



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
# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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15 JULY 1960

**I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC**

Soviet scientific ships active in northwest Atlantic collecting data useful for oceanographic research and fishing as well as for submarine operations. ①


Khrushchev's qualified threat to use rockets in Cuba's defense designed to inflate Cuban problem into major international issue. ②

Soviet command in East Germany excludes Allied military missions from virtually all of East Germany from 13-21 July. ③

**II. ASIA-AFRICA**

Republic of Congo--Government action in breaking diplomatic relations with Belgium may bring new friction between Congolese and Europeans; street clashes flare up again in Leopoldville. ④

Prospective Japanese prime minister, Ikeda, anti-Communist and pro-American, will face handicaps in dealing with internal security problems. ⑤



**III. THE WEST**

⑥ Algeria--De Gaulle reportedly planning to name study commissions to examine political basis for new Algerian institutions; rebels will be antagonized.



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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

15 July 1960

## DAILY BRIEF

## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

*no*

USSR: Current operations by Soviet scientific research ships in the northwest Atlantic are a continuation of the USSR's extensive oceanographic research program which has in recent years far exceeded that of any other nation in both numbers of research ships and extent of effort. Five ships are active in the current expedition, which has the announced aim of investigating the Gulf Stream, and which will provide data useful for basic oceanographic research and fishing. It will also produce valuable information for Soviet submarine operations in the northwest Atlantic. Strong Soviet Navy interest in the undertaking is demonstrated by the fact that an admiral is directing the operations, two navy hydrographic ships are participating.

*no*

USSR-Cuba: Khrushchev's qualified rocket threat on 9 July, and pledge of general support on 12 July, in defense of Cuba is designed to inflate the Cuban situation into a major international question. He is now in a position to claim that the USSR compelled the US to abandon plans for armed intervention. The Soviet Government may also use repeated charges of US intervention in Cuba to justify an arms agreement which now is apparently being negotiated between Castro and the bloc. (Page 2)

*OK*

USSR: The Soviet command in East Germany has issued a directive which excludes Allied military missions from virtually all East Germany during the period 13-21 July. While this new restriction is consistent with harassing measures recently employed against the missions, it might well ]

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have been imposed to conceal the movement of Soviet forces in connection with the replacement of conventional antiaircraft and other artillery units with missile units. There are also reports suggesting that certain tank divisions in GSFG may have been reorganized or re-equipped. Elements of both missile-equipped and armored units would probably be scheduled for deployment from their home stations to training areas during late July, and the latest restrictions will decrease opportunities for observing such movements.

ASIA-AFRICA

Republic of the Congo: Street clashes have flared once again in Leopoldville, stimulated in part by a rise in food prices and the failure of many Congolese to receive salaries from absent European employers. The action of the Lumumba government in breaking diplomatic relations with Belgium may bring new friction between Congolese and Europeans, and disorders are unlikely to be checked until an effective UN "presence" is established in the Congo.

OK Although Brussels has indicated its willingness to withdraw its troops to Belgian bases in the Congo as UN contingents arrive, Lumumba has demanded a complete Belgian withdrawal from the Congo, and may use the present situation as a pretext to attempt to force Belgium to give up its Congo bases. In Katanga Province, provincial Premier Tshombé has reasserted the "independence" of Katanga. Tshombé has stated that he will permit Belgian but not UN forces to enter the province, and is unlikely to reconsider his "secession" from the Congo as long as Lumumba--whom he regards as a Communist--remains premier.

OK Japan: Hayato Ikeda, the new president of the Liberal-Democratic party and prospective prime minister, will be handicapped in dealing with internal security problems by the serious factionalism in his party and by the leftists' recent successful use of violence for political ends. Ikeda is anti-Communist and values cooperation with the United States,

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but may be tempted to try to undercut the leftist opposition and impress the public by taking a firm attitude toward the US in matters involving the security treaty or by adopting a more conciliatory stance toward Communist China. The extreme leftists, who have previously expressed their hostility toward Ikeda, can be expected to intensify their popular front and mass action tactics in preparation for the general elections which are expected this fall or early next year. [redacted] (Page 4)

### III. THE WEST

[ France-Algeria: De Gaulle is reported planning to name study commissions composed of previously elected Algerian officials--both Europeans and non-FLN Moslems--to examine the political basis for new Algerian institutions, such as the legislative and judicial bodies he referred to in his recent Normandy speeches. De Gaulle may go forward with his program before the end of July. This French tactic may be aimed in part at prodding the rebels to negotiate, but it may result in increased rebel suspicion of De Gaulle's motives and make a resumption of talks more difficult. [redacted] (Page 6) ]


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Soviet Oceanographic Operations in Northwest Atlantic

Present operations by Soviet scientific research ships in the northwest Atlantic are a continuation of the USSR's extensive oceanographic research program, which has in recent years far exceeded that of any other nation in both numbers of research ships and extent of effort. Five ships are active in this expedition, which has the announced aim of investigating the Gulf Stream and which will provide data useful for basic oceanographic research and fishing and will also produce valuable information for Soviet submarine operations in the northwest Atlantic. Strong navy interest in the activity is shown by the participation of two navy research ships, direction of the operations by an admiral. [redacted]

Following a TASS announcement on 23 May that scientific research ships would conduct an investigation of the Gulf Stream between June and October, seven research ships conducted operations in waters between Bermuda and the northeast United States during the latter part of June. Subsequently, two of the ships departed for their home port, and the other five entered Canadian east coast ports.

Prior to resumption of operations in early July, the USSR informed the United Kingdom and Canada of Soviet plans to emplace instruments for long periods of time at various depths within a radius of 100-200 miles of four specific points in the northwest Atlantic, and asked if there were any objections owing to the possible proximity of trans-Atlantic cables. [redacted]

[redacted] Canada has suggested that three of the four specified locations be changed. The Soviet ships have commenced operations in the fourth location--to which no objections were made; there are no indications of their intentions regarding the other three alternate locations suggested by Canada, which are farther from the area of confluence of the warm Gulf Stream and the cold Labrador Current and thus less appropriate for research. [redacted]

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USSR Exploiting Cuban Situation

Khrushchev's qualified threat on 9 July to retaliate against the US with rockets "if necessary" in the event of American aggression against Cuba is designed to inflate the Cuban situation into a major international question. On the eve of the Cuban complaint against the US in the United Nations, Soviet propaganda accusing the US of plans for aggression against Castro reached a new peak during the week 4-10 July, and Soviet officials have sought [ ] to maximize the alleged danger of US intervention. Both First Deputy Premier Mikoyan and presidium member Kozlov in conversations with the Egyptian ambassador in Moscow expressed extreme anxiety over the US threat to Cuba's security.

Moscow is actively intervening in the Cuban situation to advance its campaign to discredit the US and to recreate the image of Soviet military superiority damaged by the U-2 incident. It may also intend thereby to justify an arms pact between Castro and the bloc. Khrushchev now is in a position to employ a familiar Soviet political warfare device and to claim--perhaps during his projected but as yet unscheduled visit to Havana--that the USSR compelled the US to abandon plans for intervention in Cuba. Castro lieutenant "Che" Guevara has already made such a claim. The Soviet press has been drawing parallels between the 1956 Suez crisis and the Cuban situation today.

However, the Soviet premier has neither repeated the threat nor made it less ambiguous. In a letter to Castro he limited himself to general expressions of "indignation" at US actions and "sympathy" for the Cuban people, and in his 12 July press conference he went no further than to pledge "support" to Cuba in the event of US aggression. [ The press chief of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs refused to clarify Khrushchev's 9 July threat on the grounds that it applied ]

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[to a hypothetical situation and therefore no clarification was "appropriate," ]

According to the US chargé in Moscow, Khrushchev in his 12 July press conference clearly recognized that the USSR could not establish a base on Cuba without damaging its campaign against American bases, but was prepared to give full psychological support to Cuba or any country in its effort to eliminate such bases. The chargé felt that the USSR was also using its threatened support of Cuba against US attack as a counter to Western guarantees of West Berlin. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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## Problems of New Japanese Government

Hayato Ikeda, the new president of the Liberal-Democratic party (LDP) and prospective successor to Kishi as prime minister, will be handicapped in dealing with internal security problems by serious factionalism in the ruling LDP. A special convention on 14 July elected Ikeda party president over Mitsujiro Ishii by 302 to 194 in a run-off vote. Ikeda had fallen four votes short of the required majority on the first ballot, which eliminated Foreign Minister Aiichiro Fujiyama. Two other contenders, Bamboku Ono and Kenzo Matsumura, had withdrawn from the race to support Ishii in a final effort to stop Ikeda.

The vote ended a month-long wrangle over the succession, but the prospect of a general election this fall or winter will keep alive hopes of Ikeda's rivals for a new chance at the prime ministership after the election. Ikeda, like Kishi, is associated with the bureaucracy, and many members of the LDP are disappointed that a career politician has not been chosen as their new chief.

Ikeda is a strong leader whose prospects for remaining prime minister after the election are considered better than would have been those of his rivals in the race for the party presidency. However, his lack of tact and heavy-handed way of dealing with different factions antagonize other party leaders.

The success of recent leftist violence will further hamper the government in its attempts to restore parliamentary processes and to halt a tendency to accept "government by demonstration." The leftists organized a series of small demonstrations on 14 July against Ikeda and the US-Japanese security treaty and are expected to intensify their mass action tactics in preparation for the election. The stabbing of Prime Minister Kishi by a member of a right-wing organization, the second such incident in a month, suggests that rightists may also resort increasingly to violence.

Ikeda is professedly pro-Western and militantly anti-Communist, but he may seek to undercut the leftist opposition and

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impress the public by taking a firm attitude toward the United States on matters involving the security treaty or by adopting a more conciliatory stance toward establishment of economic relations with Communist China. Last January he stated that Japan should actively seek an accommodation with Peiping following ratification of the security treaty, although he denied favoring recognition. He might hope by such a move to mollify both LDP dissidents and Socialists.

There is a report that these conservative opponents of Ikeda may still try to block his election as prime minister in the Diet by nominating Ishii. The Japan Socialist party would reportedly vote for Ishii on the conditions that the disappointed conservatives push his candidacy even at the risk of splitting the LDP and that he promise to call an early election.

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De Gaulle May Establish Study Commissions to Plan Algeria's Political Future

President de Gaulle may soon name study commissions composed of previously elected Algerian officials to discuss plans for Algeria's future political institutions, [redacted]

[redacted] One press report says four commissions are to be established about the end of July composed of 1) parliamentarians and economic councilors, 2) departmental councilors and mayors of big cities, 3) municipal councilors, and 4) representatives of economic interests. As all Algerian elections since 1958 have been conducted under a system guaranteeing local elected offices to both Europeans and Moslems, the proposed commissions would also include representatives of both populations, but would exclude rebel participation. However, rebel representatives might be invited to join a round-table political discussion with the commissions following a negotiated cease-fire.

In an 8 July speech in Rouen, De Gaulle stated that in an "Algerian Algeria" it would be necessary to have separate institutions, and these could result from the work of the study commissions. The idea of setting up consultative commissions has been broached a number of times in the past by French elements seeking an alternative to direct political negotiations with the rebels. Such a device would have the advantage, from the French point of view, of separating military and political discussions. He may go forward with this study commission program before the end of July.

The French plan may also be aimed at prodding the rebels to come to the conference table, but its denial of the exclusive right of the provisional Algerian government to represent the Moslems of Algeria may prevent rebel acceptance. It is likely to increase rebel suspicion of De Gaulle's motives and make negotiating more difficult, even though top Algerian leaders have recently stated that the "door was open" and they were awaiting the slightest sign from Paris of a sincere desire to negotiate. [redacted]

[redacted]

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**The Vice President**

**Executive Offices of the White House**

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Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

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Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

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Executive Secretary, National Security Council

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**The Department of State**

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

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Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

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The Secretary of the Air Force

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The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

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The Director

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The Chairman

**National Security Agency**

The Director

**National Indications Center**

The Director

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