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Government
and Politics

Brazil

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

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
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BRAZIL

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
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Government and Politics

A. Introduction (U/OU)

The armed forces provide the central block of support for the regime of President Emilio Medici (Figure 1). Top-ranking military officers have dominated national political activity in Brazil since deposing civilian President Joao Goulart in 1964 in a movement which the military labeled the "Brazilian revolution." The federal executive has become even more dominant as the locus of power, with an accompanying decline in the influence of the national legislative and judicial branches and the state governments. The political parties and special interest groups that vied for influence over the direction of political development between 1945 and 1964 have since been circumscribed in their activities. The Medici government's image of order and progress has earned it considerable support among the people, although the lack of open elections and censorship of the media make it difficult to determine how deep this support runs. Medici's predecessors had already stifled student and labor opposition, and his administration



FIGURE 1. President Emilio Medici (U/OU)

Congressional office building in Brasilia

has used all the force at hand to suppress the urban terrorists who succeeded in gaining international publicity but never gained significant support from the Brazilian people. The only sector that the government has found difficulty in muzzling is the liberal wing of the Catholic Church, but the church hierarchy wants to avoid antagonizing the regime and has therefore exercised considerable restraint in its dealings with the government. Almost certainly the only real threat to the government now is the possibility of a fracturing of the military over issues or personalities. However, such divisions are not very likely as President Medici's selections for President and Vice President have met with general approval.

The military in most Latin American countries ascended for a time to a preponderant role in national politics through their leadership of the independence movements. Brazil's peaceful transition to independent status provided no such opportunity to its military forces. Not until the War of the Triple Alliance (1864-70) had increased their numerical strength and prestige did the military assume a political role. Since deposing Emperor Pedro II in 1889, however, the armed forces have exerted a dominant influence in many political crises.

Brazil is the only country in South America to have existed as a monarchy until late in the 19th century. The nation achieved independence from Portugal in 1822 with little struggle, and most of the following seven decades were marked by relative stability under a constitutional monarchy headed by Emperor Pedro I, who ruled from 1822 to 1831, and his son Pedro II, from 1831 to 1889. The two political parties, labeled Conservative and Liberal, represented factions of the small elite group which ran the country. During the first approximately 50 years of the empire a tradition of peaceful alternation in power between these two parties prevailed. In the 1870's, however, republican sentiment began to grow among politicians and the military, many of whom were strongly influenced by the doctrine of positivism. At the same time, Pedro II came into serious conflict with the major groups heretofore supporting his rule, beginning with the Catholic Church. The abolition of slavery in 1888

antagonized wealthy plantation owners, the last important group supporting the crown. In 1889 a bloodless military coup deposed the Emperor and substituted a republican form of government headed by Marshal Deodoro da Fonseca.

The Constitution adopted for the republic in 1891 was modeled after that of the United States. It provided for the separation of powers, with a presidential executive, a bicameral legislature, and an independent judiciary. The document represented an attempt to impose liberal, democratic institutions on a backward, patriarchal, patrimonial agrarian structure. However, the very restricted franchise and the lack of a secret ballot meant that the transition to a republic brought very little political change for the great majority of Brazilians. In operation, the formal power of the national government, as granted by the Constitution, was weakened by the power of some of the states. The political system that evolved was in fact called the "politics of the states." A "Republican Party" was formed in each state, but there was no national party, nor opposition parties. The incumbent President with the approval and support of the large states selected his successor, who in turn promised the governors favors. For most of the period from 1889 to 1930, the two wealthy states of Sao Paulo¹ and Minas Gerais dominated the national government, furnishing nearly all the presidents. The state governors sent to the capital congressmen who were favorable to the President, and he in turn gave the governors a free hand in running their states. A similar reciprocity existed between the governors and the rural *coroneis* (bosses; literally, colonels, so-called because of the national guard rank which the local leaders customarily held under the empire), who delivered votes in exchange for the right to rule their patriarchal domains with an iron hand.

The 1920's brought a buildup of pressures for social and political changes in this system. As the new urban middle class, many of them immigrants, challenged the power of the sugar barons and coffee planters, young military officers took up the cause of social reform and staged revolts in 1922, 1924, and 1927. These idealistic young officers, known as *tenentes* (lieutenants), combined in 1930 with politically disaffected civilian elements to force the resignation of the President, and his replacement by Getulio Vargas, the defeated candidate in that year's presidential election. Vargas ruled Brazil from 1930 to 1945, and again from 1950 to 1954.

¹For diacritics on place names see the list of names at the end of the chapter.

Although he was a constitutional President during most of this period, in effect Vargas ruled as a dictator. His long regime brought irreversible changes in the institutions of political life and public administration. Most important, Vargas transformed the relationship between the federal authority and the state authority, and thereby moved Brazil much closer to a truly national government. In 1945, Brazil inherited an immeasurably stronger federal executive than it had had when Vargas took over. Many functions previously exercised by state and local government were shifted into the area of federal competence. Federal authority also extended into new domains, including economic fields where private capital was reluctant to enter. Increasing federal intervention in the economy required new agencies. New federal power in social welfare and labor union organization gave urban labor for the first time an interest in government. Sustained industrialization and urbanization brought about an increased political role by industrial, commercial, and professional elements. The growth of new institutions on the federal level served two purposes: it was part of the process of unifying the sprawling country administratively, and it helped the President to articulate a national network of political alliances. Vargas quickly demonstrated his ability to use persuasion, cajolery, and the promise of spoils to exploit for his own benefit the traditional power struggles within the political leadership of the major states. During most of his regime, Vargas did not try to create a national political party, since the existing system offered him a perfect medium for his great talents of conciliation and manipulation, which in turn depended upon intimate personal contact with allies and opponents.

During the last 2 years of his regime, however, Vargas was farsighted enough to realize that his dictatorship could not survive World War II. Brazil's participation in the war on the side of the Western democracies strengthened tendencies within the military and civilian groups for a return of individual liberties, and Vargas began laying the groundwork for his later emergence as a "democratic" leader who would rely on support from a new popular, labor-based movement, as well as from more established groups such as rural landowners, Sao Paulo industrialists, and the government bureaucracy. In 1945 he formed two political movements: 1) the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB) to undercut the Communists on the left and gain for himself the working class vote; and 2) the Social Democratic Party (PSD) to unite the politicians, bureaucrats, landowners, and industrialists who had benefited from

the Vargas years and who had grave uncertainties about the stability of a more open political system. Opposing Vargas were the "outs"—who had organized in 1944 the National Democratic Union (UDN), the third major party. Dominant in this movement were the liberal constitutionalists, who had supported Vargas in 1930 in the hope that he would bring a new democratic era to Brazil, only to have their hopes shattered by the emergence of Vargas' authoritarian, personalistic *Estado Novo* (New State). The UDN's protests against Vargas' political maneuvering in preparation for the scheduled 1945 national elections were one factor that led the army command to remove him on 29 October 1945.

Vargas, however, retained a strong hold on the popular imagination: for many Brazilians he was and still is a symbol of governmental concern for the common man. His former Minister of War, Marshal Eurico Gaspar Dutra, was elected President on the PSD ticket in December 1945, and Vargas himself was elected to the Federal Senate. By 1950, the people had become disenchanted with the well-meaning but essentially conservative Dutra administration, and Vargas used his new image as a "democrat" to regain the presidency—for the first time by direct popular vote. The political scene which Vargas encountered in 1951, however, was more difficult to dominate than any he had faced in his years of rule between 1930 and 1945. He now faced a suspicious bloc in the political center, implacable opposition on the right, and an army which was at best neutral. Vargas' appointment of Labor Minister Joao Goulart, a young, ambitious protege, heightened suspicions within middle class and conservative military circles that Vargas was preparing to embark on a syndicalist regime of the type that Juan Peron had created in Argentina.

Vargas' failure to cope with inflation and his inability to satisfy demands for social reform led to loss of popular support. Corruption also increased greatly. When, in August 1954, presidential aides, without Vargas' knowledge, tried to assassinate his chief critic, the brilliant polemicist Carlos Lacerda, the military demanded Vargas' resignation, and he committed suicide.

Vice President Cafe Filho succeeded Vargas and presided over the 1955 election, which was won by Vargas' political heirs, the leaders of the two parties he had founded. Juscelino Kubitschek of the PSD became President, and Joao Goulart, head of the PTB, became Vice President. Some of the military opposed their taking office, but a counter-coup led by Marshal Henrique Teixeira Lott, then Minister of War, insured their inauguration. Kubitschek, whose campaign slogan had been "Fifty Years of Progress in Five," greatly accelerated economic development projects but neglected social welfare. He constructed, at great expense, the new capital of Brasilia (Figure 2). Kubitschek's term, however, was marked by a steep rise in the cost of living and increased social unrest. In the election of 1960 the voters gave an impressive victory to Sao Paulo Governor Janio Quadros, the "man with the broom," who had promised to sweep out the corruption and inefficiency which had grown during the three decades following Vargas' accession to power.

Impatient with congressional and other forces frustrating his reform efforts, Quadros, in what many considered a ploy to gain a free hand, tendered his resignation in August 1961. To his surprise it was accepted, and he departed after only 7 months as President. The resulting crisis brought the country to the brink of civil strife between military constitutiona-





FIGURE 2. Federal buildings in Brasilia. (left) Palace of Justice, with bust of Kubitschek in foreground. (right) Congressional office building in front of Chamber of Deputies (saucer) at left and Federal Senate (dome) at right. Ministry buildings in far background. (U/OU)



list forces and elements unwilling to allow Goulart, who had sought Communist support and had narrowly won reelection as Vice President, to take over the presidency. The crisis was settled by a typically Brazilian compromise: a modified parliamentary government, with circumscribed presidential powers, was instituted as a prerequisite to Goulart's taking office.

Goulart's conduct during his 31 months in office confirmed the misgivings of those who opposed his accession. Even after a popular referendum in January 1963 had restored full presidential powers, he proved an inept and irresponsible administrator, incapable of coping with the serious economic and political problems he had inherited. Inflation mounted rapidly; foreign investment in the country dwindled, and economic growth was sharply reduced. Goulart called for "basic reforms," but the opposition was convinced that he wanted to revise the Constitution so that he could continue in power beyond the end of his term in January 1966. Moreover, he permitted both infiltration and virtual dominance of the labor movement by Communists and other extreme leftists in return for their help in exerting pressure on the Congress through political strikes and demonstrations. Among his closest advisers were a number of Marxists, and he abetted extensive Communist infiltration also in journalism, education, and many government agencies. By early 1964 there was a widespread conviction that Brazil was drifting toward economic catastrophe, that Goulart was incapable of governing, and that he perhaps planned soon to set up either a dictatorship of the Peronist type or an authoritarian regime which might fall under Communist domination. After Goulart had condoned political agitation and mutinous attitudes on the part of noncommissioned officers of the armed forces, and after he endorsed an ultimatum by the Communist-dominated Workers General Command to the Congress to accept drastic reforms by 20 April 1964 or face a general strike, the military, joined by leading state governors, revolted against him on 31 March. His support evaporated within a day, and he fled into exile.

The Brazilian military has thus intervened directly in national politics five times since World War II—to topple the dictatorial Vargas regime in 1945, to oust the corruption-riddled Vargas government again in 1954, to assure the installation of Kubitschek in 1955, to place restraints on Goulart after Quadros' resignation in 1961, and then to oust Goulart in 1964. On the first four occasions the military immediately relinquished the reins to civilian authority, but in 1964 it kept control with the determination to eliminate

corruption and ultraleftism from the government, and it remains the dominant power in the new Brazilian political system.

Humberto Castello Branco, a highly respected army general who had played a leading role in the Goulart overthrow, was endorsed by Congress to serve for the remainder of Goulart's term—until January 1966; the term was later extended by Congress to 15 March 1967. The new President pursued policies which emphasized administrative, political, and economic reform, including greater participation of private capital in the economy. He filled the key Cabinet posts with experienced, nonpolitical technicians, but relied to a great extent on former military colleagues, particularly those of the so-called Sorbonne group—senior officers associated with the Superior War School (ESG)—for advice on broad policy matters.

The government focused its early efforts on checking subversion and eliminating corruption. Several hundred politicians, military personnel, subversives, and other persons charged with illegal activities were stripped of their political rights, generally for 10 years, and many public officials, including a substantial number of congressmen, were ousted from office for similar reasons. Political activities by labor unions and student groups were sharply curtailed. Congress, with many of the opposition leaders purged from its ranks, generally was reluctant to resist the regime and approved most of the significant administration bills.

Although President Castello Branco exercised power with relative restraint for the most part, his period of rule was marked by strong authority embodied in executive decrees with the force of law—four institutional acts and more than 30 complementary acts. Under the competent leadership of Roberto Campos, Minister of Planning and General Coordination, the government instituted a sweeping financial stabilization and austerity program designed to bring the rampant inflation under control. Housing and banking reforms were very successful, but reforms in land utilization were only slightly successful.

Castello Branco's successor, Arthur da Costa e Silva, a retired army marshal, took office in March 1967, after having been selected by the top military hierarchy and formally elected President by the purged Congress in October 1966. The new Constitution approved by Congress in January 1967 institutionalized many of the special powers employed by Castello Branco. The political situation deteriorated under the Costa e Silva government. The President began by loosening somewhat the strong political controls he inherited. He also greatly changed

the style and methods of government operation, moving away from the highly personalized organizational system of Castello Branco and delegating more extensive authority to his Cabinet ministers. On the economic front the government generally maintained the development and stabilization program initiated by Castello Branco. However, the basic problem of seeking to slow inflation while producing some tangible gains for the masses remained. Popular dissatisfactions spread, and the administration reinstated and tightened political controls. By late 1968 many military officers believed that a number of factors combined to threaten the maintenance of the 1964 "revolution." Symptoms included student strikes and demonstrations, the first noteworthy labor agitation since 1964, open criticism of the government by some clerics of the Catholic Church, increasingly critical treatment of the military by elements of the press, an unprecedented series of bank robberies and urban terrorist incidents, charges of corruption in the administration reaching to the Cabinet level, and a surprising number of victories in the November 1968 municipal elections by persons considered corrupt or subversive by the military.

Ultimately, it was the defense by Congress of its diminished prerogatives that catalyzed the military into taking action against the fractious civilians. The military, taking umbrage when a federal deputy denounced them in a speech before the Chamber of Deputies, demanded that the government prosecute the deputy for "undermining the revolution." The Chamber refused, in a vote in December 1968, to lift the deputy's immunity, and the strong military reaction forced President Costa e Silva to issue Institutional Act Number Five on 13 December 1968, giving the President dictatorial powers. This act overrode the Constitution by suspending most civil liberties and, in national security cases, the right of habeas corpus, and, unlike the first four acts, carried no expiration date. Using the authority given him by Institutional Act Number Five, the President immediately suspended Congress, and a new purge of critics of the government was initiated. More than 100 persons were arrested, and many of these, including several members of Congress, were deprived of their political rights for 10 years.

When President Costa e Silva suffered a stroke in August 1969, the three ministers of the armed forces bypassed the civilian Vice President and assumed control of the government. The top level of the armed forces hierarchy selected Gen. Emilio Garrastazu Medici, commander of the Third Army, to succeed Costa e Silva. Medici chose retired Admiral Hamann

Rademaker Gruenewald as his Vice President. The suspension of Congress was lifted so that it could ratify the "election" of the two men, and they took office on 30 October, 1969.

Because the communications media are censored, virtually all public expressions of dissent are discouraged, and only elections of national and state legislators and mayors of small towns are held by popular ballot, it is difficult to determine public attitudes toward the Medici government. The popular votes for legislators and very limited opinion surveys that have been taken in urban centers showed a considerable degree of approval. The administration's success in promoting rapid economic growth, reducing the rate of inflation, and in pursuing the integration of the nation through the construction of transportation and communications links and opening up the Amazon region have earned the support of many Brazilians. The business and financial community whose center is Sao Paulo have been firm supporters of the post-1964 governments based on their effective economic performance. On the other hand, Medici has recognized that most workers thus far have received only slight personal material benefits from the economic progress achieved over the past 8 years, and he has said that more attention should be devoted to improving this record. The most consistently negative attitudes toward the military-led governments have been found among certain university students and professors, middle class professionals and intellectuals, and clergymen of the Catholic left. Violent opposition to the regime has been almost completely limited to the small urban terrorist groups whose operations reached a peak in 1969. By 1972, aggressive, and at times heavyhanded, campaigns by the security forces had severely hampered both violent and nonviolent opposition groups, and many members of these sectors now have abandoned the goal of ousting the administration or even significantly affecting its policies.

The Medici government, confident that it is rapidly putting its own house in order, is beginning to pay much more attention to foreign affairs. Medici and others in his administration, such as Minister of Foreign Affairs Gibson Barboza, are convinced that Brazil is rapidly becoming an influential factor in world affairs and must play a role, both inside and outside Latin America, commensurate with its size and destiny. Notable evidence of this expanding foreign interest was Medici's official visit to Washington in December, 1971 and Barboza's travels to many Latin American, African, Middle Eastern, and European nations in 1971 through 1973. Brazil



FIGURE 3. Gen. (ret.) Ernesto Geisel (U/OU)

has also taken the lead in various inter-American and worldwide forums on issues involving trade and territorial sea limits. In some cases Brazil has adopted positions on these issues that differ from those held by the United States, and Medici has said that he accepts the likelihood of more such friction with the developed nations in the future as a sign of Brazil's growth into an important power in world councils.

Retired army Gen. Ernesto Geisel (Figure 3) will become President of Brazil on 15 March 1974. His selection by President Medici, with the approval of senior military officers, was a result of widespread respect earned during his long army career and subsequent effective performance as president of the Brazilian state oil company, PETROBRAS. Like Costa e Silva and Medici, Geisel is a native of Rio Grande do Sul—a state that has produced many successful politicians and military officers. He was born in 1908, the last of five children of a German Lutheran immigrant. Of the four sons in the family, three rose in the army to the rank of general. One brother, Orlando Geisel, serves as Army Minister under President Medici and probably had a discreet influence in the selection of Ernesto as the next chief executive. After the 1964 revolution, President Castello Branco designated Ernesto Geisel as chief of the presidential military household. Costa e Silva appointed him to the

Superior Military Tribunal, and he retired from 44 years of army service in 1969 to take over PETROBRAS. Like Castello Branco, he is associated with the "intellectual" current in the military, nearly all of whose members are graduates of the Superior War School. He is likely to continue many of the domestic and foreign programs of the Medici administration.

B. Structure and functioning of the government (U/OU)

1. Constitutional system

The general outlines of the Brazilian governmental structure (Figure 4) are similar to those of the United States; in operation, however, the two systems are very dissimilar. One marked difference is the concentration of power in the hands of the Brazilian federal executive. The governmental structure is established by a Constitution promulgated in 1967, extensively revised in 1969, and slightly amended in 1972. The governmental structure has also been profoundly affected by a series of Institutional Acts issued by the governments since 1964. The first four of these acts have been incorporated into the Constitution, and, under article 182 of that document, Institutional Acts Five through Seventeen remain in effect until they are nullified by decree of the President acting with the advice of the National Security Council. The overall effect of constitutional changes, of the Institutional Acts, and of other presidential decrees since 1964 has been to strengthen the executive's power and greatly reduce those of the legislative and the judicial branches. The measures have also served to remove from the political scene most of the administration's important critics.

The 1967 Constitution was designed to institutionalize and codify the principles of the "1964 revolution." The Constitution provides for a federal republic of 22 states, four territories, and the Federal District of Brasilia. It also provides for "independent and harmonious" executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the government. The presidents since 1964 generally have not depended strongly on the progovernment National Renewal Alliance (ARENA) party in Congress. In fact, since the erosion of its legislative powers, Congress has only a minimal role in governing the country.

Institutional Act Number Five, of 13 December 1968, the most sweeping of the acts, granted the President strong authoritarian powers, including that of recessing the federal Congress and state legislatures.




FIGURE 4. Constitutional structure of government, 1972 (U/OU)

This act overrode the Constitution by suspending the right of habeas corpus and many other traditional civil liberties in cases involving the broadly defined national security. The chief executive was also authorized to confiscate the assets of anyone who had obtained them illegally while holding public office. The act further empowered the President to declare a state of siege for an unlimited time. It also excluded from judicial review all actions carried out under its authorization and virtually eliminated all juridical checks and safeguards. It, in effect, eliminated legal protection against arbitrary actions by the government against individuals who were suspected of acting against national security.

The judiciary also became a target of the military. Three liberal judges of the Supreme Federal Tribunal were forced to retire, and two of their colleagues then resigned in protest. Rather than replace the departed jurists, Costa e Silva permanently reduced the court from 16 members to 11. Institutional Act Number Six, issued on 31 January 1969, stripped the court of some of its powers in those matters about which security forces were most sensitive; the act restricted the court's power to review crimes against the very broad national security laws. These actions placed the protection of national security above the principle of an independent judiciary.

2. Federal government

a. Executive branch

The President is the central figure in Brazilian politics. The President and Vice President serve 5-year terms. They are chosen, not by direct popular vote, but by an electoral college composed of Congress and selected delegates from the state assemblies. The President may not succeed himself. The order of presidential succession after the Vice President is as follows: President of the Chamber of Deputies, President of the Senate, and President of the Supreme Federal Tribunal. Despite these procedures, the succession to the presidency in practice is controlled under the present government by the military. The incumbent, retired Gen. Emilio Garrastazu Medici, announced in June 1973 that another retired army general, Ernesto Geisel, will succeed him in March 1974. In case of presidential disability the vice president is supposed to succeed to office. This constitutional measure, however, has not always been followed. When President Costa e Silva was incapacitated in 1969, for example, the military service ministers bypassed the civilian Vice President, Pedro Aleixo, and took power themselves under the



FIGURE 5. Vice President Augusto Rademaker (C)

terms of Institutional Act Number Twelve. Although this act applied only to the succession to Costa e Silva, a similar pattern would probably be followed if Medici were unable to continue in office for any prolonged period. Vice President Rademaker (Figure 5)—a retired admiral—might be allowed to serve during a brief incapacitation of Medici, but the army probably would insist that one of its officers replace Medici if he became unable to continue in office.

The authority of the President was greatly strengthened under the Constitution of 1967 and the amendments promulgated in October 1969. He may propose that the Supreme Federal Tribunal suspend for a period of up to 10 years the political rights of persons found guilty of subversive or corrupt activity. They may also be deprived of official posts to which they have been elected. Persons accused of crimes against national security can be tried by military courts.

When the President's power to decree an unlimited state of siege lapses with the termination of Institutional Act Number Five, he will be empowered by the Constitution to decree a state of siege for 60 days (extendable for another 60 days) without first consulting Congress. He has broad powers to intervene in the states and to issue decrees with the force of law in the fields of national security and public finance.

Congress can approve or reject such decrees, but has no power to amend them. Congressional action is further restricted by a provision which reserves to the President the initiation of legislation pertaining to public finance, the civil service, the strength of the armed forces, or administration of the Federal District and national territories. Congress must act on the federal budget within a specified period or it becomes law as submitted—a provision which ended one of the traditional methods held by Congress under previous constitutions for pressuring the President. Time limits may also be set for congressional action on ordinary bills (100 days), but those designated urgent by the President must be acted upon within 40 days or they become law as drafted. With presidential concurrence, Congress may grant political amnesties. The chief executive may veto congressional bills in whole or in part, but the Congress can override him by a two-thirds vote.

In addition to his special powers, the President holds normal executive prerogatives, such as appointing and removing Cabinet officers, making high administrative and judicial appointments (some of which require Senate approval), and serving as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. In addition to the Vice President, the Cabinet is composed of the heads of the following ministries:²

Aeronautics	Industry and Commerce
Agriculture	Interior
Army	Justice
Communications	Labor and Social Security
Education	Mines and Energy
Finance	Navy
Foreign Affairs	Planning and General Coordination
Health	Transportation and Public Works

The head of the National Intelligence Service (SNI) and the chiefs of the President's Civil and Military Households are also considered to have Cabinet status and participate in Cabinet meetings.

Some of the Cabinet ministers have considerable influence within the administration, based either on the traditional strength of the entities they head or on their own personal ability. At the top of the list is the Minister of the Army, Gen. Orlando Geisel (Figure 6), who has effectively maintained the army as a solid base of support for Medici. Minister of Foreign Affairs Mario Gibson Barboza and Minister of Finance Antonio Delfim Neto have earned respect for their effective performance, although personal and policy

²For a current listing of key government officials consult *Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments*, published monthly by the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.



FIGURE 6. Gen. Orlando Geisel, Minister of Army (U/OU)

differences have at times caused friction between their ministries. Delfim Neto is the administration's chief economic architect; among other duties, he chairs the National Monetary Council, the top financial policymaking body. Minister of Transportation and Public Works Mario Andreazza and Minister of Education Jarbas Passarinho are retired army colonels who have proved able to fill important civilian roles in fields on which the Medici administration places high priority. Medici has been able to maintain considerable continuity in the Cabinet compared with previous administrations; only three changes of ministers have occurred during his term. Medici rarely meets with the Cabinet as a body; Cabinet sessions are usually called only when he wishes to announce an important policy decision that he has already made.

The executive branch of the federal government is an exceedingly complex apparatus, consisting of many specialized administrative bodies, advisory bodies, foundations, government agencies, and mixed corporations. Some of these are directly under the authority of the President, while others are only loosely supervised by the executive. There are nearly 30 bodies directly under the President, and approximately 40 other entities are coordinated through the office of the presidency, many of them being responsible also to one or more of the ministries. These include public foundations, such as the Getulio Vargas Foundation, which conducts research in economics, business, and other fields; mixed capital enterprises, such as the Bank of Brazil, the National Steel Company, and the government oil enterprise PETROBRAS; and government corporations, such as the Brazilian Coffee Institute.

Among the bodies directly under the President is the National Security Council (CSN). Since 1964 the

CSN, as a result of an expanded concept of national security, has been given additional authority concerning a wide range of internal matters. The CSN is constitutionally charged with advising the President on the formulation and execution of national security goals and policies in national and international affairs, with special emphasis on problems concerning internal and external security; programs on international cooperation; agreements and conventions with other nations concerning national boundaries; and activities in matters indispensable to national defense. The CSN secretariat also has responsibility for conducting studies on problems that concern national security, specifically policies regarding transportation, development of national resources, nuclear energy, labor, immigration, education, telecommunications, and several other fields. Under Costa e Silva the CSN played the leading role in purging the country of subversive and corrupt elements, making the final decision on executive action in the majority of suspensions of individuals' political rights.

The President is the presiding officer of the CSN and may convoke it whenever he wishes. Other members are the Vice President, the Chiefs of the Presidential Civil and Military Households, all Cabinet ministers, the director of the SNI, the Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff, and the chiefs of staff of the army, navy, and air force. Its principal functions are carried out by its general secretariat, which, by statute, is headed by the Chief of the Presidential Military Household. This official is thus in a key position to influence decisions regarding national security.

Under Costa e Silva, and to an even greater degree under Medici, three organizations—and their chiefs, included in the CSN—have attained great importance: these are the Presidential Military Household, under Gen. Joao Figueiredo, (Figure 7); the Presidential Civil Household, under Joao Leitao de Abreu, (Figure 8); and the SNI, under Maj. Gen. Carlos Fontoura (Figure 9). These men, along with Army Minister Geisel, constitute Medici's "inner circle," and are consulted by the President on policy matters on a daily basis. The four head the organizations that represent the real—as opposed to the theoretical—power structure in Brazil, and they also have a close personal relationship with Medici. Figueiredo formerly served as the President's Chief of Staff when Medici commanded the Third Army.

The President has a small Special Advisory Staff that prepares reports on designated topics and writes speeches for the chief executive. It is headed by Col. Leo Etchigoyen of the army.

The problems of public administration are manifold. Corruption, extending even to the presidential level, had often been sizable prior to the Castello Branco administration and, despite the military's strong moral fervor, remains widespread. The Brazilian bureaucracy, although reduced under Castello Branco, is still swollen. At the same time, however, there is a scarcity of personnel trained in modern administrative techniques. Time-consuming procedures, such as requiring numerous stamps and signatures on official documents, remain the norm, although administrative reform efforts are aimed at streamlining archaic practices. Overlapping functions and responsibilities among government entities often serve to blur lines of authority. Certain ministries are in direct competition, and there is often a lack of coordination within a ministry and the agencies loosely attached to it.

Since 1964, however, the efficiency of the executive branch has improved considerably. There has been more emphasis on recruiting administrators and bureaucrats with specific technical skills. Several inefficient autonomous agencies have been abolished and many corrupt administrators have been purged. Corruption has proved particularly difficult to eliminate; some cases continue to come to light under Medici. He has usually used the powers granted under Institutional Act Number Five to remove quietly the guilty individuals. The persistence of corruption might be used by military and civilian critics to try to impair the regime's image.

b. Legislative branch

The Congress was recessed by President Costa e Silva on 13 December 1968 after the declaration of Institutional Act Number Five, and the President and his Cabinet assumed legislative functions. Congress was reconvened in October 1969 to legitimize the selection of President Medici, and has held its regular sessions since.

The Congress, which holds an annual session from 1 March to 30 November with a month's recess in July, is composed of the Chamber of Deputies and the Federal Senate. There are 310 deputies, who are elected for 4-year terms by popular vote under a system of proportional representation. The deputies are distributed among the states on the basis of the number of registered voters, with each state being entitled to at least three deputies and each territory, except Fernando de Noronha, one. The three senators from each of the 22 states are directly elected for terms of 8 years; to provide continuity, one-third and two-thirds for the Senate are elected alternately every 4



FIGURE 7. Gen. Joao Figueiredo, Chief of the Presidential Military Household (C)



FIGURE 8. Joao Leitao de Abreu, Chief of the Presidential Civil Household (U/OU)



FIGURE 9. Gen. Carlos Fontoura, Director of the National Intelligence Service (U/OU)

years. Members of both houses are required to be native Brazilians in possession of their political rights; senators must be over 35 years of age and deputies over 21.

The present political makeup of the Congress demonstrates the dominance of the progovernment National Renewal Alliance (ARENA), which controls 59 seats in the Senate and 223 in the Chamber of Deputies, compared with the opposition Brazilian Democratic Movement's seven senators and 87 deputies.

The Congress has generally been a conservative force, reflecting the overrepresentation of the more static rural regions which is brought about by the electoral system. Presidents have often found it difficult to obtain a majority for their legislative programs. Agrarian reform bills, banking and tax reforms, and many other measures have become lost in the legislative process. Congressional opposition to President Quadros, with frequent overriding of his vetoes, contributed to his decision to submit his resignation in 1961 when he was not granted extraordinary powers.

Major changes in the relationship between the Congress and the President occurred under Castello Branco and were incorporated in the 1967

Constitution. Congress lost many of its checks over the President, such as delaying tactics used to slow execution of his programs. Constitutionally, the Congress retains the exclusive right to approve treaties; to authorize the President to declare war or make peace or to permit foreign troops to transit or temporarily remain on Brazilian territory; to approve or suspend federal intervention or a state of siege;³ and to oversee the acts of the President and the decentralized agencies.

The initiative for proposing legislation has almost completely shifted from the Congress to the President. Nearly all important programs are prepared by the President, with the advice of the organs of the executive branch such as Cabinet agencies, the CSN, and the SNI, and then are submitted to the Congress for ratification as laws. To a degree the Congress serves as a forum where the administration and its policies can be examined and criticized; however, all the legislators recognize that there are subjects which the government considers out of bounds for public discussion. These taboo areas include criticism of Medici and of the armed forces. Legislators who speak out on these sensitive subjects are likely to have their remarks deleted from the congressional record and banned from press coverage. Under the broad national security legislation, congressmen could be subject to imprisonment for attacking the government; none have actually met this fate, although under Castello Branco and Costa e Silva a number of members of Congress were purged and had their political rights suspended for 10 years. The congress clearly is "on parole," and any violations of the conditions under which it operates could bring permanent closure. The legislators appear to have accepted this fact, after having experienced an imposed recess from December 1968 to October 1969. The next congressional elections are scheduled for 15 November 1974.

c. Judicial branch

Educated Brazilians have a long tradition of respect for at least the forms of legal processes, and the judiciary has enjoyed considerable prestige. Brazil's legal order and traditions are based mainly on Roman law and continental European usage, but legal thought has conformed more closely to Anglo-Saxon principles. In the early 19th century, the law schools formalized the legal system. The extensively used writ of habeas corpus and the federal jury are two notable examples of Anglo-Saxon principles that have been

³Until Institutional Act Number Five is terminated, the President has the right to declare unlimited states of siege without the necessity of approval by Congress.

introduced. A jury, however, is mandatory only in specified criminal cases including homicide and abortion. The Brazilian legal system differs in several fundamental aspects from the U.S. system. Brazilian law is codified; precedents are not binding although they are considered one element in the chain of judicial reasoning. The application of the express provisions of the code to the case at hand is the key judicial exercise. Brazilian law is recorded in various codes, such as the Civil Code, the Commercial Code, and the Criminal Code. The Civil Code was approved and promulgated by the Brazilian Congress in 1916 after a century of study and evolution. Primarily based on the German Civil Code, it was a conservative document but had the virtues of being flexible and practical as well as comprehensive and concise. It has served as a model for other Latin American countries. A new Civil Code was being prepared in 1973. The Commercial Code, promulgated in 1850, was the first such original code in the Western Hemisphere, but it is now largely outmoded. In 1969, the latest Criminal Code, reflecting modern theories of criminal control and rehabilitation, was adopted. Although a judge is theoretically restricted to applying the law codes, he still exercises a good deal of initiative and discretion in resolving cases. This flexibility is achieved by allowing the judge to consider each case on its merits. Such an approach, however, often tends to slow down the process.

Judicial power is exercised by the Supreme Federal Tribunal, the Federal Tribunal of Appeals, federal courts of the first instance, and state courts empowered to apply federal law. Brazil does not have a dual system of federal and state laws as does the United States. On the local level there is generally one trial court in each *município* (roughly comparable to a U.S. county). The states may also establish inferior jurisdictions, such as justices of the peace. In addition to the regular court system dealing with civil and criminal cases, there are special labor, electoral, maritime, and military courts with final authority in their specialized areas, but with appeal to the Supreme Federal Tribunal on constitutional questions. While the election tribunals have contributed somewhat toward guaranteeing free elections, they have been more subject to political pressures than have the other courts.

The Supreme Federal Tribunal is composed of 11 justices appointed by the President, subject, according to the 1967 Constitution, to Federal Senate approval. Members must be Brazilian-born, over 35 years old, and of notable judicial learning and excellent reputation. The Supreme Federal Tribunal is

empowered to declare laws unconstitutional. Its performance in this role has been limited, however, by the very extensive assumption of powers by the federal executive branch, which necessarily lessens the discretionary powers of the courts. The courts have also tended to interpret the Constitution broadly, with a presumption in favor of federal executive and legislative action. Judicial tolerance of the executive's use of decree power to legislate, for example, has become a constitutional tradition.

Institutional Act Number Five and subsequent decrees have severely restricted the jurisdiction of the courts. All actions carried out under these acts are excluded from judicial review. Institutional Act Number Six restricted the powers of the Supreme Federal Tribunal to review crimes against the very broad national security laws. Although the government has become increasingly authoritarian and the courts' jurisdiction in several areas limited, the courts have maintained a degree of independence.

A significant development in the Brazilian judiciary since 1964 has been the increased use of the special military courts in cases involving civilians. The military court system, consisting of the 15-member Superior Military Tribunal and regional military courts, before 1964 had little impact on the civilian sector. It was until then—and still is—used to try military persons for violations of military laws. However, under the governments of Castello Branco and Costa e Silva the use of military courts instead of civilian courts to try crimes considered to affect national security became an integral part of Brazil's legal structure. This came about largely because the regimes believed that the civil courts were incapable of dealing with the new problem of urban terrorism. Under Costa e Silva, there was a broadening of the definitions of national security through provisions of the 1967 Constitution and the National Security Law sanctioned in 1969. Under the extended concept of national security, defense against covert efforts from within the country to destroy national institutions—political, economic, sociopsychological, or military—is as critical as defense against external aggression. Article 122 of the Constitution states that the military courts may try civilians for crimes against the national security or against military installations. The National Security Law states that all crimes committed under its provisions will be tried by military courts, and the number and type of crimes considered to be acts against the security of the state are increased. Another important institution of the Brazilian military judicial system is the Police-Military Inquiry (IPM). The IPM's are formal factfinding bodies established on a

state or regional basis. They have played an important role in the government's purge of subversive and corrupt elements.

The Constitution of 1967, as amended in 1969, provided for the creation of a Public Ministry under the supervision of the Minister of Justice made up of government attorneys headed by the Attorney General. It is the legal representative of the federal government in all cases involving the public interest. The Public Ministry defends the rights and promotes the interests of the federal government, sees that the laws are obeyed, and safeguards the rights of individuals unable to defend themselves. As an arm of the executive, elements of the Public Ministry are attached to all levels and branches of the judiciary.

The Attorney General is appointed by the President with Federal Senate approval and may be dismissed by the President. The qualifications are the same as for supreme court justices. The states also have public ministries, and at both federal and state levels members of the Public Ministry are made career officials after 2 years of satisfactory service.

The courts have generally avoided becoming involved in cases charging the abuse of civil rights by the government. Most of these incidents have occurred during investigations of subversive activities, as defined by the broad national security legislation. In 1969 the administration created a special Council for the Defense of Human Rights, which could examine cases of alleged violations of civil rights and recommend that judicial action be taken where the charges were found to have a basis. The council is composed of representatives of the government, the two legal parties, and other organizations such as the Brazilian Lawyers Association. Although the council has heard testimony on numerous cases of apparent abuse of civil rights by government officials, it has not taken any important actions to remedy the situation. In December 1971 Medici signed a law which increased the council's membership from nine to 13, reduced its annual meetings from 20 to six, and required that sessions be held in secret. These measures further weaken the council and improve the government's ability to prevent the public disclosure of embarrassing facts or allegations.

3. State and local government

The administrative jurisdictions below the federal level (Figure 10) include 22 states, four federal territories, the Federal District of Brasilia, and nearly 4,000 municipalities (*municípios*), which correspond roughly to counties in the United States.




FIGURE 10. Administrative Divisions (U/OU)

In the 22 states, the framework of government largely parallels that of the federal government. The state governors, who were elected by popular ballot prior to 1966, formerly were often important national figures who exercised considerable power. Since 1966, however, they have been picked by the President and then formally "elected" by the state legislatures to serve 4-year terms. This process will be followed in the gubernatorial elections scheduled for November 1974. Thus, their first allegiance is to the President, and he is the final judge of their performance. This reality was demonstrated by Medici's removal of one governor for ineffectiveness and corruption in November 1971. The fact that the governors are never directly accountable to the people has allowed them to take some unpopular measures to eliminate corruption and incompetence in government. The members of the unicameral state assemblies are elected for 4-year

terms by popular vote on the basis of proportional representation.

State administrations vary widely in quality. In more developed states, such as Sao Paulo, Guanabara, Minas Gerais, and Rio Grande do Sul, governments have well-developed executive branches, with large cabinets, numerous autonomous agencies, development banks, and extensive public works programs. They also have relatively efficient civil services. In poorer states, however, government services are rudimentary, and morality and the level of competence are often low.

The states tend to exercise only such powers as the federal government declines to assume, although the Constitution reserves for them all powers not included in the broad grant of powers to the federal government. In certain areas, such as education, emigration, immigration, and interstate traffic, the

states have concurrent powers of legislation, but such legislation can only supplement federal legislation and must not conflict with it. The states and municipalities also have the right, with Federal Senate approval, to contract foreign loans.

Intervention in the affairs of the states by the federal government is permitted on certain grounds, but the Constitution attempts to eliminate arbitrary intervention. The federal government may intervene to repel an invasion; to insure the execution of judicial orders; and to maintain the integrity of the state government.

The federal government's dominant role in the country's economy has been a major factor in maintaining control over the states, and the Constitution has allocated proceeds from the major sources of revenue to the federal government. Although the states together receive almost as much in total revenues as the federal government, most of it is collected by a few states. In providing public services, all but a few of the more wealthy states are increasingly dependent on federal aid. For this reason most states maintain official representatives in the federal capital.

There are four federal territories—Amapa and Roraima in the north, bordering French Guiana and Venezuela, respectively; Rondonia in the west, bordering Bolivia; and Fernando de Noronha, a group of small islands in the Atlantic Ocean off Natal. Municipal government in the territories is headed by a mayor appointed by the governor of the territory, who, in turn, is appointed by the President. The territories are in remote, sparsely populated regions and have limited economic or political significance, except that the three territories on the mainland are located in frontier areas and Amapa contains valuable minerals and guards the minor access routes from the Atlantic Ocean to the Amazon River.

The Federal District (the capital of the country) was moved from Rio de Janeiro to Brasilia in 1960. The former Federal District became the state of Guanabara. Brasilia is governed by a mayor (*prefeito*), appointed by the President with Federal Senate approval and removable by the President at will. The legislative council votes city taxes, establishes the city budget, and organizes the city's administrative services. There is a court of appeals made up of seven judges; a jury court for murder cases; a tribunal that rules on cases involving freedom of the press; and 12 trial court judges to handle different types of litigation. Approximately the same provisions regulating federal intervention in the states applies to the Federal District.

The only significant governmental division of the state is the municipality (*município*), which typically

embraces territory extending far into the countryside, so that it is somewhat comparable to a county. It is governed by a mayor and a legislative council, both serving 4-year terms. Most mayors and councilmen are elected by direct popular ballot, but mayors of state capitals and of approximately 100 other cities deemed by the President to be vital to national security are appointed by the state governors. Elections for mayors were held in all eligible municipalities in November 1972; these are the only direct elections for executive branch officials in Brazil. In some of the more remote areas, the local political boss (*coronel*) traditionally has controlled the choice of the mayor and has been the dominant political figure. The trend now clearly is in the direction of greater federal, rather than local, responsibility for many programs. Although the municipalities still have substantial powers of self-government, including the power to license and impose excise and transfer taxes, their independence of action is severely limited since the national government, and, to a lesser degree, the state governments control the financial resources.

The municipalities in many cases are too poor to carry out any but the most rudimentary public services, and in 1961 the federal government began to provide assistance to them. The National Service for the Municipalities was established to act as liaison with the municipalities, to furnish them with assistance and information, and to sponsor meetings between mayors and councilmen of various regions to discuss local problems. An older organization, established in 1948, the Brazilian Association of Municipal Organizations, was designed to represent mayors, councilmen, and leaders from over 2,500 municipalities, and has been active in securing federal aid for a vastly expanded program of municipal works and services.


The federal government has also extended grants-in-aid and subsidies to municipal governments. Several of the ministries—notably finance, health, and education—carry out local services and have attempted to stimulate corresponding municipal action. The Administrative Department of Public Service also administers assistance to the municipalities. To insure efficient administration of federal programs the government has established field agencies to supervise the planning and exercise financial control over its execution.

C. Political dynamics

1. Political forces and interest groups


The historical political experience of most of Brazil's population has been one of nonparticipation. Until the 1930's, political power was concentrated

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
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worked with student volunteers in the *favelas* (slums) and in the countryside in an effort to make workers and peasants aware of their rights as citizens and of the means available for exercising them.

The arrival of the military-led government in 1964 caused a sharpening of the existing divisions within the church. Some of the more traditional prelates, such as Jaime Cardinal Barros Camara of Rio de Janeiro, supported the "revolution," but many liberal prelates opposed it. As leftist political leaders and officeholders were eliminated from public life, progressive clergymen—especially bishops in the Northeast—assumed an important role in calling for reforms. Liberal churchmen have been increasingly willing to voice their dissatisfaction with social and economic conditions in some areas and with the government's failure to make dramatic moves to alleviate the poverty of the masses. The most radical churchmen, who represent only a small minority within the church, have said that if change cannot be instituted peacefully, it must occur violently, and that conscientious citizens have a right to opt for violence under such circumstances. A small number of these clerics assisted some of the violence-oriented subversive groups that began to operate in the late 1960's, and security forces arrested several of the radical clerics. Many moderate church leaders, who can be classified in the "centrist-reformist" trend, are also beginning to accept the necessity for a far-reaching reform of Brazilian society and to push for church association with this change. They are more frequently speaking out for needed reforms, but, unlike their more militant brothers, they do not accept violence as a means.

The liberal and moderate, as well as the radical, church leaders have earned the enmity and suspicion of archconservatives in the church as well as of many military officers, who view some types of calls for reform as Communist-inspired and who insist that the only legitimate role of the church is guiding the spiritual life of the faithful. Indeed, some military men view the church as a leading subversive influence in the country—an opinion that in part accounts for the steady increase in tension between the church and the government. Prelates such as Archbishop Helder Camara of Recife and Olinda (Figure 11) have frequently been involved in incidents with government officials. Both the church hierarchy and officials of the Medici administration want to avoid incidents that could lead to confrontations, but the difference in their attitudes toward the proper role of the church makes a degree of friction inevitable.



FIGURE 11. Archbishop Helder Camara of Recife and Olinda (C)

The Protestant movement is small, and there is little to indicate that it will play a major role in influencing government policy.

d. Students (U/OU)

Until recently, Brazilian students exerted considerable influence in politics. This situation derived in part from the prestige conferred by intellectual attainments and from the elitist nature of the political system. Further, participation in university politics had long been the proving ground for a political career. Unlike political parties in a number of other Latin American countries, major Brazilian political parties generally did not foster the formation of youth wings. Nevertheless, some Presidents—notably Vargas and Goulart—used students as an articulate and powerful pressure group. During the Vargas regime the National Students Union (UNE) was organized and subsidized by the Ministry of Education, and the same trend took place under Goulart. President Castello Branco attempted to reduce political activity among university and secondary student organizations, which at the time of Goulart's downfall were controlled by Marxists of several hues. In early March, 1966 the government outlawed all national and state student organizations, a followup to a 1964 decree by which the government had tried to supplant the UNE and its state affiliates and drastically restricted nonacademic activities in the universities and secondary schools.

Students have many legitimate grievances about the shortcomings of the education system, and these complaints were exploited by leftist student leaders to justify serious antigovernment demonstrations in 1967

and 1968. The government used strong force in repressing these demonstrations, and has established drastic penalties for students who engage in political activities, as defined by the security forces. A decree adopted in 1968 provides for expulsion from universities for a 3-year period of any student or faculty member who takes part in demonstrations or other proscribed activities. The decree has been applied against several hundred students. Broad national security laws make prison terms a possibility for students who go beyond verbal opposition to the government. Military and police informants in classrooms take note of the political expressions of students and teachers.

Aware of the futility of overt opposition to the government, and of the danger such action poses to their personal well-being and educational opportunities, most student activists—who always constituted a small minority of the total student population—have fallen into apathy. The illegal UNE, which was the primary force behind the 1967 and 1968 student demonstrations, now barely exists, and no other genuine student organization has taken its place. Government efforts to organize pro-administration movements have gained little response. Most students now concentrate on their courses, on issues such as the need for student housing and cafeterias, and on other matters with no political ramifications. Some students are pleased by this atmosphere, while those who are not have little opportunity to express their dissatisfaction. The government's economic development programs—including some in the field of education—have earned the approval of some student sectors. No relaxation of the prohibition on political activity by students seems likely, and this may create a future problem when a new generation of political leaders is needed.

e. Centralism vs. regionalism (U/OU)

The environment in which all these political forces and interest groups operate is provided by the federal system of government, one of the most complex in Latin America, encompassing vast regional differences in the level of political and economic development. National supremacy over the 22 states is assured by the preponderant economic power of the national government and by the powerful political powers (including the broad authority to remove uncooperative or inefficient officials) available to the President. Since 1966 the governors have been picked by the Presidents. Whereas the major states such as Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais once were able to hold their own in dealings with the federal government, the present

extreme centralization of power in the hands of the federal executive branch has greatly weakened the states' position. The federal executive now determines regional and state priorities in areas such as economic development and security.

Sectionalism is diminishing as a result of improved communications and transportation, the extension of government services, and the growth of nationalism. It would be further reduced by the removal of extreme disparities in economic development, notably between the prosperous industrialized southern area and the impoverished agricultural Northeast.

2. Political parties

Brazil has an artificially imposed two-party system replacing the numerous parties which had evolved after 1945. The Castello Branco administration devised legal procedures to reorganize the country's political parties into the National Renewal Alliance (ARENA) and the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB). All other political parties were abolished by decree on 27 October 1965 after the victory of opposition-supported gubernatorial candidates in the important states of Guanabara and Minas Gerais. (U/OU)

a. The party system prior to 1964 (U/OU)

Under the empire, Brazil ostensibly had a two-party system, although the Liberal and Conservative parties both represented the narrowly defined interests of the rural aristocracy. The outcome of elections was decided by the emperor and the political machines, but the system accustomed Brazilians to the idea of the peaceful rotation of parties in office. After 1889, under the republic, there was only one party—the Republican Party—in reality a coalition of autonomous state Republican Party machines. Power was lodged in the hands of the President, the state governors, and the local bosses, and the only rotation in office took place at the direction of the most powerful state machines.

In the early years of the Vargas regime a system of electoral courts was set up to take the control of elections out of the hands of those in power, but the accompanying introduction of proportional representation resulted in the extreme fragmentation of public opinion. Forty-five parties were represented in the Constituent Assembly of 1933. In 1937 President Vargas abolished all parties. A new system was hastily assembled in 1945 in preparation for free elections.

The multiparty system that prevailed from 1945 to 1965 was composed on the average of 12 nationally

registered parties, although 15 participated in the 1950 elections and 14 were registered in 1965. Of these, only three were major national parties, the others being relatively small and often regional. Although centralized structures were developed in accordance with the Electoral Code of 1945, the parties, in practice, tended to be loose agglomerations of state and local units. The leadership of the major parties was generally collegial, whereas that of the smaller parties centered around a single individual or a very small group. Most parties lacked a mass base, and the electorate typically identified with a candidate rather than with a party. Divisions within each party were often greater than between the parties. Moreover, the orientation and social makeup of a party varied from one region or state to another. The relatively undisciplined organizational structures had the advantage of permitting easy entry into the political process by newly articulate groups.

Throughout most of the 1945-65 period, the Social Democratic Party (PSD) was the strongest party and the principal government party, followed by the National Democratic Union (UDN), the major opposition party. Both steadily lost ground to the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB), which replaced the UDN in the 1962 congressional elections as the second party and, after a number of deputies defecting from other parties joined its ranks, became the largest party in the Chamber of Deputies. Some of the minor parties had considerable strength at the state level, especially in the more developed areas, and the practice of party alliances at the national level sometimes gave them the balance of power.

The PSD, organized by Vargas-appointed state governors, was originally dominated by the traditional rural oligarchy and the politicians allied to them, but later it absorbed many wealthy industrialists, financiers, and other elements. From its establishment, the PSD reflected the character of an organization of in-groups. It was eminently the "politicians' party"; maintenance in office was its principal reason for being. It won the presidency in 1945 with General Dutra, and held it again from 1956 to 1961 with Juscelino Kubitschek. The PSD was generally the uneasy ally of the PTB, and one or the other was in power nationally from 1945 to 1964 except during the brief term of Janio Quadros. The PSD consistently won the largest representation in Congress and elected the most state governors. Despite a relative decline in its strength as the urban electorate increased in importance, the PSD remained the nation's largest party in 1964, with the strongest state base and the

most extensive grass roots organization. It was badly split, however, and many members of its leftwing had defected to the PTB.

Getulio Vargas viewed the PTB as his personal machine, and as the major vehicle for control over the trade union movement. From its origin, the PTB had close ties with the Ministry of Labor, and it possessed a somewhat narrower base than the two other major parties. However, in addition to working class and middle class elements, it also contained wealthy individuals and interests, particularly in areas where there was little or no urban working class. Thus the party's most important single center of support was in essentially rural Rio Grande do Sul, which produced the PTB's only President, Joao Goulart. Despite severe problems of factionalism stemming from both ideological and personal differences, the PTB grew steadily until the overthrow of Goulart in 1964, when most of its leaders suffered suspension of their political rights.

The National Democratic Union (UDN) was formed in 1944 by a group of politicians, military officers, and professional men who were united in their opposition to Getulio Vargas. The party was more successful in its effort to oust him than in winning power through elections. It largely remained the perennial opposition party, although it cooperated with President Dutra in the late 1940's and took part in the interim administration after the suicide of Vargas in 1954. It backed the losing presidential candidates in 1945, 1950, and 1955, but finally supported victorious Janio Quadros in 1960, although he had not really committed himself to any political party and frequently adopted policies at odds with UDN positions. The UDN attracted support from a variety of social and economic groups, but its general orientation was center-conservative and its solid economic base was in the commercial-industrial sectors. In the major urban areas the UDN was also a middle-class liberal movement, while in many rural regions it derived its chief support from local political machines that were rivals of the PSD but did not differ significantly in program or social composition. Probably its most effective leader was fiery Guanabara Governor Carlos Lacerda.

Most of the minor parties were either ideological or personalistic. With the exception of the illegal Brazilian Communist Party (see below), the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB) and the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) were the most important ideological parties. Both advocated a gradual socialization of the means of production within a democratic framework.

although the PDC, which ranked fifth in the Chamber in 1964, had actually functioned as a center party.

The Popular Representation Party was both ideological and personalistic. It represented a revival of the *Integralista* movement, originally influenced by Italian fascism, and was led throughout its existence by Plinio Salgado. The Liberation Party, distinguished by its advocacy of a parliamentary form of government, and the Republican Party, which represented traditional agrarian interests, were splinters of the UDN. The most successful of the personalistic parties was the Social Progressive Party (PSP), led by Sao Paulo Governor Adhemar de Barros. He had a strong political appeal to lower class elements, in spite of his reputation for corruption. An unsuccessful presidential candidate in 1955 and 1960, he polled over 2 million votes each time. The PSP pulled some votes outside of Sao Paulo; in 1964 it had the fourth largest bloc in the federal Chamber of Deputies.

b. Party activity since 1964 (U/OU)

One of the Castello Branco government's first actions was to suspend, in most cases for 10 years, the political rights of many of the country's most influential political figures on charges of subversion or corruption. Among those so punished during the Castello Branco regime were former Presidents Kubitschek, Quadros, and Goulart, PCB leader Luiz Carlos Prestes, Francisco Juliao, leader of the Peasant Leagues in the Northeast, and many state and local politicians. In the first elections under the Castello Branco administration—in October 1965 for 11 of the 22 state governors—the government vetoed some candidacies, but otherwise generally did not greatly intervene. The winners in more than half the states, including important Guanabara and Minas Gerais, were members of the traditional parties who had been associated in the military's eyes with inefficiency and corruption. Despite pressure from some groups within the military to cancel the results, Castello Branco let the governors assume office, but, in order to establish rigid controls over future political activity, he issued Institutional Act Number Two on 27 October 1965. Among other provisions, this measure dissolved all existing national parties. The administration believed that the continuation of the prolific old parties would encourage a return to the irresponsible politics dominated by personalism that prevailed prior to the overthrow of Goulart. The decree cleared the way for the establishment of a new political system of two parties—the progovernment National Renewal Alliance (ARENA) and opposition Brazilian Demo-

cratic Movement (MDB)—which gave the administration the appearance of civilian support and of competition for power while allowing the government to eliminate any potential challenge to its authority.

Because of the rush of congressmen to the ARENA bandwagon, ARENA's strength at the national level far outweighs that of the rival MDB. ARENA has a composition very similar to that of the Revolutionary Parliamentary Bloc, a short-lived multiparty congressional alliance formed to support Castello Branco after his accession to power. The election of November 1966 gave ARENA 277 seats in the 409-member Chamber of Deputies and 47 of the 66 Federal Senate seats. This compared with MDB's 132 deputies and 19 senators. Through 1968 and early 1969, however, about 20% of the members of Congress were removed from office on a variety of charges, ranging from corruption to subversion, with the government barring any elections for their replacement. Over a third of those purged were from the progovernment ARENA party. As a result, when Congress reconvened in November 1969, the Chamber was much smaller and the Senate slightly smaller.

ARENA is dominated by members of the former conservative-oriented National Democratic Union and moderate ex-Social Democrats. It has political figures from nearly all of the 13 former parties, however, and lacks cohesion. ARENA dissenters, while not nearly as vocal in their opposition to the government as their MDB counterparts, have caused concern in the military and, along with other dissenters, have in some cases been removed from office. The impact of this dissidence in the ARENA party has been slight. Prior to the December 1968 suspension of Congress, only about 26 of the ARENA deputies in the Chamber ever voted against the policies of the administration.

Although ARENA has been a dubious vehicle for fulfilling its platform goal of "consolidating and purifying the progressive ideals which inspired the revolution of March 1964," it has provided the government with a fairly reliable, temporary political base to support the policies of the executive. President Costa e Silva was elected by Congress as an ARENA candidate, but he paid little more than lipservice to this civilian base. President Medici also joined the ARENA party after his election and personally makes the important decisions affecting the party. The president of ARENA, Petronio Portella, was elected in 1973 by the party board as a result of Medici's endorsement. He also named Ernesto Geisel to be the party's presidential candidate in the January 1974 indirect election.

Neither ARENA nor the MDB can be considered a cohesive disciplined entity. The politicians' behavior continues to be governed by personal loyalties, by regional rivalries, and in most cases by their identification with previous political parties and factions. The major weakness in the present political system is that it has been artificially imposed from above, i.e., from the national level down. Brazilians have traditionally tended to be somewhat apathetic politically but, since the creation of the two-party system, interest in the parties and where they stand on the major issues has sunk to an extremely low level. The parties are also handicapped by the fact that the executive branch has been able to use economic programs such as the Trans-Amazon Highway to interpret popular aspirations, leaving the parties without issues to capture public appeal.

The core of the MDB consists of former affiliates of the PTB, although there are also members from the PSD and other banned parties. A severe handicap facing the MDB is that the government expects it, just as much as ARENA, to support the 1964 revolution. In its role as the "loyal opposition," the MDB is allowed to criticize some of the administration's programs and methods and to make suggestions on how to improve them, but it is not permitted to question the basic principles and goals established by the regime. The rigid limits on the MDB's area of action have led some members to propose dissolving the party and forcing the administration to accept the responsibility of ruling a one-party state. Other MDB officials, who thus far have prevailed in party councils, claim that it is vital for the MDB to remain within the system in order to raise its voice against the government's errors. They say that the MDB should work to convince the government to expand the party's present minimal role so that when the time comes when civilians are allowed to return to the major offices there will be politicians capable of filling the posts.

Medici demonstrated his determination to firmly control ARENA—and the MDB as well—by selecting all 22 state governors in October 1970; these men—all but one from ARENA—were then duly "elected" by the state legislatures under the terms of Institutional Act Number Three. ARENA also triumphed overwhelmingly in the popular congressional balloting in November 1970, giving Medici the largest majority in the Congress of any President in recent Brazilian history. This triumph was largely the result of the MDB supporters' recognition that the future of the opposition party in the present system is extremely limited. As of late 1972 ARENA had 59 seats in the Federal Senate and 223 in the Chamber of Deputies; the MDB, only seven in the Senate and 87 in the Chamber.

Medici has interpreted the 1970 ARENA triumph as firm evidence that he was proceeding along the proper course. Although thus far during his administration he has attempted to keep political activity at a very low level, there were indications during 1972 that he desired to mold ARENA into a more effective vehicle to gain broad public support for his administration. In 1972 his designation of a veteran politician—the late Filinto Muller—to head ARENA suggested that Medici would attempt to upgrade the party, possibly in order to try to make ARENA into a broadly based "party of the Brazilian revolution" along the lines of the Institutional Revolutionary Party in Mexico.

There are no formal prohibitions against the formation of other parties, but the requirements are so stringent and the future for such an organization so dim that only one serious attempt has been made. Pedro Aleixo, who was Vice President under Costa e Silva, is trying—without much success—to get legal status for a Democratic Republican Party, designed to appeal primarily to those who were early supporters of the 1964 revolution but who have since become disillusioned.

c. Brazilian Communist Party (S)

The Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) has operated clandestinely during most of its existence. It was a legal party only from the date of its foundation in 1922 to 1935, and from 1945 to 1947. It did not achieve significance until 1934, when Luiz Carlos Prestes (Figure 12), a former army captain and popular symbol of the demand for reform, returned to Brazil from Moscow to head the party. With his personal popularity and status as a national hero, he was one of the party's important assets, and his following of ex-army officers helped set the PCB off from other Latin American Communist parties. The PCB was outlawed in 1935 after an unsuccessful revolt against President Vargas, and many of its leaders—including Prestes—were imprisoned. It regained legal standing in 1945 and showed significant electoral strength, earning about 10% of the vote and fourth rank among the parties in the presidential and congressional elections that year. The PCB also came in fourth in the 1947 elections, but it was then declared illegal and its representatives in Congress and other elective posts were removed. Much of its electoral following turned to other parties, and PCB membership had declined from its peak of 200,000 in 1947 to about 30,000 by 1963. By 1972 the PCB had less than 12,000 members.

From 1947 to 1964, however, the PCB exerted an influence far greater than its relatively small membership would suggest. The PCB stressed a united



FIGURE 12. Luiz Carlos Prestes, secretary general of the Brazilian Communist Party (U/OU)

front with all anti-U.S. nationalist forces and became an advocate of peaceful coexistence as defined by the Soviet Union. The Communists enjoyed substantial success in identifying themselves with the rising tide of Brazilian nationalism and in infiltrating the Socialist and Labor parties. The PCB's support of the Kubitschek-Goulart ticket in the 1955 elections insured the party increased freedom of action during that administration. The PCB benefited substantially from opportunities afforded it in the labor, student, and communications fields under Goulart. Communists came to dominate four of the six national labor confederations, and in 1963 Goulart allowed them to sabotage the efforts of church-sponsored and other democratic unionists in rural labor and to foist a Communist-controlled confederation upon Brazil's millions of agricultural employees. With presidential acquiescence, the PCB also exerted dominant influence in the National Students Union. Goulart's chief civilian adviser and his top military aide were both strongly pro-Communist, and his press secretary, also a close friend and personal adviser, was a long-time PCB member. Goulart filled vacancies on the Supreme Federal Tribunal with pro-Communist

leftists, and individuals considered to be either Communists or sympathizers sat on the CSN. A well-known extreme leftist was made commandant of the marine corps, and another was placed in charge of PETROBRAS, the powerful government oil enterprise.

The policy of the PCB, harmonizing with that of the U.S.S.R., was not directed toward violent overthrow of the government. Instead, the party worked toward increasing its strength in the Goulart regime and pushing Brazil into a neutralism that would drastically reduce U.S. influence. To this end the party maintained an uneasy alliance with ultranationalists whose views were to the extreme left but were non-Communist, such as Goulart's anti-U.S. brother-in-law, Leonel Brizola, a former governor of Rio Grande do Sul. Ironically, during March 1964 the PCB tried unsuccessfully to slow down Goulart's drive for a showdown with his anti-Communist opponents, while Brizola and other non-Communist advisers urged him to take the extremist measures which provoked his overthrow by military and civilian leaders. The widespread satisfaction with which Goulart's departure was received revealed the Communists and extreme leftists to be a noisy minority. Their influence, although they were tolerated and encouraged by the government, was important and extensive, yet they did not command deeply rooted popular support.

The PCB was thrown into confusion by the April 1964 revolution. Many of its leaders were arrested or went into hiding or exile; many members and sympathizers were ousted from government posts. Many Communist-infiltrated labor unions were taken over by the government, and student organizations were placed under strict regulation. The failure of the people to take arms against the military in 1964 led Prestes to lament that the Communists appeared to have been deceived by their own propaganda.

The PCB has been dominated for most of its life by its secretary general, Luiz Carlos Prestes (born in 1898). A veteran Comintern member, Prestes since 1945 has held this post and since 1935 has been the *de facto* leader of the party. He has never deviated from the Soviet line. He has long been regarded as something of a national hero by the lower classes. Although for more than a decade the aging Prestes has been accused of having lost his revolutionary zeal, he has successfully countered various challenges to his leadership, culminating in the expulsion of several prominent activists from the party in 1962 and 1967. Although the party denies the existence of a personality cult, to a large degree Prestes embodies the Brazilian Communist Party. His critics within the party, occasionally including his chief lieutenant

Giocondo Alves Dias, have charged him with dominating the party to such an extent that he is the only member widely known abroad. They also allege that his personal control has inhibited the development of a smoothly working team of leaders.

Prestes' control of the PCB was sharply reduced at a meeting of the party central committee in March 1971. Several senior party members criticized Prestes' leadership and demanded changes in the membership of the PCB directive bodies. It was announced that Prestes would go to the Soviet Union for a 2-year stay, and several of his critics were given positions on the central committee and national executive committee. Prestes has remained in Moscow and his opponents hope he stays indefinitely. Probably because of the factionalism that has always plagued the PCB, no new secretary general has been selected. Giocondo Alves Dias appears to be in charge of the party, although he reportedly has long been in poor health. Some PCB members advocate abandoning the peaceful line followed under Prestes, contending that the present rigid limitations on all political activity make any program to come to power without the use of violence meaningless. However, the majority of PCB members still appear to oppose the use of terrorism against the government.

The PCB chronically has been in financial crisis; assistance from the Soviet Union has often kept the party alive. Until 1971 this help took the form of a subsidy in return for the PCB's efforts to publish international Communist magazines and reviews. In early 1971, however, the Soviets reportedly decided to make their payments on a semiannual basis, probably in response to the party's downgrading of Prestes. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) apparently is concerned that Prestes' departure could lead the PCB to adopt a more militant line that would weaken the CPSU's influence on it. Attempts by PCB leaders to get funds from other European Communist parties have had little success. Other mechanisms used in the past by the PCB to secure funds have included collecting contributions from sympathizers, selling the votes of party members to political candidates of other parties, and the establishment of a few commercial enterprises. The sale of the PCB publications *Estudos* and *Voz Proletaria* bring in some money, but the cost of producing them may exceed the income gained. These methods probably contribute only slightly to alleviating the PCB's financial problems.

d. Terrorist groups (S)

During the 1960's several groups dedicated to overthrowing the government by violent means were formed. Several of the organizations were formed by

PCB members who left the party because of the leadership's refusal to use violent methods against the government. At the peak of the groups' activity in the late 1960's, there were never more than 1,000 persons involved, and subsequent aggressive campaigns by the security forces have sharply reduced the ranks of the terrorists. Many, including most of the important leaders, have been killed or captured, and others have been banished from Brazil or fled to exile. All the groups suffered from internal dissension, which has been heightened by the losses they have suffered to the government. Some may no longer exist as effective terrorist organizations, and others have at least temporarily stopped major operations hoping to salvage a hard core on which to rebuild. Active members of armed revolutionary groups number probably no more than 100 in Brazil and about an equal number in exile.

The first major defection from the PCB came in 1961, when several members left to form the Peking-oriented Communist Party of Brazil (PCdoB). In 1966, police arrested many PCdoB members and gained substantial information about the organization's structure and activities. The losses had a demoralizing effect on the PCdoB. The group has since concentrated mainly on trying to motivate and train the people of rural areas for a long-term campaign against the government; it does not appear to have had any significant role in urban terrorism. The PCdoB does have a militant dissident faction, known as the Red Wing, that may have engaged in some urban terrorism. The Tiradentes Revolutionary Movement (MRT) was founded by members of the Red Wing who were expelled in 1969 because of their advocacy of commando-type operations against the government. The leader and several members of the MRT were killed by police in 1971, a blow from which the group may not recover.

The most effective terrorist group probably remains the National Liberating Action (ALN). It was founded by several PCB members expelled in 1967 for advocating violence and close ties with Cuba. The ALN's founder, Carlos Marighella, was an experienced senior PCB official prior to his ouster, as were several other ALN militants. This organization was responsible for many of the terrorist actions that started in 1967, including bombings, robberies for funds and arms, and abductions of foreign diplomats, including the U.S. Ambassador in September 1969 and the West German Ambassador in June 1970. Marighella's death while resisting arrest in November 1969 was a severe loss for the ALN, and may have marked the turning point in favor of the security forces in their battle against the terrorists. His successor,

Joaquim Camara Ferreira, was killed by police in October 1970, and this fate has been shared by a long list of ALN members since then. The continuing campaign by the authorities against the ALN has done major damage to the organization and morale of the ALN and greatly reduced its capability of carrying out any major operation. In 1971, a dissident group called the Popular Liberation Movement (MOLIPO) split off from the ALN.

Like the ALN, the 8 October Revolutionary Movement (MR-8) and Revolutionary Brazilian Communist Party (PCBR) were founded by persons expelled from the PCB in 1967. They thus had experienced leaders and a fairly well developed ideological base. The MR-8 carried out some terrorist operations, almost always in conjunction with the ALN, during 1969-71, but since has been severely handicapped by loss of personnel.

The Popular Revolutionary Vanguard (VPR) originated in 1967 through the merger of a group of radical students with another composed mainly of cashiered military personnel and policemen. In July 1969, the VPR merged with the smaller National Liberation Command to form the Revolutionary Armed Vanguard—Palmares (VAR-P), but internal dissension led the VPR to withdraw in September 1969. The VAR-P remained in existence after the VPR's withdrawal, but lost many of its most active members. It consists mainly of students, and one of its chief goals has been to organize peasants, particularly in the Northeast. During 1968-70 the VPR was very active in carrying out bombings, robberies, and kidnappings. Alone or in conjunction with other groups such as the ALN, the VPR was responsible for the murder of a U.S. Army captain in October 1968, and for the abductions of the Japanese consul general in Sao Paulo in March 1970, the West German Ambassador in June 1970, and the Swiss Ambassador in December 1970. The VPR's numerous terrorist operations left it vulnerable to losses at the hands of the security forces, and by mid-1971 it was suffering from these defeats and from general exhaustion. The most prominent leader of the VPR, renegade army captain Carlos Lamarea, left the group about this time to join the MR-8. He was hunted down in the interior of Brazil and killed by the army in September 1971.

Originally founded in 1961 as a young people's organization linked to the Catholic Church, the Popular Action (AP) movement soon took a sharp leftward swing, thereby losing the support of all but the very small radical sector in the church. AP members dominated the UNE during Goulart's regime, and after 1964 the organization strongly

opposed the military-led regimes. Previously pro-Cuban, the AP became a pro-Peking group after five of its members returned from training in China in 1968. Since then it has changed emphasis from work in the student movement to organizing workers and peasants. It is attempting to organize a pro-Chinese Marxist-Leninist proletarian party prepared to carry out a long-term struggle. In line with this position, it adopted the label Marxist-Leninist Popular Action (APML) in 1971. Security forces have severely hampered the AP's activities, and a number of its more militant members have left it to join other more insurrectionist-oriented groups.

A number of very small, violence-oriented groups may still be in existence, although they are almost inactive. The Workers Communist Party (POC) was formed in 1967 by a group of dissidents from the PCB, PCdoB, and Revolutionary Organization of Marxist Political Workers (POLOP)—an extreme leftwing organization dating back to 1961. The bulk of the militants of POC and POLOP are violence-oriented students who advocate guerrilla warfare against the government. The Brazilian arm of the moribund Trotskyite (Fourth Communist International) movement—the Trotskyite Workers Revolutionary Party (POR-T)—has operated in the country since 1938. It has been largely restricted to urban zones and operates primarily in the student field, in spite of some attempts to move into rural areas, particularly in the Northeast. The POR-T militants' views are expounded in the clandestine journal *Frente Operaria (Workers Front)*.

Brazilian exiles, particularly in Chile, Uruguay, and Algeria, have attempted to form organizations dedicated to overthrowing the military-dominated regimes. Primary among these is the Brazilian Information Front, headquartered in Algiers. The exiles, many of them members of such groups as the ALN, VPR, and MR-8, have accomplished very little because of dissension among themselves and the difficulty of maintaining contact with their comrades still in Brazil. Security forces consider such exiles who return to Brazil particularly important targets, and have killed nearly all they have tracked down.

3. Electoral laws and practices (U/OU)

a. Formal election procedures

The 1967 Constitution placed control of election procedures under the Superior Electoral Court, a seven-man body which has the responsibility for supervising all matters connected with elections. Its decisions cannot be challenged in any court except on

constitutional grounds. It has the power to organize the electoral divisions throughout the country, to register the names of those eligible to vote, to assign dates for various elections not already established by constitutional provisions, and to handle all matters concerned with nominations, qualifications of candidates, preparation of ballots, counting votes, and issuing official credentials to successful candidates. The Superior Electoral Court has shown itself to be a creature of the Ministry of Justice and has not opposed any actions taken by the government.

There is a regional electoral court in each of the state capitals and in the Federal District. These courts also have seven representatives selected from among the judges on the state courts and prominent lawyers. Under the regional courts, electoral judges and electoral boards have the responsibility for making the initial suggestions to the Superior Electoral Court concerning local electoral geographic divisions, registration, dates of elections, and decisions on allegations of ineligibility. The states and territories are divided into electoral districts with polling places under the supervision of an electoral judge. The electoral boards are made up of both judges and laymen.

Voters are registered with the electoral judge in their locality and are assigned by him to an electoral district. On election day a board appointed by the electoral judge is required to supervise the local election. Locked ballot boxes are accompanied by representatives of the registered parties from polling places to the regional electoral tribunal. In order to vote, an individual must present a registration certificate signed by the president of the local electoral board as proof of his identity. The country's vast size and limited communications system sometimes cause lengthy delays in the final report of election results.

The most important regulations governing political parties are located in article 152 of the amended Constitution, and in the Organic Law of Political Parties (Law 5,682) promulgated by Medici in July 1971. These measures give the federal government extensive control over the formation, structure, actions, and dissolution of political parties. The provisions are designed mainly to give the administration a firm political base in the ARENA party and to insure total support by ARENA for the government's programs. One provision of the political parties law that has provoked considerable unhappiness stipulates that any legislator who opposes the directives of his party's leadership or who leaves the party under whose aegis he had been elected would automatically lose his mandate. The requirement for

formation of a new party establishes that it must have the support of at least 5% of the electorate who voted in the most recent election for the federal Chamber of Deputies, distributed in seven different states with a minimum of at least 7% of the electorate in each of these states. In order to continue as a legal entity, a party must elect at least 12 federal deputies distributed in at least seven states. The political parties law also provides for the future establishment of a fund to be administered by the Supreme Electoral Court for the financial assistance of the parties.

b. Voter participation

The basic provisions for voting are contained in the Constitution which was promulgated in 1967, substantially revised in 1969, and slightly amended in 1972. Under articles 147 and 148, suffrage is granted to and is obligatory for all those over age 18 except persons who are illiterate, are unable to express themselves in Portuguese, or who have suffered suspension of their political rights. Voting is by secret ballot.

Only a small minority of Brazil's population have ever taken part in the country's political destiny through the election process. In 1945, after Vargas had considerably broadened the electorate, only 13.4% of the people voted in the presidential election. Even under the relatively pluralistic system between 1945 and 1964 the major parties represented a limited range of public opinion, and one-half the adult population was excluded from the electoral process by the literacy requirement for voting. In 1960, the most recent popular presidential election, only 17.7% of the total population—or about one-third of the persons of voting age—went to the polls. There are also great regional variations in voting; in urban areas such as Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo the percentage of the people who vote is much greater than in areas such as the state of Acre, where 70% of the population reportedly is illiterate and therefore unable to vote.

The governments since 1964 have made major changes in the electoral system, which have resulted in an even further decline in direct participation by the people in the process. Institutional Act Number Two, issued on 27 October 1965, provided for indirect election of the President and the Vice President by simple majority vote of an electoral college composed of the members of Congress and delegates from the state legislatures. The three presidents since 1964 have been selected by the top military hierarchy, which then submitted their views to the electoral college for formal election. There were no opposition candidates. In Medici's case, his name was submitted on 25

October 1969, and he took office on 30 October. Under articles 74 and 75 of the 1967 Constitution, as amended in 1969, his successor is to be chosen by the electoral college in January 1974, to serve a 5-year term. The Vice President must be of the same political party as the President and serves the same 5-year term. In order to be eligible for the presidency, an individual is required to be Brazilian by birth, in the exercise of full political rights, and over 35 years of age.

Following the unfavorable military reaction to the outcome of the gubernatorial elections in October 1965 President Castello Branco issued Institutional Act Number Three, replacing the direct election of governors with indirect elections by the state legislatures, and eliminating the election of mayors of state capitals completely. In the gubernatorial elections in 12 states in September 1966 the administration insured the victory of the ARENA candidates—most of them picked by Castello Branco—by maintaining a veto power over the candidacies of both the ARENA and the MDB, by canceling the mandates of a sufficient number of MDB legislators in each state assembly to insure an ARENA majority, and by forbidding ARENA legislators to vote for MDB candidates.

In October 1970 Medici picked the governors in all 22 states. These were then formally elected by the state legislatures. All but one were from ARENA. In each state the President consulted with local military commanders, and, in some cases, with politicians, before making his selection. In April 1972 Medici proposed amending the 1967 Constitution in order to have the gubernatorial election scheduled for November 1974, also to be held indirectly rather than by popular ballot as had been specified by a 1969 amendment. The Congress rapidly approved Medici's initiative, despite public protests from the MDB and private ones from some ARENA figures. Medici thus provided for the continuation of the process of presidential selection of state governors initiated in 1966.

In addition, mayors of state capitals and of approximately 100 other cities designated "national security areas" are appointed by the governors rather than elected. Popular participation in the selection of all levels of the executive branch of government—which is where the power lies today—thus has been nearly eliminated.

Elections for the federal Congress and state legislatures are by direct popular ballot. Each state has three senators and each territory has one. Seats in the federal Chamber of Deputies and state legislatures are allotted according to a system of proportional

representation based on the number of registered voters. In the most recent national congressional elections, held in November 1970, out of 92 million Brazilians, some 29 million—almost all the legally qualified citizens—were registered to vote, and 22.4 million actually cast ballots. About one-third of the ballots were blank or voided because of inaccuracies in filling them out. The administration's use of the veto power—in some cases on statutory grounds, in others, informal—eliminated some potential opposition candidates from running, while narrow limits on the opposition's freedom to criticize administration personnel and policies further weakened the MDB's electoral position.

D. National policies

1. Domestic

The principal domestic aims of the Medici government are: 1) to insure national security which includes political stability, and 2) to promote economic growth while restraining inflation. Although one of the government's goals is to reduce disparities in income, this goal is subordinate to the first two. Most of the Medici government's programs are aimed at achieving one of the first two goals, political order or economic growth. (U/OU)

a. Policymaking structure (C)

Domestic policies are formulated almost entirely by the executive branch, which includes the various ministries, a large number of specialized advisory or coordinating agencies and autonomous government corporations, and mixed capital enterprises. Although it is difficult to trace the antecedents of specific policy decisions, it is clear that in nearly every case the Presidential Military and Civil Households, the SNI, and the CSN are consulted, along with the specific ministry affected by the issue. Because most of the important decisions made by the executive have economic implications, the Ministry of Finance is often involved. The chief planning organization is the Ministry of Planning and General Coordination, which was established as an autonomous entity in 1964 and transformed into a federal ministry in 1967. Its basic duties include the preparation and review of national economic and social development plans; coordinating plans prepared by state, regional, and national agencies; and coordinating programs involving foreign aid. During the Castello Branco administration the Ministry of Planning and General Coordination played a major role in setting economic

policy. Under Costa e Silva and Medici, however, the Ministry of Finance has become dominant in this area.

The heavy emphasis on national security by the military-dominated governments has flowed, in part, from the influence exerted by the prestigious Superior War School (ESG), which trains both general and field grade army and air force officers and navy officers of equivalent rank, as well as civilians from both the public and private sectors. Mainly during the Castello Branco regime, many of the doctrines on national security developed at the ESG were adopted as government policies. Since 1949, the ESG has instilled in over 2,000 persons a concept of national security in its broadest context, including strong emphasis on the domestic scene and on the inseparability of economic development and national security.

According to the Doctrine of the ESG, nations have essential interests and aspirations which may be articulated at a determined stage in their national evolution as national objectives. The national state, in turn, is responsible for pursuing domestically and internationally these national objectives, which are divided into six permanent national objectives (territorial integrity, sovereignty, progress, national integration, democracy, and social peace) and present national objectives (those conditioned by a determined historical period). The state makes use of national power to achieve national objectives through national policy. National security, which is the ESG's overriding concern, is defined as "the relative degree of guarantees which the state, through political, economic, psychosocial, and military actions, provides in a determined epoch to the nation over which it has jurisdiction, for the fulfillment and maintenance of the national objectives, despite existent or potential antagonisms or pressures."

Among the more notable characteristics of the ESG doctrine are: a sense of historical and cultural linkage with the West, which, nevertheless, is restricted when Brazilian interests clash with the interests of other Western countries; anticommunism and anti-Marxism; a formal belief in democratic institutions, with participation limited to acceptable ideologies; the desire to build a political consensus excluding or neutralizing the left; a religious culture expressed as a defense of certain Christian values; a strong preoccupation with internal order and security as preconditions for development; a belief that foreign criticism is influenced by Marxism or does not understand the complexity and peculiarity of the nation's special problems; a model of development aimed at strengthening capitalism, which, neverthe-

less, depends on extensive government investment, planning, and stimulation of the economy; the resolution of social problems through paternalism; and a strong emphasis on technocracy.

An important outreach of the ESG is a series of short courses on national security which are sponsored by the well-financed alumni association of the ESG and held in various cities throughout the country.

The ESG attained its greatest influence under President Castello Branco, who was a former director of the institution. Presidents Costa e Silva and Medici, who were not ESG graduates, have placed less reliance on it for developing policy guidelines, and have been somewhat suspicious of its theoretical approach to solving Brazil's problems, including political ones. Because Ernesto Geisel was clearly associated with the ESG during his army career, the institution may recover a measure of its former political significance during his term of office.

Since 1964, the legislative branch's involvement in the formulation of policies has been drastically reduced. In nearly all cases, the initiative for drafting policies is taken by the executive, and the measures are then usually presented to the Congress for discussion, and, almost without exception, adoption. In certain cases, involving issues with national security implications, the President issues the policies as decrees with the force of law, under the powers granted him by the series of Institutional Acts. The Congress rarely makes substantial changes in the measures presented to it by the executive, although the process does permit the legislators who oppose the initiative an opportunity to voice criticism. The administration party's overwhelming majority in the Congress insures passage of almost any measure advocated by the executive.

b. Political (U/OU)

The administration's views on what kind of new political system might allow greater participation in decisionmaking remain to be defined. Despite the prevalence of oligarchic manipulation of the political system throughout most of Brazilian history and the consolidation of executive control since 1964, the ideals of constitutionalism, democracy, and civil libertarianism have persisted. The post-1964 regimes, while suppressing civilian opposition and repressing public expressions of dissent, have maintained the outward forms of a constitutional system with separate executive, legislative, and judicial branches. Shortly before taking office Medici said that the installation of "democracy" would be one of the goals of his administration. Subsequently he has maintained that

the process of educating the population to the point that it can handle democracy will be a lengthy one, and that it would demand "deep changes of mentality" by everyone involved in the political process. Medici insisted that "democracy" in Brazil would be a type tailored to the country's unique economic and social conditions, not to those of developed nations. He also stressed that he would never permit political activity to reach the point of endangering the accomplishments of the revolution.

Medici would like to promote the formation of a new generation of politicians, less dedicated to personal gain and local interests and more concerned with national economic and social development. He is handicapped in working toward this objective by the fact that nearly all the experienced politicians in the country are of the traditional type; Medici has had to call on them to fill the posts in the proadministration ARENA and in many national- and state-level government positions. In choosing the men to fill the state governorships in October 1970 Medici indicated the type of political leaders he hopes will replace the previously dominant ones. Most of the men, including three retired military officers, were characterized as "technocrats" and had held posts closely connected with economic development. They are people Medici considers loyal and responsive to him rather than to local interest groups. In the November 1970 congressional balloting, however, the majority of the victors appeared to be traditional-style politicians who in order to get elected rely heavily on understandings with other influential politicians, on arrangements with urban "bosses" and rural landholders who control large blocs of votes, and on a liberal allocation of cash. These politicians are part of the group who have continued to participate in the political game under the rules set by the administration in the hope that ultimately events will turn to their advantage.

Medici is thus faced with uncertainty as to the viability of his political program, and the possibility that corrupt and ultraleftist politicians might sometime regain influence. This problem is one of the reasons why any major loosening of the political reins during his term is unlikely. He may make some innovations in the present system as the time for his replacement in 1974 approaches, but any radical changes seem unlikely. Some political leaders have expressed concern that the continued exclusion of politicians from the policymaking apparatus may mean that when the military regimes eventually do decide to transfer some power to civilians, the younger men will have long since been disillusioned with politics, and the only civilians with political experience thus will be "a generation of old men."

c. Social and economic (U/OU)

Medici has consistently held that political liberalization would be realized only to the extent that it contributed to achieving his administration's primary goals of economic and social development. He hopes to use the government's numerous and ambitious programs in these areas to make development Brazil's central and unifying national objective. In order to make possible this rapid expansion, the post-1964 governments had to first correct the grave economic problems that they inherited from the Goulart regime. Many of the economic policies of the three regimes have been rather successful. The annual rate of inflation was drastically reduced from 87% in 1964 to around 20% in 1970-72, and fell below that figure in 1973. A policy of frequent "minidevaluations" of the cruzeiro adopted in August 1968 has made a significant contribution toward improving Brazil's external position, particularly by stabilizing relative trade prices and by removing incentives for speculative operations against the cruzeiro. The dynamic growth of the manufacturing sector was largely responsible for making possible a rise in the GNP of nearly 10% each year since 1968. Exports, particularly of manufactured products and of iron ore, have climbed rapidly, reaching a record level of US\$2.9 billion in 1971. Major investments by foreign and domestic firms and loans from public and private institutions abroad have also made decisive contributions to the economic improvement.

The Brazilian Government's role in the allocation of economic resources, which has increased sharply since 1964, is one of the most extensive in Latin America. Its numerous controls over foreign trade and domestic prices and wages, and its granting of special investment incentives and agricultural subsidies, have been augmented by extensive governmental ownership of infrastructural facilities and industrial enterprises. This important role in the economy has enabled the administration to initiate extensive programs aimed, in part, at building popular support behind the regime's objectives. The long-range economic goals are embodied in the government's First National Economic and Social Development Plan, covering the 1972-74 period. The plan defines a strategy which aims to sustain GNP growth rates of 8% to 10% per year, to raise significantly the efficiency of public and private enterprises, to incorporate the human and material resources of the Northeast and Amazon regions into the national economy, and to expand Brazil's role in the world economy through increased trade.

The administration's single most ambitious project, which has been compared in magnitude with the Kubitschek government's launching of the construction of Brasilia, is the National Integration Program (PIN). The central objectives of PIN are to extend agricultural services to the Amazon basin, to integrate the strategy for settling the Amazon basin with that for developing the Northeast, and to redirect migration from the Northeast toward the watered valleys in that region and to the new agricultural frontier in the Amazon—so as to head off the movement toward the major urban centers. The central goal of PIN is the construction of the Trans-Amazon (Figure 13) and Cuiaba-Santarem highways and the colonization of a 6-mile zone on each side of the highways, as well as the establishment of new irrigation facilities in the Northeast. Another program intended to raise the economic levels of the less developed areas of Brazil is the Program of Land Redistribution and Encouragement to Agroindustries in the Northeast and North (PROTERRA). As another incentive to modernize agriculture, it was announced in August 1972 that some limited steps were being taken to implement the provisions of the Agrarian Reform Act of November 1964 under the auspices of the Agriculture Ministry's National Institute of Land Settlement and Agrarian Reform (INCRA). The INCRA will face a formidable challenge in attempting to modernize an agricultural system that is characterized by large numbers of plots that barely produce enough for subsistence, and huge holdings covering much of the arable land, especially in the Northeast.

An important step in the improvement of public finances was the more effective collection of taxes. The



FIGURE 13. President Medici views the Trans-Amazon Highway project (U/OU)

new procedures resulted in the number of individual income tax declarations rising from 600,000 in 1968 to 7 million in 1970, while the number of such declarations by corporations rose from 300,000 to 500,000 during the same period. Revenues from income tax collections increased from 21% of total government revenues to about 25%.

The Medici administration has initiated efforts to solve some of the deep-seated problems that affect the Brazilian educational system. Three priority objectives have been set: to improve the general quality of education, to raise enrollments, and to integrate education with the programs for scientific and technological development. The Brazilian Literacy Movement (MOBRAL) is working to provide functional literacy to the 33.1% of the population 15 years of age and older who lack this ability.

One of the most controversial policies followed by all the administrations since 1964 has been their control of wages as an anti-inflationary measure. Because inflation rose faster than the government-controlled wage levels during the period from 1965 to 1968, real wages of most workers declined. The government announced that wages in 1970 rose faster than did the cost of living, and this probably again occurred in 1971. However, in 1972 those workers who were paid at or below the official minimum wage—representing more than half of all workers—probably had not yet regained the economic position they had had in 1964. The government has defended its action on the grounds that the wage policy is only one factor in an interrelated network of economic policies intended to achieve rapid growth, and that expanding educational opportunities for workers would be a better way for them to gain a greater share of the national income than increasing the minimum salary. Because of the government's tight control over the labor unions, it is difficult to determine whether the workers have strong views on this policy. If they do, they lack any effective means of making their position known.

During the Vargas dictatorship the Brazilian population was subjected to intensive propaganda on behalf of the regime. In contrast, the Castello Branco administration was slow to adopt public relations measures, the President's attitude being that he should speak through deeds rather than words. It was not until July 1964 that the major Cabinet ministers and the President appeared in a series of nationwide radio-TV broadcasts to explain the programs of the government and indirectly the aims of the April revolution. After that, the public relations efforts of the Castello Branco government were infrequent, poorly planned, and generally ineffective. His

government never was able to develop rapport with important segments of the population, particularly labor, students, and intellectuals.

The Costa e Silva administration attempted with slight success to implement a more effective public relations program as part of its effort to gain popular support and to improve its image abroad. It established in 1968 a press office directly under the presidency, with headquarters in Brasilia, a branch in Rio de Janeiro, and other branches planned for other major cities. Under Medici, the presidential press office has effectively presented an image of the chief executive and his administration as being in favor of improving the life of the average Brazilian. Among other main domestic propaganda themes are assertions that the government recognizes the need and is striving for agricultural, educational, and other reforms, and exhortations against violent opposition. The last theme was illustrated, for example, in early 1969 in a pamphlet contrasting gruesome scenes of urban and rural warfare in Vietnam and Biafra with color shots of "happiness and progress" in housing, road construction, carnival, and soccer in Brazil. Widely used slogans are "The Revolution of 1964 is irreversible and will consolidate democracy in Brazil," "No one can hold back Brazil," and "Brazil: love it or leave it."

2. Foreign

a. General principles (C)

Under President Medici Brazil is seeking the important place in hemisphere and world affairs that Brazilians believe their nation is destined to play. The administration's basic political foreign policy goals include protecting the national integrity (its territory, resources, and economy) from foreign domination or undue influence; achieving a voice in hemispheric affairs second only to that of the United States; and, ultimately, achieving recognition as one of the important voices in world councils. The major economic goal is to expand the nation's foreign trade. Visible signs of the administration's strong attention to foreign affairs were Medici's official visit to Washington in December 1971 and the travels of Foreign Minister Mario Gibson Barboza to several nations in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Europe during 1971, 1972, and 1973. A principal aim of the diplomatic activity is to strengthen Brazil's position as a spokesman, especially on economic issues, for the developing world.

Under the Constitution, the powers relating to foreign relations are vested in the federal government,

and the primary responsibility for the direction of foreign policy lies with the President. In 1970 Medici told the graduating class of Brazil's foreign service academy that the administration's foreign policy would be an integral part of its economic development plans. He said that Brazil had to place top priority on the goal of economic independence, "which represents in the 20th century what political independence represented in the 19th." He called on the developed nations to share their scientific and technological advances with the countries that have not reached this economic stage. Medici declared that he recognized that Brazil's rapid development occasionally would tend to create conflicts of interest with other countries, but that his government faced this possibility confidently as a sign of growth itself. The policies that have been implemented during Medici's term have been much in line with this concept of Brazil as a nation on the threshold of development, one that must look out for its own interests, even at the risk of irritating the economically advanced countries.

The development of Brazil's foreign policies has been closely related to the prominence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Many of the foundations of Brazil's present policies were laid down by a series of capable foreign ministers during the empire and the early years of the republic. Most notable among these was the Baron of Rio Branco who, from 1902 to 1912, settled in Brazil's favor most of the outstanding border disputes with the country's Hispanic neighbors. After these settlements had been reached, it became possible for Brazil to expand diplomatic relations in the hemisphere, participate more vigorously in the Pan American movement, and assume the role of spokesman for Latin America at various international conferences. In its quest for international prestige under Rio Branco, the country also became a strong advocate of the pacific settlement of disputes, the sovereign equality and self-determination of nations, and nonintervention.

The prestige attached to the implementation of these foreign policies contributed to the development of one of the most capable foreign services in Latin America. Career diplomats are selected by a centralized examination system and trained in the Rio Branco Institute, established in 1945. After completing the rigorous course at the institute, candidates serve a 2-year apprenticeship in the Foreign Ministry before they are assigned abroad. Promotion is on the basis of merit, and ambassadors are generally selected from within the service. Minister of Foreign Affairs Gibson Barboza is an experienced professional diplomat whose assignment prior to entering the Cabinet was as ambassador in Washington.

The powerful competitor of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the external affairs field is the Ministry of Finance. The latter organization's importance arises from the professional skill of its staff, from its control of budget allocations, and from its achievements in promoting economic stability and growth. The ministry's aggressive pursuit of economic goals abroad has in some cases caused considerable friction with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The National Security Council's expanded role since 1964 in both domestic and international matters gives the armed forces an opportunity to examine and make inputs to foreign policy decisions other than those directly affecting the services.

Historically, Brazil's foreign policy has been notable for its responsibility and pragmatism. Under Presidents Quadros and Goulart in the early 1960's, however, a strongly nationalistic policy developed, including harassment of foreign companies, criticism of the Alliance for Progress, and espousal of third world doctrines. Relations between Brazil and the United States deteriorated greatly as Brazil forged new links with European Communist countries and with the more vocal of the less developed "socialist" states such as Ghana.

The revolt by military and civilian leaders that ousted Goulart in April 1964 quickly led to a change in foreign policy. Under President Humberto Castello Branco Brazil not only returned to its traditionally close ties with the United States but strengthened them to such an extent that many Brazilians accused the government of "selling itself to the Yankees." Encouraged by opposition politicians, the public tended to associate unpopular economic stabilization programs with the United States.

When Arthur da Costa e Silva succeeded Castello Branco as President in March 1967, foreign policy shifted toward more popular, nationalistic lines. Led by the views of Foreign Minister Jose Magalhaes Pinto, the government stressed nationalistic interests. It opposed signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and gave national development top priority. Magalhaes Pinto's efforts to develop the "independent" direction in foreign policy were limited, however, by the need to focus primary attention on domestic political and economic problems.

The foreign policy of the Medici administration has been centered on establishing a leadership role among the developing nations and on promoting Brazil's economic growth. Brazilian officials have claimed that their country's great size and human resources, its impressive economic growth, and its common experience with many problems that hamper other

developing nations mean that Brazil can effectively present the case of the developing countries to the industrial powers. Brazil has used its impatience for rapid economic development as a tool in its campaign to gain international prestige. Because continued economic growth depends heavily on Brazil's ability to export, the administration has strongly objected to any attempts by developed countries to limit imports from developing nations.

In seeking support from other developing countries, Brazil has played up the economic motives behind the claim it made in 1970 to a 200-mile limit to its territorial waters. Although several other Latin American countries had earlier made similar claims, Brazil adopted the most far-reaching position—including jurisdiction over the ocean floor, sea, and air—and has become the strongest defender of the 200-mile thesis. Officially, the government has refused to move from this stand, although it is concerned that Brazil may be isolated if other Latin Americans accept some limitations on their 200-mile claims. The Brazilians want to be sure that the position they adopt for the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference scheduled for 1974 will receive firm backing from other developing countries.

Brazil's concern for economic growth also explains its opposition to stringent international ecological standards. The administration maintains that the industrial countries, as the main generators of pollution, must be the nations primarily responsible for improving the environment. Brazilian officials claim that their environmental problems are different and that problems of poverty, sanitation, nutrition, and health are themselves forms of pollution that can best be overcome through development. An important part of the administration's grand design for national development and integration is the colonization of the huge Amazon region, and the possible harmful ecological effects of this project are not viewed as important enough to stop pursuit of this goal. Brazil's suspicion of pollution controls may derive in part from fear that international lending agencies may adopt stricter environmental standards for projects they finance, thus adding to borrowing costs and to Brazil's already large foreign debt.

Brazil has refused to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty on the ground that it might limit the future development of nuclear energy resources—including explosive devices—for peaceful purposes. The post-1964 administrations have maintained that the treaty imposes restriction on the non-nuclear countries in order to perpetuate the privileges of the "nuclear club."

b. Relations within Latin America (S)

Brazil traditionally has been rather aloof from the Latin American nations which are not its immediate neighbors. (In South America, only Chile and Ecuador are non-neighbors.) In 1971, however, the Minister of Foreign Affairs—with Medici's backing—began a campaign to strengthen Brazil's influence in the hemisphere and to expand its export markets. Administration spokesmen have insisted that they are not trying to exert continental leadership, but only to improve relations so that Brazil can exert influence appropriate to its size and progress. Several factors have led the Brazilians to believe that this is an exceptionally favorable time to expand their horizons. One frequently cited reason is the lowering of the U.S. profile in Latin America. A second factor is a belief that other Latin American countries can now support Brazil as a spokesman for the developing world on economic issues.

The Medici government marks five Latin American countries—Argentina, Bolivia, Uruguay, Chile, and Cuba—for special interest because of the potential problems and opportunities they pose for Brazil's leadership aspirations and, in some cases, for its national security.

Argentina traditionally has been Brazil's main rival for primacy in South America, and relations between them have often been strained. The situation seemed to improve after the military took control in Argentina in 1966. The armed forces of the two countries exchanged intelligence on some subjects, and in 1970 the Argentine army chief of staff visited Brazil. Since mid-1971, however, official relations have cooled. The Argentines have been irritated by Brazil's plans to build large dams on rivers that flow into Argentina, by the perennial unfavorable trade balance with Brazil, and by Brazil's undisguised attempt to increase its prestige in Latin America. For their part, the Brazilians were particularly suspicious about Argentine President Lanusse's political dealings with the Peronists and his attempt to improve relations with Chile, as exemplified by his two meetings with Salvador Allende. Medici was very reluctant to invite Lanusse for a state visit in March 1972 and was displeased that the then Argentine President violated a tacit agreement not to raise sensitive issues between the two countries in public. The Brazilians believe that the coming of the Peronists to power in Argentina probably will further weaken relations between South America's two largest nations.

Brazilian officials were deeply troubled by the leftist trend of the regime of Gen. Juan Jose Torres in Bolivia, and they were delighted by his overthrow by Col.

Hugo Banzer in August 1971. The Medici government recognized Banzer's new regime immediately. Brazil has provided Bolivia with modest economic assistance and military materiel and training, and is likely to increase this assistance as well as economic aid. The efforts of the Brazilian military to ingratiate itself with the Bolivians have disturbed the Argentines, who traditionally have exercised a strong influence on the Bolivian military services.

The Medici administration has also been very concerned over its small southern neighbor Uruguay. In 1971 Brazilian officials became convinced that they had to help Uruguayan President Jorge Pacheco improve his country's economic and security situation in order to minimize the chances that a Marxist coalition would win in the national elections. Brazil provided some economic credits and covertly supplied a limited amount of weapons, ammunition, and training to the Uruguayan security forces so as to bolster their campaign against terrorism by the Tupamaros. The defeat of the Marxist coalition eased the Brazilians' immediate concern, but they continue to observe developments in Uruguay with great care.

The Castello Branco government broke diplomatic relations with Cuba in May 1964 on the grounds that the Castro regime was Communist, that it was incompatible with the inter-American system, and that it also was interfering in Brazil's internal affairs by promoting subversion. The Medici government remains convinced that Castro continues to interfere in the affairs of several Latin American countries—including Brazil—by exporting subversion, and Medici has ordered Brazilian officials to firmly oppose attempts to return Cuba to any of the inter-American organizations.

c. Relations with the United States (C)

Many Brazilians regarded the official visit of President Medici to Washington in December 1971 (Figure 14) as formal recognition of their country's growing world status. Administration officials and the press emphasized that Medici made the trip at the invitation of the U.S. Government and that he did not ask for anything for Brazil. Medici and other senior officials welcomed President Nixon's characterization of the trip as part of a series of conferences with chiefs of state of major nations. The Medici administration's relations with the United States are based on close cooperation on international political issues and rigorous protection of Brazil's economic interests. His government has been able to pursue this course largely because Brazil's economic growth has greatly lessened



FIGURE 14. President Medici makes official visit to President Nixon (U/OU)

the country's need for U.S. assistance. At the same time, the Brazilians recognize that the continued success of their economic development program requires considerable outside capital and technology and that the largest single available source of both is the United States. The leadership has put greater emphasis on attracting American private investment; reinvestment, an estimated one-third to one-half of all foreign investment, rose by US\$200 million in 1970 to \$1.8 billion, and may have reached \$2 billion in 1972. The administration is confident that the country can absorb the growing foreign investment without endangering ultimate Brazilian control over the economy, but, nevertheless, some influential Brazilians are worried about the large role of foreign, especially U.S., capital in the economy. These Brazilians are also worried about the mounting cost of foreign investment in terms of remittances for dividends and interest. They would like the government to impose further controls on foreign investments. Some U.S. firms are now taking steps, such as selling stock in the Brazilian market, in order to acquire a measure of "political protection" should the present bright investment climate darken.

The main sore points between Brazil and the United States involve Brazil's claim to a 200-mile limit for its territorial waters and its desire to export to the United States on the best possible terms. Although Brazil has attempted to avoid a collision with the United States on the waters issue, and has signed an agreement which achieved a temporary solution of the fishing dispute, the administration has not retreated from its position that its claim is a legitimate sovereign act. Over the past several years Brazilian governments have privately expressed deep disappointment over the hesitancy of the United States to sell certain types of military aircraft and other arms to Brazil. Brazil, on one occasion, turned to France to obtain supersonic jet fighters the United States would not make available, and other important purchases in Europe have followed. The military equipment issue is likely to be a continuing problem in U.S.-Brazilian relations.

The Medici regime now is strong and confident and sees no need to call on strident nationalism or anti-Americanism to reinforce its popular base. However, some elements in the military and the society in general advocate a more rigidly nationalistic line. They have interpreted U.S. scientific exploration of the ocean off Brazil as "technological reconnaissance." Suggestions by the United States that Brazilian authorities examine the potential benefits of limiting population growth or controlling pollution are judged by some Brazilian officials as efforts to hamper rapid economic development. Even in areas where the administration wants to cooperate closely with the United States, such as suppressing the narcotics traffic, Brazilian officials are extremely watchful for anything that could be considered a potential infraction of national sovereignty. A severe economic downturn could cause the present administration or its successor to appeal to public sentiment by adopting a more nationalistic course. If this should happen, the issue of the size and influence of U.S. investment could dwarf present difficulties between the two countries.

d. Relations with other nations (C)

Brazil's relations outside the Americas are directly related to its twin goals of achieving economic development and of becoming a spokesman for the developing world. In Europe, the administration is primarily interested in protecting Brazil's exports from tariff barriers and in obtaining investments and scientific and technological cooperation. Brazil's only special relationship in Europe is with its mother country, Portugal. The Medici administration has shown its interest in strengthening ties with Lisbon by signing a bilateral convention in 1971 on equality of

rights and duties of citizens of the two countries and by inviting Portuguese President Thomaz and Prime Minister Caetano to take part in 1972 in the celebration of the 150th anniversary of Brazil's independence. At the same time, Brazil wants to make sure that its ties with Portugal do not detract from Brazil's image in black Africa.

In most countries of Asia and Africa, Brazil has engaged in little more than "flag diplomacy." An exception is Japan, which merits particular attention because of its impressive postwar economic record and its important social and economic contributions to Brazil; Brazil has the world's largest Japanese community outside of Japan and is one of the two largest recipients of Japanese foreign investment. Africa received more attention during 1972 and 1973. Gibson Barboza visited Senegal, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, Dahomey, Nigeria, Cameroon, Gabon, Zaire, and Kenya. Brazil's interest is whetted because African countries make up about one-third of the U.N. membership; because, as producers of coffee and cacao, they share important economic interests with Brazil; and because they are a potential market for industrial exports.

The governments since 1964 have strongly opposed the political policies of the Soviet Union and other Communist countries. Brazil did not establish diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. until 1946; these were broken a year later and were not resumed until November 1961. Brazil also maintains diplomatic relations with all of the Communist countries of Eastern Europe except East Germany, which has commercial missions in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. The European Communist officials in Brazil are aware of Brazil's hostility to their ideology, but they are anxious to maintain the existing political relations and therefore approach any bilateral issue with extreme caution. Brasilia continues to rebuff any attempts by the Communist nations to augment their diplomatic establishments or to conclude cultural and consular agreements.

The Medici administration does not want political issues and animosity to get in the way of normal trade relations with Communist countries, however. It is including these nations in the overall export promotion campaign. Economic officials believe that trade with Communist countries could be increased considerably from the present 3% of Brazil's total trade. The administration is likely to accept at least some offers by Communist countries, particularly the U.S.S.R., of equipment and technical assistance for economic development projects, notably in the hydroelectric area, if the countries agree to take

more Brazilian exports. Brazil has no diplomatic relations with Communist China or any other Asian Communist country. The administration does not intend to establish diplomatic relations with Peking, but unofficially is working to expand sales to China considerably.

Brazilians take seriously their role as an important power with international interests and obligations. Brazil's interests in international bodies usually coincide with those of the United States, minimizing areas of friction, but Brazil's general policy is to maintain independence and on specific issues to seek conciliation and the surmounting of antagonisms. Brazil has participated actively in international organizations, including the Organization of American States (OAS), the former League of Nations, the International Labor Organization, and the Permanent Court of International Justice. Since 1946 Brazil has been chosen five times as a nonpermanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations, and has participated in U.N. peace missions in the Middle East, the Congo, and Cyprus.

Brazil has played a leading role as a member of the OAS. It supported the OAS quarantine resolution during the Cuban crisis of October 1962. Recognizing the need for continental unity against subversive threats, Brazil contributed troops and leadership for the Inter-American Peace Force during the Dominican Republic civil war in 1965. The Castello Branco regime was a leading voice in promoting the creation of a permanent hemispheric peacekeeping force, but the Costa e Silva administration dropped the idea. Brazil firmly supports the concept of collective security and generally looks to the OAS rather than the United Nations to keep hemispheric peace. Brazil, however, opposes granting the OAS the right to impose "peaceful settlement" in cases of disputes, fearing that this could reopen old disputes settled by its border treaties and lead to endless litigation.

In February 1971 Gibson Barboza demonstrated Brazil's willingness to take an independent position in the OAS by walking out of a meeting of the General Assembly after that body had failed to support a Brazilian move for a broad document defining terrorism. Rather than be a party to a treaty applicable only to crimes against diplomats, Gibson Barboza chose to withdraw and to raise the terrorism issue later in private meetings with other foreign ministers.

In recent years Brazil has been willing to present and defend its positions in international bodies like the United Nations and the OAS. In his address to the U.N. General Assembly in September 1971 Gibson Barboza maintained that the political bipolarization

of the world was being displaced by another type of bipolarization: that between nations that possess economic, scientific, and military power and those condemned to be spectators or proteges of power. Gibson Barboza suggested that one of the United Nations' principal contributions to breaking down this new polarization would be to work for a peace based on general and complete disarmament and on the eradication of underdevelopment. He called for the international community to accept the concept of collective economic security and said that in pursuit of this goal developed nations should abandon trade barriers and aid developing countries to eliminate inequalities in their growth. Gibson Barboza noted that Brazil was already moving to assume its responsibilities toward the least developed countries. He also reiterated that the United Nations must recognize the right of each country both to protect and exploit its resources in accord with its interests and priorities and to determine the extent of its sovereignty over land and sea resources.

Before 1968 the Brazilian Government had made very limited propaganda efforts abroad, with no personnel in Brazil assigned full-time to overseas effort and virtually no information officers assigned to foreign posts. The one major exception in Brazil's general disinterest in overseas propaganda effort was the establishment in Washington, D.C., in June 1964 of the Brazilian-American Cultural Institute, which offers classes in Portuguese and lectures, as well as libraries of books, photographs, records, and documentary films.

Noting that certain countries entertained what Brazil regarded as a false view of the 1964 revolution, the government undertook through its missions to set the record straight. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, through its Department of Cultural Affairs, conducts a program of cultural exchanges with foreign countries. The primary government effort has been through the official *Agencia Nacional's* daily news and information service to foreign correspondents in Rio de Janeiro. *Agencia Nacional* also has agreements with international news agencies whereby they distribute news of Brazil abroad.

In May 1972 *Radio Nacional* began a 24-hour-per-day international service, initially broadcasting only in English; Spanish and German were added in September, and other languages including French, Italian, and Japanese are scheduled to be included later. Broadcasting to foreign audiences apparently was a response to the government's mounting concern about its inability to counter the programs from approximately 14 foreign stations beaming programs

in Portuguese to Brazil. The *Radio Nacional* broadcasts were primarily intended to improve Brazil's image abroad, particularly with its closest neighbors, and with the United States.

Brazil's major foreign propaganda objective is the expansion of its export trade, regardless of ideological considerations. In 1972 the administration launched a major campaign of advertisements in foreign periodicals to publicize the economic achievements and particularly the expansion of the country's capacity to export manufactured goods as well as raw materials. The chief agency for the promotion of foreign trade is the Propaganda Service (SEPRO) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Since 1962 SEPRO has centralized all governmental publicity and promotion activity abroad, superseding the Brazilian Government Trade Bureaus, which had been maintained for many years by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. SEPRO maintains offices in major cities of Europe, Asia, and the Western Hemisphere. They are active in promoting Brazilian participation in many international expositions and fairs.

E. Threats to government stability (S)

1. Discontent and dissidence

Many social and economic problems could in the long run lead to politically motivated violence in Brazil. Perhaps the factor of greatest potential importance is the so-called revolution of rising expectations. While many Brazilians have newly acquired material and social advantages, a considerable number feel entitled to increasing their gains. Moreover, there is a steadily widening gap between the standard of living of the more economically privileged classes and that of the mass of Brazilians who live in areas such as the drought-plagued Northeast or the slums found around nearly all urban centers. Some Brazilians, pessimistic over the prospects for rapid improvement in living conditions and changes in the social order, have been inclined to listen to, if not follow, those who call for radical solutions. In the early 1960's the forces of the left grew in influence and tried to wrest permanent control from the hitherto dominant center-conservative groups. A marked polarization developed between those who advocated far-reaching reforms in the political, social, and economic structures and those who sought to preserve or improve the existing structures. In the resulting turbulence the strengths and vulnerabilities of the Brazilian political system were rather finely balanced.

The 1964 revolution was a serious setback for the left. By early 1970, virtually all forms of public manifestation of dissent had been declared illegal and most of those who continued actively to oppose the government did so through clandestine organizations. Supporters of the government maintained that only through strong control exercised by the armed forces could order be insured. These harsh measures have created some discontent with the government, but the controls on the press and political activity make it very difficult to measure the actual amount of public support for or opposition to the regime, but there probably is considerable support. There is no indication that significant sectors of the population are inclined to join or are willing to support actively any effort to overthrow the government through armed revolution.

All Brazilians recognize that the majority of the people still have not shared in the wealth being produced by the economic boom. President Medici has declared that "the economic health of the country is good, but the people are poor." As the communications media expand and educational opportunities increase, more Brazilians are becoming aware of the disparities in income among the social classes and the various geographic regions. Medici said in 1972 that the administration will considerably expand its existing programs to remedy social problems and that it plans to implement new ones. Almost all of these projects are long-range efforts, however, and it is likely to be several years before their real impact can be determined. The government's desire to carry out such social programs is likely to be tempered in some cases by its intention to avoid making expenditures that could lead to greater inflation or reduce the rate of domestic savings, and by the possible social disruptions that programs in areas such as agrarian reform might bring.

Although economic conditions generally are worse for people in rural areas, conditions that might lead to unrest and disorder seem to be more readily exploitable in urban zones. A majority of Brazilians now live in urban areas. The extension of the powers of the federal government to all levels of administrative and political activity and the increased intervention of the government in the economic and social life of the nation have caused the federal bureaucracy to experience a rapid growth that has tended to reinforce still further the importance of the cities. As urban areas have mushroomed, the problems of providing employment, housing, and services have multiplied. If widespread popular dissatisfaction were to develop over these problems, it might be directed against all levels of the government.

a. Students

The most vocal opposition to the post-1964 regimes has come from students and other intellectuals, from liberal sectors of the Catholic Church, and from some labor groups. It is these forces where the greatest potential for serious discontent and subversive activity can be found, although this potential has proved difficult to exploit. Possibly no other group in the Brazilian population has the awareness of social discontent, the capacity for expression, or the inclination toward reform that characterize university students. They are an elite group in an institution that takes little responsibility for their social needs. The Brazilian higher educational system has been marked by relative student autonomy. The university administration and teaching faculties usually have little direct or influential contact with student groups, leaving them in an institutional vacuum. Students are expected to shift for themselves. In the universities, students often escape from the deeply paternalistic and extended family system of their homes. They become aware of economic inequality, social injustice, corruption, political maneuvering, and problems in social and economic development. Few students accept communism, despite years of Communist effort to develop support among students, but a larger number are sympathetic to socialist or Marxist views of society. Goulart permitted these students to control the National Student Union (UNE) and other student organizations; however, the military-led regimes were determined to end this influence. The authorities declared the student groups illegal, and, when student demonstrations occurred in 1967 and 1968, they were harshly repressed. Since then, the threat of expulsion and possible imprisonment has led most students and professors to abandon politics, as the government intended. A small minority of the students remain militantly opposed to the government, a considerable number of these form the rank and file of the various terrorist groups. Many violence-oriented students, and some of their colleagues who do not share this political view, have fallen into the nets of the security forces. The harsh treatment they have often received has increased their dislike of the government.

The post-1964 administrations have not been unconcerned about the distrust and hostility with which the university youth have viewed them. The governments have made sporadic efforts to develop democratically oriented student groups, but these have generally been allowed to wither because of the government's fear that any student groups with real influence might be taken over by the left and used against them. One government attempt to lessen the

students' apathy and involve them in national development was the formation of the Rondon Project, a VISTA-type program which sends students to backward areas of Brazil, particularly in the Amazon region.

b. Catholic Church

At the time of the police killing of terrorist leader Carlos Marighella in November 1969, the authorities arrested several clergymen belonging to the Dominican order on charges that they had provided logistical aid to Marighella's National Liberating Action (ALN). Some liberal clergymen had been assisting student groups since the UNE was banned in 1964, and the direct involvement of clerics with Marighella's group convinced many security officials of the validity of their long-held belief that the church had a radical wing that bore major responsibility for encouraging subversion and terrorism. There are in fact a considerable number of radical clerics—once estimated as high as 1,000—who believe the government has declared war on all effective opposition and who therefore have decided that the only way to assist the poor, illiterate, and oppressed people of Brazil is through the use of force. There is also a much larger progressive sector of the church that neither engages in terrorism nor has any ties with it, but has some sympathy for the prelates who believe that direct action is the only way to bring rapid change. The progressives, and a growing number of the majority moderate wing of the church, believe that the nonpolitical demands of students and workers are in the main legitimate, and they condemn the government's slowness to take effective action in these areas. They also agree that unless the church takes the "side of the people" in bringing about changes, such as alleviating poverty and decreasing the vast disparity in standards of living, there will be a radicalization in which the people will turn against the church and against democratic solutions. The moderates are thus becoming increasingly convinced that the church has no alternative but to involve itself in social and economic matters—admittedly at the risk of interfering in secular affairs and incurring the displeasure of temporal authorities. They hope to direct change along rational, nonviolent lines, giving encouragement to the government when they believe it is acting correctly, and criticizing it when it fails to act or moves in the wrong direction.

The arrests of clerics, some of whom were not connected with any subversive groups, have frequently created friction between the government and the church authorities. The Medici administra-

tion and the Catholic hierarchy, both as individuals and through the National Council of Brazilian Bishops (CNBB), have attempted to smooth over the problems. The CNBB's position is that it will carefully study every case in which a clergyman is charged with criminal activity, and will protest to the government in those cases where it can establish no foundation for such charges. The involvement of an increasing number of priests—particularly those who are foreign born—in activities the government considers political in nature seems to make friction between the government and the church almost inevitable. Such clerics act as individuals, but there is always a possibility that government action against one of them could draw the church as an institution into a confrontation with the regime. Both sides have given serious consideration to the potential consequences of such an event in the world's largest Catholic country.

The Brazilian Society for the Preservation of Tradition, the Family, and Private Property (TFP) is not an official church organization, but the majority of the estimated 1,500 to 2,000 members are staunchly conservative Catholic laymen and prelates, such as Archbishop Proenca Sigaud of Diamantina, for whom the TFP is Brazil's stongest defense against what they see as the encroaching danger of Communist penetration of the church. Part of the TFP's financing comes from conservative businessmen and part from public solicitation, and some unofficial help may have come from a few government and military officials.

c. Labor

Another major sector characterized by some dissatisfaction under the post-1964 administrations is labor. However, expressions of discontent from labor have been much less frequent and in a much lower key than have student protests, and the two groups have not worked well together. In late 1967, radical students from several leftist groups took over some rallies organized by labor unions to protest the wage policy and turned them into antigovernment, and at times, anti-U.S., street demonstrations. Many workers condemned the extremists' actions, resulting in a significant setback for the students and for the labor group that had organized the rallies.

The most serious of the few post-1964 strikes took place during 1968. In April, approximately 1,400 workers at a major steel mill in Belo Horizonte struck in demand for a 25% wage increase, and they rapidly received support from an additional 13,500 workers in other plants in the area. The government declared the strike illegal, and state military police occupied the affected plants. When the Minister of Labor and

Social Security threatened the strikers with loss of their jobs and possible arrest and prosecution in military courts under the National Security Law, the workers reluctantly accepted a lesser wage increase and returned to their jobs. In May a series of unauthorized strikes broke out in Sao Paulo automobile assembly plants, with workers again demanding wage increases substantially above the limit set by the government. Leadership for the strikers appeared to come from outside the recognized, elected union officials, who usually are reluctant to respond to workers' demands because they fear arrest, or at least dismissal from their jobs. Additional strikes occurred in the Sao Paulo industrial suburb of Osasco in July, with workers demanding substantial wage hikes accompanied by a long list of health, safety, and wage protections which they maintained were required by law. Again the leadership appeared to come from outside the union officials, who were characterized by some strikers as being in league with the government. There was some evidence of student militants from the illegal UNE and Sao Paulo State Students Union having taken part in the preliminary planning and in rallying popular support for the strikers. There were reports that members of the AP, PCdoB, and ALN were also in the area attempting to incite the striking workers against the government. The government again declared the strike illegal, and on 17-18 July police removed the striking workers from the factories—arresting approximately 60—and occupied the headquarters of the local metal workers' union, to which most of the strikers belonged. A government interventor was appointed to take control of the union. The Osasco strikers' cause received substantial support from other unions in the Sao Paulo area and a few national unions, although no additional workers actually went on strike. A number of other sectors recognized the legitimacy of many of the strikers' complaints; these included the president of the CNBB, as well as some worker-priests who held jobs in the affected factories. Two of these priests were among the arrested workers, and one—of French nationality—was expelled from Brazil because of his participation in the strike. Even the state Governor indicated his sympathy with the workers' wage claim. The marginal role of unions resulting from the government's unwillingness to allow freedom for them to operate was demonstrated by the Sao Paulo strikes. No important strikes have taken place since.

The workers' reasons for not challenging the government are basically economic. Many workers have large families which are entirely dependent on the breadwinner's continued employment and good

behavior, and they therefore are concerned about the very real possibility of arrest and loss of their jobs. For approximately half of all Brazilian workers, those who earn at or near the prevailing minimum wage level, the loss of even 2 or 3 days' pay could bring serious economic hardship, particularly since few if any unions are affluent enough to have strike support funds that could be used to assist striking members. For this reason, Brazilian trade union members have been reluctant to collaborate with students in demonstrations and other antigovernment activities. The workers also tend to regard the largely middle and upper class students as irresponsible agitators who have nothing to lose from their antics, and who one day themselves will become the "exploiters of the working class."

Another primary reason for the relative absence of large-scale expressions of discontent by the workers is the strong measure of control the government exercises over the trade unions. The Brazilian labor code promulgated in 1943 under Vargas was designed to make both management and labor subordinate to the government. The code provides that both workers and employers be organized in syndicates, federations, and confederations, from local to national levels, under the strict regulation of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. The government's extensive prerogatives include the power to refuse to charter a union, to withdraw any union's charter, to nullify the results of elections, and to intervene when deemed necessary. The administration's intelligence arm, the SNI, has frequently taken advantage of these prerogatives to pressure unions to drop critics of the government and to make sure that proregime figures were elected to official positions in the unions. Most important, the government collects and distributes the *imposto sindical* (trade union tax, 1 day's pay per worker per year, whether he belongs to the union in his field or not); this control of finances enables the government to play a dominant role in labor affairs, since most state and national labor organizations have little other income. In addition, the government controls appointments to several hundred well-paying positions in the Ministry of Labor and in social security institutes and has given many of these positions to cooperative labor leaders, referred to by the rank and file as *pelegos* (stooges).

Because the government has such great power to manipulate trade union affairs, there has been no genuinely independent labor movement. Labor leaders, especially at the national and state levels, have been forced to make their influence felt through political action, either by lobbying at the Ministry of

Labor and Social Security or by associating with prolabor political figures. As the prestige and powers of politicians have declined in recent years, so the few avenues available to the unions to make their views known have been sharply reduced.

The austerity program instituted by the Castello Branco government, and retained with some modifications by the Costa e Silva and Medici administrations, has been the main target of labor protests against the government. Union leaders have complained that workers have been forced to bear the brunt of the anti-inflationary campaign by being obliged to accept unreasonably low wage increases, and they have charged that the government has not demanded equal sacrifices from other sectors of the economy. These leaders feel that since their removal from the favorable position they enjoyed with the Goulart administration, and the almost complete elimination of labor politics, they have no way to communicate the workers' needs to the government. Democratic union officials have maintained that the government's strict controls over the unions and the virtual abolition of the right to strike have practically eliminated the officials' normal bargaining role and other functions. They claim that the field thus has been left open to Communists to organize both Communist and non-Communist rank-and-file elements. There is also a general conviction among workers that neither of the two legal political parties has labor's interests at heart.

One of the first serious attempts to organize rural workers, who traditionally have lacked any organizations to protect their interests, was launched by Pernambuco state deputy Francisco Juliao in 1955. The Peasant Leagues, which he started, at their peak in the early 1960's probably had about 80,000 members. With the promulgation in 1963 of a law extending to rural workers the benefits of unionization, Catholic and Communist groups moved vigorously into competition for the peasants' allegiance, and by 1964 Juliao was losing out to them. Although the military believed that the Peasant Leagues posed a potential for violence, and therefore dissolved them, it is not clear whether they actually posed a real national threat.

The rural workers' conditions certainly afford reason for discontent. Unemployment and underemployment in this sector tend to be extremely high. Droughts often aggravate the plight of rural workers, causing their frequent migration, often toward the cities. Any attempts made by persons outside the government to organize workers to spur them to action are quickly denounced by landowners and halted by the police. In

one such case, three rural labor union officials were arrested in May 1972 on charges of fomenting subversion among agricultural workers in Ceara State. Police charged that the men had incited tenant farmers not to pay rent, apparently in order to force landowners to carry out certain improvements in their properties deemed necessary by the workers. They allegedly also tried to politicize the rural dwellers and to incite them to violence. Although the men eventually were cleared of any charges, the military would not permit them to return to union activities.

The Medici administration has taken some steps to try to reduce labor's discontent. It has authorized wage increases to compensate for the cost-of-living rise, but its main emphasis has been on providing social benefits. In 1970 the government created a Program of Social Integration and an Impact Project to assist unions' health, educational, and recreational purposes. In January 1972 a decree made rural workers eligible for retirement pensions. Because rural unions were assigned to providing the necessary documentation for workers to qualify for benefits under the decree, these organizations were expanding rapidly in 1972. It is likely to be several years before the real impact of the measures on the workers' lives can be determined.

d. Military

Because the forces outside the government, including the political parties, subversive organizations, students, labor, and the church, now lack any effective means of opposing the regime or fundamental issues, it is from within that any cracks in the Medici administration's stability would probably come. Thus far the President appears to have maintained the firm support of most officers behind his effort to put Brazil in the ranks of the influential, developed nations. These officers believe that it is the government's responsibility to provide leadership, rational planning, and a climate of political stability, and they believe that Medici's record in these areas has been a very good one.

During the Castello Branco and Costa e Silva administrations, important groups within the military put heavy pressure on the presidents to take stronger action against elements the officers considered corrupt or subversive. The group calling most loudly for such action was a rather amorphous group of young army officers given the overall label of "hard line." The officers have been characterized as nationalistic, unsophisticated in the fields of economics and international relations, impatient for the fulfillment of what they view as Brazil's manifest destiny in terms of

internal development and emergence as a world power, intolerant of traditional bureaucratic corruption and inefficiency and of what they consider the venality and irresponsibility of the country's politicians, and strongly opposed to communism. Many of these men had risked their careers by opposing the leftward trend of the Goulart administration, and they advocated severe punishment for persons involved in subversion and corruption. Their urgings were at least partly responsible for the suspension of the political rights of many individuals, and they promised to continue to pursue this role of "vanguard of the revolution." The officers, mostly colonels and lieutenant colonels, who formed short-lived far rightist groups such as the Radical Democratic League and the Armed Nation movement, probably represented only a small, extremist minority of armed forces personnel. The military commanders generally have opposed the formation of such organizations as a threat to discipline. The Armed Nation's goals in 1968 included the replacement—by force if necessary—of the administration by a highly authoritarian and nationalistic government which would radically modify Brazil's political, social, and economic institutions. While advocating such progressive steps as the rigorous enforcement of all tax and fiscal laws, the group also advocated such extreme measures as the expulsion of all "unproductive" foreigners and those who could not justify their wealth; rigid control of the press and the suppression of opposition expression; and the organization of paramilitary groups in primary and secondary schools.

Minister of the Army Geisel has effectively dealt with the few military officers who have criticized the administration on basic issues by having them retired or transferred to posts where a close rein could be kept on their actions. The farthest any officers have yet gone was to suggest that certain areas, such as the Amazon region, should have even higher priority, that a more nationalistic policy toward foreign investment should be adopted, or that the armed forces had to prepare to eventually turn over a measure of authority to civilians. The most prestigious military critic of the administration, Maj. Gen. Affonso de Albuquerque Lima, was passed over for promotion and retired in 1971. Some nationalistic young officers have pointed to the army's director of finance, Maj. Gen. Euler Bentes Monteiro, as the man who has inherited Albuquerque Lima's mantle; however, Euler has been careful to maintain a strictly professional image and has avoided the limelight that could jeopardize his career in the eyes of the Minister of the Army.

2. Subversion

The Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) has been the only nationwide organization in Brazil with a long-range program to subvert the nation's institutions. The party's goal, in line with the doctrine expounded by the Soviet Communist Party, has been to increase the PCB's influence in all sectors of Brazilian life, particularly among labor, students, and intellectuals, rather than to overthrow the government. Another important aim has been to push the country into a neutral position in which U.S. influence would be greatly reduced.

In the past the party exerted an influence far greater than its relatively small membership would suggest. It received encouragement from Vargas (who also at times combated the party), from Kubitschek, and especially from Goulart. These three presidents allowed the Communists to infiltrate the labor movement in return for their support in election campaigns and in organizing political strikes and demonstrations.

The serious potential danger to democratic institutions and abundant opportunities for possible Communist subversion which can result from irresponsible use of the government's wide-ranging authority in the labor field were clearly demonstrated by Joao Goulart, who more than any other politician since Vargas used labor for political ends. As Minister of Labor (1953-54) in the Vargas Cabinet, his diligence in manipulating the labor movement to promote Vargas' Brazilian Labor Party (PTB) so incensed the military that they forced his removal. As Vice President under Kubitschek and Quadros and as President he controlled the appointment of labor leaders to high patronage positions and helped many Communists reach positions of prominence in return for the support of the PCB in electoral campaigns. He apparently attempted to build up a Communist-led labor force to counter industrialist and military pressures, and yet he planned to keep it sufficiently under his control to prevent a complete Communist takeover. His strategy proved successful in 1962 when political strikes called by the extralegal, Communist-led Workers General Command (CGT) helped build up pressures which forced Congress to return full presidential powers to him. At the time of Goulart's ouster, four of Brazil's six major labor confederations were dominated by Communists.

The new government in 1964 took immediate steps to reduce or eliminate the PCB's influence. Party members and sympathizers were purged from the armed forces, the civil service, student and labor

organizations, and other areas where the PCB had invested years of work in building support. Since 1964 the PCB has worked to rebuild these assets, but the hostility of the military and internal dissension that led to the defection of many of the party's young militant members has severely hampered these efforts.

The PCB's main target has been the urban labor movement. In an attempt to gain support among the workers, party leaders have stressed the line that labor has borne the burden of the post-1964 economic programs, but has received few benefits. The PCB has managed to control a few unions, particularly the Sao Paulo bankworkers' union, but the government frequently uses the charge of "Communist subversion" to obtain the removal of leaders it does not like, a practice which has led to an impression that the PCB's role is greater in labor than in fact is true. Most workers are therefore anxious to avoid any taint of association with a person who could be suspected of having Communist sympathies. In addition, few union leaders believe that the PCB now is, or in the foreseeable future will be, in a position to affect the government's position on issues such as the wage policy, so that the risk of association with party members is not balanced by any real benefits. The party thus is not in a position to assume a public role in labor affairs, such as urging workers to strike, but rather is limited to working behind the scenes, helping the workers to formulate their grievances and covertly identifying the party with the workers' efforts to improve conditions. Similarly, the PCB strategy for gaining the support of rural workers is to explain to them their legal rights and point out that the national and state governments do not want them to exercise these rights.

Students traditionally have been the PCB's second major target group. Even during the height of student activity under Goulart, however, more radical leftist groups such as the Popular Action (AP) and the Peking-oriented PCdoB captured the allegiance of students over the PCB. Since 1964, most student opponents of the military-dominated governments have found the direct action of the terrorist groups, most of which have split from the PCB, more appealing than the peaceful path advocated by the PCB itself. It is possible that the decline suffered by the terrorist organizations will convince some students that the PCB's position is in the long run a more realistic one. The party's aged leadership and its close identification with Moscow, however, are serious handicaps in trying to attract nationalistic youths. If a younger group took over the leadership and tried to make the PCB a genuinely Brazilian party not allied

with foreign organizations, it might have a considerably broader appeal to younger people. As long as the government maintains its ban on student organizations and student political activity, nevertheless, it is difficult to see how the PCB could capitalize on any influence it might gain among students.

In recent years the PCB has attempted to establish contacts with some Catholic clergymen, including members of the hierarchy. The party's motive appears to be to try to identify the PCB with all groups that are opposed to the government. In these discussions the PCB members usually stress the point that great social and economic injustices exist in Brazil and that the governments since 1964 have not acted vigorously to improve these conditions. They also point to the limitations on political expression and the government's harsh treatment of those suspected of subversion. While the clergies have listened to the party members' views, there is no indication that they have taken any action to assist the PCB. In fact, some prelates are concerned that the government might use allegations of links between priests and Communists to justify a crackdown on progressives within the church, which leads them to be careful not to do anything that might lend credence to the authorities' suspicions.

3. Insurgency

Although political compromise and accommodation have been the principal methods of solving conflicts, there have occurred numerous episodes of groups attempting to defy the constituted governments. Under the Portuguese, there were several examples of people born in Brazil using arms to try to break the economic hold which the European-born attempted to maintain. Throughout the colonial period, and in fact well into the national period, the threat of slave rebellion hung ominously in the air, causing the plantation owners and even the city dwellers many uneasy hours. The most notable example of the slaves' attempting to defy the central government was the establishment in the late 17th century of the Republic of Palmares in the interior of the state of Alagoas. This was the first attempt by the Negroes in Brazil to establish a state with African traditions. To the Luso-Brazilians the Republic of Palmares posed a threat because the approximately 20,000 residents enticed other slaves to flee the plantations and join them, and it also blocked agrarian expansion westward. Repeated campaigns between 1672 and 1694 failed to destroy Palmares, but these attacks and internal dissension finally caused it to collapse at the end of the 17th century.

A second major type of social violence is evident in the series of attempts by marginal groups in the backlands to establish communities under the leadership of a prophetic figure. From the early 1890's to 1915 there were at least three cases in which peasants in the Northeast, under the influence of religious fanatics, rose in protest against control by a Brazilian society which they did not understand and which did not understand them. The rustic inhabitants of the interior differed markedly from the sophisticated citizens of the coastal cities; however, as long as there was little contact between the two groups there was no conflict. But, as railroad and communication networks expanded rapidly into the interior, they brought the civilized coastal areas into contact—and occasional clashes—with the more backward and neglected interior. The first such occasion, dramatically described in Euclydes da Cunha's great work *Rebellion in the Backlands*, was the formation of the Republic of Canudos in the interior of Bahia State. Here, the mystic Antonio Conselheiro gathered impoverished and superstitious followers into a primitive settlement. Attempts by the state governor to eliminate the settlement were repelled with arms. The federal government in Rio de Janeiro took up the cause with a vengeance, believing that the miserable and ignorant peasants were loyal to the overthrown monarchy and defied the republic. The federal troops failed in two attacks, and it was only when the Minister of War led a campaign by forces equipped with artillery that the federal government was able to conquer Canudos, which was totally devastated in the process. The long and bloody struggle awoke the concern of the nation. Another disturbance took place in an area claimed by both Parana and Santa Catarina States between 1912 and 1915. A religious mystic won a considerable following among the peasants and placed himself above the constituted civil and religious authorities. Again, the federal government believed it necessary to send in the army—this time a division of 6,000 men—to wipe out the rebels after the state forces had fallen in defeat.

There have also been several revolts by government institutions against the federal administration. These took the forms of armed actions by certain states or by groups within the military who were dissatisfied with their treatment by the national government. The most recent cases were revolts by Sao Paulo State in 1924 and 1932, and a revolt by Rio Grande do Sul and Minas Gerais States in 1930 that ousted the President. A series of revolts by military officers occurred in the 1920's. One of the young officers involved, Luiz Carlos Prestes, who later became head of the Brazilian

Communist Party, led a group of his comrades in a 3-year, 14,000-mile trek through the interior of Brazil into Bolivia. Prestes, dubbed the "knight of hope," exerted a strong mystic appeal over his followers and many elements of the Brazilian population who admired his bold if quixotic challenge to the government. Nonetheless, his efforts to arouse the population to take up arms against the government failed. The peasants were still too much under the powerful sway of local bosses to be enlisted in the ranks of rebellion. The countryside never had been the place to foment change in Brazil, and the results of the Prestes Column demonstrated in the 1920's that it still was not. The discontented elements centered in the cities.

Increased central control of Brazil has made the phenomenon of violence in public life less frequent since 1930. This is one of the reasons for the widespread surprise and shock which followed the outbreak of terrorism in several cities in the late 1960's. From 1964 until 1968 most of the acts of violence appeared as isolated incidents rather than part of a larger coordinated plan intended to lead eventually to general insurgency. During 1968, however, thefts of explosives and weapons took place in several cities, and Sao Paulo and other urban centers were shaken by a series of carefully planned and executed killings, armed robberies, and bombings. These incidents increased in number and seriousness in 1969. It was not until late 1969 that the government was able to take the initiative against the groups, but, once the authorities went on the offensive, they wasted no effort or expense to suppress the terrorism.

The terrorist acts were carried out by several groups, which had separate organizational structures but which at times collaborated to carry off particular operations. The leaders in most cases were experienced figures in the PCB who had left the party because of its opposition to taking direct action against the government. The bulk of the rank and file was composed of middle class people of both sexes under 25 years of age, many of them former students who had been expelled from the universities because of their political activism. Cashiered military and police officers and a small number of workers formed the rest of the groups' cadre. Many of the young members had gained experience in clandestine life by playing important roles in illegal student organizations such as the UNE, and in planning and carrying out student demonstrations in 1967 and 1968. Some of the groups' leaders also had accumulated subversive experience which they passed on to the cadre. The most effective terrorist leader, Carlos Marighella, founder of the

ALN, was for several years a senior PCB official, responsible for contacts between the party and Cuban officials. These links were one of the main reasons for his expulsion from the PCB; another was his insistence on the need for violent revolution. On leaving the PCB, Marighella declared:

I am ready to take part in the revolutionary struggle with the masses but never to play a waiting game in bureaucratic politics . . . There is a lack of revolutionary impulse, a revolutionary conscience which is generated by struggle.

Marighella's insistence on the need for recruiting and training guerrilla fighters to engage in armed struggle and to form the core of a "people's revolutionary army" that would eventually come to power is a view shared by almost all the terrorist groups. His *Minimanual for the Urban Guerrilla*, written in June 1969 a few months before his death at the hands of Sao Paulo police, probably is the most thorough and coherent statement of the aims and methods of the terrorists. He viewed urban action as a necessary preliminary step to the main goal of fomenting revolution in the countryside. According to the *Minimanual*, the function of urban guerrilla warfare is to "demoralize and distract the enemy forces, permitting the emergence and survival of rural guerrilla warfare, which is destined to play the decisive role in the revolutionary war." The publication sets forth the groups of people who are to provide the main support for the rural guerrilla war: peasants, who know the land; students, who although politically unsophisticated have a special talent for revolutionary violence and have plenty of free time on their hands to spend on revolution; intellectuals, who spread the revolutionary call and influence the people; churchmen, who have the ability to communicate with the people; and women, who have unmatched fighting spirit and tenacity.

In fact, neither Marighella's ALN nor any of the other extremist groups has advanced beyond the stage of urban action to the second stage of rural guerrilla warfare, although some organizations, such as the AP and PCBR, have spent considerable time trying to prepare their own cadres for rural operations and in attempting to prepare the peasants psychologically to support action against the government and landowners. Although the various groups do not accept all of Marighella's maxims for revolution, their actions are in line with his view that terrorism "is an action the urban guerrilla must execute with the greatest coldbloodedness, calm, and decision." Marighella's recommended list of sniping, ambushes, hijacking of aircraft, executions, riots, sabotage, and

strikes form a virtual catalog of the operations actually carried out by the terrorists before and after his death.

The terrorist actions generally had several motives. The most frequent operations—robberies of banks and arms depots—were carried out to support the groups' members and to make possible other operations. Marighella stressed killings and kidnappings as important tools of the urban guerrilla. The terrorists claimed that they abducted four foreign diplomats in 1969 and 1970 in order to publicize their cause and to free comrades from prison—a procedure described in the *Minimanual*. Although the government did release prisoners as demanded by the abductors, in each case it took a harder line, finally refusing to free certain individuals and issuing false communiques intended to confuse the terrorists. The government apparently succeeded in convincing the terrorists that kidnaping diplomats was not effective, since none have taken place since December 1970.

It was probably the abduction of the U.S. Ambassador in September 1969 that turned the tide against the terrorists. This incident greatly embarrassed the authorities and convinced them of the seriousness of the terrorist problem. The military took over the main responsibility for suppressing the terrorists and began a campaign that has done irreparable damage to the groups. Key leaders were captured or killed; support groups were broken up; sympathizers were arrested; arms caches were confiscated; and in some cases future plans were compromised to the police. In nearly every group, disputes arose about whether to continue operations or to suspend them in order to avoid more losses. The ALN, for example, appears to have split in 1971 over this question, with the older members calling for a suspension of activities except robberies, and a younger group comprised mainly of people trained in Cuba claiming that even a temporary cessation of operations could lead to a permanent collapse of the organization. The latter group call themselves the MOLIPO.

Renegade army captain Carlos Lamarca reportedly left the VPR over this same issue shortly before his death in September 1971. The successful search for Lamarca in the hinterlands of Bahia State demonstrated that the military had substantially improved its rural counterinsurgency techniques, particularly the use of tactical intelligence. The previous year, Lamarca had escaped capture after being encircled by military and police forces in the Ribeira valley of Sao Paulo State. In both cases, he apparently had set up camps for training urban

extremists to engage in rural guerrilla operations, but the camps were discovered by security forces before much could be accomplished.

In the cities, the government continues to press its advantage against the terrorists. Although the terrorists frequently have talked about carrying off spectacular operations such as the kidnaping of Brazilian or foreign officials or bombings, none have been carried out since 1970. Small-scale operations such as robberies increased during 1971 and early 1972, but these were mainly undertaken to obtain money for subsistence. Survival is now the prime goal of the terrorists. As late as 1971 they seemed to be able to recruit replacements for fallen members, and a small flow of people who had received training abroad also returned. Attempts by exiles to organize support for the groups in Brazil have been hampered by the dissension among the exiles and the difficulty of maintaining contact with comrades at home. The main proponents of unity among the antigovernment exiles have been former Pernambuco State governor Miguel Arraes, now in Algiers, but planning to relocate in Chile, and cashiered army major Joaquim Pires Cerveira in Chile. Arraes' Brazilian Information Front (BFI), which has branches in Paris, Santiago, and several other cities, has been active in writing and disseminating propaganda against the Medici government. In late 1971, for example, the BFI's publication claimed that the government had killed 103 persons since 1968 for alleged involvement in subversive activities. Another Paris-based exile organization called the South American Documentation and Information Service advocates peaceful opposition to the Brazilian Government. There are no Marighellas or Lamarcaes left among the terrorists to provide leadership, and a clear lack of direction is evident.

The terrorist groups have demonstrated that they do not have the capability either to initiate or maintain rural or urban insurgency. Violence produced by small clandestine groups has never been a major factor in bringing about important political or social changes in Brazil. The groups are not likely to disappear, however, because they offer an alternative to exile for the small number of youth who find no legitimate means of political expression and who are not deterred by the probable consequences of violent confrontation with the government. Because terrorists continue to exist, the government has retained the extraordinary powers it assumed during the period when the problem of terrorism was most serious. In some cases, the police attribute to the terrorists robberies that

actually are carried out by criminals, and the actions that are really perpetrated by the terrorists constitute little more than a nuisance for the government.

The authorities are aware that the subversives' greatest potential for promoting serious unrest lies in exploiting the real grievances of the people. Terrorist groups such as the APMI and PCBR have spent some effort on trying to convince rural people that they have serious grievances, and their losses in the cities may force them increasingly to move into the countryside. In April and May 1972 the military found eight small guerrilla camps in the state of Para. They believe that the camps were part of an extensive 3-year effort by the Peking-line PCdoB to establish a presence and to indoctrinate the populace, with some success. A security official said in early 1972 that similar efforts by the APMI in the states of Maranhao and Piaui had been aimed at gaining support among the poorer classes there. The armed forces launched major campaigns to eradicate these subversives, and were surprised at the ability of the pursued groups to survive in the difficult terrain.

The groups advocating insurgency have made little effort to obtain foreign support. They believe that only a genuinely Brazilian movement could achieve their goals, and also the requests they have made for foreign support have not been very productive. The groups have received some outside support in the form of training, travel, and propaganda, but, aside from the guerrilla training, the foreign assistance probably has not significantly increased the groups' effectiveness. Training in Communist China has been limited to about 50 members of two Peking-line groups—the PCdoB in the early 1960's and the AP after 1967. The arrests of two of the China-trained PCdoB members in 1966 led to a roundup of many other activists, dealing the organization a severe blow. Probably well over 200 Brazilians have received guerrilla training in Cuba since 1961. Of those trained since 1967, the largest number have been members of Marighella's ALN. One of the reasons for Marighella's expulsion by the PCB was the party's disapproval of his close ties with Cuba and with the Havana-based Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO). Fidel Castro considered him one of Latin America's leading revolutionaries. Several of those trained in Cuba had been flown into exile from Brazilian jails in exchange for kidnaped foreign diplomats. Leftist Brazilian exiles in Uruguay, Chile, Algeria, France, and a few other countries have in some cases provided refuge, funds, documentation, and assistance in travel to terrorists who have been forced to flee Brazil. They may also have aided such people to return clandestinely to

Brazil. Since 1969, Brazilian security forces, in some cases acting on information gained from penetrations among the exiles, have killed over 70 terrorists trained abroad. These losses may result in a decline in foreign training for Brazilian subversives, many of whom believe the benefits gained are outweighed by the risks involved.

F. Maintenance of internal security (S)

1. Police

Since the overthrow of the Goulart regime in 1964, the Brazilian armed forces—particularly the army—have obtained a very large degree of control of the police and security services. Army officers in temporary nonmilitary status traditionally served as the commanders of the state police forces in almost every state, the one major exception being Sao Paulo. Active duty army officers now command the national and state police forces, and the armed forces specifically have been assigned responsibility for repression of crimes affecting national security, including terrorism.

Immediate responsibility for public safety and internal security historically has rested with the

individual states. The Federal Department of Public Security (DFSP), founded in 1944, was really a police service for the Federal District, first in Rio de Janeiro and later in Brasilia. In November 1964, however, the Congress made the DFSP—later changed to the Federal Police Department (DPF)—a true national force (Figure 15). It is directly subordinate to the Ministry of Justice. The DPF fills some of the roles played by most of the U.S. federal law enforcement agencies, including the FBI, Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, Bureau of Customs, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, and the Secret Service. Other agencies, such as the SNI, are also involved in these fields, and at times there is friction between them and the DPF. Among the DPF's assigned functions are the prevention of crimes against Brazilian and foreign government officials and properties; the repression of illegal drug traffic into Brazil, and censorship of all communications media. The DPF headquarters is located in the Federal District of Brasilia, where the federal police have exclusive enforcement jurisdiction, and there are 16 regional offices. It now employs about 15,000 men. The DPF is still expanding but has already made some progress in establishing services for records and




FIGURE 15. Brazilian police services, 1972 (C)





FIGURE 16. National Police Academy (U/OU)

identification, criminology, and telecommunications that have improved the DPF's own capabilities as well as that of the state law enforcement agencies. The DPF has under its auspices the National Police Academy (Figure 16), which since 1961 has provided training for all law enforcement agencies in Brazil. Also under DPF control, the National Institute of Criminology provides scientific and technical facilities for all police services, while the National Institute of Identification serves as a central repository for all criminal and civil identification records, which are made available to other police organizations. The DPF operates the Police Telecommunications Technical Center and has nearly completed installation of a national communications service that will link all police agencies throughout Brazil. The DPF has a unit, known as the Division of Political and Social Order (DOPS), that investigates cases with political aspects, although in practice these are usually handled by the military. The DPF is devoting considerable effort to improving its capability to repress the dangerous drug traffic into Brazil.

Like the other security services, the DPF still has serious problems with corruption. In January 1973, 31 DPF officers in Sao Paulo were fired because of their participation in crimes of theft, extortion, and blackmail. The heads of the DPF intended the severe punishments to serve as a warning to all officers that no involvement in graft or corruption will be tolerated, but much remains to be done to eliminate the problem.


Each of the 22 states has its own police force; there are no significant city or county police forces. The police in the states are the main law enforcement body in Brazil. They are subordinate to the secretary of public security in the governor's cabinet. Under a decree-law issued in July 1969, the police are of two types: military police, numbering about 184,000, and civil police, about 100,000. Drawing a comparison with the United States, the military police are a combination of the uniformed officers in city police departments, the state highway patrols, and the state National Guard while it is on active duty on state missions. The military police are the only uniformed law enforcement officers, and are primarily responsible for the prevention of crimes and the preservation of public order. They have also provided most manpower used in combating urban terrorism. The competence, training, and equipment of the militia vary considerably from state to state. The nonuniformed civil police are concerned mainly with the investigative and judicial phases of police operations. Like detective bureaus in U.S. city police departments, the Brazilian civil police tend to be organized into specialized squads concerned with a particular type of offense, including theft and burglary, homicide, forgery and fraud, and narcotics. All investigative work of a political nature is done by a unit of the civil police known in most states as the Division of Political and Social Order (DOPS), although in Sao Paulo it is known as the State Division of Political and Social Order (DEOPS). The civil

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
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
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includes courses in riot control, should upgrade the state police forces' ability to deal with civil disturbances in the cities.

A serious problem hampering the military, as well as the civilian security forces, is the lack of effective coordination. The commanders of the various forces are extremely jealous of their prerogatives; this frequently results in a reluctance to share information and in a contest to take credit for successes. The state police forces traditionally have operated on an autonomous basis, at times actually functioning as the private armies of the state governors. In some states, such as Sao Paulo, there has often been serious friction between the military police and the civil police. The establishment of the DPF and the National Police Academy, and the creation of the CODI's, have only partially solved the coordination problem.

The country's great size and the remoteness of many of its regions also hamper the authorities' ability to combat subversion. The construction of new highways, particularly in the Amazon region, is in part intended to expand the security forces' area of effective operation. The air force is developing an airlift capability using CC-115's and U.S. C-130's to transport troops to isolated areas that may be difficult or impossible to reach rapidly by land. The establishment by the DPF of a nationwide police radio and telex system also will assist the security forces in communicating information: this need thus far has largely been filled by the army.

The military forces have long been involved in projects contributing to the economic and social development of the nation. In addition to building railroads and highways, the army engineers assist the civilian population by building dams, digging wells, supplying medical aid, and providing schools. In this latter role, for example, the Second Highway Construction Battalion maintains 10 primary schools, employing 60 teachers for 1,800 children and 200 illiterate adults. The navy in conjunction with its river patrol provides medical and dental care to civilians at numerous villages and settlements. The air force, in addition to constructing civilian airports, controlling air traffic, and providing other nominally civilian-type services, provides transportation for isolated areas in the interior and is ready to fly missions in any emergency.

In 1967 selected armed forces units became involved in a pilot program to elicit the volunteer services of Brazilian university students in backward areas of the country. In July 1967, 25 students from universities in the State of Guanabara and Rio de Janeiro spent their vacations working at tasks, similar to those carried out by VISTA in the United States, in

the territory of Rondonia under the terms of an agreement between the University of Guanabara, the Ministry of Interior, and an army engineering and construction battalion in Rondonia. The success of this project encouraged the government to establish in December 1967 norms under which the Rondon Project would operate, requiring planning and coordination by the Ministries of Interior, Education, Army, Navy, and Aeronautics, and other organs. Permanent status was given to the project by a presidential decree in July 1968. While basic control is under the Ministry of Interior, the armed forces provide material support and assist in the preparation, execution, and evaluation of the activities.

Government officials have said that the goals of the Rondon Project, among others, are to offer Brazilian students the opportunity to become familiar with the immensity of Brazil and with the magnitude of its problems as well as the efforts the government is making to meet them; to serve to attract youths to the interior with its unexploited opportunities; to establish a dialogue, using deeds rather than words, between students and the armed forces in general and the army in particular; and to bring to the inhabitants of the interior a message of governmental concern for their future; and to inculcate in the students a belief that the immediate occupation of the Brazilian landmass—particularly of the Amazon area—is a necessity for the maintenance of Brazilian territorial integrity and national security.

There are no formal nongovernmental groups assisting the security forces. Perhaps an ominous trend, however, is to be found in the solicitation of funds from Brazilian and foreign businessmen by the commander of the Second Army to create a "shock force" within the Sao Paulo DEOPS. This unit was established in June 1972 with the mission of patrolling the city, in unmarked cars, in search of known criminals, who would be forced to resist and then be killed. Security officials had often complained that criminals who were apprehended frequently were given light sentences and soon were back on the streets to commit new crimes. The "shock force" would give special attention to the locations of the businesses of the unit's sponsors, some of whom had suffered serious losses from robberies.

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Chronology (u/ou)

1500

April

Portuguese, under command of Pedro Alvares Cabral, reach coastal areas of Brazil.

1808

Pushed out by Napoleonic invasion, prince regent Dom Joao moves seat of Portuguese Empire to Rio de Janeiro.

1822

September

Prince regent Dom Pedro proclaims Brazilian independence in defiance of Portuguese parliament's desire to restore colonial status.

December

Dom Pedro I is crowned Emperor of Brazil.

1823-24

Portuguese garrisons are forced to return to Europe, and Brazilian independence is gradually consolidated; United States is first nation to recognize new government.

1823-28

Wars with Argentina result in loss of territory which is present-day Uruguay.

1831-40

Dom Pedro, at odds with parliament, abdicates in favor of 5-year old son. Period of regency is marked by civil distress. Parliament brings Dom Pedro II to throne at age 14.

1864-70

Brazil joins Argentina and Uruguay in war against Paraguay; annexes territory north of Rio Apa.

1888

Although slave trade had been abolished in 1831, "Golden Law" finally ends slavery by decreeing complete emancipation without compensation to owners.

1889

November

Revolt of part of army brings about collapse of Empire; Dom Pedro formally abdicates and is banished with family to Europe; Brazil is declared a Republic.

1930

November

Vargas seizes power after a revolt; as provisional president, sets in motion consolidation of central power, and economic and social change.

1934

July

Constituent Assembly drafts new Constitution and elects Vargas President.

1937

November

Calling off pending election, Vargas sets aside 1934 Constitution and substitutes New State (*Estado Novo*) which allows him to rule by decree.

1942

August

Brazil declares war on Germany and Italy, collaborates with the United States in hemisphere defense, and sends troops and combat aircraft to Europe—the only South American nation to do so.

1945

October

Vargas is forced to resign by group of army officers; Chief Justice heads interim government.

December

Gen. Eurico Gaspar Dutra is elected President by large majority of popular vote.

1946

September

New Constitution is promulgated after 6-month constitutional convention; multiparty system which had been in operation since Vargas overthrow is confirmed.

1947

May

Communist Party is outlawed as undemocratic, foreign-based organization.

October

Brazil breaks relations with the U.S.S.R.

1951

January

Vargas is again inaugurated President after substantial victory in October 1950 elections.

1954

August

Vargas' henchmen murder air force officer in attempted assassination of opposition newspaper editor Carlos Lacerda; investigation of corruption by the military, Vargas commits suicide before investigation is completed. Vice President succeeds to Vargas' term.

1956

January

Josefina Kubitschek is inaugurated President, Joao Goulart Vice President.

1960

April

Capital is moved to Brasilia.

1961**January**

Jaio Quadros is inaugurated President, Joao Goulart Vice President.

August-September

Quadros resigns, blaming domestic and foreign pressures; succession of proleftist Goulart is opposed by many within military. Compromise by Congress permits Goulart to take office but Constitution is amended to introduce parliamentary government and President is stripped of important powers.

November

Relations with the U.S.S.R. restored.

1963**January**

Goulart-engineered plebiscite restores presidential system and full power to Goulart.

1964**March-April**

Goulart is ousted by military-civilian coalition led by Gen. Humberto Castello Branco, due to conviction that Goulart, who had Communist and other ultraleftist supporters, was drifting toward economic catastrophe and dictatorship, possibly under Communist domination. Supreme Revolutionary Command issues Institutional Act: executive is given extraordinary powers, certain civil rights are suspended, and many politicians and military personnel are purged. Castello Branco, elected by Congress to serve out Goulart's term, retires from army and takes office on 15 April.

May

Diplomatic relations with Cuba are broken over Cuban support of Brazilian insurgents.

1965**April**

Brazil contributes forces to Inter-American Peace Force in Dominican Republic crisis.

October

Institutional Act Number Two abolishes all political parties, lays basis for reorganizing political system around pro-government ARENA and opposition MDB.

1966**September**

Progovernment candidates win all contested gubernatorial elections.

October

Retired Army Marshal Arthur da Costa e Silva is elected President by Congress.

November

ARENA party maintains its majorities in congressional elections.

1967**January**

Government promulgates new Constitution incorporating Institutional Acts of Castello Branco administration.

March

President Costa e Silva decrees sweeping National Security Law, which authorizes trial by military courts for accused subversives.

1968**March-July**

Large-scale student demonstrations plague major cities, underscoring popular dissatisfaction with government.

May

Some 68 municipalities are declared "of interest to national security," thereby losing their right to elect municipal officials.

October

Renewed student demonstrations, urban terrorism increase pressure on government from military rightwing for corrective action.

December

Congressional refusal to permit trial of opposition deputy provokes authoritarian reaction. President issues Institutional Act Number Five, giving him dictatorial powers; Congress is dismissed; many opponents of regime are arrested and deprived of political rights, habeas corpus and many other civil rights are suspended.

1969**January-August**

Purges continue at national and state levels; six more Institutional Acts restrict role of judiciary, suspend elections, and increase punitive powers of state. Urban terrorism increases.

August

Costa e Silva has stroke; triumvirate of military ministers takes power in his name.

September

U.S. Ambassador Elbrick is kidnapped by terrorists who negotiate release of 15 Brazilian political prisoners.

October

Military declare vacancy in office of President and Vice President; choose Gen. Emilio Garrastazu Médici and retired Admiral Hamann Rademaker Grunewald to fill positions; purged Congress is convoked to ratify military's choice; both take office on 30 October.

November

Security offensive against terrorists is accelerated; information gained by roundup of ALN activists leads to slaying of leader Carlos Marighella.

1970

Despite dramatic abductions of international officials (March: Japanese consul general; June: West German ambassador; December: Swiss ambassador), terrorist activities decline in face of harsh security measures (PCBR leader Mario Alves de Souza Viera is killed in January; Joaquim Camara Ferreira, successor to Marighella in ALN, in October). Excesses, however, mainly use of torture, bring government under considerable pressure from church activists and prelates, international criticism.

March

Medici issues decree extending territorial waters claim from 12 to 200 miles, including land, sea, and air space.

October–November

ARENA party triumphs in congressional and gubernatorial elections.

1971

April

Medici launches Trans-Amazon Highway project.

June

Navy starts enforcing ban on foreign fishing in 200-mile zone.

September

VPR terrorist leader Carlos Lamarca is killed by police.

December

Medici makes official visit to Washington.

1972

April–May

Medici sends Congress proposal to hold indirect gubernatorial elections in 1974; Congress approves proposal as constitutional amendment.

1973

June

President Medici announces he favors retired Gen. Ernesto Geisel to succeed him in March 1974.

Glossary (u/ou)

ABBREVIATION	PORTUGUESE	ENGLISH
A-2.....	<i>Segunda Seccao do Estado Maior da Forca Aerea</i>	Second Section (of Air Force General Staff)
ALN.....	<i>Acao Libertadora Nacional</i>	National Liberating Action
AP.....	<i>Acao Popular</i>	Popular Action
APML.....	<i>Acao Popular Marxista-Leninista</i>	Marxist-Leninist Popular Action
ARENA.....	<i>Alianca Renovadora Nacional</i>	National Renewal Alliance
CCC.....	<i>Comando Caca Comunistas</i>	Communist Hunters Command
CENIMAR....	<i>Centro de Informacoes da Marinha</i>	Naval Intelligence Center
CGT.....	<i>Comando Geral dos Trabalhadores</i>	General Workers Command
CIE.....	<i>Centro de Informacoes do Exercito</i>	Army Intelligence Center
CISA.....	<i>Centro de Informacoes e Seguranca Aeronautica</i>	Air Force Intelligence and Security Center
CNBB.....	<i>Confederacao Nacional de Bispos Brasileiros</i>	National Council of Brazilian Bishops
CNC.....	<i>Confederacao Nacional de Comercio</i>	National Confederation of Commerce
CNI.....	<i>Confederacao Nacional das Industrias</i>	National Confederation of Industries
CODI.....	<i>Centro de Operacoes de Defesa Interna</i>	Internal Defense Operational Command
CONTAG.....	<i>Confederacao Nacional de Trabalhadores na Agricultura</i>	National Confederation of Agricultural Workers
CSN.....	<i>Conselho de Seguranca Nacional</i>	National Security Council
DEOPS.....	<i>Departamento Estadual de Ordem Politica Social</i>	State Division of Political and Social Order
DFSP.....	<i>Departamento Federal de Seguranca</i>	Federal Department of Public Security
DOI.....	<i>Divisao de Operacoes Internas</i>	Division of Internal Operations
DOPS.....	<i>Departamento de Ordem Politica Social</i>	Division of Political and Social Order (Federal Police)
DPF.....	<i>Departamento de Policia Federal</i>	Federal Police Department
ESG.....	<i>Escola Superior de Guerra</i>	Superior War School
ESNI.....	<i>Escola Nacional de Informacoes</i>	National Intelligence School
FBI.....	<i>Frente Brasilia de Informacoes</i>	Brazilian Information Front

SECRET

G-2.....	<i>Segunda Seccao do Estado Maior do Exercito</i>	Second Section (of Army General Staff)
INCRA.....	<i>Instituto Nacional de Colonizacao e de Reforma Agraria</i>	National Institute of Land Settlement and Agrarian Reform
IPM.....	<i>Inquerito Policio Militar</i>	Police-Military Inquiry
M-20.....	<i>Sub-chefia de Informacoes</i>	Sub-Command for Intelligence
MAC.....	<i>Movimento Anti-Comunista</i>	Anti-Communist Movement
MDB.....	<i>Movimento Democratico Brasileiro</i>	Brazilian Democratic Movement
MOLIPO.....	<i>Movimento de Libertacao Popular</i>	Popular Liberation Movement
MR-8.....	<i>Movimento Revolucionario 8 Outubro</i>	8 October Revolutionary Movement
MRT.....	<i>Movimento Revolucionario Tiradentes</i>	Tiradentes Revolutionary Movement
PCB.....	<i>Partido Comunista Brasileiro</i>	Brazilian Communist Party
PCBR.....	<i>Partido Comunista Brasileiro Revolucionario</i>	Revolutionary Brazilian Communist Party
PCdoB.....	<i>Partido Comunista do Brasil</i>	Communist Party of Brazil
PDC.....	<i>Partido Democrita Crista</i>	Christian Democratic Party
PETROBRAS	<i>Petroleo Brasileiro</i>	Brazilian Petroleum Corporation
POC.....	<i>Partido Operario Comunista</i>	Workers' Communist Party
POLOP.....	<i>Organizacao Revolucionaria Marzista de Politica Operaria</i>	Revolutionary Organization of Marxist Political Workers
POR-T.....	<i>Partido Operario Revolucionario-Trotskyista</i>	Trotskyite Workers Revolutionary Party
PROTERRA..	<i>Programa de Redistribuicao de Terras e de Estimulo a Agroindustria do Norte e do Nordeste</i>	Program of Land Redistribution and Encouragement to Agroindustries in the Northeast and North
PSB.....	<i>Partido Socialista Brasileiro</i>	Brazilian Socialist Party
PSD.....	<i>Partido Social Democratico</i>	Social Democratic Party
PSP.....	<i>Partido Social Progressista</i>	Social Progressive Party
PTB.....	<i>Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro</i>	Brazilian Labor Party
SEPRO.....	<i>Servico de Propaganda</i>	Propaganda Service
SNI.....	<i>Servico Nacional de Informacoes</i>	National Intelligence Service
TFP.....	<i>Sociedade Brasileira de Defesa da Tradicao, Familia, e Propiedade</i>	Brazilian Society for the Preservation of Tradition, the Family, and Private Property
UDN.....	<i>Uniao Democratica Nacional</i>	National Democratic Union
UNE.....	<i>Uniao Nacional de Estudantes</i>	National Students Union
VAR-P.....	<i>Vanguarda Armada Revolucionaria-Palmares</i>	Revolutionary Armed Vanguard-Palmares
VPR.....	<i>Vanguarda Popular Revolucionaria</i>	Popular Revolutionary Vanguard

Places and features referred to in this chapter (u/ou)

	COORDINATES		
	° 'S.	° 'W.	
Amazon Basin (drainage basin).....	2 30	60 00	
Amazon (stream).....	0 10	49 00	
Belém.....	1 27	48 29	
Belo Horizonte.....	19 55	43 56	
Brasília.....	15 47	47 55	
Cuiabá.....	15 35	56 05	
Diamantina.....	18 15	43 36	
Manaus.....	3 08	60 01	
Montevideo, Uruguay.....	34 53	56 11	
Natal.....	5 47	35 13	
Olinda.....	8 01	34 51	
Osasco (rr sta).....	23 32	46 46	
Recife.....	8 03	34 54	
Ribeira.....	24 40	49 01	
Rio de Janeiro.....	22 54	43 14	
Santarém.....	3 43	45 00	
Santiago, Chile.....	33 27	70 40	
São Paulo.....	23 32	46 37	

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM