


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27 May 1960

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
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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27 MAY 1960

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Soviet spokesmen assert increase in international tensions is "temporary." ①


East German regime reportedly considering tighter controls on travel of East German citizens to Berlin. ②

USSR extends additional \$45,000,000 in economic aid credits to Iraq. ③

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Position of Indonesian rebels on Sumatra described as critical by important rebel military leader; statements indicate some rebel leaders may be interested in Djakarta's feelers for truce or cease-fire. ④

Singapore government's insistence on granting visa to a Soviet trade official remains an issue in Singapore-Malaya relations. ⑤



⑥ Mali Federation, which attains independence within the French Community on 20 June, plans embassy in Moscow and will probably support admission of Peiping to UN.

III. THE WEST

⑦ Early announcement expected on Cuban-Polish diplomatic relations. (TOP SECRET DAUNT) Arrival of 80 Russians in Cuba on 22 May to join Soviet Trade Commission there reported.

LATE ITEM

⑧ Turkey - Armed forces take over government; promise early elections.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

27 May 1960

DAILY BRIEF

SIRAB

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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***USSR:** A public lecturer in Moscow in a 25 May discussion of the international situation stressed the "temporary" nature of the current increase in tensions, and assured his audience that the "basic forces" leading to a further relaxation of tensions were still operative. A Soviet Embassy official in Belgrade, apparently acting under instructions, expressed his view that US-Soviet relations would soon improve and that new negotiations could begin "at any time." Soviet propaganda commentary on President Eisenhower's address of 25 May, however, and Gromyko's UN speech of 26 May indicate that Moscow intends to maintain its shrill public criticism of the United States over the U-2 incident. [redacted] (Page 1)

East Germany: [Since Khrushchev's East Berlin visit of 19-21 May, party boss Ulbricht has been holding urgent meetings of East German officials, including police and security functionaries, to reappraise the problem of limiting travel of East German citizens to Berlin. [redacted]

NO

[redacted] stricter measures for controlling access of East Germans to East Berlin are being discussed, but no restrictive measures are to be taken in the near future directly affecting access to West Berlin. The regime appears to be torn between its own urgent desire to curb flights of refugees to West Berlin--it has already greatly cut the flow over the East--West German frontier--and Khrushchev's apparent desire to avoid incidents over West Berlin at this time.] [redacted]

(Page 2)

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USSR-Iraq: The Soviet Union has agreed to increase its \$137,500,000 economic aid credit to Iraq, which was granted in March 1959, by an additional \$45,000,000 for rehabilitation of the Basra-Baghdad railway. Soviet leaders probably hope this

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will help arrest the slow decline in Soviet-Iraqi relations over the past six months. In view of the slow pace of Iraq's development program, drawings against the original credit have reportedly been modest. [redacted] (Page 3)

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Indonesia: One of the top-ranking military leaders of the Sumatran rebels, Lt. Col. Nainggolan, on 17 May described the rebels' position on Sumatra as critical, with daily necessities down to the "absolute minimum" and military equipment sufficient only for "incidental defense." [redacted]

[redacted] Nainggolan claimed that the Indonesian Government's over-all position was likewise gloomy, and that only the Communists could benefit from such a situation. He stated that negotiations with Djakarta's Army Chief of Staff General Nasution should be conducted concurrently with the dissidents' struggle, with the aim of at least insinuating rebel ideas "into the structure of the Sukarno regime." [redacted] Covert feelers on a truce or cease-fire have been extended by the Djakarta government since mid-1958; Nainggolan's statement is the strongest indication to date that some rebel leaders are seriously interested. [redacted]

[redacted] (Page 4)

Singapore: [redacted] The Singapore government's insistence on granting a six-month visa to a Soviet trade official remains an issue in Singapore's relations with Malaya and could affect various aspects of the British position on the island. Malaya's opposition to Singapore's proposal resulted in a deadlock at a recent meeting of the tripartite Singapore Internal Security Council (SISC). Malaya has threatened that if Singapore persists in its decision, it will withdraw from the SISC and impose stringent restrictions at the causeway connecting Singapore with the mainland. [redacted]

[redacted] (Page 5)

Mali: [redacted] The Mali Federation of Senegal and Soudan plans to set up an embassy in Moscow as well as in three Western and four African capitals following its attainment of independence within [redacted]

27 May 60

DAILY BRIEF

ii

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[the French Community on 20 June. In the UN, to which Mali expects to be admitted this fall, the new state probably will support the admission of Communist China.] (Page 6)

III. THE WEST

Cuba: Eighty Russians arrived in Cuba on 22 May to join the Soviet Trade Commission established during Mikovan's visit in February.

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The Castro regime is granting visas to numerous Soviet bloc personnel without apparent regard to their status or activities. Cuba has asked agreement for an ambassador to Warsaw, and Cuban-Polish diplomatic relations will probably be announced shortly.]

(Page 7)

IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

(Available during the preceding week)

West New Guinea Problem, SNIE 65-2-60. 24 May 60.

LATE ITEM

*Turkish Military Seizes Government: (information as of 0400 EDT, 27 May) Turkish Army units supported by Navy and Air Force elements seized control of Ankara and Istanbul in an apparently bloodless coup in the early morning of 27 May. President Bayar, most cabinet ministers in Ankara, and several of the highest ranking army officers are reported under arrest. Prime Minister Menderes, who was last reported touring in western Anatolia about 125 miles west of Ankara, apparently has not yet been taken. The coup was carried out by younger officers, with cadets of the military academy apparently taking a major role. Representatives of the "military council" which is in control called at the American Embassy almost immediately to give assurances that the coup was directed only against the Menderes government and that Turkey would remain "a staunch ally of the United States as well as a devoted member of NATO." These military representatives promised early free elections

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27 May 60

DAILY BRIEF

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and stated that those government officials responsible for the previous regime's undemocratic measures would be tried by civilian courts. Brigadier General Refik Tulga has taken over as mayor and governor of Istanbul. He is a former military attaché in the United States and is described as "exceedingly pro-American." [redacted]
[redacted]

27 May 60

DAILY BRIEF

iv

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Soviet Views on Future US-Soviet Relations

Private comments by Soviet diplomats, together with the line taken by a public lecturer in Moscow, are designed to emphasize that the breakdown in the Paris talks does not herald a far-reaching revision of Soviet policy toward the West. At a lecture on the international situation on 25 May, the speaker spelled out this approach along the lines established by Khrushchev in his Berlin speech on 20 May. The lecturer emphasized that the current increase in tensions was of a temporary nature and assured his audience that the "basic forces" leading to relaxation of tensions were still operative.

The lecturer claimed that, in contrast to "consistent failure" prior to Stalin's death, subsequent Soviet efforts to reduce tension had been successful; as the summit approached, however, it became clear that no progress could be expected on Berlin, and the US announcement on 7 May of plans to conduct nuclear tests to improve detection techniques "scuttled" the sole issue with good prospects for agreement.

According to an American Embassy officer attending the lecture, the speaker was on the defensive in justifying Khrushchev's stand at Paris and in minimizing the adverse consequences. The comments and questions of the audience revealed skepticism over the objectives to be gained by the Soviet actions in the Security Council. The audience also appeared concerned over the possible effects on US-Soviet relations of a trial of Francis Powers and the conclusion of a separate East German peace treaty.

Soviet diplomats apparently have instructions to offset the shrill public attacks on the United States by taking a conciliatory line in conversations with Americans. A Soviet official in Belgrade expressed the belief that US-Soviet relations would improve soon and that new negotiations could be held "at any time." He added that Khrushchev had the "highest regard" for President Eisenhower. [In Vienna, a Soviet Embassy officer told the New York Times correspondent that there would be no "basic change" in Soviet policy toward the West.]

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[REDACTED]

East Germans Reportedly Planning Measures to Curb
East German Travel to Berlin

[Since Khrushchev's departure from East Berlin on 21 May, party boss Walter Ulbricht is reliably reported to have called a series of meetings to consider problems relating to West Berlin, particularly existing regulations governing travel to East Berlin by East Germans. District and county leaders for the Berlin area were to meet on 26 May, with police and customs officials in attendance. On 28 May, Ministry of Interior officials, under the chairmanship of the minister, are to discuss the results of these meetings.]

[REDACTED] no restrictive measures are to be initiated directly against West Berlin in the near future--apparently meaning that the East Germans will not harass travel between East and West Berlin or from West Berlin to West Germany.]

[A mounting proportion of the total East German escapes--more than 50,000 in the first four months of 1960--have been made through West Berlin; the regime has been able to impose increasingly effective security precautions on the East - West German frontier. In an effort to discover potential refugees, police now make frequent checks of credentials of East Germans going to East Berlin. Nevertheless, more than 3,800 persons fled to West Berlin in the week ending 17 May, and flights are continuing at a high level. The regime may be considering some new type of identity document as part of its campaign against escapes.]

[Khrushchev's failure to take any immediate steps toward a separate peace treaty, which would transfer West Berlin access controls to the East Germans, has placed Ulbricht in a difficult position. Evidently barred from imposing harsh controls on travel to and from West Berlin, he is casting about for additional measures to make East German access to East Berlin still more difficult, although he claims the city is the East German capital.]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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USSR Makes Additional Aid Commitment to Iraq

The Soviet Union has agreed to add \$45,000,000 to the \$137,500,000 economic aid credit to Iraq granted in March 1959. The new aid is to be used for the reconstruction of the Basra-Baghdad railway, [redacted]

[redacted] This project will involve the construction of a new standard-gauge line connecting these cities, in keeping with the surveys called for under the 1959 aid agreement; it may also include Soviet supply of locomotives and other rolling stock. Baghdad's announcement did not specify the terms of the new credit, but it probably carries the earlier credit's low rate of interest and will also be repayable 12 years after the individual projects have been completed. [redacted]

Prior to First Deputy Premier Mikoyan's visit to Baghdad in April, Soviet officials had informed the Iraqi ambassador in Moscow that the USSR was willing to expand its aid commitments. [redacted]

[redacted] Mikoyan's talks with Qasim reportedly did not go smoothly, however, and no additional aid was announced at the time.

Soviet leaders probably hope that the additional credit will arrest the slow decline in Soviet-Iraqi relations over the past six months which has resulted from the Qasim regime's series of anti-Communist measures and signs that Baghdad would like to improve its relations with the West. While Moscow is on schedule in carrying out its commitments for industrial, hydroelectric, irrigation, and other projects under last year's aid credit, Qasim's promises of rapid economic development and the USSR's propaganda exploitation of its program have led the Iraqi public to expect rapid results.

Rehabilitation of the Basra-Baghdad railway--a high-priority goal of the Qasim government--is therefore probably designed to restore Iraqi confidence in bloc aid. The badly run-down condition of this link--the main means for moving cargo from Iraq's principal port to the interior--has been a key factor causing the present economic stagnation. [redacted]

[redacted]

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Sumatran Rebel Leader Advocates Talks With Indonesian Army Leaders

[redacted]
[redacted] Colonel Nainggolan, a ranking rebel officer in Sumatra, said negotiations with Djakarta's Army Chief of Staff General Nasution should be regarded as a strategic aspect of the dissident struggle. Nainggolan described the rebel situation in Sumatra as critical, with supplies of daily necessities down to the "absolute minimum" and military equipment sufficient only for "incidental" defense. He alleged that economic and monetary problems rendered Djakarta's position equally gloomy and that only the Communists stood to benefit from the situation. He was even concerned over possible Communist infiltration of the rebel movement. According to Nainggolan, the increasingly tense political atmosphere in Djakarta and growing Communist agitation have created a situation favorable to discussions with anti-Communist elements in the Indonesian Government with the aim of at least insinuating rebel ideas "into the structure of the Sukarno regime."

While Nainggolan's message is the strongest indication to date of rebel interest in talks, the two sides still appear to be far apart. [Since mid-1958, the Indonesian Government has extended covert feelers toward a truce or cease-fire, but its terms requiring surrender and at least temporary exile of key rebel leaders have been unacceptable.] The rebels also have made unrealistic demands in the past. [redacted]

There is no indication that this interest in negotiations on the part of dissident leaders in Sumatra is shared by the RPI leaders in the Celebes, where the rebel military situation apparently is less critical. [redacted]

[redacted]

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~~SECRET~~Impasse Developing Over Question of Soviet Trade Representation
In Singapore

[redacted] the local government's insistence on granting a six-month visa to a Soviet trade official, I. S. Gazov, had developed into a crisis which could affect many aspects of the British position on this island as well as Singapore-Federation relations. An impasse developed between Singapore and the Federation of Malaya at the 19 May meeting of the Singapore Internal Security Council (SISC), the regulatory body responsible for internal security decisions in Singapore. Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew refused to back down on the visa question, despite adamant Malayan opposition and implied threats against Singapore.]

[The UK representatives at the SISC failed in their efforts to reach a compromise under which Gazov would be permitted to stay for six months without a staff or privileged communications and Singapore would agree henceforth not to issue visas to bloc nationals for more than two weeks without SISC approval. Malaya reserved its position until the next meeting of the council, scheduled for 30 May, but since the meeting, Malaya has told British officials that if Singapore persists in its position, the Federation will quit the SISC and close the causeway connecting Singapore with the mainland. Closing the causeway would result in increased customs controls on all commodities and require passports and visas for all travel from Singapore.]

[The British reportedly are inclined to support the Federation and inform Singapore that the UK is prepared to make the decision stick and to use emergency security measures to cope with any rioting which might break out. In this connection, [redacted] plans for military action in the event of an emergency are being reviewed.]

[Under the Singapore constitution, Malaya's withdrawal from the SISC would reduce it to a consultative body. In this event, London could not use it to solve touchy security problems and would be forced to impose its decisions unilaterally and possibly to amend or revoke the constitution in case of serious disagreement. The British would be reluctant to take these steps, in view of their belief that the present government is the best that can be obtained under present conditions in Singapore.] [redacted]

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Mali Planning Diplomatic Relations With Bloc

[The Federation of Mali, consisting of the West African states of Senegal and Soudan, plans to establish an embassy in Moscow following Mali's attainment of independence within the French Community on 20 June, according to Senegalese leader Leopold Senghor, who is expected to become president of the new state. Initial diplomatic missions also are planned for Paris, Washington, London, and four African capitals, including Conakry. Mali will be represented elsewhere by France, under the terms of a diplomatic accord signed last month.]

[In a conversation on 23 May with the American consul general in Dakar, Senghor indicated that he personally had favored delaying for a year or two any exchange of representatives with the USSR, but that the Soudanese had insisted on taking such action immediately. Many Soudanese leaders are strongly influenced by Marxism and predisposed toward friendly ties with Communist countries. Their influence seems certain to predominate within independent Mali's foreign ministry as a result of a recent deal allocating that portfolio to Soudan and the presidency and defense ministry to Senegal.]

[Senghor stated he had been "categoric" in resisting Soudanese arguments to send an ambassador to Peiping as well as Moscow. At the same time, however, he voiced a preference for recognizing "both Chinas" and indicated that Mali intended to support the admission of Communist China to the UN. Mali itself expects to become a UN member this fall, along with a number of other new African states. Earlier, Senghor had told a correspondent for the North Vietnamese news agency that Mali favored the establishment of relations with "all states of Indochina, including the Democratic Republic of Vietnam."]

[Peiping, which succeeded in 1958 in obtaining recognition from Morocco, the Sudan, and Guinea, recently has been faced with lively competition from Taipei, which established diplomatic relations with both Cameroun and Togo earlier this year. A pending request by Nationalist China to open a consulate in Dakar, the Mali capital, has reportedly been approved by Senegal but seems likely to be blocked by the Soudanese.]

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III. THE WEST

Cuba - Soviet Bloc

Eighty Russians arrived in Cuba on 22 May to join the Soviet Trade Commission established during Mikoyan's visit in February. [redacted]

[redacted] Caracas newspapers this week reported that groups of Russians and Czechs have recently been passing through Venezuela en route to Havana by several airlines. Their documents described them as mechanics, technicians, and experts in varying fields, and a "diplomatic mission of technical assistance." [redacted]

[redacted] in the past three months the Castro regime has admitted numerous bloc nationals without much apparent regard to their status or activities. [redacted]

The attachés report that the influence of Russians is beginning to be felt all over Cuba, and they believe that Soviet advisers assisted in the planning which led to the recent order for substantial use of Soviet crude oil in all refineries in Cuba. Five Soviet tankers have already delivered oil, and others are en route under a reported agreement calling for 1,500,000 tons to be received by Cuba in 1960. This probably includes some refined products. Cuban-flag vessels will commence direct trade with Russia this month.

[redacted] 70 to 80 young Cubans have been sent to the USSR for jet training has added to speculation that the Soviet bloc may soon provide Castro with jet planes--probably through Czechoslovakia, with which he has just resumed relations. [redacted] university students from all Cuban provinces are in the USSR for an "indoctrination course." They may also receive technical training, which Castro officials consider a primary need since many trained technicians have broken with the regime. [redacted]

[Cuba has asked agreement for Salvador Massip as ambassador to Warsaw, and Cuban-Polish diplomatic relations will probably be announced shortly. Massip cooperated closely with Soviet diplomats in Mexico City while he was Castro's ambassador there.] [redacted]

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Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

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