

~~TOP SECRET~~

DOCUMENT NO. 10  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.   
 DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S B  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010  
AUTH: HR 70-2  
DATE: 5 JUN 1980 REVIEWER:

12 November 1959

Copy No. C 65

3.3(h)(2)  
3.5(c)

# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

12 NOVEMBER 1959

**I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC**

Ranking Soviet atomic energy scientists claim USSR has operational nuclear submarines.

Command post exercise in Soviet Far East indicates USSR has flexibility in selection of missile launching sites.


Khrushchev tells UAR representative he is prepared to supply additional arms and economic assistance to UAR.

**II. ASIA-AFRICA**

Report on talks between Shah of Iran and King of Jordan.

Burmese premier rejects Peiping's earlier proposal for further negotiations on long-standing border dispute.

- ①
- ②
- ③
- ④
- ⑤




**III. THE WEST**

- ⑥ Cuba--Communists believed to have won substantial representation among delegates to important labor congress.
- ⑦ Problems in way of independence for Cyprus appear in process of amicable solution.

**LATE ITEM**

- ⑧ Nasir says his intelligence has established that Israelis are not planning military action against UAR or Jordan.



TOP SECRET

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN**

12 November 1959

**DAILY BRIEF****I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC**

*SIRAB*

*No*

**\*USSR:** Two ranking Soviet atomic energy scientists, now accompanying Emelyanov, head of the Chief Directorate for Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, on a tour of the United States, have commented to a US official concerning Khrushchev's recent assertions that the USSR has nuclear-powered submarines capable of making speeds double those of American nuclear submarines. The scientists claim that the USSR does, in fact, have operational nuclear-powered submarines; that the engines are more powerful than US nuclear submarine power plants, perhaps twice as powerful; but that Soviet engines do not give twice the speed of American nuclear submarines. Such speeds, they say, would require engines eight times as powerful as those of US submarines. Both scientists are reactor specialists; one is A. P. Aleksandrov, head of the reactor division and first deputy chief of the Institute of Atomic Energy of the Soviet Academy of Sciences.)

*No*

**USSR:** During a recent command post exercise, conducted by a suspected missile division of the Soviet Fifth Long Range Air Army, simulated missile strikes were scheduled from locations in the Southern Maritime District against air bases in Japan and Okinawa, 400-1,100 nautical miles distant. The exercise involved rail transportation of missiles and the use of alternate locations, suggesting that the USSR has flexibility in the selection of missile launching sites. (Page 1)

*OK  
delete  
2nd sentence  
of 2nd IP  
and all  
of last IP*

**USSR-UAR:** Khrushchev, in a long interview on 4 November with Salah Salim, head of Nasir's subsidized press, reaffirmed Soviet friendship for the UAR and stated that Moscow is prepared to supply additional arms and economic assistance, specifically the financing for the second stage of the Aswan High Dam. According to the account of the talk published in Cairo, the Soviet leader also upheld the UAR's action in interfering

i

~~TOP SECRET~~

with Israeli shipping through the Suez Canal, and parried Salim's assertion that Communists are responsible for Arab disputes with the observation that "conditions in the Arab countries are not now ripe for setting up a Communist regime." [redacted]

[redacted] (Page 2)

## II. ASIA-AFRICA

Jordan-Iran-Israel: (According to King Husayn of Jordan, he and the Shah of Iran agreed, during their recent talks in Amman, that they should not take any provocative action to "remedy" the Iraqi situation but that Jordan and Iran should be prepared for any eventuality. [redacted] the Shah told Husayn, with the "unofficial authorization" of the Israelis, that Jordan had nothing to fear from Israel if Husayn felt obliged to move into Iraq, but that if Nasir intervened in Iraq the Israeli position would be "altogether different.") [redacted]

Burma - Communist China: Premier Ne Win has sent a letter to Chou En-lai rejecting an earlier Chinese proposal for further negotiations on the Sino-Burmese border question and affirming Burma's intent to stand on its "package proposal" of June for a settlement of the long-standing dispute. Ne Win stated that if Peiping is willing to accept the latter proposal, he is prepared to go to Peining to "formalize" an agreement. [redacted]

China could neither accept nor reject the Burmese proposal as a whole and suggested that the Burmese "be more patient" in seeking a solution.) [redacted]

(Page 3)

Watch Committee Conclusions: (Situations susceptible of direct exploitation by Sino-Soviet bloc action which would jeopardize US interests exist in Laos and in the Middle East, particularly in Iraq. [redacted])

Laos: Dissident military activity remains at a low level. However, the insurgents retain a considerable potential for [redacted]

12 Nov 59

DAILY BRIEF

ii

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

guerrilla action, and no decrease in their subversive activities is foreseen at the present time.

Middle East: The situation in Iraq remains unstable, and the possibility of further assassination attempts or coups remains. [redacted]

### III. THE WEST

Cuba: While the 26th of July Movement claims sweeping victories, Communists are believed to have gained substantial representation among the 3,000 delegates elected by local unions on 8 November to attend the national congress, which opens on 18 November, of the dominant and politically powerful Cuban Labor Confederation. Raul Castro and his confidant, Labor Minister Martinez Sanchez, are expected to remove from power Confederation leaders who are opposed to growing Communist influence in labor and in the government. [redacted]  
(Page 4)

Britain-Cyprus: (The agreement reached on the constitution for Cyprus on 10 November leaves the question of British military bases the only major issue to be resolved before independence. Britain has conditionally offered to reduce by about 20 percent its base areas in Cyprus, thus decreasing the number of included villagers from 4,400 to less than 1,000. Such a concession to Cypriot demands would probably create a favorable atmosphere for final agreement.) [redacted]  
(Page 5)

### LATE ITEM

\*UAR-Israel: [redacted]

[redacted] "wide-scale contacts" in Israel had established that there is no Israeli plan for early military action "against the UAR or Jordan." Cairo had become concerned that an Israeli military venture was imminent and had instituted a moderately high state of alert for UAR armed forces beginning on 5 and 6 November. There is as yet no evidence that Nasir's message has been followed by relaxation of the alert. [redacted]

12 Nov 59

DAILY BRIEF

iii

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

### Soviet Missile Exercises

A series of command post exercises was conducted by a suspected missile division of the Fifth Long Range Air Army in the Soviet Far East in April, September, and October. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] regiments of the division simulated missile strikes against air bases in Japan and Okinawa from locations in the Soviet Southern Maritime District. Freight trains probably delivered "articles"--probably missiles--which were "unloaded" by each of two suspected missile regiments.

Few details are yet available on the precise nature or composition of the trains and their movements. The two regiments were each scheduled to launch two salvos of missiles against four assigned targets on the first day. On the following day the regiments moved to "reserve positions," at which point the exercise apparently terminated. In this exercise a weapon yield of 25 KT was indicated, whereas in April yields of 150 and 500 KT were indicated.

While the operational status of the suspected missile division is unknown, it is possible that this exercise involved operational training for launch teams of the division. The rail movement of the missiles and the reference to "reserve positions" suggest that the USSR has flexibility in the selection of missile launching sites in the Southern Maritime District against targets in Japan and Okinawa. Current US national intelligence estimates credit the Soviet Union with a surface-to-surface ballistic missile (SS-5) of 1,100-nautical-mile range which was probably ready for operational use by late 1958 or early 1959. [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

Khrushchev Discusses Soviet-UAR Relations

Premier Khrushchev, in a long interview on 4 November with Salah Salim, head of Cairo's government-controlled press, reaffirmed the USSR's friendship for the UAR and expressed confidence that relations would be restored to their "previous flourishing condition and strength." According to the account of the talk published by Cairo, Khrushchev upheld the UAR's "full right" to interfere with Israeli shipping through the Suez Canal as stemming from the continuing state of war.

The Soviet leader stated that the USSR would continue to supply Cairo with arms and is prepared to extend additional economic assistance, including help in building the second stage of the Aswan High Dam. [redacted] Discussions concerning the supply of additional arms and spare parts are in progress in Cairo, and a UAR military mission was sent to Warsaw earlier this month to negotiate arms contracts. [redacted]

[redacted] Plans for Soviet assistance in building the first phase of the dam have been completed, and construction work is to begin this month. In addition, progress is being made on projects under Soviet long-term development credits worth more than \$300,000,000.

In response to Salim's assertion that Communists who attack the UAR are to blame for disputes in the Arab world, Khrushchev denied any "direct contact" with Arab Communists but expressed "sympathy"--implying that Moscow will continue its support of Communist elements in the area. This issue was unresolved in the letters between Nasir and Khrushchev last April, and it apparently continues to obstruct a return to the close working relationship of the past several years. Khrushchev attempted to allay Cairo's suspicions on this score, however, with the observation that "conditions in the Arab countries are not now suitable for setting up a Communist regime."

In a general discussion of Middle East issues, Khrushchev said that the Western powers no longer have any intention of initiating a war in the Middle East, attributing this to a lack of strength and to "old age." [redacted]

On 8 November, Cairo ordered Salim to return home "as soon as possible" to report on his talk with Khrushchev before proceeding on his trip to London. [redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]



## II. ASIA-AFRICA

Burmese Premier Rejects Further Concessions on Sino-Burmese Border Dispute

The Burmese Government informed Peiping on 4 November that the "take-it-or-leave" proposals Burma made on 4 June for settling the Sino-Burmese border dispute represent the maximum concessions Rangoon can make and that it believes, in the interests of Sino-Burmese friendship, that Peiping should be willing to concede the small outstanding areas of disagreement. If the Communists accept the Burmese position, Ne Win is prepared to come to Peiping "at the earliest possible date" to "formalize an agreement in principle" on the border issue. Otherwise, he is not prepared to undertake further talks.

Rangoon has also informed Peiping that it agrees to the conclusion of a treaty of friendship and nonaggression to accompany the border accord but that it finds "redundant" the proposed addition by Peiping of a clause in which Burma and China specifically renounce possible membership in "any military bloc directed against the other side." In addition, Rangoon argues, such a clause "would offend against the sovereignty of the two countries." [redacted]

(The Chinese Communists have said that although the Burmese package proposal is "very near the mark," China can neither accept nor reject it as a whole. The Chinese will probably continue their pose of reasonableness while trying to induce the Burmese to submit the package proposal to further negotiation.) [redacted]

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

## III. THE WEST

Communists Gaining Strength in Cuban Labor

Communists appear to be gaining strength in the politically powerful Cuban Workers' Confederation (CTC) with the tacit support of leftist extremists now dominant in the Castro government. Armed Forces Minister Raul Castro and Labor Minister Martinez Sanchez are both reported to be exerting influence to oust non-Communists during the election of an executive committee when the national CTC congress meets on 18 November. The US Embassy in Havana believes that Communists gained substantial representation among the 3,000 delegates elected on 8 November by means of prearranged "unity" slates with the revolutionary 26th of July Movement, which claimed its candidates won 87 percent of the delegates' seats. Communist strategy was apparently to discredit individual anti-Communist labor leaders and to support 26th of July labor officials who did not oppose Communists.

The CTC controls the entire Cuban labor movement, considered one of the strongest and best organized in Latin America. Communists are strong in the CTC, but have been prevented from gaining control by Catholic and other non-Communist labor leaders and government moderates. The recent leftward trend of the regime will give the Communists opportunities to exert a disproportionate amount of influence from behind the scenes during the coming congress. [REDACTED]

Meanwhile, the Cuban Foreign Ministry on 28 October instructed several Cuban diplomats to try to stir up anti-US feeling among influential groups abroad by claiming Cuban sovereignty is threatened by "renewed serial bombing attacks." The ministry also published a brochure violently attacking the alleged US complicity in the "bombing" of 21 October. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]




~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]



British Make Concession on Cyprus Bases

(Britain has conditionally offered to reduce by about 20 percent the two military base areas in Cyprus over which it will retain sovereignty. This will decrease the number of Cypriot villagers within base areas from about 4,400 to less than 1,000. The British, however, require a satisfactory agreement on other rights specified in the London agreements of February 1959, including control of other small sites, use of roads, ports, Nicosia airfield, and public utilities, and permission to use certain other areas for troop training. The base proposal was offered on 6 November to the joint committee in London, composed of Greek, Turkish, Cypriot, and British representatives.)

(The agreement reached on the constitution for Cyprus on 10 November by a commission in Nicosia ends a three-month deadlock on executive powers and leaves the base question the only major issue to be resolved before independence. Britain's proposed concession is expected to create a favorable atmosphere for final agreement before the scheduled independence date on 19 February 1960, since Cypriot objections to earlier British proposals had centered on the large number of Cypriots included within the military areas.)



~~SECRET~~

**THE PRESIDENT**

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~