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
OCA 69-370

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Hardy folder

27 March 1957

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Luncheon for Congressman Porter Hardy, Jr., Second District of Virginia - Tuesday, 26 March 1957

1. Congressman Hardy opened the conversation by telling General Cabell that he wondered as he greeted all of the IAC members leaving the building how U.S. intelligence had been caught short by the Suez crisis. General Cabell told him that he didn't think this was the case and then proceeded with a long explanation of events. Hardy said that it was his impression by everything he had heard from both the military and diplomatic side that we had been caught short.

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2. At that point Mr. Dulles entered the room and picked up the discussion pointing out that Nasser hadn't known about the attack and that he also had been curious as to why the U.S. had evacuated its nationals. Mr. Hardy said he did not wish to pursue it but that certainly from all the President and Secretary of State had said it didn't look as if the U.S. government had been very well informed. Mr. Dulles said that he thought the President and the Secretary of State were saying only that British, French and Israel had not advised them. Mr. Hardy said that they may have meant that but that the public and most of Congress thought that the vaunted CIA had fallen on its face.

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Hardy →

3. Congressman Hardy then went on to say that he thought something should be done very quickly to keep Congress better informed about the CIA. He said that there was considerable criticism, in fact a majority in the House, of the fact that CIA was not under Congressional supervision and that there had been a bill introduced every year to investigate CIA. He then went on to say that one of his colleagues had told him that he had called up the Director to ask about something but had been told that it couldn't be discussed over the phone, and if the man would come down the Director would talk to him about it. This man came down and the Director advised him that it was too highly classified a matter to discuss. Consequently, this Congressman said he had no confidence in the Director or anybody else in CIA. Mr. Dulles stated that he didn't know who this could be because he had never treated any Congressman in that fashion. He then went on to point out that CIA regularly briefed the subcommittees on Armed Services and Appropriations. Hardy said that he had discovered this only a few weeks ago but had been unable to find any staff man who knew about the briefings inasmuch as Bob Smart was too busy. Hardy went on to say that he did not think it did CIA any good to have the fact that these briefings were conducted held so closely.

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4. Hardy then discussed what committees had legal jurisdiction over CIA pointing out that in the Senate it had been the Armed Services Committee that had worked on the bill, whereas in the House it had been the Committee on Government Expenditures which is now the Committee on Government Operations. He said he planned to discuss the matter with Chairman Vinson and to decide what should be done. There was discussion of the President's Board, and Congressman Hardy said while he thought all of the members were fine and able citizens that he felt the Board was window dressing. The Director then mentioned the problem of finding Congressmen who could spend the time to do the job. Hardy said that he recognized this but didn't think we ought to hold it against a Congressman because he was junior. He pointed out that he ranked 11th on the Democratic side of Armed Services and yet had been on the committee 9 years.

5. The Director offered Congressman Hardy a briefing, and he said that he would like very much to have this and that he did not intend to bother us unless he could do the job correctly.

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Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Inspector General

cc: Legislative Counsel