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
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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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30 JANUARY 1960

**I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC**

GMAIC statement on Soviet 20 January mid-Pacific test. ①

Soviet missile test range apparently failed 29 January in new attempt to launch to mid-Pacific. ②

USSR agrees to supply UAR with additional combat jet aircraft. ③

**II. ASIA-AFRICA**


Tunisia bringing pressure on Paris to negotiate on Bizerte base question. ④

Belgian Congo--Africans reject Belgian plan for stringing out transfer of sovereignty. ⑤

Afghanistan--Government's decision to force social and economic reform likely to arouse further tribal opposition. ⑥

Japan--Kishi considering calling early elections on issue of new US treaty. ⑦

Laos--Communists avoiding clashes but their subversive campaign is undiminished. ⑧




**III. THE WEST**

⑨ Latin American governments wary of Cuba's proposed "hungry nations" conference but some interest expressed in Asia and Africa.

**LATE ITEM**

⑩ Algeria-France--De Gaulle's reaffirmation of his self-determination policy for Algeria and his command to the army to restore order has infuriated Algerian insurgents.



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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

30 January 1960

## DAILY BRIEF

SIRAB

### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Soviet Rocket Test: [GMAIC on 29 January issued the following statement:]

[As previously noted (CIB dated 21 January 1960), the USSR carried out an apparently successful multi-stage rocket test on 20 January 1960 to the announced Soviet Pacific impact area. (1) ejection and subsequent recovery by a Soviet Sibir-class ship of a data capsule from the nose cone; (2)

NO

and (3) visual observation of the final stage and nose cone. Analysis may allow a more precise determination of the purpose of the test.

\*Soviet Missile Test Range Activity: A probably valid but unsuccessful attempt to launch a test rocket from Tyura Tam Missile Test Range was terminated at 1600 GMT on 29 January subsequent to the "readiness 30-minutes" announcement. The operation had proceeded without delay to this point. The missile was intended to impact in the area designated by the Soviets in the mid-Pacific. The Sibir ships engaged in a 4-hour count-down and were joined by rangehead facilities at "readiness two hours."

NO

As in the case of the three past similar operations (a canceled attempt on 19 January, a successful shot on 20 January, and a probable in-flight failure on 24 January), the operation appeared timed to impact just prior to local sunrise--the optimum time for target acquisition and optical tracking. Another launch attempt is expected at the same time of day, possibly as early as today.

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**\*USSR-UAR:** The Soviet Union informed UAR military officials on 27 January that it is willing to supply an additional 15 combat jet aircraft by the end of September 1960.

NO

it is apparently a more advanced model than either the MIG-17 jet fighter or IL-28 jet bomber, which the UAR has already received in quantity from the bloc. The UAR general responsible for the procurement of bloc arms is to visit Moscow early in February to discuss future supply.

## II. ASIA-AFRICA

NO

**Tunisia:** If France has not indicated by 8 February its willingness to negotiate a withdrawal of forces from Bizerte, the Tunisian Government probably will attempt to seal off the French base and possibly take the issue to the UN Security Council. President Bourguiba may also be considering seeking American good offices in this problem.

(Page 1)

OK

**Belgian Congo:** Brussels' announcement on 28 January that the transfer of sovereignty for the Belgian Congo will extend well beyond the promised 30 June date for "independence" could bring a suspension of current round-table talks in Brussels. The Belgian statement was immediately rejected by a spokesman for the African nationalists, who demanded that the Congo receive "all the prerogatives of sovereignty. . . without any reservation." The leader of the influential Abako party has called for the formation of a Congo provisional government, and may attempt to carry out his repeated threat to set up an "independent" state in the lower Congo area.

(Page 3)

OK

**Afghanistan:** The government's efforts to bring about social reform and economic development with army backing is causing increasing tribal opposition. Kabul has had to use troops on

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several occasions in the past year to maintain control in southeastern tribal areas. In recent weeks, government control has reportedly been challenged along some roads in tribal territory south of Kabul, and royal family efforts to enlist support against dissident elements reportedly have failed.] (Page 4)

*NO*  
\*Japan: Prime Minister Kishi is seriously considering dissolving the Diet in early February and calling for national elections on the issue of ratification of the new US-Japanese security treaty. Kishi's supporters in the ruling Liberal-Democratic party, believing that Kishi is at the zenith of his power while the Socialists are disorganized and divided, see an opportunity for a major victory which would extend the prime minister's tenure. In making his decision, however, Kishi must consider important difficulties, including strong resistance from the LDP's financial backers and from rival party leaders who are anxious to replace him.]

*OK*  
Laos: The Communists are continuing their subversive efforts throughout Laos while avoiding major clashes with government troops. Their major activities include propaganda and intimidation efforts, recruitment, organizing of the villages, and requisitioning of supplies. Meanwhile, the provisional government has taken little action to improve its popular standing and to prepare for the elections, which it apparently still plans for April or May.] (Page 5)

### III. THE WEST

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Cuba: Some neutralist nations in Asia and Africa have expressed interest in the Cuban proposals for a conference of "hungry nations" in Havana next September, but no Latin American government has responded favorably. Brazil has publicly stated that it will not attend, and a high Brazilian Foreign Ministry official says Argentina and Chile have also decided to decline. (Page 7)

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LATE ITEM

*NO*  
\*Algeria-France (as of 0200 30 January 1960): De Gaulle's tough reaffirmation of his self-determination policy for Algeria, accompanied by a direct command to the army to restore order, throws down the gauntlet to the insurgents and wavering army forces. The decision of army leaders--especially that of the key paratroop officers--will probably be determined by the way authorities in Algeria implement De Gaulle's statement that "there may be various ways whereby the law can be enforced." De Gaulle's pronouncement has infuriated the insurgents in Algiers, who probably now believe that only by the overthrow of the Fifth Republic can a "French Algeria" be assured.

For a detailed account of developments, see Page 8.  
(Status Report)

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DAILY BRIEF

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## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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## II. ASIA-AFRICA

### Tunisia Seeks to Induce France to Negotiate Bizerte Base Issue

[President Habib Bourguiba's warning to France in his 25 January speech that he intends to press for the evacuation of the French base at Bizerte was designed to make Paris--before his 8 February deadline--reverse its stand that the Bizerte issue is not negotiable, according to Bourguiba's foreign policy adviser. Bourguiba is reported to be willing to permit a phased withdrawal of troops over a period of six to ten months.]

[The adviser reported that if France did not meet this deadline, the Tunisians would try to seal off the base with roadblocks and other harassing tactics. Tunis probably would also attempt to have the issue placed before the UN Security Council. In 1958 the Security Council debated two Tunisian complaints of French aggression on Tunisian soil. Such efforts might incite violent incidents and a new crisis in Tunisian-French relations. The American ambassador in Tunis believes Bourguiba may be hoping that the United States might play a good-offices role on the Bizerte question, as it did in conjunction with the United Kingdom in the spring of 1958.]

[Pressures have been building up within the Tunisian Government for several months to hold the discussions provided for by the exchange of notes on 17 June 1958 in which France agreed to evacuate its forces from other bases. Although Bourguiba has at least twice offered to permit the French to retain Bizerte if they would conclude an Algerian settlement, no formal discussions have occurred. Tunis asked French]

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[Ambassador Boegner early in January to seek instructions to negotiate the eventual evacuation of Bizerte. France replied that its "right" to Bizerte was not negotiable, but the French Embassy in Tunis has indicated that France might withdraw more of its Bizerte troops--already reduced since 1958 from 15,000 to about 7,000.] ( [redacted]



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Dispute Over Transfer of Powers Threatens  
Congo Conference

Belgian Minister for the Congo de Schrijver's announcement on 28 January that the process of transferring sovereignty to the Congo will extend well beyond the promised 30 June date for "independence" could precipitate a suspension of the current round-table talks in Brussels. His statement largely confirmed views expressed by the governor general in Leopoldville, who recently told American officials that responsibility for defense, foreign affairs, internal security, and finance would remain with Belgium "for the time being." He observed that a new Congolese state would lack qualified personnel in these areas and would be preoccupied with domestic affairs.

De Schrijver's statement was immediately rejected by a spokesman for the African nationalists, who demanded that the Congo receive "all the prerogatives of sovereignty. . . without any reservation." His pronouncement came at a time when agreement on a date for independence had created an atmosphere of exultation among African conferees "bordering on hysteria."

Possibly in response to the Belgian statement, Abako leader Joseph Kasavubu has appealed for the immediate formation of a provisional Congolese government. Kasavubu, who walked out of the conference on 26 January following a dispute concerning the agenda, may attempt to carry out his repeated threat to set up an "independent" state in the lower Congo area. Belgian officials have long been apprehensive over such a move, and one official recently expressed concern over indications that a Congo nationalist had gone to East Germany to purchase arms for the Congo.

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Afghan Government May Provoke Further Tribal Opposition

Afghan Prime Minister Daud apparently has decided to press ahead with his social reform and economic development programs with army backing. This, as in the past, may increase tribal opposition and undercut his government's authority in key areas. Government efforts during January to Westernize the dress of certain Afghan groups indicate that Daud intends to push reforms, despite the unrest resulting from his efforts to abolish the veil. [He has recently strengthened army units, particularly in the disturbed tribal areas.]

Although there has been no large-scale rioting since the Kandahar disturbances in December, antigovernment sentiment may be growing in urban areas where conservative religious elements are strong and in the tribal areas of eastern and southern Afghanistan. The Mangal tribes have been a major source of unrest in their opposition to abolition of the veil. [The royal family has reportedly failed in an attempt to enlist the support of neighboring tribes against the Mangals. In addition, government control along the main road between Kabul and Kandahar has apparently been challenged.]

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Situation in Laos [redacted]

[Communist dissidents in Laos, while avoiding major clashes with government forces, are continuing efforts to subvert the population through propaganda and intimidation. Isolated kidnapings, ambushes, and road mining have been reported in various sections of the country. The dissidents are recruiting personnel, organizing villages, and requisitioning supplies. [redacted] as many as 1,000 young Lao may be receiving training in North Vietnam; others have been reported as having recently re-entered Laos.]


[There are also indications of increased Communist reliance on radio communications. A number of radio transmitters [redacted] arrived at a Lao Communist base near the North Vietnamese frontier in northern Laos, and radio communications are reportedly being used in Attopeu Province, a heavily infested area in the extreme southern part of the country. [redacted] There have been indications recently that a Pathet Lao military communications net [redacted] has been activated.]

[The insurgents probably hope domestic and international pressures will ensure reasonably fair elections in which the pro-Communist Neo Lao Hak Zat will be permitted to participate, and wish to avoid major clashes which would strengthen demands for carefully controlled elections.]

[The Khou government has taken few steps to improve its appeal or to prepare for the elections, even though it still apparently hopes to hold them before the onset of the rainy season in late May. Several sources have commented with concern on the apathy of the government, particularly of Deputy Premier Nhouy, who apparently has over-all responsibility for election preparations. General Phoumi--a leading member of the activist Committee for Defense of National Interests (CDNI)--is reported to be contemplating assigning]

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[a CDNI representative to Nhouy's office to prod the latter into action. The single slate which all non-Communists agree is of vital importance in the coming contest has yet to be agreed upon by the CDNI and former Premier Phoui's Rally of the Lao People. There is little optimism at present that they can do so, in view of the deep schism remaining between the two groups as a result of the split which led to Phoui's resignation in late December.] [redacted]



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Page 6

III. THE WEST

Cuba Gets Little Official Support for Proposed "Hungry Nations" Conference

Fidel Castro appears to be winning no official Latin American backing for a conference in Havana next summer of "under-industrialized" nations. The proposed conference, mainly a Cuban bid for leadership among neutralist countries with which it now identifies itself, has aroused suspicion in many Latin American capitals. No Latin American government has responded favorably to the Cuban invitations, Brazil has announced its intention not to attend, [redacted] Chile and Argentina have agreed to decline. Even the Betancourt regime in Venezuela, which materially supported Castro in his struggle for power, is becoming increasingly apprehensive of developments in Cuba. It has refused to co-sponsor the conference and may even refuse to attend.

Castro emissaries promoting the conference in Africa and Asia have elicited expressions of interest from several governments, but others have indicated lack of interest. The UAR, which Cuban leaders regard as a sympathetic ally, is concerned over Cuba's political motives. [redacted] The UAR minister of the presidency told the Brazilian ambassador. [redacted]

[redacted] Nasir would never attend the conference if Castro gave it a political stamp for the purpose of strengthening his regime. [redacted]

[redacted] advised the ambassador in Washington "not to express an opinion" on any question about UAR participation or about President Nasir's possible visit to Cuba. This may indicate wariness over becoming too closely identified with the Cuban proposals. [redacted]

While the failure of many of the invited governments to be represented at the proposed conference would be a severe blow to Castro's prestige at home and abroad, he may substitute a meeting of unofficial delegations from various nations. Such a conference could easily be used by Castro for propaganda against the United States and could be exploited by the Communists. [redacted]

[redacted]

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## LATE ITEM

## DE GAULLE AND THE ALGERIAN CRISIS

Since 16 September 1959 when De Gaulle announced that Algerians would have a free choice in determining their own ultimate political future, hostility to the president and the government had grown steadily among settler and army elements in Algeria. The announcement of a meeting in Paris on 22 January of key cabinet ministers with political and military leaders from Algeria aroused settler extremists, who were already worked up over revived rebel terrorism in "pacified" areas and by the fear that the lengthy conference of rebel chiefs in Tripoli was aimed at facilitating negotiations with Paris. In this atmosphere, General Massu's interview criticizing De Gaulle's Algerian policy, which was published on 19 January in a German newspaper, forced the government to recognize openly that large elements of the army shared settler concern lest the Moslem majority be permitted to cut Algeria's ties with France. The government confirmed on 20 January its intention to pursue its announced Algerian policy, and on 22 January De Gaulle's decision to relieve Massu was announced. It evoked no overt army reaction in Algiers, but 20,000 settlers demonstrated on 23 January. The next day they set up street barricades, [reportedly in the first stage of a plot by extremist civilian and army groups which may have been designed to take advantage of the expected reaction to Pinay's ouster from the government on 13 January. There is some evidence that the size of the demonstration was a disappointment to the plotters. They had hoped to overwhelm the authorities by a mass turnout which would have convinced military leaders the army would have to assume command as in 1958.] The civilian extremists seem to have been disappointed when no overt military participation developed, but they were nevertheless reassured by the reluctance of the paratroop units surrounding the barricades to limit the movements of the insurgents.

Insurgent Position and Activities

A clash between settlers and gendarmes on 24 January left 19 dead and 141 wounded. General Challe immediately declared a state of siege, forbade public assembly, and summoned regiments from the interior. By 25 January the insurgents had

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established two main barricaded strongholds within a quarter of a mile of each other--one at the University led by Assembly deputy and former paratrooper Pierre Lagaille, and the other at the Compagnie Algerienne bank, under Joseph Ortiz, a café owner and leader of the extremist French National Front. Cordons of paratroopers were thrown around the barricades, but access in and out of the redoubts and supplies to the insurgents were permitted.

Ortiz announced on 25 January that if De Gaulle publicly abandoned self-determination for Algeria and stated an intention to retain Algeria as a French province, the insurgents would lay down their arms. The US consul general reported on 26 January that most authorities in Algiers felt it was no longer possible to apply De Gaulle's policy for Algeria. During 27-28 January insurgent ranks swelled to between 4,000 and 6,000, but settlers were able to rally few Moslem supporters.

The insurgents have expressed the determination not to be robbed of the fruit of their efforts as they maintain they were after the May 1958 coup. [According to Algerian deputy Philippe Marçais, demonstrations were planned for 25 January--not to attempt to reverse De Gaulle's policy, which was thought impossible, but "to raise the temperature" in Algiers with the purpose of mounting a revolt to overthrow De Gaulle.]

[Marçais stated on 27 January that Lagaille was "absolutely determined" to obtain a reversal of De Gaulle's policy and was prepared to initiate a civil war "with the cooperation of the army, if necessary."]

This feeling of confidence was fostered by the government's censorship policy, which permitted the insurgents to believe they were winning support in France in the same way the 1958 coup unfolded. Because metropolitan France was in the dark on the seriousness of the situation in Algiers, the Algerian Deputies were emboldened to demand abrogation of the Algerian policy parliament had backed overwhelmingly in October.

The mainstay of insurgent confidence, however, was the belief in army backing. The insurgents rejected Delouvrier's impassioned appeal on the 28th for unity behind De Gaulle as a maneuver to take them in: "The army is with us and we will not budge." [Lagaille and Ortiz were reported to believe on the]

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[Evening of the 28th that the opposing positions were "irreconcilable." They were also reportedly "absolutely convinced" that the 10th and 25th Airborne Divisions--only one tenth of which are actually in Algiers, however--were prepared to fight for the insurgents, and believed other divisions would swing to their side. Insurgent leaders indicated that a move by De Gaulle against them would result in the establishment of a separate Algerian government.]

### The Army

The army had accepted De Gaulle's 16 September self-determination offer in silence, and majority army sentiment was probably correctly represented in a statement by Marshal Juin on 26 October that De Gaulle had acted unilaterally but that Frenchmen would have to accept the challenge since "the dice were thrown." Juin bowed to the idea of a referendum but maintained it could be held only after a cease-fire in which rebels "reconciled themselves to France and laid down their arms."

[A colonel in the field in eastern Algeria in late 1959 flatly opposed rebel participation in the proposed referendum, and another colonel told an American that about 20 percent of the army was determined to maintain the French Army in Algeria "at any cost." A European deputy from Algiers claimed that if those officers actively opposed to De Gaulle's policies were to organize against him, the remainder of the military "would be carried along."]

[In mid-January a member of Delegate-General Delouvrier's staff said, "We are once more in the tunnel. This time I am truly discouraged." He lamented low army morale and exclaimed, "The entire army feels it can no longer continue the war without knowing why."]

Massu's bitter attack on De Gaulle's policies reflected army fears that Algeria was being lost. He said flatly, "We no longer understand the policy of General de Gaulle." He thought De Gaulle's idea on the way to keep Algeria French "is certainly not ours," and threatened that the army would "forcibly intervene if the situation demands." He insisted the army would never leave Algeria.

[As recently as 28 January high-ranking officers are quoted as believing that whatever action might be taken by the activist army minority--even a move from Algeria to France to overthrow]

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[De Gaulle--would not be opposed by the rest of the army, which is determined to maintain "unity of the army."]

### De Gaulle and the Army

[De Gaulle was aware of this sentiment, but he miscalculated its intensity and the extent of his control over the army. His low opinion of the army's political pretensions is clear in a statement he made to Algerian rightist deputy Lauriol on 19 January: "This false atmosphere of tension has been entirely the creation of the military. I know the military and how they operate. They mounted the Dreyfus affair and they are mounting an Algerian crisis in order to serve their own purposes."]

De Gaulle apparently wanted firm action to wipe out the barricades, but the issue split the cabinet. [When Debré reported after a quick trip to Algiers on 26 January that the colonels had asserted their willingness to maintain order, but were not willing to move against the insurgents, De Gaulle appears to have changed tactics. He told a 27 January cabinet meeting it was probably a mistake to ask paratroops who have fought for five years to free Algeria to "shoot other Frenchmen who believe the same thing."] Subsequent cabinet approval of orders to Delouvrier and Challe suggests that direct use of force is no longer demanded by Paris.

The government decision to take Delouvrier and Challe from Algiers during the night of 28 January seems to have been dictated by the need to remove them from an increasingly difficult situation--possibly including seizure by insurgents in the event a new government were proclaimed--and to establish a rallying point where the loyalty of the rest of the army and the other armed services could be demonstrated for the benefit of settlers and paratroops in Algiers.

### Domestic Political Situation

The big political factor favoring De Gaulle is the absence of any individual leader or political grouping able and ready to take over the reins of government. Right-wing extremists and Algerian deputies were loudly critical of De Gaulle at first, but have had less to say publicly since police action was taken throughout France on 28 January against extremists. Initial public apathy has now given way, and support is mushrooming from a wide variety of political, labor, and religious groups and from the press. A

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quickie 28 January public opinion poll in Paris showed 68 percent in favor of backing De Gaulle, and only 9 percent against him.

The Independent party is badly split. [Ex-Finance Minister Pinay has privately assured De Gaulle of the availability of his "advice and services" in a crisis.] Senator Duchet who is firmly on the side of "French Algeria" on 27 January reportedly declared "this is the end of the line for De Gaulle," but he has since moderated his views. Duchet has apparently broken his ties with Former Premier Bidault's Rally for a French Algeria (RAF), which he considers ineffective. [Bidault apparently believes that the outcome will be the elimination of De Gaulle, and he considers himself the successor.]

The Radicals have called for respect for republican legality, and the Popular Republicans have reaffirmed full support for De Gaulle, as has the Union for the New Republic, which is firmly under control of loyal Gaullists despite Soustelle's previous efforts to commit the party to integration.

Although the Socialists have placed themselves squarely behind the government, they are worried about finding themselves in a difficult position in the future. Secretary General Mollet on 28 January saw no political leader with enough strength to take over from De Gaulle, but he felt that a military coup led by Marshal Juin or General Salan might succeed. [Mollet warned that if the right takes any action in metropolitan France, the Socialist party and other left-of-center groups will be forced into unity of action with the Communists, possibly leading to a popular front.]

The Communists appear to be trying to exploit the situation to their own advantage by pressing the government to take extreme action against the insurgents and by stimulating other "democratic forces" to join them in public demonstrations. While the Socialist-oriented Workers' Force has reportedly refused to go along with the Christian Workers Confederation's proposal for a national manifestation including the Communists, a Socialist spokesman said his party would approve common strike action.

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De Gaulle's 29 January Statement

In his speech on 29 January, De Gaulle refused to compromise his self-determination policy for Algeria. He called on the army and the insurgents to obey and respect the authority of the state, sharply distinguishing between the nation and the small group in insurrection.

On the key point of whether the army responds to De Gaulle's appeal for obedience, his 29 January address should put the situation in better perspective for officers who have tended to confuse Algiers with Algeria as a whole. This will facilitate further moves to restore order, e. g., by cutting off supplies to the dissident elements in Algiers. Even before De Gaulle spoke, statements of support for Challe had come in from the eastern and western regional commanders, Generals Ollié and Gambiez; the respected paratroop commander General Gilles; and Mediterranean Fleet Commander Admiral Auboyneau--the last an outspoken supporter of the 1958 coup.

De Gaulle's pronouncement has infuriated the insurgents in Algiers, who continue confident that the army will not use force against them. The extremists probably now believe that only by the overthrow of the Fifth Republic can a "French Algeria" be ensured. De Gaulle's refusal to give explicit assurances of a "French Algeria" increases the likelihood of some dramatic move such as proclamation of an "independent" Algeria.

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Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

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Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

**The Department of Commerce**

The Secretary of Commerce

**Federal Bureau of Investigation**

The Director

**Atomic Energy Commission**

The Chairman

**National Security Agency**

The Director

**National Indications Center**

The Director

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