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# DRAFT WORKING PAPER

DoJ/OSI

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
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Chapter Eighteen

## Belorussians, *60 Minutes*, and the GAO's Second Investigation (U)

The news exploded in the national headlines in May 1982. A CBS *60 Minutes* television report appeared to offer conclusive evidence that the Central Intelligence Agency and other US Government agencies, including the Army, the State Department, and the FBI, had employed Nazi war criminals and brought them to the United States after the war. These same agencies, according to the broadcast, also covered up their role in dealing with Nazi war criminals during the General Accounting Office investigation from 1977 to 1978. The *60 Minutes* segment, "The Nazi Connection," aired on national television on 16 May 1982 and ignited a firestorm. (U)

John Loftus devoted his brief career in the Office of Special Investigations to pursuing theories involving American intelligence and Eastern European collaborators. He joined OSI in 1979 and focused on the relationship between a particular faction of Nazi collaborators, those from Belorussia, or White Russia, and their presence in the United States in the years after the war. In a five-page letter to OGC's [ ] the CIA liaison to the Office of Special Investigations, Loftus outlined his knowledge of the Nazi "Belarus" unit and its members.<sup>1</sup> (S)

FOR COORDINATION WITH DoJ/OSI

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<sup>1</sup>John J. Loftus, OSI to [ ] OGC, "Nazi War Crimes Investigation-BELARUS File," 31 July 1979, (S), in OGC Records, [ ] Box 1, Folder 10, CIA ARC. (S)

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Loftus's July 1979 letter served as the basis for his actions over the next few years. In his correspondence with [redacted] Loftus requested access to CIA records to determine the validity of his three hypotheses. His "best case hypothesis," as Loftus described it, would reveal that "no Belarus conspiracy" existed and that the Office of Strategic Services had no connection with the White Russian collaborators either during or after the war. In this case, Loftus believed that the fact that Emanuel Jasiuk, one of the key Belorussian figures, had provided intelligence to the United States after the war would be simply coincidental. Consequently, prosecution of the Belorussian collaborators in the United States would be relatively straightforward and not involve national security interests.<sup>2</sup> (S)

On the other hand, Loftus's two other hypotheses involved significant ties among the Belorussians, their Nazi supporters, and the United States Government. His "worst case hypothesis," in fact, projected that the [existence of the] Belarus net had existed with the help of OSS. In order to ascertain the depth of American involvement, Loftus requested a search through CIA records for a number of individuals and groups, including Jasiuk, John Awdziej, Radislaw Ostrowsky, Frank Kushel, George Sabolewski, John Kosiak, and Dr. Nicholas Scors. All of these men had belonged to the White Russian Council and later immigrated to the United States.<sup>3</sup> (S)

The Loftus letter prompted [redacted] to search through Agency components for information on the various names and organizations—the first of many searches that CIA

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<sup>2</sup>Ibid. (S)

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conducted on Loftus's behalf.<sup>4</sup> Loftus followed up this request with another in August, seeking indexes to German records that may have ended up in CIA's possession. He also desired information concerning the American Committee for the Liberation from Bolshevism that, according to Loftus, funded the Belarus group during the Cold War.<sup>5</sup> While it appears that [redacted] did not pursue this latter request, he did obtain some results from Agency offices, primarily the Office of Security, concerning Loftus's July memorandum. CIA's Office of Security found scattered references in its files to two of the Belarus figures.<sup>6</sup> (S)

### The Hunt for the Belarus Files (U)

The Agency never formally answered Loftus's July or August 1979 memoranda. In fact, in November, the Agency returned Loftus's correspondence to Martin

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<sup>3</sup>Ibid. (S)

<sup>4</sup>[redacted] to Executive Secretary et al, "Nazi War Criminal Investigation-Belarus SS and Emanuel Jasiuk," OGC 79-07322, (S), in OGC Records, [redacted] Box 1, Folder 10, CIA ARC. (S)

<sup>5</sup>Loftus to [redacted], "Nazi War Crimes Investigations: Belarus," 10 August 1979, OGC 79-07473, (C), in OGC Records, [redacted] Box 1, Folder 10, CIA ARC. (C)

<sup>6</sup>[redacted] Deputy Director of Security, to [redacted] "Nazi War Criminals Investigation-Belarus SS and Emanuel Jasiuk," 24 August 1979, (S). The Directorate of Operations did not respond directly to [redacted] memorandum because it claimed that it needed legal advice on providing information on US citizens to other government agencies. See [redacted] IMS/FOIA Privacy and Litigation Group to [redacted] Chief, OG/External Inquiries Research Section, "Department of Justice Inquiry-Nazi War Criminal Investigation - Belarus SS and Emanuel Jasiuk," 31 August 1979, OGC 79-08050, both documents in OGC Records, [redacted] Box 1, Folder 10, CIA ARC. (S)

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Mendelsohn at OSI.<sup>7</sup> The arrival of Allan A. Ryan, Jr., OSI's new director in the spring of 1980, rejuvenated the Belarus investigation. On 7 April, Ryan provided the CIA with an expanded list of suspects to be reviewed. "We are particularly looking for information," the new director stated, "which discusses the subjects' activities and memberships in the quisling government of Byelorussia during Nazi occupation." In addition, Ryan sought "any information which tends to establish a connection between these subjects and certain Russian emigre groups which collaborated with the western allies in various postwar attempts to establish intelligence systems in the subjects' country of origin."<sup>8</sup> (S)

Following Loftus's earlier lead, Ryan also took up the matter of access to indices pertaining to World War II records in CIA's possession. Ryan placed particular importance on a name or place index for the *Einsatzgruppen*, the German SD, and any material collected after the war by the Gehlen Organization. He also sought OSS intelligence reports and any postwar refugee interview programs operated by the Office of

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<sup>7</sup> [redacted], Associate General Counsel to Martin Mendelsohn, OSI, 6 November 1979, OGC 79-10070, (C), in OGC Records, [redacted], Box 1, Folder 10, CIA ARC. A discussion with [redacted], now retired from CIA, reveals that OGC underwent a tremendous expansion in terms of its workload and personnel in 1979. The Nazi war criminal investigations consumed a large amount of time and resources that were not necessarily always available. Requests, such as Loftus's Belarus case, did not receive the highest priority; consequently, it took months to respond in some cases. Discussion with [redacted], 6 June 1995. (C)

<sup>8</sup>Ryan to [redacted] OGC, 7 April 1980, OGC 80-03057, (S), in OGC Records, [redacted], Box 1, Folder 10, CIA ARC. (S)

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Policy Coordination or the military. OSI planned to use the indices to find the original records for its investigations.<sup>9</sup> (U)

The pace picked up in the summer of 1980 when Richard Sullivan, OSI's assistant deputy director, told ██████████ OGC's new liaison with OSI, that the Belorussians had top priority with OSI.<sup>10</sup> At a meeting on 21 July, John Loftus claimed that information from other sources indicated that the CIA had an interest in a number of the Belorussian individuals and groups.<sup>11</sup> ██████████ who still had not received the full results of the name traces that Ryan had asked for in April, could not answer whether allegations of Agency involvement would have any impact on OSI's judicial proceedings.<sup>12</sup> (S)

By the beginning of August, ██████████ had enough information from the Agency's files to share with Loftus. In a meeting on 5 August 1980, ██████████ reviewed the name trace results, which demonstrated that, while the CIA had files on some of the

<sup>9</sup>Ryan to ██████████, 20 May 1980, in DO Records, ██████████, Box 1, Folder 3, CIA ARC. (U)

<sup>10</sup>Handwritten notes of a 25 July 1980 discussion between ██████████ and Sullivan reveal OSI's interest in the Belorussians. (U)

<sup>11</sup>See ██████████ to ██████████, Chief, IMS/FPLG, and ██████████, OS/SAG, "OSI Investigation of Byelorussian Subjects," 24 July 1980, in DO Records, ██████████, Box 1, Folder 3, CIA ARC. Loftus apparently referred to copies of CIA documents in Displaced Persons Commission records regarding the immigration of certain Belorussians. Copies of these DPC documents are found in ██████████ to ██████████ "Additional Information Concerning OSI Name Trace Request—Byelorussia [sic]," 31 July 1980, (S), in DO Records, ██████████, Box 1, Folder 3, CIA ARC. (S)

<sup>12</sup>The DO, in fact, did not start its name traces on the 17 Belorussians (including 10 that had been traced before) until 18 July 1980. See ██████████, IMS/FOIA, Privacy and Litigation Group, to ██████████, Chief, IMS/Operations Group, External Inquiries Research Section, "Request Traces on Ten Byelo-Russians [sic]," 18 July 1980, (S), in DO Records, ██████████, Box 1, Folder 3, CIA ARC. (S)

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Byelorussians, actual contact was limited.<sup>13</sup> The Agency, however, still could not provide Loftus with copies of the files, and the Department of Justice pressed CIA to hasten its review.<sup>14</sup> In the meantime, Loftus told [redacted] in September that OSI planned to file suit against five of the Belorussians "in the near future."<sup>15</sup> Loftus finally reviewed nine of the sanitized files at CIA's headquarters by early October.<sup>16</sup> (S)

### Growing Doubts (U)

By this point, the CIA began to wonder about Loftus's methodology and ultimate goals. As early as August, [redacted] from the DO had expressed his concerns to [redacted] in OGC that Loftus had a "clear misunderstanding of the early structure of CIA."

In an effort to assist Loftus, [redacted] contacted Richard Sullivan at OSI to schedule a

<sup>13</sup>See handwritten note dated 5 August 1980 by [redacted] concerning [redacted] notes on the files in DO Records, [redacted], Box 1, Folder 3, CIA ARC. [redacted] actual notes are attached and are also located in OGC Records, [redacted] Box 1, Folder 10, CIA ARC. (U)

<sup>14</sup>[redacted] to [redacted] and [redacted], Office of Security, "OSI Request for Information on Byelorussian [sic] War Criminals," 11 September 1980, in DO Records, [redacted], Box 1, Folder 3, CIA ARC. (U)

<sup>15</sup>[redacted] to [redacted], OGC, "OSI Investigation of Byelorussian [sic] War Criminals," 22 September 1980, in OGC Records, [redacted] Box 1, Folder 10, CIA ARC. (U)

<sup>16</sup>For copies of Loftus's notes from these visits, see [redacted], OGC, to Sullivan, OSI, 3 October 1980, OGC 80-08547, (S), and [redacted] to [redacted] "OSI Notes on Alleged Nazi War Criminals," 6 October 1980, (S), both in DO Records, [redacted], Box 4, Folder 1, CIA ARC. Loftus had already reviewed the DO's files on Radislaw Ostrowsky in August. See [redacted] to Sullivan, 25 August 1980, OGC 80-07331, (C), in OGC Records, [redacted], Box 1, Folder 10, CIA ARC. (S)

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briefing on CIA's historical antecedents.<sup>17</sup> The Agency, in addition, grew worried that Loftus's inquiries about the anticommunist group, the NTS, could affect the CIA's ongoing relationship with that organization.<sup>18</sup> (S)

Loftus tipped his hand to [redacted] [redacted] of the DO's Information Management Staff in late October 1980 while reviewing sanitized documents about the Belorussians. [redacted] [redacted] then reported that Loftus had told her that the Army's Counter Intelligence Corps had withheld derogatory information from the Immigration and Naturalization Service when a number of the Belorussians came to the United States. At the same time, some of these Belorussians, according to Loftus, gained employment with Radio Liberty in Germany, then under CIA sponsorship. Consequently, Loftus believed, that the CIA must have been aware of the records of the White Russians, although this information had somehow been "deliberately removed" from the Agency's files. Loftus alleged that Frank Wisner and certain CIC officers who later joined OPC had perpetrated this purge of the two files.<sup>19</sup> (U)

Loftus had already informed his superiors within the Department of Justice, and he expected that his research would result in expanded Congressional interest. In order to ascertain the truth behind his theories, Loftus asked [redacted] [redacted] for more records on a

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<sup>17</sup> [redacted] [redacted] to [redacted] [redacted] 22 August 1980, (C), in DO Records, [redacted] [redacted] Box 1, Folder 3, CIA ARC. (C)

<sup>18</sup> [redacted] [redacted], IAD/CAS/SOI, to [redacted] [redacted], "DOJ/OSI Investigation of Belorussian Emigres," 19 September 1980, (S), in DO Records, [redacted] [redacted] Box 1, Folder 3, CIA ARC. (S)

<sup>19</sup> [redacted] [redacted]. Memorandum for the Record, "Department of Justice Investigation of Nazi War Criminals," 28 October 1980, in DO Records, [redacted] [redacted], Box 1, Folder 4, CIA ARC. (U)

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number of organizations supported by CIA during the 1950s.<sup>20</sup> [redacted] superiors recognized that the Belarus case had "the potential for another mudslinging contest vs. us" and recommended immediate action.<sup>21</sup> [redacted] chief of the Information Management Staff, notified the acting Deputy Director for Operations about Loftus's findings. "If Mr. Loftus is correct in his observations," [redacted] warned, "it is going to require a great amount of work within the DO to ferret out information requested on alleged Nazi war criminals." [redacted] added "Mr. Loftus' statement that information was deliberately removed from the files and that Frank Wisner was involved with others in this deception is a serious allegation."<sup>22</sup> (C)

At another meeting in early November 1980, Loftus reiterated his claims that the Agency could be held criminally liable if it had not informed immigration authorities about the information within its files on the Belorussians. Loftus presented a new list of questions about one Belorussian, Stanislau Stankievich, and demanded that CIA provide answers within a week.<sup>23</sup> Loftus's demands prompted the Agency, both within the DO and OGC, to determine how it should deal with the larger issues presented by the various Belorussian groups and Radio Liberty. The DO, in fact, expressed its willingness to

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<sup>20</sup>Ibid. (U)

<sup>21</sup>"Official Routing Slip" attached to above-cited document signed by "SBE" (probably [redacted] acting deputy chief of the Freedom, Privacy and Litigation Group). (U)

<sup>22</sup> [redacted], Chief, Information Management Staff to Acting Deputy Director for Operations, "Department of Justice Investigation of Alleged Nazi War Criminals," 29 October 1980, DO/IMS 80-498, (C), in DO Records, [redacted], Box 1, Folder 4, CIA ARC. (C)

<sup>23</sup> [redacted] Memorandum for the Record, "November 5 Meeting with John Loftus of OSI Re: Dr. Stanislau Stankevich, OSI No. 374/11," 7 November 1980, OGC 80-09679, (S), in DO Records, [redacted], Box 1, Folder 5, CIA ARC. (S)



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allow Loftus to review its records at CIA headquarters after signing a secrecy agreement.

The Office of General Counsel came to the same conclusion as the DO.<sup>24</sup> (S)

### A Low-Key Approach (U)

Agency officers would soon have second thoughts. By early December, [redacted] reported that the DO had identified some 80 files pertaining to Loftus's inquiries.<sup>25</sup> But events were beginning to convince the Agency that Loftus's Belarus investigation perhaps reflected a personal agenda. When Loftus told [redacted] in late October about his theories regarding Wisner, he also stated that OSI could reimburse CIA for the additional research costs entailed by his investigation. As it turned out, [redacted] in speaking with Loftus's supervisor, Richard Sullivan, learned that he had extended this

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<sup>24</sup> [redacted] to [redacted], OGC, "Mr. John Loftus' (DOJ) Review of DO Materials," [undated draft secrecy agreement], in DO Records, [redacted], Box 1, Folder 5, CIA ARC. See also [redacted], Memorandum for My Files, "Meeting with [redacted], [redacted] [redacted], and [redacted] re: OSI Request for Radio Liberty Operational Files, 6 November 1980," 10 November 1980, (S); and [redacted] to [redacted] "OSI/DOJ Request for Access to Radio Liberty and Other Related Operational Files," 13 November 1980, OGC 80-09786, (C), all in OGC Records, [redacted], Box 1, Folder 5, CIA ARC. The latter document contains a list of all the Belorussian organizations that Loftus wanted CIA to check. The DO subsequently transmitted this information for traces in [redacted] IMS/FOIA, Privacy and Litigation Group, to [redacted] IMS/Operations Group, "Department of Justice Request for Information on Key Byelorussian [sic] Organizations," 14 November 1980, (S), in DO Records, [redacted], Box 1, Folder 5, CIA ARC. (S)

<sup>25</sup> [redacted] to Chief, ALD, "Request for Information on Dr. Stanislaw Stankevich from Mr. John Loftus, OSI/DOJ," 9 December 1980, OGC 80-10579, (S), in OGC Records, [redacted], Box 1, Folder 5, CIA ARC. (S)

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offer without OSI's approval.<sup>26</sup> At the same time, OGC's [redacted] found that Mark M. Richard, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, knew nothing of Loftus's theories. Richard promised to corroborate Loftus's claims with the director of the Office of Special Investigations and report his findings to the CIA. As a result of these developments, [redacted] recommended that the Agency maintain a "low-key" approach in responding to Loftus's demands.<sup>27</sup> (C)

Despite growing uncertainty about Loftus, the Agency continued to search its records in response to his far-reaching requests. In mid-January 1981, the DO completed its traces on the various Belorussian groups. After a meeting between OGC and OSI on 19 January 1981, Allan A. Ryan, Jr., confirmed that Loftus had properly submitted his lengthy request. Ryan wanted to avoid the problems that OSI had recently encountered during the Soobzokov suit. "The Office of Special Investigations is seeking this information," Ryan noted, "only to determine whether the CIA's prior knowledge or actions will affect litigation to denaturalize citizens who misrepresented their backgrounds at the time they applied for visas and American citizenship." Ryan also

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<sup>26</sup> [redacted] to [redacted] "OSI/DOJ Request for Access to Radio Liberty and Other Related Operational Files," 13 November 1980, OGC 80-09786, (C), in OGC Records, [redacted] Box 1, Folder 5, CIA ARC. (C)

<sup>27</sup> [redacted], Memorandum for the Record, "Nazi War Criminals Case," 24 November 1980, in DO Records, [redacted] Box 1, Folder 5, CIA ARC. (U)

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added 13 more questions, which included requests for information on some 20 different Eastern European wartime and postwar groups.<sup>28</sup> (S)

☐ ☐ replied to Ryan's letter in March with some surprise. ☐ ☐ explained that the Agency had identified some 3,500 separate files dealing with Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, for instance, and explained that the new questions would be tough to answer. "It had been my hope," the OGC attorney wrote, "that it would be possible to have Mr. Loftus, armed with a more focused and much redacted list of questions," to speed up the investigation. Instead, as ☐ ☐ saw it, Ryan and Loftus had made the investigation more complicated.<sup>29</sup> In further meetings, Loftus insisted that the Agency had more information in its files than CIA's records managers could find.<sup>30</sup> (S)

### The Belarus Secret (U)

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<sup>28</sup>Ryan to ☐ ☐ 27 January 1981, OGC 81-00778, (S), in DO Records, ☐ ☐, Box 1, Folder 6, CIA ARC. Notes of this meeting are found in ☐ ☐, "19 January 1981 Meeting," in OGC Records, ☐ ☐, Box 1, Folder 4, CIA ARC. (S)

<sup>29</sup>☐ ☐ to Ryan, 13 March 1981, OGC 81-02066, (S). The DO's reaction is found in ☐ ☐ to DDO, "Department of Justice Investigation of Alleged Nazi War Criminals," 2 April 1981 (later sent under a 17 April 1981 date), (S), both documents in DO Records, ☐ ☐, Box 1, Folder 6, CIA ARC. (S)

<sup>30</sup>Loftus insisted that the CIA had the "Gehlen files," although the Agency claimed not to have found anything in its records, and it promised to keep searching at meetings with Loftus on 25 and 27 March 1981. See ☐ ☐; Memorandum for the Record, "Alleged Nazi War Criminals - DOJ Investigation," 27 March 1981, and ☐ ☐, Memorandum for the Record, "Nazi War Criminals - Meeting with OSI/DOJ," 26 March 1981, both in DO Records, ☐ ☐ Box 1, Folder 6, CIA ARC. See also ☐ ☐, "25 March 1981 Meeting," 13 April 1981, (S), in OGC Records, ☐ ☐, Box 1, Folder 4, CIA ARC. Loftus also checked on the "Gehlen files" in other government repositories. ☐ ☐, Memorandum for the Record, "OSI Investigation of

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The Belarus case took an unusual turn when OGC learned that John Loftus had resigned from OSI on 22 May 1981. [redacted] [redacted] the CIA attorney handling the Nazi war criminal investigations, consequently urged the DO and the Office of Security to halt their "fairly extensive" searches, with the exception of the name traces on the 17 Belorussians. [redacted] [redacted] soon learned that Loftus planned to return to private practice in Boston and hoped to complete his book on the Belorussians by October 1982. Loftus told [redacted] [redacted] that "I think that the book will reflect well on the CIA. I am finally convinced that CIA really had nothing to do with the Nazi smuggling rings in Germany."<sup>31</sup> (S)

Loftus soon provided the Agency with a copy of his first five chapters. [redacted]

[redacted] looked at them and found they contained no classified material.<sup>32</sup> In August, the Agency finished its security review of Loftus's manuscript and asked for clarification on several matters. [redacted] [redacted] urged her colleagues to "please advise Mr. Loftus that no attempt has been made to correct any of the factual inaccuracies in his manuscript." The Agency's review did not constitute "acceptance, acknowledgment or approval of the contents," the Directorate of Operations cautioned.<sup>33</sup> (S)

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Alleged Nazi War Criminals," 9 April 1981, in DO Records. [redacted] [redacted] Box 1, Folder 6, CIA ARC. (S)

<sup>31</sup>Loftus to [redacted] [redacted] Routing and Transmittal Slip, 8 June 1981, OGC 81-04878, in DO Records, [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] Box 1, Folder 6, CIA ARC. (U)

<sup>32</sup>[redacted] [redacted] Memorandum for the Record, "Draft Chapters of 'BELARUS' by John Loftus," 15 June 1981, in DO Records, [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] Box 1, Folder 6, CIA ARC. (U)

<sup>33</sup>Correspondence concerning the classification review of the Loftus manuscript is found in [redacted] [redacted] to [redacted] [redacted] "Review of the John Loftus Manuscript 'Belarus'," 3 August 1981, IMS/FPLG-81/29, (S); Loftus to [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [undated]; and [redacted] [redacted] to [redacted] [redacted] "Review of the John Loftus Manuscript 'Belarus,'" 21 August 1981, IMS/FPLG-81/63; all documents in DO Records, [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] Box 1, Folder 6, CIA ARC. See also [redacted] [redacted] to Mark M. Richard,

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While the Agency may have felt relief over Loftus's departure, the spring of 1982 brought a new development. In an effort to promote the upcoming release of his book, *The Belarus Secret*, Loftus took his story to *60 Minutes*, the respected CBS Television news series seen by millions of Americans every Sunday evening. In a segment broadcast on 16 May 1982, Loftus summarized his main theories. He claimed that "State Department intelligence" had smuggled Nazi war criminals and collaborators into the United States after World War II. Using the Belorussians as an example, he stated that the Office of Policy Coordination, under Frank Wisner and Allen Dulles, had directed the effort to form secret armies to fight communism behind the Iron Curtain.<sup>34</sup> (U)

According to Loftus, the State Department, in conjunction with the US Army and the Displaced Persons Commission, participated in a smuggling operation between Europe and the United States. Many of the Belorussians, he said, settled in South River, New Jersey. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty in West Germany also sheltered pro-Nazi figures.<sup>35</sup> Loftus also charged the Army with trying to conceal its relationship with several Belorussians as late as the 1977-78 General Accounting Office investigation. 60

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Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice, 21 September 1981, OGC 81-08098, (S), in OGC Records, [redacted], Box 1, Folder 4, CIA ARC. Ryan told the CIA that the views expressed by Loftus did not necessarily represent those of the Office of Special Investigations or of the Department of Justice. See Ryan to [redacted], 12 August 1981, in the same job as above. (S)

<sup>34</sup>Loftus placed OPC within State Department channels, as opposed to its actually being an element of the CIA. He also cited C.D. Jackson, Nelson Rockefeller, and Richard M. Nixon as knowledgeable participants in the use of Nazi war criminals. "Nazi Connection," produced by Ira Rosen and broadcast on CBS *60 Minutes* with Mike Wallace on 16 May 1982. (U)

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*Minutes* interviewed a number of individuals, including John Tipton, GAO's leading investigator, who now expressed his belief that Federal agencies had lied to Congress during his recently completed investigation.<sup>36</sup> (U)

### **The 60 Minutes Shock (U)**

Loftus's charges created a public relations crisis for the Central Intelligence Agency.<sup>37</sup> Congressional figures were shocked at the latest scandal involving the CIA and other Federal agencies. Rep. Barney Frank (D-MA), who was interviewed on *60 Minutes*, wrote William J. Casey, the Director of Central Intelligence, on 14 May 1982 to request all Agency records pertaining to Nazi war criminals.<sup>38</sup> Other Congressmen took up the call to reopen the Nazi war crimes investigations. Rep. Peter W. Rodino, Jr., (D-NJ) chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, requested that the General Accounting Office examine Loftus's claims that Federal agencies had withheld

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<sup>35</sup>For a reaction to the charges made by Loftus against the radios, see Gene Sosin, *Sparks of Liberty: An Insider's Memoir of Radio Liberty* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), pp. 185-187. (U)

<sup>36</sup>"Nazi Connection," *60 Minutes*, 16 May 1982. (U)

<sup>37</sup>The *Washington Post* closely followed the *60 Minutes* story, see Dale Russakoff, "American Officials Accused of Aiding Nazi Collaborators," *Washington Post*, 17 May 1982, pp. A1 and A6; Thomas O'Toole and Morton Mintz, "US Probes Report Nazi Collaborators Were Helped to Immigrate," *Washington Post*, 18 May 1982, p. A3; Thomas O'Toole, "Nazis Brought to US to Work against Soviets in Cold War," *Washington Post*, 20 May 1982, pp. A1 and A20; and Thomas O'Toole, "The Secret under the Little Cemetery," *Washington Post*, 23 May 1982, pp. A1 and A5. (U)

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information from GAO investigators during 1977-78.<sup>39</sup> Sen. Daniel P. Moynihan (D-NY) supported a similar move in the Senate.<sup>40</sup> (U)

The Federal agencies, tainted by the *60 Minutes* report, scrambled to determine the validity of Loftus's charges. Allen A. Ryan, Jr., director of the Office of Special Investigations, refused to answer questions related to the broadcast. He simply stated, "to the best of my knowledge, no files were withheld from us."<sup>41</sup> The State Department insisted that it had "cooperated fully" with both the GAO and OSI investigations but was reviewing files in response to the new allegations.<sup>42</sup> The Central Intelligence Agency took steps to provide information about its role in the Nazi war criminal investigations. On 18 May 1982, Agency officials from OGC and the DO briefed the counsel of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI).<sup>43</sup> (S)

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<sup>38</sup>Frank to Casey, 14 May 1982, in DO Records, [redacted], Box 1, Folder 7, CIA ARC. See also Madelyn Miller, "Congressman Wants to Probe Report that US Recruited Nazis after War," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, 18 May 1982, p. 3A. (U)

<sup>39</sup>Thomas O'Toole, "Rodino Asks GAO to Reopen Probe on Nazis," *Washington Post*, 19 May 1982, p. A4; and Ralph Blumenthal, "Possible Cover-Up to Shield Nazis is Focus of Renewed US Inquiry," *New York Times*, 23 May 1982, p. 1. (U)

<sup>40</sup>"Moynihan Urges Probe of Postwar Nazi Asylum," *Washington Post*, 21 May 1982, p. A16. (U)

<sup>41</sup>Joan Vennoch, "Investigation of Pro-Nazis Defended," *Boston Globe*, 18 May 1982, p. 12. (U)

<sup>42</sup>United Press International, "State Scurries to Review Files in Wake of Nazi Cover Up Charges," *Washington Times*, 18 May 1982, p. 3A. See also Philip Taubman, "Agencies Deny Slowing an Inquiry on US Use of Nazi Collaborators," *New York Times*, 18 May 1982, p. A14. (U)

<sup>43</sup>[redacted], Deputy General Counsel, to Executive Director, "Allegations Concerning US Government Assistance in Immigration/Naturalization of Alleged Nazi War Criminals," 21 May 1982, OGC 82-05021, (S), in DO Records, [redacted], Box 1, Folder 7, CIA ARC. (S)

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Perhaps the most important measures that the Agency took involved the DCI's direct approach to Rep. Edward P. Boland, (D-MA) chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), Rep. Romano L. Mazzoli, (D- KY) chairman of HPSCI's Subcommittee on Legislation, and Sen. Barry M. Goldwater, (R-AZ ) Boland's counterpart on the SSCI. Rather than wait for Congressional leaders to contact the Agency about the charges, Casey offered assurances that the Agency had "spent considerable time reviewing its files for information about former Nazis who entered the United States." The Director also forwarded a copy of a report prepared by [redacted]

[redacted] of OGC that summarized the Agency's role in the investigations.<sup>44</sup> (S)

According to [redacted] report, GAO and OSI had requested name traces on some 500-odd individuals over the past several years. Of these traces, the Agency reported that it had records on approximately 80 persons and contact with about half of that number. The report briefly explained its ties to eight of those personalities, including Gustav Hilger, Otto von Bolschwing, and two of the Belorussians, Stanislau Stankevich and Nikola Abramtchik. It also described the administrative history of the Office of Policy Coordination and its relationship to the CIA.<sup>45</sup> (S)

### The GAO Reopens Its Investigation (U)

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<sup>44</sup>Casey to Boland, 26 May 1982, Executive Registry 82-5044/2, (S), in DO Records, [redacted] [redacted], Box 1, Folder 7, CIA ARC. Letters and staff reports to Goldwater and Mazzoli are located in OGC Records, [redacted] [redacted], Box 1, Folder 3, CIA ARC. (S)



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With pressure mounting from the public, media, and Congress to expand the Nazi war criminal investigations, representatives from Legislative Liaison Division, Public Affairs Office, Office of General Counsel, the Office of Security, and the Directorate of Operations met on 4 June 1982 to plan a collective response to Congressional inquiries. The group decided to pattern a new memorandum of agreement with Congress and the GAO after the 1978 example. At this point, the Agency did not know how any new investigations would differ from OSI's ongoing investigation.<sup>46</sup> (S)

The General Accounting Office soon approached DCI Casey with a plan to reopen its investigation.<sup>47</sup> John R. Tipton, one of the GAO's principal investigators during 1977-78, acted as Conahan's project manager. He sought all CIA and "third party" records dealing with Nazi war criminals and their employment by American intelligence. Tipton also wanted to review documents relating to the immigration of these suspects and any evidence that the CIA had failed to provide information during the first round of investigations.<sup>48</sup> Tipton told CIA officials that he wanted to avoid the problems that had resulted from the procedures employed by CIA during the first investigation. (U)

☐ ☐, the chief of the FOIA, Privacy and Litigation Group, agreed to allow the GAO full access to all files and to place "third agency" material into

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<sup>45</sup>Ibid. (S)

<sup>46</sup>☐ ☐, Memorandum for the Record, "Preparations for GAO/Congressional Investigation of Alleged Illegal Entry of Nazi War Criminals into the US," 8 June 1982, (S), in DO Records, ☐ ☐, Box 8, Folder 170, CIA ARC. (S)

<sup>47</sup>Conahan to Casey, 23 June 1982, in DO Records, ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Box 8, Folder 170, CIA ARC. (U)

<sup>48</sup>Ibid. (U)

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separately marked envelopes for the investigators. [ ] concession marked an important change from the 1977-78 investigation, in which the CIA provided sanitized copies for the investigators. Under the new approach, the GAO could review all files directly, without intermediaries. The Agency, in particular the DO, took this measure to "lay this matter to rest for once and for all." By mid-September, the CIA and GAO agreed to the guidelines for the investigation.<sup>49</sup> (U)

The renewed interest in the Nazi war criminal subject also generated debate about the numbers of war criminals and collaborators who entered the United States.<sup>50</sup> Loftus initially claimed that some 300 Belorussians arrived in America while others believed that US intelligence may have allowed up to 5,000 to enter the country. In any case, that remained just one of the questions that the GAO would grapple with over the next two and one-half years. The GAO investigation commenced on 9 September 1982 when

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<sup>49</sup>[ ] Memorandum for the Record, "Meeting with GAO Staff Members Re Investigation," 8 July 1982, IMS/FPLG 82/136, (S); [ ] to [ ] Chief, OS/SAG, "DO Material to be Made Available to GAO Investigators," 16 July 1982, IMS/FPLG 82/146, (C); [ ] to [ ] OS Material to be Made Available to GAO Investigators," 29 July 1982, (C); and Memorandum of Understanding between the General Accounting Office and the Central Intelligence Agency, 13 September 1982, all in DO Records, [ ] Box 8, Folder 170, CIA ARC. The Agency held a meeting with its FBI counterparts who were "appalled" that the CIA would allow the GAO to have open access to its files. See [ ] Memorandum for the Record, "Meeting with FBI re Procedures for Providing Material to GAO Investigating Alleged Nazis in the United States," [undated, c. 27 July 1982], in DO Records, [ ] Box 8, Folder 170, CIA ARC. (S)

<sup>50</sup>Thomas O'Toole, "America Long a Haven for Nazi Foes of Soviet," *Washington Post*, 9 July 1982, p. A3. (U)

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Tipton returned the signed memorandum of agreement with a list of organizations and individuals for CIA to trace.<sup>51</sup> (U)

### Interviewing Former Employees (U)

Unlike the 1977-78 investigation, the GAO also undertook to interview retired CIA employees about events that had occurred since the end of World War II. In January 1983, Tipton submitted a list of 50 retired CIA officials, including prominent individuals such as Richard Helms, James Angleton, and Harry Rositzke, who had influenced the Agency's development. This request raised some concern within the CIA because the Agency felt unable to verify or document what might be revealed in an interview.<sup>52</sup> In fairly rapid time, however, the Agency agreed on a way to handle these interviews; the Office of Personnel obtained their addresses and, if the retired officials consented to speak with GAO, then the GAO investigators informed the Agency. The Agency reviewed all notes from these meetings for declassification.<sup>53</sup> (U)

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<sup>51</sup>Tipton to [redacted] [redacted] Office of External Affairs, 9 September 1982, in DO Records, [redacted] [redacted], Box 8, Folder 170, CIA ARC. In addition to Tipton, the GAO also had several other investigators, Robert P. Glick, Anne W. Williams, David M. Broy, and Joseph P. Litzelman. On occasion, the GAO sent other staff members to CIA to review records. (U)

<sup>52</sup> Tipton to [redacted] [redacted] 27 January 1983, OEXA 83-0219; and [redacted] [redacted] Memorandum for the Record, "GAO Request to Interview Former Employees," 9 February 1983, both in DO Records, [redacted] [redacted], Box 8, Folder 170, CIA ARC. (U)

<sup>53</sup>There was some discussion whether a CIA representative should be present at the interviews. See [redacted] [redacted] to Chief, IMS, "GAO Interview of Former CIA Employees," 10 February 1983; [redacted] [redacted] Memorandum for the Record, "GAO Investigation—Meeting with DDO," 18 February 1983, IMS/FPLG 83/19, (C); and [redacted] [redacted] to Chief, IMS, "GAO Meeting with Former CIA

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The Agency faced initial difficulties in locating the retired officials. Many of their addresses had changed since retirement. Indeed, of the 50 officials, the Agency initially found addresses for only seven men. The remainder had either moved over the years and left no forwarding address or had retired through the Civil Service system and received pensions through the Office of Personnel Management, as opposed to the CIA's own retirement system. The Agency had no records on three individuals that the GAO wanted to interview, while another seven had died.<sup>54</sup> Despite these problems, the Agency soon contacted even more retired officials than were named in the GAO's initial request of January 1983.<sup>55</sup> (S)

A year later, [redacted], the DO's point of contact with the GAO investigators, reported that "the interviews with former CIA employees who were mentioned in the records being reviewed by the GAO investigators has led to no firm support for the allegations being made." Instead, the interviews provided Tipton and his team "a feel for the times when OPC/CIA was engaged in the operations, but little more." [redacted] believed "the time has come for the investigators to plan for a cut off date since

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Employees," 3 March 1983, IMS/FPLG 83-30, all in DO Records, [redacted], Box 8, Folder 170, CIA ARC. The Agency later decided to send a letter to the retirees stating the purpose of the GAO investigation. See [redacted] Chief, IMS, to [redacted] Executive Director, "Notification of GAO Investigation," 17 August 1983, IMS 83-439, [redacted] Box 8, Folder 170, CIA ARC. (C)

<sup>54</sup>James N. Glerum, Director of Personnel, to Director, Office of External Affairs, "Investigation of Nazi War Criminals," 1 March 1983, (S), in DO Records, [redacted], Box 8, Folder 170, CIA ARC. (S)

<sup>55</sup>A list of additional interview subjects is found in "Former Employees to be Contacted by GAO," 29 November 1983, (S), in DO Records, [redacted] Box 1, Folder 2, CIA ARC. A sample letter from CIA to the retired personnel is also located in this job. (S)

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they have come to the realization that every file they review leads to another, and every person they interview can suggest a more knowledgeable person.”<sup>56</sup> (S)

Indeed, the interviews provided some details that could not be gleaned from surviving documentation. [redacted] [redacted], who directed CIA’s review of the Army’s CIC operations in Austria and oversaw the formation of Detachment 35, provided John Tipton and Robert Glick of the GAO in late 1983 with an overview of the situation of that occupied country. “I opined to the inspectors,” [redacted] [redacted] wrote to the Agency, “that the directives to CIC . . . could be simply summarized: stop chasing Nazis and go after Russians and Communists.”<sup>57</sup> (U)

With this in mind, [redacted] [redacted] recalled that “the average CIC agent (and the average CIC agent’s boss) had no training or experience in espionage, but suddenly had a great deal of money to spend, a great blossoming of ‘operations’ suddenly occurred, in which one cardinal rule of ‘security’ prevailed: never ask your agent the identity of his sources, for that would be bad security.” Consequently, [redacted] [redacted] told the GAO,

the inevitable result, in cold and hungry Europe of the time, was a proliferation of papermills such as had never been seen in Europe’s history. To those of us trying to make sense of it all, it seemed that every down-at-heel veteran of the Abwehr, the Gestapo, RSHA Amt VI, and all the Fascist organizations of central and Southern Europe was peddling fabricated information sources to notional spy networks, and that CIC, MIS, the British FSS, the Austrian Stapo, the Foreign Service’s Peripheral Reports Officers, the Grombach organization, the Gehlen

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<sup>56</sup> [redacted] [redacted] to Chief, IMS, “Status Report on GAO Investigation,” 16 January 1984, (S), in DO Records, [redacted] [redacted] Box 1, Folder 2, CIA ARC. (S)

<sup>57</sup> [redacted] [redacted] to [redacted] [redacted], 22 December 1983, in DO Records, [redacted] [redacted] Box 8, Folder 170, CIA ARC. (U)

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organization, the Italian Carabinieri, Amt Blank, the French SDECE, and Radio Free Europe were all elbowing and shoving each other to buy the stuff, like so many women in Macy's Basement on the day after Christmas.<sup>58</sup> (U)

### The Barbie Affair and Public Law 110 (U)

While the GAO investigators plowed through the CIA's records and those of other agencies, new complications arose. In February 1983, news accounts of Klaus Barbie's return to France from South America raised concerns that American intelligence had assisted his escape from Europe. Peter W. Rodino, the chairman of the House's Committee on the Judiciary, broadened the GAO investigation on 17 February to include a review of the Barbie case.<sup>59</sup> Rodino notified DCI Casey of this fact a week later and requested that the Agency provide the GAO with all files relating to Barbie.<sup>60</sup> (U)

Congress also took an interest in the Agency's special authorization to sponsor aliens for entry into the United States. As early as 1979, Congress had eyed Section 7 of Public Law 110, the CIA Act of 1949.<sup>61</sup> Skeptical of the Agency's use of Section 7, Rep.

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<sup>58</sup>Ibid. In [redacted] opinion, "the one's that got most of this mis-information were the ones with the most money (or black market cigarettes): CIC and the Gehlen Organization." (U)

<sup>59</sup>Rodino to Charles A. Bowsher, Comptroller General, General Accounting Office, 17 February 1983, in DO Records [redacted], Box 8, Folder 170, CIA ARC. (U)

<sup>60</sup>Rodino to Casey, 24 February 1983, ER 83-1109, in DO Records, [redacted], Box 8, Folder 170, CIA ARC. The fact that Allan A. Ryan, Jr., directed the Department of Justice investigation of the Barbie case alleviated the GAO from actively pursuing this portion of its investigation. See correspondence between Ryan and Tipton, 24 March and 5 April 1983, and between Ryan and William J. Anderson, Director, General Government Division, GAO, 21 March 1983, all in the same job as above. (U)

<sup>61</sup>Joseph Volz, "CIA Hits Bid to End Spy Shuttle to US," *New York Daily News*, 1 November 1979, [no page listed]. (U)

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Elizabeth Holtzman sponsored H.R. 5087 to eliminate the Agency's provision on 2 August 1979. She feared that the Agency had used its special powers to bring Nazi war criminals into the country.<sup>62</sup> DCI Stansfield Turner told Rodino, "the Bill is objectionable because it would repeal a fundamental authority of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) which is critical to the fulfillment of the foreign intelligence mission of the Central Intelligence Agency." Holtzman's legislation threatened to eliminate the DCI's ability to sponsor aliens and defectors "in a time when human sources of intelligence are of critical importance to the national security of the United States."<sup>63</sup> After lengthy discussions between Agency officials and Congresswoman Holtzman, she removed the portion of H.R. 5087 concerning Section 7, CIA Act of 1949, in the spring of 1980.<sup>64</sup> (S)

Following the *60 Minutes* revelations in 1982, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence also looked into the issue of whether the CIA had abused Section 7. John Loftus had charged that the CIA continued to bring criminals to America, citing the

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<sup>62</sup>In late October 1979, John D. Morrison, the Agency's acting General Counsel, testified in open session before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law, about Section 7. Morrison had received guidance from [redacted] on how to respond to questions concerning the Agency and Nazi war criminals. Morrison's testimony, his prepared remarks [redacted] questions and answers, and other material are found in DO Records, [redacted] Box 8, Folder 156, CIA ARC. (U)

<sup>63</sup>Turner to Rodino, [no date listed but circa 30 October 1979], in DO Records, [redacted] Box 8, Folder 156. (U)

<sup>64</sup>Various briefing material, including a chart [redacted] under Public Law 110, is found in DO Records, [redacted] Box 8, Folder 156, CIA ARC. See also [redacted] Assistant Legislative Counsel to Frederick P. Hitz, Legislative Counsel, "H.R. 5087, the 'Immigration and Nationality Act





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saying that "we would have slept with the devil to obtain information on communists."<sup>66</sup> Consequently, the GAO concluded that "US intelligence used anti-Communist resources that had immediate intelligence potential," including former Nazi intelligence personnel and collaborators.<sup>67</sup> (U)

The General Accounting Office report concentrated on 114 individuals. Of this number, five with "undesirable or questionable backgrounds" had been involved with American intelligence and had received assistance in moving to the United States. An additional seven aliens also had similar checkered personal histories but had no "identifiable" help in their immigration.<sup>68</sup> Of the five men who immigrated to America with governmental assistance, all had been involved with the CIA after the war: Xhafer Deva (Subject A), Stanislau Stakievich (Subject B), Otto von Bolschwing (Subject C), Mykola Lebed (Subject D), and Nicholas Poppe (Subject E). (C)

The GAO determined that several of the seven individuals who entered the United States without government assistance also had relationships with the Central Intelligence Agency. Nevertheless, the GAO "found no specific program to aid the immigration of undesirable aliens."<sup>69</sup> After examining thousands of documents from several Federal agencies and interviewing nearly 40 former government officials, the GAO felt "its

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<sup>66</sup>1985 GAO Report, p. 15. (U)

<sup>67</sup>1985 GAO Report, p. 19. (U)

<sup>68</sup>The subjects are discussed on pages 29-40 of the 1985 GAO Report. The report does not identify the subjects by name; a key to their identities is found in Tipton to [ ] [ ] 8 July 1985, (C), in DO Records, [ ] [ ] Box 1, Folder 1, CIA ARC. (C)

<sup>69</sup>1985 GAO Report, p. 29. (U)

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review was sufficiently broad and unrestricted to state that this report fairly portrays the conditions that existed following World War II.”<sup>70</sup> The evaluators did add a caveat that tempered their overall conclusion:

We were not denied access to any documents requested; however, intelligence agencies often assign projects innocuous names which do not reflect the projects' purposes and, therefore, we cannot assure that we requested all relevant projects' files. In addition, some documents requested could not be located or had been destroyed. However, these instances were the exception rather than the rule. The deaths of certain officials and the unclear recollections by others of events from the post World War II era made it difficult and/or impossible to reconstruct certain events, circumstances, and situations. As a result, we cannot be completely sure that we have obtained all relevant information or that we have identified all Nazis and Axis collaborators assisted by US agencies to immigrate to the United States.<sup>71</sup> (U)

The release of the GAO's report in late June 1985 initially generated little public interest. Congressman Rodino, who had requested the report in 1982, said that he found the GAO's conclusions “extremely distressing.” The fact that the report had to conceal the names of individuals and agencies did not sit well in Congress.<sup>72</sup> In early October,

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<sup>70</sup>1985 GAO Report, p. iii. (U)

<sup>71</sup>1985 GAO Report, pp. 6-7. (U)

<sup>72</sup>Ralph Blumenthal, “2 War Criminals had Official Help in Getting to US, Study Finds,” *New York Times*, 29 June 1985, p. 7. (U)

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Romano L. Mazzoli, chairman of the House's Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law, called for an oversight hearing on the GAO report.<sup>73</sup> (U)

## Congress Looks at the GAO Report (U)

Mazzoli's subcommittee convened on 17 October and heard the testimony of the report's authors, Robert Glick and John Tipton, and the associate director of the General Government Division, Arnold P. Jones.<sup>74</sup> The questions, as expected, focused on the GAO's methodology and conclusions. The individual Congressmen reached no consensus in their judgements of the report's thoroughness, and the harsher criticisms of it gained the most attention. Barney Frank declared, "I have never been more disappointed in a GAO work product than I am today." He called it "totally inadequate" because it did not provide details of the intelligence operations to fight communism.<sup>75</sup> (U)

Frank also submitted for the record a lengthy critique of the GAO report written by Elizabeth Holtzman, formerly of the House of Representatives (and now a District Attorney in New York). She complained that "the actions of US intelligence agencies and officers documented in the GAO report—working with suspected war criminals and

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<sup>73</sup>Mazzoli to Casey, 10 October 1985, ER 85-3930, in DO Records, [ ] Box 1, Folder 1, CIA ARC. (U)

<sup>74</sup>US Congress. House. Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the Committee on the Judiciary. *GAO Report on Nazi War Criminals in the United States*. 99th Cong., 1st sess., 17 October 1985 (hereafter cited as the 1985 GAO Report/Hearings). (U)

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mass murderers, following a morally bankrupt policy and deliberately deceiving other government agencies—took place without public disclosure.” Holtzman called for an independent investigation and the full release of all records. “The public has a right to know the full story. Time is of the essence. We have already waited for forty years. We should not have to wait any longer.”<sup>76</sup> (U)

John Loftus testified as well, essentially repeating his claims about the Belorussians and calling for yet more investigation.<sup>77</sup> [redacted] former deputy director of the Office of Special Investigations and Loftus’s supervisor (and now an attorney with the Central Intelligence Agency), commented, “Mr. Loftus’s testimony consisted of his usual inchoate, stream-of-consciousness explications of various conspiratorial theories. Regrettably,” [redacted] added, “I was unable to follow the Byzantine contours of Mr. Loftus’ testimony.”<sup>78</sup> (U)

Neal Sher, who had replaced Allan A. Ryan, Jr., as OSI’s director in 1983, also testified at the GAO hearing. He supported the findings of the GAO report as consistent with OSI’s experience in investigating some 900 individuals since 1979, but he did note some differences. “It is important to bear in mind,” Sher observed, “that OSI is

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<sup>75</sup>1985 GAO Report/Hearings, p. 56. (U)

<sup>76</sup>Ibid., pp. 57-61. According to the terms of the agreement between CIA and the GAO, the investigators returned all of their notes to the Agency at the conclusion of the first and second GAO investigations. These notes are maintained in DO Records, [redacted], Boxes 1-3, and [redacted], Boxes 2 and 8, CIA ARC. (U)

<sup>77</sup>1985 GAO Report/Hearings, pp. 79-99. (U)

<sup>78</sup>[redacted] to [redacted], Chief, Liaison Division, Office of Legislative Liaison, “Immigration Sub-Committee Hearing on GAO Nazi Report,” 23 October 1985, in DO Records,

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essentially case oriented; we are prosecutors, whose objective is to investigate thoroughly allegations that an individual had been engaged in persecution which might warrant either denaturalization or deportation." He noted that the "historical review which was the function of the GAO Report and the efforts of OSI are for the most part separate and distinct."<sup>79</sup> (U)

The hearings concluded Congressional interest in the GAO's second investigation in the 1980s. While the Subcommittee's formal report contains additional correspondence between the House and OSI as well as with the GAO, Congress took no other action regarding the report.<sup>80</sup> The GAO's second investigation and its report, *Nazis and Axis Collaborators Were Used to Further US Anti-Communist Objectives in Europe—Some Immigrated to the United States*, stands as the Federal government's most definitive effort to address this issue. Interest in the subject, however, did not diminish. The Federal government's role in enabling Nazi war criminals to escape justice continued to make headlines in the 1980s. (U)

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⊂      ⊃ Box 1, Folder 1, CIA ARC. Sullivan was in the audience when Loftus testified.  
(U)

<sup>79</sup>1985 GAO Report/Hearings, pp. 68-79. (U)

<sup>80</sup>Ibid., pp. 99-114. (U)