

Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03179254



.....

. ....

Sec. 1 18

Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03179254

#### 25 MAY 1960

#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

East German leaders visibly disappointed by Khrushchev's Berlin speech postponing signature of separate treaty.


Peiping rejects Indonesia's protest on broadcasts and its request for withdrawal of two Chinese consuls; Djakarta plans to insist that Peiping withdraw the consuls before 31 May.

#### II. ASIA-AFRICA

Indian naval visit to Indonesia next month will coincide with Dutch carrier's arrival in West New Guinea; Djakarta expected to play up visit as support against "Dutch imperialism."

Strong boost for Laotian insurgents seen in escape of Souphannouvong and other Neo Lao Hak Sat leaders. (4)

Turkish Government strictly enforcing new martial law restrictions; some junior army officers reportedly searching for leadership for possible future action against government. 5




(6) Guinea launches "crash" program to recruit teachers abroad; education minister asks US and British help to keep country from being "wholly dependent" on Soviet bloc.

#### III. THE WEST

⑦ Belgium threatens to recall ambassador from Cairo in protest against UAR broadcasts to Congo.

(8) Cuban regime plans to build new facilities to control entrance and exit of all persons at US naval base.



Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03179254

# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

JOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03179254

### 25 May 1960

# DAILY BRIEF

SIRAB

NO

# I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

East Germany: East German party members were visibly disappointed by Khrushchev's 20 May speech in Berlin postponing the signing of a separate peace treaty with East Germany. Popular opinion in East Germany--

NO openly critical of Khrushchev for wrecking the summit conference. "Middle-class elements," especially doctors, are said to be voicing great concern over the deterioration of relations with the West, fearing that travel and cultural contacts might be stopped.

Communist China - Indonesia: Peiping has rejected Djakarta's request for the withdrawal of two Chinese consuls as well as its 21 May note demanding an end to anti-Indonesian broadcasts over Radio Peiping, and has countered with a protest note of its own,

Djakarta, in turn, plans to reject the new Chinese note and to inform Peiping that the two consuls must be withdrawn no later than 31 May.

As Peiping-Djakarta relations continue to deteriorate, Chinese broadcasts have recently broadened their propaganda attacks by implying that Djakarta is suppressing anti-Dutch demonstrations. (Page 2)

# II. ASIA-AFRICA

India-Indonesia: Major elements of the Indian fleet will  $\mathcal{D} \not\models \mathcal{V}$  visit Indonesia in late June, and Indonesian naval units are likely to participate in exercises with them. This visit, an

extension of earlier Indian plans for exercises with British and Malayan naval units in Malayan waters, will coincide with the much-heralded arrival in Netherlands New Guinea of the Dutch carrier Karel Doorman and other naval units. Indonesia can be expected to play up the Indian visit as a demonstration of friendship and support by another Asian power against "Dutch imperialism." (Page 3)

- SECRET

Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03179254

Laos: The escape from jail on 24 May of Prince Souphannouvong and 15 other leaders of the pro-Communist Neo Lao Hak Sat party will give the Pathet Lao insurgency movement a strong boost. Souphannouvong, the rallying point of anti-government "patriotic" elements throughout Laos, will probably try to go to the Pathet Lao command post, believed located in the Laos -North Vietnam border area. His escape will give the Communists added leverage in their political and subversive efforts against the government, and may be followed by a step-up in guerrilla warfare. (Page 4)

Turkey: The continued strict enforcement of the new and tighter martial law restrictions imposed on 22 May suggests that Turkish government officials remain seriously concerned over internal security despite their statements that the internal situation is now returning to normal. The government is still collecting information to "prove" that the opposition Republican People's party has abandoned "democratic procedures" in its drive for power. A group of junior army officers is reported developing clandestine communications and searching for leadership in preparation for possible future action against the government. (Page 5)

<u>Guinea</u>: Guinea's education minister stated on 20 May that his government has embarked on a "crash" program to recruit teachers wherever possible, including the Soviet bloc. This results from the decision by most of the 215 French nationals now teaching in Guinea to leave after the current term. The education minister formally requested American and British assistance in the recruiting effort so that Guinea would not become "wholly dependent on the bloc." Earlier this year the USSR reportedly offered to provide teachers, and a few Soviet nationals may already be employed in Guinean schools. (Page 6)

25 May 60

DF

Delete P2

### DAILY BRIEF

Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03179254

TOP SECRET

III. THE WEST

<del>FOP</del> SECRET

Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03179254

Belgium-UAR: The Belgian Government has threatened to recall its ambassador from Cairo if the UAR continues to assail Belgium in its Voice of Africa broadcasts to the Congo,

Radiobroadcasts from Cairo, which reach all countries of West and East Africa, have continued to include attacks on Belgian "imperialism" despite assurances from Egyptian officials that such attacks would be stopped. (Page 7)

<u>Cuba</u>: The Castro regime informed the American Embassy on 23 May that it intends to build facilities at the entrance to the US Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay to control the entrance and exit of persons and vehicles. The embassy was informed that the purpose of this measure is "to capture the entirety of the dollars" earned by Cubans on the base. The 3,500 Cuban employees at the base earn about \$600,000 a month. The regime will require "documentation" of each Cuban employee, a measure that will permit tight controls over personnel there for political purposes as well.

25 May 60

NK

### DAILY BRIEF

Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03179254

iii

# East German Party Officials Disappointed at Khrushchev's Failure to Sign Separate Treaty

<del>SECRET</del>

Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03179254

Khrushchev's announcement on 20 May that signature of a separate peace treaty with East Germany would be deferred until after another summit conference caused visible disappointment to some 8,000 East German party officials, who shortly before had loudly cheered his remark that he would not wait much longer to sign a treaty. American officials in Berlin noted that even party boss Walter Ulbricht appeared somewhat reluctant to accept the postponement.

Subsequently, Ulbricht made sweeping demands for the elimination of Western troops and activity in Berlin. He called for the turnover to East Germany of control of access routes and the elimination of the Allied Travel Office and Allied military missions in Berlin and Potsdam. This was the most extensive list of demands concerning West Berlin yet presented by the Ulbricht regime.

Another factor which may intensify the feeling of East German leaders that their claims to sovereignty are being sacrificed to the expediencies of Khrushchev's policies was the USSR's releasing the American C-47 plane without insisting on participation of East German officials.

On the eve of Khrushchev's speech in East Berlin, many East Germans--including workers and intellectuals--were continuing to express alarm and criticism over the breakdown of negotiations with the West in Paris,

Such criticisms, in one district, were attributed partly to doubts about the bloc's strength and partly to the fact that many people were listening to Western radio stations. Medical men in particular were greatly concerned lest their contacts with West Germany be cut off.

|--|--|--|

# Sharp Exchanges Heighten Sino-Indonesian Dispute

In rejecting Djakarta's request for withdrawal of two consuls and its demand for an end to provocative broadcasts, Peiping has increased the intensity of the Sino-Indonesian dispute over the Overseas Chinese question. The Indonesian notes had protested interference by the consuls in the processing of Chinese desiring repatriation as a result of Indonesian anti-Chinese legislation and had warned that a continuation of the broadcasts could seriously impair Sino-Indonesian friendship. Peiping has countered with a protest note of its own. Djakarta, for its part, plans to reject the new Chinese note and to inform Peiping that the two consuls must be withdrawn no later than 31 May.

The Chinese propaganda campaign has increased sharply in the past week.

Anti-Indonesian press articles have appeared almost daily, and a film depicting alleged Indonesian excesses against Overseas Chinese is being shown in mainland theaters. The Indonesians fear that the film may be shown abroad to win support for the Chinese in the dispute. Peiping has broadened its propaganda attack in recent broadcasts by charging that Indonesian authorities have failed to take action following murders of Overseas Chinese and, by distorting or reporting only partially Indonesian official statements, Peiping has implied that Djakarta is suppressing popular anti-Dutch demonstrations. The Chinese Communists have expanded charges of American instigation of anti-Chinese measures by contrasting Indonesian firmness in dealings with China with the smoothness of Djakarta's relations with the US.

Peiping intends its actions as continued pressure on Indonesia to moderate its treatment of Chinese, and Chinese Communist tactics may eventually include harassment of the Indonesian Embassy in Peiping, which already reports increasing difficulties in having contacts with individual Chinese.

	TOP SECRET
25 May 60	CENTRAL INTERLICENCE DIFFERING Page 2

### II. ASIA-AFRICA

<del>CONFIDENTIAL</del>

Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03179254

### Indian Naval Visit to Indonesia Set for Late June

New Delhi has announced that major elements of the Indian fleet will visit Indonesia during late June and may exercise with Indonesian naval units. The Indian force, consisting of two light cruisers and seven destroyer types, left Bombay on 24 May and presumably will be in Indonesian waters when the much-publicized Dutch carrier group calls at Netherlands New Guinea. (West Irian).

The Indian visit is in return for a good-will trip to Bombay in early May by three Indonesian warships and is an extension of previous Indian plans to conduct exercises this summer with British and Malayan units in the Indian Ocean and in Malayan waters. Elements of the Indian task force will also pay calls to Singapore and Malaya.

Exercises with non-Commonwealth forces are unusual for India. While the coincidence of the presence of Indian and Dutch naval units in Southeast Asian waters may be accidental, India's decision to expand the scope of its summer exercises to include a visit to Indonesia and maneuvers with Indonesian ships probably represents as much an effort to provide a calming influence as it does to extend support to a friendly nation.

While Djakarta has not yet commented on the projected Indian visit, it can be expected to play up the visit as a demonstration of friendship and support by another Asian power against "Dutch imperialism." During the past month, Indonesia has approached Asian and Arab governments for assistance in denouncing and obstructing the Dutch plan to augment forces in Netherlands New Guinea and to send naval units on a flagshowing cruise in the Far East. Other than statements of sympathy and cooperation, India's decision is the first demonstration of support which has resulted from Indonesia's efforts.

25 May 60 CENTRAL INTELLICENCE DILLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03179254

# Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03179254

# Escape of Jailed Pro-Communist Leaders in Laos

The escape of Prince Souphannouvong and 15 other jailed Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS) leaders in the early hours of 24 May will give the Pathet Lao insurgency a strong boost, as well as constitute a serious loss of face for the Laotian Government. The government now is relieved of the need to carry out the long-deferred trial of these pro-Communist leaders, but this advantage is outweighed by the danger of having them at large again and by the embarrassment the army must suffer over their escape from the supposedly heavily guarded prison in Vientiane.

Souphannouvong and his party will probably try to reach the Pathet Lao command post, which is believed to be located somewhere in the Laos - North Vietnam border area. Because of Souphannouvong's considerable national prestige, his name will add weight to Pathet Lao directives and propaganda pronouncements. The Pathet Lao command structure will also be strengthened by some of the other escapees, who are reported to be key members of the clandestine Communist inner core of the NLHS.

In the past few months, the Pathet Lao insurgents have de-emphasized military operations in favor of propaganda and subversive activities in the hope of influencing the recent national elections. With these elections now out of the way and with the likelihood that the new government to be formed shortly will be dominated by the militantly anti-Communist Committee for Defense of National Interests (CDNI), the insurgents may step up their guerrilla attacks.

25 May 60 CENTRAL INTELLICENCE DIMETINI Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03179254 Page 4 SECRET

### **Turkish Internal Situation**

The Turkish Government is strictly enforcing the sweeping new martial law provisions imposed in Ankara on 22 May following repeated demonstrations during the preceding three days. All public meetings are outlawed, any person or house is subject to search without warrant, and censorship of all communications is in effect. Despite these moves, Turkish leaders are publicly displaying confidence that the worst demonstrations are over and that the security situation will soon return to normal. The march by military cadets through Ankara on 21 May is officially described as nonpolitical and a result of student resentment at recent disciplinary actions at the military academy.

Premier Menderes informed other officials on 22 May that the government has enough evidence to show that the opposition Republican People's party (RPP) has abandoned "normal democratic procedures" in its resort to violent demonstrations and other nondemocratic acts. Menderes said he intends to present this "evidence" to the Grand National Assembly and to the general public. Suppression of opposition newspapers and government monopoly of the state radio will permit Menderes to ensure wide dissemination of his "evidence."]

difference of opinion as to the army's role in the present political situation is widening between generals and senior colonels on one side and junior colonels and lower grade officers on the other. While the junior officers generally support RPP leader Inonu, they are reported searching for another strong leader--possibly a retired general or some officer on active duty.7

there are sufficient forces in Ankara to accomplish a military coup--when and if the group decides to act. While dissatisfaction among the lower and middle ranks of Turkish officers has long been known to exist, this report, if true, indicates that the group is better organized than was previously recognized.

25 May 60 CENTApproved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03179254 Page 5

# -Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03179254 Guinea Seeking\_placements for Departing Fre\_1 Teachers

Guinea has instituted a "crash" program to recruit by next fall about 300 teachers from wherever they can be obtained—the Soviet bloc included—according to Guinean Minister of Education Barry Diawandou. In a conversation on 20 May with the American ambassador in Conakry, the minister indicated that the urgency of the recruitment effort stemmed from a decision by some 180 of 215 French nationals now teaching in Guinea's schools to depart permanently after the current term. This exodus can probably be attributed in part to the concern of French nationals in Guinea over the possible effects of the Touré regime's recent establishment of its own monetary system. In part it is also a by-product of the general tension and antagonism which have prevailed between Paris and Conakry since Guinea opted for independence in 1958. Diawandou claimed that some of the teachers were leaving as a result of "pressure" from the French Embassy.

Asserting that Guinea did not want to be "wholly dependent on the bloc" in this field, the minister expressed the hope that the United States would be able to send some teachers and suggested 40 as an appropriate number. These instructors apparently would be in addition to the 25 American secondary-school teachers the nonofficial African-American Institute has undertaken to recruit as part of a US-financed educational program. The minister subsequently transmitted a similar request to the British charge.

Considerable evidence of Soviet interest in placing personnel in Guinea's educational system has accumulated over recent months. Guinea's ambassador in Moscow

23 teachers were to leave for Conakry that month. On 12 April, ten Soviet secondary-school instructors reportedly arrived in Guinea. In addition, Moscow agreed earlier this year to build and staff in Conakry a polytechnic institute for 1,500 students. This project, one of several being undertaken by the USSR under the \$35,000,000 credit extended to Guinea last August, is scheduled for completion by 1963.



Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03179254 - SECRE I

### **III. THE WEST**

# UAR Interference in Congo Affairs Strains Brussels-Cairo Relations

The Belgian Government has threatened to recall its ambassador from Cairo for consultation if the UAR continues to attack Belgium's Congo policy in its Voice of Africa radiobroadcasts. King Baudouin, who apparently had been personally assured by Egyptian officials that the attacks would be stopped, is particularly concerned lest the broadcasts adversely affect developments in the Congo during these last few weeks prior to independence.

Cairo's radiobroadcasts, while avoiding concentrated frontal attacks on Belgian policy in the Congo, have consistently included Belgium in the list of European "imperialist" powers in Africa. Both its Swahili-language broadcasts to East Africa and its English programs directed at West Africa have been interlarded with critical references to Brussels. Covertly, it has furnished funds and encouragement to numerous African nationalist leaders, including Congolese leader Patrice Lumumba, who received a \$21,000 "gift" from Cairo early last year.

Last fall, the Belgian Government offered to support the UAR in several international organizations and to expand cultural relations if the UAR would agree to moderate Radio Cairo broadcasts heard in the Congo. Cairo, however, made no apparent effort to comply with the Belgian suggestion. The UAR continues to be committed to a strong line favoring nationalist movements throughout Africa and is unlikely to change its policy of "anti-imperialist" propaganda with occasional references to the Belgian Congo.

<del>TOP SECRET</del>

THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Commandant, United States Marine Corps Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director **National Indications Center** The Director

# CONFIDENTIAL

Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03179254

