3.3(h)(2)

9 March 1960

Copy No. C 68

CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



DOCUMENT NO.

NO GHANDE IN CLASS.

DECLASSIFIED


CLASS. CH:NGED TO: T3 8 8

NEXT RAVIEW DATE: 2010

AUTH: HN 16-2

B JUN 1980

REVIEWER:



9 MARCH 1960

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC


UAR-Iran--Soviet propaganda trying to arouse Shah's suspicion of the US and of his closest associates.

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Soviet Union to participate in India's non-military nuclear development program.

Pakistan says it will demand plebiscite to determine whether Pushtoons living in Afghanistan wish to join Pakistan.





3

(**CAFTDFNTIAI Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03004996 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03004996

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

9 March 1960

DAILY BRIEF

SIRAB

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR-Iran: The USSR, Concurrent with its efforts to increase covert contacts with anti-Shah groups in Iran,7 is mak-Ankara, Turkish President Eisenhower's recent visit to
Ankara, Turkish President Menderes gave him the names of prominent Iranians who are allegedly plotting a coup d'état in Tehran. The Soviet clandestine "National Voice of Iran" recently alleged that Gen. Bakhtiar, Iran's intelligence chief, and Gen. Nasiri, head of the Royal Guard, are competing for US support in plots to overthrow the Shah.

Bakhtiar has, in fact, informed the US that "contingency plans" in event the "group, alleged"

be making "plans."

(Page 1)

II. ASIA-AFRICA

New Delhi's announcement on 7 March agree-India-USSR: ing in principle to "collaborate" with Moscow in the design and construction of nuclear power stations opens the way for the USSR's participation in India's nonmilitary nuclear development program under the Third Five-Year Plan (1961-66). The announcement, however, made no reference to previously reported offers of Soviet credits for the first plant. New Delhi may be delaying a decision on foreign aid for this plant pending talks with US AEC officials now visiting India and further exploration of British interest. Indian AEC Chairman Bhabha's plan to lead a delegation to Moscow in May or June, presumably after financing of the first plan is settled, suggests that his government, as previously indicated, would prefer Soviet aid for a projected second or third atomic power plant rather than the first plant. (Page 3)

Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03004996

Pakistan-Afghanistan: Pakistani Foreign Minister Qadir announced on 7 March that since Khrushchev had openly sided with Kabul on the question of self-determination for Pushtoon tribesmen, Pakistan would now demand a plebiscite to determine whether Pushtoons living in Afghanistan wish to join Pakistan. Rawalpindi probably hopes this new ploy will strengthen its influence over its own Pushtoon tribes and contribute to its campaign to undermine the Afghan royal family. It also probably intends by this action to discourage Afghanistan from continuing its agitation for a plebiscite in Pakistan and to establish a strong talking point in any negotiations which might eventually be arranged. (Page 4)

0/2

9 Mar 60

DAILY BRIEF

ii


I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Moscow Seeks to Play on Shah's Suspicions

The USSR's year-old propaganda compaign against Tehran has taken a new turn with broadcasts designed to arouse the Shah's suspicion of his close associates in the government and of Iran's allies. On 7 March, Radio Moscow charged that during President Eisenhower's visit in December to Turkey, President Menderes gave him a list of influential Iranians, including military figures, who are allegedly "preparing a coup d'état" The broadcast accused Turkish officials of trying to convince the President that the Shah's regime is unstable and that he "must be replaced." Radio Moscow also claimed that leaflets are being distributed in Tehran and other Iranian cities, urging Iranians to "overthrow the rotten and perfidious Pahlavi dynasty."

The Soviet clandestine station "National Voice of Iran," in recent broadcasts to Iran, has accused General Bakhtiar, chief of the Iranian National Intelligence and Security Organization (SAVAK), and General Nasiri, head of the Royal Guard, of competing for support from the United States in rival plots to overthrow the Shah.

The Shah's main source of power is the security forces—the army and SAVAK—and he would almost certainly take strong action if he suspected that either Bakhtiar or Nasiri were plotting against him. Bakhtiar is vulnerable as he has engaged in "contingency planning" in the event the Shah should lose control of the government. Another group, probably including some military figures, is also making "plans," alleged—ly with the support of Bakhtiar. An investigation would probably provide the Shah with evidence of Bakhtiar's activities—evidence which could be supplied, for example, by General Kia, chief of Iran's military intelligence, whom the Shah maintains as a counterbalance to Bakhtiar.



Moscow's bid to create distrust in Tehran and apparently to eliminate potential pro-Western successors of the Shah coincides with recent Soviet efforts to establish direct contacts with antiregime nationalist groups and to build up a subversive potential inside Iran through the outlawed Tudeh (Communist) party. High Iranian security officials are continuing to express concern over increasing activities among pro-Communist elements, especially in view of serious economic problems which are expected to develop during the balance of 1960.	

Indian Cooperation With USSR in Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy

The agreement in principle by Indian and Soviet atomic energy officials to collaborate in the design and construction of nuclear power stations opens the way for the USSR's participation in India's nonmilitary atomic development program under the Third Five-Year Plan (1961-66). New Delhi's announcement on 7 March, however, following talks with Moscow's top expert on peaceful uses of atomic energy, makes no reference to previously reported offers of Soviet credits for the first nuclear reactor to be constructed. Several Soviet leaders have recently offered publicly to help the Indians set up a nuclear power station, although it is not clear whether a specific proposal has been made.

New Delhi recently decided to establish its first nuclear power station near Ahmedabad in Bombay State. Two or more additional reactors are being considered for inclusion in the Third Plan, but a decision has been deferred because of financing problems and differences among planning officials.

New Delhi may be delaying a decision on foreign assistance for the first plant until discussions with the US AEC delegation now visiting India are completed. Indian officials may also wish to explore further Britain's expressed interest in financing the plant. They had previously indicated to American and British officials that India would prefer its first plant to be built under Western aegis, although the government might be interested in Soviet assistance for a second or third plant. Indian AEC chairman Bhabha's plan to take a delegation of atomic experts to Moscow in May or June, presumably after financing of the first plant is settled, also suggests that New Delhi is primarily interested in using Soviet aid for these additional power stations. Should Western terms prove to be less favorable than Moscow's, however, New Delhi might eventually accept a Soviet bid on the original plant.



Pakistan Demands Plebiscite Among Pushtoons Living In Afghanistan

Pakistani Foreign Minister Qadir announced on 7 March that, since Khrushchev had openly sided with Kabul on the question of self-determination for Pushtoon tribesmen living in Pakistan, Rawalpindi would demand a plebiscite to determine whether Pushtoons living in Afghanistan wish to join Pakistan. Pakistani President Ayub has consistently maintained the public stand that the whole Pushtoonistan dispute is a "phony stunt" by the Afghan Government, although Pakistan recently intensified Pushtu-language propaganda broadcasts accusing Kabul of oppressing its Pushtoon citizens.

The Pakistani Government has probably felt that its position was too defensive, since Afghanistan had focused attention on self-determination for Pakistan's Pushtoons. Having begun a propaganda counteroffensive addressed to all Pushtoons themselves, the Pakistanis now seem to be establishing a bargaining position with an eye to possible future talks with the Afghans. They will almost certainly insist that any such talks cover Pushtoons on both sides of the border, probably hoping that Kabul will refuse to discuss any but Pakistan's Pushtoons.

Pakistan probably hopes this ploy will strengthen its influence over its own Pushtoon tribes, who make up about a tenth of the population, and contribute to its campaign to undermine the Afghan royal family. There are about five million Pushtoons in Afghanistan, which has a total population of ten to twelve million.



Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03004996

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director



Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03004996

Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03004996 proved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03004996