

1941 HCT

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PRIOR to submission to Cong.

They: Sources began pushing for a legal charter soon after taking office

They: CIG sent drafts of enabling legislation to W.H., but met a cool reception.

Cong. did not directly grant # to CIG. W/in the deptal. budgets, was there specific & open acknowledgment of monies going to CIG? For F.Y. 1947, did Cong. have knowledge of CIG budget?

Sandler: 1946 House Comm. on Mil. Aff. hearings - calls for a 1st rate instll. service.
See H. Report 2734.

HS/HC 800: Indep Offices Appropriation Act of 1945 - threatened to strip CIG of all unnumbered, & perhaps vouchered funds
- the impetus for Houston's alarm to Vandenberg

HS/HC 800: see Houston's original draft legislation

process of revision of Houston's original draft

Jan '47 decision to avoid detailed enabling legislation

compare W.H. bill w/ Pres's directive of Jan 22, 1946

see HST letters accompanying the W.H. bill for mention (or lack thereof) of CIA

what role does fear of Pres. play in the proceedings?

What effects do concerns re security have on cong. consideration?

Darling, HS-1 Chap. V, Action by Congress, 1947-1949

SECRET

The 1947 Act (*pre - March 1947*)

CIG vulnerable to instant disestablishment. This alone made it essential to obtain cong. sanction. To insure continuity and insurance vs. capricious or pol-motivated action by a future Pres.

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another advantage offered by statutory authorization: CIA would be less vulnerable to accusations of being another gestapo, an instrument of executive arbitrariness.

writes of "early bills in the spring of 1946" w/out ~~ampix~~ ~~fixaxixomx~~ many specifics. Most loosely provided for the creation of a CIA w/ unspecified funcs. Vague re the relationship bet the CIA and the service intell. agencies.

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Souers' final report as DCI on June 7, 1946, urged necessity of legislation and an indep. budget for NIA and its CIG.

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Houston's "24-hr." draft for Vandenberg served as the enabling bill of Dec, 1946, when the drafting committee of Army, Navy, and White H. met to draw up legislation for the Nat. Def. Estab.

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after Houston drafted his sumer 1946 bill, he took it to Lay (Sec of the NIA) and Clark Clifford, Special Counsel to the Pres. Lay made a few changes, Clifford had little to contribute.

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on Jan. 23, 1947, Vandenberg, Houston, and Pforzheimer met w/ the drafting committee of Murphy/Norstad/Sherman, where Vandenberg made a strong pitch for an indep and vigorous Agency. The preliminary W.H. draft which these indivs. considered on Jan. 23 included sections repugnant to the CIG officers peresent. Murphy then suggested that the offending section be replaced w/ the Houston draft which had earlier been cleared w/ Clifford.

At this meeting on the 23rd, Vandenberg emphatic in his views that neither the Agency nor the DCI should participate in the making of policy; their func. was to be merely and exclusively service in nature, that is, to provide the intell necessary for the poicy makers. Vandenberg also stressed the difficulties of clandestine operations and argued that they must be supported by legislation which authroized the use of unvouchered funds. Also insisted that DCI should have unchallenged authority to discharge personnel.

The drafters, prhaps impressed by Vandenberg's statement that the new Agency should not simply go "free wheeling" around the Govt, decided the DCI should report to the proposed NSC. But also agrred that Agency should have sufficient power to operate w/out having to seek specific approval from NSC for each action.

12-14

suddenly on Jan 25, Murphy announced that drafting committee had decided to omit from bill all but the barest mention of the proposed AGENCY, on the grounds that substantive portions of the draft legislation too controversial, esp. to Army and Navv, which would object to omission of an advisory board.

Troy, 11-369-10 suggests Clifford had extensive criticism on July 22 meeting in Murphy's office at 10a.m.

taken from S. 2047 so the section was being discussed at this point in the drafting of the bill of Nat. Def.

Darling, HS-1 Chap. V, Action by Congress, 1947-1949

SECRET

The 1947 Act (pre - March 1947)

re reasons for omitting detailed plans for CIA: some fear that the broad authorities which ghe CIG sought for managing its properties and expenditures might draw fire. Moreover, "the ambitions of the Marine Corps were being held in check" so this too dictated avoiding arguemtn at this pt. then Darling concludes that the delay was profitable in that the 1949 law "gained from the experiences of the next two years."

15-16

CIG also tried to get the drafting committee to provide for a DDCI in the legislation, but the mil members blocked this.

The services also blocked CIG desire to have the DCI named *Intelligence* Advisor to the NSC, but this ideal would reappear in the Senate bill which eventiaully became the 1947 law.

16-17

to give a non-voting membership on the Council

- it will be recalled that Director of 22 Jan made the Direct a non-voting member of the NIA