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8 May 1961

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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
8 May 1961

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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8 May 1961

DAILY BRIEF

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Laos: A 150-man South Vietnamese special forces group, which recently moved into Laos disguised in civilian clothes, reportedly moved up to Tchepone and on 5 May assisted the Laotian army commander and 300 men to exfiltrate east along Route 9 to the border. A South Vietnamese infantry regiment has moved up to the Laotian border to the point where Route 9 crosses into South Vietnam.]

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of Brief In Backup

[Cease-fire negotiators reportedly held another inconclusive session on 7 May at a point just north of the Nam Lik River.]

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[No major fighting has taken place since the cease-fire negotiations began, although press reports from Vientiane claim that the enemy has occupied a village 14 miles north of Luang Prabang. Laotian army forces during the past several days, have reported an enemy buildup in the area ranging in size from two companies to two battalions. Elsewhere, enemy guerrilla action and small unit probes continue. A Meo stronghold in Xieng Khouang Province was under heavy mortar fire on 6 May.]

P's 4, 8, 9.

[Soviet airlift operations continued to be scheduled through 7 May.] (Backup, Page 1) (Map)

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Congo: Foreign Minister Bomboko's statement on 7 May that the Leopoldville government plans to try Tshombé for treason will heighten tension among his followers in Katanga, who are already concerned regarding possible UN moves to disarm Tshombé's armed forces. An official of the Katanga government has alleged to the American consul that the UN is preparing an "offensive" against Katanga, and warned that the Elisabethville government would sabotage key mining installations rather than permit them to be turned over to the central government. OK

[According to reports from New Delhi, Prime Minister Nehru may now consider Dayal to have been a failure as UN representative in the Congo, and may be resigned to his removal. Hammarskjold has previously indicated that he hoped to appoint a committee to assume Dayal's functions, possibly after his return to Leopoldville for a token period] []

USSR: Khrushchev's remarks on the international situation during a 6 May speech in Yerevan were apparently intended to assure the US that recent events in Laos and Cuba have not damaged long-term prospects for the improvement of Soviet-US relations. According to Ambassador Thompson, the Soviet premier laid strong emphasis on the need for discussion of substantive matters in bilateral disarmament negotiations with the US. Khrushchev referred to talks which were to take place "soon" on the disarmament question and asserted that Moscow was preparing for these talks with "complete seriousness." Turning to the recent events in Cuba, Khrushchev called upon Cuba and the US to "live like good neighbors," and in generally restrained remarks on the situation commented that the USSR would like to look "optimistically" on the future course of Cuban-American relations. Khrushchev reiterated that Moscow desires a genuinely independent and neutral Laos. He made clear his view that an improvement in relations with the US depended not only on the outcome of disarmament negotiations but on the settlement of the Berlin and German problems as well. He repeated standard demands for a reorganization of the United Nations, but called OK

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for nations to settle outstanding differences both bilaterally and through the UN. [redacted]

USSR: Party Secretary Frol Kozlov, by many indications the second-ranking man in the Soviet leadership, has been out of public view since mid-April. There has been no official explanation for his absence. The most important event he missed was the May Day celebration, which traditionally brings the top leaders out in full force. Mikhail Suslov, the other leading party secretary under Khrushchev, was the ranking party official at several Moscow functions during the latter part of Khrushchev's April vacation. [redacted]

OK

Japan: Foreign Minister Kosaka has renewed Tokyo's request that a tripartite council be established to handle matters concerning Japan, the United States, and the Ryukyu Islands. Kosaka claims that such a council would undercut leftist agitation in Okinawa and forestall attempts by the political opposition in Japan to make the Okinawan issue a public controversy prior to Prime Minister Ikeda's visit to Washington in June. The US high commissioner for the Ryukyus comments, however, that establishing the council is likely to stimulate agitation for further concessions to reversionist forces in Okinawa and Japan. It seems likely that Japan's role in Ryukyuan affairs will be raised in Ikeda's discussions during his visit here.]

(Backup, Page 4)

South Africa: Unrest is likely to increase in South Africa in the next few weeks. Non-white organizations, aided by Communists, are planning a series of strikes and demonstrations late in the month to protest the proclamation of a South African republic on 31 May. In an effort to head off the demonstrations, the police are carrying out a series of raids and have arrested or restricted most of the leaders of the antigovernment campaign.]

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[redacted] "serious disturbances in the public order" during May. [redacted] "the armed forces have been alerted and, if necessary, will take harsh action. The white civilians are also preparing themselves, and there has been a race to the city's gunsmiths."

(Backup, Page 6)

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*Iran: Ali Amini, appointed Prime Minister of Iran on 6 May, has asked the Iranian public for time and an end to demonstrations to permit him to put his plans for social and economic reforms into effect, but he made no specific promises in his first public statement. The American Embassy in Tehran reports that Amini demanded from the Shah the right to name nearly all cabinet ministers and insisted on the formation of a special court to try cases of corruption. Amini announced that the Majlis would not be dissolved, although this was reported also to have been a condition for his acceptance of the prime ministership. OK

Amini may have a period of calm to try his programs, but the success of public protests in toppling the last two prime ministers makes it likely that he will face the same challenge unless he can move rapidly enough to satisfy at least the minimum of popular expectations. []

[] Backup Page 8)

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~~TOP SECRET~~Situation in Laos

[redacted] following the Pathet Lao occupation of Tchepone, he had no choice but to establish control over a perimeter six miles inside Laos along Route 9. [redacted] any Vietnamese Communist column attacking east from this point would neutralize Vietnamese Army defenses along the 17th parallel. Vietnamese special forces operating in civilian clothes within the perimeter will control and defend the area and give early warning of a large-scale Vietnamese Communist attack. As of 7 May the situation was quiet.]

[Boun Oum declared, at a press conference on 7 May, his readiness to meet today with Souphannouvong and Souvanna to "find a path of reconciliation and to decide on a delegation" to represent Laos at Geneva. He insisted, however, that the meeting would have to take place on neutral ground, not at Ban Namone. He added that the delegation should represent all factions and should be confirmed by the National Assembly.]

[The cease-fire talks on 6 May bogged down in the dispute over a site for formal negotiations, but the enemy was represented for the first time by qualified officers. Liaison tents have been set up at Ban Hin Heup, and since there appears to be no immediate disposition to break off contacts, both sides may be awaiting the arrival of the International Control Commission to act as an intermediary.] [redacted]

[redacted] Pathet Lao - Kong Le stalling may stem in part from confusion. [redacted]

[redacted] the negotiators are in place and requests that the commanding general return immediately "as he is the only person to make any decision on the problem." [redacted]

[Souvanna Phouma. [redacted] expounded on the desirability of forming a government of national union before the Geneva Conference and reiterated his position that any government he might head would have to include Pathet Lao representation. [redacted] Souvanna would keep the] [redacted]

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[Defense and Interior portfolios out of "leftist" hands. Souvanna was definite that General Phoumi and Prince Boun Oum would be excluded from a possible Souvanna government, but he adopted an equivocal position when asked if Phoumi could be given responsibility for military affairs at a sub-cabinet level.] []

[The Laotian Government considers that the primary objective of the conference is to work out an internationally guaranteed neutrality status for Laos, but it considers the formation of a government of national union an internal affair. In a 6 May press conference in Phnom Penh, Souvanna Phouma adopted the same position, saying it would be incorrect for the conference to deal with internal Laotian affairs. Souvanna proposed that the conference study the creation of a neutral zone which would include both Laos and Cambodia.]

The Hanoi Foreign Ministry has charged that on 6 May US aircraft violated North Vietnamese air space four times. The alleged overflights are reported to have occurred in the southernmost provinces of Ha Tinh and Quang Binh. Hanoi warned that the US must "bear full responsibility for the consequences of its actions."

Communist propaganda continues to place the blame on the US for the failure thus far to achieve productive cease-fire negotiations. A People's Daily commentary on 7 May terms Vientiane's refusal to meet at Ban Namone a "move to create new obstacles" to forming a coalition government and sending a Laotian delegation to Geneva. People's Daily also charges that the US desires only a "breathing spell" and that the "emphasis of US policy is still on intervention."

[Soviet airlift operations continued to be scheduled through 7 May. On 5 May a total of 21 Soviet and North Vietnamese transports were involved in airlift operations; of this number, five Soviet LI-2s were noted in round-trip flights from Hanoi to Xieng Khouang. On 6 May 20 Soviet and North Vietnamese transports were involved in airlift operations; of these, eight]

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[Soviet IL-14s and one Soviet LI-2 are believed to have made round-trip flights from Hanoi to Xieng Khouang.]

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Japan Seeks Broader Role in Ryukyuan Affairs

[The US-Japanese peace treaty acknowledges Japan's residual sovereignty over the Ryukyu Islands but authorizes the United States to exercise exclusive authority there for an indefinite period. Since 1952, Tokyo has maintained a small, quasi-consular agency in Naha, Okinawa's capital city.]

[Discontent among the Okinawans was first manifest in 1956 when a Communist was elected mayor of Naha during a period when there was considerable resentment against US procedures in acquiring land for military purposes. Although land acquisition is not now a problem, it awakened reversionist sentiment in both Japan and the Ryukyus, and the Japanese have not diverted their attention from the Ryukyuan question.]

[The Kishi government initiated moves for a greater Japanese role in Ryukyuan affairs in 1958. Tokyo has been permitted to provide technical and economic assistance on a project-by-project basis and to engage in teacher-training programs. The Government of the Ryukyu Islands, an indigenous structure operating with limited powers granted by the US high commissioner, has been promoting Tokyo's cause.]

[The high commissioner indicates that Okinawan support for reversionist activities has been somewhat greater recently, possibly due to Ryukyuan hopes in connection with Ikeda's visit to Washington. He believes it desirable to expand consultation with the Japanese on purely technical matters but doubts that this would satisfy reversionist elements.]

[In Japan, the moderate Democratic Socialist party (DSP) is introducing a bill in the Diet which would authorize seats for nonvoting representatives from the Ryukyus. The DSP, which heretofore has taken an equivocal position on the Okinawan question, is supporting Ryukyuan demands for increased autonomy for popular election of the Ryukyuan chief executive --he is at present appointed by the high commissioner--and for transfer of administrative jurisdiction from the Department of Defense to the Department of State. Symptomatic of the]

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[apparently closer liaison between Japanese and Ryukyuan political elements is an exchange of parliamentary delegations which is being undertaken.]

[The Ikeda government prefers, for domestic political reasons, not to adopt a firm stand against reversionist agitation and may consider that an easier solution, consistent with the ultimate Japanese objective of regaining administrative control over the Ryukyus, is to seek concessions from US authorities.]



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Tension Rising in South Africa

[Planning for the demonstrations against the proclamation of the South African Republic on 31 May got under way late in March, following an antigovernment conference sponsored by leaders of the banned African National Congress (ANC) and dominated by the Communists. The conference called for demonstrations throughout May, to culminate in a general strike of all non-white communities on 29 and 30 May. The anti-Communist Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) and the white Liberal party dissociated themselves from the proceedings, thus giving the initiative to the Communist-influenced element. A Liberal official stated recently that his party and the PAC plan to "play the month of May by ear." They will find it difficult, however, to keep aloof from the protest movement should it gain momentum.]

[The usually apathetic colored (mixed-blood) community, an important economic force in the Cape Town area, has shown considerable sympathy for the strike call. While the coloreds did not participate in the disturbances of March and April 1960, they now reportedly hope to impress the ruling Nationalist party with their strength and solidarity, in an effort to deepen the split within the party over concessions to the coloreds.]


[Although there is considerable sympathy for the demonstrations, police operations have further reduced the already tenuous organizational capabilities of the opposition groups. A few African Communists apparently still remain at large and are spending considerable sums to encourage support for the strike; otherwise, most of the potential leaders are either in jail or have had government orders served on them forbidding their participation in any meetings. The chief of the special branch of the South African police said in early May that there were no signs of rising tension in the native population. Nevertheless, the Union's Defense Ministry is increasing its]

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[arms purchases, and private white citizens reportedly are buying firearms at a record rate.]

[Intimidation by both the police and African nationalists probably will be widespread as the strike date approaches. Moreover, white civilians, who fear and distrust African mobs, are likely to become increasingly nervous. Outbreaks of violence may occur.]



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~~SECRET~~Amini Appointed Prime Minister of Iran

Ali Amini was recalled from his post as Ambassador to the United States in 1958 under suspicion of complicity in a plot against the Shah. Since that time he has come to be identified as an opponent of the Shah's regime, and the decision to appoint him as prime minister is a measure of the effect that the three days of rioting had on the Shah. Amini has had wide experience since he entered government service in 1932, particularly in economic and financial affairs. He is certainly more able than either of his two immediate predecessors, Eqbal and Sharif-Emami. He has made no secret in the last two years of his ambition to be prime minister and to give that office genuine authority independent of the Shah. Amini has stated, however, that there is no alternative to the institution of the monarchy. He believes that the Shah could be a strong force in any responsible government, but that in order to preserve his position, the Shah must work in the background.

[Amini will probably have considerable support, at least initially. The anti-Shah National Front reportedly will give Amini a chance to prove himself, but it believes he will not succeed because he will not be able to resist the Shah and will not have military support. Amini reportedly will appoint General Timur Bakhtiar to a high post in the army, however, and he has implied that Bakhtiar will run the army for him.]

In his first statement on foreign affairs, Amini said that he proposes to improve relations "especially with neighboring countries," and intends to respect the provisions of CENTO.

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U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

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Commander in Chief, Pacific

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The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

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