

~~TOP SECRET~~

NOV 2 1951

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** DEPUTY DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
**THROUGH:** Deputy Director, (Plans)  
**SUBJECT:** CIA Substantive Proposals to Task Panel A, PSB

1. The CIA representative to Task Panel A, PSB, [redacted] has been requested to submit substantive proposals prescribing psychological action "incident to a ceasefire in Korea and prior to political negotiations on Korean issues."

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2. Attachment A includes excerpts of the Panel working paper which embodies preliminary proposals for psychological operations pertinent to the problem. [redacted] proposals are tabbed to show the extent of CIA participation and coordination. These proposals have been coordinated with the appropriate offices within OPC.

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3. It is requested that you authorize [redacted] to submit to Task Panel A the general objectives and proposed operations involving CIA which are listed in Attachment A.

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[redacted]

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(b)(6)

*for*

**KILBOURNE JOHNSTON**  
Assistant Director for  
Policy Coordination

AUTHORIZATION RECOMMENDED: October 2, 1951

Attachment:

A. Excerpts of Task Panel A Working Paper s/ Frank G. Wisner

FRANK G. WISNER

Deputy Director (Plans)

cc: DD(P)

AUTHORIZATION APPROVED: October 2, 1951

*[Signature]*

Deputy Director, Central Intelligence

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ATTACHMENT A

Excerpts from Task Panel A Working Paper Considering "Psychological Action Incident to a Cease Fire in Korea and Prior to Political Negotiations on Korean Issues."

SECTION IV

SPECIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL OBJECTIVES

(GIA State Defense)

1. To Republic of Korea -- encouragement of popular confidence

in:

a. The political future of the Republic of Korea.

b. Republic of Korea military achievements and

increasing military capabilities.

c. Prospect of sustained UN (U.S.) support.

d. Prospect of peaceful and mutually beneficial

relations with a re-strengthened Japan.

(GIA State Defense)

2. To UN allies -- disposition to support:

a. U.S. positions regarding:

(1) Formosa

(2) Chinese representation in UN

(3) Limitation of political talks to

strictly Korean issues.

b. UN effort in Korea for an indeterminate period

and in augmented degree if necessary.

GIA State Defense)

3. To world in general -- understanding of:

a. U.S. position in Korea and other Far Eastern

issues as:

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(1) Based upon desire for peace in a pattern of national responsibility and without surrender to Soviet domination.

(2) Representing the principles of the UN and the interests of all free nations rather than the particular interests of the U.S.

b. The Communist purpose in Korea and the Far East as:

(1) The subjugation of Asian Nations to the Soviet Union.

(2) A challenge to the security and independence of all states.



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SECTION V

OPERATIONS APPLICABLE TO THE PROBLEM

A. IN PROGRESS

1. Routine overt and covert psychological operations by the responsible departments and agencies.

B. TO BE SOUGHT BY PSB FOR INITIATION AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE AND BEFORE A CEASE FIRE.

1. Pursuit by appropriate departments and agencies of special psychological objectives in SECTION IV above.

- 2. (State task)
- 3. (State, Defense task)
- 4. (Defense task)

(CIA, Defense)

5. Psychological preparation of UN-held prisoners of war so as to serve U.S. psychological objectives after their return to Communist jurisdiction in exchanges pursuant to a cease fire.

(State, CIA)

6. Maximised attention in ROK on prospects of peaceful and secure relationship with Japan:

- a. Through emphasis of mutual interdependence as pattern of security arrangements contemplated by U.S.
- b. Encouragement of private Japanese assistance to South Koreans.

C. TO BE SOUGHT BY PSB FOR EXECUTION IN SEQUEL TO CEASE FIRE.



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Defense, State

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2. Maximum psychological attention to capabilities of forces available for support of UN in Korea, including "fantastic weapons" propaganda.

3. (State, Defense task)

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