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### 14 JULY 1960

#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

East German officials concerned over growing peasant movement to leave collectivized farms.


Chinese Communists, in strong protest note to Indonesia, demand "open apology" for killings of two Overseas Chinese. (2)


### II. ASIA-AFRICA

Congo situation becoming more critical; food shortage in Leopoldville could lead to civilian rioting.

India--Government workers' response to strike call spotty, but violence and sabotage increasing; unions reportedly plan long siege.

Somali Republic--Naming of premierdesignate apparently has ended political stalemate.





Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03185139

# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03185139

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## 14 July 1960

## DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

SIPAB East Germany: Top East German Communist officials are concerned over a growing movement among the peasants to leave newly collectivized farms--a move which threatens agricultural production--and a campaign of persuasion and coercion to maintain control is being initiated in the countryside. The main center of unrest appears to be in the northcentral part of the country.

the

movement is spreading. Party headquarters in one district reported to the central committee on 8 July that farmers are saying: "In the fall, if we stand together, we shall once again become the farmers we were before." Page 1) (Map)

Communist China - Indonesia: Peiping has sent a strong note to Indonesia demanding an "open apology" for the recent killing of two Overseas Chinese and immediate steps to prevent  $\mathcal{A}^{\mu\nu\nu}$  the occurrence of incidents similar to those which in the past  $\mathcal{A}^{\mu\nu\nu}$  have "seriously affected" Sino-Indonesian relations. The Chinese Communists apparently feel that Djakarta's embarrassment over the incident has strengthened their position in demanding an end to forced removals of Overseas Chinese from rural areas. (Page 2)

## II. ASIA-AFRICA

**Republic of the Congo:** The situation in Leopoldville Ul paratroops and mutinous units of the Force Publique--ap-

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imminent food shortage in Leopoldville, together with the failure of many Congolese to receive salaries from employers who have fled, could lead to civilian rioting. Belgian reinforcements totaling about 350 paratroops occupied Leopoldville on 13 July, after other Belgian troops had been repulsed by mutineers at the port of Matadi the previous day.

Premier Lumumba has renewed demands for the removal of Belgian forces, apparently on the assumption that a UN police force will ultimately be dispatched to restore order. In Katanga Province, provincial premier Moise Tshombé has hedged on his 11 July announcement of an "independent" Katanga, and in the absence of Belgian recognition may be prepared to "rejoin" the Congo if guaranteed a sufficient measure of internal autonomy.

\*Moscow's statement of 13 July accusing the five Western powers of seeking to "liquidate" the new Congo state through direct military action and under cover of the United Nations is apparently designed to encourage Lumumba to resist any outside intervention, as well as further the Soviet pose as the protector of the newly independent African states.

India: The response among India's 2,000,000 government workers to the 12 July strike call by socialist and Communist labor leaders continues spotty, but incidents of violence and sabotage are reported increasing. Non-strikers, supervisors, and army reservists are maintaining most of the essential services in such seriously affected areas as Bombay and Calcutta. The unions are reported planning for a long siege, and they may be aided by a 24-hour sympathy strike threatened by Communist and socialist unions in nongovernment fields. Their capability to hold out is limited, however, especially in the face of an apparently unyielding attitude on the part of the government.

> Somali Republic: The selection of Abdirascid Ali Scermarche as premier-designate of the newly independent Somali Republic appears to reflect tribal realignments and to have ended the political stalemate. Each of the main regions--former British Somaliland and the Italian-administered trust territory of Somalia-now has received a major political office in the government. The premier-designate, reportedly a devout Moslem opposed

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( to Communist penetration, will probably favor pro-Western policies and seek to delay Somali acceptance of recent Soviet offers of diplomatic representation and economic assistance. (Page 3)

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# **III. WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS**

With respect to the question of Sino-Soviet bloc intentions to initiate hostilities, the Watch Committee Conclusions remain negative.

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
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Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03185139

East German \_\_\_\_\_gime Campaigns to Halt Withd\_\_\_wals From Collective Farms

East German peasants who were forced into collectives during the all-out drive last winter now are withdrawing in increasingly large numbers.

As a pretext the peasants are using the regime's reiterated assertion that the collectivization was "voluntary." Some of them are reported to have said: "The collectives are merely temporary affairs... in joining, we have lost all interest in work... formerly we were farmers and now we are only hired hands."

The main center of unrest appears to be in the north-central part of the country,

there has also been trouble in the extreme south. On 2 July Gerhard Grueneberg, central committee secretary in charge of agricultural affairs, berated party leaders in Neubrandenburg district for failing to correct what he termed the "critical situation" and said that the movement was spreading to neighboring districts. \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ control has not yet been re-established in Neubrandenburg, that Grueneberg is greatly concerned over the adverse effect of the withdrawals on agricultural production, and that the SED central committee--probably scheduled to meet on 19 July--plans to take a "hard and clear line" to correct matters.

In Potsdam district, the situation appears to be deteriorating. On 8 July the SED first secretary reported that many peasants had announced they would leave collectives and, in one area near West Berlin, there were "countless withdrawal declarations," Peasants were said to be threatening: "In the fall, if we stand together, we shall once again become the farmers we were before."

The top SED leadership is taking measures on the eve of the harvest to halt withdrawals and to organize farm work. The central committee is dispatching activists to trouble spots, and local officials are being subjected to a mounting barrage of criticism and threats. Grueneberg described one local broadcast as "a catastrophe" in that it revealed numerous defections, resistance by farmers, and local inefficiency.

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## Communist China Demands Redress From Indonesia for Deaths of Chinese

Peiping on 11 July sent a strong note to Djakarta demanding an "open apology" for the fatal shooting on 3 July of two Overseas Chinese who resisted Indonesian Army efforts to carry out the forced removal of Chinese residents of Tjimahi, West Java. Peiping demanded that steps be taken "at once" to prevent further incidents similar to those which have "seriously affected" Sino-Indonesian relations.

The Chinese Communist Embassy is believed to have organized the resistance, inasmuch as,

local Chinese "stopped complying" with resettlement measures after the visit of embassy personnel the day before the incident.

The Chinese Communists apparently feel that Djakarta's embarrassment over the incident has placed them in a strong position for demanding an end to forced removals of Overseas Chinese from rural areas. If the Indonesian reply to the Chinese note is unsatisfactory, the Chinese Embassy may order the closing of Chinese-run shops throughout Indonesia, which if carried out could seriously curtail the retail trade. On embassy orders, all Chinese shops in the neighboring city of Bandung closed for one day after the Tjimahi incident.

Indonesian police have been ordered to be on the alert to head off any widespread closings.

An Indonesian Army spokesman announced immediately after the incident on 4 July that the cabinet was taking steps toward a "proper settlement," including an expression of regret. Foreign Minister Subandrio has so far responded to China's second protest note only by stating that his government plans to review the Overseas Chinese issue within the framework of Sino-Indonesian friendship. Although Indonesia is adopting a conciliatory attitude in this one case, it shows no sign of abandoning measures aimed at abolishing Chinese retail trade in rural areas. The Tjimahi affair, however, may induce Indonesia to be more flexible in its implementation of these measures.

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## Somali Political Stalemate Eases

The selection of Abdirascid Ali Scermarche as premierdesignate of the newly independent Somali Republic appears to reflect tribal realignments and to have ended the political stalemate there. The National Assembly is expected to give him a vote of confidence when he presents his government within the next 30 days, as required by the constitution.

The new state is composed of the former British protectorate of Somaliland and the former Italian-administered trust territory of Somalia. Since the nation achieved independence on 1 July, there has been tension between political leaders of the two areas--including threats of secession-over issues such as distribution of the top political posts and the early integration of the British-trained security force from Somaliland into the republic's army. Disagreements have been heightened by tribal animosities.

Abdirascid, who is considered pro-Western and is reportedly a devout Moslem opposed to Communist penetration, is expected to delay any acceptance of recent Soviet offers to exchange diplomatic representatives and to furnish economic assistance. However, he is relatively inexperienced; he did not hold a ministerial position in the previous government; and his inflexibility in dealing with politicians may create early difficulties for him in view of Somalia's reputation for venal, personal politics and former Premier of Somalia Abdullahi Issa's expected efforts to regain power.



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### THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Inteiligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director



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