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Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03189342

23 JUNE 1960

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

II. ASIA-AFRICA


Japan--Hayato Ikeda, minister of international trade, appears most likely successor to Kishi

Indonesian Communist party giving strong anti-American twist to West New Guinea dispute.

Diem summoning Vietnamese diplomats to Saigon for conference in effort to counter adverse publicity about his regime.

Thailand--Sarit concerned over rumors of plots against his regime.

Tanganyika's moderate Nyerere bids for leadership of regional nationalism.





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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

23 June 1960

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Japan: Potential successors to Prime Minister Kishi are increasing their maneuvers as Kishi's resignation becomes more imminent. Minister of International Trade and Industry Hayato Ikeda is widely regarded as the strongest candidate, and his supporters are confident Kishi will recommend that Ikeda succeed directly to the top government post. *A late report indicates, however, that Bamboku Ohno and Mitsujiro Ishii are also leading candidates. Their prospects will be particularly good if the Liberal-Democratic party decides that an interim government might put off major dissension within the party. (Page 1)

Indonesia: The Communist party, continuing to exploit the West New Guinea dispute, is giving it the strongest possible anti-American twist. The party's latest tactic is to press hard for the seizure of US assets in Indonesia on the ground that the US permits the Dutch to use American weapons in West New Guinea. (Page 3)

South Vietnam: President Diem has taken the unusual step of summoning all heads of Vietnamese diplomatic missions to a conference in Saigon beginning on 25 June to acquaint them with the "true situation" in South Vietnam. He apparently is concerned the over the recent trend abroad toward adverse publicity about his regime on such matters as Communist strength in the countryside and domestic opposition to his authoritarian rule.

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(<u>Thailand</u>: Marshal Sarit seems to view with considerable concern rumors of various plots against his regime. Sarit is apparently unable to pinpoint the participants in the rumored plotting, but he almost certainly suspects that members of his ruling military group are involved. Even if these rumors lack substance, the atmosphere of uneasiness engendered by them could increase prospects for an attempt against Sarit. (Page 5)

British East Africa: Tanganyika's moderate African leader, Julius Nyerere, by actively advocating accelerated independence for the East African territories ''as one political unit,'' has made a major bid for the leadership of regional nationalism. Efforts to unify the diverse areas of East Africa face almost insurmountable difficulties, but Nyerere may believe the time opportune to bid for a wider following in view of the increasing political tempo in East Africa. Attempts to speed the pace toward independence for the problems of the settler-controlled Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland because of Nyerere's appeal to Nyasaland nationalists. (Page 6) (Map)

III. WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

With respect to the question of Sino-Soviet bloc intentions to initiate hostilities, the Watch Committee conclusions remain negative.

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Note: The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, is of the opinion that the item in the 22 June issue of the Central Intelligence Bulletin dealing with Khrushchev's speech in Rumania overemphasizes the ideological differences between the Soviet Union and Communist China. It is felt that Khrushchev's restatement of Soviet policies showed he had not been influenced by recent Peiping propaganda for a more aggressive line, but did

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not specifically constitute a "hard-hitting criticism" of the Chinese Communists. It is considered that the most critical portions of the speech were directed against the West, especially the United States, rather than against Peiping. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, believes further that, in the larger context, the ties of common interests binding the Soviets and Chinese Communists are not currently being threatened by the reported ideological differences, and that the Sino-Soviet military alliance will not be weakened in the foreseeable future.

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Representatives of the Director of Intelligence, the Joint Staff, the Director of Naval Intelligence, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, the Air Force, have associated themselves with this note.

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Japan

Potential successors to Prime Minister Kishi can be expected to step up their maneuvers following his statement, issued shortly after the exchange of documents of ratification of the US-Japanese security treaty on 23 June, that he intends to resign. Political maneuverings had already increased following Kishi's statement on 20 June to Shojiro Kawashima, secretary general of the ruling Liberal-Democratic party (LDP), that he would announce his plans to resign once the security treaty became effective.

Hayato Ikeda, minister of international trade and industy, is widely mentioned in the Japanese press of 22 June as most likely to succeed Kishi. Ikeda's supporters believe he has or will be able to obtain sufficient support to become prime minister immediately after Kishi's resignation, rather than after a period under an interim prime minister. Efforts of Ichiro Kono, archrival of Kishi who heads an anti-Kishi faction of the LDP, to develop a "stop Ikeda" campaign lend credibility to Ikeda's claim to be the strongest candidate, but observers feel that the matter is far from settled.

Ikeda, in addition to claiming support from leaders of Kishi's party faction, is reportedly confident of cooperation from Takeo Miki, another important rival leader. Miki has apparently long aspired to the post of foreign minister and has, within the past year, traveled to the United States and to Communist bloc and Middle Eastern countries to increase his prestige.

Bamboku Ohno and Mitsujiro Ishii are also potential prime ministers. The head of the LDP policy board considers Ikeda the most likely choice if a special national party convention is called to elect a new party president, whom the Diet would then install as prime minister. If, however, a party caucus should decide to select an interim party president in an effort to avoid a major fight between Ikeda and Kono, Ohno and Ishii would have good prospects.

any future Japanese government would probably adopt a much harder

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line in negotiations with South Korea. Ikeda, should he become prime minister, would probably be less inclined than Kishi to grant the South Koreans liberal financial settlements. Acting Prime Minister Huh Chung in Seoul has warned that no South Korean government is likely to reach an easy settlement with Japan and reiterated that resumption of negotiations depends on Tokyo's first ending repatriation of Koreans in Japan to North Korea.

23 June 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03189342 Indonesian Communist Party Continues to Exploit West New Guinea Issue

The Indonesian Communist party continues to exploit the West New Guinea dispute and is giving it the strongest possible anti-American twist. Party Secretary General Aidit has sent a cable to the Indonesian cabinet setting forth a series of anti-American and anti-Dutch demands.

The party demands the seizure of all American enterprises in Indonesia until the US prohibits Dutch use of American weapons in West Irian. It insists on the nationalization of Dutch assets, including those in mixed enterprises, in retaliation for the Netherlands' strengthening of its forces in the disputed area. The Communist daily, <u>Harian Rakjat</u>, headlined Aidit's demands on 21 June, and other Communist and left-wing papers gave them front-page coverage.

The Indonesian Government's response to the dispatch of Dutch naval units to West New Guinea has been chiefly at the diplomatic level--seeking support for its position from Afro-Asian countries and, on 6 June, circulating a letter to UN members condemning Dutch action. Official and non-Communist domestic Indonesian comment has sharply decreased since it has become apparent that Dutch units will not enter Indonesian territorial waters. Even President Sukarno, apparently realizing he would only be helping the Communists politically, has made no extreme anti-Dutch or anti-Western statements. Should the Communists continue to exploit the issue, however, Sukarno and the cabinet may consider renewed emphasis necessary.

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South Vietnam Summons Envoys Home for Conference

The Diem government has summoned home the heads of all its diplomatic missions abroad for a conference beginning on 25 June to acquaint them with the "true situation" in South Vietnam. The conference will include a three-day tour of agricultural production areas and the new "agrovilles"--rural resettlement centers.

the envoys

will return to their posts immediately after the conference ends on 30 June. (TOP SECRET DAUNT)

President Diem feels that the envoys have been away too long, and are failing in their mission as representatives because they have lost touch with the country's problems and progress. Many of the older ambassadors,

were motivated merely by a desire to get out of Vietnam, while others felt that foreign assignment was the equivalent of political exile. In either case, they had done little to enhance the government's reputation.

Only a matter of the highest concern to Diem would prompt calling such an extraordinary conference. After years of enjoying a good press, Diem apparently is unhappy over the recent trend toward adverse publicity abroad on such vital subjects as Communist influence in the countryside and domestic discontent with his authoritarian rule. He has frequently complained that his critics overlook the considerable progress achieved in such fields as economic rehabilitation and social welfare while sensationalizing security and political aspects. With recent developments in Korea and Turkey in mind, Diem has become more concerned with his standing on the international level, particularly in the United States.

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Rumored Plotting Against Sarit Regime in Thailand

Marshal Sarit, the Thai premier and strong man, apparently is concerned about a flurry of coup rumors this month. He avoided attendance at the cremation rites on 2 June for the late Air Chief Marshal Chalermkiat, and called a military alert. Subsequently there were rumors of an attempt to seize him or other leaders on the occasion of the King's departure for the United States later in the month.


Security agencies have apparently been unable to pinpoint any plotters. Sarit almost certainly suspects members of his ruling military group, however, as he is contemptuous of the troublemaking potential of the adherents of former Premiers Pridi and Phibun and former Police Director General Phao; all three have been in exile for some years. It is doubtful, moreover, that Sarit believes Thailand's small Communist movement could overthrow him, although he tends publicly to attribute any indications of trouble to the Communists.

The current rumors may well have little substance, but the resulting uneasiness and mutual suspicion could conceivably create an atmosphere for a coup attempt. In fact, elements within the military who may be secretly plotting Sarit's overthrow may have deliberately planted the rumors to cause him to lose face by taking overelaborate precautions, and to camouflage their machinations.

Intrigues against Sarit have not developed to the extent characteristic in recent Thai military regimes, both because of his demonstrated willingness to take strong counteraction and because of the general expectation that his chronic liver ailment would soon remove him from power. The premier's unexpected durability under a heavy workload may, however, have convinced any aspirants to his position that if they are to come to power in the next few years, they will have to work actively, if discreetly, for his overthrow.

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Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03189342 Political Pa_ May Quicken in East Africa -

Julius Nyerere, Tanganyika's moderate African leader who has cooperated closely with Britain, has apparently made a major bid for leadership of East African nationalist groups. In a recent speech in Addis Ababa, he demanded accelerated independence for all regional states--Kenya, Uganda, and Zanzibar as well as Nyasaland--and their emergence with Tanganyika as "one political unit" rather than as separate states with existing boundaries.

In Tanganyika there was initial confusion as to whether he advocated stepping up the pace of freedom for the other states or delaying local independence. Nyerere, however, later clarified his intention as meaning earlier independence for the group under Tanganyika's auspices. London has previously agreed to early independence for Tanganyika--desired by Nyerere for July 1962, but by most other nationalist party leaders for 1961.

Achievement of East African unity would appear to face almost insurmountable difficulties because of personal and tribal rivalries. However, Nyerere may have chosen an opportune time to present his bid for leadership. In Kenya, nationalist leaders are divided, and Tom Mboya faces a real challenge for power. In Uganda, African factions continue their infighting, which has complicated London's effort to ready the protectorate for early independence. In Zanzibar, Sheik Ali Muhsin, with the support of the Arab minority and growing African backing, is pressing London for early selfgovernment for the island.

Nyerere's demands may lead to new difficulties for Britain as well as the settler-dominated Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Nationalist agitation led by Dr. Hastings Banda has been a serious challenge to the Federation's security, and disorders may break out again this summer if talks in July between Banda and British officials prove inconclusive. Banda and Nyerere have conferred recently, and Nyerere's statement suggests that he may cooperate to some extent with Banda to try to dismember the Federation.

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
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