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8 September 1959

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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8 SEPTEMBER 1959

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

American officials in Hong Kong feel basic Communist motive in Sino-Indian border and Laotian situations is to reverse setbacks of the past year.

Soviet ambassador returning to Tehran; USSR may have decided to relax propaganda pressure on Iran.



Taiwan Strait--Chinese Communists may have initiated alert in Amoy area.

II. ASIA-AFRICA

India issues White Paper on border issues; Nehru states no Chinese Communist border intrusions since 26 August.

Indonesia--Peiping protests Djakarta's treatment of Chinese nationals.

Japan--Kishi fears effects of visit to Peiping by former Prime Minister Ishibashi.



Iraq--Coup attempt reportedly now set for 9 September.

UAR propaganda charges Moscow with interference in UAR internal affairs.

Algerian rebels investigating possibility of hospitalizing their wounded in the US.

III. THE WEST

Belgian Government weakened by dispute over Congo policy.

LATE ITEMS

USSR--Tyura Tam Missile Test Range activity on 6 and 8 September.

Laos--Communist pressure continues in Sam Neua and Phong Saly provinces; South Vietnam and Thailand not yet prepared to intervene openly in Laos.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

8 September 1959

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Communist China: American officials in Hong Kong speculate that a basic motive of the Communists in the Sino-Indian border and Laotian situations is to reverse setbacks in the past year which were greater than they are willing to accept. Increased Chinese military activity on the Sino-Indian border stems in part from a determination to consolidate Communist control over Tibet--an intention particularly evident in mop-up operations against Khamba rebels north of Assam. Communist activity in the Laotian situation, the officials feel, is an effort to restore losses sustained at the time of Vientiane's expulsion of the Pathet Lao from the government.

The officials discount the possibilities that the current tension in Asia is (1) part of a bloc effort to provide Khrushchev with a bargaining lever in his talks with President Eisenhower, (2) a deliberate Chinese move to embarrass the USSR because of China's opposition to an East-West rapprochement, or (3) a Chinese-sponsored external diversion for domestic purposes.

USSR-Iran: Khrushchev's remarks to the Iranian ambassador [redacted] may indicate that the USSR has decided to relax the intensive propaganda pressure against the Iranian Government which followed the break-off of the Soviet-Iranian talks on a nonaggression pact last February. [redacted]

[redacted] Khrushchev said Soviet Ambassador Pegov--absent from his post since 20 March--"must return to Iran at once." Soviet officials previously had insisted that Tehran must take the initiative toward improving relations. The Iranian ambassador, who will return home to report directly to the Shah on his talk, recommended that nothing be done about confirming the 1927 Soviet-Iranian treaty until Pegov returns and Soviet propaganda attacks are halted. [redacted]

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~~TOP SECRET~~*Taiwan Strait:

No

OK

The Chinese Nationalists claim that early on the morning of 7 September two groups of Communist vessels attempted to approach Chinmen but were driven off by Nationalist artillery fire.

II. ASIA-AFRICA

OK
delete last 2 sentences

*India - Communist China: The Indian Government on 7 September issued a White Paper documenting New Delhi's case against Peiping on various border issues. Nehru also informed Parliament that there had been no further developments on the northeast frontier since 26 August. There are press reports, however, that the people of Ladakh and Sikkim are becoming panicky.

In an apparently conciliatory move toward Nepal, Peiping has invited representatives to Lhasa to discuss continuance of traditional trade. Peiping appears anxious to minimize the seriousness of the frontier situation. The staff of a Hong Kong newspaper reportedly has been told that tension over Sikkim and Bhutan was an "unfortunate mix-up" and not a prelude to hostilities.

(The Dalai Lama, who is still seeking a sponsor to raise the Tibetan issue in the United Nations, has indicated that he will go to New York personally to plead his cause if necessary. The Indian Government still opposes raising the Tibetan issue)

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(in the UN. Indian officials feel it would be "regrettable" if such a debate "forced" the USSR to side openly with the Chinese on this issue.) (Page 1)

No

*Indonesia - Communist China: (The Chinese Communist Embassy in Djakarta recently lodged a "strong and forceful" protest against treatment of Chinese nationals in Indonesia, demanding that the Indonesian Government cease putting Chinese out of business, or at least compensate them. This protest followed several hints--including cancellation of a proposed visit by a Chinese Communist good-will delegation--that Peiping resents recent Indonesian restrictions on Chinese businessmen and intends to act as champion of their interests. In reporting the protest to a US official on 3 September, Foreign Minister Subandrio said that the Chinese Embassy had been receiving considerable financial aid from local Chinese businessmen, and that Indonesia would continue to "liquidate interests detrimental to the country." He foresaw no open rupture with Communist China, however, and noted that Peiping has been offering Djakarta arms and economic aid "without questions and terms.")

No

No

Japan: (Ambassador MacArthur reports that Prime Minister Kishi is clearly worried over former Prime Minister Ishibashi's current visit to Communist China--particularly its effect on Japanese policy toward the mainland. Since the visit is primarily to "make headlines," Kishi is virtually certain that Ishibashi, on his return, will make harmful proposals urging closer economic and cultural ties with Peiping. He also fears that Ishibashi, who is in bad health, will be easily manipulated by the Communists.) (Page 3)

No

*Iraq: "Nationalist officers" who had been planning a coup attempt in Iraq on 7 September have postponed their effort until 9 September

reported last week that a group of officers under the leadership of the strongly anti-Communist Major General Abdi were planning to oust Prime Minister Qasim by 7 September)

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[redacted] the planning is continuing, but the date is no longer firm. Rumors of coup plans continue to be received [redacted]

[redacted] In view of the widespread knowledge of these rumors and purported plans, it is probable that Qasim has learned of at least some of them, and he may be planning an effort to expose Iraqi nationalist plotters and their UAR supporters. [redacted]

OK

UAR-USSR: The controlled UAR press and radio have accused Pravda and Moscow radio of a "flagrant intervention" in the internal affairs of the UAR. These charges stem from recent Moscow rebroadcasts of anti-UAR articles in the Iraqi Communist press. Damascus radio threatened to retaliate by republishing Khrushchev's "eloquent and fluent admissions of crimes committed against humanity" during the Stalin regime--apparently a reference to Khrushchev's secret speech at the 20th party congress in February 1956. UAR propaganda has also accused the Soviet Union of an attempt to isolate Iraq from the other Arab countries and of encouraging Communist agents in the Arab world. These renewed public recriminations, the first since last March, apparently have been brought about by Communist criticism of the UAR's continuing anti-Communist campaign. [redacted] *OK*

[redacted]

No

Algeria: The Algerian rebels are investigating the possibility of sending seriously wounded soldiers to the United States for hospitalization, [redacted] The Algerian spokesman at the UN has reportedly been contacted by a representative of "an American veterans' organization" who would assist in obtaining hospitalization in either the United States or Western Europe. The European satellites and more recently the USSR have accepted groups of Algerian wounded; similar action by the US, however, would be strongly opposed by France.

[redacted] (Page 4)

III. THE WEST

OK

Belgium: The resignation of Congo Minister van Hemelrijck, which followed the refusal of the cabinet to approve his plan for a

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rapid evolution of self-government in the Belgian Congo, has further weakened the shaky Social Christian - Liberal party coalition of Premier Eyskens. Friction within the coalition over various issues has been growing since its formation in November 1958, and Eyskens adjourned Parliament in early July to avert a coalition crisis. The opposition Socialist party, which favors a more liberal Congo policy, is trying to exploit the resignation and may decide to push for new parliamentary elections. [REDACTED]

(Page 5)

LATE ITEMS

*USSR: Available intelligence indicates that on 8 September, for the second time in two days, the USSR unsuccessfully attempted to launch a space vehicle from the Tyura Tam Missile Test Range. This attempt followed a smooth eight-hour countdown and had an intended launch time of about 0240 GMT (2240 EDT, 7 September). Although the operation proceeded to "readiness one minute," the vehicle apparently did not leave the pad, and the range secured shortly thereafter.

No

In this operation, as with the attempt on 6 September, the intended time of launch coincided with the time estimated for the Soviets to launch a lunar probe vehicle. These two coincidences, together with the rapidity with which the operation was canceled when trouble developed, strongly indicates that a lunar probe, which requires precise launching time, was intended. Some past launchings at Tyura Tam, not apparently requiring a precise launching time, have taken place after eight to nine hours of delay.

The similarity of the most recent operation to that of 6 September, together with the fact that the earlier operation was abruptly canceled two to three hours before intended launch time, indicates that the same vehicle was engaged in both operations. There will probably be another attempt to launch in the next few days. [REDACTED]

No

*Laos: Laotian Government officials have issued conflicting statements about the situation in Sam Neua province. However, there are numerous reports from other sources that Communist

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pressure continues in both Sam Neua and Phong Saly provinces. South Vietnamese and Thai officials have indicated that neither country is prepared at this time to intervene openly in Laos without US backing, but their views may change if the situation continues to worsen. Saigon, however, probably would like to introduce some forces and materiel into southern Laos covertly. Vientiane is holding in abeyance appeals to SEATO and the US for active military support in case its request for UN intervention fails. [REDACTED]

North Vietnamese civil air messages of 7 September mention the transportation of five "heavily wounded soldiers" from Dien Bien Phu to Hanoi. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]) (Page 6)

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Sino-Indian Relations

Friction between India and Communist China over border problems was given new emphasis with the Indian Government's issuance on 7 September of a White Paper documenting New Delhi's case against Peiping. The 122-page document includes the texts of a series of Indian protests and Chinese replies on questions of disputed border claims, Tibetan refugee activity, treatment of Indian and Bhutanese nationals in Tibet, and the recent border incursions. In presenting the paper to Parliament, Prime Minister Nehru stated that there had been no further developments on the northeast frontier since 26 August.

(The Indian Government early in September apparently notified the Soviet and Polish ambassadors formally of its serious concern over Chinese border incursions. According to a report considered probably true, the Indian foreign secretary advised the ambassadors that if the incidents were to continue, New Delhi would be forced to reappraise its policy of nonalignment.)

Peiping appears anxious to minimize the seriousness of the frontier situation. The staff of a Hong Kong Communist newspaper reportedly was told on 31 August that publication of any stories concerning India's northeast frontier must await a formal statement from Peiping. The staff had been told earlier that tension over Sikkim and Bhutan was an "unfortunate mix-up" and a "regrettable error," not a prelude to hostilities against India. There has been no comment on the recent border situation in newspapers on the China mainland. The first extensive comment on the situation from the Communist bloc was a Prague broadcast on 4 September denying Indian charges of Chinese "territorial expansionism" and stating that Premier Chou En-lai views negotiations as the "only means" for solving border questions.

Peiping's current policy toward Nepal seems designed to allay fears in Katmandu raised by China's activities along the border. In

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a statement on 3 September, Nepalese Prime Minister Koirala asserted that the Chinese have released nine Nepalese arrested in Lhasa during the Tibetan revolt and have given assurance they will soon determine the citizenship of mixed Tibetan-Nepalese nationals still under arrest and will consider their release. The Chinese have also shown a willingness to meet with Nepalese officials to facilitate traditional border trade. [redacted]

The Dalai Lama on 7 September issued another public appeal for UN support. His efforts in New Delhi to gain diplomatic assistance apparently have yielded little result. (India continues to oppose raising the Tibetan issue in the UN, primarily because Communist China is not a member and New Delhi feels that no effective action would result. Indian officials also have expressed the view that it would be regrettable if the USSR, whose scant comment on recent Sino-Indian problems indicates to New Delhi disapproval of some Chinese actions, were forced to side openly with Peiping on this issue in the UN. The Indian foreign secretary told the American chargé on 5 September that Soviet representatives in "various capitals" have been quietly indicating they deplored some recent Chinese moves.) [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Kishi Fears Effects of Former Premier's Visit to Peiping

(Japanese Prime Minister Kishi is apprehensive that the current visit of former Prime Minister Tanzan Ishibashi to Communist China will adversely affect Tokyo's present policy of firmness toward Peiping. Kishi told Ambassador MacArthur on 2 September that he believed Ishibashi's primary purpose was to "make headlines," and that consequently the former premier would urge closer economic and cultural ties with the mainland on his return to Japan. He also fears that Ishibashi, who is in bad health, will be easily manipulated by the Communists.)

(While Ishibashi has not completely recovered from the stroke which caused him to resign in February 1957, he appears mentally alert, and not even Kishi believes he would urge diplomatic recognition of Peiping. Ishibashi does want to resume a more active role in politics, and, in view of his past advocacy of closer relations with the mainland, he may be sincere in his stated desire to determine personally whether the Chinese Communists really want to cooperate and coexist.)

(Kishi is largely concerned about the effect Ishibashi's trip will have on Japanese public opinion, which has long-favored closer relations with mainland China. Should this subject again become a popular political issue, Kishi may consider it inexpedient to resist the trend.)

(The Chinese Communists, who have concentrated their attacks on Kishi, assured a recent Japanese visitor that in the event government party leaders visited the mainland to discuss the deadlock in relations, the Chinese would not make them "lose face." The Chinese may, as a gesture of accommodation, hint at a limited relaxation of the trade embargo in an effort to create the impression that Kishi's hostility is the only bar to improved relations.)

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]Algerian Rebels May Seek To Hospitalize Wounded in US

An Algerian official has been put in charge of investigating whether wounded rebel soldiers might be sent to the United States for hospitalization, [redacted]

[redacted] noting that the Algerian spokesman at the UN had been approached by a representative of "an American veterans' organization" concerning the possibilities for hospitalization in the US or Western Europe, implied that the rebels should be prepared to follow up on such approaches.

The rebels are believed to be short of medical facilities, particularly for the treatment of seriously wounded. Several groups of wounded have been sent to the European satellites, and late last month the USSR belatedly made good on a previous offer, accepting 96 wounded rebels for hospitalization.

No approaches are known to have been made to NATO countries for hospitalization of Algerian rebel wounded. The rebels have only limited diplomatic contacts with the West, and they probably assume that NATO countries would be reluctant to prejudice their relations with France. [redacted]

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

III. THE WEST

Belgian Government Weakened by Dispute Over Congo Policy

The resignation on 3 September of Congo Minister Maurice van Hemelrijck, which followed the refusal of the Belgian cabinet to approve his plan for the rapid "Africanization" of the Congo administration, has further weakened the shaky Social Christian - Liberal coalition of Prime Minister Gaston Eyskens. Powerful financial circles in Brussels which support the Liberal party have opposed Van Hemelrijck's plan since its announcement on 13 January, and the influence of the Palace, exerted chiefly through former King Leopold, has also been thrown against it. Earlier, the Palace had blocked the appointment of a new governor general of the Congo and forced the retention of Governor General Cornelis, who is not in sympathy with Van Hemelrijck's program.

Friction within the Socialist Christian - Liberal coalition has been growing since its formation last November. Serious differences developed over local issues such as electoral reform and the relaxation of restrictions on World War II collaborators. A crisis was avoided in early July by adjourning Parliament with the government's program only partially enacted. It was hoped to reconcile interparty differences before Parliament reconvened in November, but this has proved impossible.

Eyskens has replaced Van Hemelrijck with August de Schrijver, an elder statesman of the Social Christian party who has generally backed Van Hemelrijck's Congo policy and is widely respected--even by the opposition Socialist party, which criticizes the Congo program as not going far enough in the way of economic and social reforms. The Socialists now are trying to exploit the resignation by demanding that Parliament be reconvened to discuss Congo policy, and there is press speculation that they may combine with Social Christian supporters of Van Hemelrijck to form a new coalition government. The Socialist party congress starting 18 September will probably decide whether to attempt this course or to press for early parliamentary elections.

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~~TOP SECRET~~Laos

(The military situation in Sam Neua and Phong Saly Provinces is characterized by widespread skirmishing. There are conflicting reports on whether the town of Sam Neua is in danger of imminent attack. Ambushes by roaming rebel bands and threatening propaganda activities apparently are continuing in other provinces of northern and central Laos. The government on 5 September extended a state of emergency, declared last month in five provinces, to the remaining seven provinces of the country. This declaration apparently gives the army increased police powers for maintaining order but does not remove other governmental matters from civilian hands.) [redacted]

[redacted] (Laotian Foreign Minister Khamphan Panya assured Ambassador Smith on 5 September that an appeal to SEATO would be temporarily deferred. In Bangkok, where he visited SEATO Secretary General Pote Sarasin on 7 September, Khamphan issued a statement saying the Laotian situation was deteriorating and "if the United Nations are too slow to act, Laos will have to appeal to SEATO.") [redacted]

(President Diem of South Vietnam [redacted] that he could not send any troops or materiel at this time in response to Laos' recent request. Diem, however, who has been reported considering the introduction of troops into southern Laos covertly, might undertake such action if his concern over the situation is heightened.) [redacted]

(Pote Sarasin, meanwhile, has told Ambassador Johnson in Bangkok he felt the Thai government would be willing to send troops if assured of US backing. Pote, while not authorized to speak for the Thai government, is close to Premier Sarit, who is probably turning to Pote for advice in the present situation.

[redacted] Thailand, although not now prepared to take military action outside SEATO, will however send a group of Thai armed forces officers soon "to observe and report on the true situation in Laos.") [redacted]

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The chief of North Vietnam's Foreign Ministry information department stated on 5 September that Vientiane's request for a UN Emergency Force is an "American move to interfere more deeply in Laos and prepare war against the Democratic People's Republic of Vietnam." This statement was followed by intensified propaganda from Asian Communist regimes. Peiping on 6 September accused the US of "using the name of the UN for armed intervention in Laos" and North Korea's Foreign Ministry on 7 September claimed that "US activities against Laos are reminiscent of the situation which prevailed in 1950 when they provoked the Korean war." Hanoi newspapers asserted that "nobody can replace the ICC." North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong on 6 September sent messages to the Secretary General, President of the General Assembly, and President of the Security Council of the UN asking them to reject Vientiane's request, and insisting that the only urgent measure to be taken is reactivation of the Laos ICC.

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Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

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