearings were held should be classified. I believe that recent events have invalidated this concept and that unless some method is established at a very early

date to provide the general membership of the Congress at least with

Approved For Release 2007/02/28: CIA-RDP01-01773R000300110046-0

2.

الم المناني

eurselves with a Congressional watching committee. It seems to me that there are basically two approaches to further disseminating within the Congress general knowledge of our competence: 1) by persuading the chairman of our subcommittees to either make statements on the floor or issue general announcements to the membershipl 2) by direct linious on our part with educational members of Congress with whom we can be frank and open concerning our general work.

3. It seems to me that the program that was being launched at the time that Mr. Norman Paul was transferred and the authority and responsibility for Congressional liaison was removed from this effice, effers great possibilities for breadening our contacts with the Congress. As you will recall, this program called for a massive approach to debriefing Congressmen after foreign travels

fashion; further, in addition to acquiring substantive information, we can gain an impression of the general attitude of various Congressmen.

There is one important aspect to this program that must be carefully watched. We must keep

25X1
25X1
informed of the status of major issues concerning the Agency in which

the Congressmen are interested—the progress of the new building, the adequacy of our intelligence on the Soviet Union, the general quality of national estimates, and particularly our performance during major crises such as Hungary, Sucs and Spatnik.

Approved For Release 2007/02/28 : CIA-RDP01-01773R000300110046-0

- 4. It is my belief that we can do better in Washington also in dealing with the Congress. In the past I feel our Congressional relations have been much too clearly concentrated around yourself, the DDCI, the Legislative Counsel and a small group of senior officials. This is best evidenced by the fact that nearly every Congressional luncheon is attended by about the same individuals. It is fairly obvious that this limits greatly the knowledge of Congressmen whom we can cultivate and "sell" the Agency. On the other hand, I completely agree with the necessity for the Legislative Counsel to be the focal point for Congressional relations, and preferably he should attend as many functions given by agency officials for Congressmen as is possible. But I would submit that we should set a goal of a Congressman for lunch at least every day during the ferthcoming session, and obviously this would require a much broader group of senior officials to participate and host the luncheons. I believe that this can be done, inasmuch as in our vast organization we probably have more than a hundred senior officials who are personally acquainted with one or more Congressmen.
  - 5. Finally, I believe that it is absolutely essential that with certain key Senators and Congressmen we develop as close a relation as their busy schedule will permit. This particularly applies to such key men as George Mahan of Texas, and I completely agree with Mr. Helms buck slip on the attached memorandum that we must not spare a mement in gettingsheld of Mahon and attempting to correct some of the misgivings expressed in the CBS television interview.

Approved For Release 2007/02/28 : CIA-RDP01-01773R000300110046-0

Further, I would like to reiterate my previous suggestion that I believe it most important for you to request the Vice President to convene a meeting of the big four--Johnson and Knowland of the Senate, and Martin and Rayburn of the House--fer the purpose of going over the question of the Congressional relations of the CIA and soliciting their advice and guidance. Even if the meeting never materialized, I believe that the seliciting of it by you and possibly the suggestions of the Vice President would be most valuable. In this context, of course I firmly believe that we should cultivate the democratic whip--Senator Mike Mansfield--and try to breaden our contacts with the wing of the democratic party which he represents. I am firmly convinced that Mansfield is the recipient of almost all that is bad about the Agency, having become a focal point as a result of his bill, and I think it quite important that we try to balance this lodger.

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick Inspector General

Attachment: DCI (ER-9-9960) - Excerpt from CBS-TV Face the Nation. 6 January 1958.

ec: DDCI
OGC/Legislative Counsel

(Memorandum dictated but not read by LBK)