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20 October 1959

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN





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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

20 October 1959

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

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•	*Iraq: The UAR has refused to guarantee military support for an anti-Qasim coup planned "within the next two or three
	days" by a group of Iraqi nationalist military officers,
No	The group sought assurance from Cairo that the UAR would intervene militarily as soon as the plotters established control and made an "official request." it would send military assistance only if Iraq were exposed to foreign intervention, but would support the revolt "morally and politically." Although full UAR support has not been promised, the group may go ahead with its plans believing that the time to strike is limited and that Nasir may be forced to assist. Qasim may well be forewarned, possibly as a result of Soviet interception of these messages. (Page 1) (Map)
OK	Algeria: The vice premier of the Algerian rebel government has indicated to Tunisian officials that attempts to negotiate a cease-fire in Algeria may be imminent. According to these officials, Krim stated that the rebel National Revolutionary Council this week will ratify acceptance of De Gaulle's proposals as a basis for negotiations, and that a three-man team would be given full power to negotiate with the French. The rebels have attacked several points of De Gaulle's program, including France's claim to the Sahara, and any negotiations are likely to be protracted. (Page 2)
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India: Dissension among Indian Communist leaders-heightened by the Sino-Indian border issue--continues to plague the party as preparations are being made for the important meetings of the Indian Communist leadership beginning on 7 November. The party's dilemma



Is receiving increasing publicity as leaders of the "nationalist" and "internationalist" factions vie for position and the moderat in the middle try to retain control. Moderate party secretary Ajoy Ghosh returned from Moscow and Peiping on 18 October two weeks earlier than expected in order to deal with the grow-	es
ing rift.)	

III. THE WEST

Cuba: Current changes in Fidel Castro's government indicate that the extremists are expanding their control at the expense of moderate officials. Raul Castro heads a powerful new ministry of the armed forces; one of his closest associates, characterized by the American Embassy as an extreme leftist, has been assigned to head the key labor ministry.


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20 Oct 59 DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Nasir Refuses Military Support for Anti-Qasim Coup in Iraq

Iraqi nationalist military officers, planning to carry out an		
anti-Qasim coup "within the next two or three days," have been		
refused a guarantee of UAR military support,		
The offi-		
cers, who allegedly include army and air force elements, had		
requested that the UAR fly in troops if they made an "official"		
request following their seizure of Baghdad and the Habbaniya air		
base. The UAR, however, said it would furnish moral and prop-		
aganda support but would enter militarily only if there were "for-		
eign intervention," since this would fall under the UAR-Iraqi Joint		
Military Pact concluded soon after the July 1958 revolution. The		
UAR refusal pointed out that military support under other circum-		
stances would "create a serious international situation" which would		
encourage other countries to intervene.		
Although the conspirators are likely to be dismayed at Cairo's		
failure to support them militarily, they may proceed with their		
plans, feeling that time is running out for any successful action		
against Qasim. They may believe that, once the coup has been		
carried out, Nasir will be forced to lend military support to a suc-		
cessor regime to Qasim, rather than allow Iraq to become a battle-		
ground for various contending factions.		
Pro-Communist Col. Mahdawi, president of the People's		
Court, has announced that his court will soon try Qasim's assas-		
sins, perhaps as soon as the first of November. Mahdawi claims		
that the identity of the ringleaders in the plot is known, and Qasim		
has declared that they will be treated with a "strong hand." In the		
past, Mahdawi's court has been used for propagating anti-Western		
and anti-UAR propaganda. Qasim appears to be relying on the		
vocal Mahdawi, rather than on the special committee appointed		
to investigate the attack.		
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1 OF SECRE!		

Algerian Rebels Preparing for Talks With French

A meeting of the Algerian rebel National Revolutionary Council will be held shortly to ratify acceptance of President de Gaulle's proposals as a basis for negotiations, according to remarks attributed to rebel Vice Premier Eelkacem Krim. Following such ratification, the council will reportedly appoint a three-man committee with full powers to negotiate a cease-fire with the French.

Krim's remarks, as reported by a senior Tunisian official, suggest that negotiations will begin soon. Previously, there were indications that rebel intransigents intended to use the council meeting as a forum to attack French good faith and to question the practicality of any Algerian referendum. The optimistic tone of Krim's remarks, however, suggests that he expects any such opposition to be overcome. The rebels have attacked several points of De Gaulle's program—including France's claim to the Sahara—and any negotiations are likely to be protracted.

According to Krim--who is probably the most influential rebel leader--the Algerians have declined a Tunisian offer to help establish contact with Paris, but will work through Moroccan Crown Prince Moulay Hassan.

Although Paris would probably receive the rebel committee, it is likely to maintain its insistence that discussions at this time be strictly limited to arrangements for a cease-fire. Last week's overwhelming assembly vote of 441 to 23 in support of De Gaulle's Algerian program may make it easier for French spokesmen to persuade rebel negotiators that France intends to stand by its offer of eventual Algerian self-determination.



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III. THE WEST

Cuban Cabinet Changes

Raul Castro, considered the leader of extremist forces in the Cuban revolutionary government, has consolidated his growing influence by securing a powerful cabinet post which controls all army, air, navy, and police forces. His appointment on 16 October as head of the new Ministry of Revolutionary Armed Forces makes even stronger his position as Fidel Castro's presumptive heir and correspondingly weakens the moderate officials whose influence has tempered some of the revolution's more drastic aspects.

At the same time, former Minister of Defense Augustin Martinez Sanchez, and extreme leftist and long-time confidant of Raul, was named minister of labor to replace Manuel Fernandez. Fernandez cooperated with Cuban Confederation of Labor (CTC) leaders in resisting Communist efforts to gain control of the unions in recent elections. Martinez may facilitate expected Communist attempts to dominate the CTC national conference in November, when top officers will be elected.

Raul Castro has been commander of all Cuban armed forces since Fidel resigned the post to become prime minister in February. He has converted the military into a political instrument, dismissing almost all army and air force members who had served before the revolution. Since this included most of the trained technical and mechanical personnel, the result has been a complete lack of military efficiency, discipline, and training and a series of disastrous air force accidents. Raul will completely reorganize the forces, probably reducing them and continuing his practice of consolidating as many units as possible under his direct control.



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The Secretary of State

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The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

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