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22 April 1960

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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21 APRIL 1960

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Flow of East German refugees increases; number in week ending 19 April appears to have surpassed all records since 1953. ①

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Rebel Algerian government announces plan to send ministerial delegation to Communist China. ②

Laotian elections this Sunday seen certain to result in victory of progovernment elements; exclusion of all or nearly all leftists from assembly would be likely to stimulate increased activity by insurgents. ③

Leftist government in Singapore said to be seriously considering allowing Soviet commercial office to open there; government of Malaya strongly opposed. ④

South Korean opposition elements refuse to accept cabinet resignation as sign of willingness by Rhee to satisfy popular demands; Rhee reportedly not considering easing of police-state methods. ⑤



III. THE WEST

⑥ Cuban Labor Confederation rent by dissension over Communist efforts to control it; confederation's head reportedly in hiding and may resign.



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

22 April 1960

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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East Germany: The number of East German refugees fleeing to West Berlin in the week of 13 to 19 April, against the background of the regime's drive against private farmers and businessmen, appears to have surpassed all records since the aftermath of the riots of 17 June 1953. As of 19 April, 2,734 persons, including large numbers of farmers and craftsmen, had been processed in the West Berlin refugee center, and refugee authorities reported that the actual influx for the week was double that figure. The apparently extreme concern of the Ulbricht regime over the mass exodus of its citizens is shown by the reported attempt of East German police--until stopped by the West German police--to question travelers and examine their baggage in West Berlin stations of the East German - operated elevated railroad. [redacted]

[redacted]

II. ASIA-AFRICA

no

Algeria: The rebel Algerian government's announcement that it will send a ministerial delegation to Communist China appears designed in part to pose the threat of closer rebel relations with the bloc if Western support for the Algerian position on a cease-fire is not forthcoming. Although the rebels are believed in fact to be reluctant to establish close relations with the bloc, they probably hope to obtain a commitment from Peiping on the delivery of equipment which the Chinese promised in January 1959. [redacted] (Page 1)

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Laos: Progovernment elements are certain to win a majority in Sunday's elections for the 59-member National Assembly. The number of seats which will be won by the 20-odd Communist and pro-Communist candidates will depend in part on the amount of pressure put on voters by local army and police elements. The exclusion of all or virtually all leftists from the new assembly--whether by government rigging or as a result of a possible last-minute protest withdrawal by the leftists--would be likely to stimulate intensified guerrilla operations by the insurgents. [redacted] (Page 2)

NO
Singapore: [The leftist government in Singapore appears to be giving serious consideration to requests of visiting Soviet trade officials to open a commercial office there. The Malayan Government is adamantly opposed to this and will probably seek to discourage Singapore acceptance of Soviet overtures by threatening economic reprisals, possibly including closure of the causeway connecting Singapore with the mainland.] [redacted] (Page 3)

NO
South Korea: [Opposition elements are refusing to accept the resignation of Rhee's cabinet as evidence of any real change in the government or as an indication of willingness by Rhee to satisfy the demands of the people. Lt. Gen. Song Yo-chan, commander of the troops enforcing martial law, has expressed the opinion that riots will resume in Seoul if the police do not change their present tactics. Rhee, meanwhile, is reported to have indicated he does not contemplate easing of police-state methods and has said those who demonstrated will be treated as traitors.] [redacted] (Page 5)

III. THE WEST

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Cuba: The Cuban Labor Confederation is rent by dissension over Communist efforts to control it. Secretary General David Salvador is reported to be in hiding and may resign just before May Day to bring the issue to public attention. Castro officials reportedly are infuriated and fear that Salvador's action will

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
DAILY BRIEF

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interfere with the large demonstration of support for the regime
planned for 1 May. (Page 7)



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DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Algerian Rebels Sending Ministerial Group to Communist China

The Algerian rebels' announcement that they will send a ministerial delegation to Communist China appears designed in part to pose the threat of closer relations with the bloc in the absence of Western support for the Algerian position on a cease-fire. The Algerian delegation may be that headed by Deputy Premier Belkacem Krim which has lately toured the Middle East soliciting aid for the Algerian cause.

Rebel spokesmen, in conversation with Western officials, have indicated distrust of Communism, while warning that the absence of Western support for rebel objectives might force them into closer cooperation with the bloc. Rebel disappointment at Khrushchev's apparent failure to support the Algerians in his conversations with De Gaulle has made it likely that any rebel move toward the bloc would involve Peiping rather than Moscow.

The rebel delegation appears likely to raise the possibility of material or financial support by the Chinese. In January 1959, Peiping offered the Algerians \$5,000,000 in such aid. Apart from a few radio sets and some miscellaneous clothing, however, there is no evidence of delivery. This previous commitment may be discussed and expanded by the Chinese, who want to increase their influence with the rebel movement. If asked, Peiping may offer a small number of military technicians to participate in the rebel "foreign legion" being recruited in the Arab League states. It is unlikely, however, that the Algerians would request or Peiping furnish Chinese combat "volunteers."

In addition to the rebel ministerial group--whose departure date has not yet been announced--an Algerian "youth delegation," which includes a representative of the Ministry of Armaments, will leave for China in mid-April.

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Progovernment Elements May Win Sizable Majority
In Laotian Elections

Progovernment elements are expected to win a majority which may reach substantial proportions in elections on 24 April for the 59-member Laotian National Assembly. Approximately 120 candidates were at last report still in the race, including some 60 on the government-approved slate--composed mainly of members of former Premier Phoui's Rally of the Lao People (RLP) and the Committee for Defense of National Interests (CDNI)--and nine each from the Communist-front Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS) and the fellow-traveling Santiphab party. [An estimated 25 of the 40-odd independents are in reality RLP or CDNI followers who failed to gain acceptance on the government slate.] A few of the remaining independents are considered leftists who would probably vote with the NLHS if elected.

The number of seats won by candidates or allies of the NLHS will depend in part on the amount of pressure exerted on the voters by local police and army units.

to assure free elections "in districts where no Santiphab or NLHS candidates are running," provides a strong if indirect indication that the government is in fact planning to manipulate the voting where Communist or pro-Communist candidates are seeking office.

The exclusion of all or virtually all leftists from the new assembly--whether by government rigging or as a result of a last-minute protest withdrawal by the leftists--would be likely to stimulate intensified guerrilla operations by the Communist Pathet Lao insurgents and would reflect adversely on Laos internationally. French, Indian, [and British] officials, for example, have already shown considerable concern.

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~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]Singapore Government Considering Soviet Request to Establish Permanent Trade Mission [REDACTED]

The leftist People's Action party (PAP) government of the internally self-governing State of Singapore appears to be giving serious consideration to the request of visiting Soviet trade officials to establish a permanent trade mission in Singapore.

[REDACTED] the Soviet mission has retained the law firm of which Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew is senior partner to represent the USSR in its efforts to open a commercial office. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The Malayan Government is adamantly opposed to any type of Soviet representation in Singapore and will probably seek to discourage acceptance of Soviet overtures by threatening economic reprisals, including possible closure of the causeway connecting Singapore with the mainland. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the Malayan Government sees Singapore's action in this case as a major test of its sincerity in seeking closer economic and political relations with the Federation and is awaiting Singapore's move for consultation. It seems unlikely that Singapore officials would risk Malayan displeasure unless they believe that agreeing to Soviet requests would result in large-scale economic benefits for Singapore, possibly including a long-term low-interest loan.

Under Singapore's new constitution, its foreign affairs are controlled by the UK, while Singapore has responsibility for the

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"conduct of matters concerning trade. . . ." While the opening of an official Soviet Government trade office would quite clearly require UK consent, it is possible that Singapore officials believe they can unilaterally enter into an agreement with a Soviet trading corporation to open a Singapore branch. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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South Korean Opposition Unappeased by Cabinet Resignation

[Opposition elements refuse to interpret the resignation of President Rhee's cabinet as evidence of any real change in the government or as an indication of willingness by Rhee to satisfy the demands of the people. Opposition Democratic party leader Chang Myon, the "lame duck" vice president defeated by Rhee's unpopular running mate Yi Ki-pung in the elections on 15 March, has called for "further demonstrations" and new elections. Rhee reportedly was angered by Yi's flight from Seoul during the rioting, and there has been some speculation that he may be replaced.]

[An uneasy calm appears to have settled over Seoul following the establishment of martial law. Army Chief of Staff Lt. Gen Song Yo-chan, commander of the troops enforcing martial law, has warned, however, that riots will probably break out again in the capital unless the police change their tactics. Earlier, Song who fears the police will try to blame the army for anything that goes wrong, commented that during the rioting the police had "lost their heads" and had been in a "frenzy."/]

[There are strong indications that President Rhee neither comprehends the nature of the demonstrations nor appreciates the extent of popular resentment against his regime. A high-level Korean Government official reports that Rhee has indicated he does not contemplate easing "police-state" methods and intends to treat the demonstrators as national traitors. If former Rhee strong man Yi Pom-sok is included in the cabinet, it would lend weight to this report. Rhee apparently has interpreted statements of concern by President Eisenhower, Secretary Herter, and Ambassador McConaughy as interest in his own "welfare and safety" and has no strong impression of US disapproval of his methods. Bloc propaganda is exploiting the situation in South Korea, and free-world reaction is almost unanimously negative to the Rhee government.]

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In Japan, where South Korean developments are followed very closely, the government and press attribute the demonstrations to popular resentment over the elections and pent-up dissatisfaction with the regime's high-handed policies, as well as to economic factors. In an unofficial statement, Prime Minister Kishi discounted possible Communist instigation, although Foreign Ministry officials are concerned that the long-latent opposition to the Rhee government may develop into widespread disaffection which would be exploited by the Communists and eventually affect security in the Far East.

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III. THE WEST


Cuban Labor Troubles Annoy Castro Regime

The Cuban Labor Confederation (CTC) is rent by bitter dis-
sension over Communist efforts to control it. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] CTC Secretary
General David Salvador is in hiding in Havana and is planning to
resign just before May Day in order to bring the issue to public
attention. Salvador was chosen by Fidel Castro to run Cuba's
strong labor movement as an important component of the revolu-
tion. He and some other labor leaders have resisted the Commu-
nists, with whom they have had previous experience. Castro in
recent months has endorsed the support given the Communists by
his brother Raul and Raul's protegé, pro-Communist Labor Min-
ister Martinez Sanchez.

Castro and his advisers are anxious to postpone a showdown
in the CTC until after the May Day rally they are staging to dem-
onstrate domestic and international support for the revolutionary
regime. They are infuriated by Salvador's action, which they see
as a threat to the rally's success. Martinez considers it impera-
tive that Salvador make a speech at the celebration.

Martinez evidently has already asked Conrado Becquer, head
of CTC's powerful sugar workers' federation who has avoided in-
volvement in the power struggle, to replace Salvador. Becquer,
opportunistic and politically astute, is reported to be reluctant
to accept and to have said that in the event he took the post, he
would demand government support for a non-Communist CTC di-
rectorate. The Castro government is unlikely to accept or hold
to such terms; if Becquer does replace Salvador, however, it
would indicate that he believes he can control the Communist la-
bor leaders, as he is too ambitious to share power with them.

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The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor

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The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

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