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26 April 1960

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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26 APRIL 1960

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Khrushchev speech at Baku. ①

USSR--Lenin anniversary speaker refutes Chinese Communist views on inevitability of war. ②


USSR sounding out Turkey on subjects to be discussed during Premier Menderes' visit. ③

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Nehru and Chou En-lai fail to reach any substantive agreement in New Delhi talks. ④

President Bourguiba more concerned that Tunisia will be caught in middle of French-Algerian rebel fight. ⑤

Nationalists of Somalia and British Somaliland proclaim intention to form republic on 1 July. ⑥



⑦ Afghan Prime Minister Daud in USSR, probably trying to reach agreement on future aid.

III. THE WEST

⑧ Cuba appears to be using US more and more as scapegoat for complex internal problems.

LATE ITEMS

⑨ Laos--Incomplete election returns show overwhelming conservative victory; losers claim fraud, probably with justification.

⑩ President Rhee's offer to resign and other pledges appears to have momentarily calmed situation.



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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

26 April 1960

## DAILY BRIEF

## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

*SIRAB*

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USSR: In his 25 April speech in Baku, Premier Khrushchev combined a prediction that the "favorable" international trend would continue after the summit with an effort to increase pressure for Western concessions on the major summit topics. As in previous statements, he sought to create the impression that Soviet unilateral action on a separate German peace treaty could be dependent on the outcome of the summit, while carefully avoiding committing the USSR to such a position. [Foreign Minister Gromyko also restated the standard Soviet position on Berlin and Germany to Ambassadors Thompson and Bohlen, while hinting that an interim Berlin solution was still negotiable. Both] Khrushchev [and Gromyko] took an optimistic line on the chances for resolving the main issues of a nuclear test agreement, [and Gromyko stated that Khrushchev would be seeking a "concrete" decision on disarmament which could be translated into action.]

(Page 1)

*OK*

USSR-China: The Soviet Union has used the major speech given in Moscow for the Lenin anniversary celebration to refute the views on the inevitability of war developed by the Chinese Communists in their two Red Flag editorials on the occasion of Lenin's birthday. Attributing the views not to the Chinese but to "bold publicists in the West," the speaker, Presidium member Otto Kuusinen, asserted that such ideas are one-sided, obsolete dogmatism and that today the policy of peaceful coexistence, as developed by Lenin and followed by the USSR, is the "only correct and vital policy."

(Page 3)

*OK - delete last two paragraphs and add last sent. of brief as end of C/D piece.*

USSR-Turkey: [A Soviet diplomat in Turkey is reported to be taking soundings on political subjects which could be discussed during Premier Menderes' visit to Moscow in July, presumably to determine how far the Turks are willing to go in their talks ]

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[with Khrushchev. Ankara has earlier indicated that it is ready to conclude cultural and health agreements and possibly an economic agreement with the USSR, but that Turkey will continue to base its foreign policy on the military pacts with its Western allies.]  (Page 4)

## II. ASIA-AFRICA

*OK* India - Communist China: The failure of Nehru and Chou En-lai to reach any substantive agreement as a result of their six days of talks in New Delhi makes it almost certain that relations between New Delhi and Peiping will remain strained for some time. While neither side was willing to budge from its basic position, both apparently hoped to reduce tension along the frontier and agreed, in a communiqué on 25 April, to establish a joint panel of officials to study evidence supporting respective border claims. These lower level meetings from June to September are likely to accomplish little beyond keeping the border problem on the diplomatic level.  (Page 5)

*NO* Tunisia: [Stepped-up activities by the French and Algerian rebel elements along the Algerian-Tunisian frontier, together with rebel efforts to "internationalize" the war by recruiting a "foreign legion," have aggravated President Bourguiba's fear that Tunisia will be caught in the middle. The President publicly warned France on 24 April against further border incursions,

(Page 7)

*OK* Somalia - British Somaliland: [Nationalists of the Italian-administered trust territory of Somalia and of the British Somaliland Protectorate announced on 22 April, at the conclusion of a week-long conference, their intention to unite the two territories under a new "Somali Republic" on 1 July. The conferees apparently also reached agreement on the composition of a ]

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national assembly, the selection of a president, and the formation of a coalition government. Ethiopia, apprehensive over the attraction such a union would present to its large Somali minority, is reported to have increased its security forces in the Somali border areas. [redacted] (Page 8)

*OK - delete last sent 2nd PP.*

Afghanistan-USSR: Afghan Prime Minister Daud, who is in the USSR for a three-week vacation, is probably trying to settle points of disagreement over future economic and cultural programs which apparently arose during Khrushchev's visit to Kabul in early March. If Daud is successful in eliminating objectionable Soviet conditions, a new agreement for Soviet assistance to Afghanistan's next five-year plan (1961-1966) may be announced at a later date. [redacted] (Page 9)

### III. THE WEST

*OK - delete PP 3*

Cuba: Complex internal problems are impelling the Castro regime more and more to use the United States as a scapegoat. Ambassador Bonsal believes these internal tensions and Castro's reaction to them may mount to dangerous extremes on May Day, with possible danger to American lives and property. The ambassador considers Castro's 22 April television attack on the US to be the strongest, most direct, and most insulting to date. [redacted] (Page 10)

### LATE ITEMS

*OK*

\*Laos: Conservative candidates appear to have achieved an overwhelming victory in Sunday's National Assembly elections. Incomplete returns indicate that Communist or pro-Communist candidates won very few seats, if any. The defeated leader of the fellow-traveling Santiphab party has charged, probably with justification, that the elections were "faked" and claims to have photographic evidence of election irregularities. The apparent manipulation of the vote may bring on an intensification of guerrilla attacks by the Communist insurgents and would weaken the prestige of the new government to be formed after 10 May. [redacted]

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\*South Korea: The National Assembly has requested that President Rhee immediately resign as he had earlier offered and has called for new presidential elections. Rhee's resignation probably will place control in the hands of a caretaker government now being formed. Such a government will require military support. Martial law probably will be continued.

The populace, encouraged by the successes of its mass action, probably will be easily aroused to take violent action again should there be any delay in carrying out reforms or if popular expectations are not satisfied.

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## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

### Khrushchev Reviews Soviet Position on Summit Topics

In his 25 April speech in Baku, Premier Khrushchev outlined in standard terms the Soviet position on the major East-West issues which he intends to take up at the summit. Prefacing his statements with a prediction that the present "favorable" trend in international affairs will continue after the meeting in Paris, Khrushchev singled out disarmament as the first item for discussion, to be followed by the German and Berlin questions.

The Soviet leader sought to build up pressure for Western concessions on Berlin by repeating his threat to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany. Although he did not spell out the timing, by discussing the problem in the general context of the May meeting he again gave the impression that lack of progress at the summit could be followed by such a treaty. In a further effort to urge the West to seek an interim solution on Berlin, he repeated, as he recently did in Paris, his claim that a separate treaty would end all Western occupation rights, including access to Berlin. [In a private conversation with Ambassador's Thompson and Bohlen, Foreign Minister Gromyko also restated the standard Soviet position on a peace treaty and a free city, while hinting that an interim agreement could be negotiated.]

Khrushchev adhered closely to the Soviet position taken at the disarmament talks in charging that the West continues to substitute control for disarmament. [Gromyko stated that at the summit Khrushchev would be seeking a "concrete" decision on disarmament, which could be translated into future action.] This approach provides further evidence that Moscow will press for a joint statement endorsing the main principles of a treaty for "complete and general disarmament" which the Soviet delegation at Geneva could represent as a directive to proceed with the Soviet plan.

On the question of nuclear tests, Khrushchev said he intended to conduct serious negotiations at the summit, adding an optimistic

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assessment that a treaty could be concluded, in view of the Eisenhower-Macmillan 29 March statement proposing a voluntary moratorium on small underground tests. The Soviet premier, however, implied that the length of the moratorium would be a key question.



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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~The USSR Repeats Chinese Views

The Soviet Union has used the major speech given in Moscow in commemoration of Lenin's 90th birthday to refute the views recently expressed by the Chinese Communists in their two Red Flag editorials on the same occasion. Attributing the Chinese views to "bold publicists in the West," presidium member Otto Kuusinen, without mentioning Communist China, condemned those who assert that Lenin was an opponent of peaceful coexistence.

Claiming that "these falsifiers" take from Lenin's works only those passages which support their own thesis, Kuusinen maintained that Lenin developed the idea of peaceful economic competition in the world. Contradicting the Chinese, who insist that wars are inevitable so long as imperialism exists, Kuusinen stated that the conclusions reached at the 20th and 21st party congresses about "the absence of inevitability of wars in our epoch" are "a new contribution to Marxism."

Kuusinen noted that to be loyal to Marxism-Leninism today it is not enough to repeat the old truth that imperialism is aggressive--as the Chinese do. To look on only this one side of the question is "dogmatism," he said, and such dogmatism is obsolete. Kuusinen alleged that Lenin foresaw long ago that "the time will come when war will become so destructive as to be impossible."

In developing the theme that the strength of the socialist world will soon be such that it cannot fail to win out in peaceful competition, Kuusinen made the interesting observation that the significance of violence is soon exhausted, but that "influence and example will tell." He asserted, therefore, that the Leninist policy of peaceful coexistence, now being followed by the Soviet Union, is the only correct and vital policy.

Kuusinen's observation echoes Khrushchev's admonition in Peiping last September that Communists should not "test the stability of the capitalist system by force." The speech as a whole is an expression of Khrushchev's view that bloc countries should do nothing to jeopardize forthcoming negotiations in which the West will have no choice but to make accommodations to Communist demands because of the shift in the balance of power.

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~~TOP SECRET~~Moscow Sounding Out Turks on Khrushchev-Menderes Talks

[The Soviet Government is apparently seeking to determine how far the Turks are willing to go in discussing political subjects during Premier Menderes' visit to Moscow in July. A Soviet diplomat in Ankara is reported to have recently consulted a prominent Turkish lawyer with excellent contacts among higher Turkish officials to get his reaction to the Khrushchev-Menderes exchange of visits and to specific subjects which might be brought up for discussion.]

[In particular, the diplomat was anxious to elicit a reaction to a possible Soviet suggestion that Turkey reduce its armed forces. While it is highly unlikely that Menderes would enter into serious discussions with Khrushchev on this subject, Soviet policy-makers may be planning to use the announcement on 14 January by Khrushchev of a 1,200,000-man cut in the Soviet military establishment to urge that Turkey should "match" the reduction as a contribution to ending the cold war. Following Khrushchev's statement, the Supreme Soviet appealed to other governments for military cutbacks, and Soviet spokesmen have repeatedly criticized the Western powers for failing to respond.]

[While Turkey agreed to the exchange of visits largely in order to put itself in better position to take advantage of any improvement in East-West relations following the summit meeting in May, Turkish officials have emphasized they envisage no change in their firmly anti-Communist foreign policy.]

[Turkey plans to conclude only cultural, health, and veterinary agreements with the USSR, and possibly an economic agreement.]

[ ] the Soviet ambassador has complained that the atmosphere in Turkey is "not very warm" for Khrushchev's reception; [ ] this evaluation is correct and he has informed US officials that Ankara has no intention of taking measures to improve the climate.]

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## II. ASIA-AFRICA

### Nehru-Chou Talks Fail to Produce Border Agreement

The inability of Prime Minister Nehru and Chinese Premier Chou En-lai to make any real headway toward a border agreement during their six days of talks in New Delhi makes it almost certain that Sino-Indian relations will continue strained for some time. The two leaders admitted in a joint communiqué on 25 April that while their "long, frank, and friendly talks" had led to a better understanding of their opposing views, they "did not resolve the differences that had arisen."

[Neither Nehru nor Chou retreated from his basic position on the border issue.  Nehru, during the first three days of talks, insistently argued that India was the injured party and that the next conciliatory move was up to the Chinese. He apparently refused to accept any agreement based on the status quo, demanding Chinese military withdrawal from Ladakh as a condition for any substantive negotiations. Other top Indian Government officials reportedly were even more outspoken in expressing New Delhi's indignation over Chinese actions in the border area.]

[Chou reportedly met this uncompromising attitude with equal obstinacy, insisting that "rightful" Chinese occupation of disputed territory constitutes a prime criterion of ownership and holding that the entire border is undelimited, therefore subject to negotiation.] During his stay in India, Chou hinted broadly in public that acceptance of the Chinese position could lead to an eventual exchange of disputed areas in Assam for those in Ladakh. Attempting at the same time to salvage some good will, Chou restated his old assurances that Peiping would not send troops across the McMahon line, even though the line "is completely unacceptable to China."

Nehru and Chou agreed to turn the border discussions over to subordinate officials of both countries, who will meet

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from June to September to "examine, check, and study" the historical evidence each side has advanced in support of its territorial claims. These officials are not empowered to recommend a solution but only to draft a report on points of "agreement and disagreement." "Every effort" will be made during this period to avoid further border clashes. These meetings, to be held in Peiping and New Delhi, are likely to accomplish little beyond keeping a channel open for eventual negotiations.

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[REDACTED]

Tunisian President Warns France and Rebels

[President Bourguiba, striving to maintain Tunisia's official noninvolvement in the conflict in Algeria, recently warned both France and the Algerian rebels to refrain from actions which would compromise his government's position. In a beligerent speech on 24 April he warned France: "Tunisia is capable of successfully conducting a war if she is obliged to do so by aggressions." He was referring to a series of recent border incidents which have arisen from the stepped-up activities of both French and Algerian rebel troops in the Algerian-Tunisian frontier area.]

[Meanwhile, the President is believed to have admonished the Algerian rebels in Tunisia not to engage in any activities near the border which might stimulate such French retaliation, as ground fire against concentrations of Algerian military units on the Tunisian side of the border. Bourguiba also apparently told Algerian officials that any new materiel must cross without delay from Libya to Algeria, without assembly or stockpiling in Tunisia.]

[The Tunisian foreign minister has indicated that the efforts of the Algerians to "internationalize" the conflict, particularly the acceptance of "volunteers" from other states, would pose a problem for his country. He said that any Tunisians volunteering would lose their citizenship. In the case of foreigners, Tunis would hold their own governments responsible for their actions in Tunisia.] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Somalia and British Protectorate Intend to Form Union

[Nationalist leaders of the Italian-administered trust territory of Somalia and of the British Somaliland Protectorate announced on 22 April, at the conclusion of a week-long conference, their intention to unite the two territories under a "Somaliland Republic" on 1 July.]

[Britain has invited protectorate leaders to London in May and apparently hopes to dampen enthusiasm for early independence and union. Various British officials have expressed doubts, however, about their ability to influence developments, and London might considerably shorten the present tentative schedule calling for independence in two or three years.]

[The conferees--who met in Mogadiscio, capital of Somalia and the designated capital of the new state--released a joint communiqué at the end of the conference outlining their plans for the union. The legislative bodies of the two territories are to merge to form the new national assembly which will elect a president to head a coalition government formed by the political parties now in power in the respective countries.]

[The agreement appears to be a major victory for Somalia's Prime Minister Issa. He was believed to favor a loose association with the protectorate in order to prevent upsetting the delicate tribal balance which would permit him to remain in power, but he now appears to have executed a clever political maneuver which probably will strengthen the position of his party and greatly enhance his own popularity. In return for agreeing to accept the protectorate's plan for total integration, Issa apparently received a pledge of support from the protectorate leaders as either prime minister or president of the new state.]

[Addis Ababa is apprehensive over the attraction such a union would present to the nomadic Somalis who inhabit Ethiopia's Ogaden region, and has substantially increased its security forces in the Somali border areas during the past year. Three battalions of Imperial Body Guard troops--Ethiopia's elite fighting force--reportedly were moved into this area recently.]

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]Afghan Prime Minister Daud Talks With Khrushchev

Afghan Prime Minister Daud, who began a three-week vacation in the USSR on 14 April, is probably trying to settle points of disagreement with Moscow over future economic and cultural programs. Daud's sudden visit to the USSR suggests he believes that high-level policy problems require further discussion between himself and Soviet officials. These problems were apparently first recognized as serious during Khrushchev's visit to Kabul in early March and accounted for the tense atmosphere at Khrushchev's departure.

The Afghans are probably concerned that Soviet proposals for closer economic and cultural cooperation may undercut Afghanistan's neutrality and independence. Soviet officials apparently tried unsuccessfully to secure an outlet for "cultural" propaganda by establishing a binational cultural center in Kabul under the terms of the cultural agreement signed by Khrushchev and Daud.

[REDACTED] his government "continually reminds" the USSR that an ideological campaign "or any other kind of propaganda activity" in Afghanistan would shake close Afghan-Soviet relations "to their foundations." [REDACTED]

[Another source of friction could be a reported Soviet proposal to place Soviet personnel in the Afghan bureaucracy to expedite implementation of future economic assistance programs. The USSR will probably insist that future large-scale economic assistance for Afghanistan's Second Five-Year Plan (1961-1966) consist of loans rather than grants, while Afghanistan's policy is to accept only grant aid until it can service additional debts.] [REDACTED]

Daud reportedly met Khrushchev at Sochi on 24 April. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

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### III. THE WEST

#### Castro's Growing Problems Impelling Him Toward More and Stronger Attacks on US

Cuba's increasingly complex domestic problems are impelling the Castro regime more and more to use the United States as a scapegoat. Ambassador Bonsal believes these internal tensions and Castro's reaction to them may mount to dangerous levels on May Day, when the regime plans to stage mass demonstrations of loyalty highlighted by parades of workers' and students' militias and addresses by Castro and other top officials. Workers in five of Cuba's six provinces are being offered free transportation to Havana for the May Day events. In view of the bitterness against the United States which Castro, other top officials, and the pro-government press are attempting to promote, the atmosphere on 1 May could produce serious incidents against the lives and property of US citizens.

Castro, in a television appearance on 22 April, described United States policy toward Cuba as "fascist, Goebbels-like, and a betrayal of the principles for which thousands died in the past war against fascism." Ambassador Bonsal described this attack on the United States as Castro's strongest, most direct, and most insulting to date. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the political situation has become serious, "creating great expectations with the approach of 1 May, the date on which it is hoped that Castro will define the ideological orientation of this government (with respect to Communism) before a crowd of a million people. . . . It is felt that the moment for a definition has arrived. . . . Confusion is widespread, discouragement. . . and even despondency." [REDACTED]

In Oriente Province, once Castro's stronghold, [REDACTED] support for Castro is declining [REDACTED]

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among all classes. [redacted] government intervention in business and agriculture has cut off many sources of private income and has led to an economic recession. [redacted]

[redacted] all attention is focused on the economic situation and that the Communist issue is not an important factor in the discontent. [redacted]

[redacted]

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