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This emphasis on the collection of tactical information with its exposure of agents meant that OSO operations and activities in Korea did not fulfill long-range requirements. ^{59/}

[redacted] was a major OSO project originated at the direction of the military theatre commander, which supported the Army by gathering tactical information. Koreans were recruited and dispatched via sea landings on the east coast of Korea north of the 38th Parallel. A number of the [redacted] agents were later captured by North Korean security forces. ^{60/}

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A special [redacted] mission was organized in March 1951 to determine the type and virulence of a reported epidemic in North Korea, which the latter was attributing to germ warfare. Brigadier General Crawford Sams of the FEC Public Health unit was infiltrated behind enemy lines. General Sams was put ashore by whaleboat and raft south of Wonsan. This mission was more dangerous than usual because the Wonsan area was on the alert, having detected lights at sea. The mission was successful and the disease was identified as hemorrhagic smallpox. Both Sams and

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the Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE) were impressed with the speed and efficiency of the CIA operation and commended [] personnel engaged in the mission. 61/ (b)(1)
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OSO (FRU/FEC) personnel in Pusan also concentrated on forming and reactivating agent networks during the evacuation of Seoul. [] radio personnel, after training [] were dispatched to Pusan to serve as communication links with existing [] [] nets in Seoul and Pyongyang. Efforts to contact stay-behinds in the North Korean areas continued. Line-crossers were also used extensively in the gathering of tactical information on enemy forces in the battle areas. [] and [] agent personnel were used in the collection of this material. 62/ (b)(3)
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The UN offensive in Korea to the 38th Parallel lessened the urgency for stay-behind networks for activities north of the Parallel. A [] interrogation team was organized in Pusan to interrogate prisoners and refugees. (b)(3)

In late 1951 the field concentrated on trying to eliminate peripheral activity and on developing

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position on the basis of his loyalty to Rhee and his assistance in establishing the Liberal Party.*

An indication of the volume of reporting from Korea during 1951 was reflected in statistics which showed that from 1 November 1950 to 31 October 1951, [] reports were disseminated []. Of that number, [] were considered of interest to the military command. Of these, 50 percent [] dealt with military or tactical information, 30 percent [] with North Korean political information, 15 percent [] with economic intelligence, and 5 percent [] with biographic data. The reports not disseminated to the command dealt with ROK politics, CE information, or subjects in which the military command was not interested. ^{65/}

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H. OPC Objectives and Activities

Arrangements for OPC operations in FEC were not made until the late spring of 1950 and consequently OPC was not operational in Korea at the outbreak of the conflict. The mission of OPC, which was established by the NSC in NSC 10/2 (later 5412/2), was to

* For further details on [] see Attachment A-4.

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plan and execute special covert operations such as political, economic, psychological, and guerrilla warfare. Unlike OSO, OPC was not an intelligence-gathering group. In theory OPC also did not formulate policy but implemented the policies determined by the NSC as interpreted by the Department of State and the Department of Defense and was under the guidance and instructions of these two departments. ^{66/}

The OPC base of operation

[Redacted]

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was a field head-

quarters for Korean and other Far Eastern operations.

[Redacted]

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The outbreak of the war in Korea imposed on CIA broad responsibilities in the covert field. Great pressure was exerted by the military services to provide covert support to the tactical situation through the provision of agent assets for guerrilla warfare and evasion and escape. There was also pressure on CIA to establish long-range assets in North

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OPC plans to use Han's assets in the Wonsan area for staybehind guerrilla warfare. Later these assets were used in [redacted] which became the mission's first large resistance guerrilla operation.

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After the Inchon landing and other UN military successes in late September 1950, all military and diplomatic headquarters moved from Pusan to Seoul. Several OPC personnel, including [redacted] also moved to Seoul in September and in October it was decided to close Pusan and establish OPC headquarters, under

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[redacted] as acting chief, in Seoul. [redacted]

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[redacted] New staff members, including [redacted] communications specialists, arrived to bolster the OPC operation.

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In late October an OPC base of operations was also established in Pyongyang under [redacted]

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[redacted] who concentrated on a ground approach to liberate US prisoners of war (POW's). [redacted] and

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
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city only one day before it was abandoned.

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on staybehind programs with emphasis on support of organized resistance from which pilot programs of E&E, sabotage, and guerrilla warfare could be developed. Stress was placed, therefore, on developing an E&E program based on general resistance groups which it was believed would have greater ability to receive local support and to stay behind the lines indefinitely. Approximately was requested in September 1951 for arms and equipment to supply CIA-sponsored Korean guerrillas. ^{80/}

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According to an agreement with EUSAK G-3 (McGee), North Korea was divided in 1951 by a north-south line through the center with guerrilla responsibility in the western half falling to EUSAK G-3, while the eastern half was assigned to CIA (OPC). ^{81/} From January 1951 to April 1952 CIA representatives briefed EUSAK G-3 controlled guerrilla forces operating off North Korea's west coast in E&E requirements and techniques. One OPC representative during the summer of 1951 was assigned to the island of Paengyong-do as an advisor on E&E techniques. In addition to the guerrilla units also collected agents and trained them in the establishment of E&E nets. ^{82/}

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Among the claimed accomplishments of this guerrilla program were the destruction of four bridges, five factories, a railroad station, a warehouse, and a transformer station. At least 600 casualties were inflicted on the enemy. ^{86/}

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

The 8086 AU of the G-3 Miscellaneous Group was set up to encourage, direct, and control guerrilla activity in the coastal regions of western North Korea.

[Redacted]

five intelligence services, G-2, G-3, Air Force, ROK/ONI and CIA, engaged in conducting covert activities without any coordination.

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[Redacted]

four other services and principally the 8086 AU under McGee had created such a "hodge-podge" of insecure, inefficient resistance-guerrilla programs

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[Redacted]

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that existing assets could not be used for secure post-ceasefire activities. Some agents were even being used simultaneously by two or more agencies.^{87/}

A maritime support operation was developed in early 1951. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The vessels captured a number of enemy boats, together with crews, passengers, cargo, and documentation, established safehouses in the Sinuiju-Antung area, and operated as supply vessels for advance E&E bases.^{88/}

In the summer of 1951 CIA urgently needed safe infiltration routes into North Korea to supplement aerial resupply. A [REDACTED] raider team was recruited and trained by a Navy Underwater Demolition Team (UDT) specialist during July and August 1951. Between August 1951 and October 1952 this team carried out [REDACTED] amphibious reconnaissance and raider operations along the east coast of North Korea. [REDACTED] successful landings were made.*^{89/}

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J. OSO-OPC Relations

Unlike a number of other CIA stations, there is

* For additional information on maritime operations see CSHP 71, History of Maritime Activities Korea (1950-1956).

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October 1951 attended by representatives of CIA, G-2, FEC, and G-2, Eighth Army, Ridgway, CINCFE, on 28 November 1951 ordered the establishment of Covert, Clandestine and Related Activities in Korea, better known as CCRAK (later CCRAFE) Headquarters at Seoul. The purpose of CCRAK was to achieve better coordination among the various US intelligence services that were active in Korea.

The letter order published by CINCFE dated 28 November 1951, establishing CCRAK, stated that the Korea CIA mission (JACK) would come under the command of the commanding officer, CCRAK, for those operations in the field of NSC 10/2 activities and intelligence that were in "direct support of combat and intelligence of US Forces in Korea." The words "direct support of combat operations" were significant since CIA interpreted this to mean that long-range unilateral FI operations under NSCID/5 were the sole responsibility of CIA and excluded from CCRAK control.^{99/}

Under the general staff supervision of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, FEC, CCRAK Headquarters assumed direction of all clandestine activities of

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the Army, Navy, Air Force, and CIA in Korea in direct support of combat operations of US forces. Guerrilla operations in Korea remained a staff responsibility of the G-3, Eighth Army. Provision was made in the letter order for preserving the organizational integrity of members units "to extent required." In the case of CIA, the channel of command was to continue to proceed from the Senior Representative to the chief of the Joint Korea Mission. The Senior Representative's approval was to be required for CIA participation in any "joint task force" operations mounted by CCRAK. The chief of CCRAK was initially Colonel Washington Ives. The chief of the CIA mission, Korea, became deputy chief of CCRAK, in addition to his CIA duties. 100/

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The formation of CCRAK was viewed by Headquarters as well as the field, as a continuation of the struggle by G-2, FEC, to control CIA activities in the area in such a manner as to preclude the performance of clandestine tasks clearly within the jurisdiction of CIA. Station officers believed there was no reason for the existence of CCRAK in the first place and that G-2's authority to coordinate, which it possessed

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was also initiated. This resulted in better coordination of station activities. ^{109/}

In March 1952 the Korea Mission (JACK) had moved its main headquarters to the Traymore Hotel in Seoul. The magnitude and complexity of the CIA installations in Korea in October 1952 were reflected in the total physical plant which included four major installations; Joint Korea Mission at Seoul (JACK) and the Seoul, Incheon, and Pusan bases, plus [] training or launching or reception points, offices or safehouses, [] vessels of varying sizes and a staff of [] indigenous personnel. This staff of indigenous employees later rose in number to approximately [] by July 1953. In October 1952 there were [] Americans with an administrative and housekeeping staff of [] Koreans assigned to the Joint Korea Mission (JACK). ^{110/} In addition to the operations sections, JACK had complete support facilities, including sections for service and supply, registry, security, personnel, reports and requirements, medical, finance, and mess and billeting.

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The Seoul Operating Base, which existed prior to the move of the Joint Korea Mission to Seoul, played a more restricted role after the transfer. This base

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had a staff of [] Americans and [] Koreans. It ran
 Projects []
 [] . * The cover designation of the Seoul Base was changed in May 1952 to Far East Command Department of the Army Research Unit (FE/DARU) from the Department of the Army Liaison Detachment (DALD).

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Inchon Base, developed primarily to provide assistance and support to the E&E program for the west coast of Korea, was located nine miles southeast of
 Inchon []

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[]
 [] This base, which had a

staff of [] Americans, was concerned particularly with the [] and [] projects. ** The goal of these [] projects was to contact and recruit agents in North Korea for the purpose of establishing E&E nets for downed UN airmen.

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The Pusan Base, formerly headquarters for the

* These projects are described in detail in CSHP 339, Infiltration and Resupply of Agents in North Korea (1952-1953).

** These E&E projects are described in detail in CSHP 339, Infiltration and Resupply of Agents in North Korea (1952-1953).

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into North Korea were low level and possessed only a minimum of resistance training superimposed on a background of guerrilla warfare for which they were more suited and inclined.

During 1952 and 1953 approximately 20 percent of the teams launched into North Korea failed to make any report whatsoever. At the end of 1952, [] radio-contact teams were operating in North Korea, [] of which were holdovers from 1951. After the July 1953 Armistice only [] agent radios were contacted. As of 1 January 1954 this number had diminished to [] and all were believed to be enemy controlled. 144/

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[] Chief, Intelligence Branch, stated in September 1952 that the mission's E&E teams had almost no chance of success, the cover was almost uniformly bad, the mission was vague and indefinite, the problem of communication had not been properly solved, the agents were going in with articles of clothing and equipment which would blow them, and they did not understand the nature of resistance work. He predicted that they would be captured in a very short time and that the majority of them would be doubled. 145/

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All of the resistance programs also suffered, according to [] because of the inability of the Korea Mission to get documents reproduced by the TSS unit []. The severe North Korean winter also limited many of the unconventional warfare operations, particularly those of OPC to those few months with a favorable moon phase, and in the case of air or sea infiltrations to favorable climate conditions. The necessity to communicate through interpreters also affected almost every aspect of recruitment, training, planning and control for unconventional warfare projects.

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The failure to employ in Korea the extensive experience gained in guerrilla warfare during World War II was reflected particularly in the inadequate air support for the Korea Mission during the war. It is estimated that approximately [] agents were deployed into North Korea by air from 1951 through 1952. At times the CIA agent was only one of several drops to be made during an Air Force flight, which also made flare and leaflet drops, thus compromising the security of the agent. The Air Force provided one flight, called B-flight, to support various intelligence activities.

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Crew members, however, were never taught the finer techniques of clandestine air support. Little stress was placed on accuracy of altitudes, speeds, and dropping. The main aim was to get in and out of North Korea regardless of the quality of service rendered.

The main technique was to penetrate during the moon phase in clear weather and make drops on a light pattern. Since the same technique was used during every moon phase, a defense of hill watches was set up, and numerous fires in various type patterns would appear on the ground whenever a plane flew overhead. As a result, air crews were dropping supplies and even personnel without any certainty that they were over the right drop pattern and not a trap. Many tons of rice and other items as well as personnel were dropped into North Korea from 25 June to 27 July 1953. ^{156/}

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T. Criticism of Coverage of South and North Korea (1952)

The Rhee government increasingly became a one-man show operated along personal dictatorial lines. Rhee's position had strengthened considerably, partly

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information which would please their American customers. All too often the case officer dealt with the principal agent and accepted the operational data without further investigation. There was, for example, "no shred of information supporting the existence of [redacted] so-called strategic penetrations, "which included purported high-level North Korean officials and military officers. ^{187/} [redacted] stated further that [redacted] intelligence was not only fallacious, but his trading with the enemy was an immense financial benefit to them since his American intelligence connections served to facilitate widespread traffic in narcotics amounting in value probably to many millions of dollars. ^{188/}

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CIC's knowledge of [redacted] commercial activities was so extensive, according to [redacted] that the former CIC commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Barrows, would not allow any cooperation by his organization with the Korea Mission. Only with his departure was it possible to develop a cooperative relationship with CIC. ^{189/}

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[redacted] PM Chief in Korea from July 1952 to August 1953, has also stated that

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the large majority of the intelligence

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gathered in 1952 and 1953 through infiltration and exfiltration operations was fabrication or controlled by the North Korean and Chinese Communist Forces security services. The remaining intelligence not so exposed was low level by CIA standards of that period. 190/

[redacted] also stated that although the Agency had the responsibility for clandestine operations in support of E&E of downed UN airmen and POW's from North Korean territory, no airman or POW was known to have been assisted by CIA-sponsored clandestine mechanisms. (b)(3)

[redacted] chief of the Korea Branch (FE/I) in Headquarters, expressed similar views in a January 1954 report: (b)(3)

staff officers ... agree emphatically that E&E operations as conducted by CIA in Korea were not only ineffective but probably morally reprehensible in that the number of lives lost and the amount of time and treasure expended was enormously disproportionate to attainments therefrom. 191/

In addition, insofar as the Korean experience was illustrative, special mission groups, special action teams, and caching missions also proved ineffective and wasteful both of personnel and funds. 192/ One of the greatest deficiencies in the Korea Mission's program, according to [redacted] was to attempt to convert (b)(3)

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guerrilla warfare assets into resistance assets.

"The lesson learned was not to use burned assets whatever the previous investment in them."^{193/}

The Agency had spent, over a 4-year period, some [] on unconventional warfare activities in Korea under the umbrella of Project [] A1- though in the early stages of the Korean War some operational successes resulted from activities carried on under this project, in the later stages of the war, and particularly after the battlefront solidified and enemy security increased, there was little appreciable effectiveness from the substantial sums spent and the numerous Koreans sacrificed in what proved to be a basically futile attempt to set up resistance cells and E&E capabilities in North Korea. Consequently, nearly all of the activities covered by [] were terminated, with only a few transferred to formalized individual projects, and on 30 June 1955 Project [] [] was terminated.^{194/}

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To cite a few of the failures in subprojects of [] conducted resistance activities,

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*For additional information see CSHP 339.

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