

~~TOP SECRET~~

19 May 1961

Copy No. C 79

CENTRAL


INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~


19 May 1961

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

1. Laos. (*Page i*)
2. South Korea: Military Revolutionary Committee consolidates position. (*Page ii*)
3. Congo: Leopoldville opposes Gizenga's plans for reopening parliament in Kamina; Hammarskjold says Dayal will return to Congo for about a month. (*Page iv*)
4. Algeria-France. (*Page tv*)
5. Neutralist Conference: Nasir reportedly irked by Soviet opposition to conference. (*Page v*)

~~SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

19 May 1961

DAILY BRIEF

*Laos: Several members of the government delegation to the Namone tripartite talks state that the Vientiane side agreed on 17 May to restrict future meetings to discussions on the formation of a coalition government. This concession reportedly was made in order to obtain Pathet Lao agreement in principle to the formation of a tripartite military commission to work with the ICC in regulating the cease-fire. [Phoumi, however, maintains that he expects no agreement on a coalition government to be reached since the Pathet Lao will probably make excessive demands for posts in such a government]

Leaders of five progovernment political parties, including former Premiers Phoui Sannanikone and Tiao Somsanith, have departed for Geneva to join the Laotian government delegation. The delegation remains, however, under instructions to boycott the conference.

[The Meo partisan garrison at Pa Dong continues to receive enemy artillery fire; elsewhere, additional minor enemy actions have been reported.] [redacted]

Soviet airlift operations into Laos were scheduled through 19 May. [redacted] (Backup, Page 1) (Map)

Sirah
OK
delete
last sent
IP 1. IP 3,
in Brief.
In Backup
delete
IP 3 and
last P.

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

South Korea: President Yun Po-sun's call to the nation on 18 May to support the objectives of the revolution gives a final stamp of legality to the Military Revolutionary Committee (MRC). The insurgent leaders have ordered all civil servants back to work; the government ministries are to resume operation under the executive control of their respective administrative vice-ministers, with a military officer in charge of personnel and finances in each ministry. The MRC is attempting to enforce measures to avoid a dislocation of the economy. The American Embassy notes, however, that the committee appears to have few persons experienced in economic and banking matters.

OK
delete
sent 3
of P 4
and 1st
sent of
P 7.

The failure of the committee to announce its promised revolutionary cabinet when it dissolved the National Assembly suggests that it has encountered difficulties finding persons who are both professionally qualified and politically acceptable.

American officials in Seoul see some danger that the insurgents may turn to extreme right-wing elements associated with the Rhee regime to fill the gap, particularly in the economic ministries. Several former Rhee officials are believed to be maneuvering to take advantage of the situation.

The revolutionary government has begun rounding up leftists and suspected pro-Communists. The staff of the leftist newspaper Minjok Ilbo has been arrested.

police security branches have been alerted to track down "leftist ringleaders" and seize all documents "even though you do not have a warrant." The Seoul Metropolitan Police are reported to have been ordered to arrest all persons on a "Communist Watch List" comprising about 70,000 persons including families, friends, and associates of the suspects.

First Army Commander Lieutenant General Yi Han-il has been replaced by Lieutenant General Pak Im-hang. "Well-informed revolutionary sources" indicated Yi, who was subsequently arrested, failed to support the coup quickly enough of

19 May 61

DAILY BRIEF

ii

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

[redacted] strongly enough. Several other generals and colonels whose loyalty to the coup is suspect have also been placed under arrest. [redacted]

[redacted] described the coup as "a complete fabrication of the United States" but there were no new propaganda commentaries yesterday from either North Korea or Communist China. [redacted] Soviet commentary on the coup implicates the United States in the revolt and notes that despite statements of support for the former Chang government, the US "has not even moved one finger" to support Chang. [redacted]


19 May 61

DAILY BRIEF

iii

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

Republic of the Congo



~~TOP SECRET~~

Congo: Anti-Gizenga commentary on Radio Leopoldville indicates that Kasavubu so far is holding to his own proposals on reconvening the Congolese parliament. The Leopoldville radio on 17 May characterized the Congo crisis as "in its final stages," and after alluding to Gizenga's counterproposals observed that "no delaying tactics will prevent... the convocation of parliament" by Kasavubu.

OK
delete
P 2+3 of
Brief.
In Backup
delete
P1, 4.

Belgian officials in Elisabethville have again voiced concern that the security situation in Katanga will deteriorate as Belgian military personnel are replaced in coming weeks. The Belgian consul general has said that he had no confidence in the ability of the UN to protect the 12,000 Belgians in Katanga, and that Belgian nationals in Elisabethville have drawn up emergency evacuation plans. The American Consulate believes that at present these Belgian fears are exaggerated.]

[*Hammarskjold has told Ambassador Stevenson that he plans to send Dayal back to Leopoldville on about 25 May for roughly one month. Hammarskjold stated that he was convinced that the reaction to Dayal's return would not be so sharp as to paralyze UN operations. He insisted that were Dayal not to return to Leopoldville there was a real danger that India would shift its position not only on the Congo but on broader UN issues.]

(Backup, Page 3) (Map)

France-Algeria: [Despite the hope of the Provisional Algerian Government (PAG) that the broad outline of an agreement with the French would be reached through preliminary contacts before talks begin at Evian on 20 May, recent reports indicate that little common ground has been established. The PAG negotiating team reportedly still feels that Algerian sovereignty--including the Sahara--must first be recognized before it can offer concessions for French participation in the economic sphere and guarantees for the European minority. The PAG is said to hope that the negotiations can be completed in three months--but is ready to break them off if no concrete progress is made within two weeks. The French team is expected to be firm but courteous, since it is well aware from]

OK

19 May 61

DAILY BRIEF

iv

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

[previous efforts to arrange negotiations that the rebels will attach great importance to first impressions]

Neutralist Conference:

[redacted] the UAR has suggested that joint invitations from Nehru, Nasir, Tito, and Sukarno be issued to the Cairo meeting, scheduled for early June, which is to prepare for a "neutralist summit" conference. Ambassadors or special envoys from about 20 Afro-Asian and Latin American countries and Yugoslavia are expected to attend.

*delete
sums 1+2
+ last sent
of Brief.*

[redacted] Although no significant comment from the USSR or the Communist bloc has been noted, a usually reliable [redacted] Nasir has been angered by reports that the Soviet ambassador is "talking against" the conference.

(Backup, Page 7)

19 May 61

DAILY BRIEF

v

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~Laos

Communist China is making a special effort to flatter Prince Sihanouk and dispose him toward the Communist side at the Geneva Conference. On 18 May, Peiping published a 14 May letter from Chou En-lai to Sihanouk praising the prince's decision to join the conference and promising that the Chinese delegation would work in "close cooperation" with the Cambodian delegation. In his opening speech at the conference, Foreign Minister Chen Yi went out of his way to laud Sihanouk. Earlier in May, Chou En-lai sent another letter pleading for Sihanouk's participation in the conference at a time when the prince was refusing to attend.

In Geneva, the spokesman for the Chinese Communist delegation at a press conference expressed support for Gromyko's proposals and continued the castigation of US policy in Southeast Asia.

[Quinim Pholsena, leader of the delegation representing Souvanna Phouma at Geneva, [redacted] Souvanna's policy was one of genuine neutrality, an aim shared by all who followed him. Quinim said that there was no point in escaping from the American camp merely to go into the Soviet camp. He added, however, that Laos could never be neutral without the support of both the West and the Communist bloc. Quinim stated that formation of a new government, which he considers vital to the resolution of the Laotian crisis, depended entirely on the attitude of the Vientiane government. If Phoumi were to stick to his present position as the "US strongman," it was difficult to see how a national government could be formed. In regard to a future Laotian army, Quinim observed that, provided a satisfactory settlement is reached, a force of 10,000 would be the maximum needed by a neutral Laos.]

[redacted] between 9 and 16 May about one-half of the Third Battalion of the South Vietnamese army, previously stationed near Route 9 on the Vietnamese border, moved to a Laotian army command post about four miles inside]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

[redacted] Laos, and there began forest patrols. These troops were without insignia or papers. The Vietnamese special force previously operating at this command post has moved ten miles farther west into Laos for patrol duty on a north-south axis. Souvanna Phouma, in an apparent reference to these troops, accused them on 18 May of planning to attack his "government" troops and the Pathet Lao in the Tchepone area. [redacted]

[redacted]

Airlift operations on 17 May involved 22 sorties by Soviet transports and one by a North Vietnamese transport. Of this number, six Soviet IL-14s and two Soviet LI-2s were reflected flying into Laos. In addition, North Vietnamese air-defense facilities tracked five IL-14s and six LI-2s returning to Hanoi, possibly from Dong Hoi. [redacted]

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

The Situation in the Congo

[Hammaraskjold's decision to return Dayal to Leopoldville --despite the danger of undermining the UN's newly improved relations with the Leopoldville government--reflects his sensitivity to Nehru's views. Despite Dayal's unpopularity with virtually all Congo factions, Hammaraskjold has long favored returning him to the Congo at least for a token period.]

Gizenga's determination to resist Kasavubu's call for a meeting of parliament in Leopoldville appears to have sharpened differences among his followers which forced the adoption of strict security measures. The American Embassy in Leopoldville reports, however, that Gizenga has released from prison Colonel Yangoie, the army officer who in April negotiated with General Mobutu's representatives concerning the desirability of reconvening parliament. The embassy speculates that Yangoie's release was prompted by a desire to avoid unrest in the army.

The embassy notes that recent arrests in Stanleyville stem from opposition to Gizenga among moderates, notably those in the Orientale provincial government. The easing by the Leopoldville government of the economic blockade of Stanleyville reportedly permitted an influx of goods to the provincial government which strengthened its hand in relation to Gizenga's "national" government. While the Gizenga regime appears doubtful of its ability to control a new meeting of the Congo parliament and continues to be troubled by factionalism, the American Embassy believes it is not likely to collapse soon.

[In Katanga, Belgian interests appear under pressure from both the UN and the Katanga government. Hammaraskjold's personal representative in Brussels has told Ambassador Stevenson that the new Belgian Government seems to be yielding to financial interests and the press and is doing little to bring about a progressive withdrawal of Belgian advisers from the Congo, particularly Katanga. In Elisabethville, the Munongo government has severely criticized officials of Union Miniere.]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] for alleged acts inimical to Katanga, and has said it intends to replace Belgian technicians with French advisers. Munongo's pique has probably contributed to Belgian apprehension concerning the safety of Belgians in Katanga. [redacted]

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~Prospects for French-Algerian Negotiations

[The rebel delegation is competent and politically well balanced, although its members will be handicapped by their lack of experience in diplomacy. Deputy Premier Belkacem Krim, who will head the delegation, commands the respect of the "military" faction of the rebel movement. His participation should improve prospects that the rebel fighters will abide by any agreement which might be reached at Evian. The other "ministerial" member--Finance Minister Ahmed Francis--is a skillful technician who is said to have compiled an extensive dossier on the Saharan problem and is personally more acceptable to the French than Krim.]

[De Gaulle has indicated that as soon as negotiations begin, imprisoned rebel leader Ben Bella--also a PAG deputy premier--will be moved from the military fortress where he is imprisoned, probably to enforced residence near Paris, from where he could influence negotiations. Ben Bella is highly respected as an original leader of the rebellion, and his level-headed advice to the PAG might facilitate a solution.]

[The rebel negotiators will be under considerable pressure to accept nothing less than French recognition of their fundamental right to exercise sovereignty over all Algeria, including the Sahara and the areas of dense European colonization. However, Tunisian, Swiss, and other moderate advisers are urging the PAG to limit its demands, so that it can come to power in Algeria and consolidate its political authority.]

[The rebels would prefer to use the negotiations to arrive at an over-all statute for Algeria rather than merely to arrange a cease-fire and set conditions for a referendum. Paris reportedly has not spelled out its intentions on this score, but De Gaulle's 8 May speech moved beyond his previous references to negotiating a cease-fire and conditions for a referendum to]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[suggest the possibility of a joint French-PAG endorsement, prior to a referendum campaign, of an independent Algeria with close ties to France]

[New demonstrations and possibly violence by die-hard proponents of a "French Algeria" may coincide with the opening of the Evian talks, despite the earlier warnings by top French civilian and military officials in Algiers that demonstrations on 20 May will not be tolerated. Leaflets signed by the settler extremist Organization of the Secret Army are said to call for demonstrations in Algeria this coming Saturday.]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~Neutralist Conference

[Soviet leaders probably feel that such a conference, managed by Nasir and Tito, would lessen the influence of the Afro-Asian solidarity movement in which both the USSR and Communist China actively participate and tend to undercut Moscow's efforts to identify itself with the uncommitted countries and to pose as the champion of neutralism.]

[Moscow has shown increasing concern over the growing influence of the UAR in Africa, and almost certainly views with disfavor Tito's prominent role, particularly on the heels of the Yugoslav leader's African tour in March. Peiping probably considers the conference a setback to its plans for a Bandung-type Afro-Asian conference.]

[Soviet Ambassador Yerofeyev in Cairo reportedly objected to the neutralist conference on the ground that it would weaken the "spirit of Bandung" and be used as a forum for imperialist propaganda. He complained that the conference planners had ignored Communist China's importance in Asia and added that the only purpose of the meeting is the personal aggrandizement of Nasir and Tito. Nasir, reportedly already offended by Khrushchev's recent criticism of the UAR, has ordered his minister of state to "remonstrate" with Yerofeyev.]

[redacted] the recent Touré-Nasir talks in Cairo had found the Guinean and UAR presidents agreeing that "Communism is not the answer to Africa's problems nor, probably, to those of any other new emerging nations." Nasir and Touré, while anxious to receive material aid from the bloc, have consistently maintained that they reject Communism.] [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~