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4 June 1960


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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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4 JUNE 1960

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Comment on Khrushchev's disarmament proposals.

①

Soviet party presidium may be dealing with controversial issue.

②

Khrushchev accepts invitation to visit Cuba; no date set.

③

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Japan--Major newspapers warn that violence in today's strikes will lessen public sympathy for protests against Kishi and US-Japanese security treaty.

④

Turkey--Increasing evidence of illegal activities by former regime inducing new government to broaden arrests and investigations of former officials.



⑤

Sudan--Deputy commander in chief reported planning to take over government; plan is said to have Prime Minister Abboud's concurrence.

⑥

Congo--African leader Lumumba demands he be appointed premier.

⑦



III. THE WEST

⑧ Castro regime propagandizing charges that Nicaragua's and Guatemala's suspension of diplomatic ties with Cuba is part of US plot.

⑨ Venezuelan President wants Cuban President to postpone visit.

⑩ movement of Chinese Communist fighters and standdown of North Korean Air Force.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

4 June 1960

DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR: The new Soviet disarmament proposals, published five days before the ten-nation disarmament conference resumes in Geneva, are aimed in part at exploiting Western differences resulting from France's insistence on giving top priority to measures for controlling nuclear weapons delivery systems. Khrushchev's press conference statement on 3 June made it clear that the new proposals, which include more detailed provisions on the nature and functions of a control system, are intended to appear responsive to other Western views. Khrushchev probably hopes that this move, in addition to strengthening the position of the bloc disarmament delegates at Geneva, will help offset the damage to the USSR's image as the champion of peace and disarmament inflicted by his performance in Paris.

*Khrushchev's press conference remarks on 3 June did not modify his earlier position that the status quo in West Berlin would be maintained until another summit meeting takes place in "six to eight months." (Page 1)

*USSR: A protracted meeting of the Soviet party presidium on 2 June made Khrushchev and a contingent of presidium members an hour and a half late for a scheduled appearance at a British exhibit in Moscow. Heated discussion broke out among them as they departed, according to a British diplomat who was near the group. Khrushchev was overheard to remark, "All right, we will continue the discussion tomorrow morning." The presence in Moscow of three presidium members who live in provincial centers may be an additional sign of important deliberations. There are as yet, however, no indications to support reports that the party central committee may be convened earlier than its meeting scheduled for 13 July.

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*USSR-Cuba: Khrushchev, exploiting Cuba's hostility to the United States and its willingness to strengthen ties with the Communist bloc, has accepted an invitation to visit Cuba at an undetermined date. He will probably seek additional invitations from other Latin American governments. [redacted]
(Page 3)

II. ASIA-AFRICA

NO
Japan: Major newspapers, increasingly apprehensive about leftist excesses in recent demonstrations, have warned that violence during the strikes set for 4 June would lessen public sympathy for protests against Kishi's "dictatorial" tactics and against the US-Japanese security treaty. Factions of the ruling Liberal-Democratic party may temporarily be closing ranks in the face of leftist attacks in an effort to complete the ratification of the treaty by 19 June. However, Kishi's prospects for remaining in power for more than the next few weeks do not appear improved. [redacted]

in 2nd sent of p1, delete after 3rd demonstration in 3rd sent; in p4 delete last sent
Turkey: The accumulation of extensive evidence of illegal activity and crimes--some of which are subject to capital punishment--of the members of the former regime has resulted in a broadening of the current investigations and arrests. Elimination of the nucleus of the leadership of the Democratic party will add to its impotence when the next national elections are held. [redacted] The new government is apparently concerned, as was its predecessor, over the possibility of disturbances in the Kurdish areas of southeastern Turkey. [redacted] (Page 4)

NO
Sudan: A move by army Deputy Commander in Chief Hasan Bashir Nasir to assume control of the Sudanese Government may be imminent. [redacted]

[redacted] he intends in the next few days to abolish the Supreme Military Council and take the position of prime minister over a new, all-civilian cabinet, replacing the present military-dominated group whose internal divisions have hindered effective government. Prime Minister Abboud is said to be in agreement with Bashir Nasir. Abboud is slated to become president, presumably in a figurehead role. [redacted] (Page 5)

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OK

Belgian Congo: Patrice Lumumba's demand that he be appointed premier of the Congo on the basis of his plurality in the recent legislative elections appears designed to confront Belgium with the choice of bowing to his demand or facing the threat of an attempt by him to seize power. In a press conference on 2 June, Lumumba also called for the immediate withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Congo and for the election of the chief of state by popular vote rather than by the legislature. Lumumba's warnings may have been prompted by concern over the possible formation of an anti-Lumumba coalition led by Joseph Kasavubu, who departed for Brussels suddenly on 1 June. [redacted] (Page 6)

III. THE WEST

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Cuba: Nicaragua's suspension of diplomatic relations with the Castro regime on 1 June has again called public attention to Cuban subversive activities in other Latin American countries, as did the Guatemalan break with Cuba on 29 April. The Castro regime is repeating its charges that such actions by "dictatorial, pro-imperialist" regimes are the initial moves in a US plot to cause its downfall. Some circles in Latin America were receptive to this propaganda tactic after the Guatemalan break. [redacted] (Page 7)

NO

Venezuela: President Betancourt [redacted] advise Cuban President Dorticos not to come to Caracas at this time as his visit would "create serious internal problems." [redacted]

The visit, scheduled for 6 June, is threatening to intensify the sharp differences within Betancourt's coalition government over Venezuelan policy toward the Castro regime. A new point in this controversy is the effect on Venezuela of Cuba's recent heavy purchases of Soviet crude oil. [redacted] (Page 9)

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IV. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] moves of up to 129 Chinese Communist fighters--preliminary US analysis indicates perhaps as many as 67--to forward coastal airfields opposite Taiwan, most of which occurred on 2-3 June. These appear to reflect Chinese Communist efforts to achieve a materially increased state of defensive air readiness. Except for abnormal direct communications [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] there is no evidence to reflect abnormal readiness or forward deployments of Chinese Communist ground or naval forces. The tone of Communist propaganda on the Offshores-Taiwan situation does not appear unusually aggressive or focussed on liberation themes.

[REDACTED] US aircraft commenced deployment to the Far East beginning 1 June [REDACTED]. It is believed that the Chinese Communist air developments may reflect defensive moves in response to US activities in the Pacific or alternatively as a consequence of Malinovsky's declarations of readiness by the bloc to retaliate forcefully against air intrusions.

The concurrent standdown of the entire North Korean Air Force since 30 May cannot be fully explained but may have some connection with the Chinese Communist defensive air posture. The heavy North Korean fighter activity during late May would normally have been expected to result in a standdown of only 48 hours.

4 June 60

DAILY BRIEF

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New Soviet Disarmament Proposals

Khrushchev has again put forward new disarmament proposals as a means of refurbishing the image of the USSR as the champion of peaceful coexistence. In his letter to President Eisenhower on 2 June, the Soviet premier stated that "recent events have not only not lessened but, on the contrary, have strengthened the Soviet Government's determination to achieve a radical solution of the disarmament problem." He reaffirmed his intention to work, as before, to "normalize the international situation and improve relations between states."

Khrushchev's new proposals which, he said, had been prepared for presentation to the summit meeting, are designed to appear responsive to Western views on a number of important issues. However, in an effort to exploit Western differences resulting from France's insistence on giving top priority to measures for controlling nuclear weapons delivery systems, the new Soviet plan provides for the prohibition and destruction of all means for the delivery of nuclear weapons in the first stage of Moscow's revised program for complete disarmament. The USSR insists, however, that these measures must be accompanied by the liquidation of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territory of other states.

The new proposals include detailed provisions on the nature and functions of a control system which are designed to give the impression that Moscow is seeking to meet Western criticisms of the vague and ambiguous control provisions Khrushchev placed before the United Nations last September. The new proposals spell out control measures for each of the three stages in the Soviet program and outline the composition and voting procedures of the proposed International Control Organization. Moscow now provides for on-site inspection of successive disarmament steps, missile-launching sites, and plants and installations engaged in military production.

In a move aimed at meeting the United States' emphasis on banning the use of outer space for military purposes, Moscow's

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new first stage would prohibit the launching of "special devices" and confine all missile launchings to peaceful purposes.

Moscow has also adopted another feature of the Western plan by agreeing to "joint studies" in the first and second stages of measures to be undertaken in subsequent stages.

Khrushchev's press conference remarks did not modify his earlier position that the status quo in West Berlin would be maintained until another summit meeting takes place in "six to eight months." However, he warned the West against believing that the conclusion of a separate treaty with East Germany could be delayed by postponing a summit conference beyond the time period he has suggested. He indicated that Moscow would go through the normal steps of calling a peace conference of wartime allies before taking any unilateral action. As to the timing, Khrushchev stated only that the USSR would initiate this process "when we see that enough time has passed."

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Khrushchev to Visit Cuba

Soviet Premier Khrushchev has accepted an invitation to visit Cuba, according to TASS. No date has been set for the visit.

The announcement, following Khrushchev's recent personal endorsement of Fidel Castro and his glowing praise for the aims and methods of the Cuban revolution, suggests that in keeping with the USSR's intensified anti-American propaganda since the summit breakdown, Moscow is more willing than it was during Mikoyan's winter visit to Havana to exploit the Cuban Government's hostility to the United States and Havana's readiness to strengthen ties with the Communist bloc. Soviet diplomats now will step up their efforts to obtain additional invitations which would expand Khrushchev's Cuban trip into a Latin American tour.

Bolivian President Siles, whose term expires in August, reportedly said in late May that he would extend an invitation to Khrushchev to visit Bolivia if the Soviet premier came to Latin America. The Brazilian foreign minister, on the other hand, noted in May that Brazil does not have diplomatic relations with the USSR, and that consequently "the possibility of a visit by the premier would never be studied." [] The Soviet ambassador in Buenos Aires has reportedly invited Frondizi to visit the USSR, probably angling for a reciprocal invitation to Khrushchev, but Frondizi is not likely to respond with an invitation at this time. []

The President of Mexico in late 1959 received an invitation to visit the USSR from Mikoyan, who subsequently told a Mexican senator that "without doubt Premier Khrushchev will visit Mexico."

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

The new government in Turkey, on the basis of additional evidence, is broadening the investigation into illegal activities and alleged crimes of the Menderes regime. A spokesman for the National Unity Committee, which appears to be emerging as the real power in Turkey has reported discovery of the bodies of students killed by police during the demonstrations; of plans for a violent purge of leaders of the Republican People's party, professors, and some army officers; and of large quantities of illegal arms. Arrests have been stepped up and now include about 400 Democratic party deputies, but an initial screening is apparently already under way to determine who can be released immediately. The remainder will be held for trial before civilian courts or, if military personnel, before courts martial. In the light of the alleged murders, extreme penalties probably will be demanded for some of those tried.

The initial report of the committee working on a new constitution appears to be an attempt at legal justification of the coup. The report claims that the former government "had ceased to be a social and national institution and turned into a tool of personal influence and ambition." Although the Democratic party will probably be allowed to participate in the planned election, it will probably be ineffective as a political force.

It is still too early to determine the true power relationships of the interim government. Even the size of the National Unity Committee (NUC) has not been made public. [The new minister of foreign affairs recently told the British ambassador in Ankara that the NUC might evolve into something in the nature of a constituent assembly.]

[The new government, as was the Menderes regime, is apparently concerned over the possibility of disturbances in the Kurdish areas of southeastern Turkey and may be sending troop reinforcements to that area.] [redacted]

[redacted] gendarmerie units in southern Turkey have been alerted to disarm the Kurds and make arrests where necessary to forestall "further adverse activities." [redacted]

[redacted]

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~~SECRET~~(New Government in Sudan Reported Imminent)

(The Sudan's reigning Supreme Military Council and its subordinate cabinet of civilian and military ministers may be replaced during the next few days by an all-civilian cabinet under Deputy Commander in Chief Hasan Bashir Nasir. [redacted]

Bashir Nasir, whose plans reportedly have the approval of Prime Minister Abboud and Ansar religious leader Siddiq al-Mahdi, is expected to assume control of the government during the Moslem holiday period of 4-7 June. He plans to arrest three members of the present government, while two others slated for ouster are out of the country. The arrests will be followed by announcement of the abolition of the council and the formation of a new cabinet.

(The planned membership of the new cabinet has not been revealed. [redacted] senior army officers and a government official had indicated that Bashir Nasir would emerge as a "strong-man" prime minister, with Abboud in what appears likely to become a largely honorary post of president.

(The Supreme Military Council and the cabinet, most of whose members are military men serving in both bodies, have been under fire from political and religious leaders for inefficiency resulting largely from acrimonious disagreements among council and cabinet members.

(Bashir Nasir would run little risk of effective opposition. Besides having the reported approval of Siddiq al-Mahdi, Bashir Nasir's move is not expected to be opposed by the Sudan's other powerful religious figure, Ali al-Mirghani of the Khatmia sect. Most of the senior army officers in the Khartoum area are either tribally related or otherwise attached to Bashir Nasir. Bashir Nasir, who is not categorized as any kind of extremist, would be unlikely to make any sudden shifts in the Sudan's generally neutralist foreign policy. [redacted]

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Congo Leader Hints at Move to Seize Power

The demand by extremist Congolese leader Patrice Lumumba that he be appointed premier of the Congo on the basis of his plurality in the recent legislative elections appears to be a threat to seize power if his various demands are not met by the Belgians. Lumumba's National Congo Movement won about one third of the 137 seats in the lower house of the new Congo parliament. In a press conference on 2 June, Lumumba also called for the immediate withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Congo and for the election of a chief of state by popular vote rather than by the legislature. He hinted that there would be "trouble" if his various demands were not met.

Lumumba's warnings may have been prompted by concern over the possible formation of an anti-Lumumba coalition by Joseph Kasavubu, who departed for Brussels suddenly on 1 June. Lumumba might proclaim himself head of government, but his ability to seize power is doubtful in view of the hostility toward him among many African groups and Belgium's control of the Congo's security forces.

Meanwhile, Europeans continue to leave the Congo at an accelerating rate in the face of antiwhite threats. Newspapers in Stanleyville and Katanga Province have reportedly published lists of Europeans who should leave the Congo "at once."

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Nicaragua Suspends Relations With Cuba

The Nicaraguan Government cabled the Cuban Foreign Ministry on 1 June demanding the recall of the Cuban ambassador and his entire staff for having repeatedly engaged in subversive activities. The Nicaraguans regard this move as equivalent to "suspension" of diplomatic relations, an action taken by the Guatemalan Government for similar reasons on 29 April. Nicaragua's action again calls public attention to Cuban subversive activities in other Latin American countries.

Nicaragua and Guatemala are exerting pressure to have the governments of Costa Rica, Honduras, and El Salvador take similar action, since they regard Cuban subversion as directed against all five Central American governments. Honduras may do so, because the Cuban ambassador there has been particularly provocative in his support of radical, Communist-inspired opposition groups. However, Costa Rica and El Salvador appear unlikely to break with Cuba in the near future.

The Castro regime is repeating its charges that the actions of "dictatorial, pro-imperialist" regimes are the initial moves in a US plot to cause its overthrow. Some circles in Latin America were receptive to this propaganda line after the Guatemalan break.

(Meanwhile, Guatemalan President Ydigoras is reliably reported to have threatened to consider withdrawal from the Organization of American States (OAS) or at least to have the Guatemalan representative in the OAS "walk out" if the Inter-American Peace Committee fails to act on Guatemalan charges against Cuba which were formally lodged with the OAS following Guatemala's break with the Castro regime.)

Latin American annoyance at the Castro regime is being reinforced by Cuban President Dorticos' "good-will" trip in South America, which is demonstrating that the best organized support

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in Latin America for the Castro regime is Communist. In Argentina, he flouted protocol, viciously attacked the United States before a pro-Communist university group, and went out of his way to meet with leaders of an actively antigovernment, Peronista labor group. In Uruguay, the Cuban Embassy was admonished prior to Dorticos' arrival that the Uruguayan Government wanted no public statement adversely reflecting on any foreign government. The Cubans reportedly agreed, but Dorticos nevertheless made his usual anti-US attacks.

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]Venezuelan-Cuban Relations Approach Critical Stage

[REDACTED] Venezuelan President Betancourt told Foreign Minister Arcaya, then in Argentina on a South American tour, to advise Cuban President Dorticos not to come to Caracas at this time as his visit would "create serious internal problems." The visit, scheduled for 6 June, could cause unrest in Venezuela, where outspoken anti-Castro groups are said to be planning a violent protest demonstration against the Cuban delegation. On the other hand, Arcaya, a staunch supporter of the Castro regime, has reportedly insisted that withdrawal of the invitation would also cause "grave internal problems"; he has threatened to resign if his government takes such action.

The issue of the visit is likely to intensify the divisions in Betancourt's three-party coalition, in political pressure groups, and in the press over Venezuelan policy toward Castro. At the time of Cuban Foreign Minister Roa's visit to Venezuela in March, this cleavage was clearly defined over the issue of whether Venezuela would attend Cuba's underdeveloped nations conference proposed for Havana this fall. [The Venezuelan ambassador to Washington subsequently stated that "the Cuban problem" was an extremely serious threat to internal stability in his country.] The controlled Cuban press and radio have attacked Betancourt on various occasions in recent weeks.

A new irritant in Cuban-Venezuelan relations is Cuba's program to import 900,000 tons of Soviet crude oil in 1960, which will replace about 43 percent of Venezuela's crude oil exports to Cuba. Venezuela supplied almost all of Cuba's crude oil requirements in 1959, when the Cuban market took more than 3 percent of total Venezuelan petroleum exports. A large segment of the Venezuelan press has denounced the Cuban-Soviet deal, and the acting foreign minister, [REDACTED] has called it a "rude blow to Venezuelan petroleum," which is already facing keen competition in its world markets. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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