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The Society

Greece

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

Greece

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This chapter supersedes the sociological coverage in the General Survey dated May 1969.

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FIGURES

The Society

A. General

Although exposed to modernizing influences as early as the advent of national independence a century and a half ago, Greek society has faced sweeping challenges to its traditional institutions and values only in the period since World War II, when Greece adopted policies of accelerated economic development and of progressive economic integration with Western Europe. Major factors behind the delayed onset of modernization include formidable physical disabilities, such as poverty of material resources and pronounced territorial fragmentation, and of no less importance, the nation's romantic attachment to its past, specifically to two idealized historical epochs—the Hellenic and the Byzantine. From these epochs the Greeks derive their major symbols of collective identity—the Greek language and its associated cultural legacy from the Hellenic and the Eastern Orthodox religion from the Byzantine. The ideal of "Hellenic-Christian civilization" has long formed the normative basis for contemporary Greek development, and its common acceptance has been exploited by certain governments, including the military-backed regime that came to power in April 1967, to further a supposed need for national regeneration.

One crucial aspect of this emotional commitment to the Hellenic and Byzantine heritages concerns its dualistic nature. These heritages are seen as representing two opposing forces, which the Greeks have struggled to resolve ever since the founding of their modern nation-state. Often the duality is expressed in terms of an internal east-west conflict, with an impulse toward eastern mysticism being related to Byzantium and an impulse toward western rationalism to Hellenism. The tension generated by these antithetical forces, according to some observers, is an essential characteristic of Greekness, present in each individual as well as in national life. An important practical consequence of Greek devotion to the past is that it sanctions the conservative hold of the Hellenic-Christian ideal on national institutions (for example, on the educational system), thereby obstructing realization of rapid social and economic modernization.

The ancient legacy which newly independent Greece of the early 19th century came to claim as its rightful inheritance was almost exclusively concerned with the Athenian performance (Figure 1) of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., as glorified in transmission

FIGURE 1. The Acropolis viewed from the northwest. These monuments exemplify the "tremendous outburst of creativity" that characterized the golden age of classical Greece. Adornment of the Acropolis, sacked by Persian forces in 480 B.C., was undertaken by Pericles after the final defeat of Persia. Most buildings were reduced to ruins in A.D. 1687, when the Venetians tried to wrest Athens from the Turks. Housing laws forbid the erection of any central structure that might obscure a view of the Acropolis.

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FIGURE 2. A corner of the palace of Knosos, principal center of the Minoan civilization of the second millennium B.C., so called after its legendary ruler Minos. With its colorful frescoes, spacious state rooms, and elaborate drainage system, the palace at Knosos reflected an advanced state of cultural development. Through their influence on the Mycenaeans, the Minoans contributed substantially to the flowering of classical Greece.

down the ages through Hellenistic, Roman, and Western European channels. The ancient Greeks themselves had marked the start of their era from the Olympic Games of 776 B.C., and almost everything now known about Greek development before that date, apart from the Homeric contribution, has come to light through the archeological discoveries of the past century. According to these discoveries, Greek-speaking peoples first entered Greece at the beginning of the second millennium B.C., arriving from the north. These Achaeans, as they were called in the Homeric epics, gradually expanded southward into the Peloponnesus, absorbing earlier settlers of Near Eastern origin and eventually coming under the influence of an advanced civilization, the Minoan, flourishing in Crete (Figure 2). After a period of commercial prosperity and artistic flowering, the Mycenaean civilization (so called after the dominant Achaean site at Mycenae), along with the Minoan, was abruptly terminated about 1100 B.C., apparently by a combination of natural disaster and foreign invasion. As part of the large-scale population displacement that followed, colonies of Ionian-speaking Greeks were settled on the Asia Minor coast, where beginning in the sixth century B.C. the world's first scientists and philosophers laid a foundation for the work of Plato and Aristotle.

On the Greek mainland, meanwhile, several centuries of slow recovery eventually produced a new political system of independent city-states. Most prominent of these were Athens, one of the few Mycenaean sites to have escaped devastation, and Sparta, inhabited by the Dorians, late Greek-speaking arrivals (about 1100 B.C.), whose role, if any, in the destruction of Mycenaean culture is still uncertain. Bitter rivalry between Athens and Sparta divided the Hellenic world into two opposing camps and led finally to the protracted and exhausting Peloponnesian War (431-404 B.C.), in which Athens was defeated. Thereafter, although Athens remained culturally dominant for many centuries, the political importance of the Greek city-states underwent a steady decline. Power was yielded to Philip of Macedon, whose son and successor, Alexander the Great, conquered almost all the known world. Thanks in large part to the network of Hellenistic cities founded by Alexander, Greek influence in the eastern Mediterranean flourished, even after the area was

Part of the medieval remains of Mistras, which include deserted houses, a fortress and palace, and numerous churches and monasteries. A stronghold after 1205 of the Frankish principality of Achaia under the Villehardouin family, Mistras was restored to Byzantine rule in 1262 and subsequently became a center of Byzantine culture second in importance only to Thessaloniki in mainland Greece.

Palace of the Grand Masters on Rhodes, one of numerous buildings erected during the rule of the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem. This charitable order of knights, priests, and serving brothers began occupation of the island in 1309, after it had been successively held since 1204 by a Greek nobleman and Italian adventurers. In 1522 the Knights of St. John capitulated to the Ottoman Turks and withdrew to Malta. Restoration of the medieval city was carried out during the period of Italian control from 1912 to 1945.

FIGURE 3. Mistras and Rhodes illustrate the diverse development of Greek lands after the fragmentation of the Byzantine Empire in 1204

absorbed into the Roman Empire. Greek influence was to exercise a vital role in the Byzantine Empire over the millennium of its existence—from A.D. 330, the establishment of Constantinople (ancient Byzantium) as the eastern capital of the Roman Empire, to 1453, the fall of Constantinople to the Ottoman Turks.

As the Byzantine capital rose to a position of preeminence in the civilized world, mainland Greece fell into obscurity and impoverishment. Contributing to the decline of Athens at this time were such factors as the antagonism of Christianity to Hellenic thought and culture and the gravitation of Greek talent to the new centers of learning and commerce in the east. Vulnerable to foreign invasion, the Greek peninsula was for several centuries periodically overrun by successive waves of Visigoths, Vandals, Ostrogoths, Huns, Avars, Slavs, and Normans. Then in the early 13th century, when the Fourth Crusade diverted attention from the liberation of Muslim-held Jerusalem to the conquest of Constantinople, the Greek mainland and islands were divided up by the Latin conquerors and turned into subject principalities. The subsequent course of development for these principalities varied (Figure 3), some being recovered by the Byzantines and others remaining in Latin hands. In the 15th century Greek lands, with the notable exception of certain islands under Venetian control, progressively succumbed to Ottoman expansion, as did the rest of the Byzantine Empire. Four centuries of Ottoman rule proved to be an era of opportunity for some Greeks—for those with commercial interests and for those with the administrative talent to serve the Orthodox Patriarch in carrying out his new role as civil, as well as religious, head of the Sultan's Christian subjects. For mainland Greeks, however, it was a period of oppression and stagnation, with the Orthodox Church alone functioning as a source of consolation. To priests and monks belongs the credit of preserving the Greek national consciousness and finally, in 1821, of raising the flag of rebellion that began the War of Independence.

The socioeconomic retardation and the marked political instability that have characterized Greek development over the last century and a half appear, in retrospect, to have been forecast by the circumstances attending the country's founding. Despite their own efforts at armed uprising, in the end the Greeks owed their independence to the intervention of the United Kingdom, France, and Russia. In disregard of local needs and traditions, these self-proclaimed Protecting Powers induced the new nation to adopt their own institutions of monarchy, of centralized administrative control, and later, of parliamentary democracy. Even the concept of a

Greek nation-state was a foreign import, one that conformed neither to the city-state model of ancient times nor to the multinational pattern of the Byzantine Empire. Looking back on the intrusion of "a foreign way of thinking into each and every manifestation of the young country's evolving life," one present-day Greek writer asserts that as a consequence, "all roads [were] laid out on a mistaken plan." That the Greeks tolerated foreign interference in their domestic affairs was attributable to their economic weakness and, more significantly, to their need of foreign support in "redeeming" Greek lands excluded from the new nation-state. As constituted in 1832, Greece was a small country whose population included only a fraction of the Greeks inhabiting Ottoman territories, and its boundaries contained none of the economic and religious centers of the Greek world.

The Great Idea—the dream of recovering the lost Byzantine Empire with its capital in Constantinople (Istanbul)—was to dominate Greek foreign and domestic policies for nearly a century. After 1864 the Ionian Islands, Thessaly, Macedonia, Crete, Epirus, and other territories were successively added to the original Greek kingdom (Figure 4). Greek attempts after World War I to acquire by force the whole of



FIGURE 4. Territorial expansion of Greece, 1832–1947

Thrace and the Smyrna district of Asia Minor, however, ended in a military disaster. The terms of the ensuing Treaty of Lausanne (1923) not only denied Greece these coveted lands but also brought about the eviction from Turkey of some 1.3 million Greek inhabitants in exchange for almost 400,000 Turks living in Greece. This massive influx of Asia Minor refugees saddled Greece with acute economic and social problems that took decades to resolve. Even more important were the psychological repercussions of the Asia Minor disaster. The collapse of the Great Idea, which had so long been the principal unifying factor in Greek life, left the nation bereft of its sense of mission. Bitterness in defeat and the psychological need to fix blame intensified the monarchist-republican cleavage in national life that had originally arisen over the question of Greece's participation in World War I. Pronounced instability marked political developments until 1936, when Gen. John Metaxas instituted a dictatorial rule of which the current military-backed regime is reminiscent. National differences were set aside to confront an attempted Italian invasion in 1940, but during the subsequent German occupation, Greek unity was fractured by the emergence of rival guerrilla forces, the most important of which were the Communist-led National Popular Liberation Army (ELAS) and the anti-Communist National Republican Greek League (EDES). After Greece's liberation from Germany, the pro- and anti-Communist division continued, tearing the country apart in a bitter civil war that lasted until 1949.

Massive U.S. financial and technical assistance, begun in 1947, repaired the physical damage of war and launched Greece on the road to social and economic modernization. Disruptions of the traditional social order, initially caused by World War II and the ensuing civil war, have subsequently been intensified by urbanization, by the rise of an educated urban middle class, and by an expanding communications network that promises to end the isolation of the rural community. Economic growth has brought about a substantial rise in per capita income and a sharp increase in industrial production, the value of which has exceeded that of agriculture since the mid-1960's. Moreover, after long delay caused by political considerations, measures have been initiated to reform and restructure the economy in preparation for Greece's competitive full-membership in the European Economic Community (EEC), scheduled for 1984. The postwar era has thus reversed the orientations of Greek society—from eastern to western, from rural to urban, and from traditional to modern. Nevertheless, Greece still ranks far below the fully developed nations of Europe, and continued efforts to close this gap are expected to aggravate the strains and tensions in national life. The military-backed regime has committed itself to modernization but has simultaneously adopted certain policies, such as advocacy of the ideals of Hellenic-Christian civilization, that would appear to be essentially antimodern. Many pronouncements of the government seem to point to a profoundly disturbing national dilemma: how to achieve modernization and Westernization without suffering the loss of Greek identity.

B. Structure and characteristics of society

After a century and a half of national independence, Greece still faces the problem of adapting traditional institutions and values to the demands of a modern nation-state. This is the major source of stress in a society untroubled by any significant ethnic or religious cleavages or by pronounced class divisions. Until World War II the perpetuation of traditional patterns was related to the isolation of the typical rural community and to the fact that the inhabitants of such communities made up over half the total population. Since the war, both these conditions have changed. Rural communities have become linked to the outside world through roads and radio, while mass migration to the cities has ended the numerical preponderance of villagers. Modern influence emanating from the cities, notably from Athens, has had far-reaching effects on village life at the same time as traditional ways, carried by the rural migrant, have helped shape urban patterns of thought and behavior. Urban-rural interaction has been facilitated, among other factors, by the perseverance of strong family ties, the very backbone of the traditional value system. Although this interaction has worked to advance national integration, significant regional divergencies still persist, reflecting essentially the unevenness of modernization across the country. The two major divisions created by differences in level of socioeconomic development are between urban and rural areas and between Athens and the rest of the country. Athenian dominance pervades all aspects of Greek life—to the bitter resentment of non-Athenians, particularly the inhabitants of northern Greece, who look upon Thessaloniki[1] as a rival center of national life. To deal with the problem of regional imbalance, the Papadopoulos government has instituted large-scale programs of administrative and economic

[1]For diacritics on place names see the maps in the text and the list of names at the end of this chapter

decentralization, the full effects of which are not yet apparent. The government has simultaneously undertaken the mission of indoctrinating the populace into a new moral order, based on the value system of the traditional village, excluding those elements, however, that have in its opinion long operated to undermine parliamentary democracy in Greece.

Through the use of Greek as their mother tongue and through their affiliation with the Orthodox Church, 95% of the population qualify as ethnic Greeks, the remainder being members of small minority groups. According to the 1951 census—the last census to ascertain data on mother tongue and religious affiliation—only about 4% of the population spoke a language other than Greek as the mother tongue and only about 2% followed a religion other than the Orthodox (Figure 5). The degree of ethnic homogeneity shown in the 1951 census had risen substantially since 1920 (when ethnic Greeks made up 80% of the population), the minorities having been reduced by population exchanges with Bulgaria and Turkey after World War I and by emigration during World War II and the civil war that followed. A crucial difference among groups classified as minorities is the extent to which each has become assimilated into national life. Despite their minority designation, the Vlachs, the Albanian-speaking Orthodox, and the Greek-speaking Roman Catholics, among others, are all Greek in national consciousness and are regarded as an integral part of the Greek nation. Vlachs (Figure 6) speak Koutsovlahic, akin to Romanian. They are of obscure origin, and their presence in Greece dates from at least the 11th century. They are concentrated largely in the mountains of Thessaly and Epirus, and several Vlachs have gained distinction in national life. In contrast, the Slavophones, the Pomaks (Figure 7), and the Turkish-speaking Muslims have preserved a marked degree of ethnic distinctiveness. The Slavophones, the Orthodox, Slavic-speaking people of the Macedonian region, and the area they inhabit have long been subject to rival claims of Greece, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. Denying allegations from any source of an ethnic relationship between Macedonians of Greece and those of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, the Greek Government recognizes the existence in Greece of a linguistic minority only, entirely Greek in sentiment, and speaking a Slavic tongue because of its geographic proximity to Slavic-speaking neighbors. Pomaks speak a language similar to Bulgarian, but containing Greek and Turkish elements. Pomak communities are also found in Bulgaria, but communications between Bulgarian and Greek Pomaks is minimal. The governments of both Bulgaria and Turkey claim to have a legitimate concern for the Greek Pomaks, based on ethnic and religious interests, respectively. The Greek Government argues that Pomaks are Hellenized and may even be descendants of the ancient Thracians. The largest and most significant of the minority groups are the Muslim Turks, most of whom live in Thrace. Under the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne, which exempted the Muslims in Thrace—along with the Greek Orthodox minority in Istanbul—from the obligatory population exchange between Turkey and Greece, they are guaranteed certain rights respecting religion, language, education, and other matters. Despite claims to the contrary by the Turkish Government, the Greek Government has generally honored its treaty obligations, if for no other reason than to protect the ethnic Greeks in Istanbul. Partly in consequence of the language barrier, these three groups have remained isolated from the mainstream of national development and have played no role of significance in socioeconomic life. Nevertheless,

FIGURE 5. Population, by mother tongue and religion, 1951

MOTHER TONGUE	ORTHODOX	MUSLIM	ROMAN CATHOLIC	PROTESTANT	JEWISH	OTHER*	TOTAL	PERCENT OF TOTAL
Greek	7,258,657	675	24,965	4,954	4,107	4,520	7,297,878	*95.6*
Turkish	86,838	92,219	106	580	16	136	179,895	*2.4*
Slavic	40,974	6	34	1	2	0	41,017	*0.5*
Koutsovlahic	39,820	4	5	13	0	13	39,855	*0.5*
Albanian	22,207	487	11	13	0	18	22,736	*0.3*
Pomakic	4	18,667	0	0	0	0	18,671	*0.2*
Armenian	7,528	4	283	283	10	882	8,990	*0.1*
Tsigane	6,774	494	5	0	0	156	7,429	*0.1*
Other	9,757	109	3,021	1,190	2,190	63	16,330	*0.3*
Total	7,472,559	112,665	28,430	7,034	6,325	5,788	7,632,801	*100.0*

*Including 121 persons who reported no religious preference.

FIGURE 6. Vlach shepherd outside his thatched hut. Traditionally a seminomadic pastoral people, Vlachs usually spend the winters in the lowland grazing areas, though there are some permanent Vlach communities.

because all these minorities inhabit border areas in northern Greece and have some ethnic affinity with groups in neighboring countries, they sometimes constitute an important consideration in foreign relations.

The existence of so few unassimilated minorities in a country repeatedly subjected to foreign invasion and occupation means that contemporary Greeks represent an amalgamation of numerous racial strains. During the centuries of Byzantine and Ottoman rule, the most important modification of the racial composition came from Slav and Albanian immigrants. In modern times large numbers of repatriates from long-established Greek communities in Turkey, Egypt, and elsewhere in the Near East have contributed new racial elements. As a result of extensive racial intermixing, present-day Greeks conform to no one uniform physical type. The average Greek has olive skin and dark hair and eyes, although persons of light complexion and of blue or gray eyes are not uncommon. Certain isolated groups, such as the Sarakatsans (Figure 8), exhibit physical characteristics that approximate those associated with the Greeks of classical times. Present-day Greeks, generally, regard themselves as the direct racial descendants of the ancient Hellenes, despite historical and physical evidence to the contrary. Biological, as well as cultural, identification with illustrious ancestors is an important focus of Greek national consciousness and underlies a popular sense of superiority to other peoples.

The basis of cultural identification with the classical Greeks is the language, which additionally serves as a bond between Greeks of the homeland and some 3

Macedonian women of Florina in traditional dress. A predominantly rural, largely illiterate, and economically depressed community of declining numbers, this minority forms one of the most disadvantaged sectors of the entire population.

Pomak man and children. For the most part, Pomaks inhabit small villages in the nomarchy of Xanthi in Thrace, where they earn a living by tobacco farming. They may be descendants of Bulgarian people converted to Islam in the 17th century.

FIGURE 7. Ethnically distinctive minority groups

million emigrants scattered around the world. But this symbol of coherence has since the dawn of modern independence also been a principal source of national dissension. The emergence of two general forms of modern Greek—*dimotiki* (demotic) and *katharevousa* (puristic)—has continuously engaged the country in a linguistic controversy loaded with social and political overtones. *Dimotiki* is the popular tongue as it has evolved naturally over the centuries from the classical Greek; possessing the force of a living language, it has become the preferred medium of modern poets and novelists. An artificial language, *katharevousa* was

FIGURE 8. Sarakatsan women in traditional dress at wedding in Thracian village of Sikorrakhi. Often confused with the Vlachs, the Sarakatsans are nomadic shepherds whose typical dwelling is a beehive-shaped hut. Some scholars hold that the aloofness of these people over the centuries has left them "the most Greek of all the Greeks." Supporting the conjecture of Sarakatsan antiquity is the resemblance between their decorative patterns of straight lines and triangles and the geometric designs on ancient Greek pottery.

originally manufactured by Adamantios Korais (1749-1833), who combined classical Greek and the language of the contemporary educated middle class—his objective being to strengthen modern links with the ancient heritage and to promote national unity through linguistic homogeneity. *Katharevousa* became the official language of the state and the language of the schools, professions (particularly law), newspapers, and radio. A language that has to be learned, *katharevousa* was at one time a status symbol denoting the social and intellectual superiority of its users. As the language of government, it stands for authority and symbolizes the division between the bureaucracy and the people. Politically, *katharevousa* and *dimotiki* have tended to represent conservative and liberal forces, respectively. The cause of *dimotiki*, set back by its support from Communists during the civil war, was revived during the prime ministry of the late George Papandreou (1963-65) in his pursuit of language reform in the school system. Since 1967 the identification of the regime with *katharevousa* has been so close as to render the use of *dimotiki*, in educated circles, suspect of antiregime expression. The likely resolution of the language dilemma is indicated by the growing use of *kathomiloumenn* (the language of everyday speech), a fusion of *dimotiki* and *katharevousa* originally evolved by the newspapers.

Social relationships in contemporary times are governed by a complex of values and institutions rooted not in any classical heritage but in the environment of the village community as it evolved under Ottoman rule. Traditional values and institutions, if no longer fully effective, still retain a significant influence, although the environment that originally produced them has been transformed. Improved communications, especially since World War II, have profoundly altered the isolation, self-sufficiency, and self-centeredness once characteristic of the village community. The influence of urban attitudes and ideas is apparent in changing patterns of family relations and in modified views about status; village styles of living reflect an increased consumption of manufactured goods, made possible by the growth of commercial farming. Rural emigration—to the urban areas of Greece and to the countries of Western Europe, especially West Germany—has also had far-reaching effects on village life. It has created the phenomenon of "derelict" communities, where population consists almost entirely of the very young and the very old. Personal success has come to be equated with migration, so much so that those left behind suffer a sense of abandonment and failure. The growing obsolescence of the village as a social unit has been a source of special concern to the military-backed regime, most of whose leaders have a rural origin. The government has sought to revive village life, among other ways, by improving material conditions and by discouraging migration. Moreover, government leaders have attempted to check what they regard as signs of moral degeneration in the nation by promoting the traditional values and moral standards instilled in them by their village background.

Central to the traditional value system is the primacy of family loyalties and obligations. The family functions in the social structure not only as a domestic group but also as an economic unit—even in urban areas, where most business enterprises are owned and operated by families. Since World War II the authenticity of family-based relationships has been questioned by some members of the younger generation, but not by society in general. Most Greeks think and act as part of a family, and for them the idea of an existence apart from the family is inconceivable. The individualism so often identified as a pronounced trait in Greek character is actually, according to some writers, a group individualism that

recognizes no authority outside the family. Similarly, normative behavior relating to *philotimo* (literally, "love of honor," but often translated as "self-esteem") and self-interest were originally viewed in terms of family solidarity. According to the complex concept of *philotimo*, any slight to personal or family honor constitutes a serious offense requiring retaliation. Traditionally, in the event of family dishonor—often caused by the sexually inappropriate behavior of a female member—it was incumbent upon the male members to restore the family name by committing an honor crime. In contemporary times ideas about what constitutes a dishonoring event and also what constitutes appropriate retaliation have undergone some change; honor crimes still persist, however, bringing about 5,000 convictions a year.

The corollary of exclusive familial attachment is distrust and opposition between persons lacking kinship ties. This accounts in part for the tension that typically characterizes interpersonal relations (outside the family) in the village community and, to a lesser degree, in the city. As one writer observes, "Business and social relations are maintained in an atmosphere of suspicion, surveillance, and accusation." In the competition for social recognition, loss for one family is seen as implying gain for another. An individual normally acts out of self-interest (that is, the interest of his family), and he expects others to behave in the same way. A man's failure to take advantage of other men whenever possible is considered tantamount to neglecting his family's interest. Success under these circumstances depends in large part on cunning and cleverness, personal attributes that are highly prized in society. Although Greeks are gregarious, the competition for social recognition requiring association with others, mutual distrust necessarily limits their ability to cooperate effectively or to maintain collective institutions. Apart from his family, an individual's strongest allegiances are to his nation, or to his Greekness, and to his church. Most Greeks also have an emotional attachment to their native place, but this attachment stems largely from an identification of native place with family.

Partly for reasons of social reputation, families attach primary importance to the advantageous marriage of daughters and to the proper establishment of sons. Family resources of whatever kind form a general stock from which children are endowed according to their needs. In rural areas the principal asset to be divided is land, part of which may be allocated when sons and daughters marry during the lifetime of parents, with the remaining portion going to the widow and to the unmarried children upon the death of the male head of the household. Any expense the family may bear in sending a son to secondary school or in settling him in urban employment is deducted against his claim on the family property. Daughters receive their share of the patrimony in the form of a dowry, which along with good health and a reputation for chastity, is a prerequisite for marriage. According to traditional family norms—no longer strictly observed—brothers are required to delay their own marriages until their sisters are dowered and married. Also by custom, marriages are arranged through negotiations between families, often with the assistance of a professional intermediary. In choosing a spouse for a daughter, the principal concern of parents is to enhance the family prestige. Some resistance to these traditional marriage institutions has emerged with the spread of Western norms and with changes in women's economic status. While the intellectual community of Athens argues that the dowry belongs to an outmoded past, the working girl earns money for her own dowry and thereby acquires greater freedom to select a marriage partner. Since the rationale for the dowry system is the necessity of providing a solid financial basis for the new household, a dowry tends to be dispensed with when an employed bride plans to continue working.

The employment of women outside the home is indicative of their changing role in society. Women's liberation is far from being a burning social issue in Greece, but women in cities, if not yet in rural areas, have begun to question their traditional role. Their dissatisfaction, along with other social forces at work, is slowly altering the long-established pattern of male and female relationships. In village communities, moral norms and sharply differentiated male and female spheres of activity divide the sexes, outside the home, into two separate worlds. Men pass their leisure time in the village square, especially in its coffeehouse (Figure 9)—chatting, drinking, and playing cards. Greece has altogether some 30,000 coffeehouses, but their number is declining, as they are replaced by cafes and confectionary shops that may be frequented by both men and women. Women usually spend free moments with other women in or near their homes or at the communal fountain. The main opportunity women have for social activity is during and after the Sunday-morning church service, when they exchange gossip on village happenings. In the evening and on Sundays, boys and girls stroll separately, although on festival occasions, they perform traditional dances together. In urban areas, public recreational activity has become far less sexually segregated than it is in villages; family members go out together on social

FIGURE 9. Coffeehouse in the village of Malaxa, Crete. The coffeehouse is an austere establishment with an almost exclusively male patronage. In rural areas it is a key social institution—the focus of public and recreational activity for men.

occasions, as do groups of young men and women. Along with enjoying a wider social life and engaging in gainful employment, women, in larger numbers than before, are traveling, driving cars, and acquiring an advanced education—all signs representing a retreat from the shielded domesticity traditionally prescribed for women.

The direction of social change points to an enhanced status not only for women but also for the younger generation as well. Greek society has traditionally been gerontocratic in nature, with the older generation retaining its control over position and power as long as possible. Responsible roles normally became open to younger men only upon the incapacitation or death of their fathers. Youth had no voice in decisionmaking nor even a right to make known their needs and aspirations. "Total disrespect toward the young is very typical of Greece," one Greek writer commented in the mid-1960's, "and age seems to be a sufficient *a priori* argument against anything they have to say or offer." The inevitable frustration of youth under these circumstances made them vulnerable in the past to exploitation on the part of Communist and other leftist groups. Stressing the importance of youth to the nation's future, the regime has urged the business community to make the fullest possible utilization of the younger generation. It has established a consultative assembly of 100 members under age 40 to assist in policymaking and has catered to the recreational interests of young people by sponsoring sports programs and youth organizations.

Despite a universal concern for social position and reputation, no clearly defined system of social stratification is recognized. Ideas about democracy and equality, linked to the concept of *philotimo*, are inimical to acceptance of social distinctions based on class while the ease of upward social mobility prevents the hardening of class lines. Nevertheless, many observers perceive a hazy division of the urban population into upper, middle, and lower classes on the basis of such criteria as income, occupation, education, and lifestyle. Villagers use much the same criteria to make status distinctions among themselves, although they acknowledge no class formations as such. Physicians, teachers, civil servants, and other professional people in a village community have a higher social standing than farmers in general, because their roles entail no manual labor require an education beyond the village primary school, and provide a relatively high income. Among the farming population, status is related, among other considerations, to family reputation, earnings, the advancement of children through marriage and education, the acquisition of urban ties, and the possession of urban or Western consumer goods.

The rapid formation of a sizable middle class after World War II has been viewed as a social development of major significance. The upper ranks of this class are composed of professional people, entrepreneurs, and senior civil servants; while the lower ranks include clerks, junior civil servants, small merchants and shopkeepers, artisans, and skilled workers. Unskilled workers, domestic servants, and others engaged in low-paid menial occupations make up the lower class. Together, the middle and lower classes account for the bulk of the population.

The upper class has been in a state of disarray since the military coup of 1967. Numbering some 1,000 families, it had consisted of the royal household; leading politicians; high-ranking officers of the armed forces; an economic oligarchy of shipowners, industrialists, and financiers; and prominent figures in artistic and professional fields. This elite was distinguished from the rest of the population by its wealth, commanding influence, conspicuous consumption, and identification with Western culture, although not every member necessarily possessed all these attributes. The coup of 1967 radically changed the power structure incorporated in the upper class, with only one of its segments, the economic oligarchy, surviving virtually intact. Between the traditional upper class and the erstwhile junior military officers

who have assumed control of national life, there is little in common. Reflecting their recent rural and lower middle class origins, the new rulers hold firmly to traditional values. They regard the former elite as immoral and self-seeking and blame it for the country's supposed political and moral decay.

Responsibility for this decay, according to views formulated by the military regime to justify its existence, is also shared by society in general, whose "bad habits and corrupt mentality . . . inherited from the hundreds of years of Turkish occupation" have to be overcome by civic training and other measures preparatory to the restoration of democratic government. One focus of change is the patronage process, which has operated in society as an instrument of social mobility at all levels and also as an intrinsic part of the political system. Essentially, the patronage process involves a personal relationship between a patron (who is ideally a lawyer but may be any influential person) and a client, the patron serving the client as an intermediary and protector and receiving the client's political support in return. The process is a function, in part, of the cumbersome and highly centralized administrative apparatus and of a traditional value system that lacks an ethic of public service. Civil servants are expected to be motivated, as are other people, by personal and family considerations and, accordingly, to accept favors of various kinds in exchange for bestowing preferential treatment. In dealing with the civil service, the ordinary citizen prefers to work through a patron, rather than directly, not only because that procedure has proved more effective but also because he derives satisfaction from a personal relationship and from a sense of having circumvented the law.

Popular attitudes of cynicism, suspicion, and hostility toward public authority have prevailed, regardless of the type of government in power. The Greeks have developed neither a sense of loyalty to the state as an institution nor a concensus as to what constitutes a legitimate political system. Although the Byzantine legacy provides some historical sanction for a monarchy, the degree of promonarchist sentiment has wavered, except in the Peloponnesus and the Ionian Islands, where it has always been strong. Past plebiscites have alternately favored changing from a monarchy to a republic and from a republic to a monarchy, but the plebiscites, taken after periods of political confusion, have been indicative less of a popular preference for one form of government over another than of a popular hope that constitutional change might bring about political stability. Similarly, a felt need for relief from political turmoil helps explain popular tolerance, at least for a time, of the autocratic military regimes that have periodically taken over the reins of government.

In contrast to their sense of alienation from the state, Greeks feel a deep devotion to the nation. Any threat of foreign invasion or any affront to national honor quickly reconciles all internal differences. From recent history, Greeks point with particular pride to their firm rejection of Italy's ultimatum early in World War II, an event commemorated annually (on 28 October) as *Okhi* Day, *okhi* being the Greek word for "no." The significance of this national holiday was later extended to cover the resistance to communism in the civil war. *Okhi* Day has special importance in northern Greece, where past experience has made the inhabitants acutely aware of their vulnerability to invasion from the north. As they see themselves, the people of Macedonia and Thrace are guardians of a frontier under constant menace from Communist Slavs, a frontier that protects not just Greece but the whole free world. This entrenched animosity in northern Greece toward supposedly avaricious neighbors is likely to qualify local support for the government's policy of developing cordial and cooperative relations with bordering states. The policy may also encounter popular resistance across the nation because of its effect on the sensitive issue of the "unredeemed" Greeks. For the sake of improving relations with Albania and Turkey, the regime was willing to shelve Greece's historic claims to northern Epirus (southern Albania) and to Cyprus, but it ran the risk thereby of offending deeply felt latent national aspirations.

Modern Greeks relate to the Western world with a certain ambiguity. Self-assured upon recalling the contribution of their ancient ancestors to Western civilization, they become humiliated and insecure upon contemplating their country's economic and technological lag in contemporary times. To the shame of many educated Greeks, much of the country still remains basically eastern in orientation, although the pace of Westernization has quickened considerably since World War II. Emulation of the Western elite has long been the hallmark of the Greek upper class, which in turn has served as the reference group for the other social strata. Before the war, educated Greeks were most closely aligned with the academic and cultural traditions of Germany and France, but since the war the orientation, partly because of economic and political factors, has shifted toward the United Kingdom and the United States. Indicative of this shift is the increased emphasis placed on the study of the English language, at the expense of the French

and the German. A sizable number of Greeks have worked or studied in Western countries, and even larger numbers have been exposed to Western culture at home, through books, magazines, films, and radio and television programs. But while receptive to Western cultural influence and appreciative of economic and military assistance from the West, many Greeks have become hypersensitive to any suggestion of Western intervention in their country's internal affairs, such intervention having been a characteristic aspect of the traditional dependency of Greece on one or another of the major Western powers. As the most recent power to assume the role of patron and protector of Greece, the United States has come under fire from opponents of the military-backed regime because of its presumed support of the regime. This animosity toward the United States is in keeping with the Greek tendency to blame others for their own shortcomings.

C. Population

Trends in the growth and distribution of the population since World War II have become matters of grave national concern. Low and declining fertility, along with sizable emigration, has threatened to halt population growth and to produce an age structure topheavy with elderly people. Simultaneously, Athens has become the overcrowded target of accelerated internal migration, while a combination of urbanization and emigration has seriously depleted the countryside. In the official view, the rate of population increase in Greece, one of the lowest in Europe, endangers "the strength and competitive rigor of the country and may be detrimental to its national integrity." There are also grave implications for national security in the severe drain of population from the northern border areas. Moreover, there and elsewhere in rural Greece, the proliferation of derelict village communities carries with it the destruction of cherished traditional values and social institutions. Responding to the low rate of population growth, the government has taken measures both to stimulate the birth rate and to discourage emigration. Policies of rural development and of economic and administrative decentralization are designed to curb the flight to Athens.

1. Population growth

In the period between the first census of modern Greece, taken in 1828, and the latest census, in 1971, the population increased elevenfold, from 753,400 to 8,768,641 (Figure 10). Growth was accelerated in the first century of independence as the result of territorial gains and the heavy refugee influx after the 1922 population exchange with Turkey. Greece's growth rate was fairly high for a European country in the decade preceding World War II, but during the German occupation and the ensuing civil war, loss of life and harsh living conditions precluded substantial population gain. In the 1950's and 1960's annual growth rates fluctuated between a high of 1.2% and a low of 0.2%, but showed an overall downward trend. According to population estimates as of mid-1973, Greece's population of 8,930,000, although slightly larger than that of Bulgaria and considerably larger than that of Albania, was substantially smaller than that of Turkey, Yugoslavia, and Italy. Moreover, at 0.4%, Greece had a lower average annual rate of population growth than any neighboring country.

FIGURE 10. Population, selected censuses

CENSUS YEAR	POPULATION	AVERAGE ANNUAL RATE OF GROWTH*
		Percent
1828	753,400	...
1853	1,035,527	*1.3*
1870	1,457,894	*1.0*
1889	2,187,208	*1.2*
1907	2,631,952	*1.0*
1921	5,016,889	*0.6*
1928	6,204,684	*3.0*
1940	7,344,860	*1.4*
1951	7,632,801	*0.2*
1961	8,388,553	*1.0*
1971	8,768,641	*0.4*

... Not pertinent.
*Excluding gains and losses resulting from boundary changes

The rate of natural increase fell from 12.2 per 1,000 population in the prewar years of 1935-39 to 9.1 in 1967-71. Both the birth rate and the death rate declined over that period, the former more sharply than the latter (Figure 11). The death rate of 8.3 per 1,000 population in 1967-71, down from 14.4 in the immediate prewar years, was lower than that of most European countries, Greece's population having a relatively smaller proportion of aged persons. The infant mortality rate (i.e., the number of infant deaths per 1,000 live births) was 30 in 1970, somewhat above the European average, but well below the prewar (1939) rate of 118. Reflecting the decline in infant mortality, life expectancy at birth rose from 53 years in 1940 to 67 in 1960-62 for males and from 56 to 71 for females. Life expectancy in 1960-62 was approximately the same for Greek males as for U.S. males and about 3 years lower for Greek females than for U.S. females.



FIGURE 11. Vital rates

While an effort to reduce infant mortality continues, the government's campaign to raise the level of natural increase focuses on reversing the long-term downward trend of the birth rate. There were 17.4 births per 1,000 population in 1967-71, as compared with 26.6 in 1935-39. To some extent, the postwar decline in the birth rate is attributable to urbanization, to the increased employment of women outside the home, and to the emigration of large numbers of persons in the prime reproductive years. The decisive factor, however, is the voluntary curtailment of family size, two or three children being the desired maximum. Surveys have indicated that 95% of urban families and 86% of rural families practice some form of birth control. Contraceptives are available, but their use is not common except among the upper social groups. Instead, there is widespread resort to abortion to terminate unwanted pregnancy, the estimated number of abortions reaching 150,000 per year, about the same as the number of live births. Although prohibited by law and condemned by the Greek Orthodox Church, abortions are commonly performed throughout the country by licensed physicians.

The first step toward evolving a population policy for Greece was taken by the government with the establishment in 1967 of the Special Committee to Study Demographic Problems. As one of several measures to curb the prevailing low birth rate, the committee recommended the creation of family counseling centers ready to offer advice on birth control methods other than abortion, thereby eliminating the high incidence of sterility connected with abortion in Greece. Although the government failed to act on this recommendation, it passed several legislative acts designed to encourage large families. Financial incentives provided in legislation include a monthly family allowance; income tax relief for each child, on a progressive scale; and increased housing loans for families with more than three children. Other legislation grants preferential treatment to children of large families in gaining admittance to institutions of higher education; priority in appointment to primary and secondary school teaching posts to those who are members of large families, and preferential treatment to large families in the allocation of workers' housing.

As another means of promoting population growth, the Special Committee to Study Demographic Problems recommended that emigration be discouraged. In the first quarter of the 20th century, Greece lost a significant portion of its population to overseas emigration, but from 1925 to 1955 there were both a low rate of emigration and a fairly high rate of repatriation. The period since the mid-1950's, and especially since 1960, has been characterized by a high level of emigration and by a change in the direction of the migratory flow from overseas countries, principally the United States and Australia, to the countries of Western Europe, notably West Germany (Figure 12). In both volume and direction, the post-1955 migratory movement has represented a response to West Germany's demand for an abundant labor supply. Of some 1 million Greek emigrants in 1955-71, more than half went to West Germany, the number fluctuating from year to year, depending on West German labor needs. More than two-thirds of all emigrants during this period were in the 15-34 age group, and at least three-fourths came from rural areas, with Macedonia making by far the largest regional contribution. There were 144 male emigrants for every 100 female emigrants. The exact loss of population through postwar emigration is uncertain, because data are incomplete regarding the number of repatriates as well as the number of those who emigrated more than once.

For many years the Greek Government had encouraged emigration, because it relieved domestic unemployment and because emigrant remittances provided a source of needed foreign exchange. A revision of official attitudes has come about, however, with the recognition that the continuing high level of emigration has contributed not only to a declining rate of population increase but also to a growing labor



FIGURE 12. Greek emigration

shortage in Greece. Rather than barring emigration through administrative measures, the government is relying on improvements in living and working conditions both to restrain emigration and to encourage repatriation.

2. Age-sex structure

Greece's population pyramid (Figure 13) is acquiring the elongated shape typical of demographically advanced populations which have aged as a result of declining birth and death rates. There are three major contractions in the pyramid of the 1971 population: the 5-9 age group reflects the lower number of births resulting from peak emigration in the early 1960's; the 25-29 age group reflects the deleterious impact of World War II on family formation; and the 50-54 age group reflects the double effect of low numbers of births during World War I and casualties during World War II. The fewer number of males than females in the 30-49 age groups is explained by emigration.

Data from successive censuses indicate a rapid aging of population (Figure 14). The proportion of young people steadily dropped as the proportion of aged persons rose, with the proportion of persons of working age (persons age 15-64) remaining fairly stable. In 1971 the Greek population, relative to the U.S. population, had fewer young people and more aged people, as the following comparison of age structures shows:

	Greece	United States
0-14	*24.9*	*28.3*
15-64	*64.0*	*61.7*
65 and over	*11.1*	*10.0*

The median age of the Greek population in 1971 was 33.4 years, some 5 years above the median age of the U.S. population. The urban population of Greece, as compared with its nonurban population, had a higher proportion of persons of working age and a smaller proportion of persons in both the young and old dependency age groups.

According to the 1971 census, there were 95 males per 100 females in the Greek population, about the same as the sex ratio for the white population of the United States. Males predominated among persons under age 25, but were outnumbered by females in all higher age groups.

3. Distribution and density

At the time of the 1971 census Greece had an overall density of 172 persons per square mile, lower than that of any neighboring country except Turkey. Omitting Greater Athens, where there was a concentration of 15,211 persons per square mile, density in regions ranged from a low of 87 in Epirus to a high of 207 in the Ionian Islands (Figure 15). Only eight of the 52 nomarchies had a density exceeding the national average, while in 18 nomarchies, including seven of the 11 along the northern frontier, fewer than 100 persons per square mile were recorded. Between the 1961 and 1971 censuses, there was a net population loss, and therefore a drop in density, in all but two of the regions and in all but nine of the nomarchies (Figure 16). Most of the flow of population was to the



FIGURE 13. Age-sex structure, 1971

areas already characterized by high density. Population loss was attributable to the joint factors of emigration and urbanization.

According to preliminary data from the 1971 census, 53% of the population resided in urban areas (i.e., places of 10,000 or more inhabitants), 12% in semiurban areas (communities of between 2,000 and 9,999 inhabitants), and 35% in rural areas (places of fewer than 2,000 inhabitants). The distribution of population in terms of these three categories has changed substantially over the last half century, with the urban category growing at the expense of the nonurban categories (Figure 17). Between 1961 and 1971, when there was a 4.5% rise in total population, the urban population increased by 28.6%, whereas the semiurban population declined by 5.5% and the rural population by 16.4%. Of an urban population gain in 1961-71 slightly in excess of 1 million persons, almost four-fifths was contributed by two urban agglomerations, Greater Athens and Greater Thessaloniki. In 1971 the combined populations of these two agglomerations, roughly equal to the entire rural population, accounted for more than one-third of all inhabitants in the country and about two-thirds of all inhabitants in urban areas. None of the 11 other urban agglomerations (Figure 18) approached Greater Athens, or even Greater Thessaloniki, in size. In the intercensal period, only Greater Patrai, Greater Iraklion, and Greater Agrinion registered a population increase in excess of 15%, while four experienced a population decrease.

D. Societal aspects of labor

The opportunity for earning a livelihood in Greece appeared more favorable in the early 1970's than ever before in modern times due largely to two factors: an increase in labor demand brought about by economic expansion, and a decline in the rate of labor force recruitment caused by a low birth rate in the 1930's and by a heavy emigration of workers to West Germany. Lack of job opportunities at home, more than any other factor, had earlier spurred the emigration movement, but it persisted in the late 1960's and early 1970's primarily because workers found in West Germany higher rates of pay and better working conditions than those offered in Greece. Accordingly, there appeared to be little prospect of retaining Greek labor for the domestic economy without effecting appreciable improvements in wage scales and working conditions. Responsibility in these matters has belonged not to the trade union movement, historically ineffectual as an instrument for advancing the needs and aspirations of labor, but rather to the government. Article 27 of the 1968 Constitution stipulates: "The State cares for the



FIGURE 14. Population, by broad age group

FIGURE 15. Population, area, and population density, by region and nomarchy, 1971
(Area in square miles)

REGION AND NOMARCHY	POPULATION	PERCENT OF TOTAL POPULATION	AREA	PERCENT OF TOTAL AREA	PERSONS PER SQUARE MILE
Greater Athens:					
Section of Attiki Nomarchy	2,101,103	24.0	148	0.3	14,197
Section of Piraievs Nomarchy	439,138	5.0	19	Insig	23,113
Total	2,540,241	29.0	167	0.3	15,211
Central Greece and Euboea:					
Aitolia kai Akarnania	228,989	2.6	2,103	4.1	109
Attiki (except section in Greater Athens)	201,948	2.3	964	1.9	209
Evritania	29,533	0.3	790	1.6	37
Evvoia (Euboea)	165,369	1.9	1,509	3.0	110
Fokis	41,361	0.5	819	1.6	51
Fthiotis	154,542	1.8	1,686	3.3	92
Piraievs (except section in Greater Athens)	55,660	0.6	339	0.7	164
Voiotia	114,675	1.3	1,240	2.4	92
Total	992,077	11.3	9,450	18.6	105
Peloponnesus:					
Akhaia	239,659	2.7	1,239	2.4	194
Argolis	88,698	1.0	855	1.7	104
Arkadhia	111,263	1.2	1,706	3.4	65
Ilia	165,056	1.9	1,035	2.0	159
Korinthia (Corinth)	113,115	1.3	684	1.7	128
Lakonia	95,844	1.1	1,404	2.8	68
Messinia	173,077	2.0	1,155	2.3	150
Total	986,912	11.2	8,278	16.3	119
Ionian Islands:					
Kefallinia	36,742	0.4	361	0.7	102
Kerkira (Corfu)	92,933	1.1	248	0.5	375
Levkas	24,581	0.3	125	0.2	197
Zakinthos	30,187	0.3	157	0.3	194
Total	184,443	2.1	891	1.7	207
Epirus:					
Arta	78,376	0.9	622	1.2	126
Ioannina	134,689	1.5	1,927	3.8	70
Preveza	56,586	0.6	419	0.8	135
Thesprotia	40,684	0.5	585	1.2	70
Total	310,334	3.5	3,553	7.0	87
Thessaly:					
Kardhitsa	133,776	1.5	994	1.9	135
Larisa	232,226	2.7	2,067	4.1	112
Magnisia	161,392	1.8	1,018	2.0	159
Trikala	132,519	1.5	1,289	2.5	103
Total	659,913	7.5	5,368	10.5	123

Footnote at end of table.

FIGURE 15. Population, area, and population density, by region and nomarchy, 1971 (*Continued*)

REGION AND NOMARCHY	POPULATION	PERCENT OF TOTAL POPULATION	AREA	PERCENT OF TOTAL AREA	PERSONS PER SQUARE MILE
Macedonia:					
Ayion Oros (Mt. Athos)*	1,732	*Insig*	130	*0.2*	13
Drama	91,009	*1.0*	1,339	*2.6*	68
Florina	52,264	*0.6*	719	*1.4*	73
Grevena	35,275	*0.4*	903	*1.8*	39
Imathia	118,103	*1.4*	650	*1.3*	180
Kastoria	45,711	*0.5*	651	*1.3*	70
Kavala	121,593	*1.4*	834	*1.6*	147
Khalkidhiki	73,850	*0.8*	1,137	*2.2*	65
Kilkis	84,375	*1.0*	1,003	*2.0*	84
Kozani	135,709	*1.6*	1,375	*2.7*	99
Pella	126,085	*1.4*	968	*1.9*	130
Pieria	91,728	*1.1*	598	*1.2*	153
Serrai	202,898	*2.3*	1,539	*3.0*	132
Thessaloniki	710,353	*8.1*	1,374	*2.7*	517
Total	1,890,684	*21.6*	13,208	*25.9*	143
Thrace:					
Evros	138,988	*1.6*	1,638	*3.2*	85
Rodhopi	107,677	*1.3*	982	*1.9*	110
Xanthi	82,917	*1.0*	692	*1.4*	120
Total	329,582	*3.8*	3,312	*6.5*	100
Aegean Islands:					
Dhodhekanisos (Dodecanese)	121,017	*1.4*	1,028	*2.0*	118
Khios	53,948	*0.6*	349	*0.7*	155
Kikladhes (Cyclades)	86,337	*1.0*	993	*2.0*	87
Lesvos	114,802	*1.3*	832	*1.6*	138
Samos	41,709	*0.5*	300	*0.6*	139
Total	417,813	*4.8*	3,502	*6.9*	119
Crete:					
Iraklion	209,670	*2.4*	1,019	*2.0*	206
Khania	119,797	*1.4*	917	*1.8*	131
Lasithi	66,226	*0.7*	703	*1.4*	94
Rethimni	60,949	*0.7*	578	*1.1*	105
Total	456,642	*5.2*	3,217	*6.3*	142
Grand total	8,768,641	*100.0*	50,944	*100.0*	172

*An autonomous administrative area in Khalkidhiki nomarchy.



NOMARCHY INDEX

Region and nomarchy	Percent change
Greater Athens	+37.1
Central Greece and Euboea	+2.2
1 Aitolía kai Akarnanía	3.7
2 Attikí	+34.6
3 Evritanía	25.6
4 Évvoia	0.4
5 Fokís	13.5
6 Fthiótis	3.4
7 Pireáfvs	+0.8
8 Viotía	+0.4
Peloponnesos	10.0
9 Akhaía	+0.3
10 Argolís	1.6
11 Arkadhía	17.6
12 Ilía	12.6
13 Korinthía	+0.5
14 Lakonía	19.2
15 Messinía	18.3
Ionian Islands	13.2
16 Kefallinía	20.7
17 Kérkira	8.7
18 Levkás	1.7
19 Zákinthos	15.(
Epirus	12.0
20 Árta	5.1
21 Ioánnina	13.3
22 Préveza	9.5
23 Thesprotía	21.9
Thessaly	4.4
24 Kardhítsa	12.3
25 Lárisa	+0.6
26 Magnisía	1.5
27 Trikala	7.2
Macedonia	0.3
28 Dráma	24.8
29 Flórina	22.4
30 Grevená	18.9
31 Imathía	+3.1
32 Kastoría	3.7
33 Kavála	13.6
*34 Khalkidhiki	7.5
35 Kilkís	17.9
36 Kozáni	11.1
37 Péla	5.4
38 Piería	6.1
39 Sérrai	18.2
40 Thessaloníki	+30.5
Thrace	7.6
41 Évros	11.9
42 Rodhópi	1.4
43 Xánthi	7.5
Aegean Islands	12.5
44 Dhodhekánisos	1.6
45 Khíos	13.3
46 Kikládhes	13.6
47 Lésvos	19.1
48 Sámos	15.8
Crete	5.5
49 Irákleion	+0.6
50 Khaniá	8.6
51 Lasíthi	10.4
52 Rethímni	12.9

*Includes the autonomous area Ayion Oros (Mt. Athos)

18 FIGURE 16. Movement of population, by region and nomarchy, 1961–71



FIGURE 17. Population by urban, semiurban, and rural areas

FIGURE 18. Growth of urban agglomerations

URBAN AGGLOMERATION	POPULATION 1961	POPULATION 1971	PERCENT CHANGE, 1961-71
Greater Athens:			
Section of Attiki Nomarchy	1,447,182	2,101,103	+45.2
Section of Piraieva Nomarchy	405,527	439,138	+8.3
Total	1,852,709	2,540,241	+37.1
Greater Thessaloniki	380,648	557,360	+46.4
Greater Patrai	103,985	120,847	+16.2
Greater Volos	80,846	88,096	+9.0
Greater Iraklion	69,983	84,710	+21.0
Greater Khania	50,789	53,026	+4.4
Greater Agrinion	33,281	41,794	+25.6
Greater Kalamai	41,340	40,402	-2.3
Greater Katerini	30,005	30,512	+1.4
Greater Khios	30,405	30,021	-1.7
Greater Alyion	22,098	23,756	+4.7
Greater Ermoupolis	17,231	16,082	-6.7
Greater Sparta	13,034	13,432	+1.6

securing of employment, determines general conditions thereof, and aims at the material and moral uplifting of the workers."

Patterns of economic activity are governed, among other factors, by the level of economic development, by natural resources, and by certain popular idiosyncrasies. As in ages past, agriculture is the main economic pursuit, engaging more than 40% of the working population. Maritime activities (Figure 19), although no longer accounting for a significant share of total national employment, remain a locally important means of livelihood for islanders and for inhabitants of the heavily indented coastline of the mainland. Many activities—including agriculture, food processing, tourism, and shipping—are affected by seasonal change, so that labor shortages alternate with periods of unemployment or underemployment.

In keeping with Greek individualism, people prefer to have an independent occupation (Figure 20). This accounts for the fragmentation of agriculture, commerce, and industry into small family-owned and family-operated enterprises. Only about one-third of the economically active population receive wages or salaries, the remaining two-thirds working as



FIGURE 19. Fishermen repairing their nets in the Cretan village of Matala. Fishing, although widespread, accounts for less than 1% of total employment.

Old man selling sponges. The Aegean island of Kalimnos is the main center of sponge fishing.

Row of shoeshine boys

Vendor of koulouria carries his merchandise on his head. For many Athenians breakfast consists of koulouria bought on the way to work.

Strategically situated at the base of the Acropolis, the proprietor of a handicraft stand waits for the tourist trade. A substantial part of the workforce is engaged directly or indirectly in catering to some 3 million tourists each year.

FIGURE 20. Small independent business enterprises on the streets of Athens

proprietors or as unpaid family members. Employment preference is also influenced by status considerations, occupations requiring manual labor or dexterity being eschewed in favor of prestigious white-collar work. A civil service career was once the primary aspiration of secondary school and university graduates, but because of such factors as low pay, slow advancement, and insecurity of tenure during political change, government employment has come to be considered less desirable than employment in private enterprise.

Both the agricultural and nonagricultural labor forces are fairly widely, although unevenly, dispersed. The highest concentration of the agricultural population occurs in Macedonia and Thrace, where there is intensive cultivation of cotton and tobacco. Farmers in these two regions, as well as in Thessaly, also grow wheat. In the Peloponnesus and the islands, the agricultural labor force is chiefly engaged in growing grapes, citrus fruits, olives, and similar crops. Mountainous and semimountainous areas afford a meager livelihood for a dwindling number of sheep and goat herders. As the principal centers of industry and commerce, Greater Athens and Greater Thessaloniki attract the major share of the nonagricultural work force. In 1969, one-third of all industrial and handicraft establishments, employing more than half the relevant work force, were located in Greater Athens. The tobacco industry in Macedonia, the textile enterprises in Greater Athens and the Peloponnesus, and the shipyards at Elevsis in Attiki are among the most important employers of industrial labor. Despite government efforts to decentralize economic activity, several areas, e.g., the regions of Epirus and Thrace and certain nomarchies of other regions, are unable to provide nonagricultural employment on a sustained basis. Professional activity is also concentrated in Greater Athens and, to a lesser degree, in Greater Thessaloniki—in part because professionals decline to work elsewhere. Tourism is a fast developing economic activity that provides local employment on a seasonal basis in both insular and mainland Greece.

Of a potential labor force that includes all persons age 10 and over, a little more than half are actually economically engaged. Children in rural areas begin at an early age to help with work in the home and in the fields, but the employment of minors in nonagricultural occupations is restricted by legislation. One legal prerequisite of employment is the completion of primary school. In addition, a minor has to be at least age 12 to work in a commercial shop, restaurant, pastry shop, or hotel, and at least age 14 to work in an industrial or handicraft establishment. In occupations hazardous to health the age requirement rises. The prescribed retirement age is 65 for men and 60 for women, but about two out of five men and one out of eight women work beyond the retirement age; most of these are probably engaged in agriculture. For women of all ages agriculture is the dominant economic activity (Figure 21), accounting for two-thirds of total female employment. In urban areas the proportion of active women drops to half that in rural areas. Whereas most women in agriculture work as unpaid family members, most women in other pursuits are classified as salary and wage earners. Although women have legal entry into almost all occupations, there is widespread customary discrimination against them in appointment and promotion and also in remuneration. Outside of the civil service and certain institutions and enterprises, where the principle of equal pay for equal work is applied, the minimum wage for women approximates two-thirds that for men, and the minimum salary for women equals about half that for men. An effort to narrow the gap in compensation was begun in the 1960's but was not sustained.

Substantial changes in the distribution and composition of the work force and also in the conditions of labor have been proposed as a means of

FIGURE 21. Women harvesting wheat in Thessaly, the granary of Greece since ancient times. Despite the introduction of mechanized farming, harvesting with the hand sickle is still practiced.

easing the manpower shortage. Industrial representatives have recommended, among other things, the increased participation of women in economic activities, the transfer of underemployed agricultural workers to the industrial force, and the importation of African workers. The last of these proposals has been opposed by labor interests as being "harmful for many reasons." Labor leaders have also rejected industry's suggestion that persons entitled to unemployment compensation be required to accept employment, arguing that such persons should not have to assume work foreign to their experience or beneath their social position. Industry and labor, along with government, agree that one solution to the manpower shortage lies in the repatriation of Greek workers in West Germany and other Western European countries. Proposed incentives to lure these emigrants back home and also to attract surplus agricultural manpower into industry include the upgrading of domestic pay scales, which are about one-fourth those offered in West Germany—a proposal emphasized by labor, rather than industrial, interests; the provision of housing; and the guarantee of steady employment through work contracts of 1 or 2 years' duration.

Conditions of labor are regulated by a sizable body of legislation, much of it based on the Conventions of the International Labor Organization (ILO). Labor legislation is designed to protect wage earners in industry, commerce, the hotel industry, and other urban activities, and it applies to enterprises of any size; agricultural workers are not generally covered. Workers are supposed to be engaged through local labor exchange offices, at which all unemployed persons are required to register; in practice, employers hire whomever they want, complying with a few essential formalities. The maximum workweek in industry is 48 hours in 6 days of 8 hours each, but special regulations provide shorter hours for clerical personnel in corporations and for bank employees. Since 1969 industrial establishments have had the option of adopting a 5-day workweek with a 9½-hour workday. Overtime work requires the approval of a labor inspector. A paid annual vacation is granted after at least 12 months of continuous employment with the same employer, the length of vacation depending on the employee's position and years of service and on the nature of the enterprise. Legislation on maternity leave provides that no woman may work 6 weeks before and 6 weeks after childbirth. The employment of women and minors in nightwork and in unhealthful or hazardous occupations is subject to strict regulation. Legal minimum wage rates are set by the government, but more favorable rates may be determined for individual trades through collective bargaining. Actual wage and fringe benefits paid are substantially above the legal minimum requirement. Differentials for wages are payable at the rates of 25% for nightwork, 30% for overtime work for the first 60 days per annum, and 75% for Sunday and holiday work. The principal supplemental allowances include Christmas and Easter bonuses, a vacation allowance, family allowances, and allowances for unhealthful working conditions.

Responsibility for enforcing labor legislation belongs to the labor inspection service of the Ministry of National Economy (into which the Ministry of Labor was merged in 1971). Problems of inspection and enforcement are complicated by the fragmentation of industry into numerous small enterprises and establishments. In 1971 the media pointed out that there were only about 190 labor inspectors to check on thousands of enterprises all over the country—a set of data which was seen as demonstrating the impossibility of adequate inspection. Nevertheless, several thousand violations of labor legislation are uncovered each year, the most common abuses involving payment of wages, overtime work, Sunday and holiday work, and safety and health regulations.

The development of trade unionism has been handicapped by the composition of the labor force, with its preponderance of self-employed persons and unpaid family members; by the absence among Greeks of a disposition for collective action; and by the policy of successive governments in excluding trade unions from any role in political life and from any significant voice in economic affairs. Organizationally, the labor movement is fragmented into numerous small unions which have long resisted steps toward consolidation. Most unions are organized according to trades or professions on an area rather than on an enterprise basis. Unions of the same trade or profession combine to form a national federation, while unions in the same locality combine to form a labor center. National federations and labor centers are brought together in one national confederation, the General Confederation of Greek Labor (GSEE); a total of 110 national federations and labor centers were represented at the 17th General Congress of the GSEE in May 1973. From the officials of both the national federations and the labor centers, the general congress elects a 35-man administrative council, which from its own membership chooses an 11-man executive committee, with a president and a secretary general as the top officers. Greek trade unions have been isolated from the international labor movement since 1967, when, as an expression of displeasure with the

military-backed regime, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) suspended CSEE affiliation, and several International Trade Secretariats ousted their affiliated Greek federations.

Although the government has publicly embraced the principle of a free and democratic trade union movement, the practical effect of official policy toward organized labor has been to restrict its independence. In 1969 the government enacted comprehensive labor legislation aimed at the "cleansing and rejuvenation" of the labor movement. One target of this legislation was the elimination of the existing trade union leadership, which the government regarded as both corrupt and politically unreliable. Under a provision requiring that any union official had to be employed as a worker for a minimum number of days annually, some 100 top leaders were removed from office. On the recommendation of an ILO investigating commission, this provision was discarded in 1971 labor legislation, but most leaders purged in 1969 continued to be barred from office under a new provision disqualifying any leader who had in the meanwhile collected a pension. Existing legislation regulating trade union finances continues to make the unions dependent upon the government for operating funds. Prior to 1969 the trade unions were financed through compulsory contributions made by workers and employers to a state-controlled fund called the Worker's Hearth; monthly subsidies were made to individual unions on the basis of their numerical strength. With a view to strengthening the financial independence of unions, legislation in 1969 provided for a type of checkoff system, to be included in collective bargaining agreements, that enabled all funds collected by the Worker's Hearth from union members to be turned over to their unions. In a move some observers regarded as a backward step, the checkoff system was abolished in 1971, and a new organization, supposedly free of government control, was created to administer revenues from the Worker's Hearth earmarked for trade union financing. The share of Worker's Hearth funds assigned to the trade unions, 25% of annual revenue, was far below the share allocated before 1969.

Collective bargaining is regulated by basic legislation passed in 1955 and subsequently amended. Collective agreements regarding terms of employment and general conditions of work are negotiated by representatives of both employees and employers, the most important employers' organization being the Association of Greek Industrialists. In the event of failure to reach agreement, the dispute is referred either to the Section on Employment of Labor Manpower (of the Ministry of National Economy) for mediation or to an arbitration tribunal for adjudication. The terms reached either by collective agreement or by arbitration decision are legally and automatically binding. In 1971 labor and management negotiated 46 collective agreements, while another 55 agreements resulted from arbitration decisions; 67 disputes were referred for mediation to the Section on Employment of Labor Manpower. There have been no work stoppages of any significance since the April 1967 change of government. Although the government has recognized in principle the right of workers to strike for economic reasons, it has in practice severely curtailed that right. Prior to 1967 strikes occurred with considerable frequency but seldom lasted long because of the inability of unions to provide strike relief.

E. Living conditions and social problems

Greek levels of living, although still among the lowest in Europe, have improved substantially in the past two decades of accelerated economic growth. In the late 1940's, as the country began recovering from the devastating effects of World War II and the ensuing civil war, average per capita income amounted to the equivalent of US$125, less than half the prewar level; by the end of 1972, the figure has risen to $1,421. Initially in the period of recovery, efforts to raise consumption levels and to improve social services were subordinated to economic development, but this order or priority was reversed under the premiership of George Papandreou, who promised Greeks a better life through the expansion of education, health, and welfare benefits. In like fashion, the military-backed government early pledged itself to removing "those social conditions—poverty, deprivation, insecurity, substandard housing—which tend to dehumanize the individual." Moreover, the present government, like the Papandreou government, has emphasized the importance of reducing the marked disparities in levels of living between the various regions and between the various social groups. In pursuing its objectives, the government has shunned innovation in preference to expanding certain existing social programs and reforming others. As evidence of the government's concern for the disadvantaged social groups, spokesmen point to substantially increased spending for social services and social welfare. In 1972 total outlays for social protection amounted to 13.7% of the gross national product (GNP), as compared with 8% in

1960 and 11.6% in 1966. Whereas the GNP increased by 75% between 1966 and 1972, spending for social protection rose by 109%.

Although an expanded economy appears to have done nothing to remove inequalities in the distribution of wealth, it has brought some material benefit to most of the population. Both in urban and rural areas people are better housed, better fed, and better dressed than ever before. This general impression of improved living conditions frequently noted by foreign observers is clearly supported by statistical data. In the period from 1960 through 1970, average per capita consumer expenditures rose by some 80% in terms of constant purchasing power. Moreover, there was a significant shift in expenditure patterns, the rate of increase in expenditures having risen more rapidly for nonessential than for essential needs. Per capita spending in drachmas (Dr30=US$1) was as follows:

	1960	1970	Percent increase
Food	3,899	5,707	46
Tobacco	334	544	63
Clothing and footwear	1,118	2,336	109
Housing and water supply	1,222	2,115	73
Furniture and household utensils	268	1,022	281
Heating and lighting	280	608	117
Household maintenance	304	543	79
Health and personal care	339	635	87
Travel and transportation	516	1,247	142
Telecommunications	55	161	193
Recreation	571	1,285	125
Education	173	204	18
Total	9,079	16,407	81

In the same period, particularly since 1967, wages and salaries showed a marked upward trend, although some of the gain was offset by the rising cost of living.

Income levels during the 1960's continued to vary significantly from one region to another, with lowest levels occurring in Epirus and Thrace and highest levels in Athens. Per capita income was two to three times greater in urban than in rural areas. Under the military-backed administration, however, the rural areas benefited considerably from a cancellation of farmers' debts and from public works programs. Rural families, furthermore, were the chief beneficiaries of emigrants' remittances (totalling US$342.1 million in 1970 alone), much of which was spent for consumer goods and services.

1. Housing

Housing conditions have long been unsatisfactory for low-income groups in urban areas and for much of the rural population. Investment in housing construction has traditionally absorbed a sizable proportion of the national income and of total investment, but a major part of housing investment has gone into dwellings for middle- and upper-income groups. Along with normal housing requirements, the country has been burdened in the last half-century with extraordinary needs arising from the influx of Asia Minor refugees under terms of the Treaty of Lausanne, from the destruction during World War II and the civil war of approximately one-fifth of the prewar housing stock, and from the recurrent loss of dwellings through earthquakes and other natural disasters. In the 1961 census, roughly one-fourth of all dwellings throughout the country were found to be overcrowded or to be substandard for other reasons. This figure underestimates the poor quality of housing by Western standards, however, as almost one-half of all dwellings were without electricity and almost three-fourths lacked running water.

In style and in certain other respects dwellings show considerable regional and rural-urban variation (Figure 22). The traditional rural house is typically a one- or two-storied structure made of local stone or mud brick, with a roof of clay or thatch; common features in two-storied units include a balcony and an outside stairway. Ideally, the dwelling is supplemented by a shed for livestock, a storehouse, and an outdoor oven (Figure 23)—all enclosed by a high stone wall. Among low-income families in rural and semiurban areas, a usual practice is to erect a one-storied structure for immediate occupancy and subsequently add a second or third story as resources permit. High-rise apartments have long been fashionable in Athens and Thessaloniki, and a demand for them is rapidly growing in other urban areas, although the traditional single-family home still predominates. One significant trend in newly constructed dwellings everywhere is an increase in the number of rooms; roughly one-third of all units constructed in 1968-70 had only one or two rooms, as compared with about one-half of all units occupied in 1961.

Critical of the record of previous administrations in dealing with the housing shortage, the government has pledged itself: "To satisfy as completely as possible both actual and future housing requirements, and to pay special attention to the satisfaction of the needs of the weaker income classes." In the first 3 years of military-backed rule, the number of new housing units rose by some 40% over levels achieved in the previous 3-year period (Figure 24), with rural areas receiving a much larger share of new units. Rural housing has also benefited from the extensive electrification and water supply projects pushed since 1967. In urban areas, especially in Athens, the government has given special attention to completing the eradication of refugee

Row of houses on Sifnos, one of the Cyclades Islands. Houses of this type, a familiar sight in the Aegean, are freshly whitewashed almost daily.

Old houses in Thrace and other parts of northern Greece frequently exhibit Turkish influences, such as overhanging solars

Housing project in Kozani. Concrete or cement-block houses with red tile roofs are gradually replacing traditional structures.

Apartments for high-income families on the Thessaloniki waterfront

FIGURE 22. Representative housing

slums, some of which dated from the Asia Minor influx. Of all houses constructed in the 1967-72 period, according to official claims, one out of 10 was built through state-sponsored programs under the jurisdictions of the Ministry of Social Services and the Workers' Housing Organization. Both agencies assist qualified persons needing accommodations by making housing loans and by distributing low-cost houses through a lottery system. Programs carried out by the Ministry of Social Services give priority to refugees, large families, and persons made homeless by natural disasters and urban renewal. The Workers' Housing Organization serves pensioners and workers with suitable social insurance coverage. In 1971 the agency announced plans to discontinue building houses designated for workers, confining itself to making loans, so that individuals would have greater freedom in selecting home sites. This step appears to have been inspired by the government's philosophy of private enterprise.

FIGURE 23. Stone-walled baking oven or fourno. Most ovens of this type are for communal use in the village, but some are attached to private dwellings.

2. Social insurance

The social insurance system consists of a complex network of numerous separate organizations and funds which together protect the working population and dependents against a comprehensive range of risks. Three principal agencies carry out a general national program. They are the Social Insurance Institute (IKA), which covers most wage and salary earners against all risks except unemployment; the Farm Insurance Organization (OGA), which administers a program for the rural population; and the Labor Force Employment Organization, which is responsible for unemployment insurance and family allowance programs. In addition, there are more than 300 "main," "auxiliary," and mutual assistance funds. Main funds are variously organized for employees only, for self-employed persons only, and for a combination of the two categories. They may offer one or more kinds of benefits, including pensions, sickness benefits, and lump-sum retirement or withdrawal payments. Auxiliary funds provide supplementary benefits in the form of pensions or lump-sum grants. An individual may be covered either by IKA or by a main fund for all risks, or he may be covered by IKA for some risks and by a main fund for others. Apart from the multiplicity of funds and the overlap of coverage, the system is confused by the absence of uniformity regarding such matters as level of benefits, qualifying conditions, and financial arrangements. One of the most criticized features of the system is the uneven distribution of the insurance burden, with some funds being financed almost entirely by contributions from employers and the insured, and other funds, notably those established for professional and white-collar workers, obtaining most of their finances from "social revenues," or "third-party taxes" (i.e., consumer or transaction taxes).

The military-backed government, like others before it, has promised a number of reforms designed to eliminate the most obvious inequities and shortcomings of the system, but progress thus far has been limited. Specifically, the original reform plan contemplated, among other things, a reduction in the number of funds, with some being absorbed by IKA; the gradual elimination of financing through third-party taxes and the substitution of some private means of self-financing; and the provision of a minimum old-age pension for everyone, with any desired additional protection being financed by the individual himself through an expanded system of auxiliary funds. Because of opposition from several influential trade unions that feared the proposed reforms would adversely affect their insurance funds, the preparation of a comprehensive social insurance code, announced as one of the government's major goals in 1969, remained uncompleted as of mid-1973. On the side of accomplishment, however, the government as early as 1968 carried out an administrative centralization of the various insurance funds and organizations, transferring jurisdiction from a number of different ministries to the newly created Ministry of Social

FIGURE 24. Housing construction

YEAR	NUMBER OF NEW DWELLINGS	PERCENT DISTRIBUTION						
		Urban areas				Semi-urban areas	Rural areas	Total
		Greater Athens	Greater Thessaloniki	Other cities	Total			
1964.....	66,236	49.2	16.5	13.4	79.1	7.3	13.6	100.0
1965.....	75,385	50.6	15.8	14.0	80.4	6.9	12.7	100.0
1966.....	83,944	49.1	13.1	14.8	77.6	7.7	14.7	100.0
1967.....	81,939	35.2	8.9	15.5	59.6	10.6	29.8	100.0
1968.....	112,392	33.6	9.4	14.3	57.3	11.1	31.6	100.0
1969.....	130,538	44.4	7.7	13.2	65.3	8.7	26.0	100.0

Services. In addition, the government has raised minimum monthly pension payments and has expanded sickness benefits and improved the quality of medical service for the insured.

In 1971 the number of insured persons according to type of benefit was as follows:

Primary pension	3,720,001
Supplementary pension	646,309
Sickness benefits	7,936,767
Lump-sum grants	473,758

In addition, some 360,000 persons (including civil servants and military personnel) were insured by the state against various risks. Almost the entire population (over 95%) was covered by health insurance, all but about 8% of it provided by three funds: OGA (which automatically insures the whole rural population); IKA; and the Greek Craftsmen's and Tradesmen's (Insurance) Fund (TEVE), the largest of the main funds. These three funds also carry most (about 95%) of the insurance against old age and disability; their pension branches reported the following data for 1970:

	Number of insured	Number of pensioners
OGA	2,200,000	441,000
IKA	935,000	211,200
TEVE	217,000	67,000

The two main criticisms of the benefits provided under the social insurance system are that medical services are often inferior and that pension levels are inadequate. According to some calculations, about two-thirds of all pensions are far below the minimum amount a person needs for subsistence.

A centralized system administered by the Labor Force Employment Organization covers, with few exceptions, all workers eligible for unemployment benefits. The unemployment allowance amounts to 40% of the average daily earnings for manual workers and 50% for white-collar workers but not less than two-thirds of the wage of an unskilled worker. In keeping with the downward trend of unemployment rates, the number of recipients of unemployment benefits fell from a high (during the last decade) of 124,120 in 1967 to 67,825 in 1970. The phenomenon of workers drawing unemployment allowances in a period of labor shortage is unacceptable in the view of many outside the ranks of organized labor, including the Association of Greek Industrialists, which in the early 1970's called for legislation to make the requirements for unemployment compensation more stringent. The family allowance program, also administered by the Labor Force Employment Organization, applies to all those covered by unemployment insurance. Through this program, which had 284,482 beneficiaries in 1969, an allowance is provided for each child under age 15, or under age 21 if an invalid.

3. Social problems and welfare programs

Greek patterns of criminal and other forms of antisocial behavior differ significantly from those found in the United States and Western Europe. Some observers attribute the difference to Greece's relatively retarded state of socioeconomic development and argue that with continuing urbanization and industrialization the country can expect to face the kinds of social problems typical of more advanced societies. Other observers, in attempting to account for Greece's low crime rate (allegedly "the lowest among all civilized countries") and for the absence of organized crime, find the explanation in the psychology and mentality of the Greek people. "The Greeks on the whole," one British journalist comments in discussing the crime pattern, "are well integrated with life."

On the basis of official statistics, it is difficult to evaluate the mental health of the society. Psychiatric hospitals contain about one-fifth of all hospital beds, but persons suffering from psychoneuroses make up less than 3% of all patients discharged from hospitals, while the number of suicides averages about 300 annually.

Narcotics have always been used by certain social elements in Piraievs and other major seaports, but Greece has never had a national drug problem, and as of the early 1970's any drug abuse among adolescents was minimal. The approximate number of drug addicts is officially placed at 6,000. There is strict enforcement of narcotic laws, with routine destruction of cannabis plants, which grow wild in some parts, and with frequent confiscation at Greek entry points of drug shipments from the Near East destined for Western Europe. Prostitution arouses little social concern; it is permitted under conditions of registration, medical inspection, and other forms of state regulation. As measured by crime statistics, juvenile delinquency appears to be of minor significance; young persons (aged 13-20) make up from 6% to 7% of all persons sentenced each year for criminal offenses. Approximately half the criminal offenses committed by all age groups constitute violations of special penal laws, such as price control legislation, traffic regulations, and public health regulations. Of other types of offenses, the most common are isolated assaults and petty thefts and robberies.

Probably the most serious social problems confronting the society are associated with conditions of poverty—problems which are dealt with through a complex welfare network involving government agencies, semipublic entities, and private organizations. All philanthropic societies are subject to state direction and supervision, and most are dependent on the state, wholly or in large part, for operating funds. The annual budget of the Ministry of Social Services provides for the subsidization of many (about 800 in 1972) welfare agencies, including a regional network of social welfare centers. Society at large subscribes to the idea that the state is obligated to aid the indigent and does not regard such assistance as charity. The range of welfare programs provided includes the protection of orphans and other needy children; the care and resettlement of refugees; emergency relief during natural disasters; and assistance to indigent, elderly, and handicapped persons. In 1969 a total of 113 state and private institutions maintained various welfare services for the adult population. Some 23,000 children were cared for in 517 institutions in 1970, and another 25,000 children, lacking proper support, were the beneficiaries of cash payments from the state. Particularly important in the field of child welfare is the Patriotic Institute of Social Welfare and Aid (PIKPA), a semipublic organization which has been operating since 1914. It is especially active in child health and maternity care, maintaining numerous clinics for infants and expectant mothers, and also a number of day nurseries. In general, welfare services are handicapped by insufficient funds and by a shortage of trained personnel, much of the burden falling upon volunteer workers. Services have been improved from year to year, but they are still deficient in meeting modern social demands.

F. Health

Like other indexes of levels of living, public health has improved markedly in the past two decades, although existing standards still lag behind those prevailing in Western Europe. Average life expectancy is about the same in Greece as in Western Europe, but the Greek rate of infant mortality, despite a sharp decline, remains comparatively high. Morbidity rates for infectious diseases also continue to be higher in Greece than in Western Europe, notwithstanding considerable progress by the Greeks in combating these diseases. Factors accounting for the differences between Greece and Western Europe include certain Greek deficiencies in diet, environmental sanitation, personal hygiene, and health services. On the positive side, the country has a generally salubrious climate and no insurmountable environmental characteristics adverse to health.

Factors related to substandard living conditions constitute the most significant threat to public health. Living quarters for most of the population are overcrowded, poorly ventilated, and lacking in sanitary facilities—deficiencies that contribute to the spread of infectious diseases. Scientifically treated water supplies, sewage disposal systems, and regular garbage collection services are found only in Athens, Thessaloniki, and a few other major cities. The government has been engaged in an effort to provide rural areas with a safe water supply (Figure 25), but many villagers have recourse only to contaminated water sources. Wells, streams, and springs comprise the main sources of water in rural areas, and they constitute health hazards in the many villages where human waste is disposed of indiscriminately. In a test of almost 4,000 potable water samples in northern Greece in 1968-71, almost half were found unsuitable for drinking purposes. In some parts of the country a water shortage occurs in the dry season, and in certain small islands that depend on rain water collected in cisterns water is always scarce. Standards of public and private sanitation are generally unsatisfactory, including standards involving the handling and marketing of food (Figure 26). Slaughter houses, food-processing plants, food markets, and eating places are all subject to sanitary regulations, but enforcement suffers from a shortage of inspectors. Outbreaks of typhus, paratyphus, dysentery, hepatitis, and other diseases caused by contaminated food and water were frequently reported in the press in the early 1970's.

Environmental pollution has become an acute public health problem in a number of key localities. The Thermaikos Gulf (Thermaikos Kolpos), one of the most blighted areas, faces the threat of total destruction from sewage and industrial wastes. As a protective public health measure, the gathering of shellfish was prohibited in parts of the gulf in 1972. Certain coastal waters of the mainland are regularly patroled to trace the sources of pollution, including oil spillage by commercial ships, an offense punishable by a heavy fine. Air pollution is considered a serious health hazard only in Athens; the chief factor is the high consumption of liquid fuels in central heating and in automobile use. Industry contributes little to air pollution in either Athens or Thessaloniki, being for the most part located outside the city limits in both cases. Authorities recognize the potential hazard of agricultural pesticides and have attempted to regulate their use accordingly. Thus far, the country has no



Flume from mountain spring conveys water to a village in Ioannina

A village in Lakonia receives water piped from a distant well

FIGURE 25. Government projects since World War II have provided hundreds of villages with an ample supply of safe water

single agency devoted to the problems of environmental pollution, although the need for one is widely acknowledged.

The diet is quantitatively adequate, daily caloric intake approaching the European average, but qualitatively deficient, notably in the consumption of animal protein. Nutritional deficiency diseases, however, have a low incidence, and there are only isolated cases of serious malnutrition. Significant nutritional changes since pre-World War II years (Figure 27) include a rise in the total number of daily calories consumed and a reduction in cereal consumption in favor of an increased consumption of such protective foods as meat, milk, vegetables, and fruit. The amount of daily protein has increased since the war, the proportion derived from foods of animal origin rising from 12% to 20%. Although a protein consumption of 99 grams per day is considered quantitatively satisfactory, the 20% representation of animal protein fails to meet nutritionally acceptable levels. The urban diet is nutritionally better than the rural, containing as it does a wider variety of foods and a greater amount of meat and meat products. In rural areas families continue to produce most of the food they consume. As in ancient times, the most important food items there are bread, wine, and olive oil (the principal source of fat). Other staples are goat's cheese, pulses, and fruit and vegetables in season. Meat is reserved for special occasion. Seafood is a major source of protein in coastal settlements, but its consumption in the interior is minimal.

The principal food problem lies in satisfying the increased demand for meat and high quality dairy products that has accompanied the rising level of living. During the 1960's meat consumption grew at an annual average rate of 13%, while the corresponding rate for meat production was only 8%. As a result of this gap, some 30% of domestic requirements in meat and dairy products have to be met by imports. Government programs to ease the meat shortage are directed at increasing the consumption of fish and at expanding meat production in general, but with emphasis on products that are suited to the terrain and climate. Such

FIGURE 26. Athens meat market. Meat and other food products may be marketed under sanitary conditions considered unacceptable in the United States.

products include pork, poultry, and rabbits, as opposed to beef, for which there is the sharpest rising demand.

Statistics on morbidity and mortality, although incomplete, indicate that the disease pattern has changed substantially over the past several decades. Chronic and degenerative diseases, which in 1930 accounted for only 13% of all deaths, were the major causes of death in 1970, with malignant neoplasms and cerebrovascular diseases together being responsible for almost one-third of total deaths. During the same period, the proportion of deaths caused by (nonrespiratory) infectious and parasitic diseases declined steadily—from 65% in 1930 to 9.1% in 1957 and to 2.7% in 1970. The most prevalent illness appears to be influenza, which accounted for approximately two-thirds of all cases of infectious diseases reported to health centers in 1966-70. Other frequently reported diseases were measles, whooping cough, mumps, and chicken pox. Malaria was once the nation's major health problem, but the annual number of reported cases averaged only 33 in 1966-70, and there have been no deaths from the disease since 1960. Authorities attribute the greatly reduced incidence of infectious and parasitic diseases to improved living conditions, disease control programs, and the introduction of new drugs and vaccines.

The delivery of adequate health care is hampered by a shortage of facilities and trained personnel and also by an uneven distribution of both these resources (Figure 28). In 1970, there was one hospital bed for every 161 persons, as compared with one bed for every 174 persons in 1964, but even with that improvement the Greek ratio remained one of the least satisfactory in Europe. In Greater Athens, where half of all hospital beds were concentrated, the bed/population ratio was 1:93; at the other extreme, Thrace had a ratio of 1:445. For the entire country there was a total of 852 hospitals and clinics, differentiated as follows:

Public hospitals	120
Private hospitals	32
Clinics	613
Health centers	87
Total	852

In addition, an OGA network of some 1,000 agricultural clinics and 100 health stations provided medical care for farmers. Hospitals and clinics were generally small facilities, almost 90% of them having fewer than 100 beds and about half of them having fewer than 20 beds. Medical facilities in Athens accounted for three-fourths of the largest hospitals in the country (those with more than 300 beds), although only one-fourth of all hospitals and clinics. Soon after assuming power, the military-backed government began an extensive building program aimed not only at relieving the overall shortage of facilities but also at providing a more balanced regional distribution of medical care. The heart of the program is the construction of at least one large general hospital in each of the seven administrative regions (Figure 29). This program is expected to bring about a more even geographical distribution of medical personnel, long heavily concentrated in Greater Athens, and, to a lesser extent, in Greater Thessaloniki. In 1970, there was one physician for every 338 inhabitants in Greater Athens, in contrast to a ratio of 1:1,290 in Central Greece and Euboea and a ratio of 1:1,263 in Thrace. In Greece the ratio of physicians to total population, 1:615, was more favorable than in several more developed European countries. During the 1960's the medical schools of the Universities of Athens and Thessaloniki produced approximately 5,500 new physicians, and foreign medical schools trained an additional 400 to 500 Greek physicians. The number of general practitioners appears to be sufficient, but there is a shortage of specialists in certain fields. Of other categories of medical personnel, nurses in particular are in short supply, although an expansion of training facilities for them is intended to remedy this deficiency.

Health care varies in quality from poor in the rural areas to generally satisfactory in the major cities. Most existing provincial hospitals (pending the completion of the planned network of regional hospitals) have neither the equipment nor the trained personnel to provide modern medical treatment. Provincial patients needing specialized care are normally transferred to Athens for hospitalization, while Greeks who can afford it seek medical attention abroad.

FIGURE 27. Average daily per capita food consumption

YEAR	FOODS										PROTEIN CONTENT		CALORIES
	Cereals	Starchy foods	Sugar	Pulses and nuts	Vegetables	Fruit	Meat	Eggs	Fish	Milk	Fats and oils	Total	Animal origin	
	Grams											*Percent*		*Number*
1935–38	446	57	30	40	74	169	53	11	15	268	40	84	*12*	2,600
1960–62	430	108	44	39	360	300	72	19	25	344	50	96	*15*	2,940
1967*	331	161	56	46	382	397	111	29	28	448	51	99	*20*	2,900

*Provisional data.

FIGURE 28. Medical facilities and personnel, by region, 1970

REGION	NUMBER OF FACILITIES	BEDS		PHYSICIANS		DENTISTS	
		Number	Persons per bed	Number	Persons per physician	Number	Persons per dentist
Greater Athens	217	27,262	93	7,507	338	1,780	1,427
Central Greece and Euboea	88	2,386	416	769	1,290	1,145	866
Peloponnesus	121	3,502	282	977	1,010	248	3,979
Ionian Islands	17	1,094	169	157	1,175	26	7,094
Epirus	38	952	326	278	1,116	65	4,774
Thessaly	74	2,323	284	561	1,176	172	3,837
Macedonia	154	9,847	192	2,815	672	653	2,895
Thrace	27	741	445	261	1,263	65	5,070
Aegean Islands	44	4,018	104	476	878	135	3,095
Crete	72	2,508	182	462	988	106	4,308
Total	852	54,633	161	14,263	615	4,395	1,995



FIGURE 29. General Hospital at Patrai, under construction. This 400-bed facility forms part of the government program to upgrade provincial medical services by providing each administrative region with a large modern hospital.

Greek physicians are generally well qualified, and although the country has very limited research facilities of its own, specialists attempt to keep abreast of the latest international developments in their fields. The government, through the Ministry of Social Services, has sought to improve the health care provided under the social insurance system, often a target of public complaint. Among other measures, the government has introduced a system enabling those insured with IKA to have their own family physician, and it has raised hospital fees to encourage the provision of better service.

G. Religion

The Eastern Orthodox Church is an essential part of Hellenism, as its status as the established religion acknowledges; yet its role in modern society is problematical. Almost all Greeks are nominally Orthodox, but only a small fraction practices its faith with any sense of dedication, the widespread lack of religious interest and commitment being traceable in part to the church's failure to adapt itself to the needs of contemporary life. The church, nevertheless, remains a cohesive force of unmatched importance—partly because the Orthodox heritage permeates the Greek way of life and partly because church and nation are one and inseparable in the popular mind. It was the church, as every Greek learns in childhood, that nursed and sustained national consciousness during four centuries of Turkish domination, and that initially led the struggle for national independence. But after centuries of isolation from outside influence, the church projected in independent Greece the image of an essentially backward and obscurantist institution. Self-complacency engendered by a protected status in society has worked to foreclose the possibility of self-examination and change, as has preoccupation with a struggle to gain independence from state control.

Since the military coup of April 1967, state intervention in church affairs has kept the Hierarchy

(all the bishops in a body) in an almost constant state of turmoil. A venal higher clergy, an uneducated lower clergy, and an attitude of indifference toward social concerns, among other shortcomings, made the church a primary target of the reform-minded regime. The task of "revitalizing a moribund institution" fell to a forward-looking and respected clergyman, Ieronymos Kotsonis, who became Archbishop of Athens and All Greece as a direct consequence of government action. Proceeding in a highly autocratic manner foreign to Orthodox traditions of democratic rule, the new archbishop purged the higher clergy, centralized church administration, and instituted other reforms, arousing by his deeds the intense animosity of many bishops. As of mid-1973, after a crisis of confidence had induced an ailing and embittered archbishop to submit his resignation (which was duly rejected), the only possibility for restoring harmony both in intra-church and in church-state relations appeared to be some compromise in postcoup reforms.

The Constitution of 1968, while recognizing the Eastern Orthodox Church as the established religion, declares that freedom of religious conscience is inviolable. "Every known religion" may practice its form of worship without hindrance, but proselytism or "any other form of interference" against the established religion is prohibited. Under Greek law, marriage and divorce are ecclesiastical rather than civil matters; however, marriage performed according to the rites of a church lacking official recognition may not be registered in the Vital Statistics Office, and children born of an unregistered marriage are illegitimate in status. Relations between the Orthodox majority and the religious minorities, which make up an estimated 2% of the total population (Figure 5), are generally harmonious, although religious friction is not entirely absent. The Jehovah's Witnesses, which the government refuses to recognize as a "known religion," has been unable to have its marriages registered, and some followers of this church have been arrested for attempting to proselytize Orthodox believers. Isolated instances of anti-Semitism have also occurred. Although the Greeks in general appear to have a high degree of religious tolerance, a few fanatical Orthodox clergymen have preached against Freemasons, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Zionists. The Jewish and Muslim minorities, moreover, have felt some disquiet over the slogan of the military-backed regime: "Greece of Christian Greeks."

Eastern Orthodoxy is principally represented in Greece by the Orthodox Church of Greece (Figure 30), an autocephalous body that exercises its sovereignty independently of the Ecumenical Patriarch in Istanbul, the highest spiritual authority of Orthodoxy. The Greek Church has no jurisdiction over the Orthodox Church of Crete, the Orthodox dioceses in the Dodecanese, or the monastic community of Mount Athos—all of which fall directly under the Ecumenical Patriarch. Also within the Orthodox fold is a dissident element, the Old Calendarists—so-called because they still follow the Julian calendar, which the Greek Government and the Greek Church abandoned in 1924 in favor of the Gregorian calendar. Leaders of the sect place its membership at 1.5 million, while another source sets the figure at 200,000. The Old Calendarists recognize no formal connections with either the Ecumenical Patriarchate or the Greek Church, and they have fiercely resisted the latter's efforts to subjugate them. At the center of this Orthodox schism is the conviction of the Old Calendarists, who have a fanatical hostility toward Roman Catholicism, that the Greek Church is subject to Vatican influence. In reality, most prelates of the Greek Church have a deeply ingrained antipathy toward Catholicism, and the church leadership voiced strong opposition in the mid-1960's to the efforts of the Ecumenical Patriarch and the Pope to set aside historical differences. A more positive attitude toward ecumenism, however, has been expressed by Archbishop Ieronymos.

FIGURE 30. Data on Orthodox communities, 1971

COMMUNITY	ARCHDIOCESE	DIOCESES	PARISH CHURCHES	PRIESTS	PERCENT OF PRIESTS WITH INADEQUATE EDUCATION
Church of Greece	1	68	7,138	7,405	*65.5*
Church of Crete	1	7	721	756	*51.7*
Dioceses of the Dodecanese and the Patmos Patriarchal Exarchy	0	4	137	162	*60.8*
Total	2	79	7,996	8,323	*61.0*

FIGURE 31. Iconostasis of the Vlatadon Monastery in Thessaloniki. The significance of the iconostasis, which stands between the congregation in the main body of the church and the sanctuary, which is accessible only to the priest, is the division between the world of the flesh, in which the congregation dwells, and the world of the spirit, which belongs to God. The rows of icons supported by the screen offer to the faithful a symbolic bridge between the two.

In matters of doctrine, all Orthodox communities in Greece are united with the Ecumenical Patriarchate as well as with other Orthodox autocephalous churches and patriarchates. The Scriptures are interpreted in accordance with the decisions of the first seven ecumenical councils and the teachings of the early church fathers. As in the Roman Catholic Church, seven sacraments are recognized: baptism with threefold immersion, Christmation (confirmation), communion for all members, penance (confession), holy orders, matrimony, and the anointing of the sick (holy unction). Communion is taken four or five times a year, and confession is made with similar infrequency. The Liturgy (Mass) is not celebrated daily as in the Latin rite, and it is always chanted. The congregation stands throughout the service; worshippers move about and come and go as they please. Church structures, patterned after the sixth century Byzantine Hagia Sophia (Church of the Holy Wisdom) in Istanbul, are in the shape of a Greek cross, with the ends terminating in apses. There is a dome over the center representing heaven, and the union of dome and cross symbolizes the union of heaven and earth. The altar, at the eastern end of the church, is separated from the nave by the icon screen, or iconostatis (Figure 31). Churches are usually richly decorated, not only with icons but also with frescoes and mosaics depicting religious subjects.

The church calendar plays an important part in the lives of the devout and even affects the routine of nominal adherents who seldom attend regular church services. There are altogether 200 meatless days in the year, but fasting is commonly neglected, although less so during the four principal fasting periods of the church year—Lent, Assumption, Christmas, and the Fast of the Apostles. Every Greek is feted on his nameday—that is, the day of the saint for whom he was named—and every village celebrates the nameday of its major church. Epiphany Day (6 January) is observed in Thessaloniki, Piraievs, and other seaports with a "Blessing of the Waters" ceremony. The Annunciation of the Virgin Mary (25 March) and the Dormition of the Virgin Mary (15 August) are important feast days throughout Greece, but especially on the Cycladic island of Tinos (Figure 32), where a "miraculous" icon of the Virgin was discovered in 1822. Holy Week, the culmination of the Lenten season preceding Easter, is known as Great Week, and Easter, celebrating the Resurrection, is the most important festival in the church calendar (Figure 33). To Greeks Easter day represents the height of joy—Christ and nature are alive again.

Social and evangelical activities have largely been the functions of religious brotherhoods and their associated lay organizations. The most influential of the brotherhoods are *Zoe* (Life), founded in 1907, and *Sotir* (Savior), a group of conservative older members that broke away from *Zoe* in 1960 because of the latter's progressive views. Essentially a militant reform

FIGURE 32. Religious processing on Tinos, where great crowds gather on the feast days of 25 March and 15 August in expectation of help and healing from the miraculous icon of the Virgin Mary

Worshipers with their lighted candles after the midnight service on Easter Sunday. Upon completion of the Liturgy, all candles are extinguished, and the priest lights a fresh taper, from which worshipers with their candles get a "New Light." A final service is held outdoors before worshipers depart for home with their lighted candles. It is considered bad luck to have the candle go out before reaching home.

The traditional roasting of paschal lambs in the village square on Easter Sunday marks the end of long weeks of fasting

FIGURE 33. Easter is the holiest season of the year; the period of mourning ends at midnight Saturday, and Sunday is devoted to popular rejoicing

movement. *Zoe* has aimed primarily at making religion a personal spiritual experience rather than a formality. It advocates, among other things, personal study of the Scriptures, extemporaneous prayer, and frequent communion. *Zoe* followers also favor increased lay participation in formulating church policies and active church involvement in social and economic problems. The brotherhood derives its chief support from young people, the primary target of its activities, and from urban middle-class groups. The influence of *Zoe* has been considerably enhanced under the military-backed regime, which shares much the same ideas as the brotherhood on church reform and revitalization. Since the 1967 coup active members of *Zoe* have been elevated to the Archbishopric of Athens and to many of the bishopries which aged and discredited incumbents were forced to vacate.

Largely the work of the new archbishop, the revised Charter of the Church of Greece (issued as Legislative Degree No. 126 of February 1969) and subsequent implementing legislation introduced several innovations into church administration, some of which became highly controversial. Although the Holy Synod of the Hierarchy (the assembly of all bishops) remained the supreme ecclesiastical authority, real power was concentrated to an unprecedented degree in the Archbishop of Athens and All Greece, who presided over all central administrative and executive bodies. The administrative authority of the Holy Synod of the Hierarchy was delegated to the Standing Holy Synod, whose 12 members were to include the chairmen of 10 permanent synodical committees. These committees, which had functional responsibility for diverse ecclesiastical matters, along with the General Ecclesiastical Assembly, which provided for lay participation in church administration, represented new additions to the administrative structure. Within the Hierarchy particularly strong criticism was directed against the revised system for naming the Standing Holy Synod, whereby new members were to be proposed by the outgoing body and approved by the Holy Synod. Traditionally, as provided for in a 1928 agreement with the Ecumenical Patriarchate, selection was on the basis of rotation and seniority, with half the bishops coming from "old" (pre-1913) Greece and the other half from "new" Greece (those portions added after 1913). The strong opposition of the Hierarchy to the change in system, which had also aroused the displeasure of the Ecumenical Patriarch, was one of the factors leading to the archbishop's attempt to resign in early 1973. Subsequently, in May 1973, in an act tantamount to a repudiation of the archbishop, the Holy Synod used the old system to elect a new Standing Holy Synod, after a previous election of that body, made on the basis of the revised system, was declared void by the Council of State, the highest Greek administrative tribunal.

The effect of postcoup reforms on church-state relations constitutes another area of controversy. Some circles criticize the 1969 charter for supposedly granting the church a degree of independence from the state that violates Greek tradition. Other circles contend that although the church may have acquired an enlarged degree of freedom, the state retains a considerable influence in church affairs. The charter allows the Minister of Education and Religion to attend meetings of the Holy Synod and the Standing Holy Synod when administrative matters are discussed; the minister's presence, however, is no longer mandatory as in the past. Of more importance, the government still participates in naming the archbishop and the bishops—selecting, in the case of the archbishop, from three candidates submitted by the Holy Synod of the Hierarchy, and in the case of bishops, from three candidates submitted by the Standing Holy Synod. Moreover, under the 1968 Constitution, the government retains the right to legislate on matters pertaining to church organization and administration.

While dissension racks the higher clergy, religious life at the parish level suffers from a shortage of priests and from a lack of well-trained priests. Fewer than half of all priests in the country (Figure 30) have received appropriate training, that is, training at such institutions as the Theological Schools of the Universities of Athens and Thessaloniki, the Halki Theological School (in Istanbul), and the higher ecclesiastical institutes and seminaries. A low educational standard has long been characteristic of the village priest, who, because he is almost always a married man, is barred from advancing in the church hierarchy. Higher education and theological training are reserved for celibate priests (who usually become monks), for they alone qualify for high office. In contemporary times the priesthood holds little appeal for educated youth. In a survey conducted in the early 1970's, theological school graduates who had rejected ordination included among their reasons for so doing doubts regarding their faith, the despotic behavior of bishops, low clerical pay, the clergy's lack of social esteem, and the outmoded appearance of clergymen (Figure 34). Faced with a decline in the number of trained candidates for the priesthood, the church has adopted extraordinary measures to fill vacancies in small villages, permitting the ordination of local schoolteachers and of persons with only a primary school diploma.

FIGURE 34. The Orthodox priest is easily recognizable by his flowing black robes, flat-topped cylindrical hat, full beard, and long hair twisted into a knot at the back of the head

H. Education

Educational development has been a recurrent focus of controversy since the late 1950's, as successive governments with differing ideas sought to harmonize a humanistic educational tradition with the type of schooling and training appropriate to an industrializing society. The humanistic spirit which had infused the educational system since its inception early in the 19th century was defined in terms of the Hellenic-Christian ideal. Oriented to the past, the prescribed curriculum emphasized classical Greek, Orthodox religion, and Greek history and was justified on intellectual, religious, and patriotic grounds. But with the growing awareness after World War II of the relationship between economic productivity and scientific and technological skills, it became obvious to many that the traditional educational system ill served the Greek ambition to compete economically with Western Europe. Educational reform was undertaken in turn by each government since 1950. Despite important differences concerning volume of spending and other particulars (such as the language issue), the basic objective of each government was essentially the same—to relate the system to contemporary needs without, however, discarding its Hellenic-Christian basis. Whatever its merits in terms of national interests, each measure of change met with stubborn resistance both from the educational establishment and from a general public devoted to traditional education values. Acceptance of educational reform under the military-backed government, moreover, has been additionally hampered by the confusion of reform with the imposition of political controls over education.

Partly as a result of reform measures calling for expanded educational opportunities, the national level of educational achievement improved significantly between the 1961 and 1971 censuses. The overall illiteracy rate for persons age 10 and over dropped during the decade from 18% to 14%, with the rate for persons ages 10 to 29 falling from 6% to 2%, and the rate for persons age 30 and over declining from 26% to 21%. Percentage of illiteracy rates for males and females changed as follows:

	1961	1971
Males	8	6
Females	27	22

Of all persons age 10 and over, about one-third in 1971, as compared with almost one-half in 1961, had not completed the full 6-year primary cycle (Figure 35) and were therefore presumed to lack functional literacy. There was an increase between 1961 and 1971 in the proportion of persons with full primary education, with secondary education, and with higher education. Educational advancement was relatively greater for females than for males, although females continued to lag well behind males in level of attainment.

The educational reforms also had a marked effect on school enrollment (Figure 36). From the 1963/64 school year through the 1969/70 school year, total enrollment increased by about 17%. Most of the gain occurred in the 1963/64-1966/67 period, under the impact of the Papandreou reforms; after the 1967 military coup, the rate of enrollment expansion declined substantially. Only at the preprimary level did enrollment grow at a faster rate after 1966/67 than before. This noncompulsory level of schooling, to which the government attaches considerable importance, enrolls a little more than one-fourth of all children ages 3½ to 5½. The decline in primary school enrollment after 1966/67 probably represents a change in school-age population (age 6-11) rather than a cutback in educational opportunity. A 6-year



FIGURE 35. Educational attainment of population age 10 and over

primary cycle has been compulsory for all children since 1926, although enforcement of this regulation was often lax in the past. During the 1960's all but about 2% of children in the relevant age group attended primary school, and all but a fraction of the pupils fully completed the cycle. The difference in enrollment growth rates before and after 1966/67 both in the secondary and in the technical-vocational schools is explained by changes in the compulsory education requirement. Under Papandreou, compulsory attendance was extended from 6 years to 9 years, the 3 additional years to be spent either in a *gymnasium* (secondary school) or in a technical-vocational school. The military-backed government eliminated the 3-year extension, although indicating an intention to restore it at some future time. Before 1963/64 fewer than 50% of all primary school graduates began the next level of education. This figure has since risen to almost 90%, but fewer than half of those entering *gymnasium* complete the full 6-year cycle. The annual number of new entrants into institutions of higher learning, although rising substantially, has represented no more than from one-quarter to one-third of all *gymnasium* graduates. Technical-vocational schools and foreign universities have absorbed a portion of the unsuccessful candidates for higher education slots, but about half of all *gymnasium* graduates have been obliged to discontinue study.

The programs for expanding and improving the educational system have involved heavy government expenditures. From 1964 through 1970 current expenditures of the Ministry of Education and Religion almost doubled in volume (at current prices), well exceeding the rate of growth of total current government expenditures for the same period. After the 1967 coup, however, educational expenditures increased at a much slower rate than before and at a rate below that for total government expenditures. Expenditures of the Ministry of National Education and Religion, as a percent of total government expenditures, fluctuated as follows:

1963	*10.5*	1967	*11.7*
1964	*11.7*	1968	*11.3*
1965	*12.4*	1969	*8.9*
1966	*12.5*	1970	*10.5*

Much of the increased spending has been connected with measures to broaden educational opportunity. The Papandreou government introduced the principle of free education at all levels, and the military-backed government extended the principle to providing free textbooks for all students and financial assistance for the needy. Large sums have also been spent on constructing new educational facilities (Figure 37) and on hiring additional teaching personnel. It would appear, however, that the financial resources devoted to education have been insufficient to cope with expanded student enrollments. As in the past, instruction at all levels of learning is handicapped by overcrowded classrooms (especially in urban areas), unsatisfactory teacher-student ratios, and shortages of books and teaching aids.

Far more significant than inadequacies of this kind, in the opinion of many commentators, are shortcomings in the content and orientation of education. The curriculum at the primary level, geared for the most part toward preparation for the *gymnasium*, has not been a major target of reform. Some educators have recommended that it be reorganized to include practical, as well as academic, courses, but attempts, for example, to introduce

FIGURE 36. Enrollment, by type of school

TYPE OF SCHOOL	1963/64	1966/67	1969/70	PERCENT INCREASE/DECREASE 1963/64–1966/67	1966/67–1969/70	1963/64–1969/70
Preprimary:						
Public	40,870	50,372	71,342	23.2	41.6	74.6
Private	9,396	8,863	11,542	−5.7	30.2	22.8
Total	50,266	59,235	82,884	17.8	39.9	64.9
Primary:						
Public	844,960	903,077	872,608	7.1	−3.6	3.3
Private	66,775	63,816	65,238	−4.4	2.4	−2.3
Total	911,735	966,893	937,846	6.1	−3.2	2.9
Secondary:						
Public	250,163	326,789	354,968	30.6	8.6	41.9
Private	44,037	37,936	45,335	13.9	19.5	2.9
Total	294,200	364,725	400,303	24.0	9.8	36.1
Technical-vocational:						
Public	20,413	25,426	28,913	24.6	13.7	41.6
Private	43,218	64,785	74,289	49.9	14.7	71.9
Total	63,631	90,211	103,202	41.8	14.4	62.2
Higher education	43,411	64,501	76,181	48.6	17.9	75.5
Grand total	1,363,243	1,547,635	1,600,416	13.5	3.4	17.4

NOTE—Exclude night school students at primary and secondary levels. In 1969/70, there were 16,251 students in night primary schools and 18,314 in night secondary schools. A minus (−) sign denotes a decrease.

farming as a course in rural schools have encountered popular resistance. At the secondary level, the first reform effort after World War II was undertaken by the Karamanlis government. Along with restructuring technical-vocational education, Karamanlis sought to modernize the classical *gymnasium* by instituting a 3-year junior cycle, which offered a standard curriculum with a classical and vocational orientation, and a 3-year senior cycle, which allowed a student to select a major field of study (e.g., classics, natural sciences, economics). The *gymnasium* continues to be organized more or less along these lines, although in practice a classical orientation predominates. Meanwhile, Papandreou had introduced sweeping language reforms, placing the emphasis in language study on modern, rather than ancient, Greek, and designating *dimotiki*, rather than *katharevousa*, as the operational language form for all schools. After Papandreou's fall from power, the emphasis on ancient Greek was restored, and *katharevousa* was reinstated as the medium of instruction except in the first 4 years of primary school.

Technical-vocational education was overhauled by the Karamanlis government, with the expectation of extending it to the labor force "on the widest possible scale," an expectation that has thus far gone unrealized. The military-backed regime, however, has expressed strong support for this type of education and has taken practical steps to overcome a shortage of facilities and a lack of qualified teaching personnel. Among the most intractable problems concerning technical-vocational training, however, has been the lack of interest on the part of young people, almost all of whom have a decided preference for academic studies. Enrollment in technical and vocational schools amounts to only about one-fourth of that in the *gymnasium* and is made up to a considerable extent of students who failed to gain admission into the *gymnasium*. Technical-vocational education, moreover, has long suffered from the absence of a coordinated program of development. This is attributable partly to the diffusion of administrative authority among a number of cabinet ministries, although most of the schools fall under the jurisdiction of the Minister of National Education and Religion, and partly to the predominance of private interests in this branch of education; private schools accounting for almost three-fourths of total enrollment.



Primary school in Trikala



Gymnasium for girls in Nea Smirni



Public technical school in Trikala



Library of the University of Thessaloniki

FIGURE 37. All levels of education have benefited from the government's construction program

The existing structure of technical-vocational education, essentially devised by the Karamanlis government, provides for three grades of schools: lower, secondary, and higher. Courses vary from 2 to 4 years at the lower level, and from 3 to 4 years at the secondary and higher levels. A program of special interest to the present government is the construction of five higher technical training centers in the cities of Athens, Thessaloniki, Patrai, Larisa, and Iraklion. Designed to house some 22 schools, these centers are being partly financed through a US$13.8 million loan from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The bank is also helping finance the construction of a network of lower level apprenticeship schools which operate under the jurisdiction of the Labor Force Employment Organization. Another program to which the government has attached particular importance is the development outside Athens of the School for Teachers in Trades and Technical Education (SELETE). Organized with the assistance of UNESCO, SELETE serves as the administrative and teacher training center for the entire national network of technical and vocational schools.

Instruction throughout the educational system is typically governed by the concept that knowledge is the accumulation of facts. Emphasis is on rote learning and memorization rather than on the exercise of reason and judgment. Teachers tend to be strict disciplinarians and authoritarian figures, for whom the idea of the classroom as a forum for the free exchange of ideas would be unthinkable. The end product of this outmoded concept of learning, as well as of the many overcrowded classrooms and the high teacher-pupil ratio, is an education of inferior quality. Exceptionally, certain private schools, including four U.S.-sponsored institutions, have a reputation for high standards. Although not all private schools are better than public schools, they are generally preferred by parents who can afford them. Because of the deficiencies of the regular schools, many students enroll in private tutorial schools to prepare themselves for the entrance examination at the next level of learning. Education officials have severely criticized these schools for offering "canned knowledge," but defenders of the schools have pointed out that this is precisely the type of knowledge on which entrance examinations are based.

The policies of the military-backed government in the field of higher education, which had escaped reform under earlier administrations, have had the effect of alienating much of the academic community. Along with four universities (at Athens, Thessaloniki, Patrai, and Ioannina) and a number of specialized schools institutions at the higher education level include teacher training colleges and a few other types of schools that do not, in fact, provide higher education. Although heavily subsidized by the state and subject to the supervision of the Ministry of National Education and Religion, the higher education institutions traditionally enjoyed complete academic freedom and virtual autonomy in managing their own affairs. They were, however, vulnerable to criticism on numerous accounts, including antiquated curriculums, inefficient administrations, and corruption in professional appointments. In legislation designed to "cleanse," rejuvenate, and modernize the field of higher education, the government, among other things, lowered the mandatory retirement age of professors to 65; created additional professorships and new assistant professorships (to improve faculty-student ratios); reorganized the procedure for electing professors (to eliminate nepotism and long delays in filling vacancies); provided for the publication of professorial lectures and their free distribution to students (to prevent professors from profiting at student expense); and assigned to each institution a government commissioner (usually a military officer) with broad supervisory powers. These and other measures, in the view of university administrators and professors, constitute blatant interference in academic matters. Even in circles sympathetic to reform, the regime's typically heavy-handed behavior has aroused resentment and resistance.

Student dissatisfaction with regime policies produced serious campus disorders, especially in Athens, in the first months of 1973. A primary cause of unrest involved the leadership of student organizations. Under student pressure, the government for the first time since 1967 allowed supposedly free student elections in November 1972, but both students and press charged that intimidation and fraud had been used to obtain proregime returns. In a wave of class boycotts and campus demonstrations that broke out early in 1973, the students demanded not only new elections for student bodies but also guarantees of academic freedom, greater student participation in developing a new charter for higher education, the elimination of government commissioners from governing bodies, and the removal of police informers from campuses. The government's initial reaction was to issue a new decree that ended military deferment for dissident activists—a measure which stimulated further protest. Government spokesmen played down the unrest as the work of a mere handful of "agitators," but the bloodly student riots and subsequent response by the army in November 1973 proved to be the downfall of Papadopoulos.

I. Artistic and cultural expression

Contemporary cultural expression represents a fusion of elements—the foreign with the indigenous, the past with the present, and the cultivated with the popular. This merging of opposite elements has been characteristic of creative activity since the early 19th century, when the first writers and artists of independent Greece sought to deal with the hiatus in cultural development caused by centuries of Turkish subjugation. Turning to Western Europe for guidance, Greek intellectuals not only acquired familiarity with contemporary cultural movements but also recovered their own ancient cultural heritage, which had earlier, in romanticized version, inspired the European Renaissance. Initial artistic endeavors were often blindly imitative of the achievements both of Western Europe and classical Greece, but writers and artists eventually were able to absorb these examples and to use them creatively, along with aspects of Byzantine and popular culture, to produce work that at its best reaches a high degree of originality and sophistication. Although the heavy hand of Western influence on contemporary Greek expression is often deplored, several factors have worked to sustain it. Because Greece constitutes a very limited cultural market, the creative artist has had to rely on Western patronage and, concomitantly, to adapt his work to Western modes. For the innovative artist, Western patronage has been particularly important because foreign recognition of his work assures its greater prestige at home. Many creative Greeks work and reside in Western countries, some because of the intellectual stimulation the Western environment offers, others because of financial or political factors. The number of political emigrees has risen appreciably since the advent of the military-backed regime.

The most notable cultural achievements of modern Greece lie in the literary field. Literature had to evolve, however, amid continuous dissension over the language issue, and even today its development is handicapped by this issue—the poet and novelist writing in *dimotiki* for a readership educated in *katharevousa*. Of all literary forms, poetry was the most favored in the early period of the modern epoch, partly because the country had inherited an enormous poetic tradition. In addition to the renowned classical legacy, there was a wealth of Byzantine religious poetry and a store of popular ballads and folk poetry that had accumulated during the Turkish occupation. The foundations of modern poetry were laid in the Ionian Islands, where three centuries of Venetian rule had produced an Italianate culture among the local aristocracy. There, the first great modern poet, Dionysios Solomos (1798-1857), following Dante's example, struggled to establish the language of folk literature as the country's literary language. With one exception, every major poet since Solomos has used *dimotiki* rather than *katharevousa*. The one exception is the Alexandrine Constantin Cavafy (1863-1933), whose dramatic mixture of the two language forms, along with his departure from conventional themes (in celebrating homosexual love, for example), established him as the most original Greek poet of the 20th century. Those that followed Solomos in adopting *dimotiki*, however, differed from him in their pervasive use of classical material and myths. Apart from Cavafy, outstanding 20th century poets include Kostis Palamas (1859-1943), Angelos Sikelianos (1880-1957), George Seferis (1900-71), Odysseus Elytis (1911-), and Nikos Gatsos (1916-). Seferis, who was strongly influenced by T.S. Eliot, received the Nobel Prize in literature in 1963, the citation noting "the unique thought and style and beauty of his language."

Lacking any indigenous roots, the novel lagged well behind poetry in becoming established as a major literary genre. The early prose writers, unlike Solomos and his followers, favored the use of *katharevousa*, and it was only after John Psycharis (1854-1929) took up the defense of *dimotiki* in *My Journey* (published in 1888) that novelists adopted this language form. Until well into the 20th century, short stories and novels were largely concerned with traditional village life, forming what was known as the ethnographic genre. The development of urban life, among other factors, gradually produced new literary trends that became marked in the 1930's. One Greek critic has written of the new generation of writers as follows:

> they were able to see beyond the picturesque provincialism that had dominated earlier literary efforts and portrayed Greek life as an integral part of European, and even universal, life. That was the main task of the novelists. For, although poetry claimed some important new voices . . . , and the short story, play, and essay suddenly came alive, the novel became the predominant literary genre of the thirties and the main outlet for expressing the new trends

Along with historical subjects, the main themes were the horrors of war, the trials of the Asia Minor refugees, and the problems of the modern family. Distinguished representatives of the new trends included George Theotokas (-1966) and Angelos Terzakis (1907-). As a novelist, the famous and highly controversial writer, Nikos Kazantzakis (1885-1957), belongs to a latter period, none of his novels appearing until after World War II, although work in other

genres (notably the epic poem *The Odyssey: A Modern Sequel*) were published earlier. *Zorba the Greek*, which was made into a successful motion picture in 1964, is Kazantzakis' best known novel.

Military-backed rule has had a decidedly adverse impact on literary development. After the coup, several writers chose exile, notable among them Vassilis Vassilikos (1933-), considered the most promising writer of his generation. Some writers have undergone imprisonment or other forms of harassment. These include the distinguished leftwing poet Yannis Ritsos (1909-) and Antonis Samarakis (1919-), author of the internationally acclaimed *The Flaw*. Initially, creative writers reacted to the regime with a protest of silence, refusing to submit work for publication. As Greece's first and only Nobel Prize winner, Seferis was expected to serve as the voice of opposition, a role he rejected until March 1969, when he issued a dramatic statement denouncing the regime for muzzling freedom and for imposing "a state of enforced torpor in which all values . . . are being submerged . . . in stagnant waters." In 1970, after the lifting of preventive censorship, a group of writers broke their silence in a best-selling volume of veiled opposition called *Eighteen Texts*. This was followed by the more outspoken *New Texts* and *New Texts 2*, both collections of contributions from intellectuals, almost all of whom had suffered at one time or another for political nonconformity.

The performing arts flourish on both a serious and a popular level, benefiting from the encouragement and financial support of the state and from the patronage of foreign tourists. Highlighting the tourist season is the annual Athens Festival of Music and Drama, held from July to September in the Odeum of Herodes Atticus (Figure 38). A major attraction of the festival is the cycle of ancient Greek tragedies and comedies performed by the National Theater. Other annual festivals of classical drama take place in the ancient theaters of Epidaurus, Dodoni, and Philippi, the festival at Philippi being presented by the State Theater of Northern Greece. The interpretation of classical drama has received international acclaim on the one hand and ridicule on the other, one critic describing the productions as "Gothic tearjerkers." A popular form of entertainment falling between the classical and the contemporary theater is the Karaghiozis shadow-theater (Figure 39), which is believed to have been introduced into Piraievs from Istanbul in 1860. Although originally a Turk, the protagonist Karaghiozis came to embody the Greek spirit struggling for survival under Turkish domination, deviously outwitting the oppressor in one bawdy and farcical predicament after another, often receiving assistance from Alexander the Great. The shadow-theater is no longer performed in small towns and villages, where it was once immensely popular, but there are nightly presentations of it in Athens

FIGURE 38. An evening concert in the Odeum of Herodes Atticus at the foot of the Acropolis. Inaugurated in 1955, the Athens Festival of Music and Drama includes symphony concerts and performances of opera, ballet, and classical and modern drama, presented by Greek and foreign companies.

FIGURE 39. Scene from a Karaghiozis shadow-play; the protagonist rushes with his watering can to help Alexander the Great subdue a fire-breathing dragon. In this theatrical art form, transparent silhouettes made of camel hide are manipulated on long poles against a lighted screen.

during the tourist season, and more important, it is shown regularly on television.

Apart from presenting classical drama, both the state-run National Theater in Athens and the State Theater of Northern Greece in Thessaloniki are engaged in modern productions, as are a fairly large number of private theatrical companies performing mainly in Athens. In 1970 the National Theater and the State Theater of Northern Greece, together with the National Lyric Stage, were merged to form the State Theater Organization; while remaining separate theatrical units, they became subject to the same state-appointed director and to the same artistic committee, whose members are named by the Minister of National Education and Religion. In addition to a main troupe, each enterprise has an experimental theater, and each has a traveling company that performs in provincial centers, usually to large and enthusiastic audiences. The repertoire of the state-run theaters, and also of the private theaters, is dominated by foreign plays (those of Shakespeare, Ibsen, and Ionesco are representative) and by established Greek plays of an earlier period. In contrast to contemporary Greek plays, these are considered "safe" plays, from the financial point of view as well as the political, although on occasion the military-backed regime has even banned the performance of classical dramas that audiences may be inclined to relate to the current political scene. The standard of performance and production in the Greek theater is regarded as high. Two distinguished dramatic actresses familiar to foreign audiences because of their roles in U.S. films are the late Katina Paxinou, who had her own theatrical company, and Irene Papas, currently a political exile. For his direction of the Art Theater in Athens, a private company, Karolos Koun is celebrated both at home and abroad. Film directors who have achieved international prominence include Cyprus-born Michael Cacoyannis, known especially for *Electra* and *Zorba the Greek*, and Nikos Koundouros, whose *The Young Aphrodites* won numerous awards.

In contemporary music there are two primary currents—serious music that exploits Greek themes but essentially follows European traditions and indigenous popular music. Outstanding composers of the European tradition include the late avant-gardist Yannis Christou, Theodore Antoniou, and Yannis Xenakis (1922-), a pre-1967 political exile in Paris who has attracted attention for his concerts of electronic music. The work of these men is well known in serious music circles at home and abroad, but theirs is not the music that is played hour after hour on the popular Second Program of the Greek radio and that international audiences of such films as *Never on Sunday* and *Zorba the Greek* have come to regard as Greek music. That music, which even foreigners identify by the Greek designations *rebetika* or *laike moussike* (popular music), had a disreputable past, having apparently originated shortly after World War II in the waterfront dives of Piraievs. The lyrics dwelt on narcotics and other sordid themes, and the music itself had elements of traditional folk songs, Byzantine hymns, and oriental rhythms probably introduced by the Asia Minor refugees. The special sound of *rebetika* songs came from the *bouzouki*, a type of mandolin that produces a "glass-like echo."

Gradually adapted to broader public taste, *rebetika* eventually reached the fashionable entertainment centers of Athens. It became popular abroad largely through the work of two composers, both of whom have also contributed to serious music: Manos Hadjidakis (1925-), who composed the musical score for *Never on Sunday*, and Mikis Theodorakis (1925-),

FIGURE 40. Cretan musicians with traditional instruments—a *lyra* on the left and a *lahouto* on the right

Elytis, Gatsos, and Ritsos. A growing tendency on the part of the younger musical generation to depart from *rebetika* conventions is apparent in the music of Stavros Xarhakos, who attaches much more importance to orchestral than to lyrical values. Two masters of the *bouzouki* renowned for their virtuosity are Vassilis Tsitsanis and George Zambetas. Grigoris Bithikotsis and Nana Mouskouri rank high among the numerous vocal interpreters enjoying an international following.

Folk music, although important as a source of inspiration for contemporary composers and as a tourist attraction, is rapidly losing its traditional significance in rural life, as are other forms of folk art. Each province has its own characteristic songs, dances, and musical compositions, which together constitute a national heritage described by one Western writer as "unsurpassed for richness, variety, complexity, subtlety, and grandeur." On festive occasions, village squares are still enlivened by folk singing and dancing, accompanied by traditional instruments (Figure 40). This traditional form of recreation and artistic expression, however, is threatened with extinction by the penetration of television and other Western influences. Of several professional groups concerned with the preservation and promotion of folk dancing, the most prominent is the Dora Stratou dancers, who perform nightly in Athens during the tourist season.



FIGURE 41. *View of Hydra*, an oil on canvas executed by Ghika in 1938. The artist uses a cubist technique in organizing a landscape crowded with kites, birds, houses, walls, and fig trees—all recurrent themes in his many early paintings of the island of Hydra. One critic sees in Ghika's work "a marriage of power and restraint, that vibrant synthesis which has always characterized the Greek genius."

who wrote the score for *Zorba the Greek*. Theodorakis, whose music has been banned since 1967 because of his leftist political orientation, has made highly successful popular songs from the poems of Seferis,

Like music, folk arts and crafts exhibit considerable regional variation. Certain localities are known for excellence in particular crafts—Rhodes in pottery, for example. Collections of national costumes and

FIGURE 42. Entitled Mosaic, this work of Tsarouhis in glass, ceramic, and stone was executed for the courtyard of the Doxiadis Technological Institute in Athens. His assignment was "to create an image of ancient, new, and Athenian architecture." The winged boy measuring the wall represents the Greek god Eros, who aids architects in attaining proper proportions. Tsarouhis' work has its foundation in the commonplace.

handicrafts are on display in the Benaki Museum and the Museum of Decorative Art, both in Athens.

In the fine arts, contemporary expression has achieved recognition in international art circles, although it is less well known to a general public than the Greek contribution in literature and music. Until far into the 20th century, there was little original work of distinction in painting, sculpture, or architecture, partly because the immensity of the relevant classical and Byzantine heritages, and the conflicts between the two tended to inhibit creativity. Prominent modern painters include Theophilos Hadjimihail (-1934), who left a treasure of modern "primitives" on the island of Lesbos, where he resided; Yannis Spyropoulos, who has a nonrepresentational style; Minos Argyrakis, who enjoys a popular following in Athens as a caricaturist; Nikos Hadzikyriakos Ghika (Figure 41), who is especially known for his landscapes of the island of Hydra (Idhra); and Yannis Tsarouhis (Figure 42). Both Ghika and Tsarouhis have engaged in book illustrating and in designing sets and costumes for the theater, ballet, and motion pictures. The proliferation of Athenian art galleries in the past decade or so has done much to stimulate creative activity, as has the biennial mounting of the Panhellenic Exhibition of painting and sculpture. In architecture and city planning, Greece boasts of one of the outstanding world figures, Constantine A. Doxiadis, founder of "ekistics," the science of human settlement. Doxiadis Associates of Athens has executed projects in dozens of countries throughout the world. One of its current undertakings is the construction of a model settlement, the Apollonian, Porto Rafti, about 25 miles from Athens. Described as a community far ahead of its times, the Apollonian is to retain a typical Greek color and character while providing all the modern amenities, minus the automobile.

J. Public information

Modern communications media are well developed, but their effectiveness in public enlightenment tends to be weakened by restrictive government policies. In a nation of avid newspaper readers, the press, particularly the Athens dailies, has traditionally been the most important instrument in the formation of public opinion. The general newsworthiness of the press, however, has continuously been compromised—in the past by its extreme degree of partisanship and its irresponsible character and since 1967 by the subjection of its content to government control. As a means of conveying news, radio is faster than the printed word and has a more comprehensive reach, but state ownership of the radio network makes news broadcasts even more vulnerable than newspapers to government dictation. The same disability applies to television, although this medium is not yet established as a major channel of mass communication, having acquired a nationwide range only in 1972. Fully cognizant of the value of radio and television as vehicles for disseminating its policies, the government has spent considerable sums in expanding and strengthening these media. Government spokesmen have emphasized that, along with providing entertainment, radio and television are to play an important role in the process of modernization and in the promotion of nationalism. In pursuing these objectives, the two media are to contribute to an intellectual development "based on the principles and values of classical Greek and Christian education." The public is generally suspicious of the reliability of domestic media in providing information about national developments, especially in periods of stress. When in doubt, the Greeks readily turn to foreign sources—Athenian intellectuals to easily available

FIGURE 43. The typical Athens kiosk sells the principal newspapers and magazines of Western countries, along with Greek publications. Communist papers are proscribed, but the military-backed regime has not otherwise interfered with the importation and distribution of the foreign press except for an occasional edition deemed to be undesirable.

Western newspapers and periodicals (Figure 43) and the general public to shortwave radio broadcasts from Western countries. Given the public's mistrust of the domestic mass media, word-of-mouth communication, the principal means of circulating news of local interest in the small community, has presumably acquired a role of enhanced importance.

The periodical press consists of almost 100 daily newspapers and several hundred newspapers, magazines, and journals that appear weekly, monthly, quarterly, or at some other interval. All publications are in the Greek language except for five Turkish-language weeklies published in Thrace and a small Armenian-language daily published in Athens; in addition, a few small Athens dailies are published in English, French, and German for the benefit of tourists. Most dailies and weeklies are small provincial papers concerned almost exclusively with local news. Only the newspapers and magazines published in Athens and, to a lesser degree, in Thessaloniki, are of national significance (Figure 44). Athens dailies have a countrywide readership, about 35% of all copies circulating outside the Greater Athens area. Thessaloniki dailies, with a total circulation amounting to only a sixth of that of Athens dailies, are read mainly in northern Greece. After increasing steadily in the early 1960's, the total circulation of Athens dailies declined from a high of 220 million in 1966 to 176 million in 1970. The 20% drop was in consequence of official measures designed to curb the influence of large-circulation papers, most of which have tended to be critical of the military-backed regime. By contrast, Athens-published periodicals other than newspapers rose by some 50% in circulation in the 1966-70 period. More than half the total circulation of such periodicals was outside the Greater Athens area. Reflecting a variety of interests, the periodicals ranged from academic, literary, and professional journals to magazines devoted to women, youth, and sports enthusiasts; few provided any political viewpoint.

Book publishing is the least developed of the various publishing branches. In the past a rather high rate of functional illiteracy, coupled with a level of economic development that made books a luxury item, served to limit the book-reading and book-buying public. During the 1960's, however, there was increased activity in book publishing, paralleling an expansion of educational opportunity and a growth in the economy. In 1969 a total of 1,822 titles was issued,

FIGURE 44. Principal daily newspapers

NAME AND PLACE OF PUBLICATION	YEAR FOUNDED	TIME OF PUBLICATION	PUBLISHER	COMMENT
Athens:				
Akropolis (Acropolis)	1881	A.M.	N. and S. Botsis	Strongly progovernment; once close to the monarchy and to Karamanlis; large circulation.
Apogevmatini (The Afternoon)	1952	P.M.	do.	Political orientation similar to that of *Akropolis*, but less pronounced; largest circulation in the country.
Athens Daily Post	1958	A.M.	George Skouras	Small-circulation English-language paper.
Athens News	1952	do.	Yannis Horn	Leading English-language paper; one page in French; openly and defiantly antigovernment.
Eleftheros Kosmos (Free World).	1966	do.	Savvas Constantopoulos	Pronounced identification as government supporter.
Estia (Hearth)	1898	P.M.	Kyros Kyrou	Ultraconservative, progovernment; small circulation.
Ta Nea (The News)	1931	do.	Christos Lambrakis	Left-leaning, opposition; large circulation.
Ta Simera (The Daily News)	1970	do.	Savas Constantopoulos	Progovernment.
To Vima (The Tribune)	1922	A.M.	Christos Lambrakis	Liberal, opposition; intellectually oriented.
Vradyni (The Evening)	1924	P.M.	George Athanasiadis	Conservative, opposition; large circulation.
Thessaloniki:				
Ellinikos Vorras (Greek North).	1935	A.M.	P. X. Levantis	Ultraconservative, progovernment.
Makedonia (Macedonia)	1911	do.	John Vellidis	Opposition.
Thessaloniki (Thessaloniki)	1963	P.M.	do.	*Do.*

representing a 65% increase over a 5-year period. Press runs are usually small, because even bestsellers seldom produce a demand for more than 10,000 copies. In literary circles publishing houses have been criticized for passing over new writers, while concentrating on the work of established authors, translations of foreign bestsellers, and reprints. For the most part, the work of untried authors is published privately. The lack of a well developed system of public libraries is another indication of limited reader demand. There are some isolated libraries that are impressive, but most public libraries are small, poorly stocked, and lacking in arrangements for circulation. In 1967 only about 200 libraries in the entire country had a collection in excess of 1,000 volumes. In a measure intended to subsidize writers and to build up a stock for public libraries, the Ministry of Education in the early 1960's began buying 100 copies of almost every book published.

The country has two domestic radio and television networks, one controlled by the government-owned National Radio-Television Institute (EIRT) and the other by the Greek Armed Forces Information Service (YENED). In addition, *Voice of America* has radio relay stations in Rhodes, Thessaloniki, and Kavala, and the American Forces Radio and Television Service broadcasts programs from Athens and Iraklion. Listeners may also receive shortwave radio broadcasts in Greek from various countries in Eastern and Western Europe, including the daily broadcasts of *Voice of Truth*, a station operated by the outlawed Greek Communist Party from Eastern Europe. Television viewers in certain border areas are able to pick up programs telecast in neighboring countries. No attempt has been made by the government to prevent the public from following foreign broadcasts. As of 1972 there was a total of 2.8 million radio sets in use throughout the country, or approximately 323 sets per 1,000 population. The number of television sets totaled 850,000, or about 97 sets per 1,000 population. Almost two-thirds of all television sets were in Greater Athens and Greater Thessaloniki, areas where television reception has been available for a much longer period than elsewhere in the country.

EIRT provides three programs, known as National, Second, and Third. The National Program presents news and information along with cultural and light entertainment, the Second Program offers cultural and musical entertainment, and the Third Program (on the

air only 6 hours daily) broadcasts serious music. A network of FM (frequency modulation) transmitters, the installation of which was completed in 1972, enables the National and Second Programs, also transmitted on mediumwave, to be heard throughout the country. The Third Program reaches only a limited area, but an expansion project is in the processing stage. There are some 10 regional stations, all of which relay parts of the National Program, and most of which originate regional programs as well. All EIRT domestic broadcasts are in Greek, except for news bulletins offered several times a day in English, French, and German—a service intended for tourists. EIRT's international service, *Voice of Greece*, broadcasts in Greek and numerous foreign languages; its range of transmission and its scope of activities were considerably expanded in 1972. Radio programs offered by YENED are intended for the entertainment, education, and training of service personnel; the entertainment programs have attracted a broad public following.

Television broadcasting was introduced toward the end of 1965, but it was not until 1969 that it emerged from an experimental stage and not until September 1972 that it finally reached all parts of the country. As of early 1973 the EIRT television channel was on the air weekdays for 2 hours in the afternoon and for 7½-8 hours in the evening; on Sunday there was an additional morning telecast. YENED's television service is similar to that of EIRT with respect both to hours of broadcast and to program content. According to an official spokesman, the percentage distribution of EIRT's programing time by general category is as follows:

News and information	22
Cultural development	18
National character development	15
Entertainment	45

Live broadcasts account for about 60% of program time, and films make up the remaining 40%. There are twice as many foreign entertainment films shown as domestic ones, but EIRT hopes to eliminate the foreign preponderance. Most commercial serials come from the United States. In 1973, serials shown on EIRT's channel included *I Dream of Jeannie* and *Bonanza*; among those on YENED's channel were *Peyton Place* and *Mod Squad*. For its news and information programs, EIRT draws on a staff of some 75 journalists in Athens and the provinces, on the Athens News Agency, on teletyped news and telephotos provided by the United Press International, and on the services of Eurovision. EIRT has the stated objective of making its newscasts complete, accurate, and well presented. However, one Athens newspaper (with progovernment sympathies) has criticized the news broadcasts of both EIRT and YENED for dwelling on uninteresting and unimportant occurrences and for substituting ornate phrases and rhetoric for facts.

The popularity of moviegoing, long a favorite pastime in both urban and rural areas, faces a decided challenge from television. Motion picture attendance rose steadily until 1968 and thereafter began to decline, an obvious casualty of the spread of television; ticket sales were as follows:

1961	86,622,583
1964	109,469,245
1967	137,074,815
1968	137,400,996
1969	135,275,538
1970	128,599,812

The adverse impact of television on the motion picture industry is also illustrated by the decrease in the number of indoor ("winter") theaters and in their total seating capacity:

	Theaters	Capacity
1970/71	1,062	574,660
1971/72	1,059	562,783

The downward trends disclosed in these data apply mainly to Greater Athens and to a few other urban centers where television reception was possible. The completion in 1972 of an expanded television network is likely to have the effect of sharpening the downward trend.

About four out of five feature films shown in commercial theaters are imported from Western countries, the United States supplying the greatest number. In the 5-year period from 1966 through 1970, an annual average of 162 feature films were produced domestically, a small percentage of them by foreign film companies. In 1972 the decline in theater attendance cut film production to about 70. Most Greek films are mediocre in quality; cheaply produced, they are intended for a provincial audience that favors melodramas and unsophisticated comedies. The occasional outstanding Greek film is specially designed for foreign audiences. Censorship of both domestic and foreign films has been particularly stringent under the military-backed government. Of all feature films submitted to the Greek Censorship Board in the 5-year period beginning in 1967/68, 60% were ruled unsuitable for minors, and 4% were rejected for exhibition. In 1972 Greek theater owners, convinced that television was not the sole cause for the decline in theater attendance, appealed to the government for a relaxation in censorship.

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Glossary

Abbreviation	Greek	English
EDES.....	*Ellinikos Dimokratikos Ethnikos Syndesmos*	National Republican Greek League
EIRT.....	*Ethnikon Idryma Radiophonias Tileoraseos*	National Radio-Television Institute
ELAS.....	*Ethnikos Laikos Apeleutherotikos Stratos*	National Popular Liberation Army
GSEE.....	*Geniki Synomosontia Ergaton Elladas*	General Confederation of Greek Labor
IKA.....	*Idryma Koinonikon Asfaliseon*.....	Social Insurance Institute
OGA.....	*Organois Georgikon Asfaliseon*.....	Farm Insurance Organization
PIKPA.....	*Patriotikon Idryma Klinikis Pronoias kai Antilipseos*	Patriotic Institute of Social Welfare and Aid
SELETE.....	*Sikholi Ekpaideftikon Leitourgon Epangelmatikis kai Tekhnikis Ekpaideuseos*	School for Teachers in Trades and Technical Education
TEVE.....	*Tamcion (Asfaliseos) Epangelmation kai Viotekhnon Elladas*	Greek Craftsmen's and Tradesmen's (Insurance) Fund
YENED.....	*Ypiresia Enimerosecos Enoplon Dynameon Elladas*	Greek Armed Forces Information Service

Places and features referred to in this chapter

	COORDINATES			COORDINATES			
	°	'N.	° 'E.		°	'N.	° 'E.
Agrínion	38	38	21 25	Kikládhes (*admd*)	37	25	24 55
Aitolía kai Akarnanía (*admd*)	38	30	21 30	Kilkís (*admd*)	41	00	22 40
Áyion	38	15	22 05	Knosós	35	18	25 10
Akhaía (*admd*)	38	00	22 00	Korinthía (*admd*)	37	55	22 40
Argolís (*admd*)	37	40	22 50	Kozáni	40	18	21 47
Arkadhía (*admd*)	37	35	22 15	Kozáni (*admd*)	40	20	21 43
Árta (*admd*)	39	10	21 00	Lakonía (*admd*)	37	00	22 35
Athens	37	59	23 44	Lárisa	39	38	22 25
Attikí (*admd*)	38	05	23 30	Lárisa (*admd*)	39	36	22 30
Áyion Óros (*admd*)	40	15	24 15	Lasíthi (*admd*)	35	05	25 50
Corfu (*isl*)	39	40	19 45	Lemnos (Límnos) (*isl*)	39	55	25 15
Crete (*isl*)	35	15	24 45	Lesbos (Lésvos) (*isl*)	39	10	26 32
Cyclades (*isls*)	37	00	25 10	Lésvos (*admd*)	39	10	26 20
Dhodhekánisos (*admd*)	36	50	27 05	Levkás (*admd*)	38	45	20 40
Dodecanese (*isls*)	36	00	27 00	Levkás (*isl*)	38	43	20 38
Dráma (*admd*)	41	15	24 15	Macedonia (*rgn*)	41	00	23 00
Elevsís	38	02	23 32	Magnisía (*admd*)	39	15	22 45
Ermoúpolis	37	27	24 56	Maláxa	35	28	24 04
Euboea (Évvoia) (*isl*)	38	30	24 00	Mátala	34	59	24 45
Evritanía (*admd*)	39	00	21 40	Messinía (*admd*)	37	15	21 50
Évros (*admd*)	41	00	26 00	Mistrás	37	04	22 22
Évvoia (*admd*)	38	30	24 00	Néa Smírni	37	57	23 43
Flórina	40	47	21 24	Pátrai	38	15	21 44
Flórina (*admd*)	40	45	21 25	Pélla (*admd*)	40	50	22 15
Fokís (*admd*)	38	30	22 15	Peloponnesus (Pelopónnisos) (*rgn*)	37	30	22 00
Fthiótis (*admd*)	38	50	22 25	Pieria (*admd*)	40	15	22 25
Grevená (*admd*)	40	05	21 25	Piraiévs	37	57	23 38
Idhra (*isl*)	37	20	23 30	Piraiévs (*admd*)	37	30	23 25
Ilía (*admd*)	37	45	21 35	Préveza (*admd*)	39	10	20 40
Imathía (*admd*)	40	30	22 15	Rethímni (*admd*)	35	15	24 35
Ioánnina	39	40	20 50	Rhodes (*isl*)	36	10	28 00
Ioánnina (*admd*)	39	45	20 40	Rodhópi (*admd*)	41	05	25 30
Ionian Islands (*isls*)	38	30	20 30	Sámos (*isl*)	37	45	26 48
Iráklion	35	20	25 08	Sámos (*admd*)	37	45	26 45
Iráklion (*admd*)	35	10	25 10	Sérrai (*admd*)	41	10	23 30
Kalámai	37	02	22 07	Sífnos (*isl*)	37	00	24 40
Kálimnos (*isl*)	37	00	27 00	Síkorrákhi	40	58	25 43
Kardhítsa (*admd*)	39	20	21 45	Sparta	37	05	22 26
Kastoría (*admd*)	40	30	21 10	Thermaikós Kólpos (*gulf*)	40	23	22 47
Katerini	40	16	22 30	Thesprotía (*admd*)	39	30	20 30
Kavála (*admd*)	41	00	24 30	Thessaloníki	40	38	22 56
Kefallinía (*admd*)	38	15	20 30	Thessaloníki (*admd*)	40	40	23 00
Kérkira (*admd*)	39	40	19 45	Tínos (*isl*)	37	35	25 10
Khalkidhikí (*admd*)	40	25	23 30	Trikala	39	33	21 46
Khaniá	35	31	24 02	Trikala (*admd*)	39	40	21 30
Khaniá (*admd*)	35	30	24 00	Volotía (*admd*)	38	20	23 00
Khíos	38	22	26 08	Vólos	39	22	22 57
Khíos (*admd*)	38	25	26 00	Xánthi (*admd*)	41	10	24 50
Khíos (Chios) (*isl*)	38	22	26 00	Zákinthos (*admd*)	37	45	20 45