


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10 July 1959



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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN




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 AUTH: *HR 70-2*  
 DATE: *4.14.80* REVIEWER:



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10 JULY 1959

**I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC**

Communist radar reflects another penetration of mainland by Chinese Nationalist aircraft. [redacted]

Peiping offers more military aid to Indonesia. [redacted]

**II. ASIA-AFRICA**


UAR moving to improve relations with other Arab states, except Iraq.

Cairo postpones issuance of unified currency for Egypt and Syria.

Comment on new Indonesian cabinet.

Ceylon--Bandaranaike survives 8 July confidence vote; government remains in precarious position.

- ①
- ②
- ③
- ④
- ⑤
- ⑥



**III. THE WEST**

- ⑦ Haiti fearful of rebel incursions; asks US protection.
- ⑧ Influential trade union urges radical disarmament plan for UK.
- ⑨ Finnish official endorses Khrushchev overture to Scandinavia in hope USSR will acquiesce in Finnish participation in Western trade area.

**LATE ITEM**

- ⑩ Comment on Ghana's recognition of Algerian rebel government.



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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

10 July 1959

## DAILY BRIEF

### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

SIRAB

Taiwan Strait situation: Chinese Communist radar on 9 July reflected another penetration of the mainland by four Nationalist aircraft in an area west of Lungtien near the scene of the 5 July engagement. No reaction by Communist fighters was noted. [redacted]

No

[redacted] one Communist plane, rather than four, was shot down in the 5 July clash; a second MIG crashed in the sea. Peiping admits the loss of only the one which crashed. [redacted] (Map on reverse of page) [redacted]

#### Communist China - Indonesia: [redacted]



No

[redacted] Peiping is willing to give military assistance to Indonesia "to the limit, in accord with its capacity." Aware that the Indonesian Army now is playing a greater role in determining policy toward the bloc and local Communists, Peiping apparently hopes its cordial reception of the mission and assurances of arms aid will soften the Indonesian Army's distrust of Communist China. Peiping has already supplied 12 TU-2 twin-engine piston light bombers and some MIG-17 jet fighters to Djakarta under an agreement concluded earlier this year with the Indonesian Air Force. [redacted]

An Indonesian arms mission, which has just returned from Europe, has announced purchases of over \$40,000,000 worth of equipment, chiefly from the free world, but also from Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. [redacted] (Page 1)

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## II. ASIA-AFRICA

UAR - Arab states: [Nasir is mending his fences with the Arab states, except for Iraq. Concurrent with UAR negotiations to restore diplomatic relations with Tunisia, Cairo apparently has also made some approaches to King Husayn of Jordan. These developments follow the improvement of UAR relations with Morocco, Libya, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia over the past few months. Nasir apparently believes improved relations with other Arab states will strengthen his position vis-a-vis the Qasim regime.]

(Page 2)

UAR: [Postponement of the issuance of a unified currency for Egypt and Syria, previously set for 1 July, may reflect Cairo's reluctance to make this controversial move so close to UAR National Union elections, which began on 8 July. Egyptian officials claim that concern over Syrian resistance to the currency merger played no part in the delay which they attribute to the lack of a unified bank. The new currency may be issued in the near future, however, to take advantage of the appearance of unity created by the present elections.]

(Page 3)

Indonesia: The army has been given two key posts in Sukarno's new 10-man "nucleus cabinet," which is otherwise composed largely of technicians. There are only two leftists in the cabinet, but they are non-Communist. It is possible, however, that other leftists will be included when the deputy ministers are named. For the first time since 1949, no prominent Moslem party leader is included. The cabinet's grandiose program includes the supply of adequate consumer items for the people, re-establishment of security, and the "struggle against imperialism in West Irian" (Dutch New Guinea).

(Page 4)

Ceylon: Prime Minister Bandaranaike's government on 8 July survived by a 50 to 41 vote its first test in Parliament since leftist members of his coalition withdrew. Several

10 July 59

DAILY BRIEF

ii

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opposition members, including the Communists, abstained, presumably to avoid forcing elections at this time. While Bandaranaike thus has time for further maneuvering in an effort to strengthen his position, the government remains in a precarious position. The firm action taken in the past few days to deal with leftist strike activity appears to have blunted the immediate threat to Bandaranaike's position from this direction. [redacted] (Page 5)

### III. THE WEST

*Nb*  
Haiti: Believing that incursions into Haiti by Cuban-backed rebels are imminent, Foreign Minister Mars on 8 July officially asked US help, in the form of air and sea patrols, to preserve Haiti's "neutrality and territorial inviolability during the present Caribbean crisis." Haiti is aware that any Cuban-backed landing would probably precipitate military intervention by the Dominican Republic. The Haitian Army chief of staff has admitted privately that his country is virtually defenseless against any invasion attempt. [redacted]  
 [redacted] (Page 6)

*OK*  
Britain: The rejection of the Labor party's moderate nuclear disarmament policy by Britain's largest union is a threat to Labor party unity. It may also put further pressure on the Macmillan government to achieve a test-suspension agreement. In view of the radical resolution passed by the Transport and General Workers' Union on 9 July, calling for the UK permanently to renounce missile bases, cease nuclear tests, and end production of nuclear weapons, Gaitskell and Bevan face difficulty in getting their recently adopted policy endorsed by the early October party conference. They may accept further compromise to avoid an open party fight in advance of the general elections expected this fall. [redacted]  
 (Page 7)

*OK*  
Finland: In an interview prepared for Radio Moscow, Finnish Communications Minister Kleemola implied that Finland supported Khrushchev's anticipated efforts during his

10 July 59

DAILY BRIEF

iii

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

Scandinavian tour next month to press for the creation of an alliance-free, neutral Nordic bloc. Kleemola's action was almost certainly undertaken with the knowledge and consent of President Kekkonen, if not at his advice. It may be intended to curry favor with Moscow in the hope of persuading the USSR to acquiesce in Finland's participation in the proposed little free trade area consisting of Britain, the Scandinavian countries, and certain other nonmembers of the Common Market.

[redacted] (Page 8)

LATE ITEM

\*Ghana-France: Prime Minister Nkrumah's decision to extend de facto recognition to the Algerian rebels' provisional government, announced on 9 July, will probably provoke De Gaulle to break off relations with Accra. President Touré of Guinea is likely to feel compelled to demonstrate his solidarity with Nkrumah, and the two may well put pressure on Liberia to follow suit. [redacted]

OK  
delete  
P3

Nkrumah's action was an impulsive one. It was almost certainly precipitated by France's abrupt rejection earlier this week of a formal note from Ghana requesting that Paris abandon its plans to test atomic bombs in the Sahara.) [redacted]

[redacted] (Page 9)

10 July 59

DAILY BRIEF

iv

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]



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## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

### Chinese Communist Military Aid to Indonesia

Peiping, aware that the Indonesian Army is playing a greater role in determining government policy since Sukarno reinstated the 1945 constitution, is trying to soften the army's distrust of Communist China. The Indonesian mission now in Peiping reported a noticeable improvement in its reception at the Ministry of Defense on 7 July. It was assured at that time that China will provide military assistance for Indonesia "to the limit, in accord with its capacity." China apparently will provide the necessary shipping facilities to deliver the arms as well.

Peiping has recently completed deliveries of arms and materiel to the Indonesian Air Force, including 12 TU-2 light bombers and some MIG-17 jet fighters under an agreement which apparently was not negotiated at the government level. The Chinese now have indicated their preference that Indonesian requests for arms aid be made officially at the government level.

Despite a recent statement by the Indonesian Army deputy chief of staff, following an arms-purchasing tour of Europe, that Indonesia had acquired enough arms to meet all internal security needs, a new arms deal with China may ensue. Djakarta's arms purchases since early 1958 now total approximately \$300,000,000--about \$175,000,000 of which were procured from the bloc, mainly Poland and Czechoslovakia. Most of the arms purchased during the recent tour of Europe came from outside the bloc, but some came from Czechoslovakia. Bloc deliveries of arms and materiel are still being made.

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## II. ASIA-AFRICA

### Nasir Moving to Improve Relations With Arab States [redacted]

[Nasir appears to be mending his fences with the other Arab states, except Iraq, [redacted]

[redacted] he had sent a note verbale to President Bourguiba of Tunisia, which was apparently well received, and that negotiations to return to normal diplomatic relations were being undertaken by UAR and Tunisian representatives in Libya. The UAR press has recently hinted at such a development.]

[A UAR emissary has reportedly discussed with Jordan's King Husayn the possibility of normalizing relations and is making arrangements for an official UAR delegation to come to Amman and continue the discussion. [redacted]

[redacted] he expects such action by early August. Ambassador Mills reported on 8 July that the "climate of official Jordanian opinion indicates increasing willingness and desire to normalize relations with the UAR."]

[These moves by Nasir to restore at least the appearance of normal relations with two of his most determined antagonists-- Bourguiba and Husayn--follow a gradual improvement in relations with other Arab neighbors, including Morocco, Libya, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia. Cairo's attitude toward the Sudan appears to reflect a desire for a similar development in UAR-Sudanese relations.]

[Nasir probably is trying to strengthen his position in the Arab world vis-a-vis the Qasim regime in Baghdad. He may also feel that the UAR's interest in improving its relations with the West will be served by gestures of good will toward other Arab states which may allay some Western suspicions of his intentions in the area.] [redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

~~SECRET~~New UAR Currency Issue Postponed 

[Postponement of the issuance of a unified currency for Egypt and Syria, previously set for 1 July, may reflect Cairo's reluctance to make this controversial move so close to the 8 July UAR National Union elections. The new currency may be issued in the near future, however, to take advantage of the appearance of unity created by the elections. The existence of separate currency systems in Egypt and Syria has been a major barrier to rapid economic integration of the two regions.]

[The Syrian business community has been uneasy in recent months at the prospect of replacement of the relatively hard Syrian pound with a unified UAR currency. Syrian businessmen feel such a move would accelerate Egyptian economic domination of the Syrian economic scene and result in fairly serious losses to holders of Syrian currency. In an effort to stave off a flight of Syrian capital, UAR officials have publicly denied plans to implement a new "dinar" currency.]

[Egyptian officials claim that concern over Syrian resistance to the currency merger played no part in the delay, which they attribute to technical difficulties due to the lack of a unified central bank. The Syrian business community is politically impotent, and no effective opposition to the currency merger is likely to develop.]

15,006,500 new "dinar" notes with a nominal value of \$214,452,000 have been printed by a British firm. These now are stored in Cairo.)

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~New Indonesian Cabinet Marked by Increased Army Influence

The installation of Sukarno's new presidential cabinet on 10 July leaves Indonesia's national leadership relatively unchanged. The trio which in fact has led Indonesia over the past two years--President Sukarno, Army Chief of Staff General Nasution, and Prime Minister Djuanda--has emerged with strengthened powers. The cabinet is distinguished principally by the increased political role of the army and the reduction of voting members from 27 to 10.

Sukarno's so-called "nucleus cabinet" is led by nonparty Dr. Djuanda, now designated "first minister" since Sukarno himself heads the cabinet. Djuanda will also serve as finance minister. Nasution has been given the defense portfolio; it has not been announced whether he will resign as army chief of staff or will hold the two posts concurrently. Foreign Minister Subandrio retains his portfolio. Of the remaining six posts, one is held by the army and another probably controlled by it, two are held by non-Communist leftists, and two by reasonably capable but politically insignificant non-Communists. Only one minister has not previously held a cabinet post, and all but two are holdovers from the previous government.

Seven *ex officio* ministers of state, who include the three chiefs of staff, the police chief, and three high civilian officials, may attend "plenary" cabinet meetings but will not have a vote. Yet to be announced are a group of deputy ministers whose political orientation and extent of responsibility may change the complexion of the cabinet.

The streamlined cabinet and its program indicate that an attempt will be made to cope with Indonesia's most immediate problem--that of economic deterioration. At least five cabinet posts are directly involved with the economic situation. The three-point program includes the adequate supply of consumer items for the people, the establishment of security, and the continuation of the "struggle" for West New Guinea. There is little indication that any effective economic remedial action is possible within the near future. Nevertheless, Sukarno's reinstatement of the 1945 constitution and his formation of a new cabinet may partially restore popular confidence in the government.

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### Bandaranaike Wins Test in Ceylonese Parliament

Prime Minister Bandaranaike's government on 8 July survived its first test in the Ceylonese Parliament since leftist members of his coalition withdrew two months ago, but its position is still precarious.

All 50 of the government representatives apparently voted against the censure motion, while eight of the 49 opposition members abstained or were absent. These members--who included Communists and Communist sympathizers--presumably wanted to avoid forcing elections which probably would result in considerable gains by rightist elements.

The firm action taken by the government during the past few days to deal with leftist strike activity appears to have blunted the immediate threat to Bandaranaike's position from this quarter as well. Bandaranaike has precipitated a showdown with the Trotskyite Lanka Sama Samaj party (LSSP), which controls the most powerful unions and has threatened a general strike, by refusing to negotiate with LSSP Colombo port workers until they return to work and by recruiting a "volunteer" force to replace them.

His parliamentary victory over the combined opposition, coupled with growing public resentment of prolonged strike activity, should strengthen Bandaranaike's hand in dealing with labor agitation. The government's effort to recruit a 5,000-man emergency labor force to maintain essential services during strikes has met with a quick response, 12,000 persons having applied with a few days.

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## III. THE WEST

Haiti Fears Cuban Invasion [REDACTED]

[Confronted with continuing reports of "imminent" Cuban-backed incursions, the Haitian Government on 8 July officially requested US aid in maintaining Haiti's "neutrality and territorial inviolability during the present Caribbean crisis." The note specifically stated that Haitian port and airport facilities would be made available for patrol purposes. Haitian officials previously have made several similar requests.]

[REDACTED] new expeditions are being planned in Cuba against Dominican dictator Trujillo via Haiti. The Duvalier government, itself the target of revolutionary plotting by exile groups, may fear that such incursions might provide impetus to an anti-Duvalier outbreak and precipitate Dominican military intervention.]

[The Haitian chief of staff has admitted [REDACTED] that the country is virtually defenseless against any invasion attempt. The armed forces, numbering little more than 5,000, are handicapped by inadequate arms and ammunition, and the air force had to cease training on 1 July because of lack of spare parts and ammunition. The loyalty of the armed forces to the Duvalier government, in question during most of Duvalier's more than two and a half years in office, may be strengthened by the threat of external invasion.] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[REDACTED]

British Labor Party Faces Serious Split on Nuclear Policy

[The rejection of the Labor party's revised and more moderate policy on nuclear disarmament by Britain's largest union is a threat to party unity. It may also put further pressure on the Conservative government to achieve a test-suspension agreement.]

[On 9 July the 1,300,000-member Transport and General Workers' Union, acting on the advice of leader Frank Cousins, overwhelmingly passed a resolution calling for permanent cessation of both the testing and production of British nuclear weapons. The resolution also called for the outright rejection of missile bases in Britain. This vote, following last month's similar resolution by the General and Municipal Workers' Union and the "non-nuclear club" compromise worked out by the Labor party only two weeks ago, is a serious blow to the Gaitskell-Bevan leadership. It jeopardizes Labor leaders' hope of obtaining an endorsement of their more moderate policy by the party conference in early October.]

[The Labor party is threatened with the most serious crisis since 1954 when it split on the German rearmament issue. Since the October conference will probably be taking place on the eve of the general elections, Gaitskell and Bevan may be under considerable pressure from right- as well as left-wing Laborites to make a further tactical shift. The stand of the two powerful and heretofore most moderate trade unions could be a persuasive argument that a more radical Labor nuclear policy would be potent vote-getter in the general elections.] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Finnish Official Urges Khrushchev to Promote Nordic  
Neutrality

In an interview prepared for Radio Moscow, Finnish Minister of Communications Kauno Kleemola stated that Finland would be pleased if Khrushchev's visit to Scandinavia next month increased mutual confidence between the Nordic countries and the USSR and resulted in closer foreign policy cooperation among the Nordic countries. This is tantamount to suggesting that Khrushchev press Norway and Denmark to revise their NATO ties.

Kleemola is one of President Kekkonen's closest confidants in the Agrarian government, and the US Embassy assumes he spoke with Kekkonen's full knowledge and endorsement. Kleemola's favorable comments on Nordic unity voice the interest of many Finns, including the President, in the formation of a neutral Nordic bloc. Foreign Minister Toerngren told a group of Finnish journalists on 10 May that it would be a great advantage to Finland if the whole Nordic area remained outside the field of great-power tensions.

The interview appears to put Finland in the role of promoting Soviet foreign policy objectives among the Scandinavians. Kekkonen may in fact be responding to Soviet suggestions, but it is more likely that the Finns are seeking to curry favor with the USSR in order to obtain its acquiescence to Finnish participation in a proposed free trade area consisting of Britain, the Scandinavian countries, Portugal, and Switzerland. Finland has shown interest in this project, believing that it cannot afford to remain outside if it is to preserve the competitive position of Finnish exports in Western markets. The Finns, however, would not be inclined to join directly or indirectly in the face of Soviet opposition.

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

LATE ITEM

Repercussions Likely From Ghana's Recognition of Algerian Rebel Regime

The decision by Prime Minister Nkrumah of Ghana to extend de facto recognition to the Algerian rebels' provisional government, announced in Accra on 9 July, will probably provoke Paris to follow through with its publicized threat to break off relations with countries which take such action. An announcement may not be forthcoming, however, before 11 July, when De Gaulle and other key French officials are due back from Madagascar, where they recently attended a meeting of the new French Community's executive council.

Meanwhile, Guinea's President Touré, whose relations with Paris have been difficult and at times strained since Guinea opted for independence from France last fall, will probably feel he cannot afford to be outdistanced by Nkrumah on this issue and must demonstrate solidarity for the sake of the Ghana-Guinea "union." President Tubman of Liberia, who is scheduled to confer with Nkrumah and Touré next week and to be host in early August for a conference of nine independent African states called to consider the Algerian question, will also be under strong pressure to follow suit.

[REDACTED] despite the Nkrumah government's underlying hostility toward France, which it views as the principal foe of its pan-African program, Accra had decided as recently as 2 July to continue to "avoid a de facto recognition" of the Algerian rebel regime. Its subsequent about-face was almost certainly an impulsive reaction precipitated by [REDACTED] France's summary rejection earlier this week of a formal Ghanaian note--inspired largely by Nkrumah's desire to assert a new African nationalist initiative--requesting that Paris abandon its plans to test atomic bombs in the Sahara.)

Accra's action provides the hard-pressed rebel leaders with a diplomatic and psychological lift and may encourage other countries of the Afro-Asian bloc to consider recognition. Until Ghana's action, only the Arab states, Communist China, the Asian satellites, and--somewhat equivocally--Indonesia, had recognized the rebel government. [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

10 July 59

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Page 9

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~**THE PRESIDENT****The Vice President**

**Executive Offices of the White House**  
 Special Assistant for National Security Affairs  
 Scientific Adviser to the President  
 Director of the Budget  
 Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization  
 Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination  
 Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities  
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 Executive Secretary, National Security Council

**The Treasury Department**  
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**The Department of State**  
 The Secretary of State  
 The Under Secretary of State  
 The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs  
 The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs  
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 Chief of Staff, United States Army  
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**The Department of the Interior**  
 The Secretary of the Interior

**Federal Bureau of Investigation**  
 The Director

**Atomic Energy Commission**  
 The Chairman

**National Security Agency**  
 The Director

**National Indications Center**  
 The Director

**United States Information Agency**  
 The Director

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