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(S/ [redacted] SUBJ: CI: INVOLVEMENT OF THE IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IN IRAQ'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROGRAMS

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[redacted] ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT. END OF MESSAGE ~~SECRET~~.

(S/ [redacted] 1. AS OF 1999, THE M16 DIRECTORATE OF THE IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (IIS, MUKHABARAT), HEADED BY NU'AMAN 'ALI AL-(TIKRITI), WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR TESTING VARIOUS CHEMICALS FOR THE IRAQI MILITARY. M16 WAS NOT THE ONLY TESTING OFFICE IN IRAQ, BUT IT WAS THE SOLE OFFICE WITHIN IIS TO

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CONDUCT SUCH TESTS. M16'S DUTIES ALSO INCLUDED MONITORING EMPLOYEES AND ACTING AS A CONDUIT TO THE DIRECTOR OF MILITARY INDUSTRIES. MOST M16 EMPLOYEES HAILED FROM THE AL-TIKRITI TRIBE.

(S/[REDACTED]) 2. PRIOR TO THE 1991 GULF WAR, SCIENTISTS AT M16 WORKED WITH A VARIETY OF CHEMICALS AND CHEMICAL AGENTS AND WEAPONS INCLUDING CHLORIDANE, DDT, "CS," MUSTARD, THIONYL CHLORIDE, SODIUM CHLORIDE (SIC), POTASSIUM CYANIDE, AND SARIN. DDT AND CHLORIDANE WERE STORED IN GALLON BARRELS. CYANIDE WAS KEPT IN 500-GRAM BOTTLES. THIONYL CHLORIDE WAS A BROWN LIQUID AND STORED IN 2.5-LITER BOTTLES. FROM 1985-1988, THE CHEMICALS WERE STORED IN A THREE-STORY HOUSE OWNED BY M-1, WHERE THE "SPECIAL PRINTER" AND COUNTERFEIT MONEY WERE STORED. HOWEVER, THEY WERE REMOVED FROM THIS LOCATION WHEN THE REGIME BECAME CONCERNED ABOUT FLOODING FROM THE TIGRIS RIVER.

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(S/[REDACTED]) 3. THESE AGENTS WERE FIRST TESTED AT M16 AND SUBSEQUENTLY SENT FOR PRODUCTION TO VARIOUS MILITARY PRODUCTION FACILITIES, THEN UNDER THE CONTROL OF HUSAYN KAMIL, SUCH AS THE MUTHANNA STATE ESTABLISHMENT (MSE) AND AL-QA'QA FOR PRODUCTION. AT LEAST ONE EXPERIMENT INVOLVED TESTING WHETHER THE PLACEMENT OF CS DUST ON THE SKIN WOULD KILL AN INDIVIDUAL ONCE WATER WAS ADDED. CHEMICALS WERE SOMETIMES TESTED ON A VARIETY OF ANIMALS, SUCH AS CATS, DOGS, AND MONKEYS WHICH HAD BEEN PICKED UP AS STRAYS OFF THE STREET OR AT LOCAL ANIMAL MARKETS. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] TESTS INCLUDED PLACING POTASSIUM CHLORIDE (SIC) CRYSTALS ON FISH SKELETONS AND FEEDING TO CATS. THE CATS WOULD "SCREAM," JUMP ONCE AND DIE. WHILE THERE WAS NO INDICATION THAT WORK WAS ALSO CONDUCTED ON BIOLOGICAL AGENTS, M16 WAS EQUIPPED WITH RADIATION DETECTORS.

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(S/[REDACTED]) 4. M16 ALSO CONDUCTED A VARIETY OF OTHER ACTIVITIES INCLUDING THE TESTING OF MAIL AND FOOD FOR POISONS/CONTAMINATES, EXPLOSIVES DETECTION, TESTING OF CHEMICALS FOR USE IN ASSASSINATIONS, AND VARIOUS FORENSIC STUDIES SUCH AS FINGERPRINT ANALYSIS. THE TESTING FOR CHEMICALS FOR USE IN ASSASSINATIONS WAS CONDUCTED ON BEHALF OF M14, THE IIS DIRECTORATE RESPONSIBLE FOR ASSASSINATIONS. GIVEN ITS VARIETY OF FUNCTIONS, THE ACTIVITIES OF M16 WERE DIVIDED BETWEEN THREE DEPARTMENT HEADS WHO, IN TURN, WERE EACH RESPONSIBLE FOR THREE SUBDIRECTORATES.

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(S/[REDACTED]) 5. PRIOR TO 1995, IRAQI PRESIDENT ((SADDAM)) HUSAYN OR HIS PERSONAL SECRETARY 'ABID HAMID ((MAHMUD)) WOULD ISSUE A DIRECTIVE TO KAMIL, WHO WOULD THEN FORWARD IT TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE IIS THROUGH TO M16. IN ADDITION TO THE IIS DIRECTOR, AN EGYPTIAN BY THE NAME OF DR. HAMID 'ALI ((MUSTAFA)) WAS ALSO OFTEN INVOLVED IN THE PROCESS. MUSTAFA WAS THE HEAD OF PLANNING AT M16 AND AN ADVISER TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE IIS AND WAS THUS HIGHER PLACED THAN M16'S DIRECTOR. MUSTAFA WAS RESPECTED AND CONSIDERED IMPORTANT WITHIN M16. FOLLOWING KAMIL'S DEFECTION IN 1995, SADDAM OR MAHMUD ISSUED DIRECTIVES TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE IIS AND ON TO THE MILITARY FACTORIES WHICH WERE HEADED BY IIS OFFICERS. SUCH DIRECTIVES WERE PRIMARILY VERBAL, AT LEAST AT THE MORE SENIOR LEVELS; SADDAM NEVER ACTUALLY ISSUED WRITTEN AND SIGNED DIRECTIVES TO M16.

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(S/[REDACTED]) 6. DURING THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMISSION'S (UNSCOM) TENURE IN IRAQ, THE IIS WAS MADE RESPONSIBLE FOR CONCEALMENT AS IT WAS SADDAM'S MOST TRUSTED ORGANIZATION. HIDING DOCUMENTS IN THE HOMES OF IIS

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PERSONNEL, AS WELL AS IIS SAFE HOUSES, WAS A COMMON CONCEALMENT PRACTICE. ANYTHING THAT SADDAM WISHED TO CONCEAL FROM UNSCOM, WHETHER OR NOT IT WAS RELATED TO WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD), WAS REMOVED FROM A PREMISES BEFORE INSPECTION. THIS INCLUDED HARD-COPY DOCUMENTS AS WELL AS COMPUTER FILES AND SOMETIMES THE COMPUTERS THEMSELVES. IN OTHER CASES HOWEVER, THE IIS WAS ACTUALLY INSTRUCTED BY SADDAM TO COOPERATE WITH UNSCOM SO AS TO LIMIT CONFRONTATION. MANY MILITARY FACILITIES WERE CAPABLE OF PRODUCING MULTIPLE PRODUCTS AND SIMPLY CHANGING THEIR NAMES AND SWITCHING PRODUCTION TO A LEGITIMATE PRODUCT WHEN UNSCOM INSPECTIONS WERE NEAR.

(S/) 7. WHEN AN ENTITY REQUIRED THE PROCUREMENT OF A CERTAIN PRODUCT, IT FIRST SOUGHT ASSISTANCE FROM ANOTHER DEPARTMENT WHICH HAD A LEGITIMATE NEED FOR THE PRODUCT. AS SUCH, INDIVIDUALS SIMPLY USED THEIR PERSONAL CONTACTS WITHIN OTHER INDUSTRIES, BE THEY CIVILIAN OR MILITARY, OR ASKED THE IIS TO BECOME INVOLVED IF OTHER AVENUES FAILED. THE M19 DIRECTORATE AKA THE COMMERCIAL DIRECTORATE OF THE IIS WAS INVOLVED IN CREATING PROCUREMENT COMPANIES. THESE COMPANIES WERE MANNED MOSTLY BY IIS AGENTS, BUT THEIR USE WAS NOT LIMITED TO WMD-RELATED PROCUREMENT. THE COMPANIES HAD A GENERAL "EMBARGO-BUSTING" ROLE. THE IIS WAS INSTRUCTED BY SADDAM TO BE EXTREMELY CAREFUL IN ITS DEALINGS AS SADDAM WISHED TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES WITH A VIEW TO ENDING THE EMBARGO AND THUS WANTED ALL DEALS TO APPEAR LEGITIMATE.

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(S/) 8. M-16 WAS FORMERLY KNOWN AS M-9 AND WAS AT A FACILITY ADMINISTERED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF GENERAL SECURITY (DGS, AL-AMN AL-'AMM). NADHIM ((KAZAR)), FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE DGS, ESTABLISHED IT TO TORTURE PEOPLE. KAZAR ALLEGEDLY HAD A POOL OF ACID WHICH HE USED TO DIP PEOPLE IN AND HAD UNDERGROUND PRISONS FOR TORTURE. ONE FORM OF TORTURE WAS TO LOCK A PERSON IN A BOX WITH DIMENSIONS THAT FORCED A CROUCHING POSITION. THE IIS TOOK OVER M16 IN 1983 WHEN IT WAS MOVED TO AL-TATHIR AL-JANAI, SALMAN PAK. IN 1987, A RADIATION DETECTOR FOUND RADIOACTIVE WASTE AT THE ORIGINAL DGS SITE.

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Collection: HT

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Description: (U) AS OF 1999, THE M16 DIRECTORATE OF THE IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR TESTING VARIOUS CHEMICALS FOR THE IRAQI MILITARY. PRIOR TO THE 1991 GULF WAR, SCIENTISTS AT M16 WORKED WITH A VARIETY OF CHEMICALS AND CHEMICAL AGENTS AND WEAPONS. THESE AGENTS WERE FIRST TESTED--INCLUDING EXPERIMENTATION ON ANIMALS--AT M16 AND THEN SENT FOR PRODUCTION TO MILITARY PRODUCTION FACILITIES SUCH AS MUTHANNA STATE ESTABLISHMENT AND AL-QA'QA FOR PRODUCTION. M16 ALSO CONDUCTED A VARIETY OF OTHER ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING THE TESTING OF MAIL AND FOOD FOR POISONS/CONTAMINATES, EXPLOSIVES DETECTION, TESTING OF CHEMICALS FOR USE

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IN ASSASSINATIONS, AND VARIOUS FORENSIC STUDIES SUCH AS FINGERPRINT ANALYSIS. DURING THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMISSION'S TENURE IN IRAQ, THE IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR CONCEALMENT OF DOCUMENTATION, SOME OF WHICH WAS PLACED IN PRIVATE HOMES OF INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS. M16 USED TO BE KNOWN AS M-9 AND WAS ADMINISTERED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF GENERAL SECURITY.

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