Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03164696

TOP SECRET

CDEP

10 October 1959

Copy No. C 65

3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c)

CENTRAL


INTELLIGENCE


BULLETIN



TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03164696





CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

10 October 1959

DAILY BRIEF

SIRAB

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR--International Communist Movement: Khrushchev. prior to his visit to the US, told Indian Communist party secretary Ghosh that Communist parties in India and other non-bloc states should avoid uprisings and other "warlike situations"

Communism.

Ghosh presumably interpreted Khrushchev's views to bolster his own moderate line within the Indian party, described Khrushchev's principal point that without war for three or four moderate. principal point that without war for three or four years the bloc's military position will surpass that of the capitalist powers, particularly the US. In the meantime, any uprisings by "progressive forces" would be suppressed by reactionary elements. (Page 1)

> Communist China - USSR - India: During talks with Mao in Peiping on 2 October, Khrushchev suggested the inadvisability of criticizing Nehru, who is a "popular figure" and whose antagonism would impair the advance of Communism in Asia,

Khrushchev is said to have urged that Peiping refrain from public statements on the border issue. The Chinese, who apparently accepted these recommendations, in fact have not publicly criticized New Delhi since mid-September. Chou En-lai's message on 6 October to Nehru playing down the border issue as a mere episode in an "age-old friendship" is the latest indication that Peiping hopes to create an atmosphere of reconciliation. The Chinese, however, have given no indication of willingness to accept Nehru's condition for talks by evacuating their forces from areas claimed by Nehru to be Indian territory?

No

Communist China: A recent article by a leading Chinese Communist party official contains the regime's most explicit admission of widespread discontent with the party leadership. The article seems to be mainly addressed to the lower ranks, but its warning against "individualism" on the part of high-ranking party members may be directed at some of central committee and politburo rank. Former Defense Minister Peng Te-huai and his ex-chief of staff seem to be particularly vulnerable. Both men were absent from Peiping's 10th anniversary celebration on 1 October and have not appeared since.

(Page 2)

Communist China - UAR: Peiping apparently does not want a diplomatic break with Cairo, but has warned the UAR to stop 'fabricating rumors and slanders' about Communist China. In its first public comment since the recent UAR attack--preciptated by Syrian Communist leader Bakdash's speech in Peiping--the official New China News Agency categorically denied Cairo's press charges on 8 October that the Chinese ambassador had been recalled and that the UAR Embassy in Peiping is being harassed. Citing the 'friendship of the Chinese people to people in the UAR,' the Chinese broadcast advised UAR newspapers to stop their anti-Chinese campaign. While the Chinese apparently wish to avoid public recriminations, they are likely to respond vigorously to any further UAR press attacks

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Jordan-Iraq: King Husayn said on 8 October he planned no action in Iraq "at the present time," but he has been quoted as being ready to assume leadership of a movement to re-establish an Iraqi monarchy. He has been encouraged in this regard by a organization of royalist Iraqi exiles in Beirut. Following the attempted assassination of Qasim, Husayn said plans were being made to mobilize and deploy the Jordanian Army in order to protect Jordan's borders or intervene "as necessary" in Iraq. Husayn asserts he will not move without first consulting the US (Page 3)

10 Oct 59

DAILY BRIEF

ii

TOP SECRET

Г	Yemen:		
	because of the	troops, some on rotation from Sana, were Al-Hudaydah in want of back pay apparently held up he government's financial difficulties. The Imam uced army pay and severely punished some elements	
	involved in could occur.	disturbances earlier this year. New disturbances which the Imam might find difficult to deal with, een reported, he has again suffered a physical re-	
	disclosed the in northwest roll it up to According to ization is sp. Iraqi Comm creation of a guerrilla was set up in 194	deneral Bakhtiar, chief of Iranian intelligence, has at a Kurdish terrorist network has been uncovered tern Iran and that cautious steps are being taken to prevent those implicated from escaping to Iraq. The organ-tonsored by Iraqi Kurds under Barzani, assisted by unists and the Qasim regime. Its aim is said to be a Kurdish republic through a campaign of terror and arfare. A Communist-sponsored Kurdish republic, 45-46 in northwestern Iran between the USSR and sed when the Iranian Army moved in. (Page 4)	
<u>/</u>	Ghana - Soviet Bloc: Ghana, probably influenced in part by Guinea's example, appears to be giving its neutralist policy a new emphasis by developing more active relations with the Sino-Soviet bloc. Although the USSR now is the only bloc country with a diplomatic mission in Accra, serious consideration apparently is being given to an early exchange of ambassadors with Peiping. Total bloc personnel in Ghanaincluding the existing Polish, Czech, and East German permanent trade missionsnow is estimated at 80, a figure expected to increase next year. (Page 5)		•
		III. THE WEST	
10		Nations: Ambassador Lodge estimates "pessimistical thus far has a two-vote lead over Turkey for the UN)	ly''

IOI SECREI

10 Oct 59

Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03164696

DAILY BRIEF

iii

•	Security Council seat now occupied by Japan. Even if Turkey should pick up a possible 11 votes on the second or third ballot, Ankara will not have the required two-thirds majority. The resulting deadlock might cause the emergence of a neutral dark-horse candidate, probably a member of the Asian-African bloc. Balloting begins on 12 October. (Page 6)
•	*Bolivia: Bolivian President Siles plans to ask Congress to accept his own resignation or rescind its 7 October election of Ruben Julio as the new Senate chief, a post which includes the right of succession to the national presidency. Siles' actual resignation would probably set off rioting and an intense struggle for power. Julio has recently allied himself with the leftwing opposition to Siles in a bitter conflict with the President over a cabinet appointment. (Page 7)
	*Iraq: Prime Minister Qasim's condition is "very good." and he is scheduled to leave the hospital on 12 October,
,	On 9 October senior military and cabinet officials visited him at the hospital, and that evening scenes taken in Qasim's hospital room were shown on Baghdad television. The government's stringent security measures have resulted in the maintenance of order throughout the country. the Iraqi Air Force to carry out reconnaissance of the border facing Syria, without violating the frontier. Baghdad radio on 9 October began accusing "Cairo Fascists and their hirelings" of being responsible for the assassination attempt. "at the present time there are no instructions for positive action."
	10 Oct 59 "DAILY BRIEF" 1V

- TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03164696

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Khrushchev Advises on Communist Tactics			
Khrushchev, prior to his visit to the United States, told Indian Communist party secretary Ajoy Ghosh that Communist parties in India and other non-bloc countries should avoid uprisings and other "warlike situations" since their over-all effect would be harmful to the growth of Communism,			
While Ghosh presumably presented the Soviet leader's remarks in a manner designed to give the greatest possible support to his own moderate position within the Indian party, Khrushchev's instructions are consistent with Moscow's current emphasis on relaxation of international tensions.			
Khrushchev was reported by Ghosh as having justified his views on the grounds that if war can be avoided for three or four years, the military strength of the bloc will surpass that of the West, especially the United States. He also explained that while the USSR would try to give aid in the event of uprisings by "progressive forces" in non-bloc countries, violent actions would lead reactionary elements to unite in suppressing them.			
The Soviet leader's counsel to Ghosh follows closely the advice given Indian Communists by letter from the Soviet party in late July just before the fall of the Kerala Communist regime. Moscow then suggested continuing to rely on "parliamentary means" to come to power. The Chinese Communists, while agreeing with this general policy line, suggested to Ghosh during his visit to Peiping in early September that the Indian party should adopt a "tougher" line in opposing Nehru and Congress party policies or it would risk losing the Indian Communist party's right wing to "reactionary forces." Ghosh, who returned to Peiping for national day celebrations on 1 October because of fears the Chinese might throw their support to the left wing of his party and thus jeopardize his position as party secretary, planned to leave Peiping for another visit to Moscow on 10 October.			

SECRET

Peiping Continues Campaign Against Domestic Critics

An article by an alternate member of the Chinese Communist party's secretariat in the official <u>People's Daily</u> on 28 September contains the regime's most explicit admission of widespread discontent with the party leadership. The article seems to be addressed mainly to the lower ranks, but contains a warning to "high-ranking functionaries" against "individualism."

The writer specifically attacks "unit" leaders who object to party interference and attempt to turn their spheres of responsibility into "independent kingdoms." These comrades, he continues, say that the party should assume only "political and ideological" and not "organizational" leadership. Calling this attitude a serious political mistake, the writer states that the party must completely expose this point of view and deal those who espouse it a "determined blow." Some of these charges are similar to those made in 1954 preceding the purge of two high-ranking party leaders.

The article concludes with the most effusive praise of Mao Tse-tung of the past year. This strong defense of Mao and his policies--following similar efforts in the past few months--points up the widespread criticism of the leadership, both within and outside the party, which resulted from the "leap forward" and commune programs.

This article illustrates again the intention of Mao and the "party-machine" leaders to maintain their domination of the party by threatening and punishing their critics. At the highest levels of the party, former Defense Minister Peng Te-huai and his ex-chief of staff seem to be particularly vulnerable to the kind of criticism contained in this article. Both men were absent from Peiping's 10th anniversary celebration on 1 October and have not appeared since.

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03164696

King Husayn Considering Possible Intervention in Iraq

Jordan's King Husayn, encouraged by a group of royalist Iraqi exiles in Beirut, is contemplating possible Jordanian intervention in Iraq to prevent Communist domination of the country. He probably also fears that a successful UAR-supported overthrow of Qasim would increase Nasir's potential for subverting the Jordanian Government. The King reportedly is ready to lead a movement to re-establish the Iraqi monarchy, believing that, as a cousin of the late King Faysal of Iraq, he is best qualified to claim the throne.

Husayn, who has asserted Jordan would not take any action in Iraq without prior consultation with the United States Government, said on 8 October that he was not planning intervention "at the present time," but that the Jordanian Army was making preparations in case it became "necessary" to preserve the integrity of Jordanian borders or to take action in Iraq. One infantry brigade is being readied for a possible move to the H-4 pipeline pumping station, about 50 miles from the Iraqi border; other units are to be sent on maneuvers, and Jordanian air units have been placed on alert. The American Army attaché in Amman believes the Jordanians are capable of forming and moving a small task force into Iraq in two or three days.

Husayn almost surely regards prior assurance of British or American support as a necessary prerequisite to any intervention. He also has conferred with Iranian intelligence chief Bakhtiar about possible Jordanian-Iranian action against Qasim.

The group of Iraqi exiles in Beirut with whom Husayn is in contact has been urging him for weeks to support them in operations against the Iraqi regime. Calling themselves the Iraqi Political Exile Committee, they met on 3 October and selected former Iraqi Prime Minister Ali Jawdat Ayyubi as president. Also associated with the group is Shammar tribal leader Shaykh Fannar Faysal. In mid-September Husayn said they had not offered any specific plan for overthrowing Qasim, but they claim to have supporters in Iraq among various tribes as well as the Kurds.

- SECRET

Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03164696

Kurdish Terrorist Network Reported Uncovered in Iran

Iranian intelligence claims to have uncovered an Iraqisponsored Kurdish network in northwestern Iran and is planning the early arrest of known leaders. According to General Bakhtiar, chief of the Iranian national intelligence organization Savak, captured Kurdish agents have disclosed the names of over 400 members of an alleged Kurdish nationalist organization which is plotting a campaign of terrorism and guerrilla warfare patterned after the struggle in Algeria. The Kurds reportedly plan to disarm Iranian gendarmerie and army posts on the Iraqi border and establish bases for night operations in the area with Iraqi logistic support.

Under interrogation, the Kurdish agents, who may have been tailoring their remarks to fit Iranian preconceptions and thus ease their own lot, claimed that Iraqi Communists, Iraqi Kurds under Mustafa Barzani, and the Qasim regime were helping to develop the clandestine Kurdish organization for the purpose of creating an independent Kurdistan, which would include parts of Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and Iran. These alleged plans parallel traditional Kurdish aspirations, but reports from Iraq suggest that Barzani has become disenchanted with his alleged Communist sponsors and that Qasim, enmeshed in his own national problems, probably has no desire to become even clandestinely involved in external ventures.

(Iran has apparently launched a major coordinated campaign by Savak, the border guards, and the army's counterintelligence corps in an effort to roll up the Kurdish network while still in its initial stages. According to Bakhtiar, the most dangerous partisans--including the top leadership--will be arrested in the near future. The Iranians are said to be moving cautiously to keep members of the Kurdish organization from being warned and to prevent their escape to Iraq.)

Having been alerted, Iranian security forces can probably eliminate any immediate threat from this source in the absence of any general breakdown of internal security. They would probably find it difficult, however, to cope with the type of guerrilla warfare that apparently was being planned?

--- SECRET

Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03164696

Ghana Expanding Relations With Bloc

Ghana now appears to be implementing its long-professed policy of "positive neutralism and nonalignment" in a more active manner as far as its relations with the Sino-Soviet bloc are concerned. Motivated apparently by an increasing interest in exploring the possibilities of bloc economic and technical aid as well as by a desire not to appear appreciably less "neutralist" than Guinea, the Nkrumah regime is exhibiting increased receptivity toward bloc efforts to promote contacts. These efforts have been progressively intensified since late 1958.

Although the Soviet Embassy established in August is the only bloc diplomatic mission in Accra at present, Prime Minister Nkrumah has apparently been giving serious consideration to an early exchange of ambassadors with Communist China. An announcement to this effect may possibly be made in connection with the current visit to Peiping of a Ghanaian trade and good-will mission. Since its independence in 1957, Ghana has held that it "inherited" recognition of Peiping from Britain and has consistently voted in the UN against postponement of the Chinese representation issue. Guinea's decision to establish diplomatic relations with Communist China was announced on 4 October.

Meanwhile, the European satellites—especially East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, which have permanent trade missions in Accra spearhead the bloc's drive in Ghana. Their representatives, including trade delegates and technicians, now account for over 60 of the estimated 80 bloc personnel resident in Ghana. Most of the Communist-bloc countries send periodic special delegations which have offered technical assistance and conducted industrial feasibility surveys. The East Germans, striving for international recognition, have been particularly active. Last month they induced Ghana to sign agreements providing for the training of 50 Ghanaian students in East German universities, technical schools, and factories.

SECRET

III. THE WEST

Security Council Contest May Result in Deadlock

The close contest between Turkey and Poland for the UN Security Council seat now occupied by Japan may result in a deadlock and the emergence of a neutral dark-horse candidate-probably from the Asian-African bloc. Ambassador Lodge estimates that Poland thus far has a two-vote lead over Turkey, with neither having the necessary two-thirds majority. Even with 11 votes which may switch to Turkey on the second or third ballot, Turkey will not have the 54-plus votes needed. Voting is by secret ballot.

Many UN members, now committed to Poland, might have supported Turkey if its candidacy had been announced sooner. In addition to Communist support, Poland has the backing of many UN members who consider this council seat allocated to Eastern Europe. Six Latin American members are supporting Poland for this reason. Other members claim they do not understand the United States' strong opposition to Poland in view of the "present detente" between Moscow and Washington.

Balloting begins on 12 October, and it is possible that as many as 30 ballots will be required before the issue is resolved. In 1955, when a contest occurred between the Philippines and Yugoslavia, 34 ballots were insufficient to resolve the problem, and the two countries divided the two-vear term between them.

- CONFIDENTIAL

SECRETApproved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03164696

Bolivian President Plans Ultimatum to Congress

Moderate Bolivian President Siles plans to go before a joint session of Congress to force that group to choose between his own resignation and a reversal of the Senate's 7 October election of Ruben Julio as Senate chief, a post which stands first in line of succession to the presidency. Julio has recently allied himself with the left-wing opposition in a bitter conflict with the President over a cabinet appointment.

Siles seeks a vote by both houses of congress, apparently hoping that the majority in the Chamber of Deputies may be sufficient to overcome the opposition's majority in the Senate. One of his supporters won the top office in the lower house last August by 32 to 29.

for power. tant factor	Control of the government machinery is an impor- in the decisive government party nominating conven- tuled for December for the 1960 presidential election.
Tensions wamong the	would probably lead to rioting and possibly to clashes armed groups of civilian militia, which could involve
the army.	

- SECRET

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03164696