



**Forging an Intelligence Partnership:
CIA and the Origins of the BND,
1949-56**

**Part I: CIA's Contemporary Information
on the Gehlen Organization**

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
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Senior Representative for Germany

31 July 1951

Chief of Station, Karlsruhe *clmc*

ZIPPER

Briefing for [REDACTED]

Reference: MGKA-29951

1. Transmitted herewith are brief summaries of ZIPPER operations and activities, plus POB activities pertaining to ZIPPER.

2. A number of the attachments list type activities rather than operations and do not necessarily conform to the sample outline shown in reference. However, due to the unique function and operational responsibility of POB supporting and subsidizing ZIPPER, it is our opinion that such brief summaries will serve to elucidate POB activities.

3. The following activities and operations are attached:

- a. The Organization of ZIPPER
- b. The Future GIS
- c. ZIPPER Connections to Remilitarization
- d. A ZIPPER Connection to Western IS
- e. Post-Hostilities Program
- f. [REDACTED]
- g. ZIPPER Communications
- h. POB Finance Functions to ZIPPER
- i. Rose Activities
- j. "NEPTUN" - ZIPPER Navy (431 Section)
- k. ZIPPER 331
- ✓ l. JUPITER - ZIPPER Sovzone OB Collection
- m. ZIPPER Satellite Activities
- n. USAGE
- o. ZIPPER General Agency A (GV A)
- p. ZIPPER - U/M
- q. ZIPPER Operation "Garbage"
- r. Project 117
- s. Project 73
- t. Project 124
- ✓ u. Operation CARTILAGE
- v. The Syrian Case
- w. CI/GE and Political Reports
- x. [REDACTED]
- y. WIREBEL, Zipper D/A-CI Operation

AM/EO	FI	
EB	EST	E/G
ABSTRACT	*	INDEX

Referred

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- e. "HOFFMANSTHAL", Zipper D/A Operation
- ✓ aa. WG Ruhr
- bb. [REDACTED]
- cc. "Organisation Uebergangsanweisung"
- dd. Operation KUFSTEIN
- ee. ADLER, D/A Operation
- ✓ ff. [REDACTED]
- gg. [REDACTED]

Distribution:

SRFG - 2 w/1 cy attach
~~FBN~~ - 1 w/1 cy attach
CCS - 1 w/1 cy attach
POB - 2 w/1 cy attach

NOTE: For security reasons, we are not forwarding all of the above listed briefings with this memo. Attached hereto are the summaries listed (a, b, c, d, f, h and i). The remainder will be forwarded in separate pouches.

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THE ORGANIZATION OF ZIPPER

1. ZIPPER Headquarters Organization: (Attachment #1)

ZIPPER Headquarters is located in the Pullach Compound. Headquarters staff strength is given as approximately 550. This figure does not include German maintenance and service personnel working in the Compound who are employed from Munich Military Post. It does include field personnel of the 34 and 36 Groups.

Attachment #1 is a schematic diagram of the ZIPPER Headquarters Organization. A solid line indicates direct supervision/command; a dotted line indicates advisory/coordination function. The cover names of the leading personnel together with a brief outline of the highlights of their careers follows:

30. German Chief of ZIPPER, Dr. SCHNEIDER, General Staff Corps

Born 4 March 1905 in Erfurt. Commissioned 2nd. Lt. December 1923. War Academy Berlin, 1933-35. First General Staff Officer, 10th, Fortifications, 1937-38 Aide to Chief of German General Staff. Chief of Eastern Military Intelligence (Freyde Heere Ost) 1942-44. Promoted to Brig. General December 1944. Dismissed by special order of Hitler 9 April 1945. Not a Party member.

30a. Advisor on Administrative and Organizational Matters, Mr. WENDT, General Staff Corps

Born 17 August 1912 in Berlin-Schoenberg. Entered the German Army 1930. Commissioned 2nd. Lt. 1933. From 1933 to WWII, various staff positions with artillery units. During WWII became Chief of the Organization Department of the General Staff. Not a Party member.

30b. Advisor on Intelligence Matters, Mr. WOLLMANN, General Staff Corps

Born 18 January 1897 in Munich. Entered German Army 1916. Commissioned 2nd. Lt. 1917. During WWII, Chief of Staff of a German Army Group. At the end of the War, Deputy Chief of Staff of the German Armed Forces High Command (OKW), with rank of Lt. General. Not a Party member.

30c. Administrative Assistant, Mr. LANGENDORF

Born 21 June 1903 in Berlin. Entered the German Army 1927. During WWII attained the rank of Colonel. Not a Party member.

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✓ 30d. Trouble Shooter, Mr. KOERNIG, General Staff Corps

Born 17 December 1894 at Huenern, Prussia. Entered the German Army 1914. Commissioned 2nd. Lt. 1915. Various ground force assignments, 1921-27. Russian Department of the General Staff 1927-29. Instructor at the General Staff Academy 1932-33. Senior Military Attache to Tokyo 1940-45. Promoted to Major General 1942. Under US "protective custody" in Japan 1943-47. Undertook unspecified assignments for General Killoughby. Returned to Germany early 1948. Not a Party member.

✓ 32. Personnel Group, Mr. LOENE, General Staff Corps

Born 23 December 1917. During WWII became Deputy Chief of the Personnel Section of the German General Staff, attaining rank of Major. Not a Party member.

✓ 33. Organization Group, Mr. DIEHL, General Staff Corps

Born 20 July 1904 in Tilait, Prussia. Entered the Army 1924. Commissioned 1928. Attended the War Academy 1935-36. During WWII became Chief of Staff of the Rear Services High Command. Not a Party member.

✓ 34. Stay-behind Activities, Mr. HAMMER, General Staff Corps

Born 3 November 1920 in Munich. Entered the German Army in 1939. Commissioned 1941. Adjutant of an Intelligence Section of an Army Group 1944. Not a Party member.

✓ 35. Special Connections, Mr. MERKER

Born 31 July 1898 in Hanover. Entered the German Army 1915. Assigned to General Staff 1937. Attache Section of the General Staff 1938-43. Division commander on the Russian Front 1943-45 finally becoming an Army Commander with rank of Lt. General. Not a Party member.

36. Communications, Mr. HOEBEL, General Staff Corps

Born 15 August 1907 in Ulm. Entered the German Army 1925. Commissioned 1929. Attended the War School Munich 1935. Attended War Academy Berlin 1937. During WWII various ground force staff assignments in Rumania, Crete, Russia and Italy. Nervous breakdown 1944. Not a Party member.

✓ 37. Administration and Finance Group, Dr. STAHL

Born 4 May 1910. Doctor of Philosophy in Agriculture. Worked in various German Government agriculture departments. Served in German Army 1940-45. Chief of the special train of the German Armed Forces High Command (OKr)

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38. Tactical Intelligence Group, Mr. KUEHNE, General Staff Corps

Born 21 July 1910, Oppeln, Prussia. Entered German Army 1930. Commissioned 2nd. Lt. 1933. German Armistice Commission to France 1940-41. Various staff assignments including section chief in Eastern Military Intelligence 1942-45. Not a Party member.

39. Strategic Intelligence Group, Mr. SCHACK

Born 6 July 1887 in New Ulm. Following service in Germany Army WWII, Chief of the Afghanistan General Staff Academy. Wide range of experience in the Middle East. Early in WWII, Chief of the Abwehr office in Athens in charge of Abwehr operations in the Middle East. Later moved to Sofia, where continued to conduct operations against the Allies in the Balkans and the Middle East. Not a Party member.

40. CI/CE Group, Dr. KLAUSNER

Born 17 February 1914, Bielitz, Austria. Doctor of Philosophy from University of Vienna. Curator for Army Museum in Vienna, 1934-37. Entered Austrian Army 1937. German Army 1938. Assigned to the Abwehr (CI/CE) 1942. Various assignments in the USSR to the end of WWII. Party member.

41. Economic Cover, Mr. GERLACH, General Staff Corps

Born 1 December 1887, Berlin. German Army WWI. Publishing and printing business 1920-40. Reentered German Army 1943, became Chief of Staff of an Army Corps with rank of Colonel. Not a Party member.

42. Legal Advisor, Mr. WEGNER

Born 10 August 1909, Berlin. Lawyer 1932-37. Entered German Army 1937. Became Chief of Administration of General Staff Headquarters with rank of Lt. Colonel. Party member.

45. Reports/Evaluation Group, Dr. HORN, General Staff Corps

Born 4 August 1893, Holzwinden/Weser. Entered German Army 1915. Commissioned 1916. Various ground force assignments 1920-27. General Staff training program 1927-30. Became General Staff Corps member 1932. Ground force assignments 1930-37. Assigned to Plans and Operations of German Army High Command (OKH). Became Chief Plans and Operations, OKH with rank of Major General. On 20 July 1944 arrested for participation in the Hitler Plot. Released in ten weeks for lack of evidence. Put on inactive status and kept under surveillance. In addition to ZIPPER duties, presently a member of the German delegation at the Petersburg remilitarization talks. Not a Party member.

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131. Schools and Training, Mr. KORNBERG

Born 15 December 1891, Wablen, Schlesien, Occupation, art critic, Abwehr officer (Major) with experience in Poland, France, Russia 1939-45. Not a Party member.

231. Interrogation Project, Mr. KRAMER

331. Documentation Group, Mr. SALSBERG

Born 7 May 1912, St. Petersburg, USSR. Lived in USSR before WWII. In Siberia for one year as political prisoner. Drafted into Red Army. Deserted to the German Army. Became Deputy Chief of the Documents Section of Eastern Intelligence (WALLY I). Occupation: artist, painter. Not a Party member.

431. Naval Group, Mr. DOERING

Professional German Navy officer. Last rank, Captain. Important assignments in Navy weapon development programs. Not a Party member.

631. Screening Center, Mr. SUHR

Abwehr officer during WWII with most of his experience on Eastern Front.

2. ZIPPER Field Organization: (Attachment #2)

In the field, the ZIPPER organization is characterized by a formal, rather rigid stratification with a military-type chain of command. The organization of a typical ZIPPER field agency is diagramed below:


ZIPPER Headquarters

General Agency

District Agencies

Sub-Agencies

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ZIPPER has six General Agencies, one independent District Agency and three so-called Project Agencies which are approximately the size of a District Agency and are operating in the Iron Curtain countries other than the Soviet Zone, Germany. A brief breakdown of ZIPPER field agencies follows:

<u>Agency</u>	<u>Location of Hqs.</u>	<u>Area of Operation</u>	<u>Staff Personnel*</u>	<u>Agent Personnel**</u>
GA "A"	Salzburg	Balkans	24	120
<i>cd/Rm</i> GA "B"	Bremen	Soviet Zone	73	139
<i>cd/Hms</i> GA "C"	Chiemsee	CSR, USSR, Poland	60	78
<i>cd/Rm</i> DA "E"	Ulm	Soviet Zone	33	67
<i>cd/Hms</i> GA "G"	Frankfurt/Main	Soviet Zone	102	336
<i>cd/Rm</i> GA "H"	Frankfurt/Main	Soviet Zone	164	195
<i>cd/Hms</i> GA "L"	Karlsruhe	CI/CE, Western Germany, Soviet Zone	73	83
<i>cd/Hms</i> PA "GS"	Holzhausen	CSR,	18	61
<i>cd/Hms</i> PA "PE"	Munich	Poland	9	41
✓ PA "RB"	Munich	USSR	2	32
TOTAL			558	1152

* Includes couriers and staff personnel on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

** Includes sources and sub-sources but not casual or one-time informants.

These figures represent the situation as of 1 May 1951 and are only rough approximations.

It might be noted that General Agency "A" is in the process of a drastic re-organization. Basically it involves the creation of two Project Agencies; one in the CI/CE field, and one running positive operations in the Balkans. Both of these agencies will be directly responsible to the appropriate ZIPPER Headquarters group.

Prepared by [REDACTED]

w/attachments.

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
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Field Agencies of:



Tactical J.S.

Strategic J.S.


C.J. / C.E.

Explanations

30 : German Chief
 A,B,C,G,H,I : General Agencies
 E : District Agency
 PE,CSW,RA : Project Agencies
~~Project~~ CV A to be dissolved in project agencies
 beginning on 1 June 1951
 CV B to be established up to 1 June 1951

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STAFF ORGANISATION



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The Future GIS

1. The ambition of ZIPPER to emerge as at least the dominant factor in a future GIS is abundantly documented. The present situation is that UFGROWTH has recognized this ambition and has instructed his lieutenant, Dr. GLOBKE, to participate with a representative of AIS in discussions relative to the "how" and the "when" of an eventual transfer of ZIPPER from American to German authority. Close cooperation already exists between ZIPPER and the VS. The principal obstacle at the moment is the bitter antagonism which exists between ZIPPER and the intelligence group in the office.
2. The situation in general can be described as satisfactory. Political obstacles remain, but they do not seem impossible of solution.
3. FOB staff officers:

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ZIPPER Connections to Remilitarization

1. ZIPPER's interest and involvement in German remilitarization is a natural outgrowth of two basic factors:

a. ZIPPER's concern that the influential people in the top level of a future German army be well disposed towards ZIPPER and sympathetic to its desire to emerge as the future GIS; and

b. the presence within the ZIPPER organization of many former officers who have a natural interest in German military affairs and some of whom will want to find births within the future German military setup, some of them outside the G-2 framework.

Thus far, ZIPPER has been fortunate in the selection by _____ of his military advisors. With the downfall of the rather anti-ZIPPER in the fall of 1950, the positions of influence on the advisory scene have been occupied exclusively by men close to ZIPPER, notably Dr. HORN and General SPEIDEL, who is a very special connection. A further favorable circumstance is the fact that General Adolf KUNTZEN, who appears slated to have the final say in personnel matters, is also a close special connection.

2. The present situation can be regarded, from the ZIPPER point of view, as satisfactory.

3. FOB staff officer: .

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ZIPPER Connection to Western IS

1. ZIPPER maintains unofficial liaison with the intelligence services of _____, and intelligence information is exchanged with _____ and _____. We receive information copies of ZIPPER's contribution to these services. It has long been a matter of policy, understood and agreed to by ZIPPER, that they will keep us informed of their connections with foreign intelligence services and of the nature of these connections. We are satisfied that ZIPPER has generally observed this commitment.

2. We have not yet agreed to the establishment of ZIPPER liaison with the British, and ZIPPER has not, to the best of our knowledge, violated this restriction, although they have consistently and over a long period of time pressed us for approval for the establishment of such liaison, either on our initiative or theirs. As a result of recent ZIPPER-UFGROWTH negotiations and as indicated by recent conversations, it seems likely that the establishment of ZIPPER-liaison may soon be deemed advisable.

3. FOB staff officers:

*extracted for
contacts with
foreign intelligence
officers*

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POST-HOSTILITIES PROGRAM

1. Definition of the Program

In general terms, the program encompasses planning for, and establishment of, an intelligence apparatus in Western Germany which will be activated upon the outbreak of hostilities and which will be controlled and serviced by a combined POB/ZIPPER staff operating from a rear base. It further involves the selection and special preparation of elements of the existing Soviet Zone operation adaptable for post-hostility operations.

2. Basic Assumptions

It is assumed that ZIPPER, while retaining its structural integrity, will be almost completely dependent upon the AIS for all types of logistical and operational support and subject to a much greater amount of direct control by the AIS than is now the case. Because of the great advantage ZIPPER holds over other foreign agencies in working with Germans, it is assumed that ZIPPER's primary mission is the collection of information in Germany. It is anticipated that this effort will expand into other German speaking areas of Central Europe. It is further assumed that ZIPPER will be integrated into the overall collection effort and intelligence planning of SHAPE. An attempt by ZIPPER to maintain close liaison with a German Government in exile is to be expected.

3. Special Considerations

Both POB and ZIPPER have agreed that the program must not be allowed to distract from, or in any way impede current operations. This is expedited by the existence of a special ZIPPER staff whose sole responsibility is the Project. The need for maximum operational security is realized by all. This is being achieved by the isolation and insulation of the project from all other current operations, by restricting the number of POB/ZIPPER staff members engaged in the Project and by stressing the need for maximum security in the recruitment and training of agent personnel. Because of the limited human and financial resources, it has been necessary to assign priorities within the Project itself. Finally, and different from most other ZIPPER activities is the true joint POB/ZIPPER nature of the Project. Thus it has been possible from the beginning of this major ZIPPER operation for POB to exert an overall influence, direction and operational control which is highly desirable, and which has been much more difficult to develop with other older ZIPPER components.

4. Phases of the Project

Following are the various phases of the Project listed roughly in the order of the priority assigned to them:

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- (1) Establishment of dormant W/T stay-behind networks in Western Germany (see also Commo Review).
- (2) Examination and analysis of current ZIPPER Soviet Zone operations for the purpose of selecting the most productive and stayable elements for post-hostilities use. Preparations for tying these portions into dormant communication channels which will be activated upon the outbreak of war.
- (3) Neutral burials of radio equipment and other supplies (see also Commo Review).
- (4) Establishment of a radio base station in OSMOSIS (see also Commo Review).
- (5) Survey of the logistical problems incidental to the operation of the rear operations base and continuation of the intelligence effort following displacement.
- (6) Procurement of maps, factory plans, charts and other technical aids for use at the rear base in the immediate post-hostilities period.
- (7) The recruitment of qualified individuals who will be given preliminary training and then evacuated in case of hostilities for later commitment on special missions or to broaden coverage.
- (8) Accumulation of selected operational assets including safe houses and letter drops and the selection of suitable air-drop and sea-landing areas in Western Germany.

POB Case Officers - Project - [REDACTED]

Commo - [REDACTED]

Operations/Security - [REDACTED]

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1. The cryptonym [REDACTED] is assigned to a headquarters approved program of orientation visits of key ZIPPER members to the United States. Originally conceived with emphasis on intelligence training and orientation of ZIPPER members by [REDACTED] training staff, shortage of training personnel and facilities modified the [REDACTED] program virtually to the status of sight-seeing visits intended to show off the physical magnitude and impressiveness, the industrial and technical efficiency, and the general democratic atmosphere of the United States. In addition, specific intelligence emphasis was to be gained by appropriate introductions of the ZIPPER members involved to key [REDACTED] personnel, by limited intelligence briefing by [REDACTED] and G-2, and by visits to specialized overt technical installations, such as the FBI, US communications facilities, etc.

2. It is felt that the headquarters budget allocation of \$43,000 will be sufficient to carry out the proposed program of five groups of about five ZIPPER members each. The last group should have completed its tour during the spring of 1952.

3. The program is being carried out in close coordination with FDN, who in turn has the complete cooperation of [REDACTED] domestic facilities and has further cleared the program with appropriate departments of the US government. The actual task of accompanying ZIPPER members while they are in the US has been assigned to members of POB staff, whose normal home leaves have been so arranged as to coincide with ZIPPER visits.

4. These tours are being carried out under the cover of HICOG orientation visits of German police officials, and no difficulties have been encountered in this respect, since such a program actually exists, and POB use of this cover is fully coordinated with HICOG. Excellent cooperation has been forthcoming from the US Consulate General in Munich in the matter of documentation.

5. The first group of ZIPPER members, recently returned, have reported their amazement at the entirely efficient manner in which the operation was carried off within the United States. Obviously all travel and accommodations reservations had been arranged entirely in advance, and the group had but to follow the scheduled itinerary. The

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group was very favorably impressed with their cordial reception and briefing by [redacted] representatives, and with the intelligence briefing accorded the group in the Pentagon. Based upon the very positive favorable reaction of the first returned group and the high anticipatory enthusiasm of the members of groups scheduled to follow, POB is certain [redacted] will prove to be an excellent AIS investment in ZIPPER (and future GIS) good will and increased pro-American feeling, the result of which is already easily discernible in ZIPPER-POB relations.

POB Staff Officer: [redacted]

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POB FINANCE FUNCTIONS TO ZIPPER

[REDACTED] POB Finance Officer, functioning in the capacity of Comptroller to the ZIPPER project is responsible for reviewing the financial policies and procedures employed internally in ZIPPER to insure adequate accounting of U.S. Government funds placed in this subsidized project. Since September 1949, two months after the date our agency assumed responsibility for this project, ZIPPER has progressed from rudimentary cash journal financial records to detail accounting, including double bookkeeping accounts down to the District Agency level.

Pay and travel regulations have been standardized throughout the organization, effective 1 July 1951, to provide permanent staff employees of ZIPPER with equal benefits consistent with those received by employees of the Federal Republic at Bonn. Although they are at minor variance with agency regulations they are acceptable for subsidy type financing.

A detailed monthly financial statement, prepared by ZIPPER and subject to spot check and audit at POB, is forwarded to headquarters for its operational value to FDM and also as documentary evidence in support of our POB accounting with headquarters for ZIPPER project funds required by the subsidy committee. The originals of these statements, together with all individual receipts, etc., remain at POB for analysis and operational study by POB case officers. It should be noted that these records have been particularly useful in analyzing ZIPPER activities in the field of "Special Connections".

The following provides a brief summary of the U.S. financial support given to the project.

A. U.S. Financial Support:

1. Agency Support - Fiscal Year 1950/51

a. \$2,300,000.00 less \$150,000.00 returned in March 1951.

2. Army Support

a. ID EUCGM

i. Approximately DM 100,000.00 annually.
This is for use in paying organization members employed in administrative jobs at Nicolaus, namely, guards.

b. Munich Military Post

i. Approximately DM 550,000.00 annually.
Used in paying salaries of *red badge employees in connection with the maintenance of Nicolaus Camp.

*Non-Zipperites; indigenous employees

Extracted from [REDACTED]

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B. Logistical Support:

1. Agency

- a. Routine administrative equipment needed for the POB staff.
- b. Limited operational Commo equipment.

2. Army

- a. 186 EUCOM vehicles, parts, etc.
- b. 420 rations until 30 June 1951.
- c. Normal supplies and equipment needed to maintain Nicolaus Post, CAPITOL, and other American controlled installations.
- d. Requisitioned Property
 - i. 80 houses and apartments outside of Nicolaus
 - ii. 65 houses and apartments in Nicolaus.
- e. Gasoline - 12,000 gallons monthly - without cost.
- f. R.T.A. - approximately 2,000 per month without cost.

C. Cost of Project

- 1. Combined costs, in terms of cash outlay, is approximately DM 1,000,000.00 monthly for normal running expenses (thru CIA).
 - a. Breakdown of Expenses
 - i. Overhead
 - Headquarters staff - 26%
 - Field Agencies - 50%
 - ii. Strategic - 6%
 - iii. Jupiter - 13% (Since Korea)
 - iv. "34" (Stay-behind - 5% \$75,000.00 Jan-June 1951)
Burial Program)
 - b. Evaluation of total Army logistical support - approximately DM 10,000,000.00 annually. (Including requisitioned property).

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C. Cost of Project continued:

2. Future Commitments

a. 1951/52 - Budget DM 14,000,000.00.

b. Special costs included in budget

i. Legalization - Cover Firm support

ii. Housing - Welfare Fund

iii. Motorization - Present ceiling allows for 35 new vehicles. We anticipate that all this cost can be borne from current fiscal year funds, thus allowing for extension of this program in the next fiscal year assuming our budget estimates are approved.

iv. Building construction - Commo (\$30,000. Base Station).

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ZIPPER COMMUNICATIONS

1. The organization (see attached chart) is composed of the following:
 - (a). Organization 136 (Agent Radio Program).
 - (b). Organization 236 (Monitoring and Intercept).
 - (c). STORCH (Staybehind Program, Radio).
2. The attachment, entitled "ZIPPER COMMUNICATION ASSETS", includes pertinent facts about each organization and program. Senior POB Cover Officer: [REDACTED].

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Staff, 36

**Leader, 36
Deputy**

36.0	36.1	36.2	36.3	36.4
Monitoring System Radio CI, Personnel Financial Admin.	Agent Radio Staff Comm Signal Eqpt. Transportation Radio Station	Telephone and Teletype Comm.	Files, Typist Translation	Cipher Factory
1 Chief	1 Chief 3 operators 1 mechanic	1 Chief 6 TTY operators 4 Telephone operators	1 Clerk	1 Chief

ORGANIZATION 136

**Leader, 136
Deputy**

136.0	136.1	136.2	136.3	136.4
Personnel E-Preparations	Signal Operation	Laboratory	Administration Photo Laboratory	Financial Administration
1 Chief	1 Chief 2 Base Sta. Chiefs 3 Instructors 15 operators 1 Typist 3 Mechanics	1 Chief Engineer 1 Engineer 4 Tech'ns.	1 Chief 1 Driver 1 Auto Mech 1 Photo Tech	1 Chief 3 House- keepers

ORGANIZATION 236

**Leader, 236
Deputy**

236.0	236.2	236.3	236.4	236.5	236a
Monitoring and Final Evaluation	Personnel E-Plans	Cipher	Admin. and Fiscal	Technical Section	Radio CI
1 Chief 2 Section Chiefs 2 Eval. Aids 13 Monitor.Ops 1 Typist 3 DF Sta.Chiefs 12 DF operators	1 Chief 1 Typist 2 Teletype operator	1 Chief 4 Clerks 1 Expert 1 Typist	1 Chief 1 Motor Pool Officer 1 Mechanic 2 Drivers 5 Household	1 Chief 1 Mechanic	1 Chief 3 operators 1 Eval. Aid 1 Admin.Pers. 1 Housekeeper

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ZIPPER COMMUNICATION ASSETS

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I. PHYSICAL INSTALLATIONS.

- 2 Agent Radio Base Stations - Organisation 136 (Chiensee and Butzbach)
- 1 Agent Radio Base Station - STORCH
- 1 Fixed Radio Station - West Berlin
- 1 Fixed Radio Station - NIKOLAUS
- 1 Monitor & Intercept Station - Organisation 236 (Frankfurt/Main)
- 1 Monitor & Intercept Station - 236a (Ulm)
- 3 D/F stations - Organization 236 (Bremen, Butzbach, Chiensee)
- Numerous Radio Schools (locations change periodically)
- 1 Burial Workshop (manufacture of containers and packing)
- 1 Cipher Factory (new)
- 1 Laboratory - NIKOLAUS
- 1 Teletype Network

II. COMMUNICATION PERSONNEL.

Staff 36	20 persons
Organisation 236	67 persons
Organisation 136	44 persons
Berlin W/T operators	3 persons
Commo Officers (Field)	11 persons

STORCH (F-Net) Personnel:	
Headquarters Staff	7 persons
Field Staff	12 persons
Total:	19 persons

Total: 145 persons

GRAND TOTAL: 164 persons

Radio training personnel (General Agencies and STORCH) throughout the Field.

III. Agent Radio Program (Organisation 136).

- A. Five active radio operators in the Soviet Zone at following locations: Frankfurt/Oder, Halberstadt, Letslinger Heide, West Berlin (2). The first three have been groomed to provide "early warning." The radio base listens for them several times each day.
- B. A radio agent will be in full active status soon in Halle.
- C. Thirteen additional radio agents are in various stages of training. This number includes ten for the Soviet Zone, two for Poland, and one for the GDR.
- D. The Agent Radio Program is improving rapidly due to:
 - (1). Better ZIPPER administration.
 - (2). Additional Field Communication Officers and Radio Trainers.
 - (3). Mechanical aids for training.

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IV. STORCH (F-Net). (This is a SATURN activity and mentioned in the SATURN report.)

- A. Eight 2-member teams have had full training and have taken part in extensive maneuvers.
- B. It is expected that about 15 additional radio operators will participate in the summer maneuvers.
- C. Estimate for future:
 - July 1951 - 23 teams or operators
 - Jan. 1952 - 38 teams or operators
 - Jan. 1953 - 60 teams or operators

V. BURIALS. (This is a SATURN activity and mentioned in the SATURN report.)

- A. Nine radio burials in the Berlin area have been completed in June. Others will follow at various places in the US Zone during the summer.
- B. Radio equipment, ciphers, signal plans, foodstuffs, and valuables for barter are being buried.
- C. All containers are filled with dry nitrogen for best possible preservation.
- D. There are two types of burials:
 - (1). Reserve - for known agents.
 - (2). Neutral - for unknown agents.

VI. E-CASE.

We have OSMOSIS and 52 potential operators and communication officers. The station will be split; two locations, receiving installation and transmitting installation. Ten to fifteen operating positions are planned. A skeleton staff will be maintained at the station, the staff to be augmented quickly if war starts. All signal plans, ciphers, and operating instructions for use at OSMOSIS are being held in "safe storage" in the U.S.

VII. COMMUNICATION COSTS.

36	0	
136	}	
236	}	- - about DM 1,087,920 per year.
236a	}	
Lab	}	

STORCH	720,000 per year	
OSMOSIS	42,000 per year	
	350,000 per year (estimate)	- Equipment from Home Office
DM 2,199,920 (roughly \$439,984.)		per year - estimated; total less one-time costs for improvement of base station, rehabilitation, etc.

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ROSE ACTIVITIES

The operational mission of this project is the procurement of "Roses" for the German station and headquarters. Other eastern European currencies are also purchased through these same sources at the direction of the Finance Officer at Karlsruhe.

Roses are procured from various types of black market operators in Berlin. Principal subsources to _____ live and operate from the Munich and Linz areas.

Since the inception of this project a total of approximately 1,000,000 units have been procured through these sources. The advantages to our agency in using these cutouts are threefold: (1) this is the only source, in the entire organization, which has produced Roses in appreciable quantities; (2) Security and (3) Economy.

_____, has directed this operation since June 1950 as a special project separate and apart from his his functions with ZIPPER.

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for Rose's activity*

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"NEPTUN" - ZIPPER Navy (431 Section)

REF: MOLA-6053

1. NEPTUN involves ZIPPER contacts and connections to German naval circles, ZIPPER attempt to run boat landing operations over the Baltic Sea into the Baltic States, and various aspects of ZIPPER involvement into German maritime matters. The principle ZIPPER personality is DUERKHEIM (cover name) who is the leader of the 431 section. This section is also responsible for the sifting and evaluation of naval reports collected by ZIPPER field agencies. The 431 section consists of not more than six staff members and no agent-personnel as such.

2. The 431 section has a covert connection to the [redacted] sponsored Hydrographic Institute in Hamburg and receives considerable material from them, i.e.: ships, freighter movements world wide, [redacted] collection, etc. Several contacts are maintained to the German Admirals group presently employed by [redacted]. Included is Admiral Patzig, a long time contact of [redacted] and also special consultant to ZIPPER on naval matters, and is carried on the regular ZIPPER payroll. Other connections of the 431 section include contacts to the "Bundesgrenzschutzpolizei", the Waterways Traffic Ministry of Bonn, ZIPPER connections to Post Hostilities plans.

3. The navy section has a staff payroll of DM 29, 655 per quarter, which does not include payment to Special Connections and one-time payment for services rendered.

POB Case Officer: [redacted]

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ZIPPER 331

1. The numerical designation 331 is assigned by ZIPPER to the ZIPPER operational aids, or documentation, shop. Consisting of twelve persons including a chief and all appropriate documentation technicians (such as photo expert, photo technicians, artists, printers, etcher), 331 is set up in a reasonably complete shop located within a physically secure and sound building in Nikolaus Compound at Pullach.

2. The chief of 331, Mr. SAALBERG, initiates EBIs based partly upon requirements received from TAD but largely upon documentation requirements of ZIPPER operations. These EBIs are forwarded through the ZIPPER operational agencies, ultimately reaching individual agents. In return, all documentation or document intelligence collected by ZIPPER operations is funneled to 331 for evaluation and exploitation. On the basis of completed evaluations, 331 prepares regular documentation bulletins by country, and these are routed to TAD.

3. Within 331 is performed all necessary photo work, artistic copy work, printing and binding of reproductions, as well as final numbering and filling-out. Many of 331's supplies are obtained through direct connections on the German market. Certain cachet work is done in a commercial shop partially controlled by 331. TAD supplies such paper and cover stock, particularly special watermarked papers, all Secret Writing materials, and some photographic supplies to 331. TAD and 331 regularly exchange sample original and duplicate documentation for study and files. 331 forwards to TAD two copies of all documents reproduced by 331, and sample impressions of all cachets produced by 331.

4. The actual documentation production of 331 is considerable, probably comparing favorably with that of TAD. The quality of 331 reproduction work is excellent, as witnessed by increasing eagerness of TAD and OAD to accept 331 reproductions for operational use by [redacted]. As an example, TAD recently described 331's new version of the East German Personalausweis as the best yet made, and this document has been previously duplicated both by TAD and OAD. According to TAD, 331 documentation files are excellent. Based upon observable experience, the commitment of ZIPPER agents with 331-produced reproductions has had quite acceptable results, particularly in the Soviet Zone of Germany. The careful 331 planning and recording of details which goes into the assignment of cover story and any specific documentation given to an agent is noteworthy.

5. The total cost of 331 is \$ 2,000 per month, which sum is, of course, included within the overall cost of ZIPPER.

6. One of the most cooperative sections of ZIPPER, 331 consistently urges upon us a closer liaison with TAD than the relatively close one which presently functions. In the opinion of POB, headquarters ought to consider seriously according 331 complete access to TAD documentation files. If TAD

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should be moved to the Munich vicinity, POB believes that a partial 331-TAD amalgamation could be pulled off which would be mutually beneficial, and which would have the highly desirable result of bringing an important ZIPPER technical section under close American supervision. If some step in this direction is not taken soon, POB fears 331 may be among the first ZIPPER assets to be lost by transfer to a German governmental agency. In the absence of the close collaboration which 331 desires, POB has attempted to maintain 331's pro-American attitude by inclusion of Mr. SAALBERG in the [REDACTED] program. During his trip to the US, SAALBERG will be shown American commercial documentation facilities, but the chief attempt will be to allow him to expound to his heart's content his thesis concerning the importance of organizing a Western IS pool of documentation intelligence to appropriate [REDACTED] documentation representatives.

7. POB case officer for 331 is [REDACTED].

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JUPITER - ZIPPER Sovzone OB Collection

JUPITER is the name of a ZIPPER project designed to intensify OB coverage and expedite intelligence reporting in the Soviet Zone of Germany, following the outbreak of war in Korea. In coordination with EUCOM and USAFE requirements for certain priority targets which heretofore were not or only insufficiently covered, ZIPPER was instructed to proceed with the recruitment of suitable sources for these targets. Thus from 1 August 1950 to 1 July 1951 a total of about 500 new sources have been activated in the Sovzone for ground, air, transportation, and economic targets. Originally Washington allocated a sum of DM 60,000 monthly which, with the additional sources, rose to about DM 100,000 monthly by 30 June 51. For the next fiscal year an additional monthly appropriation of DM 66,500 was approved with the clear understanding that this sum is not to be spent for further expansion but for an improvement of sources in the Sovzone. The JUPITER program is based on the proposal system, i.e. each new source to be recruited must first be proposed and only after a thorough scrutiny of the target to be covered, suitability of source, and cost involved, will the proposal be approved by the American Staff Officer. This can best be illustrated by an example:

JUPITER Proposal No. 79/G of 7 May 1951:

1. Recruiting of an eye observer for military targets in the restricted area of Peenemuende - Karlshagen.
2. 4325: German, married, one child (still in Poland), former weapons expert in the German army, Russian PW from the fall of Stalingrad until February 1950. Until a month ago source was employed as mechanic in the motorpool of a ground crew battalion of the Soviet air force in Peenemuende (island of Ruegen). He is unemployed at present and working in his father's repair shop at Zinnowitz, but expects shortly to be reinstated in his former job. Source is still in possession of a Soviet pass permitting free access to the restricted area of Peenemuende. Source is violently anti-Russian, both by conviction and as a result of his long imprisonment.
3. Source is led by agent leader 12911 of GV G and reports to him by secret writing, through a courier, or occasional trips to Berlin.
4. 12911.6 is the courier who about twice a month empties the letter-drop in Zinnowitz and carries the reports to 12911 in Berlin.
5. Monthly cost:


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4325 - compensation.....	DM 180.--
travelling and incidental expenses.....	90.--
12911.6 - courier: compensation.....	100.--
travelling expenses.....	90.--
<hr/>	
Total amount approved:	DM 460.--

Approximately 50 - 75 proposals are processed in this manner every month.

POB Case Officer: [REDACTED]

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USAGE

Born in 1910, this controversial German Baron has since pursued the life of a soldier of fortune with varying success. After leading an expedition in search of buried WW I gold in Palestine, he was barred from Germany and later re-admitted. During WW II he appeared as chief of German political intelligence in Bucharest. An SS Hauptsturmfuhrer, he married a Jewess. Intimate with certain of the July 1944 plotters, he was imprisoned by Himmler. He fought with the Austrian resistance (0-5), worked briefly for OSS, and was recruited by ZIPPER. He defected from OV A and ZIPPER in early 1949 in favor of a direct US contact. Relying entirely on our financial support, and ardently desiring eventual emigration to the US, a type of control exists. He receives \$3300 quarterly, plus a short term allowance of \$500 monthly for a developmental Hungarian plan.

His comprehensive knowledge of intelligence personalities and activities in Austria has been of considerable value, but his reports, originally Austria political, met with varying reactions, and were generally conceded to be of little POB interest. His targets are now Austrian Sovsons OB and CI/E. In addition, he is attempting, with as yet no tangible results, to establish penetrations into Hungary and Rumania. Although he has no effective cover, he has maintained superior security for an agent in Austria, and his contacts with the Austrian Chancellory, Ministries, and police, together with a collection operation controlled by an Austrian colonel, are producing Sovsons OB which is favorably commented on by USPA. His CI/E reports are of sporadic local interest, due possibly to limitations on distribution.

From leading Hungarian Jesuits, with whom USAGE holds the very best contacts, we have a number of names and locations of willing collaborators in Hungary. So much difficulty has been encountered in breaking the Austro-Hungarian border crossing problem, however, that the operation will be dropped if no tangible results are forthcoming by 1 September. In this event it may be necessary to re-examine the position of USAGE to determine if his retention is worthwhile to POB, and if not, if his internal Austrian activities and potentialities might not better be handled by and of more interest to our Austrian station.

POB Case Officer: [REDACTED]

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ZIPPER Satellite Activities

ZIPPER Satellite activities are directed on the Headquarters Staff level by the office of 39. Here overall central guidance and control of strategic operations in the Satellite areas are exercised. Area desks are established and specific areas for coverage have been assigned to individual subordinate ZIPPER agencies.

These units and their field of coverage, which together indicate ZIPPER's present charter, along with the names of the POB Case Officer concerned are as follows:

<u>Org.</u>	<u>Target Areas</u>	<u>POB Case Officer</u>
CSW	CSR	
GV C	Balkans, CSR Yugoslavia (High Political) Poland USSR	
U/M	Hungary	
PE	Poland-Baltic	
RB	USSR	

Three operations exist today on full Field Project status. These are:

<u>Project 73</u>	GV C	Penetration Sov Forces Austria
<u>Project 117</u>	RB	Nail Penetration - German Scientists in Russia
<u>Project 124</u>	GV C	Short-range Penetration - New Poland - Poland

In addition between 30 and 40 proposed or planned operations are in the formative stage of discussion between the field agencies and the POB Case Officers.

In the matter of funds the ZIPPER Ops Chief, 39, is allowed modest leeway in financing general area spade-work. In the case of each basic plan, operation and project, however, all sums must be approved monthly

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beforehand by the POB staff. In every case, full and accurate post facto accounting is demanded. The past allocation for Satellite Operations has been circa \$250,000 per year. The present rate is approximately \$50,000 per quarter which is sufficient in view of the paucity of full field projects.

POB Case Officer for Satellite Ops Coordination: 

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ZIPPER General Agency A (GV A)

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This is at present a 113 man staff (previously known as Organisation 13) comprising the Austrian Wing of ZIPPER with headquarters in Salzburg, now in process of dissolution.

Its top man is Herbert Mallner, former Abwehr captain, Austrian citizen, engaged WW II IS activities Rumania. 36 years of age, explosive temperament, hypercritical of US efforts with whom rapport steadily disintegrated. Is a controversial figure of certain capabilities but with whom a two-year assessment has shown it is impossible to work.

Its activities in the past have ranged from widespread OB collection in Soviet Zone Austria, large-scale CI/CE coverage of Austria, and variegated coverage and operations into Rumania, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. In more recent times under our control and based upon evaluation and examination the OB coverage was cut almost to nothing as being superfluous and basically outside the province of ZIPPER. Yugoslav operations died rather violently as a result of inner weaknesses and insecurities. The balance of Balkan activities shrivelled up from a complication of insecurity, non-control, extravagance and lack of guidance. The result is that during the period September 1950 and June 1951 the decision to dissolve GV A became inescapable.

Apart from the operational reasons set forth, it was realized that the whole concept of a semi-overt Austrian Wing of a German Intelligence Organization physically located and operating in, through, and out of Austria, with or without AIS support, was basically inimical to the success of any future permanent relationship between the Bonn and Vienna Governments.

This decision is now being implemented. Understandably it will be a slow process involving the salvation, reassignment and redesignation of certain modest assets both in personnel and operations. (See U/M and BV S.)

Cost of this operation from birth to dissolution, four and one-half years, has been circa one-half million dollars.

It was further decided that since ZIPPER fathered the thing it was up to ZIPPER to carry out the dissolution. The matter was put squarely up to the ZIPPER Chief and is being closely watched by Wallop. The actual details are supervised by ZIPPER's Ops Staff and by

POB Case Officers: [REDACTED]

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ZIPPER - U/M

This is the code designation for a 60-man Hungarian Group which constitutes a potentially worthwhile asset to be salvaged from the dissolution of GV A. It is to work directly under 39 of the ZIPPER Staff for operational guidance and control with a close tie-in to 40 of ZIPPER Staff on CI/GE matters.

The group is headed by MAYER II as operations chief. He is Austrian, 41 years old, living Salzburg, soon to move to Germany. Former SS Hauptsturmführer, AMT VI F, SD Wien. Balkan expert. GV A Hungarian Group leader. Has good war-time experience and knowledge of area and good connections. He is intelligent and it is believed potentially capable if segregated from GV A and given firm and sound guidance.

MAYER II's immediate office comprises a staff of eight people including himself. Under this staff are three other staffs: (1) for research, with three people; (2) for training, with one person; and (3) for security, with one person.

There are five groups for the collection of positive information and three groups for the collection of CI/GE information, as follows:

Project Group 17588 - consisting of 12 people for the collection of military information on Hungary and Soviet army and air forces in Hungary.

Project Group 17579 - consisting of 15 people for the collection of military information on Hungary and Soviet army and air forces in Hungary and also for the collection of economic information in Hungary.

Interrogation Group 17569 - consisting of two people for the collection of information of a military, economic and political nature on Hungary by interrogations of Displaced Persons, refugees and emigres inside Austria and West Germany.

Operation Group 516 - consisting of 4 people for the collection of army and air Order of Battle information in the Soviet Zone of Austria along the Austro-Hungarian border area.

Operation Group 19331 (P) which consists of two people for the collection of information on and penetration of Soviet armed forces in Austria.

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Project Group 17578 which consists of 5 people for the penetration in Hungary, Austria and West Germany of the Hungarian Intelligence Service.

Operation Group 19337 which consists of 4 people for the penetration by way of the Austrian Communist Party's Central Committee of the People's Democracies Missions and IS in Vienna.

Operation Group 19338 (P) consisting of 2 persons for the penetration of the Cominform by way of the Austrian Communist Party and People's Democracies.

The quarterly costs of U/M are not firmly fixed as yet but will be approximately DM 30,000.

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ZIPPER Operation "Garbage"

1. Operation "Garbage" is the name given by ZIPPER to the systematic collection of original Russian documents by any source and from any place. ZIPPER has about 15 regular sources collecting these documents and about 50 sources who have occasional access to such material. The documents are collected from places in or near Soviet installations in Germany and Austria, mainly from garbage dumps, furnaces, wastepaper baskets, toilets, Soviet trains. For example, agent V-11213 of ZIPPER Project 73 in Vienna hired two charwomen at 1000 Schillings each a month to furnish him with all the papers they find while cleaning the trains arriving from the USSR. The original material is carefully screened by ZIPPER for its intelligence value, and any stamps, signatures, etc. are forwarded to TAD for reproduction. The remainder of the material is then filed away.

2. It occurred to us that some of this material might have considerable propaganda value since it frequently describes intimate details of everyday life in the Soviet Union. Most of the material consists of correspondence (practically uncensored) between members of the Soviet occupation forces in Germany and Austria, and relatives and friends in the USSR. Two batches of these documents were forwarded to Washington, and we are expecting their assessment in the near future.

3. It is difficult to give a cost estimate of this operation because, with the exception of the example mentioned above, every ZIPPER agent is instructed to collect whatever original material he can obtain in the course of his specific intelligence activity.

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ZIPPER Project 117

The object of this project is to screen the correspondence exchanged between German scientists in the USSR and their relatives and friends in Germany. The correspondence mainly reveals the names of other scientists in the USSR, their locations, and the type of work they perform, all of which is rated highly valuable intelligence information. However, the ultimate objective of this project is to induce one or more of these scientists to correspond in secret code with their correspondents in Germany in order to answer specific questions prepared by ZIPPER technical experts. Several attempts have been made in this respect but all to no avail so far. At the end of last year some 1000 German technicians returned to Germany from the USSR, and every intelligence agency in Germany, including ZIPPER, started to pounce on these people to debrief them. This caused a great deal of friction between ZIPPER on the one hand and the American and [redacted] agencies on the other. It was therefore decided to coordinate the ZIPPER efforts with MIS who in turn are coordinating their activities with the [redacted]. It is believed that a satisfactory compromise can be reached. The project is in charge of a new ZIPPER staff member by the alias of DORBACH who controls the project leader 2473 alias BALLING. Three former aeronautical experts, 12 230, 12 267, 12 274, screen the correspondence of about 20 correspondents in Germany and arrange the interrogations with returnees. The cost of this project amounts to about DM 5000 a month.

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ZIPPER Project 79

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This project concerns one man, 11 213, a Polish Ukrainian, who was drafted into the Red Army in 1944 and released in 1946 in Budapest with orders to return to Poland. Instead of returning, 11 213 came to Vienna, where he first lived on the black market and was recruited by ZIPPER late in 1949. His specific task is to attempt to defeat Soviet occupation personnel in Austria. 11 213 uses the following technique for approaching Russians in Vienna. He regularly cases the Vienna railroad stations where Russians usually arrive from the Soviet Zone. 11 213 accosts likely candidates and offers some pornographic pictures for sale, at the same time suggesting that he could also procure a girl for him. To this end 11 213 recruited an Austrian girl, described as "neither a saint nor a prostitute", who is willing to take Russians to her discreet apartment. Usually 11 213 accompanies the pair pretending to be the girl's brother and while the Russian is in a state of undress, 11 213 either photographs his papers or simply steals them. Thus about six weeks ago 11 213 procured a soldier's "Soldbuch" (identity book) which was turned over to TAD, and for which 11 213 received a bonus of \$150 in US currency. 11 213 intends to recruit 2 or 3 additional girls for similar operations at other places in Vienna where Russians congregate. ZIPPER has not yet been able to find a suitable representative in Vienna who could control 11 213 and teach him the rudiments of security. Meanwhile 11 260 and 11 126 of General Agency C have to make frequent trips to Vienna to keep 11 213 out of trouble. The cost of this project amounts to about 16,000 Austrian Schillings a month.

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ZIPPER - Project 124

Project 124 involves a penetration into New Poland and consists of three separate phases.

Phase I is the collection of data about military and railroad traffic by V-11 731, a German railroad employee in Kuestrin-Kiets, who acts also as interpreter for Poles and Russians at the Kuestrin RR station, and is allowed to cross the Polish-German border at will. He has regularly supplied reports about military movements and ordinary railroad traffic thru this station. His reports, which have been found accurate and of value, are brought to Berlin by V-11 732, his wife; it is planned, however, to send them via a letter-drop in Berlin-Ost in the event travel between Kuestrin and Berlin should become curtailed. V-11 732 is receiving training as a radio operator in Berlin, and has already been on a test circuit with ZIPPER headquarters. It is planned to use her as a warning and stay-behind agent in case of emergency; she will also transmit especially important transportation reports from V-11 731 by radio to the Berlin station.

Phase II is a border crossing action. d-51 is a German professional fisherman on the tidal waters of the Odar. His brother, who is also a fisherman, has a house located near Kiets, about 100 meters from the tidal waters; no other habitation lies between the house and the river. d-51 and his brother own an eight meter long flat fishing boat, which d-51 uses for ferrying agents across the river. His first assignment, the guiding of V-11 192 onto Polish soil, was carried out successfully in September 1950.

Phase III is the establishment of a courier line from Kuestrin to Berlin by way of the British Zone. This line, which is meant as an alternate communication line for V-11 731 is still in the developmental stage. It leads from Kuestrin to letter-drops in Waren-Rathenow-Thale. The mail is carried from here by courier into the British Zone, and is then forwarded to a cover address in Berlin through the regular postal channels.

The average cost of this project is at present DM 4200 per quarter. This does not include premiums to the border crossing guide, who receives DM 300 for each crossing.

POB Case Officer: [REDACTED]

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Operation CARTILAGE

CARTILAGE is designed as a one-time operation, the purpose of which is to obtain a TU-4, MIG-15, or Type 27 (in order of priority). ZIPPER has made three attempts to accomplish this mission. The first attempt, Operation PELIKAN of GV G, was in essence a swindle perpetrated by the supposed chief agent. The second attempt, Operation MAUSI, directed by the same general agency, was revealed as a Soviet-directed double-play only after Soviet intelligence had gained some operationally useful information. The third attempt, Operation AUTOLAK of GV H, initially appeared more promising; but it now seems probable that future developments will expose a swindle or double play in this case as well. Present plans are to put the chief agent on CARRIAGE.

A 30-day CARTILAGE freeze was in effect, as a result of the possibility that the pilots of the two American jet planes in Czech possession would be held as hostages were we to succeed in our purpose. We are asking the Air Force whether rumors to the effect that a MIG-15 was recently acquired are correct. Because of the nature of the assignment, costs cannot be estimated on a quarterly basis.

POB Case Officer: [REDACTED]

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The Syrian Case

1. ZIPPER's relationship to the German Military Mission in Syria is now closer than it has ever been before, and the Syrian Desk of [REDACTED] has indicated its interest in making the exploitation of this group a long-range, joint GIS-AIS project. No intelligence operations are now being conducted, and we have expressed our agreement with the ZIPPER contention that the main initial problem is to see the German Military Mission in Syria firmly established in a position of confidence with the Syrian Government. Our only objective at the moment is to establish a sure means of communication between [REDACTED] and the German Military Mission, and the German Military Mission and ZIPPER. The office of the MA in Damascus maintains contact with the German Military Mission, which the Syrian Desk does not consider secure and which will not be exploited in the communications system which we hope to establish.

2. FOB staff officer: [REDACTED].

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CI/CE and Political Reports

1. Processing and dissemination of the ZIPPER CI/CE and political reports presents a special problem to POB. Because these fields of intelligence are rather closely related and often of interest only to select customers, and because ZIPPER's treatment of them is still influenced to a considerable extent by old German Intelligence Service concepts, POB processes these reports separately from the regular ZIPPER positive production.

2. ZIPPER reports in the CI/CE and political categories cover primarily the following targets: the KPD and its front organisations, with special emphasis on the intelligence activities of the party as well as on clandestine Communist organisations in Western Germany; the KPOe together with its front organisations and its clandestine branches; the JED and the various governmental departments of the German Democratic Republic (DDR) with special emphasis on the Ministry of State Security (MSS) and its subsidiary the State Security Service (SSD); the intelligence services of the U.S.S.R. and its satellites. Reports on the KPD and the KPOe are, for the most part, not given ditto dissemination because, strictly speaking, these are not primary ZIPPER targets; moreover, the number of customers with a primary interest in them is rather limited. Copies of these reports are sent to COS and FIM. Information copies of them are normally passed to ID EUCOM by COS. The principal value of these reports to [redacted] lies in their contribution to the card files. Reports on the SED and the DDR government including the SSD are normally given regular ditto dissemination. Reports on the intelligence services of the U.S.S.R. and its satellites, being purely CE in nature, are not given ditto dissemination but copies are forwarded to COS and FIM. Customers with a primary interest in these reports are limited and their content generally is of such a nature as to make a wide dissemination inadvisable. As indicated above, an exception to this rule is made in the case of the SED because of the wide interest in this target on the part of customers in Germany.

3. The volume of reports of a strictly political nature (exclusive of those on activities of the KPD) is rather low because reporting in this field is limited primarily to items of special interest, generally from a fairly high level; these reports are normally given regular ditto dissemination by POB.

4. Also handled by the ZIPPER CI/CE Reports Staff are reports on trade connections between Western firms and firms in the U.S.S.R. and satellite countries. These reports are given regular ditto dissemination.

5. The problem of dissemination of the ZIPPER CI/CE production is under study by COS and FIM at the present time.

6. Handling the screening, editing and dissemination of the ZIPPER CI/CE production for POB is [redacted].

*extracted for
Reports and
CI-CE reports
archives*

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1. The POB Operations Office receives from ZIPPER a wide variety of requests for documentation and travel papers which includes requests for German Kennkarte, German Temporary Travel Documents, Rail Travel Orders (2000 per month), Air Travel Orders for Berlin, German and Austrian Frontalier Permits, Housing Permits, Weapons Permits, letters of recommendation or protection issued under the names of the military cover units etc. In addition, the Operations Office maintains a Master List of the Organization which theoretically lists all field agency staff and agent personnel by agent number. As a condition for the fulfillment of these various requests and under the guise of "routine administration", the Operations Office has been able to amass over the past year a considerable amount of information on ZIPPER staff and agent personnel operating outside of the Iron Curtain. This information is recorded for the POB Card File and is also forwarded on a monthly or bi-monthly basis to COS/FDM. The Operations Office has been assisted in this particular CE approach to ZIPPER by a compartmentalization of ZIPPER Headquarters. The ZIPPER personnel office which provides documentation and travel for all ZIPPER personnel is an independent office separate from other ZIPPER operations offices and has its own channels to the field agencies as well as its own card files. Experience has proven that an approach to the Personnel Office on ZIPPER personnel is usually more successful and arouses less suspicion than an approach to an operations office. Furthermore, the Personnel Office apparently does not coordinate with other ZIPPER offices.

2. The POB CE office maintains card files on ZIPPER addresses and telephone numbers (); as time permits, CIS (through CIS) is asked to identify the subscribers of the numbers to which long-distance calls have been made by ZIPPER. This project is hampered by lack of the requisite man-hours; likewise, there has been no opportunity yet to ask for name traces (the obvious necessary next step) on subscribers identified by CIS. Another as yet abortive project would involve carding and name tracing the residents listed in city directories at addresses known to us to be occupied by or used as legal cover by ZIPPERites -- here again the requirements of man-hours exceed availability.

Another possibility is the exploitation of our inside knowledge to establish CIS coverage on selected addresses and telephones. This we have done only on an exceptional basis, because of the magnitude of the risk that ZIPPER will be informed, sooner or later,

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because of insecurity of CIS operations. We are not aware, positively, of any such leak, as yet, but consider it merely a matter of time, inasmuch as CIS installations and operations are obvious GE targets for both ZIPPER and the VS, and that completely all-American handling is not within the present capabilities of CIS. Thus we lose another golden, but fleeting, opportunity. POB CE officer: [REDACTED].

Extracted for [REDACTED] dossier / [REDACTED]

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"HOFFMANSTHAL", ZIPPER D/A Operation

Ref: MGLA-6735

1. This case involves a 26-year old KPD member who was recruited by ZIPPER in February of 1950 to penetrate the KPD in Amberg. In February 1951, while traveling by train between Amberg and Nuernberg, this agent by chance made the acquaintance of a man who subsequently made him an offer of employment by Czech IS. Upon advice of his ZIPPER case officer, the agent accepted the offer and has made several trips to the CSR to contact his Czech case officer, to whom he makes his reports and in turn receives RII's and payment for his work.

2. Although admittedly a low level case, this operation offers the possibility of producing information on the working methods of Czech IS in the border area between the CSR and Bavaria as well as Czech IS target interests and identities of Czech agents (several have already been identified). Also, the ZIPPER agent has promised an opportunity for a short training course in the CSR which, if made good, should produce additional interesting information.

3. The long-range value of this agent as a ZIPPER KPD source is believed to be considerably greater than the assets which might be derived from this particular operation; therefore, repressive action against any enemy agents exposed through the operation should be undertaken only after very careful consideration.

4. Handled for FOB by [REDACTED]. Financed by Czech IS and by general operating fund of GV L.

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HOFFMANSTHAL data*

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Ref: MGL-A-7080

1. [REDACTED] CE Case centering around a ZIPPER Special Connection, who is a [REDACTED], in addition to being manager of a firm set up in Munich by ZIPPER, maintains an office in a French bank in Paris. He is a 57-year old German, born in Russia, who has been described to us by ZIPPER as a leading engineer in the German armaments industry, with outstanding knowledge of Soviet economy, who--through his extensive Europe-wide connections--would be invaluable in the control of Soviet arms smuggling to the West. We provided travel documentation (when it was not to be procured any other way) and awaited reams of wonderful reports on illegal East-West trade and arms traffic; they did not materialize. We soon gained the strong impression that either ZIPPER did not know or did not want to tell us about the activities of [REDACTED], presumably the latter. For almost a year we have had CIS coverage on [REDACTED], which has shown him to be very active indeed in the arms business, with contacts directly or indirectly into every West European country, several satellite countries (especially Rumania), and to be involved in mysterious deals with Pakistan, Sweden, Switzerland, Africa, inter alia. A number of [REDACTED] contacts have been linked to illegal East-West trade. The intelligence aspect of these operations, if any, has not appeared in the intercepts, though this is anything but determinative; however, UTILITY has been listed in an open code key used by another (but linked) Special Connection in correspondence with a [REDACTED] whose activities have drawn queries from the [REDACTED].

2. [REDACTED] ZIPPER case officer is @ Hans ROGER, whose job it is to deal with industrial connections of ZIPPER and to arrange for and review ZIPPER's economic cover. Perhaps ZIPPER is uncommunicative in this field because engaged in establishing long term economic cover, which is to be kept secret from us, for use in future activities as a national and independent secret intelligence service--frankly, we do not know yet. ROGER is also of interest to us because he is in communication with an organization, located in Liechtenstein, which concerns itself with the development of very sensitive equipment. In addition, we have received a report to the effect that a firm of which ROGER is at least co-owner has been engaged in illegal East-West trade in ball bearings.

3. No cash outlay has been required, but our observation of the [REDACTED] has been minimal, largely because of lack of personnel.
POB CE officer: [REDACTED]

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WG RUHR

Ref: MGLA-6402

1. This case concerns the clarification of a source of GV H (BV 80) who has been supplying what are believed to be fabricated reports on a clandestine Communist resistance movement in the Ruhr area known as WG Ruhr (Widerstands Gruppe Ruhr). The reports indicate the existence of a very active resistance movement with W/T, Volkspolizei and sabotage units. The reports have not been confirmed by any other sources and their nature is such as to arouse strong suspicions concerning their genuineness.

2. The source of the reports is a miner in the Ruhr area who was recruited by a prominent CDU functionary of Gelsenkirchen who in turn is a contact of GV H. The miner claims to be serving the resistance group as a courier, and when he has the opportunity he makes copies of the documents which he carries and passes them to the CDU functionary.

3. Similar reports which reached AIS channels in the Mannheim area in February 1949 subsequently proved to be fabrications when their source was subjected to carriage. Other reports also reached AIS channels through Belgium; these reports were not only strikingly similar to the WG Ruhr reports but almost certainly came from the same source.

4. Recently a new member of GV H took over the case from the CDU official and established direct contact with the miner. This new GV H case officer is a well-known former G1S officer who was considered an expert in counter espionage and during World War II was active in Holland. ZIPPER feels confident that he will be able to solve the case.

5. This case is financed from the general operating fund of BV 80. The miner receives DM 300 per quarter.

6. Handling the case for POB is [REDACTED].

Extracted from Ruhr dossier

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ADLER: D/A Operation

Reference: MGL-A-7223

1. The principal personality in this operation is a 32-year old Hungarian of German descent who served as a pilot in the German Air Force in the last war, was a business man in Hungary for a time after the war, and finally in January 1949 came to Austria where he was recruited by GV A as an agent and sent back to Hungary in February 1949. When he applied for acceptance into the Hungarian Army, ADLER was promptly recruited by the Katpol for an intelligence mission against the West, which involved collecting OB on the U.S. Forces and, as a long-range goal, enlisting in the new German Army when organized. Upon returning to Salzburg in April 1950, ADLER reported immediately to the GV A case officer who had dispatched him on his original mission to Hungary, and the D/A play was started with ADLER settled in Heidelberg and directed by the GV A (now UV M) case officer in Salzburg.

2. ADLER's training by HIS extended over the period from late September 1949 to early April 1950 and included W/T training. Communications between ADLER and the Katpol are maintained by pre-arranged code in brief post card messages, secret inks and meetings with Katpol couriers in Munich. The Katpol has expressed its intention of equipping ADLER with a W/T set; however, this has not as yet been done. The principal short-range asset offered by this case is the possibility of monitoring W/T communications between the Katpol and ADLER in event the latter is supplied with a W/T set. Aside from that, a certain amount of information on HIS target interests in Western Germany and HIS personalities (particularly couriers) can be expected. As for long range considerations, there is the possibility (though admittedly perhaps somewhat remote), that after serving the HIS faithfully as an agent in Western Germany for a period of time, ADLER will find it possible to talk his employers into bringing him back to Budapest and making him a Katpol officer.

3. A case almost identical to this one [redacted] are being run by the same Katpol case officer; at any rate, it has been established that the false identity documents issued both agents were produced in the same shop. Both cases are under study by COS and FDM at the present time for the purpose of determining the best manner of handling the two cases to insure adequate coordination. POB takes the view that unless the [redacted] can be taken over from [redacted] and run directly by DAD, it should be turned over to ZIPPER for

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ADLER's data*

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ADLER

running along with the ADLER case. Such action seems to be indicated in view of the fact that the potentialities of both cases involve monitoring of Katpol agent W/T communications and possible penetration of the Katpol in Hungary itself. Such operations appear to be clearly outside of the realm of responsibility of [REDACTED].

4. Approximate cost per quarter of this operation is DM 1500.
5. The POB case officer handling this case is [REDACTED].

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"Organisation Uebergangsanweisung"

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REF: MDL-7292

1. This case involves the penetration, by two GV L sources, of a clandestine Communist organization which extends throughout Western Germany. This organization, known as "Organisation Uebergangsanweisung", is under the direct control of a special functionary on the SED Central Committee, and, at the present time, appears to be concerning itself primarily with illegal traffic in personnel and propaganda literature across the border between the Soviet Zone and Western Germany. Its Western German headquarters is in Dusseldorf. There have been indications that higher ranking functionaries in the organization regard it as the basis for the illegal Communist apparatus which is to go into action in Western Germany in event the KPD is outlawed. According to one report the organization headquarters in Dusseldorf serves also as a clearing station for courier mail, presumably originating in the Soviet Zone of Germany, and destined for such places as Amsterdam, Paris and Ghent.

2. ZIPPER's penetration of "Organisation Uebergangsanweisung" dated from the time the organization was first established in Bavaria in October 1950 and was effected through a ZIPPER agent who had succeeded in penetrating the KPD in Coburg. This agent has been assigned the code designation "Traverse" by ZIPPER; he is approximately 31 years of age and is an ethnic German from the Baltic. He is described as being well educated and unusually clever. These qualities have enabled him, despite his strong anti-Communist sentiment, to win the favor of high-ranking KPD functionaries in Bavaria as well as of leading figures in the illegal organization itself. At the present time "Traverse" is responsible for organizing and directing all of the illegal border traffic in the area of Coburg; however, there are good prospects that he will be promoted to a higher post in the near future.

3. Fragmentary parts of the reports submitted by "Traverse" on "Organisation Uebergangsanweisung" were confirmed by reports from police sources in the area of Coburg; however, more complete confirmation was recently obtained as the result of the recruitment by GV L of another source in the organization. The new source, whom ZIPPER calls "Schleuse", is the deputy of "Traverse" in "Organisation Uebergangsanweisung"; however, insofar as is known, neither source is aware that the other is reporting to a Western IS. The new source describes "Traverse" as one of the most fanatical Communists in the organization.

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4. The principal value in this case is believed to lie in the prospect which it offers for a fairly high level long-range penetration of what is likely to become the principal underground Communist apparatus in Western Germany. Accordingly, it is of utmost importance that, under no circumstances, any action is taken which might tend to compromise the sources. One likely hazard lies in the possibility that CIC may succeed in penetrating "Organisation Uebergangsanweisung" and then apply repressive measures. Action has been initiated to attempt to determine the extent of CIC's knowledge of the organization without cutting CIC in on the project in any way.

4. The case is financed by general operating funds of GV L. The total sum paid per quarter to the sources is approximately DM 750.

5. Handling the case for POB is [REDACTED].

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orig. Uebergangsanweisung*

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Kufstein file
16 Oct 51

Operation KUFSTEIN

REF: MGLA-7009

1. This is an operation involving a possible Soviet intelligence deception mill. It is considered of special interest to AIS because its product is strikingly similar to that of an operation known as the Baden/Wien Case which was run in 1949 and early 1950 by Organisation "F" (BARANOVSKI), a ZIPPER subsidiary recently dropped. The Baden/Wien reports consisted primarily of supposedly fairly high level information on the MGB in Austria as well as on the Central Committee of the KPOe. The source was quite obscure and the channel through which the reports reached ZIPPER was devious. Finally, before the case was dropped completely, it was learned that one of the principal sources had been dead for more than a year. The case was never solved.

2. In February 1951 ZIPPER began receiving, through GV C, the current counterpart of the Baden/Wien material and the new case was christened KUFSTEIN. By way of example of the type of material received, some of the reports deal in the movements and missions of MGB officers in such places as Warsaw and the Near and Middle East. The principal source of the Kufstein material is a KPOe member who is quite well known in intellectual circles in Vienna and who obtains the material for his reports through direct personal contact with MGB officers and high KPOe officials in Vienna. Acting as intermediary between the source and the GV C case officer in the case is a Russian emigre who is the wife of an orchestra leader in Vienna. Repeated attempts by the GV C case officer to establish direct contact with the source were rejected by the latter on the basis that he (the source) was under constant observation.

3. At present POB is awaiting evaluation of the KUFSTEIN material by Washington. No efforts will be spared to obtain a complete clarification of this case. Under active consideration is a plan to bring the [redacted] Station of [redacted] into the operation from an investigative view point, without the knowledge of ZIPPER.

4. The approximate cost per quarter of this operation is \$760.00.

5. Handling the case for POB is [redacted].

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[REDACTED] (V-12753.1)

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Reference: MGB-A-9274

1. **[REDACTED]** is a ZIPPER CS case in which ZIPPER took over a private, free-wheeling, attempted penetration of the Karlsborst MGB by V-12753.1. In March 1951 he went to East Berlin; he has not returned and no news have been obtained of him; he is presumed arrested by the Soviets. The case is dead unless **[REDACTED]** reappears or if the Soviets attempt to recruit his wife, who resides in the British Zone. Examination of possible causes of arrest and final reporting pending.

2. V-12753.1, a 30-year old former Nazi war correspondent, lately a Socialist and psychology student at the Bonn University (with parents in the Sovzone), had offered his services to the Karlsborst MGB, which gave him CE EEIs. ZIPPER's CV G then recruited V-12753.1 as a D/A, run by V/1168, a WW II Abwehr III F official who had considerable experience in the direction of D/A cases (especially against the Western Allies). Handled for POB by **[REDACTED]**.

3. In view of the short duration of this case and inasmuch as the Soviet side of this play was a CE officer, little was learned concerning the Soviet IS. While active, the case cost DM 400 per month.



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Reference: LONDF-9506

1. [REDACTED] CE/Compound security case involving an attempt by the Soviets to penetrate the ZIPPER headquarters. [REDACTED], a ZIPPERITE, reported to [REDACTED], which advised her to pretend to be amenable to the salesmanship of the Soviet IS recruiter, [REDACTED]. She indicated her willingness to cooperate and has since been awaiting contact by a person, unknown, who will present an identification token. [REDACTED] has been briefed and arrangements have been made to undertake surveillance whenever we give the word. Pending arrival of the Soviet IS contact, the case is dormant. In the meanwhile, POB has had CIS coverage on [REDACTED], as an extra check on her bona fides.

2. a. [REDACTED] is a 27-year old Silesian refugee who has worked at the ZIPPER headquarters compound as a secretary since November 1945, when it housed Civil Censorship Division (CCD); when ZIPPER moved in she joined the latter, which employment has continued ever since. It was during her employment with CCD that she met [REDACTED], a fellow employee of CCD, then generally known as a Communist. Our source has applied for emigration to the USA and is believed, on the basis of previously reliable service to the POB security officer as a security informant, to be rather pro-American, to the occasional disadvantage of ZIPPER. She is a witting source, who has been photographed and who has submitted a personnel questionnaire; she is not paid by POB.

b. [REDACTED] is a 50-year old Communist, formerly a German merchant seaman, now an official of the DLR in Berlin. During the Nazi regime he was arrested by the Gestapo and deported. Subsequently, in 1943, he was selected by the [REDACTED] for a long-term [REDACTED] operation; allegedly (according to the [REDACTED]), [REDACTED] dropped him in 1944, because of bad health. From 1945 to 1947, as a [REDACTED], he was employed in charge of the CCD dining hall, Pullach, Germany, where his divorced wife, son and daughter still reside. Thereafter, he moved to Berlin where, as an SED man, he obtained official posts. He has made a number of illegal trips back to Pullach since then; also he has been visited by his son and daughter in Berlin, where he lives with his second wife, an East Berlin secretary.

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3. [REDACTED] originally reported to [REDACTED] since April 1951 the POB CE case officer has been [REDACTED].

4. Costs so far: none. Assistance in normal processing of USA immigration promised. If Soviet IS contact established, expenses will be paid.

[REDACTED]

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WIRBEL, ZIPPER D/A-CI Operation

Ref: MOLA-6497, MOLA-7445

1. The principal personality in this project is a former Abwehr Colonel who lives in Luebeck and has close contact with the Schleswig-Holstein VS. The project is based on the recruitment by him in December 1950 of the following personalities:

- a. A 30-year old woman journalist with ADN in Luebeck who, although not a convinced Communist, joined the KPD in 1947 in order to obtain employment as a correspondent for a Communist newspaper. She is in contact with a close friend in Schwerin who is a courier for, and mistress of, an MGB major who, in turn, recruited the woman journalist as an agent. The latter has made several trips to Schwerin where she was debriefed by the MGB; the MGB in turn gave her EEI's on British OB and assigned her the mission of recruiting radio operators in the British Zone of Germany.
- b. A 33-year old former Abwehr officer who spent the closing days of the last war in the Reichschancellery bunker and published a book on his experiences there. After the war he became active in the Bruderschaft, and through his activities in the latter organization he came into contact with the chief of the section for Western German affairs of the DDR Information Office, a responsible ADN journalist in Neuburg, and with the Russian Ambassador to the DDR.

2. The woman journalist and the Bruderschaft member are acquainted and each is aware that the other is reporting to the same Western intelligence service. Neither individual is a confirmed Communist and both are believed to have become involved with the Communist movement as a result of circumstances.

3. Although developments in this operation have been proceeding at a rather slow pace, the operation holds the possibility of producing information on Soviet IS targets in Western Germany and also possibly supplying the identities of Soviet agents, including W/T operators, operating in Western Germany. In addition, it should provide valuable information on the Bruderschaft complex and Soviet interest therein, as well as information on the organization of the ADN in Western Germany.

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4. After the operation had been running for some time it developed that the Bruderschaft member had been a [redacted] agent for approximately three and one half years and that his D/A play was started with [redacted] blessings. He voluntarily admitted this to his ZIPPER case officer stating, however, that it would be difficult for him to break with [redacted] at this time. From talks between the POB and [redacted] case officers involved in the case, it was established that [redacted] considers the Bruderschaft member a valuable agent and certainly does not feel inclined to drop him. In a joint [redacted]-POB interview with the Bruderschaft member the latter stated that, if compelled to work for only one service, he would choose ZIPPER because here lay his chances for a career in the future German IS. Final agreement with [redacted] for future handling of the case has not been reached.

5. The operation is under the supervision of the OI/CE staff officer of CV G. Handled for FOB by [redacted].

6. The operation costs DM 3,900 per quarter.

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Courier

MCLA-7892

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IP

SRFG

21 August 1951

Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

Operational

Briefing for

Reference: MCLA-7543

MICROFILMED
AUG 5 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Transmitted herewith are four additional brief summaries of ZIPPER activities; the Baranovski organization, Polonaise, BV S, and ZIPPER Interrogation Effort.

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- COS - 1 @/2 cy attach.
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The BARANOVSKI Organisation

Reference: PULL-2315

MICROFILMED

AUG 5 1970

DOC. MICRO. SER.

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1. A ZIPPER subsidiary which demanded special attention from the POB staff for some time was the organization of Nikolai BARANOVSKI, sometimes referred to as Organisation F. BARANOVSKI, also referred to as Fritz, is a well-known Russian Monarchist in Munich who has specialized in collecting CI/CS information from among Russian emigre circles in Western Europe. In addition, Fritz also developed other sources as opportunities for such presented themselves.

2. Fritz's position, with respect to ZIPPER, was somewhat unique in that he received very little operational guidance or control. Aside from furnishing name traces to ZIPPER upon request, it was simply a matter of ZIPPER furnishing Fritz with certain monthly sums of money and, in return, receiving whatever Fritz was able to produce in the way of reports. ZIPPER was not furnished with personality identities or operational details except in rare and very special cases.

3/ Fritz has frequently been denounced as an intelligence fabricator, which however, is not too surprising in view of the fact that slander campaigns are frequent occurrences in Russian emigre circles. No concrete proof that he ever fabricated intelligence himself or wittingly passed such material has ever been obtained.

4. One of BARANOVSKI's cases which drew widespread attention and which was running in early 1949 and 1950 was the so-called Baden/Wien Case which allegedly involved penetration of an MOB network with headquarters in Baden near Vienna. This penetration ostensibly was effected through the secretary of the chief of the net who furnished carbon copies of all reports which she typed; these reports reached BARANOVSKI allegedly through a devious courier channel. The reports appeared suspicious from the beginning and, after some time, it was learned that the person who had been named as chief of the net had been dead for some time. The case was finally dropped without being clarified. At present ZIPPER is receiving material from a Vienna source which bears a striking similarity to the Baden/Wien material. It is hoped that clarification of this new case (Kufstein) will shed some light on the old Baden/Wien Case. ZIPPER is of the opinion that if the material in the latter case was fabricated, which appears highly probable, Fritz was not the fabricator nor was he aware that the material was fabricated. In general, POB is in accord with this view. Quite obviously the basic faults can be traced back to the concept of operational free-wheeling which characterized the ZIPPER-ID RUCCOM relationship prior to mid-1949 and which, in turn, was reflected in even greater measure in the ZIPPER-Fritz relationship.

5. Aside from reasons of lack of operational control, the ZIPPER-Fritz relationship was never a healthy one. Naturally enough, Fritz, a Russian emigre, was not happy with working for a German organization.

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POB established direct contact with Fritz in late 1950 for the purpose of extracting from him the identities of the members of his organization, obtaining whatever clarification possible of the Baden/Wien source and determining Fritz's possible future value to AIS. In this relationship Fritz was given the impression that AIS was investigating the practicability of a direct Fritz-AIS relationship, a prerequisite for which would be complete clarification of Fritz's organization to the satisfaction of AIS. Fritz supplied extensive data on his personnel and, in the opinion of POB, told what he knew about the Baden/Wien case. In the meantime ZIPPER had made preparations to sever connections with Fritz.

6. On the basis of his wide connections in all sections of the Russian emigration and his extensive knowledge of activities and personalities in those circles, which in turn is supported by his files containing approximately 20,000 carded names, POB is of the opinion that, if properly handled, Fritz could be a definite asset to the AIS CI/CE effort in Western Germany. Granted that there may be some reason for misgivings concerning his integrity, these suspicions still remain to be substantiated. Moreover, it must be admitted that if intelligence operations were conducted only through individuals of impeccable character, production would virtually be nil.

7. POB believes that Fritz could be run most appropriately by MOB () who undoubtedly would benefit most from his CI/CE production on the Russian emigration. At the time Fritz was being dropped from the ZIPPER payroll POB approached him (on the recommendation of FHM) with an offer to continue to support his organization at the rate of DM 9000 per month (the sum he received from ZIPPER) until a more permanent working arrangement with AIS could be concluded (i.e., until MOB could take over). Although emphasizing that he was still definitely interested in working for AIS, Fritz refused to accept this type of support stating that he would consider only a concrete proposal for working for AIS. POB thereupon recommended that MOB (now briefed on the case) establish contact with Fritz at an early date.

8. Representing POB in dealings with BARANOVSKI were [redacted] and [redacted].

started for BARANOVSKI [redacted]

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"POLONAISE"

Reference: MGL-A-5948

1. "POLONAISE" was an embryo ZIPPER CE D/A case in which it was hoped to penetrate alleged clandestine Polish IS activities of the Communist-front cultural organizations: CHOPIN COMMITTEE and Helmut von GERLACH SOCIETY. The case now appears to be a swindle; field analysis of the latest reports and their incorporation in a swansong report by POB are pending.

2. The D/A involved, V-694, a 37-year old official of the CHOPIN Committee and WW II Abwehr II officer, was handled by ZIPPER's V-950, a former Abwehr III F officer, experienced in CE operations against the Polish IS

3. From V-694 and other sources ZIPPER produced a 5-page CE report dated 6 April 1951 re the "Helmut von GERLACH-Gesellschaft und CHOPIN Komitee". This same report was sent by ZIPPER to Bonn Verfassungsschutz.

4. Initially, costs were estimated at DM 1693 monthly, of which DM 850 were for V-694.

5. The POB case officer is [REDACTED].

*extracted for
Polonaise dossier*

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BV S (The SCHAEFER Organization)

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Ref: FULL-2185

1. BV S (District Agency S) under ~~Dr.~~ SCHAEFER was formerly the CI/CE group of GV A and was retained when that organization was dissolved. It is now under the direct supervision of ZIPPER headquarters. With its headquarters moved from its previous location in Salzburg to Bad Reichenhall, the principal mission of BV S is to secure the lines of all ZIPPER operations running through Austria. This is effected primarily through investigators located at critical points whose principal duty it is to make routine investigations, upon request, of personalities or other matters relating to ZIPPER operations which demand clarification; in this connection police sources are also utilized. In addition BV S runs some relatively low level CI/CE sources primarily against the Austrian Communist party. Though low level, these sources have been retained principally because they represent some sort of an opening into the KPOe; their cost is relatively low.

2. BV S is divided into three UVs (Sub-Agencies) each consisting of a UV leader together with his agent sources and/or investigators. One of these, located in Linz, has seven sources in the KPOe in Linz, Urfahr and Graz and one police source in Linz. Another, with headquarters in Klagenfurth, has two police sources in Klagenfurth and an investigator together with a CI/CE source in Carinthia. The largest of the UVs is located in Salzburg; it has three investigators in Vienna, one in Salzburg and one in Styria, and in addition has police sources in the Tyrol, Vienna, Salzburg and Bruck-Neudorf near the Hungarian border.

3. Approximate budgetary allotment per quarter for BV S is 100,000 schillings.

4. Representing POB in matters concerning BV S is [REDACTED]

Extracted for BVS -
file

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ZIPPER Interrogation Group

1. The ZIPPER complex in Western Germany presently includes a group of 63 persons engaged in the interrogation effort of ZIPPER field agencies. Of this total number, 56 are German speaking, conducting interrogations of selected PW's, German returnees, Sudetan and Silesian German refugees, and any other German speaking refugees who arrive in West Germany. Their interrogation effort is conducted for a dual purpose, (a) for the procurement of positive intelligence from those countries where refugees come from (particularly German speakers from Czechoslovakia, Poland, Latvia, etc.; and (b) for the procurement of operational information required to successfully conduct agent operations into the satellites. Point (a) above undoubtedly duplicates AIS coverage through the same means and contributes very little to overall collection requirements, however, ZIPPER operates in a vacuum in that generally we do not provide them with information procured by any AIS or other agency, and ZIPPER requires this information for background data, current situations within the various countries, and the sundry other reasons an intelligence organization must possess detailed data to successfully conduct their assigned mission.

2. Most of the interrogators operating in the US Zone of Germany utilize POB sponsored cover as members of the "Historical Research Division, Statistical Branch," and has worked satisfactorily to date. The interrogators operating in the British Zone are under various German cover, i.e., VS, Ministerium fur Fluechtlingswesen, refugee camp officials, etc. ZIPPER is gradually effecting overall German cover, and will proceed as rapidly as the legalization of the ZIPPER organization.

3. The present policy regarding interrogations is to phase out the PW interrogation, place greater emphasis on refugee, returnee, illegal border crossers interrogations, and create a centrally controlled "Contacts Branch" type of debriefing of German officials who travel into the satellites for various reasons.

4. The program as presently constituted (it is extremely fluid in the number of interrogators) costs 94,650 DM per quarters.

5. The responsible POB case officer is

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VIA: AIR
(Specify air or sea pouch)

Dispatch No. EGL-A-4676

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

10 AUG 1953

To : Chief, EE

Date _____

Info: COM

FROM : Chief of Base, Pullach

SUBJECT: GENERAL- ZIPPER/Operational
SPECIFIC- Glossary

The attached glossary of numerical, letters, abbreviations and names of projects or of sections in use at POB 1946 to 1953 was compiled from old files and with the assistance of various members of POB. The names of individuals given in connection with various projects or administrative sections, are the names of the individuals who were originally associated with that project or section. This glossary does not claim to be complete; some dates were not known or arrived at by deduction rather than from records; and other items were remembered by POBers and did not come from the records. However, it is felt that this glossary will be of assistance to all individuals working with material on ZIPPER.

Approved:

7 August 1953

DIST:

- 3 - EE w/1 attach (3cy) - Direct
- 3 - COM w/1 attach (3cy)

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FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR 1949

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Numerical Designation	Description	Numerical Designation as used at FCB 1946 to 1953	Dates in Use	Aug. 1946 to
1	personnel section, headquarters, LOHME		15 Jul 49 to 19 Dec 49	32
3	organization group		15 Jul 49 - 1 Nov 49	33
7	operations, headquarters staff, SCHACK		15 Jul 49 - 4 Jan 51	31
13	general agency, WAIJNER Salzburg		15 Jul 49 - 14 Apr 50	GV A
17	Central European sub-hqtrs under 7, WAIJNER		15 Jul 49 - 1 Nov 49	dissolved
20	Mr. "Marshall" (compound name for)		25 Oct 49 - 24 Oct 50	25
22	district agency, Sovrone RITHEL , Esslingen		15 Jul 49 - 1 May 51	BF K
25	Mr. "Marshall"		24 Oct 50 - present	
25	when preceding a number indicates the American section opposite to the German section with that number			
27	sub-hqtrs under 7		Nov 48 - spring 49	
27	American operations staff		Oct 49 - Jan 52	25.38, 25.39
29	field offices		4 Jan 51 to present	
29.1	field office, Berlin		4 Jan 51 to present	
29.2	field office, Frankfurt/a		4 Jan 51 to present	
29.3	field office, Barchtesgaden		4 Jan 51 to present	
29.4	field office, Stuttgart		4 Jan 51 - 26 Feb 52	
30	Dr. "Schneider" (compound name for UTILITY)		25 Oct 49 to present	formerly 34
31	operations		1 Nov 49 - 4 Jan 51	formerly 7; some transferred 24 Oct 50; 38
32	personnel		1 Nov 49 to present	formerly 1
33	headquarters organization		1 Nov 49 to present	
33.3	"B" plan officer, CHRISTEN		7 to present	
33 Zu	courier section (murier)		1 Nov 49 to present	formerly 3 K
34	Dr. "Schneider"		15 Jul 49 - 25 Oct 49	became 30
34	special missions - they-blind net		4 Jan 51 to present	formerly F-24
35	special connections		15 Jul 49 to present	
36	communications, HALLER		1 Nov 49 to present	formerly H
37	finance, budget, administration		1 Nov 49 to present	
38	technical intelligence; Sovrone Germany		24 Oct 50 - 28 Nov 52	formerly part of 31; became 50D

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Numerical Designations as used at PCB 1946 to 1953

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39	strategic intelligence section, satellites/USSR	24 Oct 50 - 26 Nov 51	formerly part of 31, became 50S & 50R
40	CI/CS, KLAUSNER	24 Oct 50 to present	formerly LIII, 45/III, 40/III
40/A	deputy chief, CI/CS	Oct 50 to present	formerly 40/III
40/F	chief, CS branch	Oct 50 to present	formerly 40/III
40/F-1	CS officer	Oct 50 to present	
40/F-2	CS officer	Oct 50 to present	
40/P	chief, political branch	Oct 50 to present	formerly 40/PI
40/P-1	political intelligence officer	Oct 50 to present	formerly 45/P
40/PI	chief, political branch	to Oct 50	became 40/P
40/SI	security branch of 40	Oct 50 to present	formerly 40/Z and 40/III/Z
40/Z	incidents and tracing officer	Oct 50 to present	
40/K	chief, central card files	Oct 50 to present	formerly 40/III
40/3	chief, research and analysis	October 50 to present	
40/KP	communist party specialist	Oct 50 to present	formerly 40/III
40/S	satellite IS specialist	Oct 50 to present	formerly 40/III
40/3	CI economic section, illegal trade	Oct 50 to present	formerly 40/III
40/R	RIS specialist	Oct 50 to present (actually ceased to exist for brief period after estab. of 40/3)	
40/V	CI "government connections"		
40/IIIa	deputy chief, CI/CS	to Oct 50	became 40/A
40/IIIb	chief, CS branch	to Oct 50	became 40/F
40/III,1	communist party specialist	to Oct 50	became 40/KP
40/III,2	RIS specialist	to Oct 50	became 40/R
40/III,3	satellite IS specialist	to Oct 50	became 40/S
40/III,4	CI economic section, illegal trade	to Oct 50	became 40/3
40/III/Z	incidents and security	to Oct 50	became 40/Z and 40/SI
40/III/K	chief, central card files	to Oct 50	became 40/K
41	economic cover procurement "GERLACH"	15 Jul 49 to present	
43/No	MUGGER, Hans Felix		
42	legal matters, "GABLER"	4 Jan 51 to present	formerly 75
43	camp security	9 Apr 51 to present	formerly part of 67

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Numerical designations as used at POB 1946 to 1953:

- 3 -

44	intelligence activities in USSR, UBERDANK	21 Nov 51 - 28 Dec 51	formerly 39/R became 50/R
45	evaluation group	15 Jul 49 to present	
45.1	military evaluation, army		became 45H
45.1L	military evaluation, air		became 45L
45.1T	transportation and supply		became 45T/V
45.2	political evaluation		became 45/P
45.3	press evaluation		became 45Pr
45.5	translation		became 45D
45.7	economic evaluation		became 45E
45.6	"professors group"	1 Nov 47 - 31 Aug 49	dissolved
45.8	CI evaluation	prior to Oct 50	became 40/III
45 H	military evaluation, army	to present	formerly 45.1
45L	military evaluation, air	to present	formerly 45.1L
45 T/V	transportation and supply	to present	formerly 45.1T
45 P	political evaluation	to present	formerly 45.2
45 Pr	press evaluation	to present	formerly 45.3
45 D	translation section	to present	formerly 45.5
45 E	economic evaluation	to present	formerly 45.7
46	special intelligence advisor to 30, WEGMACK	26 Nov 51 to present	
50	positive operations	28 Nov 51 to present	formerly 38, 39 and 44
50 H	naval (Marine) sifting	28 Nov 51 - Oct 52	became 50/Sich/H
50 H	naval operations	Oct 52 to present	formerly 431
50/Sich/H	naval sifting	Oct 52 to present	formerly 50 H
56	agent radio operations system WBAHNER	15 Jul 49 - 1 Nov 49	became 136
57	radio monitoring system WBAHNER	15 Jul 49 - 1 Nov 49	became 236
60	psychological warfare, research and planning	Oct 52 to present	
66	sub agency, WENKEL, Tegernsee	Aug 46 - Nov 48	part became BV 7 of GV C, part became GV C
67	camp administration	15 Jul 49 to present	divided 9 Apr 55 into 67 and 43
75	administration and legal WEGMACK	15 Jul 49 - 4 Jan 51	became 42
97	district agency under 4711 ZAHN and GLASER/APP (deceased) Tegernsee	15 Jul 49 - ?	formerly Org 850 became BV 4B of

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Numerical designations as used at POB 1946 to 1953:

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99	field agency, CHENGL	1949 - 1 Nov 49(?)	became GV C
100	strategic planning, BREUER	ca. Apr 47	became 39 (then 50S)
101	district agency, Sovzone GROTH, Metzlar	15 Jul 49 - ?	? became GV G hqrs in Munich in 1953
102	district agency, Sovzone GEMMENS, Grossostheim	? - ?	became BV 80 of GV H
103	district agency, Sovzone GEROLL, Stuttgart	- 1 Jul 53	became DV 90 of GV II
107	training center, under operations, KOSNER, Lurnau	15 Jul 49 - 1 Nov 49	became 13I
114	CI field agency under LEIDL, Karlsruhe	15 Jul 49 - 1 Nov 49	became GV L
120	field agency, BOSSALT Stuttgart	Feb 47 - 14 Apr 50	GV E, BVS, CS
130	southwest German liaison, DEINERT, Stuttgart; existed as a small part of 29.4a	26 Feb 52 to present	
131	schools	1 Nov 49 to present	
136	agent radio system	1 Nov 49 to present	formerly 56
177	hqs. op NOETH, Garmisch "basket"	15 Jul 49 - 1 Nov 49	became sleeping net
178	district agency, subordinate to 120; SEIFERT, Chiemsee	Jun 46 - ?	
231	PW interrogations	24 Oct 50 - 28 Dec 51	became 50/V
236	monitoring system	1 Nov 49 to present	formerly 57
331	reproductions and documents	1 Nov 49 to present	formerly 9999
431	advisor on navy	1 Nov 49 - 1 Nov 52	formerly 785 became 50 M
500	org. headed by CHENGL	Jun 46 - 1 Nov 49	became GV II
531	hqs investigations team BREUER	1 Nov 49 to present	
631	screening of compromised agents	24 Oct 50 - 1 Oct 51	became 733
733	screening of compromised agents	15 Oct 51 to present	formerly 631
785	naval operations, DURHEIM, Bod Tualz	15 Jul 49 - 1 Nov 49	became 431
999	hqs operations	15 Jul 49 - ?	?

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Numerical designations as used at FOB 1946 to 1953:

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3000	Residentura - Bulgaria under 101	29 Jul 49 - ?	?
4711	agency, WROTH, Frankfurt/M	15 Jul 49 - 14 Apr 50	became GV G
4913	agency, WESCHLEFIER, Austria	15 Jul 49 - 14 Apr 50	became GV A,
8500	sub-org, GLASENAPP (deceased)	- 15 Jul 49	became sub org
9999	reproduction and documents, WESALBERG, Pullach	15 Jul 49 - 1 Nov 49	became 331

Latin numerals

I/V	hqs ops, operated the GVs WIKRAMER, and WEGENWALD	15 Jul 49 - ?
III/Pol	CI political	

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Letter Designations, Abbreviations and Names
in Use POB 1946 to 1953

6 Aug 53

(The letter designations were instituted about 1 Sept 1949 replacing the early numbering system. Staff personnel continued to have numbers.)

Designation	Description	Dates in Use	Changed to
BV	(Bezirks Vertretung), district field agency under a GV		
BV B	(BALLING), under GV G synonymous with B, placed under BV B in Jun 53	1 May 51 - Jun 53	
BV E		1 Sept 51 to present	formerly GV E
BV M	(Mitte)	1 May 51	
BV NB	(Nieder Bayern)	1 May 51	
BV S	(SCHAEFER) CI field unit in Austria, operationally under Sec 40, was originally under GV A		to present
BV 80	under GV II	3 Mar 52	
CS:	(Czechoslovakia - LEBER) executive agency of 50	4 Jan 51 to present	
F	Orf F, (Freedom or Fritz BARANOWSKI), field agency	1949	was project 57 dissolved
F-net	(Funk-net) stay-behind or sleeping net	1949 to 4 J in 51	became 34
Filiale	sub-agencies or nets under UVs	1949 to present	
G	Org. G (GLASERAP), under Org 5		to end Oct 48 became part of sub org 97
GV	(General Vertretung), general agency		
GV A	strategic, Austria/Satellites	1 Nov 49 - 1 Jun 51	dissolved
GV B	mostly tactical, some strategic	1 Jun 51 to present	
GV C	mostly strategic, some tactical	1 Jun 51 to present	
GV E	tactical, over BV B, BV L and BV NB	1 Nov 49 - 14 Sept 51	became BV E/ tactical and strategic
GV G	mostly tactical, some strategic	1 Nov 49 to present	
GV H	mostly tactical, some strategic	1 Nov 49 to present	formerly 500
GV L	CI/CE field agency, operationally under Sec 40	1 Nov 49 to present	
II	Hauskapelle, under I/III	15 Jul 49 - 1 Nov 49	became 531
H	(Heer), army		
HRF	sub orgs under GV C	- Apr 50	UVs
Haupt Forscher Gruppe MALLNER	forscher for Sec 50	1 Jun 51 to present	

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Letter designations, abbreviations and names, in use from 1949 to 1952

- 2 -

K (or GV K)	field agency, K/WILHELM also called "basket"	1949 - 1 Nov 49	became GV II
K (or 40/K)	(kartei) central card files		
K or Ku	(Kurier), courier, was under 3	15 Jul 49 - 1 Nov 49	became 33 Ku
Project Kranich	- stay-behind net	1949 to Jan 51	became 34
Residentura K	- was under 101	26 Jul 49 - ?	
L	(Luft), air		
L-I	hqs ops section (Leiter - I, I type work)	15 Jul 49 - ?	
L/III	hqs CI section (III type work)	15 Jul 49 - 24 Oct 50	became 40
MEZ	(Mitte Europaische Zentrum) field agency under WILHELM	fall 1946 - 15 Jul 49	became GV A
MF	independent agency	1 Nov 49 - ?	
MK	(Haldekopf) communications center		
MK Berlin	communications center, Berlin on 26 Feb 52 became Berlin field office (however this never appears to have taken over)	1949 to present	
N	(Nachrichten), communications existed as a section prior to 1 Nov 49, became 36		
PE	(Polen - GELBERT) executive agency of 50 for satellites	4 Jan 51 to present	
39/PI	planning section	15 Jul 49 - 1 Nov 51	part of 50
Q	(Quelle), source evaluation	15 Jul 49 - 1 Nov 51	50/Q
RB	(Russland - BALLING), executive agency of 50	Nov 51 to present	previously BV
RL	(Russland - LEITNER), executive agency of 50; Baltic ops	April 52 to present	
SI	(Sicherheit) security		
Res S-Y	sub org	to 14 Apr 50	became UV Y of GV C
Stein gruppe	unattached group in Berlin	26 Jul 49 - ?	
T	transportation		
UM	(Ungarn - MAYER) was under GV A 1 Sept 51 to present now executive agency of 50; Hungary and Sovzone Austria ops		
UV	(Unter Vertretung) sub agencies under BVs	Apr 50 to present	
WI	(Wirtschaft), economic		