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4 March 1960

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Copy No. C 68

# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



DOCUMENT NO. 4  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.   
 DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S \*  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010  
AUTH: HR 70-2  
DATE: 6 JUN 1999 REVIEWER: [Empty box]

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4 MARCH 1960

**I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC**

USSR trying to develop subversive potential in Iran to exploit any antiregime feeling. ①

**II. ASIA-AFRICA**

UAR orders 75-percent reduction in "emergency forces" required to be present in national guard units in Egypt and the Sinai Peninsula. ②

Jordan--King Husayn criticizes Nasir and Qasim for their pronouncements on a separate Palestine state. ③

Nehru expects coming border negotiations with Chou En-lai to be concentrated on Ladakh. ④

Philippines--Garcia promises implementation of his "Filipino First" economic policies. ⑤



**III. THE WEST**

⑥ De Gaulle using visit to Algeria to reassure French Army and put pressure on FLN to speed cease-fire talks.



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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

4 March 1960

## DAILY BRIEF

## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR-Iran: SAVAK, the Iranian security service, is showing increased concern over Soviet-sponsored subversion and has alerted its foreign and provincial posts to keep a "careful watch" on such activities, including Tudeh penetration efforts based in Iraq. [redacted]

[redacted] Soviet "agents"--presumably both Soviet intelligence personnel and members of the outlawed Tudeh party--are trying to establish contacts with antiregime nationalist elements, [redacted]

[redacted] The USSR, unsuccessful in its diplomatic and propaganda campaigns of the past year to make Tehran modify its pro-Western policies, now apparently hopes to develop a subversive potential which could exploit any movement aimed at the overthrow of the regime or take advantage of any sudden upheaval. There are considerable numbers of Iranian nationalists who, while not pro-Communist, are frustrated by government suppression and probably would accept Soviet support. [redacted] (Page 1)

## II. ASIA-AFRICA

UAR-Israel: Cairo on 1 March ordered a 75-percent reduction in the "emergency forces" required to be present in UAR national guard units in Egypt and the Sinai Peninsula, [redacted]

[redacted] some air and army units had returned to bases in the canal zone, but that the mass of troops moved to the peninsula last month apparently were still there. [redacted]

[redacted] some Syrian Army units have been called back from the Israeli front. Israel's relatively relaxed posture, evident during the past few days, apparently continues. A minor clash involving Egyptian infiltrators and an Israeli border patrol on 2 March has had no immediate repercussions. [redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

Jordan-UAR-Iraq: King Husayn in a radio speech on 1 March implicitly attacked both Nasir and Qasim for their pronouncements about a separate Palestine state, which Jordan opposes. The speech apparently was prompted by the debates at the just-concluded Arab League conference in Cairo, which failed to produce an agreement on a Palestine "entity," as well as by Qasim's recent unilateral advocacy of a Palestine state. [redacted]

[redacted] the UAR Embassy in Amman interpreted the speech as being an attack on Nasir. The UAR Embassy commented further that the US and the UK had probably instigated the speech as a reply to Nasir's threat to the "tripartite" countries. Both Nasir and Qasim probably will respond with new propaganda blasts. [redacted]

(Page 3)

Sino-Indian Border Dispute: Nehru is reported to expect Chou En-lai to come to New Delhi in April with a fairly strong negotiating position. He believes that Chou, having reached a border agreement with Burma and possibly with Nepal by that time, will suggest that India be equally reasonable. He also thinks that China, to indicate its own reasonableness, may offer to withdraw Chinese troops from Longju outpost in Assam. Inasmuch as Nehru feels that negotiations probably will be concentrated on the northeastern portion of the Kashmiri province of Ladakh, he is faced with the problem of how to reconcile his public statement that he will "give nothing away" with the probability that the Chinese will insist on holding the territory they now occupy there. Nehru reportedly has said he would accept a solution calling for neutralization of the disputed territory in Ladakh. The Chinese, however, have already rejected a similar proposal. [redacted]

Philippines: President Garcia's recent speech to a convention of Philippine businessmen, in which he promised full implementation of his "Filipino First" economic policies, is a further indication of his determination to make political capital out of growing Philippine nationalism. The program, aimed at

4 Mar 60

DAILY BRIEF

ii

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

achieving "economic independence," has led to increasing restrictions on foreign business activity, including that of American firms. The "Filipino First" slogan appears to be extending into the foreign policy field, with Philippine officials beginning to voice the need for greater "national self-assertion." [redacted] (Page 5)

### III. THE WEST

France-Algeria: De Gaulle's 3 March statement at Constantine that the Algerian problem cannot be settled for a long time and only after the victory of French arms probably has the double purpose of reassuring the French Army and putting pressure on FLN leaders to speed cease-fire talks. By confining his Algerian tour to military field installations, De Gaulle is further emphasizing his interest in army operations and in officer opinion. [redacted] (Page 6)

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4 Mar 60

DAILY BRIEF

iii

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## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

### Moscow Making Effort to Build Subversive Potential in Iran

[The Soviet Union, unsuccessful in its diplomatic and prop-  
aganda campaign of the past year to make Tehran modify its  
pro-Western policies, now is trying to develop a subversive  
potential in Iran which could exploit any movement aimed at the  
overthrow of the Shah's regime or take advantage of any sudden  
upheaval. Soviet "agents"--presumably both Soviet intelligence  
personnel and members of the outlawed Tudeh (Communist)  
party--are making a substantial effort to establish contacts  
with antiregime nationalist elements, [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]

[redacted] several Iranian military figures have also  
been approached as possible candidates to head a nationalist group-  
ing. [redacted] SAVAK has "definite information" that Soviet  
authorities have prodded the Tudeh high command, concentrated  
in East Germany, to display greater vigor in developing a sub-  
versive apparatus inside Iran.]

[These statements are supported by other information, [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted] describing contacts with antiregime nationalists by a  
Soviet national and by Tudeh personnel.] [redacted]

[redacted] during the past two months  
SAVAK has become increasingly concerned over Soviet-sponsored  
subversion, and that it has alerted its foreign and provincial posts  
to keep a "careful watch." Iranian authorities are paying close at-  
tention to Tudeh penetration efforts based in Iraq and to the activ-  
ities of Soviet and other bloc nationals in Iran. [redacted]  
[redacted]

Nationalist elements in Iran, harassed by security forces for  
the last six years, have been unable to evolve any effective organ-  
ization. Ranging from the rightist Pan-Iran party to the left-wing  
Third Force, they all oppose the present Iranian regime, hope to  
remain neutral between the Soviet Union and the West, and display a  
xenophobia ranging from mild to violent. Some leading nationalists,

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

frustrated by years of suppression, would probably be willing to accept Soviet support, although the more moderate elements would probably prefer Western backing. [redacted]

[redacted] Soviet material and moral support will probably increase significantly the nationalists' capabilities.  
[redacted]

[redacted]

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## II. ASIA-AFRICA

### King Husayn Attacks Nasir and Qasim on Palestine Issue

King Husayn of Jordan made a radio speech on 1 March in which he denounced those "in some Arab quarters... who have spoken lies" against Jordan. Other portions of the speech made clear that he was directing his remarks at Nasir and Qasim, who have made rival proposals for the establishment of a Palestine "entity" or state. Husayn opposes such proposals because they tend to undermine his control over the West Bank area of Jordan, formerly part of Palestine, and promote separatist feelings among the Palestinian two thirds of Jordan's population. Jordanian citizenship is available to all Palestine refugees who do not reside in the UAR or Lebanon. Husayn's grandfather, King Abdullah, annexed the West Bank in 1950--a move which has never been approved by the other Arab states.

The speech apparently was prompted by the debates in the recent Arab League conference in Cairo, where Jordan opposed UAR-backed efforts to get agreement on establishing some sort of Palestine entity and a Palestinian army. The league finally assigned the problem to a committee, which has been ordered to complete plans "with regard to various national and international aspects of the Palestine question." The league may meet again at the end of April.

[redacted] the UAR Embassy in Amman interpreted Husayn's speech as an attack on Nasir and suggested it had been instigated by the US and UK as a reply to Nasir's recent attack on the Tripartite Declaration of 1950, in which the US, the UK, and France guaranteed the frontiers or armistice lines of Israel and the Arab states. The speech, viewed in this light, will probably provoke new propaganda bursts from Nasir.

Nasir is going ahead with the organization of Palestinians in Egypt, Syria, and the Gaza strip, probably in the hope

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

that they can eventually dominate any all-Palestinian government. The Damascus press of 29 February carried the views of Gaza Mayor Munir Rayyis, who had just completed consultations with Nasir. Rayyis stated that the inhabitants of Gaza had been accepted into the UAR's single-party political organization, the National Union, and that plans were under way to include Palestinians of Syria and Egypt. He suggested that the National Union might eventually serve as the vehicle for unifying all Palestinians, or perhaps as a nucleus for a Palestinian state.

Nasir is compelled to keep the initiative on the Palestine issue, in the face of competitive efforts by Qasim and Husayn to pose as champions of the Palestinian cause. Qasim has exploited the question in his propaganda by creating a fund for the establishment of a Palestine republic and by promising to restore refugee "rights," while criticizing both Nasir and Husayn for alleged inaction. In a statement in December, Qasim grouped Egypt and Jordan with Israel as "usurpers" of Palestine. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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### Philippine President Emphasizes "Filipino First" Policy

President Garcia's determination to capitalize on growing Philippine nationalist sentiment has been emphasized in his recent speech to the Philippine Chamber of Commerce promising full implementation of his "Filipino First" policy in order to wrest control of the economy from "alien domination." Garcia's remarks are likely to encourage the congressional clamor for legislative restrictions on foreign nationals and firms in the Philippines. In addition to an existing law, aimed primarily at the Overseas Chinese, for the gradual exclusion of aliens from the country's retail trade, there has been a growing tendency to apply discriminatory administrative measures to all foreign businessmen, including Americans.

Despite the relatively weak appeal of the administration's "Filipino First" slogan in last November's senatorial and local elections, Garcia may hope that continued exploitation of nationalist sentiment will divert attention from the opposition's effective attack on government inefficiency and corruption. He may increasingly seek to place the blame for his domestic failures on close ties with the United States. A developing Philippine tendency to make unilateral reinterpretations of existing agreements with the United States may indicate that the "Filipino First" theme is being extended from commercial to foreign policy questions.

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### III. THE WEST

#### De Gaulle Says Algerian Settlement Possible Only After Military Victory

President de Gaulle's statement on 3 March that the Algerian problem would not be settled for a long time, and only after the victory of French arms, is his toughest public statement yet on the Algerian problem and probably reflects his mounting irritation with FLN slowness in moving toward a cease-fire. The statement is almost certainly an attempt to bring additional pressure on FLN leaders. The French President has indicated that he hoped to achieve a settlement in Algeria prior to Khrushchev's visit in mid-March. De Gaulle has not yet mentioned the 29 February statement of rebel leader Ferhat Abbas, but French officials in Tunis have indicated that it was regarded by Paris as "constructive in tone."

The statements, made to French Army officers at Constantine, the first stop on a tour of military installations in Algeria, are probably also intended to reassure the army in the wake of the repression of the January "revolt" and the resulting command shifts. De Gaulle stated clearly that "France must stay in Algeria," although he said the conditions would depend on the wishes of the inhabitants. De Gaulle is probably also attempting to sound out army opinion and gauge army sentiment on moving ahead with self-determination.

De Gaulle's omission of the city of Algiers from his tour may have been partly on security grounds but was probably also a way of implying to the army that he is satisfied with the progress in shifting local administration from army to civilian control. On the eve of De Gaulle's arrival in Constantine, a directive of the Delegate General explained that the shift was made to permit the army to concentrate on "operational action." [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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**The Vice President**

**Executive Offices of the White House**

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

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The Secretary of the Treasury

**The Department of State**

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

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The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

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The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

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Commander in Chief, Pacific

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The Director

**National Indications Center**

The Director

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