

stepped into the deadlocked negotiations between the striking Newspaper Guild of New York and the newly merged World Journal Tribune, Inc. But there was no indication of an early settlement.

The publishers appeared to be concentrating their efforts on getting an agreement on supplemental severance pay with another union - Typographical Union No. 6.

The printers are not on strike, as are 1,800 guild members, but have refused to work for the new corporation until full agreement is reached on extra pay for the 400 printers scheduled to be dismissed as a result of the merger.

While these developments were taking place, Gene Robb, president of the American Newspaper Publishers Association, warned that unless labor leaders here softened their positions the merged publishing company might never produce a newspaper.

*The labor relations committee heard of Commerce and other Gov. in its first last month.

seven Republicans and eight Democrats teamed up to knock out the funds. Most of the Democrats were Southerners.

Voting to retain the appropriation were 10 Democrats and two Republicans.

The Republican Backers
Although committee members declined to disclose their votes, it was learned that the two Republicans voting for rent supplements were Clifford P. Case of New Jersey and Margaret Chase Smith of Maine.

One committee source attributed the Southern Democratic defections to a fear that the program would speed up integrated housing.

The program is designed to provide privately built housing in which a poor tenant would pay 25 per cent of his income for rental, with the Federal Government paying the rest.

While deleting rent supplement funds from the Administration's \$2.8-billion supplemental appropriations bill,

Continued on Page 26, Column 3

news conference, the Secretary dismissed as "shockingly distorted" an unusually critical report released here yesterday by a House Armed Services subcommittee headed by Representative F. Edward Hébert, Democrat of Louisiana.

The subcommittee declared that Mr. McNamara had virtually overridden the views of his military advisers, and had shown a lack of candor in explaining to Congress the true nature and the risks of the coming cutbacks in manned bombers as the nation begins to depend increasingly on intercontinental ballistic missiles.

"The suggestion that major decisions on the manned bomber program were made against the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is without any foundation whatsoever," Mr. McNamara declared today.

Seated beside him as he met with the press were Deputy Defense Secretary Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of the Air

Continued on Page 22, Column 3

North Vietnam's Premier were trans- abroad today by the official press agency. "Our fight will be long and hard," Ho Chi Minh said. "The people are resolved to fight until final victory." He was

"Again we say to Premier Johnson: If the United States really wants peace it should withdraw all United States satellite troops from Vietnam and stop the aggressive war there."

Other Demands Resound
The United States, he said, must also "at once and additionally" stop bombing North Vietnam, and the Vietnamese people must settle the reunification of Vietnam without foreign interference.

Premier Pham Van Chan charged the Johnson Administration with "turning a blind eye and deaf ear" to the four-point stand on the settlement of the war. He particularly noted Washington's objection to the third point, calling for settlement of the internal affairs of South Vietnam in accordance with the program of the National Liberation Front, the political affiliate of Vietcong.

"To object to the third point to object to the whole point stand," the Premier said. The three other points - United States withdraws military forces from Vietnam, demilitarization of Vietnam, and reunification of Vietnam in accordance with the 1954 Geneva agreements that ended the China war, and reunification of Vietnam - are

Continued on Page 4, Column 3

How C.I.A. Put 'Instant Air Force' Into Congo

Intervention or Spying All in a Day's Work

Following is the second of five articles on the Central Intelligence Agency. The articles are by a team of New York Times correspondents consisting of Tom Wicker, John W. Finney, Mps Frankel, E. W. Kenworthy and other Times staff members.

Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, April 25
At the Uru River, eight miles south of Nla Nla in the northeast Congo, a government column of 800 Congolese troops and 100 white mercenaries had been ambushed by a rebel force and was under heavy fire. Suddenly, three B-26's skimmed over the rain forest and bombed and strafed a path through the rebel ranks for the forces supported by the United States.

At the controls of the American-made planes were anti-Castro Cubans, veterans of the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961, three years before. They had been recruited by a purportedly private company in Florida. Servicing their planes were European mechanics solicited through advertisements in London newspapers. Guiding them into action were American "diplomats" and other officials in apparently civilian positions.

The sponsor, paymaster and director of all of them, however, was the Central Intelligence Agency, with headquarters in

Langley, Va. Its rapid and effective provision of an "instant air force" in the Congo was the climax of the agency's deep involvement there.

The C.I.A.'s operation in the Congo was at all times responsive to and welcomed by the policy-makers of the United States.

It was these policy-makers who chose to make the agency the instrument of political and military intervention in another nation's affairs, for in five years of strenuous diplomatic effort it was only in Langley that the White House, the State Department and the Pentagon found the peculiar combination of talents necessary to block the creation of a pro-Communist regime, recruit the leaders for a pro-American government and supply the advice and support to enable that government to survive.

In Dark and Light

From wiretapping to influencing elections, from bridge-blowing to armed invasions, in the dark and in the light, the Central Intelligence Agency has become a vital instrument of American policy and a major component of American government.

It not only gathers information but also rebuts an adversary's information. It not only organizes its own far-

flung operations but also resists an adversary's operation.

Against the Soviet Union alone, it performs not only certain of the services performed in Moscow by the K.G.B., the Committee for State Security, but also many of the political, intelligence and military services performed by pro-Soviet Communist parties around the world.

When the Communist and Western worlds began to wrestle for control of the vast, undeveloped Congo in 1960 after it had gained independence from Belgium, a modest little C.I.A. office in Leopoldville mushroomed overnight into a virtual embassy and miniature war department.

This was not to compete with the real United States Embassy and military attachés but to apply the secret, or at least discreet, capacities of the C.I.A. to a seething contest among many conflicting forces.

Starting almost from scratch, because the Belgians had forbidden Americans even to meet with Congolese officials, the C.I.A. dispersed its agents to learn Congolese politics from the bush on up, to recruit likely leaders and to finance their bids for power.

Capable of quickly gathering information from all sources, of buying informants and disbur-

Continued on Page 30, Column 1

Reins Weighed

By E. W. KENWORTHY
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, April 25
A small group of Senators responsible for monitoring the Central Intelligence Agency met today to discuss whether their "watchdog" committees should be enlarged and its surveillance tightened.

The bipartisan group is made up of ranking members of the Armed Services Committee and the Appropriations subcommittee dealing with funds for the armed services.

For many years the Senate group and a comparable group in the House, also drawn from the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, have constituted the only "legislative oversight" of the secret operations and the secret funds of the C.I.A.

For many years also a large number of Senators and Representatives have urged that these two groups be expanded to include members of the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees so that the activities of the agency would be subjected more closely to political considerations.

Although Senator Richard B. Russell, chairman of the Armed Services Committee and the watchdog committee, has resisted these suggestions, in-

Continued on Page 30, Column 6

Jersey Sales Tax Voted by Assen

By RONALD SULLIVAN
Special to The New York Times
TRENTON, April 25
New Jersey Assembly, in a partisan vote, approved a cent state sales tax tonight. Earlier today the Senate approved Gov. Richard Hughes's \$876-million budget, anticipation of the Assembly's passage of the tax. The levy is scheduled to take July 1.

The Legislature will hold a special session Wednesday that both houses can complete final action on the Democratic Government fiscal program, the most ambitious ever attempted in Jersey.

In a table released by Governor's office, the family of four in New Jersey would pay \$56 a year in tax if their income was

Continued on Page 41, Col

Water Mayor Says

BENNETT
city will begin water supply

man holding up the apartment

aid that the individual apartment great obstacles were not in financial purposes conservat-

STAT

4/26/66
pi

tion charged with all those stratagems and wiles — some as old as those of Rahab and some as new as satellites — associated with the black and despised arts of espionage and subversion.

The operations of the C.I.A. go far beyond the hiring and training of spies who seek out informers and defectors.

It was the Plans Division that set up clandestine "black" radio stations in the Middle East to counter the propaganda and the open incitements to revolution and murder by President Gamal Abdel Nasser's Radio Cairo.

It was the Plans Division that masterminded the ouster of the Arbenz government in Guatemala in 1954, the overthrow of Premier Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran in 1953 (two notable successes) and the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961 (a resounding failure).

Among the triumphs of the Plans Division are the development of the U-2 high-altitude plane, which, between 1956 and May, 1960, when Francis Gary Powers was shot down by a Soviet rocket; photographed much of the Soviet Union; the digging of a tunnel into East Berlin from which C.I.A. agents tapped telephone cables leading to Soviet military headquarters in the Eastern Zone and the acquisition of a copy of Premier Khrushchev's secret speech to the 20th party congress in 1956 denouncing Stalin's excesses and brutalities.

Liberals in the C.I.A.

The C.I.A. analysts of the Intelligence Division, in the opinion of many experts, are aware of the embedded antagonisms and frustrations of peoples just emerging into nationhood. Thus they are likely to be more tolerant than the activists in the Plans Division of the flamboyant nationalism and socialist orientation of the leaders in former colonies and more flexible than many of the State Department's cautious and legalistic diplomats.

In discussing the Portuguese territories of Angola or Mozambique, for example, the analysts are said to take the altitude that change is inevitable; that the United States has to deal with a pluralistic world. The State Department, on the other hand, tends to be diverted by Portuguese sensitivities and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization base in the Azores, also a Portuguese territory.

Regarding the C.I.A. analysts, one State Department officer said that "there are more liberal intellectuals per square inch at C.I.A. than anywhere else in the government."

The operators and agents of the Plans Division, on the other hand, are described as more conservative in their economic outlook and more single-minded in their anti-Communism. This is particularly true of those engaged in deep-cover operations, many of whom are ex-military people or men formerly in the Office of Strategic Services or the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

It has been said, however, that many of the agents who are essentially information gatherers and who work under transparent cover are as sophisticated as the analysts back

agents masquerade as businessmen, tourists, scholars, students, missionaries or charity workers.

Second, there are those agents, by far the larger number, who operate under the looser cover of the official diplomatic mission. In the mission register they are listed as political or economic officers, Treasury representatives, consular officers or employees of the Agency for International Development (the United States foreign aid agency) or United States Information Agency. The C.I.A. chief of station may be listed as a special assistant to the Ambassador or as the top political officer.

A Thin Cover

This official cover is so thin as to be meaningless except to avoid embarrassment for the host government. These agents usually are readily identifiable.

The chief of station is recognized as the man with a car as big as the Ambassador's — as in Lagos, Nigeria — better.

In practically all the allied countries the C.I.A. agents identify themselves to host governments, and actually work in close cooperation with Cabinet officials, local intelligence and the police.

In some embassies the C.I.A. agents outnumber the regular political and economic officers. In a few they have made up as much as 75 per cent of the diplomatic mission.

The chief of station often has more money than the Ambassador. Sometimes he has been in the country longer and is better informed than the Ambassador.

For all these reasons the host government, especially in underdeveloped areas of the world, may prefer to deal with the chief of station rather than the Ambassador, believing him to have readier access to top policy-making officials in Washington.

Well Kept Secret

Obviously the number of agents abroad is a closely held secret, kept from even such close Presidential advisers in the past as the historian, Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. In his book "A Thousand Days," Mr. Schlesinger states that those "under official cover overseas number almost as many as State Department employees. This would be roughly 6,000. The actual number, however, is believed to be considerably less, probably around 2,200.

The secrecy of identification can lead to some amusing situations. Once when Allen Dulles, then C.I.A. director, visited New Delhi, every known "spook" (C.I.A. man) was lined up in an anteroom of the embassy to greet him. At that moment a newspaper correspondent who had been interviewing Mr. Dulles walked out of the inner office. A look of bewilderment crossed the faces of the C.I.A. men, plainly asking, "Is this one we didn't know about?"

Mr. Schlesinger has written that "in some areas the C.I.A. had outstripped the State Department in the quality of its personnel."

Almost without exception,

with only a smattering of Spanish and no understanding of Latin America or Latin character, Bender antagonized the more liberal of the leaders by his bullying and his obvious partiality for the Cuban right.

Offices in This Country

The C.I.A. maintains field offices in 30 American cities. These offices are overt but discreet. Their telephone numbers are listed under "Central Intelligence Agency" or "United States Government," but no address is given. Anyone wanting the address must know the name of the office director, whose telephone number and address are listed.

At one time these field offices sought out scholars, businessmen, students and even ordinary tourists whom they knew to be planning a trip behind the Iron Curtain and asked them to record their observations and report to the C.I.A. on their return.

Very little of this assertedly is done any more, probably because of some embarrassing arrests and imprisonment of tourists and students. While the C.I.A. deals frankly with businessmen, it reputedly does not compromise their traveling representatives.

Most of the work of domestic field agents involves contacts with industry and universities. For example, an agent, on instructions from headquarters, will seek evaluation of captured equipment, analysis of the color of factory smoke as a clue to production, an estimate of production capacity from the size of a factory, or critiques of articles in technical and scientific journals.

The Human Inadequacy

In greater secrecy, the C.I.A. subsidizes, in whole or in part, a wide range of enterprises — "private" foundations, book and magazine publishers, schools of international studies in universities, law offices, "businesses" of various kinds and foreign broadcasting stations. Some of these perform real and valuable work for the C.I.A. Others are not much more than "mail drops."

Yet all these human activities, all the value received and the dangers surmounted, all the organization and secrecy, all the trouble averted and all the setbacks encountered still do not describe the work of the C.I.A. For the most part, the analysts, the most trustworthy of agents — like all human beings — have their limitations.

At the time when the Americans were successfully keeping the Congo out of the Communist orbit, it still took the same men several months to slip an African agent into Stanleyville in the Congo to check on the lives and fate of some arrested Americans.

Men are fallible and limited, and the demands on the C.I.A. are almost infinite that is why, today, some of the most valuable spies are not human and some of the most omnipotent agents burn through the heavens, and above.

Tomorrow: The C.I.A. in action.

SENATORS WEIGH NEW C.I.A. REINS

Continued From Page 1, Col. 5

formed sources said he called today's meeting precisely to consider such an expansion.

These sources said also that two recent disclosures of C.I.A. activities had apparently brought the whole issue to a head in the Senate watchdog group.

The first of these was the revelation that at least five C.I.A. agents operated in South Vietnam during the late 1950's under the cover of a multi-million dollar technical assistance program conducted for the government of the late President Ngo Dinh Diem by Michigan State University.

Intercedes in Suit

The second was the disclosure that the C.I.A. interceded in the slander trial of one of its agents, Juri Raus, an Estonian refugee, who was being sued by Erik Heine, another Estonian emigre. Mr. Heine charged that Mr. Raus had publicly called him an agent of the K.G.B., the Soviet intelligence agency.

In a public memorandum addressed to the Federal Court in Baltimore, the C.I.A. said it had ordered Mr. Raus to cease testifying in order to protect the United States foreign intelligence apparatus. Mr. Raus claimed immunity on the ground that the alleged slander had been committed in the course of his C.I.A. duties.

Several days ago Senator J. W. Fulbright, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, wrote to Senator Russell suggesting that they discuss the possibility of having representatives from his committee on the watchdog group. It could not be learned whether Mr. Russell has replied to this letter.

Senator Eugene J. McCarthy, Democrat of Minnesota, and a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, has expressed concern that the C.I.A. "is making foreign policy and in so doing is assuming the roles of President and Congress."

Mr. McCarthy has introduced a resolution calling for a "full and complete" study of the effect of C.I.A. operations on policymaking by a special subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee. He also favors expanding the present oversight group to include members of the Foreign Relations Committee.

Today Mr. McCarthy said that, in view of the Michigan State and Raus cases, Congress would be rejecting "a very basic constitutional responsibility" if it did not begin "to exercise some degree of jurisdiction beyond what it is exercising now."

"Either the special group doesn't know about these things and it should, or it does know and tolerates them," Mr. McCarthy said.

Senator Mike Mansfield of Montana, the Majority Leader, said with a smile that the proposal to widen the watchdog

committee was "not a bad idea."

In 1954 Mr. Mansfield introduced a resolution to create a 12-man joint committee—six from each house—to maintain scrutiny on the C.I.A.

The resolution had 34 co-sponsors. However, much of the support evaporated under the opposition of Senator Russell and Senator Leverett Saltonstall, Republican of Massachusetts, who agreed with the then C.I.A. director, Allen W. Dulles, that the joint committee might jeopardize security.

When the Mansfield resolution finally came to a vote in 1956, 14 sponsors reversed themselves, and it was defeated, 59 to 27.

Besides Mr. Russell and Mr. Saltonstall, the present watchdog committee is made up of Democrats John Stennis of Mississippi, Carl Hayden of Arizona, Stuart Symington of Missouri, and Republicans Milton R. Young of North Dakota and Margaret Chase Smith of Maine.

City Wc U.S. I

WASH (AP)—T denied a Catherine City res victed of refusing before grand jury Miss J contempt \$250 fine high trit a New Y fusal to adjudical mission Miss fore the tion of 1964. She question with a k live Lab

Name the time and place

and your Hertz car will be in any city on your bus Ford or other fine car you have to worry about. A call and you're got it. Hertz put you in the car



LO5-20

4/26/66 p 30