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18 April 1960

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
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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18 APRIL 1960

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR--Second vehicle launched from TTMTR within 25 hours; neither believed to have achieved its objective.

Mikoyan, at end of visit to Iraq, says no change envisaged in Soviet aid program for Baghdad.

II. ASIA-AFRICA

South Africa's most influential African leader reported dying as result of police beatings.

Change or overthrow of Sudanese Government increasingly likely.

Greek Government under increased pressure to improve relations with USSR because of planned Menderes-Khrushchev visits.



III. THE WEST

⑥ Castro planning to use May Day rally to demonstrate hemisphere and Sino-Soviet support of his regime.



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

18 April 1960

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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***USSR:** Two vehicles were launched from the Tyura Tam Missile Test Range about 25 hours apart. The first was launched at 1007 EST, 15 April, the second at 1108 EST, 16 April. Although there is evidence to the contrary,

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[redacted] the 15 April event was some type of space venture--probably with a lunar mission. Preliminary calculation reveals that the probe attained only enough velocity to go into space about 115,000 miles. The continued lack of a public announcement and the low velocity achieved indicate that the vehicle failed to reach its objective.

NO
Preliminary analysis of the 16 April event indicates that the vehicle lifted off the launching pad but failed almost immediately thereafter. The possibility exists that this was a stand-by lunar vehicle, inasmuch as it was launched at the next optimum time.

The 25-hour interval between the launchings is less than half the previous shortest interval and suggests that at least two launching pads are available on the Tyura Tam range

NO
USSR-Iraq: Mikoyan's statements to the press on 16 April at the end of his visit to Iraq were mostly cordial generalities. Although he had several private talks with Qasim, no joint communiqué was issued. The Iraqi Government's reception of Mikoyan was correct but not enthusiastic, and the military and the press continued their efforts to undermine the Communists.

[redacted] Moscow would be receptive to Iraqi requests for additional economic aid. In response to a direct question at his final press conference, however, Mikoyan said that no alteration of the existing \$137,500,000

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aid program was envisaged because "we have such a good agreement that there is no desire from either party to change it."

[REDACTED] (Page 1)

II. ASIA-AFRICA

South Africa: [Albert Luthuli, the president of the African National Congress and the most influential African nationalist in South Africa, appears to be dying as a result of the harsh treatment he received after his arrest on 30 March, [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

OK The death or permanent incapacitation of Luthuli, who had exercised a restraining influence over African extremists, would provide Africans throughout the country with a rallying symbol for further action against the government. Regardless of Luthuli's condition, serious disorders may occur if Africans provoke police retaliation by heeding nationalist appeals to begin a week-long stay-at-home campaign on 19 April. [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

OK Sudan: [Dissension within the top leadership of the Abboud military regime is growing, as each of the several factions tries to line up army and civilian supporters. The regime's unpopularity has increased, partly as a result of strong pressures by influential political and religious leaders for a return to civilian government. Junior army officers and elements of the National Unionist party reportedly are again planning a coup. It seems doubtful that all five regional army commanders would support the regime in the event of a showdown.] [REDACTED] (Page 3)

ND Greece: [The recent announcement that Turkish Prime Minister Menderes and Soviet Premier Khrushchev will exchange visits this summer has created difficulties for the Greek Government, according to Foreign Minister Averoff. Opposition groups, both left and right, are again denouncing the "inflexible" foreign policy which has left Greece almost alone in its opposition to the USSR's economic and cultural offensive. Thus the government may decide /

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DAILY BRIEF

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[it must make some dramatic move toward improving relations with the bloc.]

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III. THE WEST

Cuba: Fidel Castro seems intent on making the May Day rally in Havana a demonstration of strong support for his regime not only by the Cuban masses but also by public sentiment throughout the hemisphere. Evidently aware of the cool attitude of most Latin American governments, he is trying to show hemisphere support by inviting numerous political figures who are out of office but have widespread reputations as liberal or "anti-imperialist" leaders. [The Cuban Communist party is taking a leading part in preparations for the rally, and almost 100 representatives from Communist China and Soviet bloc countries are expected to participate.]

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DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

The Mikoyan Visit to Iraq

Soviet First Deputy Premier Mikoyan's eight-day visit to Iraq did not inhibit the Iraqi government and army from continuing strong measures to undermine the Iraqi Communists. The government's reception of Mikoyan was correct but not particularly enthusiastic. Although he talked privately with Qasim several times, no communiqué was issued.

His statements to a press conference on 16 April, the day of his departure, were mostly cordial generalities. In a message late in March reporting arrangements for the visit, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] the Soviet Government had indicated that it would be receptive to Iraqi requests for additional economic aid. In response to a direct question at his final press conference, however, Mikoyan revealed that no alteration of the \$137,500,000 economic aid program was envisaged. He said, "We have such a good agreement that there is no desire from either party to change it."

Nationalist newspapers used the visit as an occasion for new attacks on Iraqi Communists, and one paper asked directly, "Have you, O Comrade, come to communize?" The Baghdad military court began trials of a large additional group of Communists, and the army used force to break up several small strikes, apparently Communist inspired. [When Mikoyan went to Basra on 14 April, the Iraqi army and police sealed off all avenues approaching his route, into the city and beat off crowds of Communist demonstrators who attempted to break through.] [REDACTED]

Soviet displeasure at these tactics--and perhaps at the entire tone of Mikoyan's reception in Iraq--was reflected by an Izvestia criticism that Mikoyan was prevented from having contact with "the Iraqi people." [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

South African Native Leader Reported Dying

[Albert Luthuli, the president of the African National Congress and the most influential African nationalist in South Africa, appears to be dying as a result of the harsh treatment he received from the police after his arrest on 30 March,]

[Luthuli is reportedly suffering from dangerously high blood pressure as a result of police beatings.]

[even if Luthuli should survive, he will be a "dull and shuffling moron."]

[Luthuli is almost the only African nationalist whose prestige extends throughout South Africa. His program has been moderate, emphasizing peaceful reform. He has favored the creation of an African-dominated state, with non-African minority rights constitutionally guaranteed. Although government-imposed restrictions have hindered his activities, he has heretofore acted to restrain African extremists. His death or permanent incapacitation would provide Africans throughout the country with a rallying symbol for further action against the government.]

[Regardless of Luthuli's condition, serious disorders may occur if Africans provoke police retaliation by heeding nationalist appeals to begin a week-long stay-at-home campaign on 19 April.]

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The Sudanese Situation

[The possibility of a sudden move to change or overthrow the Abboud military regime in the Sudan is growing. Dissension within the Supreme Military Council--the top governing body--has become acute, as each of its several factions tries to line up army and civilian support. Two council members, Deputy Army Commander in Chief Hasan Bashir Nasir and Minister of Information Talat Farid, have resorted to the use of spies to keep track of each other's activities.]

[Influential political and religious leaders have sustained their pressures for a rapid return to civilian government, and the Supreme Council members have been unable to agree on how to deal with them. The minister of interior has refused to present them with an ultimatum to desist or be jailed unless such action is endorsed by all army leaders. The head of the Ansar religious sect, which could probably muster several thousand partially armed tribesmen in an emergency, has warned the government that action against him would force "drastic counter-measures."]

[Junior army officers are again plotting a coup; elements of the National Unionist party are reportedly in contact with some of them for the purpose of joint planning to seize control of the government. A week ago, a considerable quantity of arms and ammunition was allegedly stolen from Khartoum military stores; almost immediately army units in the Khartoum area were put on standby alert.]

[It seems doubtful that the regime can count on support of all five regional army commanders in the event of a full-scale show-down.]

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[REDACTED]

Greek Government Faces Increasing Pressure to Improve Relations With USSR

[The announcement on 12 April that Turkish Prime Minister Menderes and Soviet Premier Khrushchev will exchange visits has caused the Greek Government more domestic difficulties than it had anticipated, according to Greek Foreign Minister Averoff. The opposition press, both the far left and the anti-Communist center, is again attacking the government's "inflexible" foreign policy. Several non-Communist political leaders have denounced the government for permitting Greece to become isolated in its opposition to the Soviet bloc's economic and cultural offensive. Liberal party leader Venizelos has seized the opportunity to announce that he has accepted a month-old Soviet invitation to visit the USSR. Venizelos, although a non-Communist, is sufficiently vain and ambitious to be used by the USSR for propaganda to undermine Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis.]

[The USSR has alternately used the "carrot and the stick" in attempting to "normalize" its relations with Greece, and late last year the Soviet ambassador in Athens vainly attempted to arrange an exchange of visits between Karamanlis and Khrushchev.]

[Athens is "resentful and unhappy" over Ankara's precipitate announcement of the visits and its omission of the fact that Menderes will visit Athens before going to Moscow.]

[Averoff has told the American ambassador that Athens must soon decide if it will "fall in line" and abandon its resistance to a detente. Thus Athens may decide to make some dramatic move to improve its relations with the bloc.]

[REDACTED]

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III. THE WEST

Plans for Cuban May Day Rally

Fidel Castro seems determined to make the May Day rally in Havana a demonstration of strong support for his regime not only by the Cuban masses but also by public sentiment throughout the hemisphere and by the Sino-Soviet bloc.

A parade by the armed forces and militia units is planned to show Cuba's capacity to repel the foreign invasion. Castro officials insist is being plotted by "imperialism!" Previous plans for a march of a million workers are rumored to have been abandoned because of a bitter fight within the Cuban Labor Confederation (CTC) over the government's endorsement of efforts to purge non-Communist leaders. The Cuban Communist party has taken advantage of this situation to usurp CTC responsibility for organizing the May Day celebration, hoping thus to strengthen its influence with Castro and within the CTC. [REDACTED]

Delegations invited from other Latin American countries include liberal leaders--many of them widely respected--who recently signed a "statement of solidarity with the Cuban Revolution." Their presence would be used to demonstrate support by nonofficial hemisphere groups and to offset the coolness of most Latin American governments toward Castro and their concern over his rejection of the Rio de Janeiro Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.

[Castro will also probably attempt to attract to Havana a large number of the prominent liberals and leftists from all Latin American countries and the United States who have been invited to Maracay, Venezuela, from 21 to 26 April to attend the scheduled conference of the Inter-American Association for the Defense of Democracy and Freedom--a meeting which is supported by Venezuelan President Betancourt's regime. Those invited to the Maracay conference include eight former chiefs of state and other influential] [REDACTED]


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[political leaders and government officials, several of whom have long been considered unfriendly toward the US.]

The Cuban Government reportedly is paying transportation and lodging costs for 18 Chinese Communists who will participate in the May Day rally. Along with 73 Soviet visitors and other bloc delegations, the Chinese will probably be given a prominent place in the demonstration.

The American Embassy in Havana is convinced the rally will have a strong anti-US and Communist-line flavor.



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